Lawyer's Oath

I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance

to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
SECOND DIVISION

A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the
bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance)
in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already,
as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex A .......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in

Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B .......- "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in
Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Annex C .......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP
(not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the
bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides
that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a
member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme
Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28,
1981 ( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see
attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is
purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997
referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above his name, address
and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by
Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has
not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which
the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,4 dated June
3, 1998, respondent alleged:5cräläwvirtualibräry

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of
the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is
entitled to practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October
28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was even
promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is
still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and
reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited
practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4
of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he
honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment
by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP
member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any
manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all
past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not
for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but
as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in
all food faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.

Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22,
1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the
IBP ordering respondents suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his
pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three
years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier
that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being
a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."

....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the
practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up
to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the
same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He
likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060"
in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP
chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is
only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does
not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most
severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in
the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94457 June 10, 1992
VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC. and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH
94, respondents.
R E S O L U T I ON

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for specific performance with damages filed by private respondent New
Cathay House, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint was aimed at compelling Victoria Legarda to sign a
lease contract involving her house and lot at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City which New Cathay House, Inc. intended to use in
operating a restaurant.1

As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Victoria Legarda and her agents from
stopping the renovation of the property which was being done by New Cathay House, Inc. After hearing, the lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.

Thereafter, Antonio P. Coronel of the Coronel Law Office at 146 Katipunan Road, White Plains, Quezon City, entered his appearance
as counsel for Victoria Legarda. He also filed an urgent motion for an extension of ten (10) days from February 6, 1985 within which to
file an answer to the complaint. The motion was granted by the court which gave Victoria Legarda until February 20, 1985 to answer the
complaint.

However, Victoria Legarda failed to file her answer within the extended period granted by the court. Hence, upon motion of New Cathay
House, Inc., she was declared in default, thereby paving the way for the presentation of evidence ex parte.

On March 25, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision by default. It ordered Victoria Legarda to execute and sign the lease contract
and to pay the following: (a) exemplary damages of P100,000.00, (b) actual and compensatory damages in the total amount of
P278,764.37 and (c) attorney's fees of P10,000.00.

Atty. Coronel received a copy of the lower court's decision on April 9, 1985 but he did not interpose an appeal therefrom within the
reglementary period. Consequently, the decision became final and, upon motion of New Cathay House, Inc., the lower court issued a
writ of execution. In compliance with the writ, on June 27, 1985, the sheriff levied upon, and sold at public auction, the property subject
of the litigation to New Cathay House, Inc., the highest bidder. The sheriff's certificate of sale was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

The one-year redemption period having expired on July 8, 1986, the sheriff issued a final deed of sale which, on July 11, 1986, was
duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. On November 6, 1986, Victoria Legarda, represented by her attorney-in-fact
Ligaya C. Gomez, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment against her in Civil Case No. Q-43811. She
alleged therein that the decision was obtained through fraud and that it is not supported by the allegations in the pleadings nor by the
evidence submitted.
Forthwith, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from dispossessing petitioner of the
premises in question. Private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. then filed its consolidated comment on the petition with a motion for
the lifting of the temporary restraining order. Victoria Legarda, through Atty. Coronel, filed a reply to the consolidated comment. The
petition was thereafter orally argued. Required by the Court of Appeals to manifest if the parties desired to file their respective
memoranda, Dean Coronel informed the appellate court that he was adopting Victoria Legarda's reply to the consolidated comment as
her memorandum.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on November 29, 1989. On the issue of fraud, for which Victoria Legarda claimed that
Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., who represented New Cathay House, Inc., made her believe through false pretenses that he was agreeable to
the conditions of the lease she had imposed on the lessee and that the latter would withdraw the complaint against her, thereby
prompting her to advise her lawyer not to file an answer to the complaint anymore, the Court of Appeals 2 said:

On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly practiced upon her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is
so improbable as to inspire belief. For the Coronel Law Office had already entered its appearance as petitioner's
counsel by then, so that if it were true that Cabrera had already agreed to the conditions imposed by petitioner, said
law office would have asked plaintiff to file the proper motion to dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court, and if
plaintiff had refused to do so, it would have filed defendant's answer anyway so that she would not be declared in
default. Or said law office would have prepared a compromise agreement embodying the conditions imposed by their
client in the lease contract in question which plaintiffs had allegedly already accepted, so that the same could have
been submitted to the Court and judgment on a compromise could be entered. All these, any conscientious lawyer of
lesser stature than the Coronel Law Office, headed by no less than a former law dean, Dean Antonio Coronel, or
even a new member of the bar, would normally have done under the circumstances to protect the interests of their
client, instead of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its complaint against defendant, as it had allegedly
promised the latter. Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of pure and simple negligence on the part of the
defendant's counsel, who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of defendant. But counsel's negligence does not
stop here. For after it had been furnished with copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should then have
appealed therefrom or file (sic) a petition for relief from the order declaring their client in default or from the judgment
by default. Hence, defendant is bound by the acts of her counsel in this case and cannot be heard to complain that
the result might have been different if it had proceeded differently (Pulido v. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon v. Sevilla, 156
SCRA 257, among other cases). And the rationale of this rule is obvious and clear. For "if such grounds were to be
admitted as reasons for opening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be
employed who could allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or
learned" (Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138). (Emphasis supplied.)

Finding the second ground for the petition to be likewise unmeritorious, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Surprisingly,
however, inspite of the Court of Appeals' tirade on his professional competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file a motion for
reconsideration. Neither did he initiate moves towards an appeal to this Court of the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to his
client.

Thus, the Court of Appeals decision became final. On December 8, 1989, counsel for New Cathay House, Inc. sent petitioner through
the Coronel Law Office, a letter demanding that she vacate the property within three days from receipt thereof. Atty. Coronel did not
inform petitioner of this development until sometime in March, 1990. Due to petitioner's persistent telephone calls, Atty. Coronel's
secretary informed her of the fact that New Cathay House, Inc. had demanded her eviction from the property. Consequently, petitioner
had no recourse but to oblige and vacate the property. 3

On August 7, 1990, Victoria Legarda, represented by a new counsel, 4 filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
contending that the decisions of the courts below "are null and void as petitioner was deprived of her day in court and divested of her
property without due process of law through the gross, pervasive and malicious negligence of previous counsel, Atty. Antonio Coronel.5

In its decision of March 18, 1991, this Court declared as null and void the decisions of March 25, 1985 and November 29, 1989 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Court of Appeals, respectively, as well as the sheriff's certificate of sale dated June 27,
1985 of the property involved and the subsequent final deed of sale covering the same. The Court further directed private respondent
New Cathay House, Inc. to reconvey the property to the petitioner and the Register of Deeds to cancel the registration of said property
in the name of said private respondent and to issue a new one in the name of the petitioner.

