EVIDENCE – Judge Pengson
Held:
ALUDOS vs. SUERTE, (G.R. No. 165285, June 18, 2012)
Topic: Offer of Evidence
Doctrine:
Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and
until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which
such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of
probative weight.
Facts:
1. In 1969, Lomises Aludos acquired leasehold rights from the Baguio City
Government over two stalls in the Hangar Market.
2. In 1984, petitioner entered into an agreement with Johnny Suerte for
transfer of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls for
P260,000. However, petitioner backed out from the agreement and
returned the amount of P68,000 to Suerte.
3. Suerte sued Aludos in the RTC. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere
lessee of the market stalls, and the Baguio City Government was the
owner-lessor of the stalls. Under Article 1649 of the Civil Code, [t]he
lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless
there is a stipulation to the contrary. As the permit issued to Lomises did
not contain any provision that the lease of the market stalls could further
be assigned, and in the absence of the consent of the Baguio City
Government to the agreement, the RTC declared the agreement
between Lomises and Johnny null and void.
4. CA rejected Lomises claim that the true agreement was one of loan.
The CA found that there were two agreements entered into between
Johnny and Lomises: one was for the assignment of leasehold rights and
the other was for the sale of the improvements on the market stalls. The
CA agreed with the RTC that the assignment of the leasehold rights was
void for lack of consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government. The
sale of the improvements, however, was valid because these were
Lomises private properties. For this reason, the CA remanded the case
to the RTC to determine the value of the improvements on the two
market stalls, existing at the time of the execution of the agreement.
Issue:
WON CA is correct in not considering the lease contract as evidence?
YES.
1. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. The offer of evidence
is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact
and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the
purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is
merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.
2. Based on Lomises allegations in his pleadings, we consider three
circumstances to determine whether his claim is well-supported. First,
Johnny was a mere college student dependent on his parents for
support when the agreement was executed, and it was Johnnys mother,
Domes, who was the party actually interested in acquiring the market
stalls. Second, Lomises received only P48,000.00 of the P68,000.00 that
Johnny claimed he gave as down payment; Lomises said that the
P20,000.00 represented interests on the loan. Third, Lomises retained
possession of the market stalls even after the execution of the
agreement. Whether separately or taken together, these circumstances
do not support a conclusion that the parties only intended to enter into
a contract of loan. Hence, the CA was correct in characterizing the
agreement between Johnny and Lomises as a sale of improvements
and assignment of leasehold rights.
3. We agree with the CAs order of remand. We note, however, that
Lomises had already returned the P68,000.00 and receipt of the amount
has been duly acknowledged by Johnnys mother, Domes. Johnny
testified on October 6, 1986 that the money was still with his mother. Thus,
upon determination by the RTC of the actual value of the improvements
on the market stalls, the heirs of Johnny Suerte should pay the
ascertained value of these improvements to Lomises, who shall
thereafter be required to execute the deed of sale over the
improvements in favor of the heirs of Johnny.
DIZON VS CTA
Doctrine:
It is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally
offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of
the evidence of a party.
 A distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its
formal offer as an exhibit must be made. We said that the first is done in the
course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an
exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not
before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes
that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do
the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
Facts:
Petitioner (special administrator of the deceased Jose P. Fernandez)
alleged that several requests for extension of the period to file the required
estate tax return were granted by the BIR since the assets of the estate, as well
as the claims against it, had yet to be collated, determined and identified. An
estate tax return was filed later on which showed zero estate tax liability but BIR
issued a deficiency estate tax assessment, demanding payment of Php 66.97M
as deficiency estate tax. During the hearings conducted, petitioner did not
present testimonial evidence but merely documentary evidence but BIR’s
counsel presented one witness, Alberto Enriquez, who was one of the revenue
examiners.
CTA denied the petition and opined that the pieces of evidence
introduced by BIR were admissible in evidence since they were properly
identified during the presentation of respondent's witness, whose testimony was
duly recorded as part of the records of this case. Besides, the documents marked
as respondent's exhibits formed part of the BIR records of the case
The petitioner claims that in as much as the valid claims of creditors
against the Estate are in excess of the gross estate, no estate tax was due; that
the lack of a formal offer of evidence is fatal to BIR's cause. While BIR's witness
Alberto Enriquez in his testimony before the CTA identified the pieces of
evidence aforementioned such that the same were marked, BIR's failure to
formally offer said pieces of evidence and depriving petitioner the opportunity
to cross-examine Alberto, render the same inadmissible in evidence.
Issues:
Whether the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the admission of
the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered by the BIR.
Held:
The petition is impressed with merit. No evidentiary value can be given
the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary
evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the
CTA.
The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of Vda. de Oate, which
reiterated this Court's previous rulings in People v. Napat-a and People v. Mate
on the admission and consideration of exhibits which were not formally offered
during the trial.
The Court reiterates that Vda. de Oate is merely an exception to the
general rule. Being an exception, it may be applied only when there is strict
compliance with the requisites mentioned therein; otherwise, the general rule in
Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should prevail.
The BIR's failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA's
directives, is fatal to its cause.47 Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not
even a single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This,
we take against the BIR.
SPOUSES TAN VS REPUBLIC
Topic: Importance of Offer of Evidence
Doctrine:
Evidence should be presented during trial before the Regional Trial Court
and evidence not formally offered should not be considered.
Facts:
Spouses Pedro and Nena Tan (Spouses Tan) seek registration of a parcel
of land in their name. they took possession of the property and declared the
same for taxation purposes in their names. A certain Patermateo Casio (Casio)
claimed portion of the property, he filed Application for Free Patent. RTC ruled
in favor of spouses Tan but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision on the ground that spouses failed to comply with the required
possession of property starting on or prior to June 12, 1945. In their Motion for
Reconsideration, spouses Tan attached a copy of their Tax Declaration issued
1944.
Issue:
Whether the Tax Declaration is formally offered to be considered as
evidence.
Ruling:
No. Tax declaration cannot be considered evidence as it was not
formally offered.
Sec. 34, Rule 132. The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which it is offered must be specified.
The tax declaration should have been presented during trial before the
RTC. The Court cannot take into consideration tax declaration as it was only
submitted by spouses Tan when they filed their Motion for reconsideration.
NATIVIDAD CANDIDO vs. CA G.R. No. 107493. February 1, 1996
Marking of a Document, Not a Formal Offer; When Evidence is to be Offered
Doctrine:
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is
simply marked for identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing
counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called
upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges are required
to base their findings of fact and judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial.
Facts:
Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria Rumbaua are co-owners of
a first-class irrigated Riceland.
Respondent Sofronio Dabu served as their agricultural tenant.
Petitioners lodged a complaint with the RTC against respondent for
termination of tenancy relationship and recovery of unpaid rentals.
Petitioners averred in their complaint below that a team from the Ministry
of Agrarian Reform had fixed a provisional rental of twenty-six (26) and twenty-
nine (29) sacks of palay for the rainy and dry seasons, respectively, which
respondent failed to pay beginning the crop-year 1983 dry season up to the filing
of the complaint.
Private respondent denied any provisional rental allegedly fixed by the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
After finding that no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove the
provisional rental alleged to have been fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
RTC dismissed the complaint.
The Court of Appeals confirmed the findings of the court a quo and
affirmed its judgment. It also found that no evidence was introduced to prove
the expenses incurred by the parties for planting and harvesting hence the
amount of the net harvest was never determined. Only the transfer certificate of
title of the property and its corresponding tax declaration were offered in
evidence.
Issue:
Whether the verified complaint and the affidavit presented by
petitioners are proofs of the provisional rentals fixed by it and that it was error for
the trial court not to have taken cognizance of these documents.
Ruling:
No. It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has
been formally offered. The affidavit of petitioner Natividad Candido mentioning
the provisional rate of rentals was never formally offered; neither the alleged
certification by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
Not having been formally offered, the affidavit and certification cannot
be considered as evidence. Thus the trial court as well as the appellate court
correctly disregarded them. If they neglected to offer those documents in
evidence, however vital they may be, petitioners only have themselves to
blame, not respondent who was not even given a chance to object as the
documents were never offered in evidence.
