SECTION 4
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
• The instrument and the guaranty and the bright consummate
flower of liberty. (Wendell Philips)
• Other rights in addition to freedom of speech are:
1. Freedom of the press
2. Freedom of assembly
3. Freedom of religion
4. The right of association
5. The right to access to information on matters of public con-
cern
6. The right not to be detained solely by reason of one’s politi-
cal beliefs and aspirations
• Freedom of expression is available only insofar as it is exercised
for the discussion of matters affecting public interest. Purely pri-
vate matters do not come within the guaranty. Only matters that
touch the heart of the existing order.
Importance
• This is the first right that is always curtailed when a free society
falls under a repressive regime. Our Constitution provides that
“sovereignty resides in the people” who manifest it regularly
through their suffrages and, more frequently and generally, by
the assertion of their freedom of expression.
• As an individual particle of sovereignty every citizen has a right
to offer his views and suggestions in the discussion of the com-
mon problems of the community or the nation.
Modes of Expression
• Freedom of expression is usually exercised through language,
oral and written.
Elements
1. Freedom from previous restraint or censorship
• Censorship conditions the exercise of freedom of expression
upon the prior approval of the government. Only those ideas
acceptable to it are allowed to be disseminated; all others
are restricted and suppressed.
2. Freedom from punishment
• Freedom of speech includes freedom after speech. Without
this assurance, the citizen would hesitate to speak for fear
he might be provoking the vengeance of the officials he criti-
cized. In a free society, the individual is not supposed to
speak in timorous whispers or with bated breath but with the
clear voice of the unafraid.
• Freedom of expression is not absolute. Like all rights, it is
subject to the police power and may be properly regulated in
the interest of the public. Thus the lewd word, the obscene
word, the seditious word, the slanderous word, cannot be
considered “a step to truth” and therefore will not enjoy im-
munity from prohibition and punishment.
To determine the liability of the individual for ideas expressed by
him, three major criteria have been applied to wit:
a. Clear and present danger rule
• Whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such nature as to create a clear and present dan-
ger that they will bring about substantive evils that the State
has a right to prevent.
• The rule is that the danger created must not only be clear
and present but also traceable to the ideas expressed. The
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high before utterance can be pun-
ished.
• Clear- seems to point to causal connection with the danger
of substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned.
• Present – refers to the time element
• Case: Reyes v. Bagatsing
b. The dangerous tendency doctrine
• Case: Bayan Muna v. Ermita
• If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the
State has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.
It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of
force or violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is suffi-
cient that such acts be advocated in general terms. It is suf-
ficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the ut-
terance be to bring about the substantive evil which the leg-
islative body seeks to prevent.
• Under this test, a person could be punished for his ideas
even if they only tended to create the evil sought to be pre-
vented. It was not necessary to actually create the evil; a
mere tendency toward evil was enough.
Justice Holmes
The expression of an opinion and incitement in narrower sense is the
speaker’s enthusiasm for result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But
whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us, it had
no chance of starting a present conflagration.
3. The balance of interest test
• When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public
order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional,
partial abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to de-
termine which of the two conflicting interests demands
greater protection under circumstances presented.
• This test has not found favor with many libertarians. The flaw
in this method, according to Justice Black, is that in effect al-
lows the court to decide that this freedom may not be en-
forced unless they believe it is reasonable to do so.
• Case: Social Weather COMELEC
Obrien’ test
Government regulation is sufficiently justified
1. Within the constitutional power of the government
2. It furthers an important or substantial government interest
3. If the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of
the freedom of expression
4. If the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment of
freedom of speech, expression and press is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of the interest.
Criticism of official conduct
• Case: U.S. v. Bustos
1
The official acts, and now even the private life, of a public servant are
legitimate subjects of public comment. The people have a right to scru-
tinize and commend or condemn the conduct of their chosen repre-
sentatives in the government. And as long as their comments are
made in good faith and with justifiable ends, they are insulated from
prosecution or damage suits for defamation even if such views are
found to be inaccurate or erroneous.
Private individual may still be subject of public comment even if he is
not a public official or at least a public figure, as long as he is involved
in a public issue.
• Case: Borjal v. Court of Appeals, Ayer Productions Pty.Ltd.
v. Judge Capulong
The rule in the Philippines proscribes public comment on pending liti-
gation, on the ground that it would interfere with the administration of
justice.
• Case: People v. Alarcon Art and Obscenity Miller v. Califor-
nia Tests of obscenity
1. Whether the average person, applying contemporary standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest.
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in patently or offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law.
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
In Pita v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court adopted the test of
obscenity laid down in the case of People v. Kottinger
1. Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to de-
prave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such im-
moral influences and into whose hands a publication or order
article charged as being obscene may fall.
2. Which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an inde-
cency.
Freedom of assembly and petition
• The right of assembly is important to freedom of expression
because public issues are better resolved after an exchange
of views among citizens meeting with each other for the pur-
pose.
• The public meeting is an effective forum for the ventilation of
ideas affecting the common welfare.
• Case: Primicias v. Fugoso
Tests
1. The purpose for which it is held, regardless of the auspices under
which it is organized (auspices test)
2. If the organizers of the meeting be unquestionably lawful, the as-
sembly will still be illegal if its objective is, say, to incite sedi-
tion or rebellion. (purpose test) Case: Malabanan v. Ramen-
to Freedom of Religion
Religion any specific system of belief, worship, conduct etc., often
involving a code of ethics and a philosophy.
Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and ele-
vates man to his Creator is recognized. (Aglipay v. Ruiz)
Religion also includes a rejection of religion, a refusal to believe in a
hereafter or in the supremacy of a supernatural person with powers
over life and death. Religion embraces matters of faith and dogma, as
well as doubt, agnosticism and atheism.
Religion in the Constitution
“ No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.”
SECTION 5
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Separation of Church and State
Art.3 Sec. 5
“No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof.”
Rationale: The rationale of the rule is summed up in the familiar say-
ing,” Strong fences make good neighbors.” The idea is to delineate the
boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments
by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of
their respective exclusive jurisdictions.
The doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the State that is prohibited
from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs; the Church is likewise
barred from meddling in purely secular matters.
Reason: A union of Church and State, as aptly remarked, “tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion.” It is also likely to result in
a conspiracy, well nigh irresistible because of its composite strength,
against the individual’s right to worship.
According to the U.S Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education,
the establishment clause simply means that the state cannot set up a
church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer
one religion over one another nor force or influence a person to go to
or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in a religion; that the state cannot punish a person for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non attendance; that no tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activity or institution what-
ever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach
practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in
the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa.
There will be no violation of the establishment clause if;
1. The statute has a secular legislative purpose.
2. Its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhib-
its religion
3. It does not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion.
The doctrine of separation of Church and State should be read specifi-
cally with Art.6 Sec. 29 (2)
“ No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid
2
or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit or support of any sect;
church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion, or for
the use, benefit or support of any priest, preacher, minister or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such.”
Case: Aglipay v. Ruiz, Garces v. Estenzo
Intramural Religious Disputes
Intramural disputes regarding religious dogma and other matters of
faith are outside the jurisdiction of the secular authorities. These are
questions that may be resolved by the religious authorities themselves,
and among themselves only.
Religious profession and worship
Has two fold aspect:
1. Freedom to believe – Absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. He may indulge in his own theo-
ries about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or
none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the
divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence;
2. Freedom to act on one’s beliefs – Subject to regulation where the
belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to pre-
vent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true
even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious
conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the
reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter
“ The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabili-
ties, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma,
not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.”