The same decision required the former counsel of petitioner, Atty. Antonio Coronel, to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
he should not be held administatively liable for his acts and omissions which resulted in grave injustice to the petitioner. Said counsel
having been inadvertently omitted in the service of copies of said decision, 6 on February 11, 1992, the Clerk of Court of this Division to
which this case was transferred, sent Atty. Coronel a copy thereof which he received on February 12, 1992. 7

On the tenth day from his receipt of said copy, Atty. Coronel filed an urgent ex-parte motion for an extension of thirty (30) days from
February 22, 1992 within which to file his explanation. He alleged as reason for the motion pressure of work "consisting of daily
hearings in several forums and preparations of pleadings in equally urgent cases, such as the more than 80 civil and criminal cases
against the Marcoses. 8
The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992, granted said motion for extension with warning that no further extension will be given. Atty.
Coronel received a copy of said resolution on March 27, 1992 but it appears that on March 24, 1992, 9 a day after the expiration of the
30-day extended period prayed for in his first motion for extension, he had mailed another urgent motion for a second extension of thirty
(30) days within which to submit his explanation on the ground that since March 2, 1992, he had been "treated and confined at the St.
Luke's Hospital." Attached to the motion is a medical certificate stating that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic cardiamyopathy, diabetes
mellitus, congestive heart failure class IV and brain infarction, thrombotic." 10

While off-hand, the reasons cited in the second motion for reconsideration seem to warrant another extension, the fact that it was filed
on day late, coupled with the circumstances of this case do not call for a reconsideration of the resolution of March 9, 1992. Hence, the
second motion for extension must be denied. Lawyers should not presume that their motions for extension of time will always be
granted by the Court. The granting or denial of motions for extension of time is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court with a
view to attaining substantial justice. 11

It should be emphasized that the show-cause resolution was addressed to Atty. Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer of a litigant in
this Court. It was addressed to him in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the disciplinary powers of this Court. That he failed to
immediately heed the directive of the decision of March 18, 1991 to show cause, notwithstanding the grant of a 30-day extension for
him to do so, reflects an unbecoming disrespect towards this Court's orders. We cannot countenance such disrespect. As a lawyer,
Atty. Coronel is expected to recognize the authority of this Court and obey its lawful processes and orders. 12

Hence, the Court considers his failure to show cause, not-withstanding reasonable notice therefor, as a waiver of his rights to be heard
and to due process, thereby warranting an ex parte determination of the matter for which he had been required to explain. 13

The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that
"a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which
requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable."

Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the travails attending the disposition of the case against her not to mention the
devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar. By
neglecting to file the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set off the events which resulted in the deprivation of petitioner's
rights over her house and lot. In this regard, worth quoting is the observation of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco in his ponencia of March
18, 1991:

Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would
extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned
the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent,
said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer.
Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on the motion of private
respondent's counsel. . . .

This is not the only case wherein, in dealing with this Court's orders, Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence, inattention
to his obligations as counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In G.R. No. 97418, "Imelda R. Marcos, et al. v. PCGG, et al., the
Court en banc, in its Resolution of May 28, 1992, imposed upon Atty. Coronel a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) after he was
found guilty of inexcusable negligence in his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions. The Court said:

We find the explanation for his failure to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991
unsatisfactory, Atty. Coronel had obviously taken this Court for granted. Although he received a copy of the 4 June
1991 Resolution on 4 July 1991, he nonchalantly let the 10-day period pass and even deliberately chose to remain
silent about it even after he received a copy of the Resolution of 27 August 1991. It was only on the last day of the
period granted to him under said Resolution that he showed initial efforts to comply with the Resolution by filing a
motion for a 20-day extension from 30 September 1991 to file the Reply. This was a self-imposed period and,
therefore, he was expected to faithfully comply with it not only because of the respect due this Court, but also
because he had put his honor and virtues of candor and good faith on the line. For reasons only known to him, he did
not. Worse despite his receipt on 27 November 1991 of the Resolution of 5 November 1991 which granted his 30
September 1991 motion, Atty. Coronel did not even move for a new period within which to comply with the
Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991. This Court had to issue the Resolution of 30 January 1992 to
compel compliance. When he finally did, he committed, allegedly through inadvertence, the blunder of placing his
Reply under a wrong caption.

For deliberately failing, if not stubbornly refusing, to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991
and meet his self-imposed deadline. Atty. Coronel was both unfair and disrespectful to this Court. Furthermore, he
has unduly delayed the disposition of the pending incidents in this case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of his client
caused the latter material prejudice. 14 It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he
will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause
makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the
latter. 15 Moreover, a lawyer owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey
this Court's order even on a matter that personally affects him, such that one cannot avoid the conclusion that he must be bent on
professional self-destruction. Be that as it may, Atty. Coronel cannot escape this Court's disciplinary action for gross negligence which
resulted in depriving petitioner of her property rights, for, as this Court enunciated in the aforecited Cantiller v. Potenciano case:

Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong
and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the
canons of professional ethics is an imperative.

Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The
profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

WHEREFORE, the second motion for an extension of time to file explanation is hereby DENIED. Atty. Antonio P. Coronel is hereby
found GUILTY of gross negligence in the defense of petitioner Victoria Legarda in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and accordingly
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this resolution. A repetition
of the acts constituting gross negligence shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his personal record, another copy be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
copies thereof be circulated in all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for petitioner.
Arturo A. Alafriz & Associates for and in their own behalf.

REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 08265-
08268 1 affirming the order of Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, in Civil Cases Nos.
19123-28, 19136 and 19144, fixing attorney's fees and directing herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank, for brevity), as defendant in said civil cases, to pay its attorneys, herein private respondent Arturo Alafriz and
Associates, movant therein, the amount of P936,000.00 as attorney's fees on a quantum meruit basis.

The records show that from March, 1974 to September, 1983, private respondent handled the above-mentioned civil
cases before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig (Branches I, II, VI, X, XIII, XIX, XX AND XXIV) in behalf of
petitioner. 2 The civil cases were all for the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages.

The antecedental facts 3 which spawned the filing of said actions are undisputed and are hereinunder set forth as found
by the trial court and adopted substantially in the decision of respondent court.

A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of
about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan
obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. The obligors having defaulted, petitioner
foreclosed the mortgages after which certificates of sale were issued by the provincial sheriff in its favor as purchaser
thereof Subsequently, Alejandro, alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale
of the parcels of land, brought suits against Javier et al., and included petitioner as defendant therein.

It was during the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation,
Service Leasing Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of P600,000.00. On the same day, the properties
were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation for the purported price of P2,500,000.00.
Three months later, or on June 7, 1983, Herby mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro for P9,200,000.00. The
lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.
As a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service Leasing Corporation, petitioner filed an urgent motion
for substitution of party on July 28, 1983. Private respondent, on its part, filed on August 16, 1983 a verified motion to
enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's
fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted
the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the
parcels of land.

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs Alejandro, et al. in the aforesaid civil cases, which had been consolidated and were pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, filed a motion to dismiss their complaints therein, which motion the lower court
granted with prejudice in its order dated September 5, 1983. On December 29, 1983, the same court ordered the Register
of Deeds to annotate the attorney's liens of private respondent on the derivative titles which cancelled Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 453093 to 453099 of the original seven (7) parcels of land hereinbefore adverted to.
On May 28,1984, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion
precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid
private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be
considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15,
1980. It further appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit,
offering a compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
Finally, on October 15,1984, the court a quo issued the order assailed on appeal before respondent court, granting
payment of attorney's fees to private respondent, under the following dispositive portion:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion is hereby granted and the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (METROBANK)
and Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation 4 are hereby ordered to pay the movant Arturo Alafriz and
Associates the amount of P936,000.00 as its proper, just and reasonable attorney's fees in these cases. 5
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the order of the trial court in its decision promulgated on February 11, 1988. A
motion for reconsideration, dated March 3, 1988, was filed by petitioner but the same was denied in a resolution
promulgated on November 19, 1988, hence the present recourse.

