Futures 109 (2019) 39–49

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Futures
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/futures

Citizen attitudes about job replacement by robotic automation

T
Taewoo Nam
Graduate School of Governance, Sungkyunkwan University, 25-2 Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, 03063, Republic of Korea

A R T IC LE I N F O ABS TRA CT

Keywords: This study explores the factors influencing citizen attitudes about job replacement by robotic
Automation automation and policy options addressing the replacement effect. To this end, 2017 American
Robot Trends Panel Wave data from the Pew Research Center are analyzed. The juxtaposition of en-
The fourth industrial revolution thusiasm and concern about the impacts of job replacement by robotic automation is captured in
Job replacement
a bi-dimensional view of citizen attitudes, as manifested in four attitudinal categories: optimistic
Technology determinism
(high enthusiasm and low worry), pessimistic (low enthusiasm and high worry), skeptical (low
enthusiasm and low worry), and hybrid (high enthusiasm and high worry). A regression-based
analysis is used to predict which attitudinal category an individual belongs to and the degree to
which he or she supports certain policy options (guaranteed income, robot quotas, extra pay for
human interaction, and a national program for displaced workers) according to his or her
awareness, perceived likelihood, and expectation of positive outcomes of job replacement. This
analysis reveals that attitudes differ considerably based on ideology and partisanship.

1. Introduction

Many predict that the fourth industrial revolution, characterized by such technologies as cyber-physical systems, robotics, arti-
ficial intelligence, and machine learning, will eventually affect societies, economies, industries, and daily living, either dramatically
or marginally. A rising number of future projections are focused on the substantial replacement of labor by artificial intelligence,
robots, and automation. Jobs that consist of routine processes and do not require creativity or humanity are expected to disappear
(Schwab, 2016) and the nature of the work and occupations remaining in the future is expected to change fundamentally (Arntz,
Gregory, & Zierahn, 2016; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015; Frey & Osborne, 2017; Hirschi, 2018). While some predict that
automation will eliminate half of the U.S. labor force (e.g., Frey & Osborne, 2017), others expect that new occupations, industries,
and ways of working will emerge (e.g., Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). Indeed, the trajectory of the industrial revolution thus
far—from the first (mechanization using steam power) to the second (mass production using electricity) to the third (computer-
ization)—has been characterized by the substitution of manual labor with machines. Thus, massive changes in the labor force are
expected in the transition to the fourth industrial revolution.
Given this ongoing and predictable situation, individuals may feel that technology-driven changes present serious threats or
unprecedented opportunities. In the meantime, governments are making efforts to prepare for and respond to such changes in various
ways. For instance, some governments are taking a regulatory approach to slow down labor substitution effects and protect human
labor. However, this approach will not be sustainable, given the imperative that government policies keep up with the pace of change
(Manyika et al., 2017). Governments and policymakers would like to address the following questions: How concerned are individuals
about job replacement by robotic automation? What do they think of policies to mitigate their concerns? While these are key inquiries
that mirror the current trends of questioning closely, in this study, these two inquiries are converted into causality-loaded research

E-mail address: namtaewoo@skku.edu.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2019.04.005
Received 1 November 2018; Received in revised form 21 February 2019; Accepted 9 April 2019
Available online 10 April 2019
0016-3287/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
T. Nam Futures 109 (2019) 39–49

questions that are more meaningful for empirical research. The two considered research questions are: 1) What influences citizen
attitudes about job replacement by robotic automation? 2) What influences citizen attitudes about policies addressing job replace-
ment by robotic automation?
To answer these questions, this study uses 2017 survey data from the Pew Research Center. This article consists of seven sections,
including the foregoing introduction. Section 2 discusses citizen attitudes about robotic automation regarding the first research
question. Section 3 reviews public policies created to deal with automation-driven labor substitution regarding the second research
question. Section 4 describes the data and variables in detail. Section 5 reports the results of the analysis. Section 6 discusses the
policy implications, theoretical implications, and research limitations. The final section presents concluding remarks.

