THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015

JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:

In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to
the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime
charged at the time of its commission.17 Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine x x x

Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine, fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC, in accordance with Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended x x x

On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated when the Cooperative filed a criminal case
against petitioner without undergoing conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the Cooperative Code and the By-
laws of the Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative. Conciliation or mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a
criminal case for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner, because such case is not an intra-cooperative dispute.

Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability, and her role in the prosecution of the offense is
limited to that of a witness for the prosecution.20 In petitioner's criminal case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the
State is the real offended party, while the Cooperative and its members are mere private complainants and witnesses
whose interests are limited to the civil aspect thereof. Clearly, such criminal case can hardly be considered an intra-
cooperative dispute, as it is not one arising between or among members of the same cooperative.

In People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an
acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case" and
when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal
of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so
would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for insufficiency of evidence,
but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the case on the merits, let alone
resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the
case, the October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to
ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or
the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused.

Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by
moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to evidence. As correctly argued by the People, where the
dismissal was ordered upon or with express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against
doubly jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not
attach.

Section 7 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper. There is double
jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. As to the first requisite, the
first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.

The test to determine whether an offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other is provided under
Section 5, Rule .120 of the Rules of Court:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes of falsification of private
document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the Informations
filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the
other, the third requisite for double jeopardy to attach—a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first—is,
therefore, absent. Not only are their elements different, they also have a distinct nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as
what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it
a crime is the special, law enacting it.

x x x Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in our
penal laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act
constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised
Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other.

G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,

vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:

In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the
entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c)
assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after
all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. x x x Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right
of the accused to speedy trial."

x x x requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the
application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the
accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the
public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. In this case, it is apparent from
the records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-
77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon which was served on the private complainant at least three days before said
hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. The fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for
provisional dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue her complaint."

The importance of a prior notice to the offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal x x x Such notice will enable
the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the
motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses
unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would
enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction,
provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of
the offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or
the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.

x x x the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor
cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
x x x if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better rule is that the reckoning period should
commence to run from the time such private counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal. When a
party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given
address. Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon the
former shall be made upon the latter.

x x x Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal with clogged
dockets in addition to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all times on all
pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some of
them, motivated by ill-will or malice, may simply exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on
time.

x x x Since the period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the private counsel's date
of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.

Principles in Legal Ethics

x x x Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and advice of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless and
vexatious legal maneuver for no purpose other than to delay the trial court proceedings. It appears that Atty. Maglaque’s
conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and
not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse
court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyer’s Oath also upholds in particular:

x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients x x x.

This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt termination of litigation is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice. In Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, We said:

The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on
the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A
lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

G.R. No. 229420, February 19, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ROGER DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS, RAYMOND DOMINGUEZ Y
SANTOS, JAYSON MIRANDA Y NACPIL, ROLANDO TALBAN Y MENDOZA, AND JOEL JACINTO Y
CELESTINO, Respondents.

VELASCO JR., J.:

The death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically render his testimony during the
discharge proceeding inadmissible

Section 17 and 18, Rule 119

The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will only be inadmissible if the
court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state witness. However, the motion hearing in this case had
already concluded and the motion for discharge, approved. Thus, whatever transpired during the hearing is already
automatically deemed part of the records of Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431 and admissible in evidence pursuant to the
rule.

x x x True, the provision requires the accused to testify again during trial proper after he qualifies as a state witness.
However, noncompliance therewith would only prevent the order of discharge from operating as an acquittal; it does not
speak of any penalty to the effect of rendering all the testimonies of the state witness during the discharge proceeding
inadmissible.
To qualify as a state witness, the respondent must testify on the details of the commission of the crime

Section 36, Rule 132

Noteworthy is that Miranda never raised in his Comment that he and his co-respondents have timely raised an objection
when Mendiola delved into the particulars of the crime in his testimony. They are, thus, precluded from belatedly
questioning the relevance of the said details.

Respondents had the opportunity to cross-examine Mendiola

Section 1, Rule 115

x x x Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of
the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. (emphasis added, citations omitted)

Respondents' reservation for trial proper of the right to further cross examine Mendiola did not diminish the sufficiency of
the opportunity that they were given to confront the adverse witnesses. Notwithstanding the said reservation, Mendiola's
testimonies and admissions as regards the particulars of the crime already formed part of the records of the case when
the RTC granted his motion to be declared a state witness. Respondents' constitutional rights were not violated since the
fair hearing envisaged by criminal due process had been complied with when the counsels for the respondents conducted
a rigorous and exhaustive cross-examination of the deceased witness during the discharge hearing.

G.R. No. 184658 March 6, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE RAFAEL R. LAGOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 79, JONATHAN DY y RUBIC, CASTEL VINCI ESTACIO y TOLENTINO, AND CARLO CASTRO y
CANDO, Respondents.

