Ella Yvonne T.

Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Philconsa vs. Gimenez

Facts:
The suit was instituted by the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. a non-profit civic
organization, to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of
both Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the
checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member of the
House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No.
3836 which is entitled, “An Act Amending Subsection , Section 12 of Commonwealth Act
Numbered 186. As Amended by Republic Act Numbered 3096”. This act allows a Senator or a
member of the House of Representatives and an elective officer of either House of Congress to
retire regardless of age and whose service must be at least 12 years.
The enactment of the retirement law for its members which is the Appropriation Act for
the fiscal year 1964-65, Republic Act No. 4164, provides for payment of retirement gratuities of
members of the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3836: PROVIDED, That
no portion of this Appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims
shall have been paid — P210,000.00.
In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), it was stated that, for
payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1616: PROVIDED, That no portion of this appropriation shall be transferred to any other
item until all approved claims shall have been paid — P100,000.00.
It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, which provided for the retirement of
the members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and void.

Issue: Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter
expressed in the act.

Ruling:

Article VI, Section 21, paragraph 1, of the Constitution provides that No bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill. It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate for
P210,000.00 to implement Republic Act 3836 was eliminated.
With respect to sufficiency of title the Court has ruled in two cases, in the case of People
v. Carlos, it states that, the Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as
sufficient to reflect their contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in
its title, and it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of the content and in the case of
Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections which provides that the Constitutional requirement
that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably construed so as not
to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a practical,
rather than technical, construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that
general subject.
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly
illustrated and explained in Central Capiz v. Ramirez. The Court further stated that this provision
of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of
legislative procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to
declare void any statute not conforming to this constitutional provision.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby

declared null and void, in so far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the
elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional. The restraining order issued in our resolution
on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board

Facts:
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and
purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code. On October 23, 1986,
the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and
Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers
Association, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's
opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete
protection of their rights and that their "survival and very existence is threatened by the
unregulated proliferation of film piracy."

Issue:
Whether or not Section 10 of PD 1987 which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross
receipts payable to the local government is not germane to the subject matter thereof.

Ruling:
The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to
achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute
wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are
related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is that the
constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as
to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given practical rather than
technical construction.
Section 10 of the foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the decree, which is the
regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed
in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation, it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. The express purpose of the decree to
include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. The
title of the decree, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and
reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in
the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Philippine Judges Association vs Prado, supra

Facts:

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is
asserted by the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute
and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these
measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at
the same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 whichentitled, "An
Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith." It was implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through
its Circular No.92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its
Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7354 embraces more than one subject and does not
express its purposes.

Ruling:

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354 agreees to its title and it does not violate the
Constitution. Article VI, Sec. 26, of the Constitution provides that "Every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." However, the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has
been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all
the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the
general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be
unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.

The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a
more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its
nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the
title of the said law.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, supra

Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods
and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending
the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not pass 3 readings as required by the
Constitution and that the titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197 do not embrace only
one subject.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI Section 26 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI, §26 (1) of the Constitution which provides that
"Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof." By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[Restructure] The
Value-Added Tax (Vat) System [By] Widening Its Tax Base And Enhancing Its
Administration, And For These Purposes Amending And Repealing The Relevant
Provisions Of The National Internal Revenue Code, As Amended And For Other
Purposes," Congress thereby clearly expresses its intention to amend any provision of
the NIRC which stands in the way of accomplishing the purpose of the law.
On the other hand, S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the
same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that
of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President
the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be
dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Tan vs. Del Rosario 237 SCRA 324

Facts:
Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued
implementation of the Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the Simplified
Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code and the validity of Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93.
They contend that the title of House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic Act No.
7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7496 violates Art. VI Section 26 (1) of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to
prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor
any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even
fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications
of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. Republic Act No.
7496 sufficiently met the above objectives of the fundamental law and anything else
would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which could not have been the
intendment of the constitutional mandate.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, supra

Facts:
There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds. The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of good
sand properties as well as on the saleor exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of
the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act
No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
itsadministration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
Issue: Whether or not the President’s Certification is valid pursuant to Article VI section
27 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are distinct and
unrelated measures also accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's)
contention that because the President separately certified to the need for the immediate
enactment of these measures, his certification was ineffectual and void. The certification
had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which at the moment was being
considered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the
President to certify as many bills as are presented in a house of Congress even though
the bills are merely versions of the bill he has already certified. It is enough that he
certifies the bill which, at the time he makes the certification, is under consideration.
Since on March 22, 1994 the Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which
had to be certified. For that matter on June 1, 1993 the President had earlier certified H.
No. 9210 for immediate enactment because it was the one which at that time was being
considered by the House. This bill was later substituted, together with other bills, by H.
No. 11197.
As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained
in the main decision that the phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies not only the
requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the
members three days before its passage" but also the requirement that before a bill can
become a law it must have passed "three readings on separate days." There is not only
textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Gonzalez vs. Macaraig 191 SCRA 452

