STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES

CHAPTER I

1. Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966

Issue/s: W/N construction should be employed in this case and W/N the contest violates the provisions
of the Postal Law.

Ruling: Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning
of the words used in a certain law. In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words therein. Lottery extends to all
schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three essential elements of a lottery are: (1)
consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift enterprise is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under
which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement, each purchaser is given a chance
to win a prize. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery. In the
present case, the element of consideration is not observed. No payment or purchase of merchandise was
required for the privilege to participate. Therefore, the contest is inviolate of the Postal Law.

2. Judge Rodolfo T. Allarde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103578, January 29, 1993

Issue/s: Whether or not the P4,000.00 monthly allowance that the petitioner had been receiving from the
Municipality of Muntinlupa should be included in the computation of his retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1438.

Ruling: No. As clearly specified in the law, only transportation, living and representation allowances
may be included in the computation of the first five-year lump sum retirement benefits for members of
the judiciary.
Accordingly, the provisions of Section 3, P.D. No. 1438, which are clear and unambiguous,
should be given their plain and natural meaning. Inasmuch as the law limits the computation of the lump
sum of 5 years’ gratuity to “the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of
transportation, living and representation allowances that the judge was receiving on the date of his
retirement,” it is understood that other allowances are excluded.
Petitioner’s allowances were non reimbursable in nature as he failed to prove that they were only
transportation, living and representation allowances. Such conclusion can be drawn by his certification
in a sample voucher that expenses were incurred by him in the performance of his duties. Such
allowances, therefore, are expense items and cannot be equated with salary or compensation.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Commission on Audit, the
petition for review is hereby DISMISSED.

3. People v. Patricio Amigo, G.R. No. 116719, January 18, 1996

Issue/s: Whether or Not the penalty imposed upon the accused "Reclusion Perpetua" be modified or
reduced by virtue of Section 19 (1) of Article III of the Constitution which prohibits the imposition of
death penalty.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court hold that Article III, Section 19 (1) does not change the penalty periods
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only in so far as it prohibits the imposition
of death penalty. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains the same.
 Thus, a person originally subject to death penalty and another who committed the murder
without the attendance of any modifying circumstances will now be both punishable with the same
medium period although the former is conceitedly more guilty than the latter. But that is the will of the
constitution and the duty of the court is to apply the law, disregarding the sympathy or pity for an
accused. Dura Lex Sed Lex.

4. Security Bank and Trust Co. v. RTC-Manila, G.R. No. 113926, October 23, 1996

Issue/s: W/N the rate of interest on a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, as stipulated in a
contract, far in excess of the ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, prevail over Section
2 of Central Bank Circular No. 905 which prescribes that the rate of interest thereof shall continue to be
12% per annum and W/N the 23% rate of interest per annum agreed upon by petitioner bank and
respondents is allowable and not against the Usury Law?

Ruling: Yes, the rate per contract prevails.

From the examination of the records, it appears that indeed the agreed rate of interest as
stipulated on the three (3) promissory notes is 23% per annum. The applicable provision of law is the
Central Bank Circular No. 905 which took effect on December 22, 1982:

Sec. 1. The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on a loan
or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured,
that may be charged or collected by any person, whether natural or judicial, shall not be subject to any
ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended.

Only in the absence of stipulations will the 12% rate be applied or if the stipulated rate is grossly
excessive.

Further, Eusebio never questioned the rate. He merely expressed to negotiate the terms and
conditions. The promissory notes were signed by both parties voluntarily. Therefore, stipulations therein
are binding between them.

5. Songco, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 50999-51000, March 23, 1990

Issue/s: W/N earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the monthly salary of
Songco, et al. for the purpose of computing their separation pay.

Ruling: Yes. In the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of
the basic salary of the employee, but also of the transportation and emergency living allowances.

Even if the commissions were in the form of incentives or encouragement, so that the salesman
would be inspired to put a little more industry on jobs particularly assigned to them, still these
commissions are direct remunerations for services rendered which contributed to the increase of income
of the employee. Commission is the recompense compensation or reward of an agent, salesman,
executor, trustee, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the
amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and the
reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate that commissions are part of
Songco, et al's wage or salary.

If the opposite view is adopted, i.e., that commissions do not form part of the wage or salary,
then in effect, we will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and, therefore, not
entitled to separation pay in the event of discharge from employment. This narrow interpretation is not
in accord with the liberal spirit of the labor laws, and considering the purpose of separation pay which is,
 to alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown to the streets to face the harsh
necessities of life.