2. Attitudes about technology-driven changes

In much recent literature on attitudes about technology-driven changes, especially changes brought about by the use of in-
formation communication technologies (ICTs) and the Internet, attitudes have spanned the extremes of optimistic enthusiasm
(utopia) and pessimistic concern (dystopia). Contemporary cultures offer contradictory views on emerging technologies at the two
extremes (Yar, 2014). Robotic automation, a key component of the fourth industrial revolution, has also gained attention from
scholars, who have taken stances ranging between optimism and pessimism. Individual attitudes about vast technology-driven
change such as robotic automation need to be discussed from various viewpoints with respect to new technologies, especially ICTs.
This section unravels the negative aspects as seen from sociotechnical views, political views, and economic-industrial views.
Sociotechnical views consider the social influence of technological developments largely from the following three perspectives:
descriptive determinism, normative determinism, and voluntarism. These views have served as an umbrella over debates about
technology-driven changes. Descriptive determinism considers technological developments as autonomous and necessary (Swierstra,
2015). This position is justified by market-driven competition (the first developer or user of technologies dominates the market and
wins larger shares). Normative determinism claims that society should not steer technological progress, but rather only decide where
and how scientific findings are applicable. In contrast, voluntarism argues that social factors constantly affect technological devel-
opment. This view is related to political perspectives because it pertains to who is influencing policy, who should ideally do what, and
who decides what (Morozov, 2014; Winner, 1980). In practice, discussions about such issues tackle how to avoid harmful tech-
nologies and develop worthwhile technologies (Stilgoe, Owen, & Macnaghten, 2013; Von Schomberg, 2013). Techno-determinism
provides arguments for optimism or pessimism based on technology-driven changes, while voluntarism accounts for the pivotal
influence of social forces.
Determinism and voluntarism have also been reflected in political views. Since the early stages of Internet-enabled participation
and decision-making, ICTs have been considered a double-edged sword (Arterton, 1987; Bimber, 2003; DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman,
& Robinson, 2001; Katz & Rice, 2002; Park & Perry, 2008). Utopian political scientists argue that the ICT-enabled reduction of
information and communication costs presents traditionally marginalized and disenfranchised groups with more and easier oppor-
tunities to participate in the public sphere (Browning, 2002; Foot & Schneider, 2006; Rheingold, 1993). On the contrary, e-democracy
pessimists believe that the digital divide or the gap between participants and non-participants is becoming wider because ICTs engage
the already-engaged to a greater extent than they mobilize the unengaged (Davis, 2005; Kavanaugh, 2002; Norris, 2001). In addition,
political views give rise to skeptics, who take a cautious view that resonates with “politics as usual” (Margolis & Resnick, 2000). To
them, nothing changes substantially and everything is normalized (Bimber, 2003; Davis, Elin, & Reeher, 2002; Uslaner, 2004).
Economic and industrial views have been expressed in optimistic and pessimistic scenarios regarding automation-driven changes.
Among these changes, a topic of priority is “technological unemployment” (Keynes, 1930), meaning the loss of jobs caused by
technological change, which is an inevitable result of creative destruction through technological advancements (Arntz et al., 2016;
Hines & Searle, 1979; Peters, 2017; Schumpeter, 2013; Standing, 1984; Woirol, 1996). Kurzweil (1999) proposed the singularity
hypothesis, which posits that computer intelligence will exceed and override human intelligence in the coming decades. This hy-
pothesis has invoked various predictions regarding the extent to which and the specific timing in which robots and artificial in-
telligence applications will be able to do the same things as humans do. A continuum of perspectives lies between the optimistic and
pessimistic extremes with respect to the extent and timing of this occurrence. Ford (2009) proposed two opposing predictions. For
optimists, technology will never evolve to the extent that the average human being’s work can be automated. While routine work will
disappear gradually, the economy will create new jobs requiring average human knowledge and skills. The other prediction pos-
tulates that developing technology could replace a large proportion of human labor and lead to permanent structural unemployment.
In this pessimistic future, average workers will never be able to find new jobs (Pistono, 2014), and robotic automation may bring
about neo-Luddism (Kaivo-Oja, Roth, & Westerlund, 2017: 196). Many jobs (middle-skilled) lying between knowledge-intensive
(high-skilled) and labor-intensive (low-skilled) occupations will remain under severe threat of replacement by artificial intelligence
(Autor & Dorn, 2013; Autor, 2015; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Frey & Osborne, 2017; Goos, Manning, & Salomons, 2009).
Opinions about the extent to which middle-skilled jobs will disappear and the extent to which automation will replace human
labor determine citizen attitudes. While determinism bifurcates into optimism and pessimism, voluntarism is manifested as skepti-
cism and belief in the normalization theorem because newly created jobs compensate for disappearing jobs. The public may believe in
an overall social equilibrium created by social factors (e.g., policies, public programs, and civic actions). This projection is similar to
the political skepticism that everything will continue linearly as before (Blit, Amand, & Wajda, 2018; Kaivo-Oja et al., 2017; Kurzweil,
2005).
In addition, attitudes about robotic automation mostly appear as three types. While existing studies have placed these three
attitudes on a uni-dimensional continuum, a bi-dimensional typology of attitudes (as seen in Fig. 1) can be drawn according to key

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T. Nam Futures 109 (2019) 39–49

Fig. 1. A bi-dimensional view of attitudes about technological development regarding socio-economic outcomes.

concepts in the lexicographic definitions of optimism and pessimism. This bi-dimensional view of citizen attitudes accounts for the
juxtaposition of enthusiasm and worry about the social impacts of robotic automation, as manifested in four attitudinal categories:
optimism (high enthusiasm and low worry), pessimism (low enthusiasm and high worry), skepticism (low enthusiasm and low
worry), and hybrid (high enthusiasm and high worry). Hybrid types have mixed feelings, predicting both desirable and undesirable
outcomes of emerging technological developments to a substantial extent. Those with hybrid attitudes have enthusiasm and concerns,
or hopes and fears, at the same time. This type considers opposing standpoints regarding technology-driven change as compatible
ones.