SERENO, CJ.:

It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule
on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is endowed with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so
severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to
be at risk of double jeopardy.

x x x The validity of buy-bust transactions as an effective way of apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an
offense is well-settled.

The Court has held that when police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold the presumption of regularity accorded to them in the performance of their official duties. In the present case, there
is no contention that the members of AIDSOTF who conducted the buy-bust operation were motivated by ill will or malice.
Neither was there evidence adduced to show that they neglected to perform their duties properly. Hence, their testimonies
as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation deserves full faith and credence.

x x x the Court has long established that the presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the prosecution of drug
cases. The testimony of the CI is not indispensable, since it would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of
the poseur-buyer who was presented in court, and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of
the prohibited drug.

Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable
services to the police. Except when the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the officers had motives to
falsely testify against the accused, or that it was the informant who acted as the poseur-buyer, the informant's testimony
may be dispensed with, as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness accounts. x x x
Similarly, in the present case, the fact of the illegal sale has already been established by testimonies of the members of
the buy-bust team. Judge Lagos need not have characterized the Cl's testimony as indispensable to the prosecution's
case. We find and so hold that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing
jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution's evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove
the criminal charges filed against respondents, subject to the defenses they may present in the course of a full-blown trial.

G.R. NO. 175939 : April 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN, Accused-Appellant.
BERSAMIN, J.:

While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present circumstances, the
established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is
further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the
sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In the case before Us, it has
been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant were the same
prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, We find that the court a quo committed no
reversible error in convicting the accused-appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of RA 6425
necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. x x x

In People vs. Manzano, the Court identified the elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, as follows: (1) the accused
sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous
drug. Although it did not expressly state it, the Court stressed delivery, which implies prior possession of the prohibited
drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure and identification of the prohibited drug, affirming
that possession is a condition sine qua non.

G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014

VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
REYES, J.:

x x x whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence
notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.

Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents
and not falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence.

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court

Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved
when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.

x x x To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily included
in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the
willful act of falsification of public documents.

G.R. No. 184320, July 29, 2015

CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BRION, J.:

Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. Section 8 of said
rule provides that the Information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the
Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental
that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information.

We reiterate that the Information in the present case did not allege that the petitioner made an express representation that
the property sold is free from any encumbrance. This Information was crafted in such a way that only one particular crime
was charged (i.e., Article 316, paragraph 1), and the alleged manner through which such offense was committed (that is,
by pretending to be the lawful owner x x x) did not constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may be
committed even by the owner of the property.

Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the petitioner and Naval also did not contain any representation by
the petitioner that the property being sold was free from any encumbrance.

Principles in Special Proceedings

x x x The issue in an ejectment case is the right to physical possession of the premises or possession de facto, and the
court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of possession especially if the former is inseparably
linked with the latter. Corollarily, a party who can prove prior possession de facto may recover the possession even from
the owner himself, since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership.

Principles in Criminal Law

The elements of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1)
that the thing disposed of be real property; (2) that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the
encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that there must be express representation by the offender that the real property is
free from encumbrance; and (4) that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another.

For a successful prosecution of the crime of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following essential elements of this crime must be established: (1) that the thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or
a building; (2) that the offender who is not the owner of said property should represent that he is the owner thereof; (3)
that the offender should have executed an act of ownership, e.g., selling, leasing, encumbering, or mortgaging the
property; and (4) that the act be made to the prejudice of the owner or a third person.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that the petitioner did not pretend to be the owner of the property sold. From the
very start, the petitioner made it clear to Naval that the subject property was still under the name of her (petitioner's)
father; and that the area subject of the sale would still be segregated from the mother title. Naval also admitted that he
saw the front page of the land's title showing Nicolas to be its registered owner. The element of deceit - central to
prosecutions for swindling - is therefore wanting. We additionally point out that Nicolas' heirs (Narcisa and his nine
legitimate children) eventually executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Renunciation of Shares, Donation and
Deed of Absolute Sale where they agreed, among others, to give a portion (totalling 1,236-square meters) of the land
covered by TCT No. T-364319 to the petitioner.

In the light of these considerations, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for other forms of swindling under Article 316,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code absent a finding that she employed fraud or deceit in the form of false pretenses
with regard to her ownership of the real property sold.

G.R. No. 145336 : February 20, 2013

REYNANTE TADEJA, RICKY TADEJA, RICARDO TADEJA and FERDINAND TADEJA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SERENO, C.J.:

Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgment or orders of courts should attain finality at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation.

Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by the court on motion of the
accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In
this case, petitioners judgment of conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 the date on which the
Decision of this Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer be
entertained.

Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.

The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered." The confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He
participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense. It was only after he and petitioners had
been convicted by the trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been
obtained during trial does not hold water.