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is
simply marked for identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing
counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called
upon to prove or identify it.
A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their
findings of fact and judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and
then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted
consequences.
The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the
document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty
reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on
appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched
as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing of the
case.
Vda. De Oñate vs. CA
(Marking of a Document, Not a Formal Offer)
** This case is an exception!!**
DOCTRINE: In the case of People vs. Napat-a, the Court relaxed the Rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the
trial court provided the following requirements are present: (1) evidence must be
duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and (2) it must be incorporated in the
records of the case.
FACTS: Deceased Leonor Taguba bought a Riceland from petitioner in
instalment. When the property was fully paid, they failed to reduce their contract
in writing, thus, Eulalia Taguba, as administratrix, demanded petitioner to
execute a public document of sale. Petitioner refused, hence, Eulalia filed an
action for specific performance with damages against petitioner. The RTC ruled
in favor of Taguba. On appeal, petitioner alleged that RTC erred when it took
cognizance of Taguba’s evidence which had been marked but not formally
offered as required by the Rules. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision and held
that the exhibits, though not formally offered, may still be admitted in evidence
for having complied with the 2 requisites for admission: (1) evidence must be duly
identified by testimony duly recorded; and (2) it must be incorporated in the
records of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the documents which are marked as exhibits but not formally
offered can be considered by the Court
RULING: YES. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, the Court made a distinction
between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an
exhibit. The identification is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied
by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit, while the formal offer is done only
when the party rests its case. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his
evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at. If he
chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider
the same.
However, in the case of People vs. Napat-a, the Court relaxed the Rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the
trial court provided the following requirements are present: (1) evidence must be
duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and (2) it must be incorporated in the
records of the case.
In this case, the Court finds, affirming the decision of the RTC, that the above
requisites have been satisfied. The exhibits were marked at the pre-trial for the
purpose of identifying them, and the same were admitted by the petitioners.
Eulalia identified the said exhibits in her testimony which was duly recorded.
Lastly, the exhibits were also incorporated and made part of the records of the
case.
INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT, INC. v. RUFO AVILES and JOSEPHINE AVILES G.R. No. 86062,
JUNE 6, 1990
Doctrine:
The rule is that the objection to documentary evidence must be made
at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to
that time is premature. The time for objecting the evidence is when the same is
offered. The effect of such omission is obvious. The rule is that evidence not
objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in
arriving at its judgment.
Facts:
Private respondents were the accused in a criminal case for qualified
theft. They were the sub-agents of petitioner (Interpacific) and as such enjoyed
its trust and confidence. They collected from petitioner’s clients payments for
airway bill which they appropriated for their own use and benefit instead of
remitting to the petitioner. At the trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies
of the airway bills which the accused supposedly received and had not
rendered proper accounting. In the examination of the prosecution witness, the
defense objected to the presentation of these photocopies invoking the best
evidence rule. The prosecution undertake to submit the original airway bills, thus
the trial court allowed the marking of the photocopies as prosecution’s exhibits.
The prosecution, however, failed to submit the original and did not prove their
loss to justify the substitution with secondary evidence. Nevertheless, when the
photocopies of the said bills were formally offered, the defense interposed no
objection.
Thereafter, the trial court acquitted the private respondents on the
ground that the parties have no principal-agent relationship, but instead a
creditor and debtors only. The court also held that the photocopies of the airway
bills were not admissible, hence ruled out on the civil liability. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the photocopies should be admitted and given probative
value?
Ruling:
The certified photocopies of the airway bills should have been
considered. There is no question that the photocopies were secondary evidence
and as such were not admissible unless there was ample proof of the loss of the
originals; and neither was the other exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable.
The rule is that the objection to documentary evidence must be made
at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to
that time is premature. The time for objecting the evidence is when the same is
offered. The effect of such omission is obvious. The rule is that evidence not
objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in
arriving at its judgment.
In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to
by the private respondents as secondary evidence only when they, were being
Identified for marking by the prosecution. They were nevertheless marked as
exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted later.
it is true that the originals were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding this
omission, the defense did not object when the exhibits as previously marked
were formally offered in evidence. And these were subsequently admitted by
the trial court.
BANTOLINO VS COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.,, GR 153660, June 10, 2003
Topic: When formal offer of evidence is not required
Doctrine:
The rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We find no
compelling reason to deviate therefrom.
Facts:
1. On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola
Bottlers, Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Services, Inc., Peoples Specialist
Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against
respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation
of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the Cabo System.
They thus prayed for reinstatement with full back wages, and the
declaration of their regular employment status.
2. For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the scheduled
mandatory conferences or submit their respective affidavits, the claims
of fifty-two (52) complainant-employees were dismissed. Thereafter,
Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit
information from the ten (10) remaining complainants (petitioners
herein) relative to their alleged employment with respondent firm.
3. In substance, the complainants averred that in the performance of their
duties as route helpers, bottle segregators, and others, they were
employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. They further
maintained that when respondent company replaced them and
prevented them from entering the company premises, they were
deemed to have been illegally dismissed.
4. On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision
ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants to their former
positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due regular
employees, and to pay their full back wages which, with the exception
of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed upon
proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998, already amounted to an
aggregate of P1,810,244.00. On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding
of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee
relationship between the complainants and respondent company
when it affirmed in toto the latters decision.
5. Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals
which, although affirming the finding of the NLRC that an employer-
employee relationship existed between the contending parties,
nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits of some of the
complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina,
Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson
Manalastas, should not have been given probative value for their failure
to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a
consequence, the appellate court dismissed their complaints for lack of
sufficient evidence. In the same Decision however, complainants Eddie
Ladica, Arman Queling and Rolando Nieto were declared regular
employees since they were the only ones subjected to cross-
examination.
Issue:
WON the affidavits should be given probative value despite the failure
of the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo test of cross-examination.
Held: YES.
1. Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC succinctly states
that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of
law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We find no
compelling reason to deviate therefrom.
2. To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in
courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy
or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent,
citing People v. Sorrel, that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere
hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find
relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution
requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative
proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is
given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or
hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases
 may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here
documents and their affidavits. challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been
sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower
TABUENA VS COURT OF APPEALS court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with
Doctrine: evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should
not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.
As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, "At the trial on the merits, the party
may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its
PEOPLE VS NAPAT-A
cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such
Topic: When Formal Offer of Evidence in Not Required
documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any
Doctrine:
evidentiary value."
The subsequent loss of exhibits did not affect the case for the trial court.
Facts: Facts:
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of Susana Napat-a was convicted of drug pushing (marijuana). The
about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an Narcotics Regional Unit of Baguio conducted the buy-bust operation where CIC
action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Leo Quevedo posted as the buyer. Before trial, Quevedo died.
Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein Issue:
petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the Whether the non-presentation of poseur-buyer and informant will make
defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. the evidence inadmissible.
Ruling:
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of
No. the non-presentation of Quevedo, the poseur-buyer and the
the lot, which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World
informer, as witnesses at the trial did not destroy the case of the prosecution. The
War II and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also
reason is that the sale and the actual delivery of the marijuana by Napat-a to
disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and
Quevedo were witnessed by certain persons who was also part of the buy-bust
Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded
operation, and that they all testifies at the trial.
on three sides by the Makato River.
The court further ruled that, subsequent loss of the exhibits did not affect
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in
the case, for the trial court had described the evidence in the records. That even
arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of
without the exhibits which have been incorporated into the records of the case,
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never
the prosecution can still establish the case because the witnesses properly
formally submitted in evidence.
identified those exhibits and their testimonies are recorded. Also, Napat-a’s
Issue:
counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witness who testified on those
Whether the evidence presented is already offered as evidence.
exhibits.
Held:
No. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of
the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time.
PEOPLE VS. MATE G.R. No. L-34754 March 27, 1981
They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits.