3. Policies responding to automation-driven unemployment

Considering the possibility of technological unemployment due to robotic automation, governments play a critical role in dealing
with the kind of chronic joblessness that will result from the rise of automation. Policymakers can facilitate the development of new
skills and enable the retraining of workers, thereby enhancing the competence of workers in the future labor market (Hancock, 2015;
Harayama, 2017). To this end, tax-based approaches such as robot taxes, negative income taxes, and earned income tax credits are
considered to be strong interventions (Etzioni, 2017; Lent, 2018; Straubhaar, 2017). Moreover, the guarantee of jobs by the gov-
ernment is considered as a last resort in the event of massive-scale unemployment for the sake of a huge budget. Besides these
progressive approaches, governments are developing ways to strengthen social safety nets (worker protection), in which programs
provide income and other forms of support (e.g., food, health care, and housing) to low-income individuals and families. In this
regard, the following four policies are notable.
First, universal basic income (guaranteed income) could serve as a financial cushion without strings attached, and is already being
tested on a small scale in Australia, Canada, Finland, and New Zealand (Pulkka, 2017; Rankin, 2016; Reed & Lansley, 2016). All
citizens, regardless of their employment status or income, receive a periodic paycheck from their government. Governments can
preserve their budgets by eliminating costly social programs (e.g., welfare and unemployment benefits) and solidify social safety
networks by generating incentives for individuals to take risks, start new businesses, change their jobs, return to school, or try new
careers (Standing, 2017; Yang, 2018).
Second, guaranteeing quotas of human workers—that is, restricting quotas of robots to dirty and dangerous work—would help
define the appropriate scope of robotization. The legislation for quotas of human workers is expected to protect their rights.
Governments could force any sector to maintain a human quota and add more value to the “made by humans” label (Wisskirchen
et al., 2017: 40).
Third, related to the quota approach, governments could list jobs that humans should exclusively perform and increase the pay for
workers who do such jobs (Wisskirchen et al., 2017). This approach is aimed at jobs requiring emotional interactions among human
beings—e.g., baby care, nursing, and psychological consulting (Schwab, 2016).
Last, a government may consider a national service program that pays displaced people to perform certain jobs. In this way, the
government could respond to the increasing demands on social safety net programs to support workers’ basic economic needs (Blit
et al., 2018).

4. Data and methods

To address the research questions raised in the introduction, this study employs large-scale survey data (N = 4135 U.S. adults)
from the 2017 American Trends Panel Wave conducted by the Pew Research Center from May 1–15, 2017. The American Trends
Panel is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults recruited from landline and cellphone random-digit-dial
surveys. This study includes 3795 respondents from the original sample, excluding incomplete responses to questions related to the
analysis. Table 1 presents the demographic distribution of the sample. These demographic conditions are included in the regression-
based analysis as control variables.
Measures regarding the dimensions in Fig. 1 are based on two variables: enthusiasm and worry. Table 2 presents the wording of
and the responses to the original questions. These two variables are used to estimate the degree of support for specific policy options.
In addition, the ordinal variables are used to classify the four groups in Fig. 1. The four groups are formed as combinations of positive
(valued 3 or 4) or negative (valued 1 or 2) responses. Fig. 2 presents the proportions of the four groups composed in this way. The
group with mixed feelings (high enthusiasm and high worry) is labeled hybrid, which indicates a concerned pro-robot attitude in this
paper.
Four questions in the dataset address citizen attitudes about policy options to prepare for massive technological unemployment.

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T. Nam Futures 109 (2019) 39–49

Table 1
Demographic composition of the sample.
Demographics Groups

Age [1] 18–29 (12%), [2] 30–49 (28%),

[3] 50–64 (32%), or [4] 65+ (28%)
Gender [0] female (49%), or [1] male (51%)
Educational attainment [1] less than high school (3%),
[2] high school graduate (12%),
[3] some college, no degree (22%),
[4] associate’s degree (10%),
[5] college graduate (28%), or
[6] postgraduate (25%)
Annual household income [1] less than $10,000 (5.6%),
[2] $10,000 to under $20,000 (6.9%),
[3] $20,000 to under $30,000 (8.7%),
[4] $30,000 to under $40,000 (9.4%),
[5] $40,000 to under $50,000 (9.0%),
[6] $50,000 to under $75,000 (17.7%),
[7] $75,000 to under $100,000 (15.0%),
[8] $100,000 to under $150,000 (15.6%), or
[9] $150,000 or more (12.1%)

Note: Coded values in brackets.

Table 2
Measurements of enthusiasm and worry about replacement by robots.
Variable Original question Responses

Enthusiasm “Thinking about the possibility that computers and robots could do most of the work currently done by [1] “not at all enthusiastic” (18%),
humans, how enthusiastic are you, if at all, about this possibility for society as a whole?” [2] “not too enthusiastic” (49%),
[3] “somewhat enthusiastic” (28%),
or
[4] “very enthusiastic” (5%)
Worry “Thinking about the possibility that computers and robots could do most of the work currently done by [1] “not at all worried” (4%),
humans, how enthusiastic are you, if at all, about this possibility for society as a whole?” [2] “not too worried” (26%),
[3] “somewhat worried” (49%), or
[4] “very worried” (21%)

Note: Coded values in brackets.