Facts:
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased
certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to
the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to
the President for consideration and approval.
On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the
same to have become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions
and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed.
On 11 April 1989, the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of
Section 55, and the implementation of Rep. Act No. 6688 was assailed.
Issue: Whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional and without effect.
Ruling:
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto
a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters
that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by
the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and
rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to
veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the
budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated
as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some “particular appropriation” therein. The challenged “provisions” fall
short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed “provisions” do not relate to any particular
or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by
Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be
made to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source
indicated by petitioners themselves, i.e., the “Legislative Budget Research and
Monitoring Office” (Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more
of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather
than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY
’90) although labelled as “provisions,” are actually inappropriate provisions that should
be treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Bengzon vs. Drilon, supra

Facts:
On June 20, 1953 Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement
pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have
rendered at least 20 years service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the
Government or in both, having attained the age of 70 years or who resign by reason of
incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. However, President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 644 repealing Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic
Act No. 3595 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the
prevailing rates of salaries.
House Bill No. 16297 was passed by the Congress for the reenactment of the
repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. President
Aquino, however vetoed it on the ground that according to her "it would erode the very
foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce
strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No.
6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said
that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials
whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over
those of the vast majority of our civil service servants."
Issue: Whether or not the veto of the President on House Bill No. 16297 is
constitutional.
Ruling:
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also
provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not absolute. Section 27(2), Article
VI, Constitution states that, “The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object.”
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its
entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines,
provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto
power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of government
and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The
President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its
undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item
veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable
appropriation or revenue measure. The Constitution provides that only a particular item
or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate
bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of the same item.
Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of
repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating unto the Presidency legislative powers which are
beyond its authority. The President has no power to enact or amend statutes
promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The President's
power is merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Philconsa vs. Enriquez

Facts: The General Appropriation Bill of 1994, was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on
December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in
the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating
budgets. The President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act No.
7663. On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions
of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in either House of
Congress to override the vetoes.
Issue: Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for
the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights,
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges
(SUC’s) are constitutional;
Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional
Ruling: The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the
repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the
President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If
some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that
purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special
laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy”
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended
70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly
comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the DOH is an “appropriate” provision.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the
AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization
program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval,
is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper
occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos.
2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being
“inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the
trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of
the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec.
10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is
therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund
for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of
Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to
defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But
even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such
intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the
Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain
when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the
guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into
execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas vs. Tan

Facts:
The VAT is a tax levied on a wide range of goods and services. It is a tax on the
value, added by every seller, with aggregate gross annual sales of articles and/or
services, exceeding P200,00.00, to his purchase of goods and services, unless exempt.
VAT is computed at the rate of 0% or 10% of the gross selling price of goods or gross
receipts realized from the sale of services. The VAT is said to have eliminated privilege
taxes, multiple rated sales tax on manufacturers and producers, advance sales tax, and
compensating tax on importations. The framers of EO 273 that it is principally aimed to
rationalize the system of taxing goods and services; simplify tax administration; and
make the tax system more equitable, to enable the country to attain economic recovery.
The Philippine sales tax system, prior to the issuance of EO 273, was essentially a
single stage value added tax system computed under the "cost subtraction method" or
"cost deduction method" and was imposed only on original sale, barter or exchange of
articles by manufacturers, producers, or importers. Subsequent sales of such articles
were not subject to sales tax. However, with the issuance of PD 1991 on 31 October
1985, a 3% tax was imposed on a second sale, which was reduced to 1.5% upon the
issuance of PD 2006. Reduced sales taxes were imposed not only on the second sale,
but on every subsequent sale, as well. EO 273 merely increased the VAT on every
sale to 10%, unless zero-rated or exempt.
Issue: Whether or not EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive, in
violation of the provisions of Art. VI, Sec. 28(1) of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
The petitioners assertion that EO 273 is violating the provisions of Art. VI, Sec.
28(1) of the 1987 Constitution is not supported by facts and circumstances to warrant
their conclusions. They have failed to adequately show that the VAT is oppressive,
discriminatory or unjust. Petitioners merely rely upon newspaper articles which are
actually hearsay and have evidentiary value. To justify the nullification of a law. there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication. As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of
a valid tax.
The sales tax adopted is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the
public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or
services by persons engage in business with an aggregate gross annual sales
exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its
application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products,
spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower
and within the reach of the general public.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Province of Abra vs. Judge Hernando

Facts:
The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from real estate tax,
through an action for declaratory relief. A summary judgment was made granting the
exemption without hearing the side of the Province of Abra.

Issue: Whether or not the properties of the Bishop of Bangued are tax-exempt.