Case: American Bible Society v. City of Manila Ebralinag v. The divi-
sion superintendent of school of Cebu
Religious tests
The constitutional prohibition against religious tests is aimed against
clandestine attempts on the part of the government to prevent a person
from exercising his civil or political rights because of his religious belief.
SECTION 6
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
Liberty of Abode and Travel Sec. 6 art.3 “ The liberty of abode and
changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be im-
paired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as may be provided by law.”
Purpose
To further emphasize the individual’s liberty as safeguarded in general
terms by the due process clause. Liberty under that clause includes
the right to choose one’s residence, to leave it whenever he pleases,
and to travel wherever he will. It is a specific safeguard of these rights
and is intended to underline their importance in free society.
Limitations
according to sec.6, the liberty of abode can be limited “upon lawful
order of the court” and the right to travel by the requirements of “na-
tional security,public safety or public health as may be provided by
law.”
Case: Marcos v. Manglapus Manotoc v. Court of Appeals
SECTION 10
NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
• “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.” Impairment- anything that diminishes the efficacy of a
contract; must be substantial
• When is there impairment?
When there is a change in the terms of a legal contract between
parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes
new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes
for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its
terms
• Purpose: To safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agree-
ments against unwarranted interference by the State
• NOT absolute: There are instances were contracts valid at the
time of their conclusion may become invalid, or some of their pro-
visions may be rendered inoperative or illegal, by virtue of super-
vening legislation
• As a rule, contracts must be respected by the legislature and not
tampered with by subsequent laws that will change the intention
of the parties or modify the rights and obligations.
• Contract- any lawful agreement on the property or property rights,
whether real or personal, tangible or intangible; protects public
contracts including onerous franchises and privileges granted by
the State; does not cover licenses, marriage contract and public
office
• As used in the impairment clause, it does not include judicial de-
cisions or adjudications made by administrative bodies in the ex-
ercise of their quasi-judicial powers.
• A law impairs a contract when it enlarges, abridges, or in any
manner changes the intentions of the parties and this is true even
if the change is done indirectly. Degree of diminution is immateri-
al.
• Limitation: legislature cannot bargain away the police power
through the medium of contract. Neither may private parties fetter
the legislative authority by contracting on matters that are essen-
tially within the power of the lawmaking body.
• To impair, the law must retroact so as to affect existing contracts
concluded before its enactment. There will be no impairment if the
law is made to operate prospectively only, to cover contracts en-
tered into after its enactments.
• Application of the contract clause 1. Employment contracts 3. Tax
exemptions 2. Franchises
SECTION 11
FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS
• “ Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and ade-
quate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by rea-
son of poverty.”
• This is a collective primary responsibility of all lawyers, judges,
prosecutors, legislators and executives in the government includ-
ing all its employees.
• The IBP provides deserving indigents with free legal aid, including
3
 representation in court, and similar services are available from
DOJ to litigants who cannot afford retained counsel.
• Free access to court does not mean that the courts cannot im-
pose filing fees.
• There are also private legal assistance organizations now func-
tioning for the benefit of penurious clients who otherwise might be
unable to resort to the courts of justice because only of their mis-
fortune of being poor.
• This provision makes poor equal of the rich in the eyes of law.
SECTION 12
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
• Custodial investigation - any questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
• R.A. 7438 - "custodial investigation shall include the practice of
issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without preju-
dice to the liability of the 'inviting' officer for any violation of law."
• Operative act when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory
statements.
• An extrajudicial confession, to be inadmissible, must be:
(a) Voluntary;
(b) With assistance of counsel;
(c) In writing; and
(d) Express.
• In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S Supreme Court
declared:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the
pages which follow, but, briefly stated, it is this: the prosecu-
tion may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpa-
tory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards ef-
fective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be em-
ployed, unless other fully effective means are devised to in-
form accused persons of their right of silence and to assure
a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive ef-
fectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made volun-
tarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in
any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes
to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates
in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may
have answered some questions or volunteered some state-
ments on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain
from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted
with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
• More protection is thus accorded the suspect who otherwise could
be easily pressured, by physical force or other forms of compulsion,
including the condition of being held incommunicado or in solitary
confinement or being held in secret detention places and thus una-
ble to seek the advice and moral support of counsel, into making
damaging confessions.
• Crimes must be punished and the guilty must not be allowed to
escape. A desirable end cannot, however, be attained by unconstitu-
tional means. There should be less than full respect for the law if in
the process of enforcing it lawless methods are employed.
• It is not enough that the police investigator merely inform a person of
his constitutional right to silence and to counsel, and then taking
statements down, the interrogating officer must have patience in ex-
plaining these rights to him.
• If confessions written in advance by the police for persons of limited
intelligence or educational attainment have been outlawed, the
same disapprobation applies where a confession was signed by a
person whose sanity was dubious, where the intelligence was not
only limited but impaired.
• People v. Barros, the Court made the salutary reminder that swear-
ing officers should have the confessants physically examined by in-
dependent doctors before administering the oath, to discourage at-
tempts to secure confessions through violence.
• The rights guaranteed under Section 12(1) may be waived by sus-
pect so long as he does this in writing and in the presence of coun-
sel, who has presumably advised him. This advise may include the
waiver of the counsel's services.
• The right to counsel attached upon the start of an investigation, i.e.,
when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit infor-
mation, confessions or admission from the accused.
• Today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and the judicial
system before his trial begins. It is therefore appropriate to extend
the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before
the trial.
• The Constitution requires not just any kind of counsel but effective
and vigilant counsel.
• While the right to be represented by counsel is absolute, the ac-
cused's option to hire one of his own choice is limited. This rule is il-
lustrated in People v. Serzo, where the accused repeatedly asked
for postponement of his trial on the ground that he was still looking
for a lawyer de parte. The court should appoint a counsel de oficio
for him. Such option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dila-
tory tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equally im-
portant rights f the State and the offended party to speedy and ade-
quate justice.
• Paragraph 4 of Section 12 is a new provision provoked by the open
complaints during the martial law regime of many abuses committed
by the military. By this provision, it is hoofed that such abuses may
be deterred and, if committed, punished with appropriate civil and
criminal sanctions that, besides compensating the victims for their
injuries, should also serve as a warning against repetition of such
acts.
• R.A. 7309, victims of unjust imprisonment, arbitrary or illegal deten-
tion, or of violent crimes may file a claim for damages with the Board
of Claims under the Department of Justice.
SECTION 13
RIGHT TO BAIL
4
• Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Bail defined. – Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or
a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court
as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail
may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond,
cash deposit, or recognizance.
Sec. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. – The judge who issued
the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable
amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the
following factors:
(a) Financial liability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstance of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
• Persons under detention may petition for bail, for the purpose of bail
is to secure their provisional release.
• One who is not in custody of the law cannot ask for bail.
• Bail is not intended as punishment nor as satisfaction of civil liability.
• Bail cannot be denied simply because the person detained has not
yet been formally charged in court but is still under investigation for
the commission of an offense. If one who is already indicted is enti-
tled to bail, there is no reason why another who has not yet been
charged- and against whom prima facie case has not been estab-
lished- should be denied a similar right.
• Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for
bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is
held.
• Right to bail is available even if the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has been suspended.