When Formal Offer of Evidence is Not Required
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B"
Doctrine:
and "C", which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should
Even without the exhibits which have been incorporated into the
have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court
records of the case, the prosecution can still establish the case because the
also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and
witnesses properly identified those exhibits and their testimonies are recorded.
took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner,
Facts:
An information was filed with the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal against
Silvestre Mate y Abad, John Doe alias "Ben Almine Bohol", Peter Doe alias "Doro"
for the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom With Murder and Frustrated Murder.
The trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the spontaneous and voluntary
confession of guilt of accused Silvestre Mate y Abad, the Court
finds him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder and Frustrated Murder…”
When investigated, Mate voluntarily made his extra-judicial statements
contained in Exhibit "A". On November 3, 1971, Investigator of the CIS
investigated mate. Mate again voluntarily gave his extra-judicial statements
contained in Exhibit "B". In Exhibit "B", Mate revealed the brown suitcase he
brought to the Butler residence containing things needed to commit the crime.
He also revealed his well prepared plan to kidnap the children of the Butlers for
ransom. Police Investigator corroborated Mate's confession about the brown
suitcase containing things to be used in the crime when Dizon testified that said
brown suitcase, together with its contents, was recovered from the scene of the
crime.
Before Patrolman of the Makati Police Force, Mate again voluntarily executed
his extra-judicial confession Exhibit "J". Exhibit "J" contains detailed narration of
how the crime was planned and committed, and its contents substantially are in
harmony with the narration of Exhibits "A" and "B".
Long after the accused Mate had been convicted by the trial court in
this case in 1971, he testified on May 7, 1973 as witness for the prosecution agaist
his co-accused in the crime. Mate affirmed the same narrations of events
contained in his extra-judicial confessions Exhibits "A", "B" and "J", and even
elaborated on them.
The defense questions the failure of the state prosecutor to make a
formal offer of his exhibits, although they have been marked and identified.
Issue:
Whether Exhibits "A", "B", and "J" are all admissible against Mate despite
failure to make a formal offer.
Ruling:
Yes. Such an oversight appears trivial because the entire evidence for
the prosecution is recorded. Even without the exhibits which have been
incorporated into the records of the case, the prosecution can still establish the
case because the witnesses properly identified those exhibits and their
testimonies are recorded.
Exhibits "A", "B", and "J" are all admissible against Mate because it
appears with clarity that he voluntarily and spontaneously gave those narrations
without compulsion from anybody, In fact, ... when he testified against Been
Bohol he affirmed those narrations again.
WHEREFORE, the decision of conviction being in accordance with law
and the evidence, is hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety, with costs.
Medina vs. People
G.R. No. 182648 June 17, 2015
(When Formal Offer of Evidence is not required)
DOCTRINE: To be admissible, two essential conditions must concur: first, the same
must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the
same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. In this case, while
the acknowledgment receipt was duly identified by the defense testimony that
was duly recorded, the receipt itself was not incorporated in the case records.
FACTS: Lim engaged the services of Medina, who is a mechanic and maintains
a repair shop, to repair Lim’s Jeep. Medina was charged of simple theft after he
unlawfully took, stole, and carried away parts of Lim’s jeep without the consent
of Lim. Medina was convicted by the RTC. After the arraignment and pre-trial,
Medina and a former barangay kagawad testified for the defense. Eventually,
the case was submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of evidence by
the defense. For the CA, the trial court correctly ruled that Medina’s claim that
he turned over the missing auto parts to Crispin Mendoza, who is alleged to be
an employee of Lim, was unsubstantiated in view of Medina’s failure to formally
offer in evidence the purported acknowledgment receipt.
ISSUE: Whether the Court shall allow the admission of evidence not formally
offered by the defense
RULING: NO. To be admissible, two essential conditions must concur: (1) the same
must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, (2) the same
must have been incorporated in the records of the case. As regards this case,
the acknowledgment receipt was not considered by the trial court because it
was not formally offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by the defense
testimony that was duly recorded, the receipt itself was not incorporated in the
case records. For its part, the CA opined that nowhere from the case records
does Medina’s acknowledgment receipt appear.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y
VALENCIA G.R. No. 136860, JANUARY 20, 2003
Doctrine:
Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long
as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have
themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. All the documentary
and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and
marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. Even without their
formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because
witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded
Facts:
The facts found by the trial court are: the appellants were arrested who
boarded a tricycle. The tricycle was flagged down at the check point by the
police officers and a certain black bag was discovered. The police officers
brought the appellants and the black bag to Kabayan Center 2 at Brgy.
Salapungan, Tarlac. They later found that the appellants were about to deliver
marijuana leaves wrapped in a transparent plastic weighing approximately
eight (8) kilos. On their part, the appellants denied the accusation.
Appellants were convicted beyond reasonable doubt of crime of
violation of R.A. No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act, by the RTC of Tarlac City
and sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua, thus, the automatic review by
the Supreme Court.
One of the defenses of the appellants is that the trial court abused its
discretion when it appreciated and considered the documentary and object
evidence of the prosecution not formally offered.
Issue:
Whether the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution not
formally offered may be admitted by the trial court in arriving at its decision?
Ruling:
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be
considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by
testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the
records of the case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were
properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the
bricks of marijuana. Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution
can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits,
and their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, appellants counsel had cross-
examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORP. VS UNI-FIELD ENTERPRISES, GR 153874, March 1, 2007
Topic: When Evidence is offered by petitioner and not by respondent
Doctrine:
While the delivery receipts and sales invoices did not form part of
respondents’ formal offer of evidence, records show that the delivery receipts
and sales invoices formed part of petitioner’s formal offer of evidence. Since
petitioner freely entered into the contract, the stipulations in the contract are
binding on petitioner. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in
using the delivery receipts and sales invoices as basis for the award of interest,
liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Titan Construction Corporation (petitioner) is engaged in the
construction business, while respondent Uni-Field Enterprises, Inc.
(respondent) is engaged in the business of selling various construction
materials. From 1990 to 1993, petitioner purchased on credit various
construction supplies and materials from respondent. Petitioners
purchases amounted to P7,620,433.12 but petitioner was only able to
pay P6,215,795.70, leaving a balance of P1,404,637.42. On 19 October
1994, respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner. But the balance
remained unpaid.
2. On 26 June 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for
collection of sum of money with damages against petitioner. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of respondent.
3. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
WON the CA erred by overlooking certain facts or circumstances of
weight and influence which if considered would alter the results of the case
Held:
NO.
1. Petitioner insists that the trial court and the Court of Appeals had no
legal basis to award interest, liquidated damages, and attorney,s fees
because the delivery receipts and sales invoices, which served as the
basis for the award, were not formally offered as evidence by
respondent. Petitioner also alleges that the delivery receipts and sales
invoices were in the nature of contracts of adhesion and petitioner had
no option but to accept the conditions imposed by respondent.
2. While the delivery receipts and sales invoices did not form part of
respondents formal offer of evidence, records show that the delivery
receipts and sales invoices formed part of petitioner’s formal offer of
evidence. The delivery receipts and sales invoices expressly stipulated
the payment of interest, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees in
 case of overdue accounts and collection suits. Petitioner did not only
bind itself to pay the principal amount, it also promised to pay (1) interest
of 24% per annum on overdue accounts, compounded with the
principal obligations as they accrue; (2) 25% liquidated damages based
on the outstanding total obligation; and 25% attorney’s fees based on
the total claim including liquidated damages. Since petitioner freely
entered into the contract, the stipulations in the contract are binding on
petitioner. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in
using the delivery receipts and sales invoices as basis for the award of
interest, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees.
3. Considering that petitioner and respondent have been doing business
from 1990 to 1993 and that petitioner is not a small time construction
company, petitioner is presumed to have full knowledge and to have
acted with due care or, at the very least, to have been aware of the
terms and conditions of the contract.1[16] Petitioner was free to
contract the services of another supplier if respondent’s terms were not
acceptable. Moreover, petitioner failed to show that in its transactions
with respondent it was the weaker party or that it was compelled to
accept the terms imposed by the respondent. In fact, petitioner only
questioned the terms of the contract after the trial court issued its 9
September 1997 Decision. The Court, therefore, upholds the validity of
the contract between petitioner and respondent.
