[No. 11658. February 15, 1918.] title thereto in the Land Registry,.
do not accrue unless such
LEUNG YEE, plaintiff and appellant, vs. FRANK L. STRONG
MACHINERY COMPANY and J. G. WILLIAMSON,
defendants and appellees.
1. CHATTEL MORTGAGE; REGISTRY OF
MORTGAGE .COVERING REAL PROPERTY.—The sole
purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to
provide for the registry of "chattel mortgages," and transfers
thereof, that is to say, mortgages of personal property
executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute.
Neither the original registry in a chattel mortgage registry
of an instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of a
building and the machinery installed therein, nor the
annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged
property, had any effect whatever so far as the building is
concerned.
2. ID.; ID.—A factory building is real property, and the mere
fact that it is mortgaged and sold, separate and apart from
the land on which it stands, in no wise changes its character
as real property.
3. VENDOR AND PURCHASER; REGISTRY OF TITLE;
GOOD FAITH.—The rights secured under the provisions of
article 1473 of the Civil Code to that one of two purchasers
of the same real estate, who has secured and inscribed his
inscription is made in good faith.
4. ID.; SEPARATE PURCHASERS; DETERMINATION OF
RIGHTS.—The respective rights of two or more separate
purchasers of the same real estate from the same owner in
case none of them has secured an inscription of his title in
the land registry in good faith, are to be determined in
accord with the third, and not the second paragraph of that
article.
5. ID.; GOOD FAITH.—One who purchases real estate with
knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot
claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith, as
against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein;
and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge
of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and
investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the
defects in the title of his vendor.
6. ID.; ID.—A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim
that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor.
7. ID.; ID.—Good faith, or the lack of it, is in its last analysis
a question of intention; but in ascertaining the intention by
 which one is actuated on a given occasion, we are
necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and
outward acts by which alone the inward motive may, with
safety, be determined.
8. ID.; ID.—"Good faith, or the want of it, is not a visible,
tangible fact that can be seen or touched but rather a state
or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual
or fancied tokens. or signs."
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite. Revilla, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Booram & Mahoney for appellant.
Williams, Ferrier & SyCip for appellees.
The "Compañía Agrícola Filipina" bought a considerable
quantity of rice-cleaning machinery from the defendant
machinery company, and executed a chattel mortgage thereon to
secure payment of the purchase price. It included in the
mortgage deed the building of strong materials in which the
machinery was installed, without any reference to the land on
which it stood. The indebtedness secured by this instrument not
having been paid when it fell due, the mortgaged property was
sold by the sheriff, in pursuance of the terms of the mortgage
instrument, and was bought by the machinery company. The
mortgage was registered in the chattel mortgage registry, and the
sale of the property to the machinery company in satisfaction of
the mortgage was annotated in the same registry on December
29, 1913.
A few weeks thereafter, on or about the 14th of January,
1914, the "Compañía Agrícola Filipina" executed a deed of sale
of the land upon which the building stood to the machinery
company, but this deed of sale, although executed in a public
document, was not registered. This deed makes no reference to
the building erected on the land and would appear to have been
executed for the purpose of curing any defects which might be
found to exist in the machinery company's title to the building
under the sheriff's certificate of sale. The machinery company
went into possession of the building at or about the time when
this sale took place, that is to say, the month of December, 1913,
and it has continued in possession ever since.
At or about the time when the chattel mortgage was
executed in favor of the machinery company, the mortgagor, the
"Compañía Agrícola Filipina" executed another mortgage to the
plaintiff upon the building, separate and apart from the land on
which it stood, to secure payment of the balance of its
indebtedness to the plaintiff under a contract for the construction
of the building. Upon the failure of the mortgagor to pay the
amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage, the
plaintiff secured judgment for that amount, levied execution
upon the building, bought it in at the sheriff s sale on or about
the 18th of December, 1914, and had the sheriff's certificate of
sale duly registered in the land registry of the Province of Cavite.
At the time when the execution was levied upon the
building, the defendant machinery company, which was in
possession, filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its
claim of title and demanding the release of the property from the
levy. Thereafter, upon demand of the sheriff, the plaintiff
executed an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff in the sum of
P12,000, in reliance upon which the sheriff sold the property at
public auction to the plaintiff, who was the highest bidder at the
sheriff's sale.