• The exception applies to any offense which under the law existing at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail
may be punished by reclusion perpetua, or death, even if a lesser
penalty may be imposed upon conviction owing to the mitigating cir-
cumstances that may be disclosed later. Nevertheless, the accused
is still entitled to bail if, say, he is charged with murder and the evi-
dence adduced by the prosecution at the hearing on the petition for
bail indicates only a case of homicide.
• Even if the crime imputed to the accused is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, he is still entitled to bail if the evidence of guilt is not
strong. This does not have to be established by him; it is for the
prosecution to prove the contrary, although it is not necessary at this
point to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Hearing on the petition for bail is required to satisfy due process,
but this may be summary in nature or held in the course of trial itself.
A separate hearing is not indispensable.
• Mere probability of escape does not warrant denial of the right to
bail; the remedy is to increase the bail, provided it is not excessive.
But after conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be
denied bail if there is risk of his absconding.
SECTION 14
Criminal Due Process
• Difference between Section 1 and Section 14(1) of Article III:
Section 1 - deals with die process in general and covers
both its substantive and procedural aspects. Moreover, it applies to
all kinds of proceedings, civil, criminal and administrative.
Section 14(1) - restricted to criminal cases only and purely
to their procedural requirements.
• Criminal due process - requires that the accused be tried by an
impartial and competent court in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law and with proper observance of all the rights ac-
corded to him under the Constitution and the applicable statutes.
• Due process is denied in the following cases:
a. Denial of the right to preliminary investigation. Even if this
right is purely statutory, denial of it in the absence of a valid
waiver will violate due process.
b. Where the judge has a personal and pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the case, as where he is allowed to share in
the fines he may impose or where he is covered by the dis-
qualification enumerated in the Rules of Court.
c. The proceedings were held under such circumstances as
would prevent the accused from freely making his defense or
the judge from freely arriving at his decision.
d. A person is impleaded for violation of a law, administrative
regulation or municipal ordinance not previously published
as he would not know what acts he must do or avoid to pre-
vent prosecution.
e. Where appeal is permitted by constitution or by statute, de-
nial thereof will also militate against due process.
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. L-72335-39, March 21, 1988
Facts:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed
"a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command
(PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of
Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Fran-
cisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the
PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary
(then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had
resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint
was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanod-
bayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which
was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was ac-
cepted by Pres. Marcos — by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presi-
dential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16,
1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending
the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Min-
ister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits
and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by
the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution
was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the cor-
responding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad.
Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on
June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitu-
tional mandate of "due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in
unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and
in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade
from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amount-
ed to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations.
Issue:
5
Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with
the Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to
due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against
him.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the long delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan is violative of the constitu-
tional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to
the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary inves-
tigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation pre-
scribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is
part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process
clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition"
of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of
the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years
can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circum-
stance obtaining in this case. Three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of
assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certain-
ly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating
such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of
almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The
other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of un-
warranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal
and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three
years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete ab-
sence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the
information. True-but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be
corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay
in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for
until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
Presumption of Innocence
• Accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
• It is the responsibility of the prosecution to establish the defendant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise he is entitled to acquittal.
(Exception: self-defense)
• Conviction will depend not on the weakness of the defense but on
the strength of the prosecution.
• Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (See case of Peo-
plev.Dramayo)
• The constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by
contrary presumptions based on the experience of human conduct.
Example:
a. Unexplained flight may lead to an inference of guilt.
b. Failure on part of the accused to explain his possession of
stolen property may give rise to reasonable presumption that
it was himself who had stolen it.
c. Under the Revised Penal Code, the inability of an accounta-
ble officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him will
be considered prima facie evidence that he has appropriated
them to his personal uses.
• The constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply as long
as there is "some rational connection between the fact proved and
the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof
of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary
mandate."
• On the right to be silent, the Supreme Court said in People v. Ar-
ciaga that "no inference of guilt may be drawn against an accused
for his failure to make a statement of any sort. The neglect or refusal
of the accused shall not in any manner prejudiced or be used
against him."
Right to be Heard
• Such a right is indispensable in any criminal prosecution where the
stakes are the liberty or even the life of the accused, who must for
this reason be given a chance to defend himself.
Assistance of Counsel
• Begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placed
under investigation for the commission of a crime. This right be-
comes all the more important when he is already on trial and con-
fronted by a skilled and experienced prosecutor.
• RATIONALE: The intricacies of a courtroom procedure are not with-
in the knowledge of the ordinary layman, let alone one who is igno-
rant and unlettered.
• A counsel de oficio shall be appointed for him if he (the accused)
cannot afford the services of a retained lawyer.
• The right of the accused to counsel in a criminal proceedings has
never been considered subject to waiver.
• However, the right to be silent and to the assistance of counsel may
be waived during a custodial investigation under Article III, Sec. 12
(1).
• A counsel de oficio should still, despite the objection of the accused,
be appointed by the court to represent him.
• The duty of the court is not ended with such appointment, as it
should also see that the counsel does his duty by the defendant.
• Counsel de oficio must exert his utmost efforts as if he were repre-
senting a paying client. The Supreme Court has reversed convic-
tions based on pleas of guilty made on advice of counsel de oficio
presumably seeking to avoid the inconveniences of unremunerated
services.
• Right to counsel does not cease after trial, but continues even where
the case is appealed.
People v. Holgado
G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950
Facts:
Accused Frisco Hidalgo was charged with slight illegal detention. Trial
was set and without the assistance of a counsel, he pleaded guilty.
Two days after, the judge rendered judgment convicting the accused of
the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Issue:
Whether the decision rendered by the lower court, finding the accused
guilty of the crime charged, is justified.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The proceedings in the trial
court is irregular from the very beggining. It is expressly provided in our
rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the
court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be
asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney
de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procur-
ing attorney.
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the
court has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the
defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2
— After giving him such information the court must ask him if he de-
6
sires the aid of an attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ
attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4
— If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court
must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules
of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because
he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant
or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if
he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own.
People v. Agbayani
G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998
Facts:
Accused was charged for raping his daughter and was found guilty of
said crime. The accused, through his new counsel, filed a Motion for
New Trial on the ground that serious irregularities prejudicial to his
substantial rights were committed during the trial. It was alleged,
among others, that the lower court failed to apprise him of his right to
have counsel of his own choice.
Issue:
Whether the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial
judge advised the accused of their right to have counsel is sufficient
ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case
back for a new trial.
Ruling:
No. The failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to
reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be pre-
sumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the
hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be
overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been
held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positive-
ly proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to
counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the
court of such right.
Amion v. Judge Chiongson
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999
Facts:
Accused-complainant avers that respondent judge appointed another
lawyer in the person of Atty. Ong of the Free Legal Aid to act as legal
counsel de oficio for the scheduled hearing on March 28 and 29, 1996.
He further avers that his retained counsel was ready for hearing on
said dates but on March 27, he was informed that Atty. Depasucat was
ill. The court made of it in the record that the appointment of Atty. Ong
was without prejudice to the appearance of counsel de parte. Hearings
were scheduled on several dates. On August 1, 1996 at the scheduled
hearing date, Atty. Depasucat withdrew as counsel de parte. Thereaf-
ter, accused-complainant engaged the services of diffferent counsels
who adopted the dilatory tactics of the previous counsel de parte.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of counsel de oficio by Judge Chiongson
was justified.