The issues raised and submitted for determination in the present petition may be formulated thus: (1) whether or not
private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney's fees; (2) whether or not a
separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien and (3) whether or not private respondent is entitled to
twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that private respondent has no enforceable attorney's charging lien in the civil cases
before the court below because the dismissal of the complaints therein were not, in the words of Section 37, Rule 138,
judgments for the payment of money or executions issued in pursuance of such judgments. 6

We agree with petitioner.

On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party;
and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his
lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires
as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main
action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an
incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which
the fee is to be paid. 7

In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of
their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any monetary award to any
litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This being so, private respondent's supposed
charging lien is, under our rule, without any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to
which it can attach in the same manner as an ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property.

In point is Morente vs. Firmalino, 9 cited by petitioner in support of its position. In that case, movant-appellant attorney
sought the payment of his fees from his client who was the defendant in a complaint for injunction which was dismissed by
the trial court after the approval of an agreement entered into by the litigants. This Court held:
. . . The defendant having suffered no actual damage by virtue of the issuance of a preliminary injunction, it follows that no
sum can be awarded the defendant for damages. It becomes apparent, too, that no amount having been awarded the
defendant, herein appellant's lien could not be enforced. The appellant, could, by appropriate action, collect his fees as
attorney.

Private respondent would nevertheless insist that the lien attaches to the "proceeds of a judgment of whatever
nature," 10 relying on the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. vs. Henares 11 and some American cases holding that
the lien attaches to the judgment recovered by an attorney and the proceeds in whatever form they may be. 12
The contention is without merit just as its reliance is misplaced. It is true that there are some American cases holding that
the lien attaches even to properties in litigation. However, the statutory rules on which they are based and the factual
situations involved therein are neither explained nor may it be said that they are of continuing validity as to be applicable
in this jurisdiction. It cannot be gainsaid that legal concepts of foreign origin undergo a number of variegations or nuances
upon adoption by other jurisdictions, especially those with variant legal systems.
In fact, the same source from which private respondent culled the American cases it cited expressly declares that "in the
absence of a statute or of a special agreement providing otherwise, the general rule is that an attorney has no lien on the
land of his client, notwithstanding such attorney has, with respect to the land in question, successfully prosecuted a suit to
establish the title of his client thereto, recovered title or possession in a suit prosecuted by such client, or defended
successfully such client's right and title against an unjust claim or an unwarranted attack," 13 as is the situation in the case
at bar. This is an inescapable recognition that a contrary rule obtains in other jurisdictions thereby resulting in doctrinal
rulings of converse or modulated import.

To repeat, since in our jurisdiction the applicable rule provides that a charging lien attaches only to judgments for money
and executions in pursuance of such judgment, then it must be taken in haec verba. The language of the law is clear and
unequivocal and, therefore, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, barring any necessity for elaborate
interpretation. 14

Notably, the interpretation, literal as it may appear to be, is not without support in Philippine case law despite the dearth of
cases on all fours with the present case. In Caina et al. vs. Victoriano, et al., 15 the Court had the occasion to rule that "the
lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable
by a writ of execution." In Ampil vs. Juliano-Agrava, et al., 16 the Court once again declared that a charging lien
"presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client . . ." Further, in Director of Lands
vs. Ababa, et al., 17 we held that "(a) charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only
to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real property as in the instant
case."

Even in the Bacolod-Murcia Milling case, which we previously noted as cited by private respondent, there was an express
declaration that "in this jurisdiction, the lien does not attach to the property in litigation."

Indeed, an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his client from the adverse party in any
action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter
of the litigation. 18 More specifically, an attorney merely defeating recovery against his client as a defendant is not entitled
to a lien on the property involved in litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the
client's title to property already in the client's possession. 19

While a client cannot defeat an attorney's right to his charging lien by dismissing the case, terminating the services of his
counsel, waiving his cause or interest in favor of the adverse party or compromising his action, 20 this rule cannot find
application here as the termination of the cases below was not at the instance of private respondent's client but of the
opposing party.

The resolution of the second issue is accordingly subsumed in the preceding discussion which amply demonstrates that
private respondent is not entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien. Nonetheless, it bears mention at this juncture that
an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction
subsists until the lien is settled. 21 There is certainly no valid reason why the trial court cannot pass upon a petition to
determine attorney's fees if the rule against multiplicity of suits is to be activated. 22 These decisional rules, however, apply
only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable under the rules.

On the last issue, the Court refrains from resolving the same so as not to preempt or interfere with the authority and
adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper proceeding which may be brought
by private respondent.

A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main action, has to be
prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim. The persons who are entitled to or who
must pay attorney's fees have the right to be heard upon the question of their propriety or amount. 23 Hence, the obvious
necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.

Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the
elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the
services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. 24 These are aside from the several other
considerations laid down by this Court in a number of decisions as pointed out by respondent court. 25 A determination of
all these factors would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondent can adduce
evidence to establish its right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same.

Nothing in this decision should, however, be misconstrued as imposing an unnecessary burden on private respondent in
collecting the fees to which it may rightfully be entitled. But, as in the exercise of any other right conferred by law, the
proper legal remedy should be availed of and the procedural rules duly observed to forestall and obviate the possibility of
abuse or prejudice, or what may be misunderstood to be such, often to the undeserved discredit of the legal profession.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job
done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from
government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 26
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of
February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such
appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD - 1).

SYNOPSIS

For respondent’s stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since the latter’s
constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines unanimously
adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a resolution recommending the removal of respondent’s name from its Roll of
Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.

Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, questions the all-
encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the
provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense
that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the
IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his
name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of
an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar are valid exercise of the police
power over an important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate; that the requirement to pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measure designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration; that the penalty provisions for non-payment are not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an inherent judicial function by a host
of decided cases; and that the provisions of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and
the IBP By-Laws complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial
A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or
causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall
be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon’s comment: on
March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda
in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent’s pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of
Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was
integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member’s
name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of
the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: chan robles law lib rary

"SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the ‘Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,’ composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule: jgc:c han robles. com.ph

"SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member
of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that
the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to
an administrative body." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably
come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice,
or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative
Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, Et Al.,
Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was.
". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is ‘perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable’ . . ." crala w virtua1aw l ibra ry

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process
by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well
as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline
or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare
to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the
personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested
right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to
his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the State. The Act’s avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and
welfare of the State (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The
public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy (Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some
individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the
explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines, which reads:jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

x x x

"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar . . .",

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to
the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that
this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. chan roble s.com.p h : virt ual law li bra ry

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional
right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee
is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the
1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in
the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow
to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities,
and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: The
power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is
a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice . .
. the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit
in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to
protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be
misused or prostituted. . ."
cralaw virtua 1aw libra ry

The Court’s jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar .
. ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.chan rob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as
he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s
free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar
when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to
Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in
2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s
oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the
rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes
him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the
bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and
other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the
rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss
of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant
to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his
oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order
dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases
of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz,
Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor
on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set
the case for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1,
2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section
34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to
deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No.
00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere
does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730
dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent
or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion
for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said
court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration and his
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner
before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:
I. the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of
injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;

II. THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE
BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III. THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI;

IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED
TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS
WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE
THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may
take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant. The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private
complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved
by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings,
motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a
municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus: 8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied) which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his
Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance
of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions
when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by
the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been
used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that
Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether
or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student
may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of
Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the
injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for
damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s
appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy
country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action,
and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,
Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to
ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct
control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ADM. CASE NO. 5737 : October 25, 2004]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against
his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his
neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City,
presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:

xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:

You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx xxx.