This action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover
possession of the building from the machinery company.
The trial judge, relying upon the terms of article 1473 of
the Civil Code, gave judgment in favor of the machinery
company, on the ground that the company had its title to the
building registered prior to the date of registry of the plaintiff's
certificate.
Article 1473 of the Civil Code is as follows:
"If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first
taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be personal
property.
"Should it be real property, it shall belong to the person
acquiring it who first recorded it in the registry.
"Should there be no entry, the property shall belong to the
person who first took possession of it in good faith, and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith."
The registry here referred to is of course the registry of
real property, and it must be apparent that the annotation or
inscription of a deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage
registry cannot be given the legal effect of an inscription in the
registry of real property. By its express terms, the Chattel
Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages
of personal property; and the sole purpose and object of the
chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of "Chattel
mortgages," that is to say, mortgages of personal property
executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute. The
building of strong materials in which the rice-cleaning
machinery was installed by the "Compañía Agrícola Filipina"
was real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have
dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood
in no wise changed its character as real property. It follows that
neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of
the instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the
building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation
in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any
effect whatever so far as the building was concerned.
We conclude that the ruling in favor of the machinery
company cannot be sustained on the ground assigned by the trial
judge. We are of opinion, however, that the judgment must be
sustained on the ground that the agreed statement of facts in the
court below discloses that neither the purchase of the building
by plaintiff nor his inscription of the sheriff's certificate of sale
in his favor was made in good faith, and that the machinery
company must be held to be the owner of the property under the
third paragraph of the above cited article of the code, it appearing
that the company first took possession of the property; and
further, that the building and the land were sold to the machinery
company long prior to the date of the sheriff's sale to the plaintiff.
It has been suggested that since the provisions of article
1473 of the Civil Code require "good faith," in express terms, in
relation to "possession" and "title," but contain no express
requirement as to "good faith" in relation to the "inscription" of
the property in the registry, it must be presumed that good faith
is not an essential requisite of registration in order that it may
have the effect contemplated in this article. We cannot agree
with this contention.
It could not have been the intention of the legislator to base the
preferential right secured under this article of the code upon an
inscription of title in bad faith. Such an interpretation placed
upon the language of this section would open wide the door to
fraud and collusion. The public records cannot be converted into
instruments of fraud and oppression by one who secures an
inscription therein in bad f faith. The force and effect given by
law to an inscription in a public record presupposes the good
faith of him who enters such inscription; and rights created by
statute, which are predicated upon an inscription in a public
registry, do not and cannot accrue under an inscription "in bad
faith," to the benefit of the person who thus makes the inscription.
Construing the second paragraph of this article of the
code, the supreme court of Spain held in its sentencia of the 13th
of May, 1908, that:
"This rule is always to be understood on the basis of the good
faith mentioned in the first paragraph; therefore, it having been
found that the second purchasers who record their purchase had
knowledge of the previous sale, the question is to be decided in
accordance with the following paragraph." (Note 2, art. 1473,
Civ. Code, Medina and Marañon [1911] edition.)
"Although article 1473, in its second paragraph, provides that
the title of conveyance of -ownership of the real property that is
first recorded in the registry shall have preference, this
provision must always be understood on the basis of the good
faith mentioned in the first paragraph; the legislator could not
have wished to strike it out and to sanction bad faith, just to
comply with a mere formality which, in given cases, does not
obtain even in real disputes between third persons." (Note 2, art.
1473, Civ. Code, issued by the publishers of the La Revista, de
los Tribunales, 13th edition.)
The agreed statement of facts clearly discloses that the
plaintiff, when he bought the building at the sheriff's sale and
inscribed his title in the land registry, was duly notified that the
machinery company had bought the building from plaintiff's
judgment debtor; that it had gone into possession long prior to
the sheriff's sale; and that it was in possession at the time when
the sheriff executed his levy. The execution of an indemnity
bond by the plaintiff in favor of the sheriff, after the machinery
company had filed its sworn claim of ownership, leaves no room
for doubt in this regard. Having bought in the building at the
sheriff's sale with full knowledge that at the time of the levy and
sale the building had already been sold to the machinery
company by the judgment debtor, the plaintiff cannot be said to
have been a purchaser in good f faith; and of course, the
subsequent inscription of the sheriff's certificate of title must be
held to have been tainted with the same defect.