Ruling:
Yes. The word “preferably” under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer
by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equal-
ly competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If
the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation,
will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, ob-
struct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer,
who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation
• The defendant is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accu-
sation against him so he can adequately prepare for his defense.
• Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or infor-
mation shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circum-
stance and for the court to pronounce judgment.
• The description and not the designation of the offense is controlling.
Hence, even if there be erroneous designation, the accused may be
validly convicted of the crime described in the information.
• Void for vagueness rule: The defendant is also deprived of the
right to be informed of the charge against him, and to due process
as well, where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite lan-
guage that is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to deter-
mine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and hence,
should be avoided.
• "vagueness" doctrine - requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld- not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude.
Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
• This requirement will call for no less than "the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge."
• The judge just not only be impartial but must also appear to be im-
partial.
• Publicity of the trial is necessary to prevent abuses that may be
committed by the court to the prejudices of the defendant. This rule
is not absolute, however, for it is competent for the court to bar the
public in certain cases like rape trials.
• A speedy trial has been defined as "one free from vexatious, capri-
cious and oppressive delays and is intended to relieve the accused
of needless anxieties and inconveniences before sentence is pro-
nounced upon him.
• Right to speedy trial is consonant with Section of the Bill if Rights
providing that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposi-
tion of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies."
• In Amberti v. Court of Appeals, however, the court gave the follow-
ing reminder:
The Court has consistently maintained that although a
speedy determination of an action implies a speedy trial,
speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and delib-
7
 erate consideration for the administration of justice, a genu-
ine respect for the rights of all parties and the requirements
of procedural due process and an adherence to the Court's
standing admonition that the discretion granted judges in the
granting or denial of motions for postponement and the set-
ting aside of denial orders previously issued "should always
be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the
ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby are
more important than a race to end the trial.
• The right to a speedy trial, which begins from the filing of the in-
formation, cannot be quantified into a specified number of days
or months but must be examined in the light of the surrounding
circumstances.
Trial in Absentia
• Although trial is indispensable, the right to be present thereat is a
personal right and therefore may be validly waived.
• The presence of the accused, however, may be required if it is nec-
essary for purpose of identification, that is, the prosecution intends
to introduce witnesses who will identify him.
• Requisites:
a. The accused has already been arraigned
b. He has been duly notified of the trial
c. His failure to appear is unjustified
• In cases if fugitives, the defendant's escape will be considered a
waiver of his right to be present at trial and the inability of the court
to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from con-
tinuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice.
The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjusti-
fied because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale,
and prosecution of the law.
Right to Confrontation
• Intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts
provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-
examination.
• Intended to prevent conviction of the accused upon disposition ex
parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve right of the accused to
test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right to
cross-examination.
• It may be added that normally, there is propensity to lie on the part
of a witness when actually confronted by the accused than when the
testimony is given behind his back.
• Furthermore, the presence of the witness at the trial will enable the
court to observe his demeanor and gauge the credibility of his testi-
mony.
• Depositions and ex parte affidavits are inadmissible unless the per-
son making them are present in court for examination on their
statements by the judge and the accused. Evidence of this nature is
hearsay and excluded by the Rules of Court.
Compulsory Process
• The accused is entitled under the Constitution to the issuance of
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the purpose of compelling
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence that he
may need for his defense.
• Failure to obey the process is punishable as contempt of court; if
necessary, the witness may even be arrested so he can give the
needed evidence.
• Right to compulsory process must be invoked during the trial. Fail-
ure to do so constitutes a waiver that cannot be rectified or undone
on appeal.
Roco v. Conteras
G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner was engaged in the business of buying and selling dressed
chicken. Sometime in 1993, he purchased his supply of dressed chick-
en from private respondent Cal’s Poultry Supply Corporation (Cal’s
Corporation). As payment for his purchases, petitioner drew five (5)
checks payable to Cal’s Corporation against his account. Cal’s Corpo-
ration deposited the above checks in its account wbut the bank dis-
honored them for having been drawn against a closed account. There-
after, Cal’s Corporation filed criminal complaints against petitioner for
violation of Batas Pambasa Blg. 22 (BP 22), otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law. The lower court rendered a judgment of convic-
tion against petitioner on account of petitioner’s failure to adduce evi-
dence in his behalf. On appeal to RTC, petitioner contends that the
lower court rendered judgement against him without affording him of
the right to present his evidence. Hence, the case was remanded.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a request for issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. Judge conteras denied the
petitioner's request. The RTC and CA likewise dismissed the petition.
Hence, this action.
Issue:
Whether the denial of the petitioner's request for issuance of subpoena
ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum is violative of the consti-
tutional guarantee on compulsary process.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend
and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation
conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his
deposition.
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoe-
na ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to
compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the
production of books, records, things ordocuments therein specified. As
characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Com-
pay:
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary sub-
poena ad testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an
injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the ex-
amination the books, documents, or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena ducestecum may issue,
the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are pre-
sent: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear
primafacie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of rele-
vancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the par-
ties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). Again, to quote from
H.C. Liebenow:
In determining whether the production of the documents described in a
subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper to
consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific
documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly, whether that
proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its produc-
tion. A general inquisitorial examination of all the books, papers, and
8
documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain wheth-
er something of value may not show up, will not be enforced.
Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al., we held:
Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the
issuance of a ‘subpoena duces tecum,’ it must appear, by clear and
unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced
contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court,
and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evi-
dence has been so designated or described that it may be identified.
SECTION 15
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS
Annotations:
A prerogative writ of liberty employed to test the validity of a person’s
detention. If he is restrained of his liberty, he or someone acting on his
behalf may file a petition for habeas corpus to secure his release.
The writ is “directed to the person detaining another, commanding him
to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place,
with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, to submit
to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall
consider in his behalf. It is a high prerogative common law writ of an-
cient origin the great object of which is the liberation of those who may
be in prison without sufficient cause.”
Liberty of an individual may be restored by habeas corpus where he is
subjected to physical restraint, such as arbitrary detention.
Habeas corpus may also be resorted to in case of unlawful denial of
bail.
Grounds for issuance of the writ:
4. Deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in a restraint of a per-
son;
5. Court has no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
6. An excessive penalty has been imposed, in which case the sen-
tence is void as to such excess
It is not the writ itself but only its privilege that may be suspended.
Suspension of the privilege itself is the exception and not the rule, the
rule being the affirmation and not the limitation of liberty.
Purpose of suspension: to enable the govt. to deal with the situation of
an invasion or a rebellion. The govt. must charge judicially those who
are involved in the rebellion or invasion within 3 days, otherwise the
person shall be released.
The Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the execu-
tive dept., the executive dept. will have to open whatever findings it
might have to the scrutiny of the SC if the President wants his suspen-
sion sustained.
Art. 3, Sec. 15, “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it.” This power is no without limitations and may be
revoked by the Congress or the SC in proper cases.
The SC has the power to annul the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus: 1. Invasion or rebellion
2. When the public safety requires it the justification was that the Pres-
ident, with all the intelligence sources available to him as commander-
in-chief, was in a better position than the SC to ascertain the real es-
tate of peace and order in the country.
The ff. are the significant changes in the original authority of the C-I-C:
1. He may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion only.
2. The grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ and the
proclamation of martial law are now limited to invasion or
rebellion when the public safety requires it.
3. The duration of such suspension or proclamation shall not exceed
sixty days, following which it shall be automatically lifted.
4. Within forty-eight hours after such suspension or proclamation, the
President shall personally or in writing report his action to
the Congress.