4. The Court notes that respondent had more than adequately protected
itself from a possible breach of contract because of the stipulations on
the payment of interest, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees. The
Court finds the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of whatever
amount is due and payable to be exorbitant because it includes (1) the
principal of P1,404,114.00; (2) the interest charges of P504,114.00 plus
accrued interest charges at 24% per annum compounded yearly
reckoned from July 1995 up to the time of full payment; and (3)
liquidated damages of P324,147.94. Moreover, the liquidated damages
and the attorney’s fees serve the same purpose, that is, as penalty for
breach of the contract. Therefore, we reduce the award of attorney’s
fees to 25% of the principal obligation, or P351,028.50. WHEREFORE, we
AFFIRM the appealed Decision dated 7 January 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56816 with MODIFICATION as regards the
award of attorney’s fees. Petitioner Titan Construction Corporation is
ordered to pay respondent Uni-Field Enterprises, Inc. attorney’s fees of
P351,028.50.
MACASIRAY VS PEOPLE
Doctrine:
Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally
offered. In the case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the
witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for
which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other,
that objection to the documentary evidence may be made.
Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not
equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence.
What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally
offered as an exhibit.
Facts:
Petitioners are the accused in the Criminal Case No. 33(86) of the RTC
of San Jose City. It appears that in the course of the trial of the case, the
prosecution introduced in evidence, as Exhibit B, an extrajudicial confession
executed by petitioner Benedicto Gonzales on March 27, 1986, in which he
admitted participation in the crime and implicated petitioners Macasiray and
Gonzales, his co-accused. Also presented in evidence (Exh. D) was the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation before the
fiscal's office. This transcript contained statements allegedly given by Benedicto
in answer to question of the fiscal, in which he affirmed the contents of his
extrajudicial confession.
When the extrajudicial was offered at the conclusion of the presentation
of evidence for the prosecution, petitioners objected to its admissibility on the
ground that it was given without the assistance of counsel. The transcript of the
preliminary investigation proceeding was similarly objected to on the same
ground.
It appears that when it was the turn of the defense to present evidence,
Gonzales was asked about his extrajudicial confession (Exh. B). On cross-
examination, he was questioned not only about his extrajudicial confession but
also about answers allegedly given by him during the preliminary investigation
and recorded in the transcript of the proceeding.
Issue:
Whether petitioners waived objection to the admissibility of the
documents, either by failing to object to their introduction during the trial or by
using them in evidence.
Held:
 In this case, petitioners objected to the admissibility of the documents
when they were formally offered. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court,
petitioners did not waive objection to admissibility of the said documents by their
failure to object when these were marked, identified, and then introduced
during the trial. That was not the proper time to make the objection. "Objection
to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered,
not earlier."
Objections to the admissibility of documents may be raised during trial and the
court may rule on them then, but, if this is not done, the party should make the
objections when the documentary evidence is formally offered at the
conclusion of the presentation of evidence for the other party. Indeed, before
it was offered in evidence, the confession in this case cannot even be
considered as evidence to which the accused should object.
PEOPLE VS DIAZ
Topic: Formal Offer of Evidence; Waiver
Doctrine:
Where accused fails to object to the admissibility of certain items during
their formal offer, he is deemed to have waived his right against their
admissibility.
Facts:
Manuel Diaz, Eddie Luto, and Arnald Angquilo are the accused in this
crime of robbery against one Ferdinand Furigay. Employees of Fruigay, Melchor
Bacani and Conrado Caliguiran stated that they heard a gunshot from Furigay’s
office and that Diaz poked his gun at them on his way out. Furigay was shot on
his neck and died thereafter due to the gunshot wound. Accused were found
guilty by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether objection to admitting in evidence the gun, five bullets, and
magazine were made on time.
Ruling:
No. the objection of the accused-appellants was too late.
The gun, five bullets, and magazine were taken from them by the police
at the time of their arrest. The records show that the accused-appellants failed
to object to the admissibility of the said evidence during their formal offer. Thus,
they waived their right against their admissibility.
Amidst a waiver, the court did not err in admitting the evidence.
SPOUSES RAGUDO VS. FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC. G.R. No.
146823. August 9, 2005
How an Offer of Evidence is Made
Doctrine:
To stress, it was only during the hearing of the motion for execution
pending appeal that said documents were presented and offered in evidence.
Sure, the trial court admitted them, but the admission was only for the purpose
for which they were offered, that is, by way of opposition to FETA’s motion for
execution pending appeal. It is basic in the law of evidence that the court shall
consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it was offered.
Facts:
To effect the ejectment of the spouses Ragudo from the portion in question
which they continued to occupy despite the earlier award thereof to Mrs. Miriam
de Guzman, (a qualified FETA member), FETA filed against them a complaint for
unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court.
MeTC dismissed the unlawful detainer case
FETA then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for recovery of possession
against the Ragudos.
Trial court rendered judgment in FETA’s favor.
Therefrom, the spouses Ragudo went on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, whereat their appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
51230.
Meanwhile, pending resolution by the appellate court of the Ragudos’
appeal, FETA filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal, to which the Ragudos interposed an Opposition,
followed by FETA’s Reply to Opposition.
Then, on 11 October 1994, the Ragudos filed with the trial court a
Rejoinder to Reply With Counter-Motion to Admit Attached Documentary
Evidence Relevant to the Pending Incident. Attached thereto and sought to be
admitted therein were the following documents and photographs.
The trial court admitted in evidence the attachments to the Ragudos'
aforementioned Rejoinder With Counter-Motion, etc., and ultimately denied
FETA’s motion for execution pending appeal.
Later, the Ragudos filed with the appellate court a Motion To Admit
Certain Documentary Evidence by Way of Partial New Trial, In the Interest of
Justice, thereunder seeking the admission in evidence of the very documents
earlier admitted by the trial court in connection with the then pending incident
of execution pending appeal, and praying that said documents be made part
of the records and considered in the resolution of their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
51230.
The appellate court denied their aforesaid motion and ordered
expunged from the records of the appealed case the documents they sought
admission of, on the ground that they could not be considered as newly
discovered evidence under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the court of appeals erred in not admitting in evidence the
documents sought to be introduced by ragudo at the appellate level
Ruling:
No. With the reality that those documents were never presented and
formally offered during the trial of the main case, their belated admission for
purposes of having them duly considered in the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No.
51230 would certainly collide with Section 34, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. – The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified. (Emphasis
supplied).
To stress, it was only during the hearing of the motion for execution
pending appeal that said documents were presented and offered in evidence.
Sure, the trial court admitted them, but the admission was only for the purpose
for which they were offered, that is, by way of opposition to FETA’s motion for
execution pending appeal. It is basic in the law of evidence that the court shall
consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it was offered.
While the said documents may have the right to stay in the records of
the case for purposes of the incidental issue of execution pending appeal, they
do not have that same right insofar as far as the main case is concerned, and
ought not be considered in the resolution thereof.
FLOY VS HIBBARD, 227 Iowa 154, 1940
Topic: General and Specific Objections
Doctrine:
We have set out the testimony in the first case for the reason that from
that testimony it is apparent that the only object in introducing testimony in
relation to the conversation in the present case was for the purpose of bringing
before the jury, by inference or suggestion, the fact that the defendant Gifford
was protected by insurance.
Facts:
1. On February 9, 1938, the plaintiff was driving west on a highway and
approaching the crest of a hill. The defendant Hibbard, driving east,
came over the crest of the hill and at a point 15 to 30 feet east the car
he was driving collided with the car of plaintiff. The cause of the collision
as claimed by the plaintiff was that the defendant was driving on the
wrong side of the road, while the defendants claim that there was but
one traveled track and both cars were in this traveled portion.
