250 Phil.

214

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Sought in this Petition are a review and a reversal of the Decision of respondent Court
of Appeals,* promulgated on 19 February 1987, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 08406, entitled
"Opulencia vs. Hon. de la Cruz, et al.," as well as its Resolution of 2 April 1987 denying
reconsideration.

The spouses Manuel and Natalia Carpena Opulencia (hereafter the OPULENCIAS)
became indebted to petitioner Delta Motor Corporation (DELTA, for brevity) for the
construction of the building, supply and installation of their ice plant equipment in the
total amount of P1,438,090.58. As security for the payment of these obligations, they
executed a real estate mortgage over their land, building and ice plant equipment in
favor of DELTA.

For failure of the OPULENCIAS to pay their obligation, DELTA filed a Complaint
against them on 21 May 1975, docketed as Civil Case No. 21335, before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Branch CLX.

On 23 August 1978, the OPULENCIAS entered into a Compromise Agreement

confessing to an obligation of P1,644,496.19 plus 12% annual interest, payable without
need of demand in eighty-four [84] equal monthly installments beginning 30 April
1978. An acceleration clause in the agreement provided for immediate demandability
in case of default in any one payment.

The Trial Court approved the aforesaid Agreement on 29 November 1978.

On 6 August 1979, for failure of the OPULENCIAS to comply with the terms and
conditions of the Compromise Agreement, the Trial Court issued a Writ of Execution
for the full compromise amount.

Pursuant thereto, on 27 August 1979, a Special Sheriff levied execution, not on the
Torrens Title covering the mortgaged properties, but on two [2] Tax Declarations at the
Office of the City Assessor of Batangas City. The first, Tax Declaration No. 44126,
covered 4,475 square meters of land at Batangas City; and the second, Tax Declaration
No. 14266, covered the improvement thereon, an ice plant built on the land.

In his Notice of Sale, dated 11 January 1980, the Special Sheriff set the auction sale of
both properties for 30 April 1980. On the said date, the Special Sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale to DELTA as the highest bidder at the auction sale on a bid of
P2,147,162.49.

The sale, however, was not registered and annotated at the back of the covering title,
OCT No. RO-124 (O-722), of the Register of Deeds of Batangas, until approximately
four [4] years later, or, on 26 June 1984 for the reason that the title still had to be
judicially reconstituted after the said title was burned when the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Batangas City was razed by fire and the owner's copy was also lost.
The one-year period within which to redeem the mortgaged properties having lapsed
without any redemption having been effected, a Final Deed of Sale on the same bid of
P2,147,162.49 was issued on 31 August 1985 in favor of one Jose Ch. Alvarez whose
name appeared in the said Final Deed of Sale as the highest bidder of the properties
sold, instead of DELTA, although the first Certificate of Sale issued after the 30 April
1980 auction sale listed DELTA as the highest bidder.

On 27 September 1985 the Trial Court approved the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale and
issued a Writ of Possession on 30 September 1985.

On 29 October 1985 the OPULENCIAS filed an Urgent Petition for Relief from
execution of judgment and to set aside the Writ of Possession on the ground of
irregularity in the implementation of the Writ of Execution by the Sheriff. The Petition
was denied by the Trial Court on 23 December 1985.

On a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the Appellate Court, in its Decision
promulgated on 19 February 1987, reversed the Trial Court holding that "the actuations
of the special sheriff from levy on the properties to the issuance of certificates of sale
were attended by irregularities serious enough to invalidate all proceedings had
pursuant to the writ of execution" (p. 3, CA Decision, 109, Rollo), "without however
prejudice to whatever rights which have accrued to Delta from the August 23, 1978
Compromise Agreement" (p. 6, CA Decision, p. 112, Rollo).

It is the aforesaid judgment of reversal, invalidating the approval by the Trial Court on
27 September 1985 of the Final Deed of Sale, and its issuance of a Writ of Possession
on 30 September 1985, that is assailed in the instant Petition, predicated on the
following averments:

The decision in Civil Case No. 21335 (Delta vs. Opulencia, et al.) has long become
"I.
final and executory.

