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Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano

Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016


Introduction:
Bill of rights vis a vis Power of the State
Tip: Keep your answer short and direct to the point. This is not the tume to display your literary prowess.
In the 1935 and 1973 Constitution there was no definition of judicial power
Note: This has been made a duty by the Constitution mandatorily to be performed by the courts. This is not
merely a power but a duty. Duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable….
Political question has been adversely affected due to the expanded power of the judiciary. Logic would dictate
that when there is an increase there will be a corresponding decrease.
Question of Policy: Should we legalize divorce here in the Philippines? (Political question) it involves the wisdom
of an act or even the morality of the act.
Should we legalize same sex marriage: political question
The APPOINTMENT or selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority
can decide.
Another example should we withdraw our membership with the UN: leave this to the president
Appointment made by the president is a political question. Hence, non-justiciable.
Is this law adopted in accordance with the law etc: Justiciable question: this will involve the application of the law

Justiciable question; definition of. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided
on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the
exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. Our inquiry is limited to whether such
statutory grant of disciplinary authority to the President violates the Constitution, particularly the core
constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of
the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No.
196232, January 28, 2014.

Courts are not supposed to enact laws


In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, “prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
the one question.”
Decided by the people in their sovereign capacity: forbidden territory  Correlate to the Local Government Code
or RA 7160: The concept of recall on the ground of lost of confidence: Section 8 Article 10: Term of Local
Officials
Here is another way of viewing this matter: If he happens to be a good local official the term of 3 years is very
short if he is a bad or a corrupt local official 3 years is very long.
Lawyers Leauge vs. Aquino: The 1st kind of political question an example of which is the question of legitimacy
of the government of Cory.
Ruling of the SC: We should no longer inquire into the motives of going to EDSA. It is an established fact that
since they are there Marcos fled to Hawaii and the Cory government was able to take control of the government
without substantial resistance and the international community recognized this government. This is not subject to
judicial review.
2nd type: full discretion/ authority
Legislative and executive branch
Article VII, Section 18:
1. Commander in Chief;
2. Martial Law;
3. Power to suspend the privilege of Habeas Corpus
Montenegro vs. Baker
Enrile vs. Morales: reverted to the political question doctrine. This resolved the issue once and for all.
What about the calling out power: IBP vs. Zamora  Do not tie the hands of the president and do not place him
in a legal straight jacket. On the spot decisions are allowable to avert massive loss of human lives subject to
unfettered judicial scrutiny. (this is the 2nd type of political question)
Comfort women case: Asia pacific region rape of Nanki  Roponggi property part of the Peace reparation
treaty Treaty amounted to a waiver of the claims of the aggrieved party According to the SC we cannot force
the President to bring the cause to Japan  In matters of foreign policy the president has sole discretion Full
discretionary authority.
Belgica vs. Ochoa: (REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW) No question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with
the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Advisory Opinion: Courts may not render advisory opinions. However, when it comes to international law ICJ
may render an advisory opinion. This is embodied in the UN Charter.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
TIP: find relevance in your study so that you will not easily forget the concepts.
OSG: protector of the government
The enumeration of the requisites for judicial review, correlate this with the defenses that the OSG may raise in
order to disallow a claim against the government.
Example: OSG may raise the first line defense that this is a political question hence it is not ripe for judicial review.

BRIEF HISTORY about the Kalayaan Islands or the Spratly Islands (Kalayaan Island Group/ KIG)
Marcos as an expert in international law knew what to do. He held electins in these islands. This is an act of
administration.

Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et al. Vs. Scott H. Swift, et al.


G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in
relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.

This is a case about the USS guardian an American vessel from Okinawa Japan. You can find an American Base
there. This vessel is on its way to Indonesia pero dumaan sa Subic along the way dumaan sa Tubbataha Reefa this
is along Sulu Sea. Pag dating sa Tubattaha Reef nabajora siya sumadsad yung barko. They filed for the issuance
of the Writ of Kalikasan. (Lecture)

LOCUS STANDI
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”10 Specifically, it is “a party’s
personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act
being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do
ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations.
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this Court has
jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability
of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states: Section 3.
The State may not be sued without its consent.

This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without the former’s consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine
which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends
only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who
had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial
actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

Issue: Will it prosper?

Held: No. SC said that the respondent is Admiral Swift. Applying the doctrine of the non-suability of the state.
Par in parem non habet imperio The naval vessel is considered as an extension of the territory to which it
belongs.

By virtue of the extrerritoriality principle: foreign embassies or foreign naval vessels.


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Extraterritoriality is now obsolete with the rise of modernization of nations.

Principle of sovereign equality of the sate. An equal may not assume jurisdiction over another equal otherwise
you will unduly vex the peace of nations. With regard to the action seeking damages the US Naval did not deny
liability all they want is a panel of experts to assess the damages caused. Case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.

The concept of intergenerational responsibility was once again invoked. Relate to the case of Oposa vs. Factoran in behalf
of generation yet to be born. This is a class suit because the parties are too numerous that it is impossible to bring them all
to court.

Guide post: Right to a healthful ecology Section 16 Article 2

Not because this right is not found in Article 3 it means that it is less important. Because the rights found in Article 3 are
pertaining to civil rights. This right is concerned with self-preservation and self-determination. This basic right need not
be written in the Constitution it should be deemed there from the inception of humankind.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY EXTERRITORIALITY
Obsolete Applicable

Guide post: Doctrine of State Immunity from suit. Section 3, Article 16


USA vs. Guinto, Justice Holmes:

The ethical basis of this doctrine is: There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law upon
which the right depends. Royal prerogative of dishonesty.

Basis: Par in parem non habet imperium: all states are considered as an equal and an equal cannot assert against another
state.
Doctrine of sovereign equality of the State.

Waiver of State Immunity from Suit:


1. State gives it consent to be sued;
2. Waiver

Express waiver
1. Through a general law: Act No. 3083 (applies to money claim arising from contract w/ the government
whether expressed or implied in relation with CA 237 as amended by PD 1445 or the general auditing law
one must file with the Commission on Audit.)
2. Special Law: Civil Code: Art 2180: the state may be held liable when acting through a special agent.
Defective maintenances of road, canal etc.
Guide post: Section 24 RA 7160 LGC.
Republic vs. Purisima: A mere lawyer may not waive the immunity of the State. Only Congress can validly waive
the immunity through the enactment of a general law or special law.

Implied Waiver
1. When state commences litigation against private party: It opens itself to a possible counterclaim. At the initiative
of the State.
2. When a State enters into a contract with a private party.
General Rule: It has come down to the level of a private party. However this is not absolute, an example of such is
US vs. Ruiz.

Distinguish between Acta Juri Imperii and Acta Jure Gestionis

ACTA JURE IMPERII ACTA JURE GESTIONIS


Governmental function sovereign capacity Commercial capacity or proprietary
No waiver of State Immunity There is waiver of immunity
USA vs. Guinto case

USA vs. Guinto: Cook hinahaluan ng wiwi yung soup. Q_Q (Bastos nito ah!)
Employment is in connection with the cafeteria of Camp John Hay this is a contract entered into its commercial
capacity.

Restrictive doctrine of State Immunity

You sue a public official:


Lansang vs. CA: General Rule
The doctrine of state immunity applies to complaints filed against public officers in the performance of his public
duty. Since he acts as an agent of the State.

This will not apply if the acts are unlawful and injurious to the rights of other people. They are not exempt in their
private capacity. Once they exceed their authority they are not immune from suit.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

Republic vs. Sandoval: Mendiola Massacre. A group of farmers who marched their way to Mendiola. The rally
was quite unruly so there was a violent dispersal because several death and injuries occurred among the
demonstrators. The guards here exceeded their authority so they should be personally liable.
BP 880 provides for the maximum tolerancerule: The police should observe this during rally.
What is maximum tolerance? The highest degree of restraint.
Sexual Harassment filed against public officers? Of course it is not within the duty of a public officer to commit
harassment as against any person.

We are a democratic and republican State, correlate this with Sec. 1 of Art. 11 (accountability of public officers)
public office is a public trust it is not a privilege there must always be a sense of accountability.
1. Public office is public trust it is not a privilege;
2. Public office is not inheritable ;
3. Outside the commerce of man not subject to a valid contract; Not subject to a term sharing agreement.

Abolition of an office Removal of an officer


The power to create public office carries
with it the power to abolish it.

Guidepost: Section 2 Article 11 ( The list is exclusive)


1. Supreme Court
2. Constitutional commissions
3. Ombudsman
2nd sentence under section 2 all other public officers as provided by law but may be removed but not by
impeachment.

GROUNDS
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution
2. Treason
3. Bribery
4. Graft and Corruption
5. Other high crimes
6. Betrayal of Public Trust

Enumeration is EXCLUSIVE.
In America there are only 3 > Initiated by the house of rep> Tried by the senate

POWER OF IMPEACHMENT
Impeachment
The method by which persons folding government
Positions of high authority, prestige, and dignity with definite tenure may be removed from office causes closely related to
their conduct as officials.
NOTE: It is a national inquest into the conduct of public men.
It is primarily intended for the protection of the State, not for the punishment of the offender. The penalties attached to
impeachment are merely incidental to the primary intention of protecting the people as a body politic.
IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS
1. President
2. Vice-president
3. Members of the Supreme Court
4. Members of the Constitutional Commissions
5. Ombudsman (1987 Constitution, Art. Xl. Sec. 2]
NOTE: The enumeration is exclusive.

GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT


1. Culpable violation of the Constitution
2. Treason
3. Bribery
4. Graft and Corruption
5. Other high crimes
6. Betrayal of public trust (1987 Constitution, Art Xl, Sec. 2]

NOTE: The enumeration is exclusive.


Steps in the impeachment process

1. Initiating impeachment case:


a. Verified complaint/resolution filed by any member of the HoR or any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any
member thereof;
b. Included in the order of business within 10
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Session days;
c. Referred to the proper committee within 3 session days from its inclusion.
d. The committee, after hearing, and by majority vote of all its members, shall submit its report to the HoR together with
the corresponding resolution;
e. Placing on calendar the Committee Resolution within 10 days from submission;
f. Discussion on the floor of the report;
g. A vote of at least 1/3 of all the members of the HoR shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution of the
Articles of Impeachment of the committee or override its contrary resolution.

2. Trial and Decision in impeachment proceedings


a. The Senators take an oath or affirmation
b. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the SC shall preside but shall not vote.
c. A decision of conviction must be concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of Senate.

Senators will not act as senators but rather as judges. That is why they are addressed as the honorable
senatorial judge. They are required to take an oath before the commencement of the trial.

PURPOSE OF THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE:


The purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold:
1. To prevent undue or too frequent harassment
2. To allow the legislature to do its principal task of legislation [Francisco, et ai, v. House of Rep., et aJ., G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003).
The consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of complaints. The
impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from
performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not
to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of lawmaking. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation
means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional
provision (Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, et al, G.R No. 193459, February 15,2011).
NOTE: Congress may look into separate complaints against an impeachable officer and consider the
inclusion of matters raised therein, in the adoption of the Articles of Impeachment.
Judicial review in impeachment proceedings: Given their concededly political character, the precise role
of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning
of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government (Chief
Justice v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200242. July 1 7, 2012). it is, by its nature, a sui generis
politico-legal process that signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as shown by the process
required to initiate the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited grounds for
Impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases; and the number of
votes required for a finding of guilt [Gonzales HI v. Office of the President, et al, G.R. 196231, January
28, 2014).
Take note: Former President Estrada and Chief Justice Corona: Both were impeached. That is why there
was a trial. There is an article of impeachment.
Impeachment is not synonymous to guilt. There will be a trial after your indictment.

Estrada Corona
The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada He was found guilty.
was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his
loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7,
2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution
No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment
Court is Functus Officio.

Who has the power to declare war? Sec 23


Congress does not have the power to declare war but rather to declare the existence of a state of war.
Among the fundamental principle governing the UN is the renouncement of war. We can no longer afford any bloodshed
that will amount to the obliteration of Earth considering our advance weaponry.

The war that was renounced is the offensive war Sec. 2 Art. 2
A defensive war is allowed springing from the right of existence and self defense

SPEED
Fundamental right of a state in international law
1. Sovereignty and independence
2. Property and jurisdiction
3. Existence and self defense
4. Equality
5. Diplomatic intercourse

Adherence to the doctrine of incorporation


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

Incorporation (Philippines) Transformation

Generally Accepted Principles The GAP of international law does not


automatically become part of their laws. automatically become part of the law of
No enabling law is needed. the land there must be an enabling act.