Defendants' car was driven by Hibbard with the consent of Gifford, the
owner. There was trial to a jury, verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and,
motion for new trial and exceptions to instructions being overruled, the
defendants appeal.
2. A serious question involves the matter of insurance. In the case brought
by the wife of the plaintiff against the same defendants, the plaintiff
herein was interrogated as to a conversation held with one of the
defendants, the postmaster and owner of the car. He testified as follows,
as shown by the opinion in Floy v. Hibbard, et al., supra:
a. "Q. Just relate to the jury what was said in that conversation."
Objected to as wholly incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial
to any issue in the case. Objection overruled.
b. "Q. What did you say to Mr. Gifford, and what did he say to you?
Just relate your conversation that you had with him at that time.
A. Well, I asked about the accident and Mr. Gifford said he
would let, had insurance and he would let that take care of it.
He didn't even come out." A motion to strike in that case was
overruled and this court, by Justice Hamilton, stated as follows:
i. "The objection to the question was, no doubt, properly
overruled but, when the answer revealed the subject
to which the conversation inquired about related,
namely, the question of insurance and nothing else, the
motion to strike should have been sustained."
3. In the instant case the plaintiff was again interrogated about this same
conversation, which occurred on the Saturday following the
Wednesday when the collision occurred.
a. "Q. Just tell the court and jury what was said by you and what
was said by Mr. Gifford at that time?
b. "Mr. Reynolds (for the defendants): Just a moment. We object
to that as calling for extraneous matter, incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial to any issue in the case, not proper.
c. "The court: Witness may answer. To which ruling of the court the
party or parties adversely affected are given an exception.
d. "A. Well, I went into the post office and asked Mr. Gifford why
he was not out to the accident. As near as I can remember, he
told me that that is the reason, he had insurance and let them
see to it.
e. "Mr. Reynolds: Now I move to strike it for the reason that it is
incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and bringing an
improper matter before the jury, and it is extraneous matters
which are incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, which
 should not be considered by the jury in arriving at a verdict in PEOPLE VS GABUYA
this case, and we move to strike it for all of these reasons and
Doctrine:
ask that the court instruct the jury to disregard the statement
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal;
made by the witness with reference to any insurance company
when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state
or any other matters in the conversation."
in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question
for the first time on appeal.
Issue: WON the testimony should be given weight.
Facts:
Held:
PO1 Rosales conducted a buy bust operation upon an information he
NO.
received from a confidential informant that appellant. After the illegal drug
1. It is quite apparent that the verdict was influenced by extraneous
transaction had already been consummated, the back-ups arrived. PO1 Rosales
matter. One of such extraneous matters was the diligent suggestion, by
informed appellant that he is a police officer and immediately caused his arrest
examination of jurors and otherwise, that the damage sued for had
then confiscated the other two plastic sachets from appellant while PO3 De
been insured against. The impression thus conveyed to the jury naturally
Guzman recovered the marked money after appellant emptied his pocket.
was that the action was a mere method of collecting insurance. This
Appellant, together with the marked money and the specimens recovered from
seems to be a growing practice of trial stratagem, which is not
him, were turned-over to the police investigator, PO3 Randulfo Hipolito, who
calculated to secure a fair trial, and which incurs the increasing disfavor
marked each sachet with the letters JGA, the initials of appellant. The seized
of the courts.
items and appellant were thereafter brought to the police crime laboratory for
2. A distinction has been made between diligent suggestion and the
examination of the forensic chemist.
mention of insurance in answer to a question involving a conversation
During trial, PO1 Rosales identified appellant as the person who sold him
relating to other material matters; and where such mention has been
shabu for ₱100.00 during the buy-bust operation. He also identified the sachets
merely incidental courts have not ordinarily held it to be error. It is true
of shabu that were formally offered in evidence as the same items that were
the suggestion in the testimony offered in this case did not go to the
seized from appellant. The RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish
extent of that introduced in the trial of the case of the wife against the
the unbroken link in the chain of custody of the illegal drugs in both cases.
same defendants. However the same conversation was testified to in
In his appeal to the CA, appellant asserted that the RTC erred in finding
that trial. Plaintiff knew that the answers elicited would be the same and
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt since the failure of the buy-bust team to
must have known that the conversation related to no material matter,
coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and to mark
nor indeed to anything affecting the issues in the case unless it should
the seized items at the place of seizure constituted gaps in the chain of custody.
be the question of insurance. We have set out the testimony in the first
However, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
case for the reason that from that testimony it is apparent that the only
Issue:
object in introducing testimony in relation to the conversation in the
Whether the objection to evidence is properly made.
present case was for the purpose of bringing before the jury, by
Held:
inference or suggestion, the fact that the defendant Gifford was
No. It is well to note that the records of the case are bereft of evidence
protected by insurance. Plaintiff argues that this question was only
that appellant, during trial, interposed any objection to the non-marking of the
incidental, that the conversation related to the attitude of the
seized items in his presence and the lack of information on the whereabouts of
defendant in not going to the scene of the accident. How the fact that
the shabu after it was examined.
he did or did not go to the scene of the accident affected the rights of
While he questioned the chain of custody before the CA, the alleged defects
the parties, or could have any influence on the verdict, we are unable
appellant is now alluding to were not among those he raised on appeal. The
to discover. That part of the testimony alone, if it had any effect, would
defects he raised before the CA were limited to the alleged lack of physical
only tend to show that he was indifferent to the outcome of the case so
inventory, non-taking of photographs of the seized items, and the supposed
far as any financial loss to him was concerned.
failure of the police officers to mark the sachets of shabu at the crime scene. But
even then, it was already too late in the day for appellant to have raised the
same at that point since he should have done so early on before the RTC.
Besides and as already mentioned, the CA has already concluded that the
identity of the seized drugs was established by the prosecution and its integrity
preserved.
MANLICLIC VS. CALAUNAN G.R. No. 150157. January 25, 2007
Waiver of Objection; Belated Objections
Doctrine:
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an
alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection
shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which
the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does
not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law.
Facts:
Respondent Calaunan, together with Mendoza, was on board his
owner-type jeep when it collided with the Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by driven
by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc before
the RTC.
The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who
testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos.
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be
received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI.
The Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the decision of the
trial court, affirmed it in all respects.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in affirming the trial court’s
questionable admission in evidence of the TSN’s and other documents
presented in the criminal case.
Ruling:
No.
Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos should not be admitted in
evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be
satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition
was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between
the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different
causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the
same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the
requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or
proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner
PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case, had no opportunity to cross-examine
the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against
petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are
not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said
criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the
ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party
may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not
conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex
gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but
on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and
considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence
alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the
importance it deserves.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing
the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial
court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were
admitted by both petitioners. Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in
evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal
case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s
witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why
then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the
criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it
too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the
adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time
insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in
its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to
admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
People vs. Martin
G.R. No. 172069 January 30, 2008
(Waiver of Objection; Belated Objections)
DOCTRINE: Failure of the defense to make an objection to the sworn statements
on the ground of hearsay is deemed as a waiver of the ground and cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.
** “In failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel
waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence
offered may be admitted.”
FACTS: Martin was convicted by the RTC of the crime of rape against his minor
mentally-retarded daughter. The victim took the witness stand in addition to her
sworn statements. Appellant asserts that the sworn statements of the victim and
her mother, the victim’s birth certificate, marriage contract submitted by the
mother and the psychological evaluation report of the DSWD psychiatrist should
not have been considered by the RTC. He claimed these were all hearsay
evidence since they were never identified or testified to by witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether there was a waiver of objection
RULING: YES. Appellant merely contested the sworn statements for being self-
serving but did not raise any objection on the ground of hearsay. Therefore, he
was deemed to have waived this ground and cannot raise them for the first time
on appeal. The Rules of Court requires that grounds for objection must be
specified, whether orally or in writing.
In Krohn v. Court of Appeals, the counsel for the petitioner objected to the
testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was privileged but did not
question the testimony as hearsay. We held that "in failing to object to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make
such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted." In
the case at bar, the respondent did not assail in the trial court the hearsay
character of the documents in question. It is too late in the day to raise the
question on appeal.