Perhaps we should make it clear that in holding that the
inscription of the sheriff's certificate of sale to the plaintiff was
not made in good faith, we should not be understood as
questioning, in any way, the good faith and genuineness of
plaintiff's claim against the "Compañía Agrícola Filipina." The
truth is that both the plaintiff and the defendant company appear
to have had just and righteous claims against their common
debtor. No criticism can properly be made of the exercise of the
utmost diligence by the plaintiff in asserting and exercising his
right to recover the amount of his claim from the estate of the
common debtor. We are strongly inclined to believe that in
procuring the levy of execution upon the factory building and in
buying it at the sheriff's sale, he conceived that he was doing no
more than he had a right to do under all the circumstances, and
it is highly possible and even probable that he thought at that
time that he would be able to maintain his position in a contest
with the machinery company. There was no collusion on his part
with the common debtor, and no thought of the perpetration of a
fraud upon the rights of another, in the ordinary sense of the
word. He may have hoped, and doubtless he did hope, that the
title of the machinery company would not stand the test of an
action in a court of law; and if later developments had confirmed
his unfounded hopes, no one could question the legality or the
propriety of the course he adopted.
But it appearing that he had full knowledge of the
machinery company's claim of ownership when he executed the
indemnity bond and bought in the property at the sheriff's sale,
and it appearing further that the machinery company's claim of
ownership was well founded, he cannot be said to have been an
innocent purchaser for value. He took the risk and must Stand
by the consequences; and it is in this sense that we find that he
was not a purchaser in good faith.
 One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a or signs." (Wilder vs. Gilman, 55 Vt., 504, 505; Cf. Cardenas vs.
defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has Miller, 108 Cal., 250; Breaux-Renoudet, Cypress Lumber Co. vs.
acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of Shadel, 52 La. Ann., 2094-2098; Pinkerton Bros. Co. vs.
the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be Bromley, 119 Mich., 8, 10, 17.)
applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have
put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his We conclude that upon the grounds herein set forth the
vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should disposing part of the decision and judgment entered in the court
put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he below should be affirmed with the costs of this instance against
acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the appellant. So ordered.
the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such
defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility
of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, will not make Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Malcolm, JJ.,
him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops concur.
that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such
notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he
acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be Torres, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ., did not take part.
required of a prudent man in a like situation. Good faith, or the
lack of it, is in its last analysis a question of intention; but 'in
ascertaining the intention by which one is actuated on a given Judgment affirmed.
occasion, we are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the
conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward motive may,
with safety, be determined. So it is that "the honesty of
intention," "the honest lawful intent," which constitutes good
faith implies a "freedom from knowledge and circumstances
which ought to put a person on inquiry," and so it is that proof
of such knowledge overcomes the presumption of good faith in
which the courts always indulge in the absence of proof to the
contrary. "Good faith, or the want of it, is not a visible, tangible
fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition
of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens
 G.R. No. 109946. February 9, 1996
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MYLO O. QUINTO and JESUSA
CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO, respondents.
Land Titles; Free Patents; Real Estate Mortgage; A land still
subject of a Free Patent Application cannot be validly
mortgaged.—The crux of this appeal thus lies in the basic issue
of whether the land in dispute could have been validly
mortgaged while still the subject of a Free Patent Application
with the government. We agree with the court a quo. We hold
that petitioner bank did not acquire valid title over the land in
dispute because it was public land when mortgaged to the bank.
We cannot accept petitioner’s contention that the lot in dispute
was no longer public land when mortgaged to it since the
Olidiana spouses had been in open, continuous, adverse and
public possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years.