Thereafter, the respondent said:

Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!

To this the complainant remarked:

"Your Honor, I m not xxx xxx."

Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:

Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.

Respondent's imputations were uncalled for and the latter's act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a
lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a
lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent's imputations of complainant's
misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to
appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words "appear ka
ng appear, pumasa ka muna!" were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule,
incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.

Complainant claims that respondent's display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the
performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent
transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding
appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent.

In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from
appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including
him to further complainant's illegal practice of law; complainant's complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein
complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge
was misled when she issued an order stating "[i]n today's hearing both lawyers appeared;" because of which, respondent
stated: "Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this
case is not a lawyer," to which complainant replied: "The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer;" the reason he
informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not
a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: "for the plaintiff your
honor;" he stated "pumasa ka muna" out of indignation because of complainant's temerity in misrepresenting himself as
lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering
that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: "It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540);" in another
malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending before Judge Priscilla
Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself
as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruz's motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise denied, movant not having
satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.

Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge
stated in Tagalog in open court "Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK?" the same was dismissed by the
Honorable Court's Third Division which stated among others: "That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered
more out of frustration and in reaction to complainant's actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a
lawyer but was already lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the
part of the complainant." Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.

The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondent's suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondent's averment that the
utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not
relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial before the said court.

Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the complainant had been the
basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-
2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.

Likewise respondent did not refute complainant's allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not allowed to
practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on
December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others.

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner, substance and tone of
his voice which was not refuted by him "that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" in whatever manner it was uttered
are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar
examination required of them.

Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose relative to
complainant's appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied
with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.

Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as not to offend the
sensitivities of the other party as in this case.

On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation of the
investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit.

Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which states:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by
the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons
on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the
Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
In Teodosio v. Nava,1 the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of the Board of
Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts
of record, thus:

For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the
findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance
that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning. 2

In this case, the Board of Governors' resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not contain any findings of
facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case.
Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be
resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and
speedy disposition of cases.3 This case falls within the exception.

We hold that respondent's outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" does not amount to a violation of Rule
8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant
is not a lawyer to correct the judge's impression of complainant's appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of
January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer.4 Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude
as to warrant respondent's suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the
course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words
said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even
contemptuous language.5

Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A party's right
to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. - - In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

In Maderada v. Mediodea,6 this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:

This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress - - from its
commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.
Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are
not considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself."

The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain,
mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private
practice has been defined by this Court as follows:

x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
[referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a
lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.7

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.8 Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 9

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties as an officer of the court.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Callejo, Sr., TINGA, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the
Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant,
vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law
without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to admit the
practice. In exculpation he gives the following lame explanation:

1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court En
Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar
Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his
Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, ... and also paid his
Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by Official
Receipt No. 83740,... .

2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme Court,
included the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a
Letter of Request dated July 23, 1979, ...

3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn to take my Oath as
a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable
Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to
his Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for which reason
the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *

4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable Supreme
Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;

5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may take upon my Prayer
to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an Annual General
Meeting together with my Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, ... .
 6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's
(Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my name in the Roll
of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, I paid
my membership due and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City
Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise respondent
paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown by Official Receipt No. 058033 and Official Receipt No.
4601685, ... .

7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also included the
name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for the year 1981-
1982, ... .

8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981,
Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with
the Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein
respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;

9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982 membership due
and other assessment for which the undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and
Official Receipt No. 3363, ... .

10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official Receipt No.
3195776, ... .

11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well
as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, ....

Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the
Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer
still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)

The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)

WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days
from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

In re David, Adm Case No. 98, July 13, 1953

1. LAWYERS; SE defines "practice the profession." - Practice as a lawyer is to practice the acts of his profession. To prepare and file
motions requesting the execution of a sentence, the demolition of the homes of the defendants in the case asking the court to order the
sheriff to betray him the amounts charged in the case are acts that fall within the exercise of the profession advocacy; the allegation
and submit memorandum to the Appeals Tribunal do is practice as a lawyer, because an agent can not do it; the charge rents of more
than a hundred defendants to issue receipts and signed as the applicant's counsel is to exercise the profession.

2. Id .; Id .; - The fact that the lawyer had not put in his motion requesting execution acting as a lawyer but as an agent and employee of
the applicant, does not alter the nature of its services are certainly professional services of a lawyer. Hiding acting as a lawyer and was
only pretending agent, their situation worsens; which is more guilty, covered with a mask, he shot his enemy who makes a pool and a
view of the public face.

3. ID .; ATTORNEY SUSPENDED exercising the profession. - The suspended lawyer practicing the profession during the period of
suspension will be completely disabled for such a profession in the Philippines with the consequent cancellation of the certificate issued
in their favor as such attorney.

DECISION
PABLO, M. :

In the administrative case No. 35 respondent was suspended for misfeasance in the exercise of his profession for a period of five years
from the 9 November 1949. The appeal supports this suspension in its report 17 March 1951; however, continued to exercise the
profession within the period of the suspension, November 9th 1949 and November 8, 1954.

On February 28, 1950 the Respondent submitted a claim (Exhibit J) in R. G. CA No. 4792-R cause, Tan Tek v Sy. Maliwanag not as
counsel for Sy Tan Tek, but with the following words: "for and in Behalf of Tan Tek Sy"; on 26 January 1951 sent it by certified mail
notification of the decision in that case (Exhibit G), confirming the decision of the Court of First Instance; on March 13, 1951 filed a
motion in this court - and returned the file - requesting the issuance of a warrant of execution, which motion is signed as follows:
"TAN TEK SI

"By (Sgd.) FELIX P. DAVID,

"c/o Atty. Felix P. David,

"Corner Dagupan and Azcarraga St.,

"Filipinas Saw Mill & Construction,

"Manila"

The present appeal therefore written not as they do practicing lawyers, but as an agent Sy Tan Tek. In the civil case No. 3658 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, the Respondent filed a brief on September 25, 1950,
requesting an order to demolish the homes of the respondents (Exhibit TO); on October 10, 1950 I filed a motion asking the Sheriff of
Manila was authorized to pay "the amount or other amount Such as May be Collected by the Sheriff from time to time" (Exhibit B); on
November 13, 1950 I present another motion (Exhibit C) asking another demolition order, signing three letters, Exhibits A, B and C, as
counsel for the applicant; the exhibits B to B-34 show that was receiving payments amounts of several defendants as counsel for the
applicant; the oldest receipt is dated 12 February 1950 and last December 7, 1950. In defense resorted says appeared as counsel for
Tan Tek Sy from the Municipal Court of Manila in 1948; which, being suspended, he had advised his client to seek other counsel to
prepare the brief to be submitted to the Court of Appeal; when there were only two or three days and his client could not submit, he
himself wrote and presented at the request of his client; the allegation that arrangement with the intention of his client to sign it, but as
this was in Dagupan and could not sign and there was more than one day, then I sign it as follows: "Felix P. David, for and in Behalf of
the appellee. " On September 25, 1950 I present to the Court of Appeal a memorandum in reply to the appellant, signed as this
allegation.