Fig. 2. Four attitudinal types based on the bi-dimensional view.

The name of each policy option reflects its purpose. Each question starts with “In the event that robots and computers are able to do
most of the jobs that are done by humans today, would you favor or oppose the following?” and then asks about the specific policy
options in Table 3 (briefly named as guaranteed income, robot quotas, extra pay for human interaction, and program for displaced
workers). The following response choices are given: [1] “strongly oppose,” [2] “oppose,” [3] “favor,” or [4] “strongly favor.”
The dataset contains four questions regarding future situations related to automation in two decades. The four variables are
combined into a single variable, named prediction of automation, by factor scoring (principal component analysis). All the questions
start with “Do you think each of the following things will or will not happen in the next 20 years?” and offer four choices: [1] “will
definitely not happen,” [2] “will probably not happen,” [3] “will probably happen,” or [4] “will definitely happen.” As Table 4
presents, the combined variable reflects predictions including such diverse areas as medical services, stores, delivery, and 3D
printing.
The survey gives respondents the following scenario in brief: “In the future, robots and computers with advanced capabilities may
be able to do most of the jobs that are currently done by humans today.” Regarding this scenario, there are three follow-up questions.
The first question is “How much have you heard, read, or thought about this idea before today?” This is considered the variable

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Table 3
Policy attitude variables.
Variable The original wordings of policy options

Attitude toward guaranteed income
Attitude toward robot quotas
Attitude toward extra pay for human
interaction
Attitude toward programs for displaced
workers
“If the federal government provided all Americans with a guaranteed income that would allow them to meet
their basic needs” (M = 2.55, SD = 1.10)
“If robots and computers were mostly limited to doing jobs that are dangerous or unhealthy for humans to do”
(M = 3.28, SD = 0.78)
“If people had the option of paying extra to interact with a human, rather than a robot or computer, when
buying a product or service” (M = 2.71, SD = 0.92)
“If the federal government created a national service program that paid [displaced] people to perform tasks
even if a robot or computer could do those tasks faster or cheaper” (M = 2.49, SD = 0.93)

Note: M=mean, SD=standard deviation.

Table 4
Prediction of automation.
Items Loadings

• “Doctors will rely on computer programs to diagnose most diseases and determine treatments.” (M = 3.00, SD = 0.66) 0.557
• “Most stores and retail businesses will be fully automated and involve little or no human interaction between customers and employees.”
(M = 2.73, SD = 0.68)
0.622

• “Most deliveries in cities will be made by robots or drones instead of humans.” (M = 2.73, SD = 0.68 0.636
• “When people want to buy most common products, they will create them at home using a 3-D printer.” (M = 2.35, SD = 0.67) 0.580

Note: Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.700, Eigenvalue = 2.105.

awareness [of job replacement by robots]. Three options are available: [1] not at all (10%), [2] a little (63%), or [3] a lot (27%). The
second question is worded as follows: “Based on what you know, does this concept seem [1] “not at all realistic” (3%), [2] “not very
realistic” (18%), [3] “somewhat realistic” (59%), or [4] “extremely realistic” (20%)?” This variable is named perceived likelihood [of
job replacement by robots]. The final question asks: “If robots and computers were able to perform most of the jobs currently being
done by humans, do you think the following are likely or not likely to happen as a result?” For this question, there are six items that
can be answered with a yes [1] or no [0] response. They include: 1) “inequality between rich and poor would be much worse than it is
today [reversely coded]” (78%), 2) “people would have a hard time finding things to do with their lives [reversely coded]” (60%), 3)
“people would be able to focus less on work and more on the things that really matter to them in life” (41%), 4) “the economy as a
whole would be much more efficient” (46%), 5) “the economy would create many new, better-paying jobs for humans” (27%), and 6)
“humans would find their jobs more meaningful and fulfilling since machines would mostly be doing things that humans find
unappealing” (42%). A composite index (a score ranging from 0 to 6) is created through the summation of the binary (yes or no)
responses to these six statements. The higher the index, the more positive the consequences of job replacement are expected to be.

Table 5
Descriptive statistics and correlation.
Variable Scale M [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I]
(SD)

[A] Guaranteed income Ordinal 2.55

(1–4) (1.10)
[B] Robot quotas Ordinal 3.28 0.13*
(1–4) (0.78)
[C] Pay for human interaction Ordinal 2.71 0.13* 0.09*
(1–4) (0.92)
[D] Program for displaced workers Ordinal 2.49 0.48* 0.28* 0.12*
(1–4) (0.93)
[E] Enthusiasm Ordinal 2.21 0.15* –0.09* 0.14* –0.07
(1–4) (0.80)
[F] Worry Ordinal 2.86 0.07 0.13* –0.01 0.16* –0.31*
(1–4) (0.79)
[G] Awareness Ordinal 2.17 0.08* –0.03 0.08* –0.06 0.22* 0.06
(1–3) (0.58)
[H] Perceived likelihood Ordinal 2.97 0.10 *
0.04 0.09 *
–0.01 0.30 *
0.07 0.41*
(1–4) (0.70)
[I] Expected positive outcomes Ordinal 2.15 0.09* –0.08* 0.13* –0.10 0.53* –0.37* 0.13* 0.19*
(0–6) (1.79)
[J] Prediction of automation Factor 0.00 0.14* 0.08* 0.12* 0.08 0.21* 0.08 0.20* 0.31* 0.14*
score (1.25)

* p < 0.01.