LEODEGARIO BAYANI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 155619, AUGUST 14,
2007
Doctrine:
If no objection to the admissibility of prosecution witness’ testimony was
timely made – from the time her testimony was offered and up to the time her
direct examination was conducted – then defense has effectively waived any
objection to the admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to have her
testimony excluded for being hearsay has no ground to stand on.
Facts:
Petitioner Bayani was charged with Violation of BP 22 for issuing the PS
Bank Check in the amount of Php. 10,000.00, payable to cash, in favor of Dolores
Evangelista. The said check bounced for insufficiency of funds. Evangelista
made demands and confrontation to Bayani, but to no avail. Bayani denied of
having talked with Evangelista regarding the latte’s claim of payment. The trial
court convicted Bayani and ordered him to pay Evangelista. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.
Petitioner basically denies having issued the check subject of this case.
He argues that the evidence pinpointing him as the signatory on the check is
merely hearsay.
Issue:
Whether the testimony of Evangelista is hearsay and thus be disallowed?
Ruling:
Evangelista’s testimony is hearsay since she had no personal knowledge
of the fact that petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the check
exchanged for cash, as she was not personally present when petitioner
supposedly made this request. What she testified to, therefore, was a matter that
was not derived from her own perception but from Rubia’s.
However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of
Evangelista’s testimony even if the same is hearsay. Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court requires that the trial court shall not consider any evidence which
has not been finally offered. Section 35 of the same Rule provides that as regards
the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is
asked to testify. And under Section 36 of the same Rule, objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as
soon as the ground therefor becomes reasonably apparent.
Thus, it has been held that "in failing to object to the testimony on the
ground that it was hearsay, the evidence offered may be admitted." Since no
objection to the admissibility of Evangelista’s testimony was timely made – from
the time her testimony was offered and up to the time her direct examination
was conducted – then petitioner has effectively waived any objection to the
admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to have her testimony excluded
for being hearsay has no ground to stand on.
ABRAHAM VS KASTEN, GR L-16741, January 31, 1962
Topic: Waiver of Objection
Doctrine:
Facts:
1. On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan
C. Ysmael died intestate on April 23, 1952 leaving the note still unpaid.
2. On November 13, 1954, in Special Proceedings No. Q-285 for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael, pending before the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Florencia Q. Vda. de Abraham,
together with her sons, Alfonso and Jesus, all surnamed Abraham, filed
a pleading entitled "Reclamation" demanding payment of the amount
represented by the note. Because no regular administrator of the estate
had yet been appointed by the court, the "Reclamation" was not acted
upon. However, as soon as Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed
administratrix, the claimants reproduced their "Reclamation" before the
lower court and the same was finally set for hearing. As agreed upon by
the parties, the reception of evidence was delegated to a
commissioner. During the hearing before the commissioner, the counsel
for the administratrix interposed a general and continuing objection to
the testimony of Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the provisions of
Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. However, after the claimant
had testified, he lengthily cross-examined her on the very matters
against which he interposed a general objection.
3. On October 4, 1956, the lower court issued in Order-Decree allowing the
claim against the intestate estate of Juan C. Ysmael.
4. CA concluding that "the lower court erred in finding that the claimants
have established a just and valid claim, and in allowing the claim —
supposing it was a claim with consideration — when the same had been
barred by prescription, estoppel and laches," reversed the Order-
Decree appealed from.
Issue:
WON petitioners have established a just and valid claim. If the answer is
in the affirmative, whether the same is already barred by prescription and
laches.
Held:
YES.
1. It is interesting to note that the promissory note executed by the
deceased was produced before the Court and marked as Exhibit B-1,
and the circumstances under which the same was executed was
extensively described by Florencia Q. de Abraham during the hearing,
who, strikingly is one of the witnesses to the said instrument. Much to the
surprise of the Court this description was more vividly given by the said
witness not in answer to the questions propounded by her lawyer but on
cross-examination of counsel for the administratrix, who feebly
attempted to destroy the due execution and genuineness of the said
document. It is indeed unfortunate that counsel for the administratrix did
not choose to present evidence to destroy the alleged genuineness of
the promissory note (Exhibit B-1) in support of his theory, despite his
insinuation during the course of the trial that he might try to secure the
services of an expert to determine the genuineness of the signature of
the late Juan C. Ysmael mentioned therein. (t.s.n., p. 83), Again counsel
manifested that if Exhibit B-1 is a genuine document the same has been
fully paid already, (t.s.n., p. 83), however, counsel did not present any
proof to support this contention.
2. However, there was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the
administratrix extensively cross-examined the witness on the very matters
subject of the prohibition. (Wright v. Tinio, G.R. No. L-4004, May 29, 1952;
see also Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Macfarlane v. Green, 54 Phil.
551) It was for this reason that the trial judge eventually overruled the
counsel's previous general and continuing objection and admitted the
testimony of the witness. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the
counsel's lengthy cross-examination on the prohibited matter was
merely for the purpose of establishing the "motive, prejudices and
predilection" of the witness.
3. In order that the defense of laches may prosper, the following elements
must be present: (1) conduct on the part of defendant, or one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of, (2) delay in
asserting complainant's right after knowledge or notice of defendant's
conduct and an opportunity to sue, (3) lack of knowledge or notice on
the part of the defendant that complainant would assert the right on
which he bases suit, and (4) injury or prejudice to defendant in the event
relief is accorded. (Villoria v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
 Resources, G.R. No. L-11754, April 29, 1960) Assuming that the first three wrapped in a piece of paper". They never saw or heard her giving any instruction
elements are present, we do not see how the last element may exist, for to Pipe to deliver the wrapped object to the children. Both claimed that they
neither injury or prejudice to respondent may occur by the allowance learned or obtained the information from Pipe after interviewing him by means
of the claim. It should be emphasized here that mere lapse of time of sign language. Which the trial Court accepted as competent, trustworthy and
during which there was neglect to enforce the right is not the sole basis credible.
of the rule on laches, but also the changes of conditions which arise There is nothing in the testimony indicating that the deaf-mute, Pipe,
during the period there has been neglect. When there are no changes pointed to her sister Lucila Valero as the source of the poisoned bread. We have
of conditions detrimental to the defendant, the defense of laches may examined the entire transcript of the stenographic notes, and, except the
not prosper. portions of the testimony of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, there is
4. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- nothing in the record showing that Pipe communicated to the prosecution
G.R. No. 21222-R is hereby reversed and the Order-Decree dated witnesses by comprehensible sign language that his sister was the source of the
October 4, 1956 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Special poisoned bread.
Proceedings No. Q-285 is hereby affirmed in all respects. Without cost.
Issue:
Whether the evidence presented is admissible.
PEOPLE VS VALERO Held:
The evidence is purely hearsay. The presentation of such evidence
Doctrine:
likewise violates the principle of res inter alios acta. The rights of a party cannot
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule
With particular reference to the testimony of Ceferino Velasco, its
of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not
admission cannot be justified by claiming that it is a part of the res gestae. When
give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any
Pipe allegedly revealed to Ceferino Velasco that the source of the poisoned
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
bread was the defendant, the children had not eaten or tasted it. Nobody was
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not
yet poisoned. Stated otherwise, there was no startling occurrence yet.
has no probative value.
With reference to the testimony of Jaime, there is no showing that Pipe
Facts:
made the extrajudicial revelation spontaneously when he was still under the
The two of the Velasco children died of food poisoning after tasting the
influence of a startling occurrence. Pipe made his extrajudicial revelation not
poisoned bread. The evidence of the prosecution and the defense conflict as
spontaneously but after an interview through the complicated process of sign
to the source of the poisoned bread. The evidence of the prosecution shows that
language. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative
the poisoned bread was given to the children by Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, a
value.
deaf-mute brother of the defendant Lucila Valero, and that it was Lucila Valero
who gave the bread to Pipe for delivery to the minor children. On the other
hand, the defendant Lucila Valero denies that she ever gave bread to her deaf-
DELA TORRE VS COURT OF APPEALS
mute brother, Pipe, for delivery to the minor children. The evidence for the
Topic: Formal Offer of Evidence
defense tends to show that the Velasco children might have eaten one of the
Doctrine:
sliced poisoned bread used by their father in poisoning rats in his garden.