Since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual transactions attributable to
Song, et al., these should be included in their separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be
taken into account is the average commission earned during their last year of employment.

6. Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995

Issue/s: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of the party is a
violation of R.A. 4200.

Ruling: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it shall be
unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by
means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.

The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored
by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
“even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, therefore plainly supports the view held
by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

7. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993

Facts: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a
suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave
from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of
her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void
ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad
insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide
a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.

Issue/s: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.

Ruling: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that
 his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from
being charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases,
are the following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the
net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in
default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage
in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from
the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void
ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of
the other are revoked by operation of law.

Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their
properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is
the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.

8. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005

Facts: On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Courtbfor the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton.

At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he
berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person,
it would be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he
reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the
day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss,
Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.

Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.

Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to
leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed.
 However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in
Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she
had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan
decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still
to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.

On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. The police
authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the
National Bureau of Investigation on July 9, 2001.

On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on August 4,
2003, affirming the decision of the trial court.

Issue/s: Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the wife is valid

Ruling: No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the Court in
locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. It is the policy of the State
to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the
family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from
dissolution at the whim of the parties.

For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead
and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for
declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of
Appeals. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon
writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and
so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition
in the trial court, that his spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was already dead. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and set aside.

9. Re: Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the special allowance for
judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August
13, 2004

Issue/s: W/N the second 25% grant of the special allowance for judges be included in the computation
of his retirement benefits.

Ruling: No. After a careful evaluation of Judge Gustilo’s letter, the OCA’s memorandum and the Chief
Attorney’s report, the Court, regrettably, cannot grant the request of Judge Gustilo.

It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple application, not
interpretation or circumvention.6 With respect to the manner of computation of the retirement benefits in
light of the Special Allowance granted under Rep. Act No. 9227, Section 5 thereof, quoted anew below,
could not be any clearer:

Sec. 5. Inclusion in the Computation of Retirement Benefits. – For purposes of retirement, only the
allowances actually received and the tranche or tranches of the special allowance already implemented
and received pursuant to this Act by the justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the
equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized
under existing laws shall, at the date of their retirement, be included in the computation of their
respective retirement benefits.

A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of retirement, only the
allowances "actually received" and the tranche or tranches "already received and implemented," upon
the date of retirement, shall be included in the computation of the retirement benefits. Otherwise put,
before the Special Allowance could be considered in the computation of retirement benefits, it should
have been "actually received" and the tranche or tranches thereof should have been "already
implemented and received" at the date of retirement.

The Guidelines promulgated by this Court pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9227 is even more definite
as it used the term "accrued" in this wise: "only the special allowance actually received and that which
has accrued at the time of retirement shall be included." As correctly reasoned by the Chief Attorney:

Notably, the phrase "has accrued at the time of retirement" is used in the Guidelines instead of
"the tranche or tranches of the special allowance already implemented and received" which is used in
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227. Nevertheless, the same meaning is conveyed. The word "accrue" means
"to come into existence as an enforceable claim: vest as a right" or "to come by way of increase or
addition: arise as a growth or result" or "to be periodically accumulated in the process of time whether as
an increase or a decrease." Hence, a Special Allowance that has not yet come into existence as an
enforceable claim or has not yet vested on the recipient judge as a matter of right cannot be considered
in the computation of retirement benefits.10

Indeed, "accrue" in its past tense is "in sense of due and demandable; vested."11 In the case of
Judge Gustilo, on the date of his retirement, the second tranche of the Special Allowance has not
accrued as yet; hence, it cannot be said that the same is due and demandable or that it has vested insofar
as he is concerned.

The Chief Attorney, likewise, correctly posits that the strict application of Section 5 of Rep. Act
No. 9227 is called for by the fact that, under Section 3 thereof,12 the source for the Special Allowance is
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), established under Presidential Decree No. 1949, which basically
comes from the docket fees paid by litigants:

... As such, the JDF as a fund source is not constant or fixed in amount, as its amount
depends on the amount collected by the courts and the amount of increase in docket fees that the
Court would impose. The fact of the JDF becoming insufficient has been foreseen by the Court
and is reflected in the second paragraph of 4.1 of the Guidelines quoted above. It is worth noting
that until now, the first tranche of the Special Allowance has been received only for the months
of 11 November 2003 until February 2004. The delay in receipt thereof may continue if courts
nationwide do not timely transmit the reports of collections to the OCA, as the JDF should be
disbursed only if the reports of collections and the deposits under the JDF account for the Special
Allowance tally in accordance with accounting and auditing rules.