5. If not in session, Congress shall convene within 24 hours following
the proclamation or suspension.
6. The Congress may, by a majority vote of all its members voting
jointly, revoke his action. The President may not set the
revocation aside.
7. By the same vote and in the same manner, the Congress may,
upon the initiative of the President, extend his suspension or
proclamation for a period to be determined by the Congress
if the invasion or rebellion shall continue and the public safe-
ty requires the extension.
8. The action of President and Congress shall be subject to review by
the SC, which shall have the authority to determine the suffi-
ciency of the factual basis of such action.
9. Any citizen may file the challenge.
10. Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ.
11. The suspension shall apply only to persons facing charges
of rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
12. Any person arrested for such offenses must be judicially
charged therewith within three days. Otherwise he shall be
released.
Writ of amparo- the courts will be more diligent in the protection of the
life, liberty and security of the desaparecido and can order the re-
spondent to extent more and actual effort in locating the missing per-
son and showing that he is in good condition and has not been mal-
treated by the authorities.
Quantum of evidence required The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence. If respondent: private individual – he must
prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations were observed in the performance of duty. If respondent:
public individual- he must prove that extraordinary diligence as re-
quired by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty
9
Hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum
test.
Writ of habeas data- intended to insure the human right to privacy by
requiring the respondent to produce the necessary information to lo-
cate the missing person or such data about him that have been gath-
ered in secret to support the suspicion that he has been taken into
custody in violation of his constitutional rights, or, worse, has been
salvaged without benefit of lawful trial.
Writ of kalikasan- it is available to a natural or judicial person, entity
authorized by law, people’s organization, NGO, or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two
or more cities or provinces.
• Literally means "you have the body."
• Writ of habeas corpus - order issued by a competent court di-
rected to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce
the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, to explain
the time and cause of the caption and detention, and to follow what
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in behalf of the
prisoner. The purpose of the issuance of the writ is to inquire on the
legality of the restraint or detention without necessarily ordering the
release of the prisoner.
• Privilege of the writ of habeas corpus - an order coming from the
court to (immediately) release the prisoner if the court finds that the
detention is without legal cause or authority.
• The privilege and not the writ itself may be suspended.
• When the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, the courts are mo-
mentarily prevented from determining the legality of a detention.
• The power to suspend the privilege of the WHB is entrusted to the
President but may be revoked by the Congress or the. Supreme
Court in proper cases.
• Section 15 must be read with Article VII, Section 18 which settle
once and for all the President's military powers by providing the fol-
lowing changes in the original authority of the commander-in-chief:
(1) He may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion only.
(2) The grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
and the proclamation of martial law are now limited to inva-
sion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
(3) The duration of such suspension or proclamation shall not
exceed 60 days, following which it shall be automatically lift-
ed.
(4) Within 48 hours after such suspension or proclamation, the
President shall personally or in writing report his action to the
Congress.
(5) If not in session, Congress shall convene within 48 hours the
following proclamation or suspension.
(6) The Congress may, by a majority vote of all its members vot-
ing jointly, revoke his action. The revocation may not be set
aside by the President.
(7) By the same vote and in the same manner, the Congress
may, upon the initiative of the President, extend his suspen-
sion or proclamation for a period to be determined by the
Congress if the invasion or rebellion shall continue and the
public safety requires the extension.
(8) The action of the President and the Congress shall be sub-
ject to review by the Supreme Court p, which shall have the
authority to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of
such action. This matter is no longer considered a political
question and may be raised in an appropriate proceeding.
Moreover, the Supreme Court must decide the challenge
within 30 days from the time it is filed.
(9) The challenge may be filed by any citizen.
(10) Martial law does not automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the operation of the
Constitution. The civil courts and the legislative bodies shall
remain open. Military courts and agencies are not conferred
jurisdiction over civilians where the civil courts are function-
ing.
(11) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of ha-
beas corpus shall apply only to persons facing charges of
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
(12) Any person arrested for such offenses must be
judicially charged therewith within three days. Otherwise, he
shall be released.
Lansang v. Garcia
G.R. No. L-133964, December 11, 1971
Facts:
President Marcos, on August 23, 1971 issued Proclamation No. 899
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as response to
Plaza Miranda bombing. Presently, petitions for writ of habeas corpus
were filed by those who were arrested without warrant and detained
upon the authority of said proclamation. Upon filing, the respondent
returned the writ with an explanation that there is a state of insurrection
or rebellion in the country and that the public safety requires the sus-
pension of the privilege.
Issue:
Whether the determination by the President of the existence of any of
the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the
courts (as held in Barcelona v. Baker and reiterated in Montenegro
Case.)
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and abandoned the Barcelo-
na v. Baker ruling. Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege
is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Con-
stitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Depart-
ment, is limited and conditional. For from being full and plenary, the
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed,
confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the condi-
tions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and
the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforemen-
tioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the
confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist.
And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental
Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compli-
ance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of
justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would
be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have
intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.
SECTION 16
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
Annotations:
Maximum periods are prescribed to:
1. Twenty-four months in the case if SC
2. Twelve months for all lower collegiate courts unless reduced
by the SC
3. Three months for all other lower courts
10
It is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to
all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in
all proceedings including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
Violation of this right, remedy should be the dismissal of the said right
obtained through mandamus.
• "Justice delayed is justice denied."
• The rule that the accused shall be entitled to a speedy trial is reiter-
ated in Section 14(2) of the Bill of rights.
• Implementation of this rule depends ultimately upon the Supreme
Court.
• In Article VII,
Section 17- Right Against Self- Incrimination
A question is incriminating if it tends to elicit, even just one, of the ele-
ments of a criminal act.
Scope: it applies only to testimonial compulsion and production of doc-
uments, papers and chattels in court except when books of account
are to be examined in the exercise of police power and power of taxa-
tion.
An accused may be compelled to be photographed or measured, his
garments may be removed, and his body may be examined.
Only natural persons are protected by the self-incrimination clause. It
has no application to judicial persons.
Availability: Criminal proceedings, All government proceedings, Civil
actions, Administrative and Legislative investigations
Who may invoke the right?
7. The accused in criminal case; he may refuse to take the witness
stand
A witness in any suit, buy only relating to particular questions asked of
him in the witness stand
Waiver of the right: - Can either directly or by failure to invoke it, pro-
vided the waiver is
certain and unequivocal and intelligently, understandingly and willingly
made
Immunity statutes:
Transactional immunity- testimony of a person or whose possession of
documents or other evidence necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted is immune from criminal prose-
cution for an offense to which such compelled testimony relates
Use-and-derivative-use immunity- a witness is only assured that his
particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used
against him in a subsequent prosecution
SECTION 18
RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Annotations:
The condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or impris-
onment and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or
not. 2 types:
Slavery- one man has absolute power over the life, fortune and liberty
of another
Peonage- a condition of enforced servitude by which the servitor is
restrained of his liberty and compelled to labor in liquidation of some
debt or obligation, real or pretended, against his will
Exceptions:
1. Punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted
2. Defense of the State
3. Posse comitatus
4. Naval enlistment
5. Patria potestas- children are obliged to obey their parents so
long as they are under parental power and to observe re-
spect and reverence toward them always
• Paragraph 1 of Section 18 was intended against the recurrence of
the much-abhorred practice, employed to excess by the past dicta-
torship, of arresting political critics and dissenters and indefinitely
detaining them without prior conviction and sometimes even without
the giling of charges against them, as a means of punishing them for
their opposition to the administration.