Clearly, the cousins chose not to tell the truth during trial. Whatever their reasons were, the inevitable conclusion is that
Plaridels version in his extrajudicial confession is not newly discovered evidence that can be a ground for a new trial
within the contemplation of the rules.

It is worth pointing out that the motion in Licayan was granted pro hac vice, which is a Latin term used by courts to refer to
rulings rendered "for this one particular occasion." A ruling expressly qualified as such cannot be relied upon as a
precedent to govern other cases.

G.R. No. 227577, January 24, 2018

ANGEL FUELLAS DIZON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

It is undisputed that petitioner is a low-ranking public officer having a salary grade below 27, whose appeal from the RTC's
ruling convicting him of six (6) counts of Malversation of Public Funds Through Falsification of Public Documents falls
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Section 4 (c) of RA 824941 (prior to its amendment by
RA 1066042) x x x

Thus, since petitioner's case properly falls within the appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, his appeal was
erroneously taken to the CA.

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the foregoing error is not primarily attributable to petitioner, since the duty to
transmit the records to the proper court devolves upon the RTC.

Case law states that "[i]n the notice of appeal[,] it is not even required that the appellant indicate the court to which its
appeal is being interposed. The requirement is merely directory and failure to comply with it or error in the court indicated
is not fatal to the appeal", as it should be in this case.

x x x In fact, it remains apparent that the CA, by granting his motions for extension, had already given petitioner the
impression that it had jurisdiction over his appeal. Hence, all things considered, the Court finds that petitioner's filing of the
Motion to Endorse beyond the original fifteen (15)-day period much more the erroneous transmittal of the case to the CA
by the RTC should not be taken against him, else it result in the injudicious dismissal of his appeal.

Principles in Legal Ethics

x x x The judge was expected to know and should have known the law and the rules of procedure. He should have known
when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they should be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have
conscientiously and carefully observed this responsibility specially in cases such as this where a person's liberty was at
stake.
G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161266
PLANET INTERNET CORP.,Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent.
SERENO, C.J.:

An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary
to give the aggrieved party personality to question an order quashing search warrants.

Section 5, Rule 110

The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "(a)ll
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a
complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is
defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its
nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized the
right of parties to question orders quashing those warrants. Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of
the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion
to quash search warrants.

An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the filing of a criminal action,
partakes of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.

A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other hand an order is
interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. x x x

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case already
filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident)
has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or
denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.

Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a
search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the
determination of the guilt of the accused therein."

In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order
quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing
more to be done thereafter.

Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications for search warrants were
instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued
were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the
search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.

Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by reviewing courts when the finding
has substantial basis.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:

In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in
the place to be searched."
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded
respect by reviewing courts x x x

The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items described in
the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought.

A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the
property to be seized." It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the
officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.

Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our
Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to
ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only
necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and
seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not
know exactly what kind of things to look for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer
making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an illegal operation that
amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint
items with one hundred percent precision.

A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the things
described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants
and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera
conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX
or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary
records to support the illegal toll bypass operations."

Principles in Criminal Law

x x x the use of PLDT’s communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and
business
G.R. No. 231983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
CRISPIAN MERCED LUMAYA a.k.a. "IPYANG", and DEREK JOSEPH LUMAYA, Accused
CRISPIAN MERCED LUMAYA a.k.a. "IPYANG", Accused-Appellant

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Prefatorily, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the
reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165

x x x immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official

x x x non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and
invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.

and x x x the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind
the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved. x x x the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume
what these grounds are or that they even exist .

The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related
items will use the marking as reference. x x x In short, the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the
dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value." x x x
marking at the nearest police station, or x x x the office of the apprehending team."

In this case, it is undisputed that the police officers did not immediately mark the sachets of shabu at the place of
confiscation during the buy-bust operation or at the nearest police station. Instead, they proceeded to the house of
Crispian to implement the subject search warrant and only thereafter, conducted the marking. To justify the
deviation, they proffered that that they could not "allow [the accused’s] companions to escape and bring the possible
huge amount of shabu." Thus, they marked the items "only after the search of the house of the parents of Crispian."

x x x t is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.Perforce, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA
9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR, Crispian’s acquittal is in order.

Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

While it is true that it was only Crispian who successfully perfected his appeal, the rule is that an appeal in a criminal
proceeding throws the entire case out in the open, including those not raised by the parties. Considering that under
Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment - as in this
case - shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal, Derek should likewise be acquitted herein.

Principles in Criminal Law

Here, Crispian was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, as well as Illegal
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5, 11, and 12, Article II of RA 9165.
Case law states that in every prosecution for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the following elements must be proven with
moral certainty: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment. Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, the prosecution must establish the necessary elements thereof, to wit: (a) the accused was in possession of an
item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. And finally, to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, the prosecution must show: (a) possession or control by the accused of any
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (b) such possession is not authorized by law.