"In order - says the appeal - to show That I Did not Have the intention to disregard the suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not With
the knowledge of even Identified Sy Tan Tek myself as the attorney for the appellee but in good faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the
appellee without designating That I am practicing as attorney-at-law. "cralaw virtua1aw library

We do not think this justified the performance of the resorted to submit the claim and its memorandum on behalf of his client being
suspended in the exercise of their profession; knowing I was suspended, I ought to have presented either as an agent or a lawyer; I
was in no obligation to continue to serve his client before the Court of Appeal; I must have noticed that your client was suspended in the
exercise of his profession as a lawyer and was to advise him to employ another in his place if he wanted to be represented; ought not
contravene the express order of this Court; He must know that he who is not a practicing lawyer can not appear for trial before a court
except before a justice of the peace. When presenting its case and its memorandum with the words "For and in Behalf of the Appellee"
violated Article 31 of Rule 127 which states that "In other courts, a party can run their own dispute personally or with the help of a
lawyer, and his appearance must be made in person or by a member of the Forum duly authorized. " An agent or an attorney or a
member of the Forum suspended may not appear for trial.

To explain the presentation of motions in case No. 3655, Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, the appeal says I act in good faith,
that I present not to disobey the decision of this Court but to collect their fees. As an officer of the Forum, the lawyer must comply with
the judgment of the Court above all other considerations. We think not acting in good faith when, putting his interest in collecting their
fees, engaged in the profession knowing that he was forbidden to exercise it. But he had not submitted their motions exhibits A, B and
C and issued receipts B to B-34 amounts recovered from the defendants, the Respondent could collect their fees directly from their
already demanding client, and claiming them in accordance with Article 33 Rule 127.

The appeal says that if appeared on March 2, 1950 in case No. 7679 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Juan de la Torre against
Philippine Trust Co., was by request of his brother Juan de la Torre and also the I do not charge fees for his appearance because he
knew he was suspended from the exercise of the profession. Although not taken into account this hearing, the Respondent can not
save for having provided various professional services and reported.
Practice as a lawyer is to practice the acts of his profession. To prepare and file motions requesting the execution of the judgment, the
demolition of the houses of the defendants, asking the court to order the Sheriff to betray him the amounts collected are acts that fall
within the exercise of the legal profession; the allegation and submit memorandum to the Court of Appeal is to exercise the legal
profession, because an agent can not do it; the charge rents of the 109 defendants issuing 35 receipts and signed as lawyer for the
plaintiff, is to exercise the profession.

The fact that he had not put in his motion for order execution in Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, who acted as a lawyer but as
an agent and employee of the Philippines Sawmill and Construction, does not alter the nature of its services they are certainly
professional services of a lawyer; but hiding who acted as counsel for Tan Tek Sy and pretending that it was only an agent, their
situation worsens: it is more guilty that covered with a mask, shot his enemy who does open face and in view the public; Hence the
criminal law imposes more severe sentence in the first case.

The evidence of record shows that respondent Felix P. David practiced law attorney intentionally disobeying the decision of the Court of
September 30, 1949 , Administrative Case No. 35 . Therefore , he is ineligible to practice as a lawyer in the Philippines , it is declared
canceled the certificate issued in their favor to practice and directed to return it to the Clerk of this Court.

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. L-10236-48. January 31, 1958.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for Appellant.

Luis F. Gabinete for appellee Eustacio de Luna.

Pedro B. Ayuda for appellee Estela R. Gordo.

Alejandro P. CapÃtulo for appellees Angelo T. Lopez and Alawadin I. Bandon.

Francisco de la Fuente for appellee Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.

Bienvenido Peralta for appellee Abraham C. Calaguas.

Santos L. Parina, Generosa H. Hubilla, Maria Velez y Estrellas, Jaime P. Marco, Roque J. Briones, Balbino P.
Fajardo and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr., in their own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1. BAR FLUNKERS; OATH AS LAWYERS BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT OF COURT. — Although know
that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they sought admission to the Bar under the Bar Flunkers Act, they were
subsequently notified of the resolution of the Supreme Court denying their petitions. This notwithstanding, they took their
oaths as lawyers before a notary public and formally advised the Court, not only of such fact, but, also that they will practice
in all courts of the Philippines. Held: The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may taken only before the
Supreme Court by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice. The resolution of the Supreme Court denying
appellees’ petition for admission to the Bar implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said oath, as well as prohibition
of the taking thereof. By taking oaths before a notary public, appellees expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact,
challenge and defy the authority of the Supreme Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue
whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice
and impair the respect due to the courts of justice and the Supreme Court, in particular, in violation of section 3, subdivision
(b) of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such acts, therefore, constitute contempt of court.

2. CONTEMPT OF COURT; MEANS BY WHICH CONTEMPT MAY BE COMMITTED: "HOLDING OUT TO THE PUBLIC AS
ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW" ; CASE AT BAR. — The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be
guilty of contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by
means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for "assuming to be an attorney . . . and acting as such without authority," is,
only one of the means by which contempt of court may be contempt of court may be committed, under said Rule 64, section
3, of the Rules of Court. Besides by taking "the oath of office 3, of the Rules of Court. Besides by taking "the oath of office as
attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the
Philippines that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had, for all intents
and purposes, held out to the public" as such attorney-at-law (U.S. v. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146).

3. id.; id.; jurisdiction OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO TRY AND PUNISH THE CONTEMPTS AT BAR. — If the
contemptuous acts were committed not against the Court of First Instance where the amended informations for contempts
were filed, but against the Supreme Court, does the former court have jurisdiction to try and punish said contempts? In the
first place, according to said information, the act charged were committed in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as of all
other courts of the Philippines, including the Court of First Instance of Manila. In the second place, pursuant to Section 44 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, courts instance have original jurisdiction over criminal cases, in which the penalty provided by law
is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two thousand pesos. Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding
P1,000 may be imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, it follows that the same is within the original
jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of
contempt against the same.