• Provision on involuntary servitude serves as a further guarantee of
the liberty already protected under the due process clause.
• Involuntary servitude - "the condition of one who is compelled by
force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for
another, whether he is paid or not."
• Includes slavery - "that civil relation in which one man has absolute
power over the life, fortune and liberty of another," and also peon-
age, or "a condition of enforced servitude by which the servitor is re-
strained of his liberty and compelled to labor in liquidation of some
debt or obligation, real or pretended, against his will."
• Restraint of the individual so he can be compelled to work for anoth-
er, be it government or a private party, violates the constitutional
guaranty, subject to certain exceptions.
• Exceptions:
a. Punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted.
b. While a person may not be as a rule be compelled to accept
a public appointive office, he may not refuse to do so if the
position is intended for the defense of the State. Article II,
Section 4, of the Constitution provides that, for this purpose,
"all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal military or civil service."
c. Naval enlistment. A person who enlists in the service of a
merchant vessel may be compelled to remain in such ser-
vice until the end of the voyage for which he contracted.
d. Persons may be validly pressed into service under the posse
comitatus for the apprehension of criminals. This would be
justified under police power.
e. Striking workers in industries affected with public interest or
public utilities may be required to return to work pending set-
tlement of the labor dispute. The purpose of such compul-
sion is to prevent disruption, to the detriment of the public, of
essential services being performed by the strikers.
f. Unemancipated minors come under thepatria potestas and
so "are obliged to obey their parents so long as they are un-
der parental power, and to deserve respect and reverence
toward them always."
11
• Under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any
person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt,
shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as house-
hold servant or farm laborer."
SECTION 19
PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT
Annotations
Fine is considered excessive when it is clearly shown that the nature of
the violation compared with the fine is disproportionate, or if it exceeds
the utmost limit of the punishment which the vindication of the law
demands.
Mere fines and imprisonment are not violating. Mere severity does not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment. To violate constitutional guar-
antee, penalty must be flagrant and plainly oppressive, disproportion-
ate to the nature of the offense as to shock the senses of the commu-
nity.
When an unforeseen accident adds to the suffering of the convict, a
penalty otherwise valid does not become cruel or unusual.
RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of death penalty RA 9745 prohibited
use of torture as punishment to ensure that the human rights of all
persons are respected at all times.
The old prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment” has been
rewritten to cover “cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment” to make
the provision more comprehensive in line with the emphasis on the
protection of human rights in Article XIII of the Constitution.
• Mere fines and imprisonment are not violative of tis provision. To be
so, the penalty must be inhuman and barbarous and shocking to the
conscience.
• To come under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantly and
plainly oppressive, wholly disproportionate to the nature of the of-
fense as to shock the moral sense of the community.
• Cruelty must be inherent in the penalty.
• But where an unforeseeable accident adds to the suffering of the
convict, a penalty otherwise valid does not become cruel or unusual.
• The due process clause requires an equivalence between the de-
gree of the offense and the degree of the penalty.
• These principle notwithstanding, it has been held that a penalty not
normally proportionate to the offense may be imposed in some in-
stances without violation of the constitution. This would be allowed,
for example, where the offense has become so rampant as to re-
quire the adoption of a more effective deterrent.
• The prohibition against excessive fine is addressed not only to the
legislature but also to the judge who, in the determination of the fine
to be imposed (within the range of the law), must take into account
the financial condition of the convict, to prevent the fine from becom-
ing excessive, and also discriminatory.
• Article 66 of the. Revised Penal Code provides that "in imposing
fines the courts should fix any amount within the limits established
by law, in fixing the amount in each case, attention shall, be given ,
not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more
particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.
• According to the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Ching
Kuan:
It may seem paradoxical, but the truth is that the codal provi-
sion in question, in authorizing the imposition of unequal
fines, aims precisely at equality before the law. Since a fine
is imposed as penalty and not as payment for a specific loss
or injury, and since its lightness or severity depends upon
the culprit's wealth or means, it is only just and proper that
the latter be taken into account in fixing the amount. X X X
Obviously, to impose the same amount of a fine for the same
offense upon two persons thus differently circumstanced
would be to mete out to them a penalty of unequal severity
and, hence, unjustly discriminatory.
• The Commission on Human Rights is especially entrusted with the
enforcement of the prohibition in Subsection 2.
• Appropriation should also be provided for the improvement of the
facilities of penal institutions.
SECTION 20
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
Annotations
1. “No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll
tax.” Debt- any civil obligation arising from contract either ex-
pressed or implied. It includes even debts obtained through fraud
since no distinction is made in the Constitution.
2. Poll tax- specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a cer-
tain class without regard to property or occupation
3. As long as the obligation to pay arises ex contractu, it is consid-
ered a private matter between the creditor and the debtor and the
punitive arm of the State cannot be employed in a criminal action
to enforce the former’s right.
4. The remedy in this case is a civil action only for the recovery of
the unpaid debt. The responsibility of the debtor in this situation
arises not from the contract of loan, but ex delicto
5. BP 22 is an act of making and issuing a worthless check or check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the
nonpayment of an obligation, which the law punishes. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making
of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law pun-
ishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order. Poll tax- specific fixed sum levied upon every
person belonging to a certain class without regard to his property
or occupation.
• The motive is humanitarian.
• "Debt" - any civil obligation arising from contract, expressed or
implied. As held in Ganaway v. Quillen, it includes even debts ob-
tained through fraud since no distinction is made in the Constitution.
As long as the obligation arises ex contractu, it is considered a pri-
vate matter between the creditor and the debtor and the punitive
arm of the State cannot be employed in a criminal action to enforce
the former's right. The remedy in this case is a civil action only for
the recovery of the unpaid debt.
• Although a debtor cannot be imprisoned for his failure to pay his
debt, he can be validly punished in a criminal action if he contracted
his debt through fraud. In such a case, the act for which he is penal-
ized is the deception he employed in securing the debt, not his de-
fault in paying it. The responsibility of the debtor in this situation
arises not from the contract of loan, but exdelito, i.e., from the com-
mission of a crime. As his obligation does not arise ex contractu, it is
not considered a debt under this provision.
Serafin v. Lindayag
12
A.M. No. 297-MJ, September 30, 1975
Facts:
A criminal complaint was filed with respondent judge charging that "the
above named accused with intent to gain did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously owe the sum of One Thousand Five Hun-
dred Pesos, (P 1,500.00) Philippine currency; that said amounts has
long been due" and "that the accused failed to pay her account in spite
of due notice sent by registered mail and up to the present she failed to
settle her obligation." Although on the face of this complaint no criminal
offense had been committed, the judge nevertheless, after a rather
hasty preliminary examination, issued a warrant for the arrest of the
complainant.
Issue:
Whether the constitutional guarantee against non-imprisonment for
debt of the complainant was violated.
Ruling:
Yes. The compalinant did not commit any offense as her debt is con-
sidered a simple loan without collateral or security because complain-
ant was an old friend of the spouses who lent the money and that
when they wrote her a letter of demand, she promised to pay them and
said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable
things at her home. Under the Constitution, she is protected.
In admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects
from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and
issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless
finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," re-
spondent judge grossly failed to perform his duties properly — which in
this instance was to dismiss the complaint outright since it is elemen-
tary that non-payment of an indebtedness is not a criminal act, much
less estafa; and that no one may be criminally charged and punished
for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money.