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T. Nam Futures 109 (2019) 39–49

Table 6
Binary logistic regression of attitude about job replacement.
Optimist Pessimist Skeptic Hybrid

Awareness 0.300* 0.060 –0.563* 0.083

(0.105) (0.072) (0.092) (0.085)
Perceived likelihood 0.345* 0.054 –0.690* 0.417*
(0.095) (0.061) (0.074) (0.076)
Expected positive outcomes 0.708* –0.614* 0.065* 0.229*
(0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024)
Prediction of automation –0.013 –0.027 –0.261* 0.213*
(0.039) (0.028) (0.036) (0.032)
Generation –0.149* 0.208* –0.024 –0.185*
(0.056) (0.040) (0.050) (0.046)
Male 0.440* –0.368* 0.123 0.062
(0.113) (0.077) (0.098) (0.091)
Educational attainment 0.129* –0.047 0.005 –0.006
(0.042) (0.028) (0.036) (0.034)
Income stratus 0.018 –0.022 0.038 –0.005
(0.025) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021)
Liberalism 0.074 –0.018 –0.118* 0.039
(0.063) (0.043) (0.056) (0.050)
Republican inclination 0.163 0.227* –0.001 –0.528*
(0.140) (0.096) (0.122) (0.114)
Social media use 0.167 0.100 –0.364* –0.019
(0.202) (0.129) (0.154) (0.159)
Constant –6.557* 0.808* 1.659* –2.881*
(0.495) (0.311) (0.390) (0.372)

N 3795 3795 3795 3795

Likelihood ratio χ2 853.21 971.67 329.15 361.48
Log likelihood –1173.67 –2144.60 –1480.23 –1673.07
Pseudo R2 0.267 0.185 0.100 0.098

* p < 0.05.

The composite variable is named expected positive outcomes [of job replacement by robots]. Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics
of and the correlations among the main ordinal and continuous variables that have been introduced so far.
In addition to demographic conditions, three variables are added to a set of controls. Partisan preference is included as a dummy:
[0] Democrat (54% for self-identified Democrats or independents leaning toward being Democrats) or [1] Republican (46% for self-
identified Republicans or independents leaning toward being Republicans). To ensure the bi-partisanship of all respondents, the
survey forces self-identified independents to select their inclination toward being Democrats or Republicans. This binary dummy is
named as Republican inclination because Republicans are coded as 1. Ideology is included as a five-point ordinal measure (M = 2.99,
SD = 1.11): [1] very conservative (9.5%), [2] conservative (23.1%), [3] moderate (36.4%), [4] liberal (20.9%), or [5] very liberal
(10.0%). Because a higher value for this measure indicates a more liberal position along the ideological spectrum, this variable is
named liberalism. Lastly, the dataset contains information about individuals’ use of social media (variable named social media use): [0]
not a social media user (10%) or [1] a social media user (90%).
This analysis seeks to predict the likelihood that an individual belongs to each attitudinal type and the degree of his or her support
for each policy option. Whether an individual belongs to a particular attitudinal type is predicted through binary logistic regression.
Because the policy attitude variables are measured in four points, the level of policy support is predicted through ordinal logistic
regression. The subsequent section reports the results of the binary logistic regression analysis and the ordinal logistic regression
analysis.

5. Results

5.1. Determinants of attitudes about automation

Table 6 presents the results of the binary logistic regression analysis of citizen attitudes about automation-driven job replacement.
Four regression specifications (being a skeptic, being a pessimist, being an optimist, or being a hybrid) are estimated. The main
significant findings of this analysis are as follows.
First, those who are aware of job replacement by automation are likely to be optimistic but not skeptical. In other words, skeptical
attitudes about automation-driven job replacement arise from unawareness. In the context of technological revolution, awareness of
automation is a source of optimism for socio-economic changes, whereas unawareness is a source of skepticism rather than pessi-
mism.
Second, those who perceive a high possibility of job replacement due to automation are likely to be optimistic or hybrid, but not
skeptical. A high perceived likelihood of job replacement by robots results in optimism or hybrid attitudes (based on enthusiasm),

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Table 7
Ordered logistic regression of policy attitudes.
Attitude toward

Guaranteed income Robot quotas Human-interaction pay Program for displaced workers