"II. Private respondent bound their properties under the compromise agreement.

Execution issues as a matter of right and is mandatory when the judgment

"III. becomes final, this petition filed in the Court of Appeals was improper to alter or
repeal a ministerial act.

"IV. Under the facts and the law, a writ of possession must issue ministerially.

Possession of premises have been delivered or transferred to bidder as shown by

"V.
notice of delivery.

Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the petition for certiorari,
"VI.
etc.

Private respondent is barred by laches, having voluntarily ratified the execution

"VII.
of the judgment.
 Hon. Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was no valid levy and no valid
"VIII.
notice of sale.

That the RTC Judge in denying the petition for relief and to set aside writ of
"IX. possession did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion.

The appearance of two (2) certificates of sale did not and will not prejudice
"X. private respondent." (pp. 5-7, Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 175-177,
Rollo)
We resolved to give due course and required the submittal of memoranda by the
parties with which they have complied.

There is no gainsaying that, as DELTA alleges, the Decision in Civil Case No. 21335
(Delta vs. Opulencia, et al.) approving the Compromise Agreement between the parties
had become final and executory; that the OPULENCIAS bound their properties under
the Compromise Agreement of 23 August 1978; that execution issues as a matter of
right once the judgment has become final and that a Writ of Possession follows
ministerially thereafter. These are not the points in controversy, however. They are of
marginal relevance.

The threshold issue is the validity of the levy and sale on execution and of the Writ of
Possession which ensued thereafter.

The factual findings of respondent Appellate Court are: (1) that there was no valid levy
on the properties so that there was nothing that the Sheriff could have sold, citing a
Certification of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City that no notice of levy or Writ of
Execution was ever presented or filed in that Office for registration and annotation at
the back of OCT No. O-772; (2) that even assuming that there had been a valid levy,
still, proper posting was not effected as required by Section 18, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. The Sheriff's Return mentioned the publication of the notice of sale but nothing
was mentioned of the required posting. And more significantly, (3) the Special Sheriff
issued two [2] Certificates of Sale over the same properties in favor of two [2] different
buyers both as the highest bidders, one of whom was DELTA and the other, Alvarez,
although respondent Appellate Court found as a fact that Alvarez was not a participant
at the auction sale much less the highest bidder. As said Court held, "the conclusion
must be that Alvarez' certificate of sale is spurious and constitutes an attempt to vary
the results of official actuations" (p. 5, CA Decision; p. 111, Rollo).

Not only are the foregoing findings of fact of respondent Appellate Court entitled to the
highest respect from, and binding, on this Court but its conclusions derived from those
facts are supported by law and jurisprudence.

It is basic that sales on execution must be preceded by a prior levy on execution. The
levy on execution of a judgment consists in the act or acts by which an officer sets apart
or appropriates a part or the whole of the property of the judgment debtor for purposes
of the prospective execution sale (Llenares vs. Valdevella, et al., 46 Phil. 358 [1924]).
Levy is the essential act by which the property is set apart for the satisfaction of the
judgment and taken into custody of the law (Del Rosario vs. Yatco, L-18735, December
29, 1966, 18 SCRA 1263). And in case of levy upon a realty, notice of levy is required to
be filed with the Register of Deeds.

"To effect a levy upon a realty, the sheriff is required to do two specific things: (1) File
with the Register of Deeds a copy of the order, description of the attached
property and notice of attachment, and (2) Leave with the occupant of the
property copy of the same order, description and notice. These are prerequisites to a
valid levy, non-compliance with any of which is fatal. For the weight of authority is to
the effect that a special statutory provision respecting the manner of carrying out levy
of attachment must be strictly complied with, and departure therefrom shall invalidate
the levy. (Philippine Surety and Ins. Co. Inc. vs. Zabal, L-21556, October 31, 1967, 21
SCRA 682). [Underscoring supplied].
In this case, notice of levy was filed with the City Assessor's Office on two tax
declarations covering the properties in question and not on the title itself as provided
for by the Land Registration Act, which requires all transactions respecting property
covered by Torrens Titles to be recorded with the Register of Deeds. Consequently, the
levy made by the Special Sheriff herein could not bind the land nor create a lien on the
property.

While the original of OCT No. O-722 was admittedly burned on 23 May 1979 and the
owner's copy lost, copy of the levy could have been preliminarily furnished the Register
of Deeds. Besides, the Appellate Court found, as a fact, that DELTA had in its
possession authentic copies of Decree No. N-142968 from which OCT No. 722 was
issued and of the technical description of the land (p. 3, CA Decision, p. 109, Rollo).
The loss of the original and copy of the title, therefore, was no justification for failure to
cause the annotation of the lien on execution with the Register of Deeds.

Section 18, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court also provides that, before any sale of real
property on execution, notice thereof must be given by posting copies of the notice of
sale for twenty [20] days in three [3] public places in the municipality or city where the
property is situated and also where the property is to be sold, and if the assessed value
of the property exceeds P400.00, copy of the notice is to be published once a week, for
the same period in a newspaper of general circulation in the corresponding province or
city. That compliance with said requisites was inadequate is shown by the Sheriff's
Return, which mentioned only the publication but not the posting. The presumption
that official duties were regularly performed (Section 5 [m], Rule 131) cannot be
invoked considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining.

The issuance of a Writ of Possession is complementary to a Writ of Execution and is

likewise dependent on the valid execution of the procedural stages preceding it. Any
flaw afflicting any of those stages, affects the validity of its issuance (Cometa vs.
IAC, L-69294, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 563).

The irregularity of having two highest bidders at the same Sheriff's sale, both offering
the same highest bid for the same property has not been satisfactorily explained. A
Certificate of Sale was issued to DELTA as the highest bidder on 30 April 1980 after the
auction sale (Annex "D", p. 41, Rollo). But the Final Deed of Sale was issued on 31
August 1985 in favor of one Jose Ch. Alvarez, who was listed therein as the highest
bidder of the property sold in the auction sale (Annex "E', p. 43, Rollo). This runs
counter to Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court explicitly providing that if no
redemption be made within twelve [12] months after the sale, the purchaser, or his
assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property. Alvarez has not
been shown to be the assignee of DELTA.

DELTA's posture that said two [2] sales will not in any way prejudice the
OPULENCIAS, since DELTA recognizes the sale of the property to Alvarez, can not be
allowed to overcome the irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale. An
anomalous situation cannot pass unchallenged. The OPULENCIAS acted seasonably
after the approval by the Trial Court of the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale and its issuance
of the Writ of Possession and they cannot be held barred by laches. It was not the
compromise judgment of the Trial Court of 29 November 1978 that they were assailing
but the execution of that judgment.

It should be stressed, however, that while irregularities attended the proceedings

concerning the execution sale sufficient to affect the Writ of Possession which is but a
consequence thereof, the OPULENCIAS are bound by the terms of the Compromise
Agreement they had executed on 23 August 1978 and approved by the Trial Court on
29 November 1978. They cannot be allowed to renege on the same on the ground that
the husband did not sign said Agreement it appearing that the spouses mortgaged the
same properties in favor of DELTA to secure the very same judgment obligation and
that in their Petition for Reconstitution of OCT O-722, said spouses acknowledged
their obligation to DELTA, thereby evidencing that the obligation is actually conjugal.
It is still incumbent upon the OPULENCIAS to pay their judgment obligation to
DELTA plus interest at the legal rate and back real estate taxes paid thus far.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that the

spouses Manuel and Natalia Opulencia are hereby ordered to pay Delta Motors
Corporation the sum of P2,147,162.49 plus interest at the legal rate, back real estate
taxes, and costs, the same to be paid into the Trial Court within a period of ninety [90]
days from the date of service of this judgment, and in case of default of such payment,
the properties mortgaged shall be sold in the manner and under the regulations that
govern sales of real estates under execution, the proceeds realized to be turned over to
petitioner Delta Motors Corporation.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regaldo, JJ., concur.

CASE 84: URBANO v. CHAVEZ- JOSHUA BAGOTSAYFACTS:
Two petitions consolidated into one decision
.First Case: Urbano instituted a criminal case against Secretary LuisSantos of the Department of Local Government and several otherpublic officials for
alleged violation of the provisions of RA 3019,otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Thecomplaint against them was filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman.The Office of the Solicitor General, through Solicitor GeneralFrancisco I. Chavez entered its appearance as counsel for
the saidrespondents as far as the preliminary investigation of the case isconcerned.
Second Case: Co filed a complaint for damages against SolicitorGeneral Francisco I. Chavez, the Businessworld PublishingCorporation, and several
other persons. Co alleged that thedefendant Chavez knowingly, willfully and maliciously publishedand/or caused to be published certain defamatory
imputationsagainst the petitioner in an article which appeared in the December4, 1987 issue of Business World. Co alleged that the defamatoryremarks
impute that he was a close associate of former PresidentFerdinand Marcos and his daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoc and thathe was involved in some
anomalous transactions relating to thefunds of the national government during the time that PresidentMarcos was in office.

It appears that at the time of the publication of the questioned article,Solicitor General Chavez was the counsel of the PresidentialCommission on Good
Government (PCGG), the government agencyresponsible for the investigation of alleged graft and corrupt practicesrelating to the former President, his
relatives and his closeassociates.The first case relates to the authority of the Office of the SolicitorGeneral to appear for certain government officials in
the course ofthe preliminary investigation of their case before the Office of theOmbudsman. The second case pertains to the authority of the saidOffice
to appear for the Solicitor General who was haled to court in acivil suit for damages arising from an alleged defamatory remarkwhich appeared in a
newspaper.
ISSUE:
Can the Office of the Solicitor General represent a publicofficer or employee in the preliminary investigation of a criminalaction against him or in a civil
action for damages against him?
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
It is undisputed that the Office of the Solicitor General is theappellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminalcases. As such, the said
Office participates in a criminal case onlywhen the same has reached the appellate courts. It is the office ofthe city, provincial or state prosecutor, as the
case may be, and notthe Office of the Solicitor General, which attends to the investigationand the prosecution of criminal cases in the first instance.

However, under the doctrine announced in Anti-Graft League of thePhilippines, Inc. and Garrido, the Office of the Solicitor General isauthorized to enter
its appearance as counsel for any public official,against whom a criminal charge had been instituted, during thepreliminary investigation stage thereof.
Nevertheless, in the samecase, this Court held that once an information is filed against thepublic official, the Office of the Solicitor General can no
longerrepresent the said official in the litigation. The anomaly in thisparadigm becomes obvious when, in the event of a judgment ofconviction, the case
is brought on appeal to the appellate courts. TheOffice of the Solicitor General, as the appellate counsel of the Peopleof the Philippines, is expected to
take a stand against the accused.More often than not, it does. Accordingly, there is a clear conflict ofinterest here, and one which smacks of ethical
considerations, wherethe Office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the public official,defends the latter in the preliminary investigation stage of
thecriminal case, and where the same office, as appellate counsel of thePeople of the Philippines, represents the prosecution when the caseis brought
on appeal. This anomalous situation could not have beencontemplated and allowed by the law, its unconditional terms andprovisions notwithstanding. It
is a situation which cannot becountenanced by the Court.

Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor

Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines

September 16, 1947

Jose Tan Chong, petitioner and appelle,

vs.
The Secretary of Labor, respondent and appellant

x--------------------------------------------------------------x

Lam Swee Sang, petitioner and appellee,

vs.
The Commonwealth of the Philippines, oppositor and appellant

Facts:
- On October 15, 1941, a decision was rendered in the case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, whereby this Court affirmed the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, which had granted the writ of habeas corpus applied for by tan Chong, on the ground that he, being a native of the
Philippines, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a citizen of the Philippines. - On the same date, in the case of Lam Swee Sang vs.
Commonwealth of the Philippines, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition of the applicant for naturalization filed in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga, on the ground that the applicant, having been born in Sulu, Philippines, of a Chinese father and Filipino mother, is a citizen of
the Philippines. The dismissal of the petition implies and means that there was no need of naturalization for the applicant who is a Filipino citizen. - The
petitioner in the first case was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in July 1915, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, lawfully married, left for China in
1925, and returned to the Philippines on 25 January1940. The applicant in the second case was born in Jolo, Sulu, on 8 May 1900, of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother. It does not appear whether they were legally married, so in the absence of proof to the contrary they are presumed to be lawfully
married. From the date of his birth up to 16 November 1938, the date of filing of his application for naturalization, and up to the date of hearing, he had
been residing in the Philippines. He is married to a Filipino woman and has three children by her. He speaks the local dialect and the Spanish and
English languages. - On 21 October 1941, a motion for reconsideration was filed in both cases by the Solicitor General. The latter contends that even if
the petitioner in the first case and the applicant in the second were born in the Philippines, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, lawfully married,
still they are not citizens of the Philippines under and pursuant to the laws in force at the time of their birth, and prays that both decisions be set aside
and the judgments appealed from be reversed.

Issue/s:

- Whether the petitioner, Jose Tan Chong, and applicant, Lam Swee Sang, are Filipino citizens.

Ruling:
 - No. The decision of this Court in the first case confirming the lower court's judgment is set aside; the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
appealed from is reversed; the petitioner is recommitted to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration to be dealt with in accordance with law; and
the decision of this Court in the second case is set aside; the decree of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga appealed from granting the applicant's
petition for naturalization filed on16 November 1938 is affirmed, for the applicant comes under section 1 (a), Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and
possesses the qualifications required by setion 3 of the same Act, as amended, which was the law in force at the time of the filing of the petition for
naturalization. The ff. are its grounds:

- Both parents should be Spanish subjects or native Filipinos. - The law on Philippine citizenship was contained in the Philippine Bill, section 4, as
amended by the Act of Congress of March 23, 1912. The petitioner, Tan Chong, could not be a Filipino citizen upon the date of his birth because his
father, who was legally married to his mother, was a Chinese citizen and not a subject of Spain. - As for the applicant, Lam Swee Sang, his father was a
Chinese subject on April 11, 1899. The said applicant was born in 1900 his parents were Chinese subjects. When the Philippine Bill was enacted on
July 1, 1902, therefore, the said applicant and his parents were not subjects of Spain and consequently could not have acquired Philippine citizenship by
virtue of section 4 thereof.

Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446
(December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall”
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would
be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007

FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax which
Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to the
increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and
remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999,
revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to which Primetown complied with.
However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed
the petition as it was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229
of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed
its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after
Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed
the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar months. The
SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain.
The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable.
Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AICHI

FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC.- Tax Refund

FACTS:

On September 30, 2004, Aichi Forging filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT attributable to its
zero-rated sales for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 with the CIR through the DOF
One-Stop Shop. On the same day, Aichi Forging filed a Petition for Review with the CTA for the same
action. The BIR disputed the claim and alleged that the same was filed beyond the two-year period
given that 2004 was a leap year and thus the claim should have been filed on September 29, 2004.
The CIR also raised issues related to the reckoning of the 2-year period and the simultaneous filing of
the administrative and judicial claims.

ISSUES:

(1) Was the Petitioner’s administrative claim filed out of time?

(2) Was the filing of the judicial claim premature?

HELD:

(1) NO. The right to claim the refund must be reckoned from the “close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made” – in this case September 30, 2004. The Court added that the rules under
Sections 204 (C) and 229 as cross-referred to Section 114 do not apply as they only cover erroneous
payments or illegal collections of taxes which is not the case for refund of unutilized input VAT. Thus,
the claim was filed on time even if 2004 was a leap year since the sanctioned method of counting is
the number of months.

(2) YES. Section 112 mandates that the taxpayer filing the refund must either wait for the decision of
the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period provided therein before filing its judicial claim. Failure to
observe this rule is fatal to a claim. Thus, Section 112 (A) was interpreted to refer only to claims filed
with the CIR and not appeals to the CTA given that the word used is “application”. Finally, the Court
said that applying the 2-year period even to judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112 (D)
which already provides for a specific period to appeal to the CTA --- i.e., (a) within 30 days after a
decision within the 120-day period and (b) upon expiry of the 120-day without a decision.

People vs. Jabinal

55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974

Antonio J.

Facts:

The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of
Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on
September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He however,
contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was
likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the
authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace
officer. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and
People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court
nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.

Issue:

Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in

Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer
reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

Ruling:

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

Reason:

The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in
question and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is
overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof.
Sps. Gauvain Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97973, January 27, 1992

FACTS: In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review on the
decision made by herein respondent Court of Appeals – sustaining the right of private
respondent Pe to repurchase a parcel of land sold to petitioners. It started when
respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands acquired through free patent, however, Pe
then mortgaged the lot to DPB; developed it into commercial complex. Failed to pay the
mortgaged, DBP foreclosed the lot; Pe leased it to DBP; the former failed to redeem such
property within one year period; DBP sold it to petitioners Benzonan. Then Pe filed a
complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA affirmed and granted the claim to repurchase.
Petitioners filed a complaint against CA, alledging, among other issues, that the latter
erred in its decision re. the five-year period in foreclosure sale by not relying on the
doctrine in Monge v. Angeles and instead relied on the ruling inBelisario v. Intermediate
Appellate Court which was applied retroactively. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the
foreclosure sale by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge v. Angeles and instead
applied retroactively the ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC?

HELD: Yes.

REASONING:

At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still
the Monge case, hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at bar.
However, the respondent court applied the rulings in Belisario case in 1988 thereby
rendering a decision in favor of the private respondent. But the Supreme Court sustained
the claims of the petitioners. The Court said that though they are bound by decisions
pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code, the Court also stressed that: “while our decisions
form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
states that “laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided””. Moreover, the Court emphasized that “when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
appliedprospectively xxx.” Therefore, respondents cannot rely on the Belisario ruling
because it should be applied prospectively and not the contrary. CA erred in its decision
regarding this case. Wherefore, such decision was reversed and set aside.

Albino Co vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 100776.

October 28, 1993)
31MAY
ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
Ponente: NARVASA
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against petitioner with
the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in petitioner’s conviction of the crime charged on the basis that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation,
Ministry of Justice Circular No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22) was subsequently
reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation
is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon
the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court but the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check will no longer be considered
as a valid defense be retroactively applied.

HELD:
NO. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal prosecution against accused-petitioner was
dismissed.
RATIO:
It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court’s decision of September 21,
1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other
persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope
of B.P. Blg. 22.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of
the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should
override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal
liability.

Co vs Court of Appeals
By Unknown - May 08, 2014

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

Facts:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken

vessel — and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations
therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank,
postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. The check was deposited
on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated
reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime
charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty
(60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals which later affirmed the
decision of the lower court. This is a petition for certiorari from the
appellee under the grounds that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by Batasang Pambansa Blg.
22 or the Anti - Bouncing Check Law. In Circular (No. 4), dated December 15,
1981, pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement
to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or
not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.
 However this was later reversed in administrative circular was
subsequently issued on August 8, 1984.

Issue:
Whether or not Co is guilty of violating BP 22 at the time of issuance of his
check?

Held:
No. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check
on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the
judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, which the RTC's conviction
was relied on, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for
an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official
pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
The new circular was delivered after almost one (1) year when
Albino Co hand the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983.
The Court merits this case under the maxims that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the
Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed
by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal.

Ratio:
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which,
pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the
doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and
its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating
criminal liability.

Dispo:

The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court
are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-
petitioner is DISMISSED, with cost de officio.

Erectors, Inc., v. NLRC

Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/may1996/104215.htm
Facts:
In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi Arabia for 12 months
with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-
month period, he renews/extends his contract without availing his vacation or home leave His contract was approved by
the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the position of Service
Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract changing his position from driver
to laborer with a salary of $105 and an allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE.
On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia as
a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary
and allowance were increased to $231.
Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded the
difference between his salary and allowance in teh said contract and the amount paid to him.
On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime
pay and bonus.
While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec 4(a) of E) 797 vested the
POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving employer-employee
relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."
Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In view of EO 797,
Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the
LA's jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by Burgos.

Held:
No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement
of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing
laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the
Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-
employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., et al, v. Feliciano
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1965/mar1965/gr_l-24022_1965.html

Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote
the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government
agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council. The
President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the
needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government
agency authorized to undertake the importation. Considering that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters
Association alleged that it is contrary to RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no
law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is prohibited by RA 3452 which in
Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private properties upon payment of the
corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that
should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national
emergency and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru any government agency he may
designate - is repealed by RA 3452.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national emergency is repealed by
RA 3452

Held:
No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.
Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not an express repealing
clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be repealed. Rather, is is a clause which
predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such
being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals
apply ex proprio vigre. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law, unless on irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws. Here there is no inconsistency.
While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by
a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during
normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local
supply of sucy gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore
not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.

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CASE DIGEST: AGUJETAS V. CA

October 8, 2017

Case Title: Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, petitioner v. Court of Appeals and the
People of the Philippines, respondents

G.R. No. 106560, August 23, 1996

Facts: The petitioner assail the decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental finding them
guilty as charged for failure to proclaim a winning elected candidate.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 7166 repeal section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code saying
that the winners should be proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers.
Held: No, since R.A. 7166 neither expressly or impliedly repealed section 231 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

SCHNECKENBURGER v. MORAN G.R. No. L-44896

July 31, 1936 Jurisdiction
NOVEMBER 28, 2018

FACTS:

The petitioner, an honorary consul of Uruguay in the Philippines, was charged with the crime of falsification of
a private document before the CFI of Manila. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that
both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no
jurisdiction to try him. He filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the CFI from
taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner.

RULING:

This case involves NO question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the
privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country
to which he is accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the
country where he resides.

In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The
Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls.” In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional
provision.

It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Constitution over
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive.

The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.”

It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFI. Inasmuch as this is the same
original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and made to include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is
not exclusive.

Indeed, the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner. Hence, the petition for a writ of prohibition
must be denied.
Bayot vs. CA
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
Rebecca Macapugay Bayot was an American citizen and born in Agoa, Guam, USA. She married Vicente
Bayot at Greenhills, Mandaluyong on April 20, 1979. On November 27,1982, Rebecca gave birth to a daughter
named Alix at San Francisco, California. However, as the marriage turned sour, Rebecca initiated a divorce on
1996 in Dominican Republic. The latter ordered the dissolution of marriage and remarriage after competing the
legal requirements. However, there must be a joint custody and guardianship to Alix, and the conjugal property,
particularly the real properties located only in Manila that they acquired during their marriage be settled.

However, Rebecca stated under oath on May 28, 1996 that she is an American citizen and she is carrying a
child not of Vicente. Rebecca again filed another petition in Manila on March 2001 for absolute nullity of
marriage on the ground of dissolution of partnership gain, monthly support for their daughter and that Vicente
is psychological incapacitated.

Vicente averred and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause and action and filed a case of adultery and
perjury against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the contrary, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

On the other note, Rebecca became a recognized Filipino citizen on 2000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce is valid?

HELD:
1) No serious dispute that at the time of divorce to Vicente, Rebecca was an American citizen and still remains
to be one. Evidences: a) she was born in USA and jus soli is followed in American territory in granting
American citizenship; b) she was and may still be an American passport holder; c) in marriage certificate, birth
certificate of Alix and divorce decree in Dominican Republic, it was declared that she is an American

2) VALID. Rebecca was bound by the national laws of USA where divorce was valid. Their property relations
were also properly adjudicated through their Agreement on 1996. Foreign divorce can be recognized in the
Philippines provided that the divorce decree is fact and valid under the national law of the alien spouse. The
reckoning point is the citizenship of parties at the time the divorce was obtained and not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of marriage.