Lozano v. Martinez
G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986
Facts:
Petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the
Bouncing Check Law.The defendants in those cases moved seasona-
bly to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did
not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The mo-
tions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case
wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed
the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the Supreme
Court for relief.
Issue:
Whether BP 22 offends the constitutional provision forbidding impris-
onment for debt.
Ruling:
No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of mak-
ing and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce
a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
SECTION 21
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Annotations:
Res judicata in prison grey
The right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution again of
any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or
convicted. The object is to set the effects of the first prosecution forev-
er at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subject-
ed to the dangers and anxiety of a second charge against him for the
same offense.
Requisites:
• A valid complaint or information
• A prosecution based on an invalid complaint or information
cannot lead to a valid judgment and hence will not place the
accused under jeopardy
• Where the original information is defective and the case is
dismissed on motion of the accused, it may be validly re-
newed with the filing of a corrected information
• Filed before a competent court
• A court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment
• If the proceedings in the municipal court were totally void or
lack of record, double jeopardy could not attach
• Where a court martial and civil court have concurrent juris-
diction, a decision by one court will bar another prosecution
for the same offense in the other court
• Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the de-
fense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in
the second proceeding
• There must be a plea
1. Where a defective complaint was dismissed before the accused
had pleaded and an amended complaint was later filed, his plea
of double jeopardy was rejected because he had not been ex-
posed to danger under the first indictment
• Termination of the case
2. The acquittal is executor upon rendition and entitles the accused to
immediate release
3. The judgment of conviction is appealable within 15 days but be-
comes final if the convict starts serving his sentence even before
the expiration of this period
4. General rule: a dismissal with express consent will not bar another
prosecution for the same offense, as the said consent is consid-
ered a waiver of his right against double jeopardy. The consent, to
be effective, must be express, and this excludes mere silence or
failure of the accused to object to the dismissal.
5. Where the accused succeeds in having the case dismissed on the
ground that the information is insufficient, he cannot upon filing of
corrected information invoke double jeopardy by claiming that the
original information was sufficient.
a.) Appeal of prosecution
1. Defense will be available to the accused where the dismissal
of the prosecution even with express consent was based on
insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution or denial of his
right to a speedy trial because these dismissals are consid-
ered in the nature of an acquittal.
13
 b.) Crimes covered
2. If the 4 requisites are present, the accused may not be pros-
ecuted anew for the original offense charged, or for any at-
tempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense, which necessarily includes or is necessarily includ-
ed in the offense charged in the original complaint or infor-
mation.
3. Doctrine of supervening event: the accused may be prose-
cuted for another offense if a subsequent development
changes the character of the first indictment under which he
may have already been charged or convicted
4. Inseparable offenses: when one offense is inseparable from
another and proceeds from the same act, they cannot be the
subject of separable prosecutions. The first sentence of
Sec. 20, Sec. 1, Art. III prohibits double jeopardy of punish-
ment for the same offense, while the second sentence con-
templates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
• "Res judicata in prison grey," the object is to set the effects of the
first prosecution forever at rest.
• Prohibits the prosecution again of any person for a crime of which
he has previously been acquitted or convicted.
• Rule 117, Section 7, of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. –
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, up-
on a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or in-
formation.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar
to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily in-
cludes the offense charged in the former complaint or infor-
mation under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts
arising from the same act or omission constituting the former
charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or
were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former
complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without
the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party ex-
cept as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.
Requisites:
1. A valid complaint or information- A prosecution based on an
invalid complaint or information cannot lead to a valid judgment
and hence will not place the accused under jeopardy. Where the
original complaint is defective and the case is dismissed on mo-
tion of the accused, it may be validly renewed with the filing of a
corrected information. But if, without the express consent of the
accused, the information is dismissed on the ground that its de-
fective when it is jot so in fact, another prosecution based on the
same allegation will constitute double jeopardy.
2. Filed before a competent court- A court without jurisdiction
cannot render a valid judgment; hence, a person charged before it
cannot plead double jeopardy when tried anew for the same of-
fense by a competent court, as the first prosecution never placed
him in jeopardy. Double jeopardy, Justice Abad Santos said, re-
quires 'valid previous proceedings.'
3. To which the defendant had pleaded (valid plea)- A defendant
is never placed under jeopardy until after he shall have pleaded to
the charge against him during the arraignment. Thus, where a de-
fective complaint was dismissed before the accused had pleaded
and an amended complaint was later filed, his plea of double
jeopardy was rejected because he had not been exposed to dan-
ger under the first indictment.
4. Of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or
which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent (termination of the case)- If the case is termi-
nated by acquittal or conviction, another prosecution based on the
same allegation constitute double jeopardy. The acquittal is exec-
utory upon rendition and entitles the accused to immediate re-
lease. The judgment of conviction is appealable within fifteen
days but becomes final if the convict starts serving his sentence
even before the expiration of this period.
As a general rule, a dismissal with the express consent of
the accused will not bar another prosecution for the same offense,
as the said consent is considered a waiver of his right against dou-
ble jeopardy. The consent, to be effective, must be express, and
this excludes mere silence or failure of the accused to object to the
dismissal.
• If the above-stated elements of double jeopardy are present, the
accused may not be prosecuted anew for the original offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration there-
of, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily in-
cluded in the offense charged in the original complaint or infor-
mation.
• Doctrine of Supervening Event, the accused may be prosecuted
for another offense if a subsequent development changes the char-
acter of the first indictment under which he may have been already
charged or convicted. This doctrine applies only when the accused
was convicted for the lesser or same offense.
• Inseparable offenses- Where one offense is inseparable from an-
other and proceeds from the same act, they cannot be subject of
separate prosecutions (e.g. a person indicted for smoking opium
cannot be charged also with possessing opium, one already con-
victed of less serious physical injuries cannot be later prosecuted for
assault on a person in authority committed on the same occasion
and against the same victim. )
• However, it is possible for one act to give rise to several crimes, in
which case separate prosecutions for each crime may be filed, pro-
vided the elements of the several crimes are not identical.
• When subsequent information charges another and different of-
fense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no
prohibited double jeopardy.
SECTION 22
EX POST FACTO LAW
1. “No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.” The ex
post facto law, like the law impairing the obligation of the contract,
operates retroactively to affect antecedent acts. A law can never be
considered ex post facto as long as it operates prospectively since
its structures would cover only offenses committed after and not be-
fore its enactment.
14
 2. Ex post facto law is one that would make a previous act criminal
although it was not so at the time it was committed.
3. The ff. are considered ex post facto laws:
1. Every law that makes criminal an act done before the pas-
sage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act.
2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was when committed.
3. Every law that changes punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when com-
mitted.
4. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives
less or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the of-
fender.
5. Every law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and reme-
dies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a
right for something which when done was lawful.
6. Every law which deprives persons accused of crime of some
lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of a
proclamation of amnesty.
• Characteristics:
1. Refer to criminal matters
2. Retroactive in its application
3. Prejudice of the accused
• Even if the law were penal and retroactive, it will still not be ex post
facto if it does not operate to the disadvantage of the accused. But
if the punishment originally imposed is retroactively made heavier,
or the method of its execution made more severe, then the law will
be subject to the constitutional prohibition.
• Bill of attainder -A legislative act that inflicts punishment without
trial, its essence being the substitution of legislative fiat for a judi-
cial determination of guilt
• If a statute is a bill of attainder, it is also an ex post facto law. But if
it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not
persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder.