4. ID.; ID.; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF LOWER COURT AND SUPREME COURT; COURT AGAINST WHOM THE ACT WAS
COMMITTED HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHT. — In the vent of concurrent jurisdiction over the cases of contempt of court, the
court against whom the act of contempt was committed has the preferential right to try and punish the guilty party.
However, the court concerned (the Supreme Court in the present case) may elect not to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction
over the acts of contempt in question, as it did in the present case, when the said court referred the case to the City Fiscal of
Manila for investigation and appropriate action. In such a case the Court of First Instance of Manila may not refuse to
exercise its jurisdiction over the case.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting a motion to
dismiss filed by the defendant in each one of the above entitled cases, for lack of jurisdiction and, also, upon the ground that
the facts alleged in the amended informations, filed in said cases, do not constitute the crime of contempt of court with which
said defendants (Eustacio de Luna, Jaime P. Marco, Santos L. Pariña, Estela R. Gordo, Angelo T. Lopez, Generosa H.
Hubilla, Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez, Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J. Briones, Alawadin I. Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo, Maria
Velez y Estrellas and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.) are charged. It is alleged in said amended informations that, on or about the
22nd day of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each one of these cases

". . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a
lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the
candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were
refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, the Supreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and contemptuously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the
Supreme Court directed to him and each and everyone of the petitioners, and perform acts constituting improper conduct
and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of
the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all
other inferior courts by then and there, without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer before a notary
public and making manifestations to that effect before the Honorable, the Supreme Court." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

After quoting from Rule 64, section 4, of the Rules of Court, the pertinent part of which reads: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph

"Where the contempt . . . has been committed against a superior court or judge, or against an officer appointed by it, the
charge may be filed with such superior court . . . ." (Italics our.)

and from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the rule to the effect that

"It is a well-established rule that the power to judge a contempt rest exlusively with the court contemned and that no court
is authorized to punish a contempt against another. Accordingly, disobedience of the order of a state court is not punishable
as for contempt by a court of another state or by a federal court." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

the lower court concluded that the contemptuous act allegedly committed by appellees herein "was committed not against"
said court "but against the Supreme Court of the Philippines" and that, accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Manila "has
no jurisdiction to try and punish" the appellees herein.

This conclusion is untenable. The above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court is permissive in nature. It is merely
declaratory of the inherent power of courts to punish those guilty of contempt against the same. It does not declare that
jurisdiction of the court concerned to so punish the guilty party is exclusive. Indeed, in promulgating said Rules of Court, this
Court could not have validly denied to other Courts, to which the jurisdiction may have been vested by statute, the right to
exercise said authority, for the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, under Article VIII, section 13, of the Constitution, is
limited to the promulgation of "rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law," and does not extend to the determination of the jurisdiction of the courts of justice in the Philippines. In
fact, section 2 of said Article VIII of the Constitution explicitly ordains that "Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," thereby implying, necessarily, that such power is withheld
from the Supreme Court. Needless to say, the aforesaid view, quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum, is good law only "unless
otherwise provided by statute" (17 C.J.S., 81), and such statute, providing "otherwise", exists in the Philippines.

Moreover, the amended informations specifically allege that the defendants herein did "perform acts constituting improper
conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all
courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court
and all other inferior courts." To put it differently the acts charged were committed, according to said amended informations,
in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as of "all other courts of the Philippines," including the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Thus, the very authorities cited in the order appealed from do not justify the same.

Again, section 236 of Act No. 190 and section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provide that a person guilty of any of the
acts of contempt defined, respectively, in section 232 of said Act and section 3 of said Rule 64, "may be fined not exceeding
one thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than six months." Pursuant to section 44 of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948
(Republic Act No. 296), courts of first instance have original jurisdiction over criminal cases "in which the penalty provided by
law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two thousand pesos." Inasmuch as a fine not
exceeding P1,000 may be imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, it follows that the same are within the
original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, although such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme
Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of contempt against the same.

It may not be amiss to add that, in the event of such concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court, it would be a
good practice to acknowledge the preferential right of the court against which the act of contempt was committed to try and
punish the guilty party. However, insofar as appellees herein are concerned, on February 3, 1955, this Court passed and
promulgated a resolution of the following tenor: jg c:chan roble s.com.p h

"The Court received from Pedro B. Ayuda a communication of the following tenor: cha nrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT

MANILA

"IN-RE ATTORNEYS WHO TOOK THE OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT No. 972.

"Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez

"Pedro B. Ayuda

"Alawadin I. Bandon

"Abraham C. Calaguas

"Balbino P. Fajardo

"Claro C. Gofredo

"Estela R. Gordo

"Generoso H. Hubilla

"Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.

"Angelo T. Lopez

"Eustacio de Luna

"Jaime P. Marco

"Santos L. Pariña

"Florencio P. Sugarol, and

"Maria Velez y Estrellas. Attorneys.

x x x

"MANIFESTATION

"COMES NOW the undersigned for and in representation of the above-named attorneys and to this Honorable Court, hereby
respectfully makes manifestation that they have taken the oath of office as Attorneys-at-Law on December 22, 1954 before
Mr. Anatolio A. Alcova, a Notary Public in and for the City of Manila, with office at R-201 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila, in
pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. 972;

"There are attached to this manifestation seventeen (17) copies of the oath of office as Annexes ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’,
‘H’, ‘I’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’, ‘N’, ‘O’, ‘P’, and ‘Q’.

"Messrs, Alejandro P. Capitulo, Claro C. Gofredo, and Florencio P. Sugarol of the group took the bar examinations in August,
1954. They also had taken their oath before this Honorable Tribunal, January 20, 1955.

"This manifestation is made for all legal effects as they will practice law in all the Courts of the Philippines.

"Manila, Philippines, January 28, 1955.

(Sgd.) PEDRO B. AYUDA

In his own behalf and on behalf of the others in his capacity as president of the 1946 - 1952 BAR EXAMINEES ASSOCIATION,
2034 Azcarraga, Manila.

"It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, have not passed the Bar Examinations, it
was resolved: jgc:cha nrob les.co m.ph

"A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriate action in connection with Section 3 (e),
Rule 64;

"B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10 days from notice hereof, within which to
explain why he should not be dealt with for contempt of this Court;

"C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegally administered the oath to the said persons in
disregard of this Court’s resolution denying them admission to the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby
given ten days to show cause why he should not be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law;

"D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court of Appeals and to all courts of first instance,
the Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Department of Justice;

"E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in their respective cases." (pp. 36-37, rec., G. R.
No. L- 10245.)

It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of
alleged contempt committed by appellees herein and that we preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the City
Fiscal of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no justification whatsoever in refusing to
exercise its jurisdiction over the cases at bar.

The next question for determination is whether the acts charged in the amended informations constitute contempt of court.
After quoting the allegation of said amended informations to the effect that the defendant in each one of the instant cases

". . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contamptuously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said
Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him, and each and everyone of the petitioners and perform acts constituting
improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly and indirectly to impede obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice . . ."
cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

the lower court had the following to say: jgc:chanro bles.c om.ph

"From this allegation, there is no hint whatsoever that any command, order or notification from the judicial court or any non-
judicial person, committee or body clothed by law with power to punish for contempt has been disobeyed or violated by the
herein accused. Moreover, there is nothing shown in the resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court of March 18, 1974
directing the accused not to take their oath as lawyers. The mere fact of taking an oath by any person as a lawyer does not
make him automatically a lawyer without having completed the requirements prescribed by the Supreme Court for the
admission to the practice of law. It is necessary before his admission to the Bar that he passes the required bar examinations
and is admitted by the Supreme Court to practice law as attorney. Our statutes punish as criminal contempt one ‘assuming
to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority.’ (par. F. Rule 64, Rules of Court.) The mere
taking of oath as lawyers by herein accused, in the humble opinion of this Court, is not tantamount to practice law. However,
if this had taken one step further, as for example, after taking their oaths, they have held out themselves as lawyers to the
public, received cases for litigants, appeared before any court of justice personally or by filing pleadings therewith, would be
considered that they are really engaged in the practice of law. These accused have not committed any of these acts as
enunciated by our Supreme Tribunal in the case of Bosque and Ney, 8 Phil., 146, nor have they disobeyed or defied any
command, order or notification of this Court or of the Honorable Supreme Court. What they have done only was the taking of
their oath as lawyers before a notary public who was not authorized by law to take their oath as lawyers, as the latter can
only aware as such before the Supreme Court or any member thereof.