While this Court had, in certain cases, adopted a liberal stance in interpreting retirement laws in
favor of the retiree, it cannot do so in this case because, as earlier stated, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227
 is quite clear and unambiguous. In other words, there is no room for interpretation but only
simple application of the law.

ACCORDINGLY, the request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% or second tranche
of the Special Allowance granted under Rep. Act No. 9227 be included in the computation of his
retirement benefits is DENIED.

10. Francisco et al., v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), G.R. No. 160261,
November 10, 2003

Issue/s: 1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. W/N the second impeachment complaint is
valid.

Ruling: 1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for
that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence,
or set going.

As Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
means “to perform or facilitate the first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records
to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean
the filing of the verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House. This is also based
on the procedure of the U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the
impeachment complaint.

2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

11. Mantrade/FMMC Division Employees and Workers Union, v. Froilan M. Bacungan, G.R. No. L-
48437 , September 30, 1986

Issue/s: Whether or not Mantrade Development Corporation is not under legal obligation to pay holiday
pay to its monthly paid employees.

Ruling: No. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, issued
by the then Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code’s
provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion. The
questioned Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretary’s Policy Instruction No. 9
add another excluded group, namely ‘employees who are uniformly paid by the month.’

While the additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid
employees have already been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must
 be in the law if it is to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor
more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Therefore, respondent
corporation is ordered to grant holiday pay to its monthly salaried employees.

12. Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70443, September 15, 1986

Facts: Braulio Conde (Conde), et. al. filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
He also filed a petition against Gutierrez (Gutierrez) for fraud. Conde claims that Gutierrez used fraud to
acquire absolute ownership of the properties of Esteban Guiterrez (Esteban) and Fermina Ramos
(Fermina) by succession.

Conde, et. al. initially filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land before
the Court of First Instance in Tarlac (Now Regional Trial Court Branch 64). After a full blown trial in
the RTC Branch 64, Marcello Gutierrez lost the suit and was ordered to pay the Conde, et. al.

Gutierrez filed a petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) which then reversed the decision of the
RTC ordering Conde, et. al. to deliver the property to Gutierrez. The decision became final and
executory on December 20, 1982.

Conde, et. al. filed a petition before the RTC Branch 56, Third Judicial Region in Capas, Tarlac
to annul the judgment of the CA which was then dismissed for it had no jurisdiction to annul the
judgment of the CA.

Conde, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration before the respondent court which was then
denied. A petiton for certiorari, mandamus, and a writ of injuction was filled before the Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) and raffled to the Third Special Case Division. The court dismissed the case for
lack of merrit on the grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction to annul the IAC.

Finally, Conde, et. al., filed a motion for reconsideration to this court (Supreme Court - SC)
where it was denied.

Issue/s: Whether or not the courts have acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the case of fraud

Ruling: The Petition is DISMISSED.

There are two kinds of fraud, Intrinsic and Extrinsic. Intrinsic fraud is the presentation of false
documents before the courts, while extrinsic fraud is a fraudulent scheme that would prevent a party
from having his day in court from presenting his/her case.

The CA was correct in determining that the fraud committed by Gutierrez was intrinsic in nature.
Even if the contention of Conde, et. al. were true it would be of no merit because intrinsic fraud is not
sufficient to attack a judgment of the court.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The respondents' counsel, Atty.
Adelaido G. Rivera is fined Five Hundred Pesos (P500) for his failure to act on the order to file
comment.

SO ORDERED.
13. Go Ka Toc & Sons v. Rice & Corn Board, G.R. No. L-23607, May 23, 1967

Facts: Plaintiff-appellee Go Ka Toe Sons & Co. is a duly registered partnership, not wholly owned by
Filipinos, engaged since 1958 in the manufacture, processing and marketing of vegetable oil extracted
from corn, rice, copra,... soybean, peanuts, fish, and other vegetable products.

On August 2, 1960, Republic Act 3018 was approved, Section 1 of which prohibited, among
others, partnerships whose capital was not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines... from engaging,
directly or indirectly, in the rice and/or corn industry. The law was to take effect on January 1, 1961.
However, Section 3(a) allowed such partnerships, upon registration with the... municipal treasurer, to
continue business until two years from and after January 1, 1961.