If a party fails to invoke the rule which requires that the offer of the
Only Rodolfo Quilang, among the nine prosecution witnesses testified
testimony of witnesses be made at the beginning of the testimony of said witness
that he saw the defendant Lucila Valero deliver "something wrapped in a piece
or to object to such testimony at the close of the presentation of the evidence,
of paper" to her deaf-mute brother Pipe with the alleged instruction by sign
he is deemed to have waived his objection based on this ground.
language to deliver the same to the Velasco children. However, Quilang has a
Facts:
tendency to provide self-contradictory statements.
Alejandro B. De la Torre, employee of MERALCO was convicted of
On the other hand, both Ceferino Velasco and Federico Jaime did not
qualified theft for stealing 6 electric meters of MERALCO. De la Torre appealed
see the delivery by the defendant to her deaf-mute brother "something
contending that the admission in evidence of the testimonies of the prosecution
were not formally offered.
Issue:
Whether the objection to the testimonies of prosecution’s witnesses was
properly made.
Ruling:
No. the rule is that an objection in the course of the oral examination of
a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was
made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not
be considered.
De la Torre has waived his objection by his failure to raise it at the close
of the presentation of the prosecution evidence in the trial court. He should have
objected to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, if not before each of
their testimonies, then at least at the time their testimonies were formally offered
at the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence.
PEOPLE VS. NEBREJA G.R. No. 92447 October 17, 1991
Extent of waiver for failure to object
Doctrine:
As the defense failed to object to the hearsay evidence presented his
right of confrontation and cross-examination is deemed waived. The evidence
then, is admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value.
Facts:
The information filed against the accused Guiraldo (appellant) and
Nebreja and three other companions for the crime of Violation of Section 3 (b)
in relation to Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as
the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.
The appellant questions the credibility of the Identification made by the
prosecution's sole eyewitness, Romeo Duenas, pointing to him as one of the
malefactors. The appellant contends that such identification is not believable
because of the following circumstances:
1. Romeo never described the perpetrators to the policemen who
interviewed him when he was in the hospital nor did he furnish such
information to the doctors who treated him. His non-disclosure is not
natural for someone who is on the brink of death as it is expected that
one would want to have the perpetrators brought to justice, if that
would be the last thing that he would do.
2. Even after his confinement at the hospital, he still did not go to the police
authorities to describe his assailants. It was only on April 10, 1988, 19 days
after the occurrence of the incident that he executed his affidavit.
3. As Romeo was in a shocked and startled state, his faculties of
observation were not as keen as that of one in a normal state.
4. There was no description of the scene of the crime, whether or not there
was sufficient light to make a proper identification.
5. The inconsistencies in Romeo's testimony make such testimony doubtful.
Romeo testified that it was accused Nebreja who was the person seated
beside his father despite his earlier claims that it was the appellant
Guiraldo who was beside his father. Also, he stated that it was Guiraldo
who stabbed his father
The Regional Trial Court found the accused Guiraldo (appellant) and
Nebreja guilty of the crime.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the identification
made by the lone eyewitness Romeo Duenas of both accused as among the
perpetrators.
Ruling:
No. As the defense failed to object to the hearsay evidence presented
his right of confrontation and cross-examination is deemed waived. The
evidence then, is admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated
with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value.
People vs. Villaviray and Gutierrez
G.R. No. 105084 September 18, 1996
(Extent of waiver for failure to object)
DOCTRINE: Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, possesses no
probative value unless the proponent can show that the same falls within the
exception to the hearsay rule.
FACTS: Villaviray et al were convicted by the RTC of the crime of violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act for selling marijuana. Gutierrez, on the other hand, was
charged of co-conspiracy for sale of marijuana by the other accused which
charge was solely based mere presence at the scene of the crime. Records
show, however, that the arrests made were unlawful as there were no warrants
of arrest presented to the respondents and their detention was in Bicutan when
they were separately arrested in Quezon City. The trial court merely depend its
decision based on the testimonies of Constable Enano, the star witness of the
prosecution, which were purely hearsay. Enano himself averred that the only
reason why they arrested Gutierrez was because he was with Ronnie and
because the informant said that Edgar is a pusher, too.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred when it based its decision solely on the
hearsay testimonies of Enano
RULING: YES. It bears emphasis that hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, possesses no probative value unless the proponent can show that the same
falls within the exception to the hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these
hearsay statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would be to
render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the witness against him, in this
case the informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness. The trial court not
only failed to take this into consideration but had evidently misappreciated the
testimony of the accused Gutierrez when it did not give credence to his
statement because, Gutierrez resides in Nasugbu, Batangas quite far from Frisco,
Quezon City for a man to go just to wash his clothes. The stenographic records
show that Gutierrez testified that he happened to be in Villaviray’s house
washing clothes at the time of his arrest because he was then applying for a job
overseas. He never said that he went to Villaviray’s house all the way from
Batangas just to wash his clothes.
All these circumstances taken together fail to overthrow the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused. It is pointless to argue that there is no motive
on the part of the policemen to impute such a grave crime to the accused when
the sale of marijuana has not been adequately established. It is likewise irrelevant
to dwell on the lack of motive by the Barangay Chairman, Teodoro Evangelista,
in concocting a story and testifying against the accused because the fact
remains that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
All told, the accused were ACQUITTED of the crime charged and their immediate
release was ordered.
BENITO LOPEZ v. TOMAS VALDEZ G.R. NO. 9113, DECEMBER 24, 1915
Doctrine:
A party who offers an objection to a question propounded to a witness
testifying on the trial of a civil action is entitled to a ruling at the time the objection
is made, or as soon thereafter as may be possible; in any event during the trial
and at such time as will afford the party against whom the ruling is made a
reasonable opportunity to meet the situation created by the ruling.
Facts:
This is an action begun by the administrator of the estate of Marcela
Emradura, deceased, against Tomas Valdez for the recovery of possession of the
land described in the complaint on the payment by the plaintiff of the sum of
P30. Judgment was for plaintiff and the court ordered delivery of possession of
the land described in the complaint on the payment by plaintiff of the P30
mentioned in the complaint. The court also ordered the cancellation of the
registration of that portion of the land of Gregorio San Agustin which includes
the land in litigation in this action.
Issue:
One of the assigned errors is when should the trial court rule on the
objections interposed by an adverse counsel in the presentation of the testimony
of a witness?
Ruling:
Parties who offer objections to questions on whatever ground are
entitled to a ruling at the time the objection is made unless they present a
question with regard to which the court desires to inform itself before making its
ruling. In that event it is perfectly proper for the court to take a reasonable time
to study the question presented by the objection; but a ruling should always be
made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom the
ruling is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
It appears from the record that appellee relied on certain written
contracts entered into between the appellant and Marcela Emradura during
her lifetime to prove the cause of action set out in the complaint. The documents
themselves were not produced and when counsel for appellee sought to prove
by certain witnesses the contents of these documents, without presenting facts
justifying secondary evidence with reference thereto, counsel for appellant
made the objection that the evidence was incompetent and improper as the
documents themselves were the best evidence. Several of these objections
were made, to each of which the court, without a decision on the objections,
stated: "The objection of Mr. Reyes will be taken into consideration." The witnesses
were thereupon allowed, over the exception of appellant, to answer the
questions to which the objections were interposed. A decision on these
objections was thus left in abeyance and the trial terminated without a resolution
of the questions presented. In spite of that the trial court in its final decision took
into consideration the secondary evidence thus introduced and based its
decision thereon.
The Court is of the opinion that this procedure was prejudicial to the
rights and interests of the Appellant.