Enthusiasm 0.157* –0.146* 0.196* –0.108*

(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Worry 0.251* 0.190* 0.123* 0.292*
(0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045)
Awareness 0.049 –0.128* 0.142* –0.214*
(0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060)
Perceived likelihood 0.028 0.141* 0.049 –0.017
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
Expected positive outcomes 0.072* 0.007 0.091* –0.022
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Prediction of automation 0.124* 0.125* 0.101* 0.092*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Generation –0.161* 0.092* 0.090* 0.006
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Male –0.057 –0.330* –0.028 –0.260*
(0.064) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064)
Educational attainment –0.065* 0.010 –0.024 –0.152*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Income stratus –0.132* –0.024 0.004 –0.114*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Liberalism 0.582* 0.074* –0.029 0.323*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036)
Republican inclination –1.244* –0.021 0.040 –0.654*
(0.080) (0.081) (0.078) (0.079)
Social media use 0.227* –0.110 0.056 0.451*
(0.106) (0.108) (0.105) (0.107)
Cut 1 –0.352 –3.059 –0.440 –2.231
(0.300) (0.320) (0.297) (0.301)
Cut 2 1.179 –1.383 1.010 –0.265
(0.300) (0.309) (0.297) (0.299)
Cut 3 2.758 0.686 3.066 1.693
(0.302) (0.308) (0.301) (0.300)

N 3,774 3,782 3,778 3,760

Likelihood ratio χ2 1536.16 150.49 149.60 727.23
Log likelihood –4455.52 –3977.30 –4749.07 –4546.61
Pseudo R2 0.147 0.019 0.016 0.074
OLS adjusted R2 0.344 0.043 0.038 0.171

Note: OLS adjusted R2 is the adjusted R2 statistics when the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of four dependent variables is run.
* p < 0.05.

while a low perceived likelihood results in skepticism. An overall perception of technological unemployment as an upcoming socio-
economic trend induces the expectation of socially and economically desirable outcomes that follow from technological revolution.
Third, those who predict more positive outcomes of job replacement by automation are likely to be optimistic, hybrid, or
skeptical, but not pessimistic. The expectation of positive socio-economic outcomes due to automation distinguishes pessimists from
those in the other three categories, even skeptics, as indicated by the definition of pessimism (expectation of more negative out-
comes).
Last, those who predict vast automation in various fields of work are likely to be hybrid but not skeptical. Interestingly, an
assertive prediction regarding automation does not influence whether an individual becomes optimistic or pessimistic. Such a pre-
diction causes neither enthusiasm nor worry about robotic automation alone, but rather provokes a mixture of both attitudes.
Explanatory variables such as perceived likelihood and expected outcomes have similar influences on whether an individual
becomes an optimist or a hybrid. Awareness and perceived likelihood make prominent distinctions between optimists and skeptics,
but not between optimists and pessimists. Whether an individual is pessimistic about robot-driven change is better explained by other
controls such as generation, gender, and self-identified partisanship. Pessimism may stem partly from older age and Republican
inclinations. Partisanship serves as a differentiator between pessimists and hybrids. The elderly usually take a negative stance on
technological change. Optimistic and hybrid types seldom appear in older generations. The gender effect on attitudes regarding
future technological change is salient. Male respondents are more likely to be optimists, while females are more likely to be pessi-
mists. The more educated are more likely to be optimistic, but wealth does not influence attitude significantly. There is a significant
prediction that liberal individuals and social media users are not likely to be skeptical.

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5.2. Determinants of attitudes about policies

Table 7 presents the results of the ordinary logistic regression analysis of citizen attitudes about public policies to respond to
automation-driven job replacement. The regression analysis determines what predicts citizen attitudes toward the four policies
discussed in Section 3.
Predictions that work will become automated increase the support for all four policy options. Additionally, worry about tech-
nology-driven job replacement positively influences attitudes about all four policies. Expectedly, great concern leads to strong
support for policies that help people at risk for unemployment. Enthusiasts for technology-driven job replacement support guaranteed
basic income and extra pay for human interactions, but do not agree with the restriction of robot roles or the implementation of a
national service program to pay displaced workers. Those with more hope than fear regarding job replacement basically agree on the
expansion of robot roles. They may value cheaper and faster production and delivery by robots over human-involved processes.
Nevertheless, they support policies of guaranteed income and extra pay for human interactions. The effects of awareness on policy
attitudes are similar. High awareness leads to support of the robot quota policy and the displaced worker pay policy. Robot en-
thusiasts may oppose these two policies, as these policies will inevitably weaken the competitive power of robot-related industries
and economies. Those with high expectations of positive outcomes support guaranteed income and human-interaction pay, but this
support is not consistent with their attitudes regarding the other two policy options.
One notable determinant of Americans’ views on these policy options is their political affiliation. Democrats and Democrat-
leaning independents are more supportive than Republicans and Republican-leaning independents of both guaranteed income and a
national service program in the event of widespread job losses due to automation. Workers with lower levels of education and wealth
are also more likely to favor these two policies than their counterparts. The policy preferences of social media users and non-users
differ according to the same pattern. In contrast, significant partisan, educational, and income-related divisions do not exist regarding
policies limiting robots to dangerous/dirty jobs and offering people extra pay for human interactions. Liberalism overall bolsters
support for policies other than human-interaction pay.