On November 21, 1960, the newly created Rice and Corn Board issued Resolution No. 10,
pursuant to Section 6 of the law, defining the term "by-product" used in the law and on July 10, 1961,
the RICOB issued Gen. Circular No. 1, as amended, which defined the term "capital investment" used in
Section 3 of Republic Act 3018 which limits the maximum amount of capital investments of alien
persons and... entities engaged in the rice and/or corn industry to the amount stated in their statement
made pursuant to Section 2 of the law.

Plaintiff-appellee, having been required by agents of RICOB to register in accordance with

Section 2 of the law and the latter's resolution,... filed action in the Court of First Instance to declare the
said law and RICOB Resolution No. 10, Nov. 21, 1960 and Gen. Circular No. 1, July 10, 1961, as
inapplicable to it to abbreviate the proceedings, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts.
Thereupon, the lower court rendered judgment (a) declaring Republic Act 3018 not applicable to
plaintiff's business; (b) declaring null and void RICOB's Resolution No. 10, dated November 21, 1960
and General Circular No. 1, as amended, dated July 10, 1961 in so far as they were and are being made
applicable to plaintiff's business and (c) making and declaring permanent and perpetual the preliminary
writ of injunction issued in the case.

Admittedly, plaintiff-appellee has stopped from engaging in the purchase and sale of rice and/or
corn since the lapse of the two year period from the effectivity of the law. It has limited its activities to
the... trade, processing and manufacture of corn and rice oil from raw materials consisting of corn germ
proper or embryo ("sungo") and "tahup", as well as from rice husk which it secures from others who mill
rice and... corn. In the processing and manufacture of corn oil, plaintiff also produces a residue called
"corn meal" or "corn meal germ" which it sells and trades.

Issues: W/N the activities of the company are covered by Republic Act 3018?

Ruling: Yes. Now, "tahup", "sungo" and "rice husk", which plaintiff acquires from rice and corn millers
and from which it manufactures the vegetable oil and produces the "corn meal" or "corn germ meal" that
it subsequently distributes and sells are clearly by-products of rice/and or corn.

Although the term "by-product" is not particularly and specifically stated in the title of Republic
Act 3018, its inclusion in the body of the law is not invalid, as the lower court held, since it is germane
to the subject matter expressed in the title of the law.

Neither is the statutory inclusion of said term in the definition of the phrase "rice and/or corn
industry" an invalid legislative usurpation of the court's function to interpret the laws, as the lower court
also ruled. This definition is part... of the law itself.

Since plaintiff-appellee is covered by the statute, there is no necessity for an extensive discussion
regarding the validity of Resolution No. 10 of November 21, 1960. The power and authority of
 appellant RICOB to issue such rules and regulations implementing the law, proceeds from the law itself.
Said resolution, by enumerating some specific examples of by-products of rice and/or corn, merely
carried out the provisions of law. And the sole reason why the lower court invalidated it, was its
mistaken stand that the term "by-product" ought not to have been made a part of the statute.

14. People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967

Facts: The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On
August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made
revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the
gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by
Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented
the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and
which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.

Issue/s: Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal
possession of firearms.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law
is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."

The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such
officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.

The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list
therefore the accused is not exempted.

15. Luzon Surety Co. v. De Garcia, G.R. No. L-25659, October 31, 1969

Facts: Luzon Surety granted a crop loan to Chavez based on a surety bond executed in favor of
Philippine National Bank. Garcia was one of the guarantors of the indemnity agreement. On April 1957,
PNB filed complaint against Luzon Surety. This subsequently prompted Luzon Surety, on August of the
same year, to file a complaint against the guarantors (one of which was Garcia). The lower court ruled in
favor of PNB in the first case and ordered the guarantors in the second case to pay Luzon Surety. July
30, 1960, CFI issued a writ of execution for Garcia to pay the amount of P3,839. On August, the sheriff
levied his sugar quedans, conjugal property of the Garcia spouses. The Garcias filed a suit of injunction
which the lower court found in their favor based on Art. 161 of the CC. Luzon Surety appealed to the
CA which affirmed the lower court’s decision. Review through SC.

Issue/s: WON the signing of the indemnity agreement redounded to the benefit of the family and thus,
should fall under the liabilities of the conjugal partnership.

Ruling: No. The administrator’s obligations are only chargeable to the conjugal property if he believes
it is done for the benefit of the family. No proof was presented that Vicente Garcia, acting as surety or
guarantor, did so for the benefit of the family. Luzon Surety claims that the surety did benefit the family
 because it added to Garcia’s reputation as being trustworthy and enhanced his standing in the
community. This is too remote/fanciful a benefit to be considered in terms of what is provided for in Art.
161.

16. Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012, September 30,
1976

Facts: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to
reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The act
provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to
set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of
Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together
with all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).

Issue/s: W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

Ruling: The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all the
provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by
Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants
have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public
money or resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area
reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of
Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included, would
defeat the policy of legislation.

17. Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125183, September
29, 1997

Issue/s: Is proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power? More specifically, is
Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation?

Ruling: No. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. Notwithstanding the fact
that the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified upon the issue of res judicata,
there, exists a more basic reason for setting aside the appealed decision and this has reference to the
fundamental and gross error in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164. Proclamation No. 1716 was issued
by the late President Ferdinand Marcos in the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him. Being
a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of legislation.

Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-called bloodless
revolution of February 1986, President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power under a revolutionary
government. On March 24, 1986, she issued Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional
Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected and
convened under a new constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino
lost this legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. Proclamation No. 164 was issued on October
6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely in Congress.

The Supreme Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No 164 was an invalid exercise of
legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared void. The appealed decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby set aside. Public respondent DENR is hereby permanently enjoined from
enforcing Proclamation No. 164.

18. Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Insurance System, et al., G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
 Issue/s:

1. Whether or not Article XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the Constitution is self-executing.
2. Whether or not Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony

Ruling:

1. Article XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the Constitution is self-executing.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution,
is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe
a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.

2. Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino,
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which
have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930’s. It was the site of the
festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House
of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality.

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a
military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by
the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950’s
and 1960’s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political
convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions,
an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup
d’etat where an aspirant for vice-president was “proclaimed” President of the Philippine Republic.
 For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony.

Other matters discussed: Doctrine of constitutional supremacy

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution
that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.

19. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010

Facts: For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the
validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."

In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional
authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and
the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an
entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a
public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section
37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All
it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal,
civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

Issue/s: Is EO No. 1 unconstitutional?

Ruling: The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators
to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of
the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the
cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and
rights as members of the legislature before the Court.
 As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any
member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the
ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code?
Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any
agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.

Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition

thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an
office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an
office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the
question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section
31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an
"alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the
President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.
Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is
inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or
his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the
President to create a public office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission
pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to
create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a
delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of
the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate
flexibility in the organization of the national government.
 Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the
interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the
First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft
and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers
have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it.

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or
erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement
those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but
a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual
prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is
certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its investigation,"
under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is
shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. The same holds true with respect to the
DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code
is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the
President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view
of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class."Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification."

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
 sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle
for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is
vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government."

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the
power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on
the constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of
conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the
other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a
co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government isdone in consonance with the
authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional. GRANTED.

20. Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970)

Facts: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are
working from the purchasers where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor of the latter’s
intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court dismissed
petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold
tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the
jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else.
Moreover, the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share
tenants through judicial legislation, the section would have expressly said so.

Issue/s: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses
only leaseholders and not share tenants.

Ruling: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing “agricultural
lessee” to only “leasehold tenants”. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition
of agricultural share tenancy. The policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to
the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital
purpose of the statute.

21. Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-26419, October 16, 1970

Facts: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged real estate properties to
secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in
favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with
DBP was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding
 obligation out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised Petitioners of
the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on
June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the
foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public
auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP.

Issue/s: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the
Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in
declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953.

Ruling: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for which back pay
certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20,
1953). While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on
March 23, 1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there
was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.

22. Ferdinand E. Marcos et al., v. Raul Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

Facts: This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed under Sections 1 and 6 of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power
to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits
prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her
to do so.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family
to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those specically
enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and
what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her.

On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a
political question which is non-justiciable.

Issue/s: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling: Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. The right to return to one's
country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of
the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right
to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
i.e. , against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
 We hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope
of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government
is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the
national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power
is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the
common good.

The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of
even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of
limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests.

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good
against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power
to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the
people.

When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the
latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

We find that from the pleadings led by the parties that there exist factual bases for the President's
decision.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily
or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his
family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.