Ruling:
The 1935 and the present Constitutions differ in language as to the exemption of
religious property from taxes as they should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually”
and “directly” used for religious purposes. However, the change should not be ignored
and it must be duly taken into consideration. There must also be proof therefore of the
actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or
charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation.
Herein, the judge accepted at its face the allegation of the Bishop instead of
demonstrating that there is compliance with the constitutional provision that allows an
exemption. There was an allegation of lack of jurisdiction and of lack of cause of action,
which should have compelled the judge to accord a hearing to the province rather than
deciding the case immediately in favor of the Bishop. Exemption from taxation is not
favored and is never presumed, so that if granted, it must be strictly construed against
the taxpayer. There must be proof of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings,
and improvements for religious (or charitable) purposes to be exempted from taxation.
The case was remanded to the lower court for a trial on merits.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Abra Valley College vs. Aquino

Facts:
On June 8, 1972 the properties of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. was sold
at public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid real property taxes thereon and the
same was sold to Paterno Millare who offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 and a
Certificate of Sale in his favor was issued by the defendant Municipal Treasurer.
The trial court among others, found the following: (a) that the school is
recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School and College
Courses, and has a school population of more than one thousand students all in all; (b)
that it is located right in the heart of the town of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza
and about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; (c) that the elementary
pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street; (d) that the high school and
college students are housed in the main building; (e) that the Director with his family is
in the second floor of the main building; and (f) that the annual gross income of the
school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos.

Issue: Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for
educational purposes

Ruling:
It must be stressed that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for
in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable
emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.
Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is
neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second
floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and
his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is
complimentary to the main or primary purpose, the lease of the first floor thereof to the
Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education.It will be noted however that the aforementioned
lease appears to have been raised for the first time in this Court. That the matter was
not taken up in the court is really apparent in the decision of respondent Judge. No
mention thereof was made in the stipulation of facts, not even in the description of the
school building by the trial judge, both neither embodied in the decision nor as one of
the issues to resolve in order to determine whether or not said properly may be
exempted from payment of real estate taxes.
Indeed, it is axiomatic that facts not raised in the lower court cannot be taken up
for the first time on appeal. Nonetheless, as an exception to the rule, this Court has held
that although a factual issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of
substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual matter.
"The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not
assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision." (Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 645 [1984]).
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that
the school building as well as the lot where it is built should be taxed, not because the
second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential
purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes.
However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half
of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works

Facts:
Provincial Governor Wenceslao Pascual instituted this action for declaratory
relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which appropriates funds for
public works particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road
terminals. However, some of the feeder roads as alleged and as contained in the
tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision
roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private
respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not
connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway.
On May, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council
of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of
Pasig, Rizal and the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the
donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of
them. However, no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was,
executed.

Issue: Whether or not the appropriation of funds is valid.

Ruling:
No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct
object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not
the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited
by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the
promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does
not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether
the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of
the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally
serve the public.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case
sufficiently justify petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and donation in
question; that this action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and that
the writ of preliminary injunction should have been maintained.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Aglipay vs. Ruiz

Facts:
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of
Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The designs of the postage stamps for printing is, in the center is
chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue,
green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange.
Petitioner Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

Issue: Whether or not issuing and selling of postage stamps is constitutional.

Ruling:
Yes. In the present case, the issuance of the postage stamps in question was
not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of
Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only
purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people". It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed,
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of
the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows. What
is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself, but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress.
It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be
said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and
purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its
activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere
incidental results not contemplated.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Guingona vs. Carague

Facts:
The automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81,
entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled
"Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of
the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the Guarantee
and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The 1990 automatic appropriation budget consists of P98.4 Billion (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,1 while
the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service in the 1990 budget.

Issue: Whether or not the appropriations are violative of section 29(l), Article VI of the
constitution.

Ruling:
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their
essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in
order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and
other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as
guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law
appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable
the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and
maintain the credit standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be
paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts
nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.
The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt
servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or
security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by
virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in
executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books
of the Treasury.
The Court, therefore, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81,
Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or
appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The
Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Osmena vs. Orbos

Facts:
On October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a
Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund .
The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and
imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from
increases in the world market prices of crude oil. Subsequently, the OPSF was
reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024,and ordered released
from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. The same Executive Order also
authorized the investment of the fund in government securities, with the earnings from
such placements accruing to the fund.
President Corazon C. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956 and promulgated Executive
Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil
companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of
domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery being left for
determination by the Ministry of Finance.
Petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . . P.D. 1956, as
amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust
fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated
there from shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated,
and not channeled to another government objective." Petitioner further points out that
since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State,
such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objective for which it was created."

Issue: Whether or not the creation of the trust fund violates Section 29(3), Article VI of
the Constitution.