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
• Citizenship is a personal and more or less permanent membership
in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular
political community of full civil and political rights subject to special
disqualifications such as minority. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty
of allegiance to the political community.
• Modes of acquiring citizenship:
1. By birth
• Jus sanguinis – acquisition of citizenship on the basis of
blood relationship - Those whose fathers or mothers
are citizens of the Philippines - If the child is born under
the 1973 or 1987 Constitution and either his father or
mother is a Filipino citizen at the time the child is born,
the child is a Filipino citizen no matter where he may be
born
• Jus soli- acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place
of birth
2. By naturalization- legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the privilege of a native born citizen
3. By marriage to a foreigner whose laws automatically make the
spouse citizen of his country
• Philippine law follows the rule of jus sanguinis and provides for
naturalization. Philippine citizens at the time of adoption of the
1987 Constitution were those who were citizens under the 1973
Constitution.
• Citizens of the Philippines
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adop-
tionof this Constitution
a. Those who are citizens under the treaty of Paris
b. Those declared citizens by judicial declaration applying the
jus soli principle
c. Those who are citizens under the 1935 Constitution
d. Those who are citizens under the 1973 Constitution
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon attaining the age of majority Time
to elect: 3 years after age of majority Applicable not to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after Feb. 2, 1987 but also to
those who, having been born of Filipino mother elected citi-
zenship before that date.
4. Those naturalized in accordance with law
• Caram Rule Under the 1935 Constitution, those born in the Phil-
ippines of foreign parent, who before the adoption of the Constitu-
tion had been elected to public office in the Philippines, are con-
sidered Filipino citizens.
• Section 2 Natural-born citizens
1. Citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to per-
form any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizen-
ship; or
2. Those born before Jan. 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majori-
ty
• The ff. offices may only be occupied by natural-born citizens:
• Elective office - President, vice-president, senators, mem-
bers of the House of Representatives
• Appointive office - Members of the SC or any lower colle-
giate court; Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitu-
tional Commissions; Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman;
members of the governing board of the Monetary Board;
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights
• Naturalization- process by which a foreigner acquires, voluntarily
or by operation of law, the citizenship of another State
• Procedures of naturalization:
1. Declaration of intention: filed with OSG 1 yr. before filing the
application for naturalization
2. Such declaration shall set forth the personal identification of
the person
3. Upon receipt of petition, the clerk of court will published it in
the Official Gazette or general circulation to post notices
thereof and for hearing
4. Non-observance will make the proceedings null and void
5. At least 6 months after the last publication, but in no case
within 30 days before any election, the hearing shall begin,
petitioners should establish all allegations to be corroborat-
ed by at least 2 credible witnesses
15

6. If petitioner is able to prove his qualifications and no disquali-
fications, petition shall be granted and it will become final af-
ter 30 days from notice.
7. After probation, applicant may apply for administration of
oath of citizenship in accordance with the decision ren-
dered. Motion will be granted provided:
• Petitioner has not left the country
• Devoted himself to a lawful calling
• Has not been convicted of any violation of law
• Has not committed any act in contravention of any
government announced policies
4. Suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease
5. Convicted of crime of moral turpitude
6. Who during residence in the Phil have not mingled socially with
Filipinos, or not evinced sincere desire to learn and embrace cus-
toms and traditions and ideals of Filipinos
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at
war, during the period of such war, or
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof
• Grounds for denaturalization
1. Naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently or illegally

• Kinds of naturalization:
2. If, within 5 years, he returns to his native country or to some for-
eign country and establishes residence therein,
1. Direct naturalization effected by: 3. Naturalization obtained through invalid declaration of intention
4. Minor children failed to graduate through the fault of the parents
1. Individual proceedings, usually judicial, under general natu- either by neglecting support or by transferring them to another
ralization laws; school
2. Special act of the legislature, often in favor of distinguished
foreigners who have rendered some notable service to the
5. Allowing himself to be used as dummy
local state;
• Effects of denaturalization
3. Collective change of nationality as a result of cession or sub-
jugation 1. Ground affects intrinsic validity of proceedings, denaturalization
4. Adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the State where shall divest wife and children of their derivative naturalization;
they are born and
2. If ground is personal, the wife and children shall retain citizenship
2. Derivative naturalization:
• Loss of citizenship
1. Wife of a naturalized husband
2. Minor children of naturalized parent 1. By naturalization in foreign countries
3. Alien woman upon marriage to a national 2. By express renunciation of citizenship
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution
• Qualifications for naturalization (Sec 2&3, CA 473) or laws of a foreign country upon attaining 21 years old or more
1. Not less than 18 years of age on the date of hearing 4. By rendering service to, or accepting commission in the armed
2. Resided in the Phil. For not less than 10 years; may be reduced forces of a foreign country
to 5 years, if: • Exception: when rendering service is done with the consent
a. Honorably held office in the Phil of the Republic of the Philippines, if either of the ff. circs. Is
b. Established new industry or introduced a useful invention present:
c. Married to a Filipino woman a. Phil has a defensive/offensive part of alliance with the
d. Engaged as teacher in Philippine public or private school not said foreign country
established for exclusive instruction to a particular nationali- b. Said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philip-
ty or race, or in any branches of education or industry for a pine territory with the consent of the Phil
period of not less than 2 years; and c. By cancellation of the cert. of naturalization
e. Born in the Philippines d. By having been declared by competent authority, a de-
3. Character serter of Phil. armed forces in the time of war, unless
a. Good moral character subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been
b. Believes in the Constitution; and granted;
c. Conducted himself in an irreproachable conduct during his e. In case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner, if
stay in the Philippines by virtue of the laws in force of her husband’s country,
she acquires his nationality
4. Owns real estate in the Phil not less than 5,000 in value; or has
some lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation that can • Reacquisition of citizenship
support himself and his family 1. By naturalization
5. Speaks and write Filipino or English and any principal Philippine 2. By repatriation - Refer to R.A. 8171- act providing repatria-
dialect tion
6. Enrolled minor children in any public or private school recognized 3. By direct act of Congress - R.A. 9225
and civics are taught as part of the curriculum, during the period
of residence prior to hearing of petition • Derivative citizenship- the unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted below 18, of those who reacquire Phil citi-
• Disqualifications for naturalization zenship upon affectivity of said R.A. shall be deemed citizens of
the Philippines
1. Opposed to organized government or affiliated with any associa-
tion or group of persons which uphold and teach doctrines op- • Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
posing all organized governments; shall be dealt with by law.
2. Defending or teaching necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their • Dual citizenship allows natural-born Filipinos to enjoy the rights
ideas they used to enjoy before they acquired a new citizenship abroad;
3. Polygamists or believers in polygamy’ also available to natural-born Filipino who are naturalized after the
affectivity of the law in 2003 and are allowed to retain their Philip-

16
 pine citizenship.

• If the person intends to run for public office or accept an appoin-

tive public office, he shall cease to be a dual citizen

• Supreme Court stressed that the constitutional policy is not

against dual citizenship but dual loyalty, such as that often mani-
fested by naturalized Filipinos who, while professing allegiance to
their adoptive land, retain their allegiance to their native land and
even involve themselves in its political affairs.

• RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition act of

2003) Does not provide that “duals” actually establish residence
and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exer-
cise the right to vote.

17