G A P of International Law
1. Non suability
2. Equality of the Sates
3. Pacta sunt servanda: Tanada vs. Angara (general agreement on tariff and trade): Treaties must be observed and
complied with in good faith.
4. The right to internal self determination

YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES:
Ang Ladlad case in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity: Using even the most liberal of senses. They
do not constitute binding obligation to the Philippines.
Principle of
1. Check and balances
2. Principle of non-delegation of powers: Potestas delagata non delagari potest: what has been delegated cannot
be delegated
PETAL
a. Delegation to the PEOPLE through plebiscite and referendum
b. Emergency power of the president section 23 2nd paragraph Article 6
c. Tariff Powers of the President Section 28 paragraph 2 Article 6
d. Administrative agency
e. Local governments

Test of valid delegation of power- Every delegation of power should be subjected to the following:
1. Completeness test: The law delegating the power must be complete when it leaves the Congress so that
the delegate will do nothing but implement and enforce the law.
2. Sufficient Standard Test: This is more complex. The court must devise this test to set guidelines. For as
long as there are standards that will limit which standards are determinable…
A sufficient standard is one that which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. (Santiago vs. COMELEC, 270SCRA106, March19,1997)

LEGISLATIVE

1. May the president exercise this power? No that is vested in the Congress. During Martial Laws: a
state does not suspend the operation of the constitution so even if during the Martial Law the
president cannot do this. (Section 1 of art 6)
2. Is legislative power exclusively vested in the legislative? No. The people may exercise their right to
initiative and referendum. However this reservation is not self-executing because we need to consider
sec 32. The congress shall provide as early as possible… RA 6735 Raul Rocco law. (Unconstitutional
as per the ruling in Santiago vs. COMELEC)
a. Initiative on the statutes
b. Initiative on localization
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado: A bicameral committee is a mechanism for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance: By the nature of its function the bicameral committee is capable of producing results
beyond its functions. Results that may go beyond its mandate.

But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur
even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee. (Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, Nov. 11, 1993, En
Banc [Cruz]) Highlight on unexpected results. Results that may even go beyond its own mandate.

Pag yan bill mo dumaan sa bicameral committee baka di mo na makilala yan hehe.

Next step: consolidated version will now go back to both houses


Since galling sa bicameral committee there will now be a vote taken on the bill. Yays or Nays.

If during the vote the Nays prevailed over the Yays there will be another bicameral committee until there will be a bill that
both houses will agree upon.

Bicameral Congress: Sec 24 Art. 6


Bills that must originate from the House of Representative:
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
APRIL
1. Appropriations Bill
2. Private Bill
3. Revenue: EVAT
4. Bill authorizing the INCREASE of public debt
5. Local application
However if you read sec 24 there is a last phrase the senate has the power to propose or concur with amendments.
Amendments here may also include amendment by substitution. After all what is required is not the law itself but only the
bill.

New Developments: Powers and Function


Macalintal vs. COMELEC: Post enactment measures undertaken by congress to enhance the understanding of and
influence over and the (J. Puno)

SIS

Scrutiny
Investigation
Supervision

Macalintal vs. COMELEC: Extent of exercise of Congress of its oversight powers in the implementation of RA No 9189:

Power of oversight: embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and
influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. It is intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of the government.

Categories:
Congressional scrutiny (determine economy & efficiency of operation of government activities), congressional
investigation (inherent power w/c involves a more intense digging of facts), legislative supervision (most encompassing;
allows Congress to supervise over executive agencies through its veto power).

COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but it is not part of the judiciary. The Court has no general
power of supervision over it except those specifically granted by the Constitution. However, the
COMELEC is subject to congressional scrutiny especially during budget hearings. Congress cannot
abolish it as it can other agencies under the executive branch. COMELEC is not a mere creature of the
legislature, it owe its origin from the Constitution.

POWER OF THE PURSE: CONGRESS


The one who really prepares the budget is the president through the department of budget and management and is
transmitted to congress.
PRESIDENTCONGRESS

Budget Hearings: Power of the Purse


Congress will now conduct budget hearings
During the budget hearing if you happen to be a member your appearance will be required. Defend your budget proposal
otherwise it will be trimmed down.
FUNCTION OF SCRUTINY during the budget hearings.

No budget tantamount to an abolition of the office.

Guidepost: Question Out Section 22 Article 6


Senate vs. Ermita: a borrowed concept from a parliamentary government. Regular feature of a democratic government.

Confirmation under the commission on appointments


1. Appointed member of the cabinet you are required to se secure the confirmation of the commission on
appointments
2. Congress exercises the check power. The member of this Constitutional Commissions are very nasty at times.

Matibag vs. Benipayo: appointment cannot be withdrawn once qualified. Ad interim appointments are permanent until
disapproved during the next session of congress.

Legislative investigation: We refer to section 21 of article 6 the power of the congress to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation

Arnault vs. Nazareno: you cannot expect the congress to enact good laws if you will not give it the power to investigate.
It is intrinsic in the grant of the power to Congress.

Supervision: the most encompassing form by which the congress exercises its oversight function.
Legislative veto: disapproval by congress of an administrative regulation that was promulgated by an administrative body.

Rule making power


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Subordinate legislation :
Power of legislation example: Implementing Rules and Regulation
Usually pag nag delegate ang Cingress ng rule-making power sa admin agencies naglalagay ng kulatilya yan. Na subject
pa din sa review ng Congress.The moment that the congress promulgates rules.

Abakada Guro vs. Purisima: admin veto is unconstitutional this violates the separation of powers. Congressional oversight
is now limited to scrutiny and investigation.

How many Congressman should there be? Not more than 250 (WALA NA TO)

At present we have 300 congressman including party list you have to consider sec 5 par 4. Power of the congress to
reapportion legislative districts.
Sec. 5 par 3: Whenever Congress creates a city with a population of at least 250k

How many partylist representative should there be?

Veterans Federation Party vs. Comelec


240 district congressman = 80% kasi 20% ang party list
divided by 4= 60

4:1 for every 4 legislative district representative 1 party list


JUST DIVDE IT BY 4

Fractional representation is not allowed

Atong Paglaum Inc vs.


Comelec

National parties/ orgs. Regional Parties/ orgs. Sectoral parties/orgs

Those that belong to


Those that lack well-defined
marginalized or
political constituencies.
underrepresented sectors:
Labor, Peasant, Fisherfolk,
Urban Poor, ICCs, Veterans PRofessionals, women, youth
and elderly

Women sector of the LP: provided that it registers separately


LP may not participate in party list election since it fields candidate in the district elections.

Sec 5 par 2 art 6 except the religious sector


RA 7941 party list law
Sec. 11

She maligned the president: yes she may not be liable in other places but not in the senate itself
Sec 15 par 3

Absolute privilege communication: Qualified privilege communication


Not actionable even if the author acted in bad
faith

Hence the case that was filed by Binay will


not prosper

Borjal vs. CA: That is not exclusive. Meron


pang isa

Doctrine of fair comment


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
“A fair comment on matters of public interest is included and is covered by the mantle of privileged communication
which constitutes a valid defense against libel and slander.” “If the comment is an expression of opinion based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might be reasonably inferred
from the facts.” Further explaining the right to comment on a public issue, the Court said, “If a matter is a subject of
public or general interest, it cannot become less so merely because a private individual is involved. The public primary
interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participants and not on their prior anonymity or notoriety.
( Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1 )
May be validly invoked only if the offender is a public figure

Belgica vs. Ochoa

Philconsa vs. Enriquez was reconsider and superseded by Belgica vs. Ochoa.
Pork barrel is the lump sum discrtionary funds of the Legislature.

To rectify an error which is persistent in the chronicles of our history in the final analysis the court must strike down the
pork barrel system as unconstitutional. To recount in so far as it allow.

Sec 27 art 6
GR: Hindi pwede ang selective veto sa president dapat in toto or in its totality talaga. Bengzon vs. Drilon: The exec must
veto a bill in its entirety. He or she cannot act as an editor.

EXPN: 2nd paragraph is more of an exception apply it to APPROPRIATION, REVENUE AND TARIFF BILL. (Item
veto is allowed)

Expn to the expn:


1. Doctrine on inappropriate provisions, a constitutionally inappropriate provision;
2. Executive impoundment ( refusal of the President to spend funds already allocated by Congress to specific
purposes).

Pocket veto is allowed.


Impaired public accountability:
Subversion of local autonomy
Subverted genuine local autonomy
Congressional Pork Barrel Presidential Pork Barrel
Effectively controlled through A kind of lump-sum which,
post enactment measures and discretionary fund which allows
practices the P to determine the manner
of UTILIZATION.

(Court shall delimit the use of


such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds (PD 910)
and the Presidential Social
Fund. (PD 1869)

Pork Barrel System (Lump-


Sum, Discretonary Fund)

Congressional Pork Barrel Presidential Pork Barrel

Source of Presidential PB:


CDF Malampaya Fund (oil in
PDAF: Php 200M-senator
Php 17M-Senator Palawan)
70M-Congressman
Php 12M- Congressman Presidential Social Fund (
PAGCOR)
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

Congressional
Investigations
Inquiry in aid of legislation
(Sec. 21 Art. VI)
Arnaul vs. Nazareno
Senate vs. Ermita Question Hour Sec. 22 Art.
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee Executive Privelege VI
compare Standard
Chartered Bank vs. SCB
Legislative contempt

LEGISLATIVE POWER OF INQUIRY

2 kinds of congressional investigations


1. Inquiry in aid of legislation sec 21 art 6
2. Question out sec 22 art 6
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION: Art QUESTION OUT
VI, Sec 21 – “The senate or the house of Power to Conduct a Question Hour
representatives or any of its respective Art VI, Sec 22 – “The heads of
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of departments may upon their own initiative,
legislation or in accordance with its duly with the consent of the President, or upon the
published rules of procedure…” request of either house, as the rules of each
house shall provide, appear before and be
heard by such house on any matter pertaining
to their departments x x x”

- relates to the power to conduct inquiries in - pertains to the power to conduct question
aid of legislation; the aim of which is to elicit hour; the aim of which is to obtain information
information that may be used for legislation. in the pursuit of the congress’ oversight
- co-extensive with the power to legislate function
- attendance is meant to be compulsory* - in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function
- grounded on the necessity of information in - attendance is meant to be discretionary
the legislative process(the power of inquiry - congress merely seeks to be informed on
being co-extensive with the power to how department heads are implementing the
legislate) statutes which it has issued.

*non-appearance will impair the work of Congress and violate Section 7 ofthe Bill of Rights (right to information
in matters of public concern – through their duly elected representatives in Congress)

Q: May members of Cabinet and other top executive officials validly refuse to appear before congressional
inquiries without the consent of the Presidentby invoking EO 464 (prohibiting members of the cabinet and other
Executive officials from appearing in Congressional Inquiries) promulgated by thePresident?
A: If the requirement then to secure presidential consent under EO 464 is limited only to appearances in the
Question hour, then it is VALID. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
departmentheads in question hour is discretionary on their part. However, this cannot be applied to department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department heads
toappear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President himself, or
by the Executive secretary (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita). A claim of privilege, being a claim of
exemption from an obligation to disclose information must be clearlyasserted. Absent a statement of the specific
basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of
thetraditional privileges, whether given the circumstances in which it is made. Itshould be respected.

Q: Does the invocation of this privilege through executive orders, prohibiting executive officials from
participating in legislative inquiries, violate the constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern of the people?
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
A: YES. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which
they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can
then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means
allowed by their freedom of expression (Senate, et oL v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006).

Reason behind the law: Arnault vs. Nazareno,you cannot expect congress to enact good laws if you deny
it the power to investigate.

Bengzon Jr. vs. SBC: two important questions were raised.

Is the 1st kind of inquiry absolute or there are limitations?

2nd is this subject to judicial review or this is a political question?

Held:

1st issue:
SC: a mere reading of sec 21 will show that it is not absolute:
a. The inquiry must always be in aid of legislation whether in connection with a pending bill or an expected bill
to be filed.
b. Must be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure of the House of congress
conducting that inquiry
c. The rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry shall be respected. Among the rights that
may be invoked is the right against self-incrimination, the right to privacy etc.
2nd issue:
SC ruled that since this power is not absolute it follows that it is subject to judicial review specifically the expanded power
of the SC. The court may validly inquire as to the compliance of the three requisites above mentioned.