5.3. Connection between attitudes about automation and attitudes about policies

This subsection discusses the relationship between attitudes toward automation and attitudes toward policies. Table 8 shows the
degree of preference for policy options, which considers the four-point responses of [1] “strongly oppose,” [2] “oppose,” [3] “favor,”
and [4] “strongly favor” for each option. In particular, Table 8 presents the mean value of these responses, thus measuring the overall
attitudes toward automation. Since the mean value of preference for robot quota is higher than those of the other options, robot quota
is taken as the most preferred policy option regarding attitudes about automation. Pessimists showed the strongest preference for
robot quota (M = 3.47), especially compared to optimists, but the robot quota option in general is a consistently preferred policy
among sampled individuals. The second most preferred option (human-interaction pay) is also consistent across the four attitudinal
types; note however that the hybrid type has guaranteed income as tied with human-interaction pay for the second most preferred
option. Interestingly, guaranteed income is the least preferred option for pessimists and skeptics. This indicates a fundamental
difference in perspectives on technological unemployment and strategic solutions between hybrids and pessimists-skeptics.

6. Further discussion

6.1. Academic implications

Little research has evaluated the determinants of citizen attitudes about changes resulting from the fourth industrial revolution.
This study expands the applicability of existing theories and hypotheses (optimism, pessimism, and skepticism based on technological
determinism and voluntarism) to new sociotechnical contexts by analyzing the determinants of individuals’ attitudes. Another
contribution is the creation of a new category of technology-related attitudes. This bi-dimensional view is expressed using four
categories, one of which is labeled “hybrid” (individuals with many hopes as well as many fears regarding technological changes).
This analysis validates the presence of hybrids by showing the differences among the attitudinal types regarding the influence of
common determinants. The bi-dimensional typology of attitudes related to technological changes could be used in future research to
uncover typological differences in attitudinal nature.
This more complicated understanding of attitudes reveals the existence of contrasts other than the optimism-pessimism contrast.
As shown in Table 6, the effects of the determinants distinguish between optimists and pessimists/skeptics, between hybrids and
skeptics/pessimists, and between skeptics and pessimists. Hybrids, who express both enthusiasm and worry about technology-driven
social changes, overall resemble optimists (much enthusiasm and little worry) far more than pessimists (little enthusiasm and much
worry). This indicates the strong influence of enthusiasm within the hybrid type.
Understanding these attitudes can help enhance technology acceptability, technology acceptance, and policy compliance (Weiss,
Igelsböck, Wurhofer, & Tscheligi, 2011). Acceptability (a favorable or unfavorable evaluation before use or implementation) and
acceptance (an evaluation after use or implementation) should be considered as distinct (Schuitema, Steg, & Forward, 2010). Op-
timistic, pessimistic, skeptical, or mixed attitudes ultimately have consequences, such as technology acceptance (or resistance) and
policy compliance (or disobedience). While acceptance differs from acceptability mainly in regard to timing, the decision to address
robotic automation in its early phase or at its more mature level will lead to divergences in technology acceptability, technology
acceptance, and policy compliance based on attitudinal differences. The findings of this study can serve as a preliminary guide

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Table 8
Policy preferences according to attitudes about automation.
Guaranteed income Robot quota Human-interaction pay Program for displace workers

Optimist SO = 22%, O = 24%, F = 27%, SF = 27% SO = 8%, O = 21%, F = 27%, SF = 44% SO = 7%, O = 20%, F = 53%, SF = 20% SO = 21%, O = 44%, F = 28%, SF = 7%
M = 2.60(1.10) M = 3.08(0.97) M = 2.86(0.80) M = 2.20(0.85)
Pessimist SO = 25%, O = 24%, F = 27%, SF = 24% SO = 1%, O = 7%, F = 45%, SF = 47% SO = 15%, O = 25%, F = 40%, SF = 20% SO = 15%, O = 30%, F = 37%, SF = 18%

47
M = 2.50(1.11) M = 3.37(0.67) M = 2.66(0.96) M = 2.58(0.95)
Skeptic SO = 29%, O = 29%, F = 25%, SF = 17% SO = 4%, O = 10%, F = 46%, SF = 40% SO = 16%, O = 29%, F = 40%, SF = 15% SO = 17%, O = 40%, F = 32%, SF = 11%
M = 2.29(1.05) M = 3.21(0.78) M = 2.55(0.92) M = 2.36(0.89)
Hybrid SO = 13%, O = 21%, F = 33%, SF = 33% SO = 3%, O = 15%, F = 37%, SF = 45% SO = 7%, O = 21%, F = 51%, SF = 21% SO = 12%, O = 36%, F = 36%, SF = 16%
M = 2.87(1.02) M = 3.25(0.81) M = 2.86(1.05) M = 2.57(0.89)

Note: SO = “strongly oppose,” O = “oppose,” F = “favor,” SF = “strongly favor,” M = mean, standard deviation in parentheses.
Futures 109 (2019) 39–49
T. Nam Futures 109 (2019) 39–49

regarding acceptability, acceptance, and policy compliance.