PEOPLE VS SINGH, GR 129782, June 29, 2001
Topic: Rulings on Objections
Doctrine:
Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the
evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial. The mandate of the Rules is clear and there is no need
for the trial court to issue an order so that the evidence presented in the bail
proceedings may be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
Facts:
1. Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated murder in Criminal Case
No. 8682, recounts that on November 26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the
morning while he was cleaning his motorbike in front of the Mendiola
Apartment in Barangay Canlalay, Bian, Laguna, Dalvir, Balwinder,
Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit, Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip- all surnamed Singh-
Johander Singh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived, shouting foul
remarks in their native language and demanding Surinder Singh to
come out of the apartment. When Surinder Singh came out of his
apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab him but Surinder Singh was able to
move away. Dalvir Singh told his companions to hold Surinder Singh as
he will kill him. Thereafter, Dial Singh and Johinder Singh each held the
right and left arms of Surinder Singh, with Kuldip Singh pushing Surinder
Singh on his back. Dalvir Singh then stabbed Surinder Singh, hitting him
on the right side of his stomach, and causing him to fall on the ground.
Dial Singh remarked that Surinder Singh failed to give money and if
others will likewise refuse, the same fate will befall them. As Surinder Singh
tried to get up, Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh started hitting him
with lead pipes all over his body, while Johinder Singh and Dial Singh
punched and kicked Surinder. Amarjit Singh, who was holding a gun,
warned everyone not to help Surinder Singh or else he will shoot. Thereat,
when all these things were going on, private complainant Dilbag Singh
tried to stop them but Balwinder Singh stabbed him on the left side of his
back. Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him with a bolo, but he was not
hit as he was able to move to one side. After that, the ten (10) accused
Indians left.
2. Appellants Balwinder, Malkit, Mohinder and Dalvir, all surnamed Singh,
were convicted of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 8683 for
killing Surinder Singh, and Frustrated Murder in Criminal Cases No. 8682
for stabbing Dilbag Singh. Each of them were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder, and the indeterminate
penalty of 8 years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for
frustrated murder.
Issue:
WON the court a quo erred in sanctioning errors and irregularities of
procedure which resulted in denial of due process to accused-appellants.
Held:
NO.
1. According to appellants, an irregularity attended the admission of the
amended Informations. They claim that the prosecution failed to
conduct a preliminary investigation for the upgraded crime of murder
and frustrated murder. This claim lacks basis. Evidence on record reveals
that when private complainants filed a motion for re-investigation to
upgrade the charge to murder and frustrated murder, in the course
thereof, the prosecutor who handled the reinvestigation conducted
another preliminary investigation. Subpoenas were issued and sent to
both contending parties requiring them to appear and be present on
the scheduled date and time for the said re-investigation, and to
present, or submit, their evidence in support of their complaints and
defense, respectively." The prosecutor propounded clarificatory
questions to the prosecution witnesses revealing the necessity to raise
the category of the criminal charge to murder and frustrated murder.
2. In hearing the petition for bail, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 8, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court specifically provides that the burden of proof in bail
application lies in the prosecution.
3. Appellants contend that they were deprived of their rights to be heard
and to present evidence with the issuance of the trial court Order dated
February 24, 1997. As culled from the records, appellants were
protracting the trial by filing motions for postponement on scheduled
hearings. On February 24, 1997, the scheduled date for appellants’
presentation of additional evidence, appellants filed a motion for leave
to file demurrer to evidence and set the same for hearing on that same
day. It bears stressing that judicial action on a motion to dismiss, or
demurrer to evidence, is left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
The trial court, mindful of the violation of the three-day notice rule by
appellants, declared that the trial court must be given time to resolve
the motion, and ordered the parties to proceed with the hearing,
without prejudice to the outcome of the motion. The trial court
emphasized that there should be a limitation or an end to unnecessary
postponements. Thus, it disclosed that when the Court of Appeals
denied appellants Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for temporary
 restraining order, no legal hindrance existed to defer the scheduled allow cumulative testimony upon the same point and as the record shows that
hearings. Appellants were given all the opportunity to be heard and he understood Mrs. Woodd as having testified generally to the same facts
defend their cause but opted not to utilize the same by its continued concerning which answers were sought particularly, the appellant has no cause
refusal to proceed with the trial. Nevertheless, appellants were given for complaint.
time to file their formal offer of exhibits to bolster their defense. This Before the taking of evidence was concluded, counsel for the appellant
negates the appellants’ claim of denial of due process. offered to show by the testimony of the appellant and "by other witnesses" that
the respondents affirmatively took positions which were entirely inconsistent with
and directly negatived the asserted agreement to divide the appellant's legacy.
DOUILLARD VS WOOD But the appellant did not state the names of these witnesses nor the facts to
Doctrine: which any one of them would testify. A mere general offer of proof without
producing the witness or stating the evidence whereby the fact in issue is to be
A mere general offer of proof without producing the witness or stating
proved, or, if the witness be present, without putting a question to him in such
the evidence whereby the fact in issue is to be proved, or, if the witness be
form as to give opportunity for objection, is not correct trial procedure and it
present, without putting a question to him in such form as to give opportunity for
affords no ground for appeal.
objection, is not correct trial procedure and it affords no ground for appeal.
Facts:
Following the administration of the estate of Emily S. Donahue, the
REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN
respondents, who were legatees under her will, sued the appellant, the principal
Topic: Additional Evidence after case is rested.
beneficiary of it, upon an asserted oral contract by which Mrs. Woodd agreed
Doctrine:
to divide her legacy with them.
The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to
According to the complaint, Mrs. Woodd orally agreed with the
allow it to present additional evidence even after it has rested its case.
respondents that if they would not contest the will, she would divide her legacy
Facts:
of $10,000 between herself and them in the same proportions designated by Mrs.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of the cases relating to
Donahue for the division of the residue of her estate. By way of answer, Mrs.
the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos family and cronies. Republic filed motion
Woodd denied that she made that agreement.
requesting to adopt the testimonies and documentary exhibits presented and
The trial court found that Mrs. Woodd made the contract alleged by the
identified by them in another case. But it was partly denied insofar as the
respondents in consideration of their forebearing to contest the will of Mrs.
testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice Bane and Rolando Gapud for the
Donahue, and that these legatees had performed their part of the agreement
reason that the deponents are not available for cross-examination of Court.
by permitting the estate to be administered, without contest, in accordance with
Republic filed 3rd motion seeking admission of Bane deposition but was still
the terms of the will. Upon the issues raised by the affirmative defenses of Mrs.
denied.
Woodd, the court found that there was no novation or waiver of any rights under
The petitioner thus filed the petition. Petitioner claims the crucial
the oral contract and that the contract does not violate the statute of frauds.
importance of the Bane deposition that Sandiganbayan should not have denied
Judgment was entered accordingly.
its admission on flimsy grounds.
When the case was before the District Court of Appeal, a controversy arose
Issue:
concerning the transcript. The appellant charged that much of the testimony
Whether the Bane deposition is admissible.
stated in the bill of exceptions settled by the trial judge is incorrect.
Ruling:
Issue:
Yes.
Whether mere general offer of proof without producing witness is
The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing
sufficient.
to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the
Held:
Bane deposition.
The witness clearly included all of the legatees in her testimony and the
Under the rule (Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court), a party who has
court stated, in sustaining the objections to continued questioning along this line,
the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he relies
that "there is sufficient for the record on that now." A trial judge is not bound to
upon and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The obvious rationale of
the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the
consequent delay in the administration of justice.
A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his
evidence prevents him from introducing further evidence; but where the
evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the
shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other; or where the
evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,
the party’s right to introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise,
the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.

In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:

However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of
justice, permit the parties to offer evidence upon their original
case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of
discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed
when x x x; but it may be properly disallowed where it was
withheld deliberately and without justification.

Thus, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to

reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioners 2nd motion to avoid
any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the
Sandiganbayan’s action actually left the petitioners concern in limbo by
considering the petitioners motion redundant. This is tantamount to a refusal to
undertake a positive duty as mandated by the circumstances and is equivalent
to an act outside the contemplation of law.