During the time of Senator Enrile he delivered a privilege speech in the Senate he alleged that there were certain
properties owned by Marcos but somehow it landed to the hands of some relatives of President Cory Aquino. Because of
that Senator Enrile urged the SBC to conduct an inquiry to determine whether there was a violation of Philippine criminal
laws. Obviously this is not in aid of legislation. Hence, this is an encroachment to judicial prerogative. This function
belongs to the court. What if the SBC will arrive at a different ruling from the ruling of the Sandiganbayan this is inviting
a constitutional crisis.

Compare this with a later case: Standard Charter Bank vs. committee of banks

SCB is a foreign bank allowed to do business in the Philippines. Someone alleged that they were defrauded by SCB
and they approached Senator Enrile so he again delivered a speech about this. He urged the committee on banks to
conduct an inquiry so that remedial measures will be enacted to protect local investors from fraudulent practices.
Also, to determine whether there are loopholes in the banking system.

Issue: Is this an inquiry in aid of legislation?

Held: Justice Nachura ruled in the affirmative. The sole purpose of this inquiry is to inquire in aid of legislation.
That is why the petition for certiorari was not granted.

CAVEAT: pag pumasok na ang section 21 not far behind kadugtong nyan ang legislative contempt:
Arnault vs. Nazareno: Intrinsic in the power of the power of legislative inquiry is with the process to enforce it and
this process is referring to contempt.

AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WITNESS FOR CONTEMPT BEYOND


PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION. — There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish
for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
While the existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The
Senate is a continuing body which does not ceases to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House
of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power
may constitutionally be exerted.

How long shall you remain in prison? You hold the key to your freedom. You shall remain there for as long as
you refuse to cooperate.
May pardon be granted by the president? No hindi pwede yun applying the principle of separation of powers.

Section 22: Question out: borrowed concept from a parliamentary government: senate vs. Ermita

Then former president Gloria Arroyo EO No 464 prohibiting members of her cabinet and other top level officers
including PNP members of … from appearing in lcongressional inquiries without her consent. It was in this case Senate
vs. Ermita the SC made a distinction between sec 21 and 22 of article 6.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

If what is involved is inquiry in aid of legislation: They may not validly refuse to appear because that will impair the work
of congress. Furthermore, they cannot invoke EO 464 and they can be cited in contempt. It will violate one important right
in the BOR the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Binoto ng mga tao yan kaya dapat gawin
nila yung function nila. So hindi pwede yan if they will not appear they might be cited in contempt. That will impair the
work of congress you cannot expect ocngres to encact good laws if you will deny the opportunity to inquire. (take note of
the 2 points.)

But then the court did not stop with that sino lang ba ang pwede tumanggi? Only the President or the executive secretary
acting under his authority may validly refuse inquiries in aid of legislation. Important he must claim and assert and invoke
what is now known as an executive privilege. As understood an executive privilege refres to the right of the president and
other top level executive branch officers to withhold information from the legislative branch and ultimately to the public.

3 EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:

1. State secrecy privilege: on the ground that the disclosure of the information will subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objective.
2. Informers privilege: non disclosure of the names or identities of persons who furnish information in violations of
law to officers charged with the enforcement of the laws.
3. Generic privilege for Internal deliberations: said to attach to intra-governmental documents.
4. Presidential communication privilege
5. Deliberative process privilege

PRESIDENTIAL OR EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE


The power of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold certain types of information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public. Invocation of the privilege Executive privilege must be invoked in relation
to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.
NOTE: While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground
invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive office exempt
from the duty to disclose information the mere fact of being executive officials. (Senate et al. v. Ermita)
Must be claimed and asserted it cannot be implied. We are democratican and republican state the GR is disclosure
of information not secrecy. Especially in view of the rule about transparency under the BOR. Moreover, there
shall be no blanket invocation of executive privilege.The executive privilege does no attach to the president or
person or office but rather to the nature of the information or kind that is asked by congress. This is with respect
to section 21.
Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when Invoked by the
President on a matter dearly within the donain of
the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized and be given
preference or priority. In the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for
disclosure by the one assailing such presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render meaningless the
presumption accorded by settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In fact. Senate v. Ermita reiterates
jurisprudence citing "the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications." (Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
564SCRA 152 Sept 4 2006, En Bane [Leonardo-De Castro])

(question out) Further, if what is invoked is sec. 22 of art. 6 the members of the cabinet and other top level
executive branch officers they may invoke EO 464. After all this is not mandatory and this is not a regular feature
of our government this is merely a borrowed concept from a parliamentary government.

Power of augmentation: (more of an exception) the following are authorized to augment or increase in the general
appropriations law from their rspective offices FROM SAVINGS in the other items of their respctive
appropriations.
GR: Prohibition against transfer of appropriations.
1. Senate president and speaker of the house ( Congress)
2. Chief Justice (Judiciary)
3. President (Executive)
4. Head of constitutional commissions.
3 requisites:
1. Laws authorizing such exercise of power of augmentation
2. Funds to be used must come from the SAVINGS from their respective departments: the savings may only be
determined after the end of the fiscal year.
3. There shall be no cross-border transfer of funds: Example: Kulangin ang pondo ng Dep Ed pwede ba gamitin
ng ang funds ng DENR? Walang violation against the cross-border rule. Both department falls under the
executive department.

Araullo vs. Aquino: Sec 25 paragraph 5:

What shall we do with those projects na nasimulan na under DAP eh declared unconstitutional siya? Jan papasok ang
operative fact doctrine: Agbyani vs. PNP: IT NULLIFIES VOID LAWS BUT SUSTAINS IT EFFECTS. The used of
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
this doctrine must be subjected to great scrutiny or circumspection. This is only applicable to cases where extraordinary
circumstances exist.

Telling portion of the decision: We find the doctrine of Operative Fact applicable to the application and implementation of
the DAP its application proceed from EQUITY and FAIR PLAY this could no longer be ignored what has already been
done.

Executive Branch: Article 7, section 1


Faithful execution clause: The president as chief executive shall ensure that the laws shall be faithfully executed.

DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY OR THE ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE:


The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency: All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Under the qualified political agency doctrine, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. The
secretaries are the alter ego of the President, men of his bosom confidence whom he designated to assist him in his
otherwise physically impossible multifarious functions, the extension of the President in the particular field in which they
act. Their acts are presumptively acts of the "President, until countermanded or reprobated by him". The President can
substitute his will over those of the secretaries, and they cannot complain. Furthermore, they hold their office subject to
the discretion of the President, who can replace them anytime once he loses his confidence in them.
The Sec. Of Finance can act as an agent of the legislative department. Hence, the president cannot alter modify or
nullify the findings of the SOF.
Sec. 16 art 7 Appointing power:Art. VII, Sec. 16. The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Under the 1987 Constitution: Not all appointment made by the president will require confirmation:
From the cases of Sarmiento III vs. Mison (156 SCRA 549); Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga (172 SCRA
160), and Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Constitutional Commission, et al (177 SCRA 259),
these doctrines are deducible:

Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional
commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman
and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior
offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such
appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law.

1. Members of the cabinet: confirmation needed ( exception VP needs no confirmation)


2. Ambassadors, public ministers and consuls… : same as above
3. Officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of colonel or naval captain
(Because these are officers of a sizeable command enough to stage a coup)
Manalo vs. Esposa: officers of PNP are not included
4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in the Constitution:
(i) Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions
(ii) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (composed of the IBP representative, professor of law, retired SC
justice, and representative of the private sector. (regular members their appointment requires confirmation)

No need to be confirmed to further their independence.


Note the ex-officio members: Chief Justice as chairman, Secretary of Justice, and representative of Congress so isa
lang dapat to ah. Clerk of the SC: ex officio secretary
Relevant cases: Calderon vs. Carale and Manalo vs. Sistoza
The SC clarified that the list are exclusive so congress by a legislative act may not add nor subtract.

QUESTION: Does the Office of the President have administrative jurisdiction over deputy Ombudsman Gonzales?

ANSWER: (Emilio Gonzales vs. Ochoa, 2014) Our discussions, particularly the Court’s expressed caution against
presidential interference with the constitutional commissions, on one hand, and those expressed by the framers of
the 1987 Constitution, on the other, in protecting the independence of the Constitutional Commissions, speak for
themselves as overwhelming reasons to invalidate Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 for violating the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s
disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself.
The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to
support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted
independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only
with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.

What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete
trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures
and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young
democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these
reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be
declared void.

Nomination Procedure for those that news Commission’s confirmation: NICA

Nomination by President > Confirmation by CA > Issuance of COMMISSION > Acceptance by the appointee
Note: before all steps has been complied with the President can withdraw nomination and appointment (Lacson
vs. Romero)

Procedure for those that do not need the commission’s confirmation: APPOINTMENT AND ACCEPTANCE

Ad interim (in the meantime or for the time being) appointment of the president: The President’s power to extend
ad interim appointments may indeed briefly put the appointee at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming
powers. This situation, however, in only for a short period – from the time of issuance of the ad interim
appointment until the Commission on Appointments gives or withholds its consent.
The Constitution itself sanctions this situation, as a trade-off against the evil of disruptions in vital government
services. This is also part of the check-and-balance under the separation of powers, as a trade-off against the evil
of granting the President absolute and sole power to appoint. The Constitution has wisely subjected the
President’s appointing power to the checking power of the legislature.
Presidential appointments that need prior recommendation or nomination by the JBC:
1. Members of the SC and all lower courts
2. Ombudsman and 5 deputies

This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body. The
vacancies in the COMELEC are precisely staggered to insure that the majority of its members hold confirmed
appointments, and no one President will appoint all the COMELEC members. The special constitutional safeguards that
insure the independence of the COMELEC remain in place (See Sections, 3, 4, 5 and 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution).

In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1
(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

Ad interim Regular Appointment


EFFECT OF THE The appointment takes place immediately he may Does not take effect immediately.
APPOINTMENT: immediately assume office.
Congress was in session but same
Example: Nag assume na Dep Ed Sec pero later facts hindi ka naman nag assume
on hindi na confirm so hindi na siya pwede ng office mo as dep ed sec so
bumalik as Regional Director this is an pwede ka bumalik as regional
incompatible office. You cannot hold both offices director.
simultaneously.
- Pwede mo tanggapin pero sa oras na President does not appoint he
tanggapin mo di ka na makakabalik sa nominates.
dati mong posisyon.
IS IT REVOCABLE? Matibag vs. Benipayo citing Summers vs.
Ozaeta:

Ad interim is permanent it is not temporary. It is


permanent!

Because it takes effect immediately.


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

It cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the


president once the appointee has qualified into
office.
NEED OF CONFIRMATION Requires the CONFIRMATION of the Yes! Kailangan din. 
BY THE COMMISSION ON commission. YES!
APPOINTMENTS?
TIME WHEN Made only while congress is in recess or not in Congress must be in session!
APPOINTMENT WAS session!
MADE
PRESIDENT’S ACTION The President appoints, subject only to the The President does not appoint; he
resolutory condition that it be confirmed later on merely nominates subject to
by the Commission on Appointments confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments
RISK INVOLVED There is risk of losing both positions should he be No risk involved (appointee cannot
disapproved by the CA (upon assumption of new assume until appointment is
office), he loses his former position. confirmed)

Matibag vs. Benipayo: the SC stated that an AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter
its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.

Pag na dis approve: di na pwede I reappoint ng president


Pag na bypass lang pwede pa. If there is inaction on the part of the commission on appointments so pag regular hindi ka
matatangal pag ad interim matatangal ka.

Q. How is an ad interim appointment distinguished from an appointment or designation in an acting or temporary


capacity? Pimintel vs. Ermita
HELD: While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment
or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing
power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. (Matibag v.
Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, April 2, 2002, En Banc [Carpio])
While congress in recess or not in session: ad interim
Section 17: POWER OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
The power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or to set aside what a subordinate has done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute one's own judgment for that of a subordinate. "Executive control" is
not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees
of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively
limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions (Philips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. BOI,
G.R. No. 175787, February 4, 2009).
Q: What is CONTROL?
A: (1) to direct the performance of a duty; (2) to restrain the commission of acts; (3) to review, reverse, revise,
alter, or modify the decisions of his subordinates; or (4) to substitute his own decision over that of his
subordinates.