This study has the following limitations. The first limitation is the selection of specific policies among a variety of possible options.
For example, this study does not evaluate citizens’ attitudes toward education and training related to new skills or knowledge. On the
one hand, the policy options considered in this study can be seen as more progressive than education and training approaches. These
progressive options are currently under debate in an increasing number of countries. On the other hand, the four policy options
included here are relatively less progressive than robot taxes and government guarantee of jobs. Further research needs to explore
citizens’ attitudes regarding multiple options with respect to the ideological spectrum from less progressive to more progressive, and
further address the relationships between preferences for more diverse policy options and the perceived feasibility of those policies.
Second, awareness of upcoming technological changes and subsequent labor displacement could be better measured by objective
items (external evaluation of the extent to which an individual is concretely aware of given situations as primary components of
incoming changes) than by subjective items (self-evaluation of the extent to which an individual is aware of overall changes). Last,
respondents’ occupations and jobs are not considered in this analysis. Although the original dataset contains basic information about
occupations and jobs, the related questions are not connected with work characteristics (i.e., technology-related, routine, low-skilled,
and high-skilled).

6.2. Policy implications

Most policymakers who enjoy success stories about technology are not involved in critically analyzing the side-effects of tech-
nological progress. By the same token, laws, cultures, and citizen attitudes have not evolved to face the changes brought about by
technological waves. Policies should be developed to confront these changes and further reflect the policy preferences of citizens who
are at potential or imminent risk of technological unemployment. To this end, this study reveals who prefers specific policy options
over others and why.
Support for the four policy options investigated in this study aligns with ideology and partisanship. However, this is not ex-
clusively the case for the fourth industrial revolution. Basic income has been supported or opposed by arguments from both the right
and the left. Direct government intervention into market systems (e.g., with universal basic income) could be a disincentive to work,
but may also encourage low-level entrepreneurship. There are different motives for supporting the four policy options. Automation
enthusiasts may not support robot quotas (restricting robot roles to dirty and dangerous work) and special pay for displaced workers
because their enthusiasm centers upon a better quality of life, more productive industries, and new job opportunities fostered by
further automation. These enthusiasts think that such policies will reduce the competitive power of robot-related technologies and
industries. Policymakers should consider the possibility that a robot quota may impede technological progress. However, as seen in
Table 8, policymakers should also consider that a robot quota policy is the most consistently preferred option across attitudinal types
if individual citizens are forced to choose one among many possible options.
This study provides policymakers compelling evidence about liberal support and Republican opposition in general. A further step
in policy research will be to more precisely determine how enthusiasm and worry are related to ideology and partisanship. Certain
ideological and partisan inclinations may increase compliance with government policies in response to technological unemployment.
Policymakers could develop a strong rationale for extra pay for human interaction. The survey questions used in this study offer
questionnaire respondents “the option of paying extra to interact with a human, rather than a robot or computer, when buying a
product or service.” The mean value of citizen attitudes toward this policy option could increase if respondents are informed that
most human-interaction jobs are not replaceable by robots, at least in the near future. Optimists claim that the collective obsession
with job-stealing robots may be causing contemporaries to overestimate the impact of automation on societies and economies.
According to the Occupational Outlook Handbook by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/ooh/fastest-growing.
htm), the fastest-growing occupations are mostly service-oriented, including occupational therapy assistants, physical therapist as-
sistants and aides, home health aides, nurse practitioners, and other similar occupations. While robots may be decreasing manu-
facturing jobs, the demand for labor-intensive services in the U.S. is soaring. Human service jobs have unique qualities that robots
cannot imitate. Policymakers could list and support jobs characterized by irreplaceable human interactions.
The McKinsey report (Manyika et al., 2017) emphasizes the importance of timely and relevant decisions by policymakers. This
report states that the worst effects of the current transition can be ameliorated if governments take an active role, as the U.S.
government has done through the Marshall Plan. Policymakers will need to be flexible, creative, and ambitious as they look to
harness rapidly-emerging technologies and ensure that automation increases productivity and prosperity. The effects of automation
on work will differ from country to country. Developed economies like those of the U.S. and Germany are likely to be hit the hardest
by the coming changes, as higher average wages incentivize automation. In the U.S., employment in the health care industry will
increase as society copes with its aging population. Many developing countries are attempting to strengthen their workforce through
secondary and higher education, some parts of which can be supported by robots and artificial intelligence, but other parts of which
still require education through human interaction.

7. Conclusion

Technological unemployment is not a new phenomenon in the fourth industrial revolution, but the pace at which automation-
related technologies and science are developing is extraordinary, in that ordinary people have never experienced it. Individuals
overwhelmed by the pace of development may become optimists, pessimists, or skeptics. For a better understanding of individuals’
attitudes, this study proposes a bi-dimensional typology of attitudes regarding technology-driven social changes, and adds the hybrid

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type (having both high enthusiasm and high concern) as a new attitudinal category in the face of such changes. Among many possible
policy options, four approaches (guaranteed income, robot quotas, extra pay for human interaction, and a national program for
displaced workers) are analyzed. This study also explores the cognitive and demographic determinants of policy support. The findings
reveal substantial differences in the perceived values and demographic profiles of supporters for each policy option. Governments and
policymakers could use the implications from these findings when considering strategies to enhance citizens’ acceptability, accep-
tance, and compliance with respect to suggested policy options.

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