• political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution,

are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to

which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government
• grave abuse of discretion to mean the capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility

Article VIII

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Case Summary of Marbury v. Madison

▪ Madison failed to finalize the former president’s appointment of William Marbury
as Justice of the Peace.
▪ Marbury directly petitioned the Supreme Court for an equitable remedy in the
form of a writ of mandamus.
▪ The Supreme Court held that although Marbury was entitled to a remedy,
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 expanding the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction was unconstitutional.
▪ Prior to this case, no law had been rendered unconstitutional. The major
significance of Marbury v. Madison is that it helped define the
original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court.
Marbury v. Madison Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:
Towards the end of his presidency, John Adams appointed William Marbury as
Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia. After assuming office, President
Thomas Jefferson ordered James Madison not to finalize Marbury’s
appointment. Under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Marbury brought
an action against Madison in the United States Supreme Court requesting the
Court to issue a writ of mandamus to force delivery of the appointment.
Procedural History:
 Marbury directly approached the Supreme Court to compel Madison, Jefferson’s
Secretary of State, to deliver the commission to Marbury.
Issues and Holdings:
1. Does Marbury hold a right to his judicial appointment? Yes
2. Is Marbury entitled to a remedy under U.S. law? Yes
3. Is Marbury entitled to a writ of mandamus under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789? No
Judgment:
Chief Justice John Marshall denied issuing a writ of mandamus.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
The United States Supreme Court has the authority to review both the legislative
acts of congress and laws to determine if they comply with the Constitution.
Reasoning:
▪ Justice Marshall held that although Marbury was entitled to his commission,
the United States Supreme Court could not hear the case because it lacked
original jurisdiction.
1. Marbury was lawfully appointed as Justice of the Peace through the president’s
(Adams) signing of Marbury’s commission and Senate confirmation.
2. Under federal law, Marbury is entitled to a remedy. Whether or not Marbury may
receive a remedy is contingent upon whether the appointment made Marbury an
agent of the president or assigned a duty by law. If appointed as a political agent
of the president, Marbury is not entitled to a remedy. However, if Marbury was
deprived of the ability to carry out a duty assigned to him by law, Marbury is
entitled to a remedy. Here, Adams gave legal title to the office of Justice of the
Peace to Marbury for the length of the appointment. Madison interfered with
Marbury’s legal title when he refused to finalize Marbury’s appointment. As a
result, Marbury is entitled to a remedy.
3. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorizing the United States Supreme
Court jurisdiction to provide the remedy of a writ of mandamus is
unconstitutional. The Judiciary Act of 1789 permits the Supreme Court to
exercise original jurisdiction over causes of actions for writs of mandamus. The
problem is the provision directly conflicts with the Constitution, specifically
Article III. Article III serves as a limitation on the types of cases the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over. Cases not within the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction may fall under the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. In short,
Section 13 of The Act is unconstitutional since it attempts to expand the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions:
Unanimous decision
Significance:
The holding of Marbury v. Madison established the United States Supreme
Court’s power to determine whether a law passed by Congress was constitutional
(Judicial Review). Prior to this case, it was clear that laws conflicting with the
Constitution were invalid, but the branch of government who determined validity
had not been established.

The government pursued a policy of deregulation by enacting Republic Act No.

8180 (R.A. No. 8180) or the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.
However, the law was decided to be invalid because its provisions on tariff
differential, inventory requirements, and predatory pricing inhibited fair
competition, encouraged monopolistic power, and interfered with the free
interaction of market forces. Congress enacted a new oil deregulation law, R.A.
No. 8479. This time, Congress excluded the offensive provisions found in the
invalidated law. Nonetheless, petitioner Garcia again sought to declare the
new oil deregulation law unconstitutional on the ground that it violated Article
XII, Section 19 of the Constitution. He specifically objected to Section 19 of R.A.
No. 8479 which prescribed the period for removal of price control on gasoline
and other finished petroleum products and set the time for the full deregulation
of the local downstream oil industry. He averred that Section 19 of R.A. No.
8479 is "glaringly pro-oligopoly, anti-competition, and anti-people", and thus
asked the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional.
For the second time, petitioner Garcia presents petition for certiorari and raises
the same issue of the constitutionality of Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479.

Issue:
Is the Court bound to decide for the unconstitutionality of the said law?

Ruling:
It bears reiterating at the outset that the deregulation of the oil industry is
a policy determination of the highest order. It is unquestionably a priority
program of Government. The Department of Energy Act of 1992 expressly
mandates that the development and updating of the existing Philippine energy
program "shall include a policy direction towards deregulation of the power and
energy industry."
This is outside our jurisdiction. The judgment on the issue is a settled
matter and only Congress can reverse it.
Petitioner Garcia invokes the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial
review, which power is expressly recognized under Section 4 (2), Article VIII of
the Constitution. 10 The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to
test the validity of executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the
Constitution. 11 Through such power, the judiciary enforces and upholds the
supremacy of the Constitution. 12 For a court to exercise this power, certain
requirements must first be met, namely:

(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
 (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Garcia didn’t meet 1st requirement. He invoked that the removal of price
controls would ensure monopoly and said that this violates Article XII, Section
19 of the Constitution. This Section states:
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest
so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.
Congress, by enacting R.A. No. 8479, determined that this objective is better
realized by liberalizing the oil market, instead of continuing with a highly
regulated system enforced by means of restrictive prior controls. This legislative
determination was a lawful exercise of Congress' prerogative and one that this
Court must respect and uphold. Regardless of the individual opinions of the
Members of this Court, we cannot, acting as a body, question the wisdom of a
co-equal department's acts. The courts do not involve themselves with or delve
into the policy or wisdom of a statute; it sits, not to review or revise legislative
action, but to enforce the legislative will. For the Court to resolve a clearly non-
justiciable matter would be to debase the principle of separation of powers that
has been tightly woven by the Constitution into our republican system of
government.
The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil
industry is a policy determination by Congress which this Court cannot overturn
without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers.

BIRAOGO VS PTC

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
 x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all
the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the
President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
“Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and
the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those
of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and

argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in
any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No.
141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-
judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E.
O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping
the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a
body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they
are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It
provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that
the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise
of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine
if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing

funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive
of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever
funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very
source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to
the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement
those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing
of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and
the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that
it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No.

1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined
in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid

classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which
all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.