"Pursuant to the above stated reasons, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that no criminal contempt has been
committed by the herein accused before this Court and neither before the highest Tribunal of this land." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The aforementioned quotation from the amended informations is, however, incomplete. It did not include the allegation to
the effect that the defendant in each one of the cases at bar took his "oath as a lawyer before a notary public" and filed the
manifestation transcribed in the resolution above quoted,

"well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer
and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers
Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates
including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were refused and
denied by the resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court, on March 18, 1954, . . . ." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

In other words, appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they, likewise, sought admission to the
Bar under the provisions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, they were subsequently notified of
the resolution of this Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and
may be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution
denying the aforementioned petition of appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said oath, as well
as a prohibition of or injunction against the taking thereof. When, this notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a
notary public, and formally advised this Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they will practice in all the courts of the
Philippines," they, accordingly, disobeyed the order implied, and resisted the injunction implicit, in said resolution, thus
violating section 232 of Act No. 190, which declares in part: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for contempt: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

"1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by
a court or judge."cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

and section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, which is identical.

This case is, in principle, analogous to that of U.S. v. Ney and Bosque (8 Phil., 146), which involved two lawyers, an
American, C.W. Ney, and a Spaniard, Juan Garcia Bosque, who sent out a circular, signed "Ney and Bosque", stating that
they had established an office for the general practice of law in all courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote
himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish Law. Accused of contempt of court, both were convicted
as charged, although upon different grounds. As regards the Spaniard, it was held that a former order of this Court denying
his admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, on account of alienage, "was directly binding upon him;" that the
aforementioned circular "amounted to an assertation of his right and purpose" to engage in such practice of law; and that
"consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he
was a party." As regards Ney, he was found guilty of "misbehaviour" committed by "an officer of the court." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in the amended informations, appellees herein expressed clearly their
intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and defy the authority of this Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive
manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the
administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular.
Thus, they performed acts constituting an "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice," in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64.

". . . Acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its
authority constitute contempt of court.." . . . (12 Am. Jur. 395.)

The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court unless they
actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate,
for "assuming to be an attorney . . . and acting as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of
court may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking "the oath of office as
attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the
Philippines", the appellees had, for all intents and purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorneys-at-law (U.S. v. Ney
and Bosque, supra).

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, and let the records of these cases be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,
concur.

Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749

FACTS:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. In a letter-
complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that Atty.
Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only
indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as
Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He
also had criminal case involving estafa but was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals.

On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice of law and under RA 7432, as a
senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption, is the payment of membership dues

In the numerous violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a
more temperate application of the law.

CANON 7: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated
bar.

CANON 10: A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for being a
senior citizen.

Or

Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.

Even if he had “limited” practice of law, it does not relieve him of the duties such as payment of IBP dues.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.

Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal
of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of
law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not include exemption from payment of membership or association dues.
 In addition, by indicating “IBP Rizal 259060” in his pleadings and thereby misprepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01
which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice. Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

Legarda v CA

FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements located at 123 West Avenue,
Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner for specific
performance with preliminary injunction and damages in RTC alleging that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with
the private respondent through its representative, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of petitioner.
Respondent drew up the written contract and sent it to petitioner, that petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign
the same despite demands of respondent.
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance with an urgent motion
for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from February 26, 1985. However, said counsel failed to file
the answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare
petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to
present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision.

Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set aside or to appeal
therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. The property of petitioner was sold at public auction to
satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent. The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of
private respondent, and a certificate of sale was issued in his favor. The redemption period expired after one year so a
final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the same to
private respondent.

During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great shock, what happened to
her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such
appropriate action possible under the circumstances.

As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the Court of Appeals. But
that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said
counsel did not inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for
review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner
that she learned from the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.

HELD: A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client
except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of his
client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not
be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public. 12

Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his utmost learning
and ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only a case of simple negligence as found by the appellate court,
but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that his client was deprived of her property without due process of law.

The Court finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and inexcusable. This was compounded
by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel another chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a
petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that
after he received a copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court, he did not do anything to save the situation or
inform his client of the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and gross
negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.
Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged lease agreement of the property of petitioner, private
respondent went to court, and that because of the gross negligence of the counsel for the petitioner, she lost the case as
well as the title and ownership of the property, which is worth millions. The mere lessee then now became the owner of
the property. Its true owner then, the petitioner, now is consigned to penury all because her lawyer appear to have
abandoned her case not once but repeatedly.

FACTS:
Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari after the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner should pay the
certain amountbased on the charging lien on the civil case filed against them which resulted to dismissal. In the dismissed
case, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney’s fees, based on quantum meruit, which precipitated an
exchange of arguments between the parties. Petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent, Arturo Alafriz
and Associates. Private respondent countered and attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid
suit, but the negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUES:
Whether or not: (1) respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney’s fees; (2) a
separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien, and (3) private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%)
percent of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD:
(1) NO. (2) YES. (3) Ruling subject to separate trial.
RATIO:
[A] charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a
judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of
his client
The persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney’s fees have the right to be heard upon the question of their
propriety or amount. Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
[I]n fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the
determination of elements to be considered would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (petitioner)

vs.
The Honorable Court of Appeals and Arturo Alafriz and Associates (respondents)

FACTS:

A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area
of about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan
obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. During the pendency of these suits that these
parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation and on the same day, the
properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation. Three months later, mortgaged the
same properties with Banco de Oro wherein the lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these
transfers and transactions.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of party as a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to
Service Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed a verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid
civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%)
of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed
to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds
of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land.

Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an
exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private
respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full
payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears
that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise
amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
ISSUES:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney's
fee.
Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien.

Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market values of the
litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD:

NO. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: He shall also have a lien to the same extent
upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured
in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be
entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written
notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements. Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's
fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in
the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition
as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from
which the fee is to be paid. The civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill
satisfaction of their claims."

NOT NECESSARY. At this juncture an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court
trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. Court trying main case will determine attorney’s
fees.

Canon 20 – Attorney’s Fees

“A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.”

Rules of Court: Rule 138, Sections 24 and 32

Section 24 – Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees
“An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his clients no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view
to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable and unreasonable.”

Section 32 – Compensation for attorneys de oficio

“Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de
oficio to be compensated in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with Section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is
allowed, it shall not be less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light
felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses;
(4) Five hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.”

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondent.