Q: Does the President have CONTROL over local government units?


A: No. His power is limited to GENERAL SUPERVISION. The power of supervision means “overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the subordinate officers fail or
neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. The President’s power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are
faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the law. (JOSON VS. TORRES)
- Hence, the President’s power of general supervision means to oversee; to see to it that the local governments
and their officials perform their functions in accordance with law. No more than that. - Control is said to be the
very heart of the power of the President. (Joson vs. Torres)

CONTROL SUPEVISION
exercised over all executive departments bureaus, exercised over local governments
and offices
ARTICLE X, Section 4 – “The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments xxx”
ARTICLE II, Section 25 – “The State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments.”

LIMITATIONS ON THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

(1) ARTICLE VII, Sec. 13, Par. 2 – “The spouse and relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not, during his tenure be appointed as member of the Constitutional Commissions, or
the Office of the Ombudsman, or as secretaries, undersecrataries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.” (nepotic appointments)
- This is a prohibition against NEPOTISM on the President.
(2) Q: To what positions?
A: (1) Constitutional Commissions – COA, Comelec, CSC (2) Office of the Ombudsman (3) Secretaries (4)
Undersecretaries (5) Chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including GOCC’s and their subsidiaries

ARTICLE VII, Sec. 15 – “Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointment to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.” - This
applies only to a presidential election: every 6 years.

Q: To what kind of appointment is this directed against? (In Re: Valenzuela and Vallaria)

(1) Those made for buying votes (to influence the outcome of Presidential elections) - refers to those
appointments made within the 2 months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are
declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code.
(2) Those made for partisan considerations (the so-called “midnight appointments”)
- refers to appointments made after election day but before the term of the next president begins (30 June). -
Hence, this provision contemplate not only midnight appointments (appointments made for partisan
considerations where an outgoing President fells up all vacant positions thereby preempting an incoming
president of his prerogative) but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of
the Presidential election.

AYTONA VS. CASTILLO


- After the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was
defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a “caretaker” administrator, whose duty was to prepare for
the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President.

IN RE: HON. MATEO VALENZUELA AND HON. PLACIDO VALLARTA


- Before the 11 May 1998 elections, President Ramos appointed on 30 March 1998 2 gentlemen as RTC judges.
On 14 May 1998, already after the elections, their appointments were transmitted to the Office of the Chief
Justice. However, the 2 were able to secure advance copies of their appointments so they were able to take their
oaths and assumed office.

SC: The questioned appointments are void. They were unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
Consequently, they come within the prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the
purpose of buying votes or influencing the elections.
- The only exception is temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, this case does not even fall within the exception.
Their appointments are not temporary and not to an executive but to the judiciary.

Q: How do you detect if it’s a midnight appointment or for purpose of votebuying?


A: If the appointment was made within 2 months immediately preceding the presidential election, then the
purpose is for vote-buying or to influence the outcome of the elections. IF the appointment was made after the
Presidential election but before the outgoing president’s term end (his term ends noon of June 30), then it is
midnight appointment.

DE RAMA VS. CA
- Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja was a municipal Mayor. When her term is about to end, she filled up all the positions
before she vacated her position. When her successor sit, there was no more vacancy and all the appointments
were nullified by the latter on the ground that they were midnight appointments.
SC: The records reveal that when De Rama brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the 14
respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were “midnight
appointments” that are forbidden under ARTICLE VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled and
correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law
that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
ARTICLE VII, Sec. 13, Par. 1 – “The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege, granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict in the conduct of their office.”
- This is a prohibition against HOLDING MULTIPLE POSITIONS.

Q: Directed against whom?


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
A: (1) President (2) Vice President (3) Member of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants - applies to private
employment - the idea is for them to focus in their functions
Q: What are the exceptions?
A:
(1) unless otherwise provided in this Constitution
EX: The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet xxx. (ARTICLE VII, Sec. 3, Par. 2)
The Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio Member of the Judicial and Bar Council (ARTICLE VIII, Sec. 8, Par. 1)
(2) If they will hold that other office in an ex-officio capacity. (Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Sec.)
Local government: general supervision section 4 Art 10
Prohibition against the President or acting President making appointments within 2 months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s term does not extend to Members of the SC.
Ban on midnight appointment is not applicable to the SC. Only to the SC, with regard to the other courts it is
applicable.
"General supervision" means the mere overseeing of a subordinate to make sure that they do their duties under the
law. But this does not include the power to overrule their acts, if these acts are within their discretion.

Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds
that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as
the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive
therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local
autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations.
Art. X, Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed.
The grant of mere supervisory power over local governments and autonomous regions is in line with the policy of
the State to promote the autonomy of local governments and autonomous regions. There can be no real local
autonomy while the National Government controls the local governments.

MILITARY POWER/ COMMANDER IN CHIEF POWERS

CALLING OUT POWER


It is a political question, a question in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated by the
Constitution to the President.
SC: It is the unclouded intent of the Court to grant to the President full discretionary authority. The hands
of the President should not be tied; otherwise, this could be a veritable proscription for disaster. Unless
grave abuse of discretion is shown, the President’s exercise of the power should not be questioned. Mere
abuse of discretion will not suffice. To doubt is to sustain.

Sec 18
1. calling out power: Call the armed forces to suppress LAWLESS VIOLENCE, INVASION OR REBELLION.
LIR
2. martial law power
3. suspend the writ of habeas corpus
4. Proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines or ay part thereof.

CALL OUT THE AFP TO PREVENT LAWLESS VIOLENCE (CALLING OUT POWERS)
This is merely a police measure meant to quell disorder. As such, the Constitution does not regulate its exercise
radically
We now have a limited concept of martial law when the public safety requires it.
Requisites:
a. There must be an invasion or rebellion
b. Public safety requires suspension
c. Invasion or rebellion must be actual and not imminent
LIMITATIONS ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
1. Applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion; and
2. Anyone arrested or detained during suspension must be charged within 3 days. Otherwise, he
should be released.
3. Political question first before it is a justiciable question:
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the
Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power
to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only
sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only
the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.
Lawless violence
Invasion
Rebellion

Other Limitations
(1) For a period not exceeding 60 days
(2) Expressly been made subject to judicial review under ARTICLE VII, Sec. 18, Par. 3 – “The Supreme Court
may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation ofMartial Law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.” (LANSANG VS. GARCIA)
(3) Within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
(4) The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its members in regular or
special session,, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President.

(5) Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress, may in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to bedetermined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
(6) The Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
(7) A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, NOR authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies overcivilians, where civil courts are able to function, (OLAGUER DOCTRINE) Nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ.

OLAGUER DOCTRINE
- Superseded AQUINO VS. COMMISSIONER
- during martial law, military courts may assume jurisdiction over civilians
- Ninoy Aquino questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of the militarytribunals
- predictably, he was sentenced to death by musketry (firing squad)
- sentence was not carried out but he died just the same
- Several Filipinos abroad were against the decision in Aquino vs. Commission – they were known as
Olaguer group.
- They were out to embarrass the Marcos Government.
- Unfortunately, the Lovely brothers, among their con-conspirators accidentally detonated a bomb.
- They did not die and the group was arrested.
- All were sentenced to die by musketry.
- While the case was pending before the SC, EDSA I happened.
- Justice Teehankee, the lone dissenter in the Aquino case, became the Chief Justice of SC and he penned
the Olaguer doctrine.
- ARTICLE VII, Sec. 18, Par. 5 – “The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”
- In connection with ARTICLE III, Sec. 13 – If the offense is bailable, one can still post bail because
under this – “The right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.”

ARTICLE VII, sec. 18, Par. 6 – “During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested
or detained shall be judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise he shall be released.”

NJamar vs. Abdursakurtan M. Tan, 2012: Kidnapping of a foreign journalist:

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the constitution mandates that civilian authority, at all times,
supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of, Article
2Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President ceremonial, legal and administrative head
of the armed forces. The Constitution not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but
as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he
would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts, but the ultimate power is his.

Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon
the armed forces st his own bidding, In issuing the assailed proclamation. Governor
Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers,
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official/ even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. Jamar 'Kulayan v. GOV. Abdusakur Tan, G.R.
No. 187298, July 3, 2012, En Banc [Sereno])
Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of President. [I]t has already been established that
there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that
when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President
and no one else.
As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in [Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil.
541 (1939)]: “With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which
is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution,
dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that ‘The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.’ This means that the President of the Philippines
is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.”
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as
provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-
out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan
etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.

Executive power; civilian police force; authority of local executives over police. Regarding the country’s
police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: “The State shall establish and maintain
one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission.
The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.” A
local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police,
and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations … In the discussions of the Constitutional
Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended for local chief
executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without
prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative
to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional
Commission.
But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes
within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. Jamar M.
Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.

Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of local executives. Respondents cannot rely on
paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 [of the Local Government Code], as the said provision
expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief
executive of the province, is certainly empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during
these occurrences.

But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster.
Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to justify their actions.

Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines does not fall under the category of a “national law enforcement agency,”
to which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong. Its mandate is to
uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all
enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national territory. Second,
there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope
with the situation or apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial
governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, or such other
authorized officials, for the assistance of national law enforcement agencies. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs.
Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.

IBP vs. Zamora: President as commander in chief of all the armed forces
Martial law: 60 days

IBP VS. ZAMORA


During the time of President Estrada, he issued a LOI ordering the deployment of Marines in the
metropolis to conduct joint visibility patrols with members of the PNP in various shopping malls. IBP
asks that the exercise of such power be subjected to judicial review.
SC: No. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from
the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution. Thus, the Court cannot be compelled upon to
overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

1. To grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, to remit fine and forfeiture and amnesty. Recal Mary Jane Veloso:
upon the intervention of the president her execution was suspended. This is an example a reprieve.
Reprieve: suspension of the execution of a death convict
Since amnesty is an official act of the president it is not required to be proven.

Llamas vs. Sec. Orbos

Amnesty Pardon
Amnesty, for political crimes. Pardon is usually granted for common
crimes
Amnesty, to a group, class, or community Pardon is granted to individuals
generally.
Amnesty may be granted even before Pardon can only be granted after
trial. conviction
Amnesty looks backward and abolishes Pardon looks forward and relieves the
and puts into oblivion the offense itself, offender from the consequences of an
that is, it overlooks and obliterates the offense of which he has been convicted,
offense with which the convict is charged that is, it abolishes or forgives the
that the person released stands precisely punishment
as though he had committed no offense.
Amnesty is a public act of which the Pardon is a private act of the President
courts take judicial notice. which must be pleaded and proved by the
person because the courts do not take
judicial notice of it
Amnesty requires such concurrence. Pardon does not require the concurrence
of the Congress
Atty. Alicia Risos Vidal vs. COMELEC
Query: What about the pardon granted by GMA to Estrada after being convicted of plunder? Absolute pardon.
Do hereby grant the executive clemency to him.

 Tip: for purposes of answering the bar do not anchor your answer on dissenting opinions. This is a
gamble which may not pay off.

Pardoning Power - ARTICLE VII, Sec. 19 – “Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise


provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all Members of theCongress.”

5 matters mentioned:
(a) reprieves
(b) commutations
(c) pardons
(d) remit fines and forfeitures
(in these 4, conviction by final judgment is a requirement)
(e) amnesty

Limitations on the pardoning power of the president


1. Impeachment
2. Conviction by final judgment so if pending appeal you are not qualified
3. No PAPS shall be granted pardon amnesty parole suspension of sentence for violation of election laws
rules and regulations without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC
4. Legislative contempt in view of the separation of powers

Sec 20
2. Borrowing power
Limitations on this power
1. Prior concurrence of the monetary board
2. Subject to limitations as may be prescribed by law

Sec 21
3. TREATY MAKING POWER: Bayan vs. Zamora The power of ratification is with the president and not in the
legislature. The role of the senate is the giving or withholding of the consent or concurrence of the ratification.

ARTICLE VII, Sec. 21 – “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate.”
Q: Who has the power to ratify treaties?
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
A: The power to ratify is vested in the President and not in the legislature. The role of the Senate is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent or concurrence to the ratification. (Bayan vs. Zamora)
- What requires concurrence is a treaty or international agreement NOT an executive agreement.

Q: Is an EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT equally binding as an INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT?


A: Yes. In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned as long as the functionaries have remained within their powers.
International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements. They are
equally binding obligations upon nations.
The distinction between TREATY and EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT is more of a municipal law – whether concurrence
of the Senate is required or not.

Q: How to determine whether an agreement is executive or international?


A:

INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE
- involves major policy - involves implementation of that policy
- more or less permanent duration - more or less temporary and of short duration

Q: Is VFA a treaty?
Q: Is VFA a treaty?

- involves implementation of that policy


- more or less temporary longer and of short duration
A: Yes. The President himself considered it as a treaty. He referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence.
Q: What are the conditions before foreign military bases, troops, or facilitiesmay be allowed in the Philippines pursuant
to ARTICLE XVIII, Sec. 25 of the1987 Constitution?
A: Sec. 25, ARTICLE XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met:

(a) it must be under a treaty;


(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and

(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state

Executive agreements entered into by the President need no concurrence.


The reason is that although executive agreements are a kind of international agreements, when the
Constitution intends to include executive agreements, it says so specifically, as in Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par. 2,
when it speaks of the power of the SC to review final judgments of lower courts in cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, is in question.

In holding that treaties are formal documents which require ratification with approval of the Senate, while
executive agreements become binding through executive action without need of a vote by the Senate, the
SC in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), said that the difference
between a treaty and an executive agreement is that a treaty is an international agreement involving
political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a
permanent character, while an executive agreement is an international agreement embodying
adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions, and those
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature.

Nature of Executive Agreements: There are 2 classes : (1) agreements made purely as executive acts
affecting external relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, which may be termed
as presidential agreements, and (2) agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Congress, or
Congressional-Executive Agreements. (USAFFE Veterans Assn. v. Treasurer, 105 Phil 1030)
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc [Buena]
HELD: The Phil. Gov’t. has complied with the Constitution in that the VFA was concurred in by the Phil.
Senate, thus complying with Sec. 21, Art. VII. The Republic of the Philippines cannot require the US to
submit the agreement to the US Senate for concurrence, for that would be giving a strict construction to
the phrase, “recognized as a treaty”. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA as
merely an executive agreement because under international law, an executive agreement is just as binding
as a treaty.

Whether treaty or executive agreements they are equally binding.


During the time of the president Estrada we entered into a vfa to conduct joint military exercises with the AFP. All this
balikatan exercises they are all being conducted within the auspices of the VFA.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Which is the governing provision
Section 25 Art. 18: after the expiration of the VFA
1. There must be a treaty duly concurred in by the senate
2. When congress so requires Ratified by majority vote of the people in a national referendum held for that purpose
3. The other contracting state should also recognize such as a treaty
Those are the requirement of sec 20

EDCA: Signed by Defense Secretary Voltaire


American ambassador Goldberg
EDCA is supposed to reinforce the mutual defense treaty with the USA
When the EDCA was questioned by the Supreme court wala pa din desisyon ang SC
Treaty: concurrence of the senate
Executive agreement: Need not comply with the formalities of the treaty.

BUDGETARY POWER

ARTICLE VII, Sec. 22 – “The President shall submit to the Congress within 30 days from the opening of every regular
session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including
receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.” - Correlate with Section 25(1), ARTICLE VI – “Congress may
not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Govt as specified in the budget.
The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.”

- The most that Congress could do is to trim down or slash the budget!
INFORMING POWER ARTICLE VII, Sec. 23
– “The President shall address the Congress at the opening of the regular session. He may also appear before it at any
other time.”

Rome Statute: the treaty the created the ICJ Int’l Criminal Court
That treaty created a tribunal
Raul Pangalanan was appointed to be one of the judges in the ICJ.

Pangilan state tayo: 117th state to ratify that rome statute so we are bound by that. What offenses falling within the JD of
the ICJ

1. Genocide
2. Crimes against humanity
3. War crimes
4. Crime of aggression

Principle of complimentarity: shall be complimentary to national criminal JD. It gives primacy to national
criminal JD. That if the court of one estate assume jd over a person who committed the above mentioned offenses
the ICJ will no longer take cognizance of such.

Exception
1. If the proceeding in the national court is for the purpose if protecting the accused from liability
2. Not conducted partially
In the followings instances the ICJ may assume JD even though if the national criminal JD took cognizance first.

Tip: power of correlation: ICJ power of complimentarity


There must be a treaty duly con

Sec. 21 of Art 7
Bayan vs. Zamora: Deals with International agreements in general in which case the concurrence of the 2/3 of the
members of the senate are required. Whatever the subject matter is. In contrast sec 25 Art 18 is a special provision which
applies to the presence of foreigners in Philippine bases. Under this provision, a special provision of law prevails over
general one. It being a special provision, a general provision will apply to all treaties. The court agreed here the governing
constitutional provision should

Sec 22
4. Budgetary party
Sec 23
5. Informing power part of this during the opening of the regular session of congress… the president have to deliver
the SONA
6. Veto power (art 6)

7. Power over local government: power of general supervision (art 10 sec 4)


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Marcos vs Manglapus: Unstated residual powers. Power not mentioned in the constitution but nevertheless may be
validly exercised: According to the SC, that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive
power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power enumerated in
the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. In this case,
the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. She has the obligation to protect the
people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. She has to balance the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

Belgica vs. Ochoa, 2013: both pork barrel system were declared unconstitutional
Reason for unconstitutionality
PDAF:
1. Separation of powers: it has conferred upon the legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal,discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine.
2. Non delegation of power (undue delegation of power) the legislature also created a system of budgeting wherein
items are not textualized or identified into the appropriations bill.
3. Denied item veto: because of the above-mentioned reason the P is denied his power to veto items. The effect of
which is to dilute effective congressional oversight bu giving legislators a role in the budget execution, an aspect
of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize.
4. Impaired public accountability: legislators who are national officers are allowed to intervene in local affairs
despite the existence of capable local institutions.
5. Subvert local autonomy: since the P was given the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related
purposes to other purposes he may deem fit under the broad classification of priority infrastructure development
projects again it has transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
Under Art. 6 sec. 25 (5) 1987 Consti. Requisites for valid transfer of appropriated funds:
1. Law authorizing the P, the P of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice of the SC, and the heads of
the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds WITHIN their respective office;
2. Funds to be transferred are savings from the appropriations of their respective offices; and
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment/increase an item in the general appropriation law for their respective
offices.

Bodies connected and associated to the Congress


1. Commission on Audit
2. Commission on appointment- act on presidential appointments: Through this commission congress serve as
check and balance:
How are they chosen? Basis is proportional representation having members in the senate and in the house of
representatives. The commission on appointment shall meet only when Congress is in session

Ad interim appointment- avoid hiatus in the government

Electoral
Tribunal

Senate Electoral
Tribunal HRET
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

Remedy: Rule
From the 65, grave
decision of abuse of
electoral NO APPEAL discretion
tribunal Basis: SET is amounting to
where should the sole jud lack or excess
a party go to of jurisdiction.
appeal? Special Civil
Action

Appeal is not a constitutional right because this is not mentioned in the Constitution.
Remedy is Rule 65 not rule 45 which is a mode of appeal: The basis is grave abuse of jurisdiction.

- PRINCIPLE OF INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE: one which may not be held by a member during his term
without forfeiting his seat.
EX: Fiscal and PAO;
Treasurer and Auditor;
Congressman and Cabinet Secretary

ARTICLE VI, Sec 13 – “No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including GOCC’s or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.”

Incompatible office 1st sentence Forbidden office 2nd sentence


An INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE is a post which a Is one to which a member cannot be appointed
member cannot accept unless he waives or even if he is willing to give up his seat in
forfeits his seat in Congress. A sensu contrario, if Congress. The effect of his resignation from the
he waives or forfeits his seat, he may accept the Congress is the loss of his seat therein but his
other post, since the incompatibility arises only disqualification for the forbidden office
because of his simultaneous membership in both. nevertheless remains.

A member of the Congress may be appointed. The prohibition lies in the "fiduciary" nature of
The moment he accepts he forfeits his seat in the relationship involved.
congress
Even if he is willing to forfeit he may not be
Example: Congressman and then you will be appointed since to begin with this is forbidden.
appointed by the President as secretary of labor?
Pwede but the moment you accept you forfeit
your position.

Mar Roxas was appointed by Estrada as


department secretary of DTI (ad interim) hindi
siya nag assume agad hinintay nya na maconfirm
ng commission on appointment. Sinigurado muna
nya na may confirmation coming from the
Commission on Appointment. Obviously he
knows his political law.
Political maturity: magulang

Butch Abad: He was appointed by Cory as the


secretary of ADR this is an ad interim
appointment.
One which may not be held by a member during One which is forbidden by law even if he is
his TERM of office without forfeiting his seat. willing to forfeit his seat.
TERM: provided by law
TENURE: actual stay in office -not necessary for
him to resign before he accepts the other office;
It is automatic.
a member may be validly appointed but he He may not be validly appointed
forfeits his seat.
Q: Congressman X was appointed as Secretary of Q: Congress created a new office, Urban Poor
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
DENR, can he validly accept the appointment? Commission. It appropriated P10B. Congressman
A: Yes. X resigned and applied for that position. Can he
be validly appointed? A: No. It was created
during the term in which he was elected. Even if
he is willing to resign, He cannot still be
appointed because it is a forbidden office.
Q: Can he still go back to his former position? A:
No!

STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

ARTICLE II (AND RELATED PROVISIONS), 1987 CONSITUTION

I. General Considerations:

Tañada v. Angara – By its very nature, Art. II are policies and principles that may guide the Legislature in the enactment
of laws and the courts in its interpretation

Hence, as a general rule, these provisions are non-self-executing

BUT – a provision that is complete in itself, and provides sufficient rules for the exercise of rights, is self-executing

Thus, certain provisions under Art. II are self-executing E.g.: Sec. 16 (See Oposa v. Factoran)
The 1st sections are entitled “Principles”, while the rest are entitled “Policies” However, there seems to be no clear
distinction between what are
“Principles” and what are “Policies”.

II. Sec. 1, Art. Ii – “The Philippines I a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

This is prescriptive of the kind of government that we should have – it should be “democratic” and “republican”. We
cannot have any other kind of government

Note that in International Law, it is not concerned with the kind of government. What is essential is that there is a
government, since it is an essential element of the State.

“Republican” – hence, we have a representative type of government – we elect our leaders.

Thus, we have Art. V on Suffrage, and Art. IX-C on COMELEC

Relate to Art. XI, Sec 1 – “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.”

Because sovereignty resides in the people, public office is a public trust. Hence, there is the sense of accountability.

III. Sec. 2, Art II – “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adhere to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations”

War is renounced as an instrument of national policy. Thus, no one has the power to declare war

BUT: Congress can declare a “State of War”

Also, the President can only use military powers in case of invasion, rebellion, etc. He has no power to declare war.

BUT, does not that when we are attacked, we cannot engage in war!

Constitution only renounces offensive war, not defensive war

This is one of the Rights of States: SPEED

1. Sovereignty and Independence


2. Property and Jurisdiction
3. Equality
4. Existence and;
5. Self-Defense
Diplomatic Intercourse
This is constituent with the policy of the UN, of which we are a member.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
“Adopt: the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land”. Reaffirms the Doctrine of
Incorporation

Examples of generally accepted principles of International Law

1. Pacta sunt servanda


2. Rebus sic stantibus
3. State Immunity from Suit
4. Sovereign Equality if States

IV. Sec. 3, Art II – “Civilian authority is at all times, supreme over the military. The AFP is the protector of the people
and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State snd the integrity of the national territory. (Civilian
Supremacy Clause)

It is expressly stated that it is SUPREME over the military

Role of the AFP:

1. Secure State sovereignty


2. Secure integrity of the national territory

Q: The provision says the AFP is the “protector of the people and the State” Does this justify a coup d’ etat?

A: NO! This clause should not be lifted out of context. Look at the 1st sentence of the provision – that the civilian
authority is supreme over the military. Thus, the AFP’s role must be understood within the context of civilian supremacy.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILS. v. ZAMORA

FACTS : Estrada issued an LOI deploying the marines all over Metro Manila

HELD: (1) Civilian Supremacy Clause not violated – The calling of the marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian enforcement. The limited participation of the Marine is evident in the provisions of the LOI,
which provides the metes and bounds of their authority. The local police forces are in charge of the visibility patrols – the
real authority belongs to the PNP, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint
visibility patrols.

(2) Deployment of Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the PNP – the Marines render only
assistance in conducting the patrols. There is no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs. In fact, military
assistance to civilian authorities is rendered in the following actuations: elections, administration of the Philippine Red
Cross, relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters, amateur sports, promotion and development,
development of the culture and the arts, conservation of natural resources, implementation of the agrarian reform program,
enforcement of customs laws, composite civilian-military law enforcement activities, conduct of licensure examinations,
conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students, anti-drug enforcement activities, sanitary
inspections, conduct of census work, administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board, assistance in installation of weather
forecasting devices, and peace and order policy formulation in LGUs.

V. Sec. 4, Art. II – “The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon
the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal military on civil service.”

Q: What is the Government’s Duty?

A: To serve and protect the people Service to the State

Q: It states that the government may call upon the people to defend the State. Does this amount to involuntary servitude?
A: NO! This is an exception to the rule n involuntary servitude:

Exceptions to the rule on involuntary servitude: PAM³

1. Penal punishment
2. Assumption of jurisdiction of DOLE in labor cases
3. Military service to defend the State
4. Mariners and pilots
5. Minor children under the patria potestas of parents

Note that the provisions says “PERSONAL service”

Thus, one cannot hire mercenaries to take one’s place.


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
VI. Sec. 16, Art. II – “The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”

Q: This refers to a right of the people. Why is this found in Art. II and not in Art. III (Bill of Rights)?

A:This right belongs to a different category of rights!

– Oposa v. Factoran (224 SCRA 792, 1993)


HELD: While this right is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights under the Bill of Rights. This right belongs to a different category of
rights, since it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self- perpetuation, the advance of which may be said to
predate all governments and Constitutions, since they are presumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

This is self -executing provision! (Oposa v. Factoran) Thus, its violation gives rise to a cause of action.

In relation to the Preferential Right of Subsistence Fishermen to the Use of Communal Marine and Fishing Resources

Art. XIII, Sec. 7 – “ The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore.”

TANO v. SOCRATES (GR. 110249, 21 Aug. 1997)

FACTS: The Province of Palawan and City of Puerto Princesa enacted ordinances prohibiting the catching and
exportation of live tropical fishes. Some fishermen were apprehended for violating said ordinances, they now challenge
the constitutionality of said ordinances, invoking their preferential rights as subsistence fishermen to the use of our
communal marine resources.

HELD: The preferential rights of subsistence fishermen to the use of marine resources is not absolute. Marine resources,
as per the Regalian Doctrine and under Art. XII, Sec. 2, belongs to the State, and their exploration, development and
utilization shall be under the State’s full control and supervision. It is a policy enshrined in the Constitution that the State
has the duty to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature. The ordinances are meant precise to this, so that the enjoyment of our resources may be
guaranteed for the present and future generations. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

VII. Provisions on Economic Policy

1. Art. XII, Sec. 10(2) – “In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos”

This is known as the “Filipino First Policy”

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS (GR. 118295, 02 May 1997, 267 SCRA 402)

FACTS: The Manila Hotel, which was previously owned by a US Corporation, was then owned by GSIS. Pursuant to the
policy of Privatization, the GSIS held it up for bidding. The Filipino Corporation lost. However, it offered to match the
bid of the winning foreign corporation.

HELD: (1) Art. XI, Sec. 10 (2) is a self-executing provision. It is a mandatory, positive command that is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement, it does not require any
legislation to put it in operation.

(2) The word “patrimony” means heritage. Heritage includes not only natural resources but also our national and cultural
heritage. While the Manila Hotel was not originally Filipino, it has become truly Filipino, with its own history. It is a mute
witness to our history.

2. Art. II, Sec. 19 – “The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos”

TAÑADA v. ANGARA (272 SCRA 18, [1997])

HELD: This economic policy does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services, nor does it
contemplate “economic exclusion” or “mendicancy in the international community”. Aside from envisioning a trade
policy based on “equality and reciprocity”, the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets”, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but
one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign market.

VIII. Provisions on Education


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Academic Freedom – Art. XIV, Sec. 5 (2) – “Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.”

Note that the provision says “institutions of higher learning”

This refers to the tertiary level only!

Q: What is “academic Freedom”?

A: This is the right of the school or college to dictate for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them – free
from outside coercion or interference save possible when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a
wide sphere of autonomy. (University of San Agustin v. CA [23 SCRA 761])

Subsumed in the tern academic freedom is the freedom to determine, on academic grounds, the following:

1.Who may teach? This refers to the faculty


2.What may be taught? This refers to the subject and courses to be offered
3.How it shall be taught? This refers to the method of teaching
4.Who may be admitted to study? This refers to the students Right of the School to Determine Who may be
Admitted to Study Thus, mandamus would not lie to compel a school to accept a student
BUT: once the school admitted the student, there is now a contract between them – this a contract with PUBLIC
INTEREST

Thus, the school may not arbitrarily dismiss or expel a student – it should be based on either:

1. Failure to meet minimum academic requirements prescribed for the school or for the subject;
2. Violation of the school’s rules of discipline
Also, the school must conduct an investigation – it must observe due process to establish the culpability of the student

UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA (GR. 134625, 31 Aug. 1999)

FACTS: Aroklaswamy William Margaret Celine was given a masteral degree and was allowed to graduate. Subsequently,
however, it was discovered that her thesis was plagiarized. Thus, UP revoked her degree.

HELD: If an institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it can also determine on whom
it can convey the honor and distinction of being its graduates. If the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained
through fraud, a university can revoke or withdraw such honor or distinction. This freedom does not terminate upon a
student’s graduation, since it is precisely the “graduation” that is in question.

Art. XIV, Sec. 4(1) – “The State recognizes the complementary role of public and private institution in the educational
system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions”

This deals with the State’s power to regulate educational institutions

MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION v. CA (348 SCRA 265, 15 Dec. 2000)

HELD: The power of the State to regulate educational institutions is subject to the requirement of reasonableness.
Moreover, what is allowed is only the regulation and supervision of educational institutions not the deprivation of their
rights.

IX. Rights of Indigenous Peoples

CRUZ v. SECRETARY of DENR (GR. 135385, 06 Dec 2000)

FACTS: The constitutionality of RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Reform Act) was questioned. The SC en banc voted 7-7,
hence, since the presumption is for constitutionality, such presumption was not overthrown, and the law was declared
unconstitutional. Each justice wrote a separate opinion, and all opinions form part of the decision.

SALIENT POINTS
1. Nature of RA 8371(Separate Opinion of J. Puno)

RA 8371:
(1) Recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities (ICCs) or indigenous peoples (IPs) as a distinct
sector in the Philippine society
(2) Grants them the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of
these lands and domains,
(3) Gives the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

2. Definition and Distinction ICCs/IPs (Separate Opinion of J. Kapunan)


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Sec. 3, RA 8371 – IPs/ICCs “refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and
ascription of others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory,
and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories,
sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos.

NOTE: There is really no difference between the 2 terms, except:


ICCs – the term used in the Constitution
IPs – the term used in the international community and the UN
NOTE: The terms are always used in the plural form

3. Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands, Definition and Nature (Separate Opinion of J. Puno)
Nature: These are private property of indigenous peoples – it does not constitute part of the land of the public domain

Definitions:
(1) Ancestral Domain – Sec. 3(a), IPRA

Ancestral Domain all areas belonging to ICCs/ IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs
by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the
present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations

It comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, including ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural and other lands whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies
of water, mineral and other natural resources.

(2) Ancestral Land - Sec. 3(b), IPRA

These are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands
and that these land are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by them under claims of individual or
traditional group ownership.

Thus, Ancestral Domain is a broader concept – it includes Ancestral Lands

4. Acquisition by ICCs/IPs of their Rights to their Ancestral Domains and Lands (Separate Opinion of J.
Puno)

2ways:

1. By Native Title – over both Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands


2. By Torrens Title under the Public Land Act – over Ancestral Lands only.

5. Native Title, Concept (Separate Opinion of J. Puno)

This refers to the ICCs/IPs pre-conquered rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back
as memory reaches.
These lands are deemed NEVER to have been public lands and are presumed to have been held privately since before the
Spanish Conquest.

This right of private ownership is peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their Ancestral Lands and Domains.

Formal recognition of this right is embodies in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)

A CADT is just like a Torrens Title – it is evidence of private ownership of land by native title.

6. Ownership by Acquisitive Prescription v. Ownership by Native Title (Separate Opinion of J. Kapunan)

Ownership by Acquisitive Prescription

Involves a conversion of the property’s character from alienable public l and to private land
Thus, there is a transfer for title from the State to a private person
Meaning, the land is originally public land, which is converted to private
Note: This requires that the land is alienable

Public Land – Art. XII, sec. 3 – “Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks”

Of these, only agricultural lands are alienable


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Requirement for Acquisitive Prescription

– the private individual must have possessed the land open, continuously, exclusively, adversely, and notoriously, in the
concept of an owner, for either of the following periods:

(1)30 years – bad faith


(2)10 years – good faith

Ownership by Native Title

Here, the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessor-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial Thus, the land is not acquired from the State – there was no transfer from the State

The land is private in character as far back as memory reaches.

7. Jura Regalia – requires that private title to land must be traced to some grant – express or implied – from the
Spanish Crown or its successors – the American Colonial Government and after, the Philippine Government.

Q: Does jura regalia negate native title?

A:NO!

In Cariño v. Insular Government, the SC has held that when as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

Native title is an exception to jura regalia.

Art. XII, Sec 2. – “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and other natural resources are owned by the State”

This is the recognition of the Doctrine of Jura Regalia

ELECTION LAW

Significant Laws

BP 881 – Omnibus Election Code

RA 6646 – Electoral Reform Law of 1987

RA 7166

RA9006 – Fair Election Act

RA 9189 – Absentee Voter’s Act of 2003

Ombudsman act of 1989


Section 21 of RA 6770
Ombudsman have administrative… except only with respect to those impeachable officers
Sec 24: preventive suspension: How long? 6 months (sa civil service law 90 days lang or 3 months) pero sa ombudsman
act
No court will issue injunction against the Ombudsman
Sec 21 and 24 and sec 14 ra 6770

DEFENSE: doctrine of condonation


Aguinaldo vs. Santos: the term of office if public offcers are separate and distinct from each other. His election serves as a
condonation from the people. So in his new term he will no longer be
Mayor Alvin Garcia vs. Honorable Arturo Mojica: when electorate put him back in his office. If absence this
knowledge…
(Obiter ni Sandoval: the SC has the tendency to abandon this doctrine)
Under section 24 ra 6770 for the ombudsman to issued the preventive suspension order ang cases niya is for grave
misconduct, negligence. If ever he will be found guilty he will be punished by dismissal.

PRE-ELECTION STAGE

Registration of Voters

Q: Who may register?


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

A: Only those who are qualified.

VOTER’S QUALIFICATIONS

Art. V, Sec. 1 – “Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least eighteen years of age and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. No literacy, property or other substantive requirement shall
be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.”

(1) citizens of the Philippines

(2) not otherwise disqualified by law

(3) at least 18 years of age

(4) resident of the Philippines for at least one year and of the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the elections

Election Period: 90 days before the day of the election and shall end 30 days thereafter
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

We are supposed to have a multi-party system as provided under Art. IX-C, Sec. 6 – “A free and open party system shall
be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.”

ELECTION PERIOD

Q:What is the election period?


A: Art. IX-C, Sec. 9 provides that “unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases,
the election period shall commence 90 days before the day of election and shall end 30 days thereafter.”

PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES DURING ELECTION PERIOD

(1) construction of public highways/ public works


(2) public employment, appointment

CAMPAIGN PERIOD

-duration usually shorter

-depends on the office aspired for


-usually starts after the last day of filing of the certificate of candidacy and ends one day before elections.

ELECTION CAMPAIGN

‐“Election Campaign” and “partisan political activity” are the same. They are used interchangeably.

‐Under Sec. 79 (b) Omnibus Election Code, it refers to “an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office xxx”

Section 80, Omnibus Election Code – “ ELECTION CAMPAIGN OR PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY OUTSIDE
CAMPAIGN PERIOD – It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period:
PROVIDED, that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within
30 days before the commencement of the campaign period and 45 days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.”

GENERAL RULE: It is unlawful for any person to engage in an election campaign except during the campaign period.
Otherwise, it will be an election offense.

EXCEPTION: Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their candidates within 30 days before the
commencement of the campaign period within 45 days for President and Vice-President elections.

CANDIDATE

Sec. 79(a) Omnibus Election Code – “ the term “CANDIDATE” refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office, who has filed a

certificate of candidacy by himself of through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties.”

Q: Does Pichay’s as “itanim sa senado” even before the elections and campaign period violate Sec. 80 of the OEC?
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
A: No. At that time, Pichay has not yet filed his certificate of candidacy. He is not yet a candidate within the meaning of
the law. Therefore, it cannot be considered as an election campaign.

FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY

Sec.76. Omnibus Election Code – “Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt – The Commission,
provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election
inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the
certificate of candidacy.”

It is a ministerial duty on the part of the election official to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of
candidacy. The question of whether or not a person is disqualified belongs to another tribunal in an appropriate
disqualification case.

Q: Ka Roger went to Laguna to file COC. The election officer refused because he seeks to achieve goals through violence.
Valid?

A: No. It is the ministerial duty on the part of the election official to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of
candidacy. The question of whether or not a person is disqualified belongs to another tribunal in an appropriate
disqualification case.

PERIOD

Sec. 73, 1st sentence, OEC – “No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate
of candidacy within the period fixed herein xxx”

The certificate of candidacy must be filed within the period prescribed by law.

Late filing not allowed

Sec. 73, 3rd sentence, OEC – “No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if
he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them xxx”

The certificate of candidacy must be filed for only one office in an election

If a candidate files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.

WITHDRAWAL

Q: Can you withdraw the certificate of candidacy?

A: Yes. A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to
the office concerned a written declaration under oath. (Sec. 73, 2nd sentence, OEC)

MONSALE v. NICO

On the last day of filing of certificate of candidacy. March 31, Jose Monsale withdrew his certificate of candidacy. April
1, campaign started. On April 2, he wanted to run again so he filed a written declaration withdrawing his withdrawal.

HELD: The withdrawal of the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy made after the last day of filing is considered as
filing of a new certificate of candidacy. Hence, it was not allowed since it was filed out of time.

EFFECT OF FILING OF A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY

Appointive Officials

Sec. 66. OEC – “Candidates holding appointive office or position – Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in the
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.”

Q: X, a municipal treasurer filed a certificate of candidacy for governor. What is the effect?

A:He is considered ipso facto resigned.

Q:Is there a need to resign?

A: NO! The appointive official is ipso facto resigned. Ipso facto means no need to resign.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Q:What if after filing, the appointive official withdrew his certificate of candidacy. Can he be reinstated to his former
position?

A:No! What matters is the moment of filing.

PNOC-EDC v. NLRC

HELD: The OEC does not distinguish between employees of GOCCs which have original charters and those that do not
have one.

Elective Officials

Sec. 67, OEC – “Candidates holding elective office xxx” has already been repealed by the Repealing Clause of the Fair
Election Act under Sec. 14, RA 9006 – “Repealing Clause. Sec 67 and 85 0f the EOC xxx are hereby repealed.”

Q:What governs now?

A:Secton 38, COMELEC Resolution 7767 (30 Nov 2006),

Implementing Rules of the Fair Election Act – “Effect of Filing Certificate of Candidacy of Elective Officials – Any
elective official, whether national or local, who has filed a certificate of candidacy for the same or other office shall not be
considered resigned from his office.”

FARIÑAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

HELD: The provision of the Fair Election Act (RA 9006) to the extent that it repealed Sec.67 of OEC is constitutional.

Q: Vice-governor filed a certificate of candidacy for governor. What is the effect?

A: He is NOT ipso facto considered resigned. Sec. 67 OEC has been repealed by the FAIR ELECTION ACT (RA 9006).
Any elective official, national or local shall not be considered as resigned from their elective office.

SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDATES

Q: What are the GROUNDS for substitution of candidates?

A: Sec.77, OEC enumerates 3Grounds:

(1) Death
(2) Disqualification
(3) Withdrawal of another

Section 77. OEC – “Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the
filing of certificates of

candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace
the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-
day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country,
with the Commission.”

Q: When may substitution take place?

A: Substitution can only take place on the first day of campaign period until NOT later than mid-day of election day.

Q: Martin de Guzman, a candidate for mayor, died 3 days before the election. Can his wife substitute him?

A: It depends. Under Sec. 77, only a candidate belonging to the same political party may be substituted. By
implication, an independent or those who do not belong to any political party may not be validly substituted
because nobody will qualify.

Q: What are the requirements for substitution?

A: (1) nominated by the political party concerned

(2) certified by the political party concerned


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

Q: Martin de Guzman died while campaigning. His son substituted him. Voters on the day of the election wrote Martin
de Guzman instead of casting the same in the name of his son, Joel de Guzman. Should the votes be counted in favor
of Joel?

A: Yes! As a general rule, under RA 9006, Sec. 12, the same will be considered as stray votes but will not invalidate the
whole ballot. Exception is when the substitute carries the same family name, the said provision will not apply.

Section 12. RA 9006 – “Substitution of Candidates. In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been
printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole
ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the substitute
candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided, however, That if the substitute candidate of the same family name,
this provision shall not apply.”

MIRANDA v. ABAYA

FACTS: In the 1998 election, mayor Miranda of Isabela, already served 8 consecutive terms, yet he still filed a certificate
of candidacy. As a result, Abaya filed a disqualification case. COMELEC then disqualified Miranda and cancelled his
certificate of candidacy. The son of Miranda, Joel, upon nomination of their political party, filed a certificate as a
substitute. Joel Miranda won.

HELD: There was no valid substitution. COMELEC did not only disqualify Miranda but also cancelled his certificate of
candidacy. Therefore, he cannot be validly substituted. It is as if he was not a candidate.

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is already understood that the concept of a substitute
presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not
exist or who never was. The court has no other choice but to rule that in all instances enumerated in Sec.77 of the OEC,
the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine quo non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first
place because if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed COC, he is and was not a candidate at
all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Sec. 77 of the OEC.

The purpose of the law in requiring the filing of the COC and in fixing the time limit therefore are:

(a) To enable the voters to know at least 60 days before the regular election, the candidates among whom they are to
make the choice and

(b) To avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast

Q: Considering that Joel possesses all the qualifications, can he be considered as a candidate in his own right?

A: No. The certificate of candidacy was filed long after the last day of filing (Sec. 73, OEC)

The existence of a certificate of candidacy is a condition sine qua non under Section 77.
Q: Since there was no valid substitution, should the candidate who obtained the second highest vote be proclaimed?

A: No. Under the doctrine on the rejection of second placer, the second placer is just like that – second placer. He was not
the choice of the electorate. The wreath (crown) of victory cannot be transferred to the repudiated loser. (Cayat v.
COMELEC citing Butch Aquino v. COMELEC and Sunga v. COMELEC)

Q: Who will now assume the position of mayorship?

A: Following the rule on succession, it is the Vice-Mayor.

LABO DOCTRINE
The thrust is what to do with the votes cast for a disqualified candidate. Should they be considered as stray votes?

SC: No! That would disenfranchise the majority. The votes cast for the disqualified are not stray votes they are valid votes
only that the candidate was later on found to be disqualified.

It would have been different if his disqualification was so apparent, so notorious, so much so that the people,
notwithstanding that they knew him to be disqualified, they still voted for him in which case the votes cast for him shall
be considered as protest votes. Protest votes are considered as stray votes. But not in this case, where the people of Baguio
voted for Labo only to find out that he is disqualified.

You cannot apply Labo Doctrine in Party-List because of Section 10, RA 7941

CAYAT v. COMELEC
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
FACTS: Rev. Fr. Nardo Cayat ran for Mayor. Palileng, his opponent, found out that Cayat, before the elections, was
previously convicted of acts of lasciviousness although he was granted probation. His candidacy was then questioned in a
disqualification case invoking Section 40 pf the LGC. (Disqualification – The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position: (a) those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within (2) years after serving sentence ; xxx) .
COMELEC disqualified Cayat on the ground of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. However, Cayat
alleged that he did not receive a copy of the judgment. That decision disqualifying Cayat became final even 2 weeks
before the election. Still, Cayat won in the election. Palileng claimed that since Cayat is disqualified, he should be the one
proclaimed.

HELD: The Court agreed and did not apply the doctrine of the rejection of the second placer. The one who obtained the
second highest number of votes was the one actually proclaimed. This is very peculiar because here, there is only one
candidate. Since Cayat was disqualified, it is as if he is not a candidate. Hence, there is no second placer here.

The doctrine of the rejection of second placer is not applicable because of Sec.6 of RA 6646

Also, under Section 6, RA 6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987 – Effect of disqualification) which contemplates of 2
situations, it is the 1st sentence which applies to Cayat. He was declared by final judgment, to be disqualified because the
decision attained finality even 2 weeks before the election. He shall therefore not be voted for and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted.

The second sentence contemplates that there was a disqualification case filed before the COMELEC but for whatever
reason, COMELEC was not able to render a decision before the election and such candidate won in the election, in which
case, the court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the election, inquiry or protest.

DISQUALIFICATIONS/REMEDIES BEFORE ELECTION

Any disqualification filed before the election, whether pursuant to Sections 68, 69 and 78 of OEC, the jurisdiction is with
the COMELEC

(1) Section 68, OEC – “Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having:
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.”

Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Violation of election laws is without prejudice to the filing of criminal action.

(2) Section 69, OEC – “Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if the candidate is a nuisance candidate.”

Q:Who is NUISANCE CANDIDATE?


A: A nuisance candidate is a candidate who has no bona fide intention to run, his purpose is merely to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts intended to prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

(Bautista v. COMELEC)

Period to file a petition

Within five (5) days from the last day of filing of the certificate of candidacy assuming that COMELEC did not act motu
proprio.

(3) Section 78, OEC – “Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. Xxx”

Period to file a petition

Within twenty-five (25) days from the time the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy/ from the date the candidate
alleged to have made misrepresentation in the COC filed.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
LOONG v. COMELEC

FACTS: Loong was a candidate for Vice-Governor in ARMM. There was an election held but there was yet no
proclamation. Eventually, it was found out that Loong was still underage. Can the petition to disqualify Loong on the
ground of material misrepresentation prosper?

HELD: No. The petition was filed out of time. The disqualification case under Sec. 78 should be filed within 25 days from
the date the candidate who made the misrepresentation filed his certificate of candidacy, not on the date of discovery. The
25-day period is mandatory.

Q: What then is the remedy?

A: There is a GAP in the law, which must be addressed by Congress.

SALCEDO v. COMLELEC

HELD: Material misrepresentation refers to the QUALIFICATIONS of the elective official for the elective office and
NOT to any innocuous mistake. There must be a deliberate intent to deceive the people to one’s qualification for public
office.

TECSON v. COMELEC

FACTS: A disqualification case was filed against FPJ in accordance with Sec. 78 on the ground of material representation
as to the citizenship.

HELD: There was no material misrepresentation. The misrepresentation must not only be material. There must also be a
deliberate intent to mislead or deceive as to one’s qualification to public office.

EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION CASES

Section 6. RA 6646 – “Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC

There was yet no proclamation, hence not yet a member of the HOR. COMELEC still has jurisdictom

GUERRERO v. COMELEC

Fariñas was elected, proclaimed and took his oath. The COMELEC ousted itself of jurisdiction. SC upheld COMELEC. It
was recognition of the power of the HRET and the constitutional boundaries.

Election – 7am – 3pm, then counting, members of Board of Canvassers

Return usually 7 copies:

(1)COMELEC
(2)Treasurer
(3)Municipal Judge

The idea is that in case of lost return, they can refer to the other copies.

Number of votes written in words and number

POST ELECTION

PRE-PROCLAMATION CASE

Q: After election, but before proclamation, what is the remedy?

A: Pre-proclamation case. But this presupposes that there was election

Q: After proclamation, what is the remedy?


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

A:
(1) Election Protest
(2) Quo Warranto

In pre-proclamation cases, the governing provisions are Section 241, 242, 243 OEC.

Section 241, OEC – “Definition. - A pre -proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233,
234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.”

Section 242, OEC – “Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. - The Commission shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. It may motu proprio or upon written petition, and after
due notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annual partially
or totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding
sections.”

Section 243,OEC – “Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. - The following shall be proper issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned
in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously
manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which
materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

Section 243, OEC refers to issues that may ne raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. There are four (4) grounds, which
can be summarized into two (2):

(1) illegality in the composition of proceedings of the BOC – (a)

(2) illegality in the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, or appreciation of election returns – (b, c,d)

Once a candidate has been proclaimed, the pending pre-proclamation case should be dismissed. After all, the issues
pending in the pre-proclamation case will also be raised in the subsequent Election Protest or Quo Warranto case filed.

DOCTRINE OF STATISTICAL IMPROBABILITY – LAGUMBAY DONCTRINE

Where there exist similarities in the tallies in favor of candidates belonging to one party, and results in the blanking out of
the opposing candidates, the election returns are obviously manufactured on the basis of the doctrine of statistical
improbability.

As watcher, object to the inclusion of the canvass of the particular return on the ground that the election returns are
obviously manufactured on the basis

Maquiling vs. Comelec:


Dual Citizenship Law: Citizenship Retention Act of 2003
1. Retention
2. Reacquisition
Will you be qualified to run for a public office?
Yes
1. Must possess the qualifications and non of the disqualifications
2. At the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy you have to renounce your foreign citizenship.
May you be appointed?
Sec par 3 those appointed shall subscribe to an oath prior to their assumption of office you will have to renounce your
allegiance to the foreign country. This is a very significant development of the doctrine of statistical improbability. If still
included, it can result to a pre-proclamation controversy.

Pre-proclamation cases is NOT allowed in barangay elections.


Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Section 15, RA 7166 – “Pre- proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President Vice-President, Senator, and
Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the
case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon
written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before
it. “

Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly
with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.

Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of
canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district boards of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be
specifically noticed in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

For purposes of election of –

(1) President
(2) Vice-President
(3) Senators
(4) House of Representatives
There can be no pre-proclamation case on matters relating to transmission, custody of election returns; the only issue that
can be raised – illegality of the composition or proceeding of the Board of Canvassers

Therefore, there can only be a pre-proclamation case on the following:

(1) Municipal officials

(2) City officials

(3) Provincial officials Autonomous officials

FAILURE OF ELECTION

Section 6, OEC Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes
the election in any

polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and
after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect.

GROUNDS FOR FAILURE OF ELECTION

(1) Force majeure


(2) Violence
(3) Terrorism
(4) Fraud
(5) Analogous Causes

SITUATIONS

(1) No election

The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of FVTFA

(2) Election is suspended

The election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account
of FVTFA

(3) There is a failure to elect

After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or to the custody or canvass thereof,
such election results in a failure to elect on account of FVTFA; nobody emerged as winner
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
Q: What are the two (2) conditions that must concur before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election?

A: (1) no voting took place in the precinct

(2) on the date fixed by law or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect.
Q: Where to file a petition to declare a failure of election?

A: COMELEC EN BANC. The majority of the Commission may grant the petition and schedule special election in areas
affected.

(Section 4, RA 7166 – “Postponement, Failure of election and special Elections – The postponement, declaration
of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sec. 5, 6, and 7 of the OEC shall be decided by the
Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its Members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may
occur before or after the casting of votes or n the day of the election xxx”)

BANAGA v. COMELEC

Failure of election is the same with petition to annul election returns

General Rule: “xxx All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commision en banc. (Art IX-C, Section 3)

Exception: A petition to declare a failure of election shall be heard by the COMELEC en banc.]

PRE-PROCLAMATION v. FAILURE OF ELECTION

In pre-proclamation, there is actually an election that took place

In failure of election, there was no election at all or it was suspended or there was a failure to elect.

MITMUG v. COMELEC

There were 3 candidates for mayor. The total registered voters is 10, 000. Only 3,000 voted. There was a low turn out of
voters. A petition was filed to declare a failure of election

HELD: The petition cannot be granted. There was an election that took place. The law does not require the majority of
voters to cast their votes. There can onlybe a failure of election if the will of the people is defiled and cannot be
determined.

PROCLAMATION

Q: Who proclaims the winner?


(1) Board of Canvassers
(2) President, Vice-President Elections: Congress acting as Board of Canvassers
(3) Senators: COMELEC
(4) Congressman

(a) Lone Congressional district – Provincial BOC

(b) Several districts – District BOC

It is the ministerial duty of the BOC to proclaim the winning candidate. It has no discretion whether to proclaim or not.
After the last official act, which is the proclamation, the BOC becomes functus officio and may not validly reconvene
motu proprio. However, when the COMELEC ordered the reconveyance of the BOC, it may.

POST-ELECTION REMEDIES –After election

ELECTION PROTEST v. QUO WARRANTO

ELECTION PROTEST QUO WARRANTO


- who really won in the election?, - whether the winning candidate is
determination of real choice of qualified, eligibility or lack of
electorate qualifications of the candidate

- only the candidate running for the - If the winning candidate is


same can file disqualified, he shall be removed
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
and automatic succession shall
apply unless what is removed is not
- if the protestant wins, he shall be a local elective official, in which
proclaimed and shall replace the case, the position shall be declared
previously proclaimed winner. vacant, until there is a special
election to fill the vacancy.

- eg. coercion, terrorism, ballot box


switching, vote buying. -eg. Citizenship, residence,
disloyalty to Republic of the
Philippines

DUMAYAS v. COMELEC

Election Protest is a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in
the casting and counting of the ballots or in the preparation of returns. It resolves the question of who actually obtained
the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.

Quo warranto raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the
respondent from office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place.

JURISDICTION

President/ VP - SC en banc , acting as - EP 30 days from


Presidential proclamation
Electoral Tribunal QW 10 days
(Art. VII, Sec. 4[7]) proclamation
“sole judge”

Members of the Congress -Senate Electoral -EP or QW


-15 days after
-Senators Tribunal proclamation
-Congressmen -HR Electoral Tribunal -10 days after
(Art. VI, Sec. 17) proclamation

No appeal
Rule 65 (Special Civil Action on
Certiorari)
Governor/Vice-Governor -COMELEC (Original) -10 days proclamation
(Art. IX-C, Sec. 2[2])
-SC (Appellate)

Regional/ -COMELEC (Original)


Provincial/City -SC (Appellate)
Elective Municipal -RTC (Original)
Official (“trial courts of general
jurisdiction”)
-COMELEC
(Appellate)
(Art. IX-C, Sec. 2[2])
Elective Barangay -MTC (Original)
-MTC (Original) Official
Official (“trial courts of limited
jurisdiction”)
-COMELEC (Appellate
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

REYES v. RTC OF ORIENTAL MINDORO

From the decision of the COMELEC, file first a motion for reconsideration. It is only the decision of COMELEC EN
BANC that is reviewable by the SC.

TECSON v. COMELEC

Before the election, a petition was filed on the ground of material misrepresentation. COMELEC dismissed the petition.
TECSON et. al. argued tha the jurisdiction with the SC.

HELD: Contest refers to “post-election” scenario and not pre-election scenario. It shall consist of either an election protest
or quo warranto which are two (2) distinct remedies but with one objective, to unseat winning candidate. SC has
jurisdiction over election contests of President/Vice-President and NOT candidates. It does NOT include a petition
qualifying a candidate for President/Vice-President. Sc is the sole judge for President/Vice-President and NOT over
candidates for President/Vice-President. Hence, the action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity.

“election returns” – refers to election protest

“qualification” – refers to quo warranto

GALIDO v. COMELEC

Notwithstanding the finality of COMELEC’s decision, the parties are NOT precluded from filing a petition for certiorari
with the SC.

FRIVALDO v. COMELEC ; LOONG v. COMELEC

If the ground relied upon is lack of citizenship or disloyalty to the Republic, the period must be extended.

EFFECT OF DEATH OF A PARTY

Q: What is the effect of death of a party in an election protest? Should it warrant the dismissal of the protest?

A: The death of the protestant neither constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the contest not ousts the trial court of its
jurisdiction to decide the election contest. An election protest involves both the private interests of the rival candidates and
the public interest in the final determination of the real choice of the electorate, and for this reason, an election contest
necessarily survives the death of the protestant or the protestee. But while the right to public office is personal and
exclusive to the public officer, an election protest ins not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee
such that after the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. An election
contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with paramount public interests. (DE
CASTRO v. COMELEC)

COUNTER-PROTEST – available to a winning candidate if his election is protested.

A remedy available to a duly proclaimed winner in order to protect one’s lead. Allege also the precinct where your
opponent cheated.

KHO v. COMELEC

Counter protest must be filed within 5 days from receipt of the copy of the protest. The period is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional. It partakes the nature of a counterclaim. So that the court is ousted of jurisdiction to entertain a counter
protest belatedly filed.

If a counter protest was belatedly filed, but was erroneously admitted, the remedy is to file a motion to expunge the
counter protest from the records. If not expunged from the record, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

ELECTION OFFENSE

Q: Who has jurisdiction over election offenses?

A: RTC, except in cases where there is failure to register to vote which shall be under the MTC.

Section 268, OEC – “Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction
to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of
failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts.
From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016

Q: Who shall prosecute election offenses?

A: COMELEC not the fiscal unless the latter is deputized by the COMELEC

Q: In case of public official, should COMELEC still prosecute?

A: COMELEC can still prosecute. It is not the personality of the accused but the nature of the offense.

INCLUSION/EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS

- within the jurisdiction of MTC appealable to RTC

-RTC decision is not appealable

WHEN ELECTION PROTEST BECOMES MOOT

Defensor Santiago filed an Election Protest. Subsequently, she ran for Senator and won. She abandoned her protest when
she ran for an office different from that of the President.

RULES ON APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS

(1) GENERAL RULE – After the elections, the liberal interpretation rule shall be applied. IN CASE OF DOUBT, the
rule in favor of the vote being valid as to give effect to the will of the electorate shall be followed.

(2) EQUITY OF INCUMBENT RULE – 2 or more candidates running for the same office, they bear the same first
name, surname or both and the voter in his ballot wrote only either of the 2, the vote shall be appreciated in favor
of the incumbent. If neither of them is incumbent, the votes shall be considered stray votes.

(3) IDEM SONANS RULE or SAME SOUNDS RULE – If the name of the candidate is misspelled by the voter, for as
long as when it is pronounced, it sounds like the name of the candidate, the vote is counted in the latter’s favor
UNLESS it can be considered as marking, in which case the entire ballot is invalid.

(4) DESCRIPTIO PERSONAE – rule is the same in idem sonans rule.

Maquiling en banc ruling Chief Justice Serreno


There was no chance for Arnado's proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his
answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections
and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino
and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public
office based on Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position."
The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as
candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from
the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although
made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.

Mercado vs. Manzano:


SC: Section 5 Article 4: dual allegiance is inimical to national interest. Not self-executing it requires a future law citing
Aznar vs. Comelec.

The LGC should be the implementing law


Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position. Dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance.

Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
Transcribed and completed by: Maria Victoria Z Matillano
Atty. Edwin Ray Sandoval Lecture Notes 2015 and 2016
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine
of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens
of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who
marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to
file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other
hand, is brought about by the individual's active participation in the naturalization process. Under R.A. No. 9225, a
Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to
the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation
of a naturalized citizen's foreign citizenship.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Section 5 (3)
of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public
office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed
in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 (this is also known as the twin requirement). In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-
born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A.
No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Add’l info: Cordora's reasoning as to Tambunting's residency fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American.
Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place
and the intention to return there permanently, and is not dependent upon citizenship.
Petition is dismissed.

Dual Citzenship Dual Allegiance


Involuntarily: USA follows the jus soli Voluntary: a product of his own volition
principle
Yung kay Arnado voluntary act yun:
Maquiling case

The disqualification retroacted

Sino papalit sa kanya as mayor? Doctrine of the rejection of the 2nd placer. This was abandoned by the SC so pina
proclaim si Maquiling 1912 Topacio vs.
Maquiling is not a 2nd placer in fact he was the first placer among the qualified candidates. Kasi qualified naman tumakbo
si Ejercito na tumakbo the votes cast for him are valid votes but he committed an election offense over spending
Maquiling Case ER Ejercito
He is not qualified to run to begin with there He is qualified to run and the votes cast for
is a defect. him are valid votes.

He merely committed an election offense


which is OVER SPENDING.

Kaya ang pumalit sa kanya Vice Mayor

ER Ejercito was replaced by the vice mayor: Hindi inapply ang Maquiling case
Even Labo is a mere obiter dictum.