Ruling:
To address the position of the petitioner on these issues, the Court cited the case
of Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al., which states that, “The foregoing
arguments suggest the presence of misconceptions about the nature and functions of
the OPSF. The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of
minimizing the frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment
and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products."
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes,
they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the
OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is
segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a
"trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review
of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional
description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Philconsa vs. Enriquez

Facts:
The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and
identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets.
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Countrywide Development Fund of
P2,977,000,000.00 to "be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries."
Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to
propose and identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide
Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since
said power in an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue that the
proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the
repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the appropriation of fund is constitutional.

Ruling:
The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation
must take into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation
of the political branches of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven
allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members of Congress, with the
members close to the Congressional leadership or who hold cards for "horse-trading,"
getting more than their less favored colleagues. The members of Congress also had to
reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power to cancel
from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is
also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and
their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their
respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

First Lepanto Ceramics Inc. vs. CA

Facts:
On December 10, 1992, BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its
registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually, oppositor
Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-
Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom.
Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with
respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.
Acting on the petition, respondent court required the BOI and petitioner to
comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why no injunction should issue.
Respondent court temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision.
On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift
Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction
over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. However, respondent
court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the
decisions of the Board of Investments.

Ruling:
Yes. The authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it by the
BOI must be deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9, to be exercised
by it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91.
In the provision of B.P. 129 is the laudable objective of providing a uniform
procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the
bench and the bar. Equally laudable is the twin objective of B.P. 129 of unclogging the
docket of this Court to enable it to attend to more important tasks.
Under this contextual backdrop, the Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P.
129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of
Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial
agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the
BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the
substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from
decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be
respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this
agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e.,
fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to
appeal.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226
insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the
BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously
allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court
of Appeals.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Diaz vs. CA

Facts:
On January 23, 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value
appraisal of its property in service. The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property
and equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990 at P1,141,774,000.00.ERB approved the
application of DLPC after deducting P14,800,000.00 worth of property and equipment
which were not used by DLPC in its operation.
On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.Court of Appeals subsequently
dismissed the petition causing petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration which
Court of Appeals similarly denied for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition.

Ruling:
The President also promulgated E.O. No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory
Board to replace the Board of Energy. Under Sec. 10 thereof, "[a] party adversely
affected by a decision, order or ruling of the Board x x x may file a petition to be known
as petition for review with the Supreme Court."
On 27 February 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated Circular No. 1-91, par. (1)
of which specifically provides that the proper mode of appeal from any quasi-judicial
agency, including ERB, is by way of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the
advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the
result that it cannot be deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the
Board of Energy, now ERB, remains (Cf. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 7 October 1994).If the appeal is brought to either Court
(Supreme Court or Court of Appeals) by the wrong procedure, the only course of action
open to it is to dismiss the appeal. There is no longer any justification for allowing
transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to another.
Prior to Circular No. 1-91, the Supreme Court promulgated Circular No. 2-90
dated 9 March 1990, Item No. 4 of which states that "[a]n appeal taken to either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed". Paragraph (d) of said Circular No. 2-90 also provides that "[n]o transfer of
appeals erroneously taken to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals to
whichever of these Tribunals has appropriate appellate jurisdiction will be allowed;
continued ignorance or willful disregard of the law on appeals will not be tolerated."
Consequently, the Court of Appeals was correct when it held that contrary
to petitioners' stand, the Supreme Court's Resolution dated September 8, 1992,
referring 'this case to the Court of Appeals for further disposition' was not a directive for
this court to disregard the above circulars and precedents. Rather the said SC
resolution could mean only that this court should dispose of the subject petition in
conformity with, and not in violation of, those circulars and precedents.
Ella Yvonne T. Ansino
Section JD 1B
Constitutional Law 1

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs Comelec

Facts:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227, which among others,
provided for the creation of the Subic Economic Zone. The American navy turned over the Subic
military reservation to the Philippines government on November 24, 1992. Immediately,
petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-
ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan
Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12
of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. They submitted the said act to the Office
of the President.
On the other hand, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition
with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition of respondents by promulgating
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend
certain provisions of RA 7227, particularly those concerning the matters cited in items (A), (B),
(K), (E), and (G) of private respondent's petition. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong also
informed respondents that items (D) and (H) had already been referred to and favorably acted
upon by the government agencies concerned, such as the Bases Conversion Development
Authority and the Office of the President. Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of
their petition, herein respondents resorted to their power initiative under the Local Government
Code of 1991,4 Sec. 122 paragraph (b).
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein
a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the scheduled
Referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the
assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of
the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan".
Issue: WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10.
Ruling: Respondent Comelec commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and
implementing Resolution No. 2848.
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an
initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act,12 Congress differentiated one term
from the other. From this differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to
supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and
canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in
the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate.
This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should
thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon
separately. Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject
shall be submitted to the electorate,"although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an
initiative"
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of
the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers
belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may issue relevant and
adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our
Constitution.