PONENTE: REGALADO, J.:

NATURE: Review on certiorari – annul the decision of Court of Appeals ordering Metrobank to pay Arturo Alafriz and Associates
P936,000.00 as attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit.
PROCEDURAL FACTS:
 Arturo A. Alafriz and Associates (AAA) handled the civil cases of Metrobank from March 1974 to September 1983.
o All the cases were declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages.
ANTECEDENT FACTS:
 Celedonio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about 10 hectares.
o Properties were mortgaged by Javier with Metrobank to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or
International Hotel Corporation.
o Javier defaulted. Metrobank foreclosed the properties.
o Alejandro, on the other hand, alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale of the
parcels of land, brought suits against Javier et al., and included Metrobank as defendant therein.
o AAA’s services were already acquired here.
 While the case was pending, Metrobank sold the properties to its sister company, Service Leasing Corporation on March 23, 1983
for the purported price of P600,000.00. SLC, on the other hand, sold the property to another company and the cycle went on.
o Metrobank, no longer the possessor of the properties, moved for substitution of party on July 28, 1983.
o AAA had no knowledge about this. AAA only knew when Metrobank filed its motion. Thus, they filed on August 16, 1983 a
verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated
properties as its attorney's fees.
o This was granted by the TC because of Metrobank’s failure to appear.
o The Alejandro case was subsequently dismissed as well.
 On May 28,1984, AAA filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange
of arguments between the parties. (dismissal of the Alejandro case, etc.)
o Metrobank: paid in full.
o AAA: P50,000.00 given by Metrobank could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance
o Negotiations up to P600,000.00 were even made to evade court litigation but to no avail.
 CA: Affirmed RTC (sub bullet 3, bullet 2 of AF)

ISSUE: Whether or not the legal fees charged by AAA are reasonable.

HELD: NO.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
 On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party;
and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his
lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires
as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main
action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an
incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which
the fee is to be paid. .

 In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of
their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant,
much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This being so, private respondent's supposed charging lien is,
under our rule, without any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in
the same manner as an ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property.

RULING: CA Ruling is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

NOTES: Quantum meruit means as much as the lawyer deserves or such amount which his services merit.
It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the
services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task is expecting to be paid
compensation therefor. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on equitable postulate that it is
unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. (Agpalo, R. (2010). LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS. QC: Rex Printing
Company, Inc.)

(In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency) Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION, petitioner
Reinstatement of a Disbarred Member of the Bar

FACTS:

Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, the vote being unanimous with the late. On November 29,
1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the
IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. From the time the decision was rendered, there were various pleadings
filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978.

RULE:

Effect of non-payment of dues: Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Marcial A. Edillon shall be disbar and strick out his name in the
Roll of Attorneys due to his stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues.
Whether or not refusal to pay his IBP member dues invade his constitutional rights.

HELD:

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon. On the petition of Mr. Marcial Edillon for reinstatement to the
Roll of Attorneys, appearing that he had fully paid his delinquent membership fees due the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
submitted to the IBP Board of Governors a verified application for reinstatement together with an undertaking to abide by all By-laws
and resolutions by said Board in the event of reinstatement, the Court Resolved to grant the petition of Mr. Marcial A. Edillon to be
reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar. He was allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after payment
of the required fees.

FACTS:

Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

He, stubbornly, refused to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging that the provision containing the
obligation to pay membership dues constitutes an invasion of his constitutional right in a sense that he is being compelled, as a
precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property granted to him by the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the provisions enclosing the membership dues are constitutional.
Yes. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Moreover, it is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the objectives and purposes of integration. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognized, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary.

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On
November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors recommended to the
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice.

Court required the respondent to comment on the IBP’s resolution. The core of the respondent's arguments is
that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled,
as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.”

Issue:
Whether or not the Court has the power to compel a lawyer to be member of IBP ?
WON the Court ruling requiring payment of a membership fee is void?

Decision: Provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon be disbarred and his
name struck from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program – the lawyers.
1973 Constitution explicitly granted to the Court the power to “Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice … and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar … (Article X, Sec. 5(5)
the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.

Under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate
its existence, the respondent’s right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

Matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities.

Issues:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues?

Held:
It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Ratio Decidendi:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer
is a ready a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program -
the lawyers. Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong.
It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the objectives and purposes of integration. Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under
the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may
be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. It is sufficient to state then that the
matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision
have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities
holding such are legion. Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it
explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of
the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s
free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
practice.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship

Ruling:

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss
of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.

CRUZ VS MINA
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father, Mariano
Cruz, is the complaining witness.
 The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases
of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz,
Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor
on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set
the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant

Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.

Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

CRUZ VS CABRERA
SECOND DIVISION[ A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT.

Facts:
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against
his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his
neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City,
presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.

Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is
a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a
lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s
misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to
appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear ka
ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule,
incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling:
1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna” does not amount to a violation of
Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such
magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the
moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an
 account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the
court to condone even contemptuous language.

2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A party’s
right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for
gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others.

Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:

x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of
the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a
lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of
his duties as an officer of the court.

A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983

ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc.,
complainant
Vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent

FACTS:

Mr. Elmo S. Abad was charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers
Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar. Mr. Elmo S.
Abad could not deny and had to admit the practice.

On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc dated July 10,
1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar Admission Fee in the amount of
P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by
Official Receipt No. 8128793, ... and also paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as shown by Official Receipt No. 83740,... .

2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme Court, included the
respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of Request dated July
23, 1979, ...

3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn to take my Oath as a member of the
Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there,
Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply
of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer
the Reply and for which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *

4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable Supreme Court
determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;

5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may take upon my Prayer to determine my
fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter
dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an Annual General Meeting together with my Statement of Account for
the year 1980-1981, ... .

6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased)
Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my name in the Roll of Attorneys with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, I paid my membership due and other
assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and
Official Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown by Official Receipt No.
058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, ... .

7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also included the name of the
respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for the year 1981-1982, ... .

8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981, Complainant Jorge Uy in
SBC607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the Honorable Supreme Court on April
27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of
the Bar;

9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982 membership due and other
assessment for which the undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official Receipt No. 3363, ... .

10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official Receipt No. 3195776, ... .

11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as a Certificate of
Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, ....

Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and
the right to practice law.
He should fulfill the two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)

ISSUES:
WON respondent constituted contempt of court.
HELD:

Yes. The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of
Court.)

Mr. Elmo S. Abad is fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to the Court within ten (10) days from notice,
failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment. The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes
contempt of court.

In re: David 93 Phil 461

Facts:
Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer for a period of five years from
the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in `his written report filed on March 17, 1951, yet he continued
to exercise the profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954.

On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as an agent. (For and in behalf
of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently Atty Felix David filed a motion for execution. In another civil
case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc vs Tolentino, defendant filed a brief for an order to demolish homes.
“In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the suspension of the Supreme Court, I
did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even myself as the attorney for the Appelles But In Good Faith, I
signed for and in Behalf of the appellee Without Designating That I am Practicing as attorney-at-law.”

ISSUE:
Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.

HELD:
Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm name under the signature of
another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-qualified senator or congressman,
the office of an attorney being originally an agency, and because he will, by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial
or administrative body in violation of the constitutional restriction. “He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits
directly.”

The evidence of record shows that respondent Felix P. David practiced law attorney intentionally disobeying the decision of the Court of
September 30, 1949 , Administrative Case No. 35 . Therefore , he is ineligible to practice as a lawyer in the Philippines , it is declared
canceled the certificate issued in their favor to practice and directed to return it to the Clerk of this Court.

In the case of In Re David, 93 Phil 461 (1954), the act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the
practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristics of the legal profession. As such, neither can he allow his
name to appear in such pleading by itself or as a part of a firms name under the signature of another qualified lawyer as
he is under suspension from the practice of law. Thus, he cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly.