1)no

section 56 inlcudes two types of impossibility- initial and supervening impossibility. In the case of former the act is
impossible from the very beginning of the contract and thus the contract is void-ab-initio while in the case of former a
subsequent event/s or circumstance/s render the contract void. In the case of initial impossibility, knowledge of parties
regarding the impossibility does not effect the voidness of the contract as since the act or performance of the contract is
impossible from the very beginning, but in case of supervening impossibility the foreseeability or knowledge of parties
that an event might become impossible can make the contract enforceable.
The reasoning that could be applied in such a scenario where the possibility of the act becoming impossible is foreseeable
or is in the knowledge of the parties is that the parties even after having knowledge or have foreseen such an impossibility
goes on to enter into a contract with an intention to enforce the contract absolutely and thus they cant deny liability if
the act do become impossible because they had already consented absolutely.
In Rowe v. Town of Peabody,1 twenty-third article of the contract between both the parties seeked consent of contractors
to take all responsibility for the work and to bear all losses resulting on account of its nature or character or because of
the nature of the ground being different from what was estimated or expected, to which they consented. The difficulties
which it was asserted made the prescribed mode of construction of the tunnel, which was object of contract, impossible
arose wholly from the character of the soil beneath the surface. They were warned that there might be such difficulties,
and no one could say in advance that these might not be very great, or even insurpable and since the contractors had
agreed absolutely to do the act they could not be excused for non performance on the basis of impossibility of the act.

Houston Ice Brewing Co. v. Keenan, 2 it was asserted that “when a party voluntarily undertakes and by contract binds
himself to do an act or thing, without qualification, and performance thereof becomes impossible by some contingency
which should have been anticipated and provided against in the contract, the nonperformance will not be excused. In
such case the party's failure to exempt himself from responsibility in the event of the happening of the contingency will
be attributable to his own folly and he will be held to make good his contract.”

2) the term impossibility in section 56 of ICA have been interpreted to be of both permanent and temporary nature.
While in case of a permanent impossibility the contract is rendered void the moment the act becomes impossible which
can be initial , case of which the act is in itself not humanly possible to be done, or it can be supervening as well, in case
of which either the subject matter of the contract gets destroyed or the very means of performance of the contract is
rendered impossible because of some event/s. The same cannot be said about the temporary impossibility in case of
which party is not completely discharged from the duty to perform the contract but only until the impossibility ends as
since such an impossibility doesn’t render the performance impossible but possibility remains for the performance of
the contract. As per the well known jurist, Pollock, the existence or continuance of a normal state of things at the due time
of performance, and the material circumstances should be so radically changed by unforeseen accident that the purpose of
the contract as a whole is frustrated.
In Pacific Trading Co., Inc. v. Mouton Rice Milling Co.3' Mouton contracted in October and November, 1941, to sell rice to
Pacific. Shipment was to have been made in November, December or January. Pacific was a Japanese national. On
December 7, 1941, the United States froze its assets and made performance on part o Mouton impossible until December
31, when it secured a license to perform under three of the contracts involved, and January 31, when it secured a license
to perform under the remaining contract. There had been a sharp rise in the price of rice in November and December but
the evidence in this case, however, does not show that the seller would have sustained any loss by reason of the change
in the market price of rice. In fact, the seller's evidence establishes the contrary. It had purchased more than the rice
required to fill its contracts before the price advance occurred. Its own evidence shows that it was willing to perform the
contracts until December 29, 1941; that nothing occurred between that date and the expiration of the time for delivery

1
207 Mass. 226, 93 N. E. 604 (1911)
2
88 S.W. 197 (Tex. 1905)
3
184 F. 2d 141 (8th Cir. 1950).
under the contracts to change the situation; and that immediately after its attempt to cancel the contracts, and as late as
January 20, 1942, it was soliciting and accepting orders for the immediate delivery of Arkansas Extra Fancy Blue Rose rice.
Which was the object of the contract. When Mouton refused to ship the rice, Pacific sued for damages. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Mouton was liable for damages and that the temporary impossibility merely
postponed the time for performance.

It may be discharged completely if after the period of impossibility the performance would be much more burdensome
on either of the party than had it occurred on time, thus capable enough to frustrate the object of the contract.

The case of Neumond v. Farmers' Feed Co. of New York4 involved the same question regarding an option contract for the
sale of a trade mark. The New York Court of Appeals held that after the temporary impossibility caused by action of the
United States in World War I had been removed, the parties were not obligated to perform because the value of the
bargain had been materially impaired by the delay, which lasted from April, 1917, until the war was over in November,
1918.

Thus such a contract will be a valid contract as there was no impossibility at the time of performance of the contract since
the act became possible again. but if the period of impossibility led to the change in the object or subject matter of the
contract than what had been agreed between the parties, the parties to the contract could be discharged from the
contract as the contract will be rendered void as the variation in subject matter would be equal to the destruction of the
previously agreed subject matter or object.

3) if human element plays a role in rendering an event as inherently impossible, section 56 mail clause cannot be applied
to it as it will amount to self-induced frustration of contract in case of which the athe party on behalf of whom the
grustration has occurred cannot seek discharge of his contractual liability.

4
244 N. Y. 202, 155 N. E. 100 (1926).