Same; Same; Same; The approval of a sales application merely
authorizes the applicant to take possession of the land so that he
could comply with the requirements prescribed by law before a
final patent could be issued in his favor—what divests the
government of title to the land is the issuance of a sales patent
and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds.—In
Visayan Realty, Inc. v. Meer we ruled that the approval of a sales
application merely authorized the applicant to take possession of
the land so that he could comply with the requirements
prescribed by law before a final patent could be issued in his
favor. Meanwhile the government still remained the owner
thereof, as in fact the application could still be canceled and the
land awarded to another applicant should it be shown that the
legal requirements had not been complied with. What divests the
government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent
and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. It is
the registration and issuance of the certificate of title that
segregate public lands from the mass of public domain and
convert it into private property. Since the disputed lot in the case
before us was still the subject of a Free Patent Application when
mortgaged to petitioner and no patent was granted to the
Olidiana spouses, Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) remained part of the
public domain.
Same; Same; Same; A mortgage constituted before the issuance
of the sales patent to the mortgagor is void and ineffective.—
With regard to the validity of the mortgage contracts entered into
by the parties, Art. 2085, par. 2, of the New Civil Code
specifically requires that the pledgor or mortgagor be the
absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged. Thus, since
the disputed property was not owned by the Olidiana spouses
when they mortgaged it to petitioner the contracts of mortgage
and all their subsequent legal consequences as regards Lot No.
2029 (Pls-61) are null and void. In a much earlier case we held
that it was an essential requisite for the validity of a mortgage
that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property
mortgaged, and it appearing that the mortgage was constituted
before the issuance of the patent to the mortgagor, the mortgage
in question must of necessity be void and ineffective. For, the
law explicitly requires as imperative for the validity of a
mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of what is
mortgaged.
Same; Same; Same; The act of third parties in securing patents
over mortgaged land cannot be categorized as having been
tainted with fraud in the absence of evidence showing that they
had prior knowledge of the mortgages.—Anent the contention
of petitioner that respondents fraudulently obtained the property
in litigation, we also find for the latter. As correctly found by the
lower courts, no evidence existed to show that respondents had
prior knowledge of the real estate mortgages executed by the
Olidiana spouses in favor of petitioner. The act of respondents
in securing the patents cannot therefore be categorized as having
been tainted with fraud.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Legal Counsel for Development Bank of the
Philippines.
Alexander A. Acain for private respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES filed
this petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals holding that the mortgages in favor of the bank
were void and ineffectual because when constituted the
mortgagors, who were merely applicants for free patent of the
property mortgaged, were not the owners thereof in fee simple
and therefore could not validly encumber the same.
On 20 April 1978 petitioner granted a loan of P94,000.00
to the spouses Santiago Olidiana and Oliva Olidiana. To secure
the loan the Olidiana spouses executed a real estate mortgage on
several properties among which was Lot 2029 (Pls-61) with Tax
Declaration No. 2335/1, situated in Bo. Bago Capalaran, Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, with an area of 84,108 square meters, more
or less. At the time of the mortgage the property was still the
subject of a Free Patent application filed by the Olidianas with
the Bureau of Lands but registered under their name in the Office
of the Municipal Assessor of Molave for taxation purposes.
On 2 November 1978 the Olidiana spouses filed with the
Bureau of Lands a Request for Amendment of their Free Patent
applications over several parcels of land including Lot No. 2029
(Pls-61). In this request they renounced, relinquished and
waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61)
in favor of Jesusa Christine Chupuico and Mylo O. Quinto,
respondents herein. On 10 January 1979 Free Patent Nos. IX-5-
2223 (covering one-half of Lot No. 2029 [Pls-61] and IX-5-2224
(covering the other half of the same Lot No. 2029 [Pls-61] were
accordingly granted respectively to respondents Jesusa Christine
Chupuico and Mylo O. Quinto by the Bureau of Lands District
Land Office No. IX-5, Pagadian City. Jesusa Christine Chupuico
later obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-27,361
covering aforementioned property while Mylo O. Quinto was
also issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-27,362 in view of
the previous free patent.
On 20 April 1979 an additional loan of P62,000.00 was
extended by petitioner to the Olidiana spouses. Thus on 23 April
1979 the Olidianas executed an additional mortgage on the same
parcels of land already covered by the first mortgage of 4 April
1978. This second mortgage also included Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61)
as security for the Olidiana spouses’ financial obligation with
petitioner.
Thereafter, for failure of Santiago and Oliva Olidiana to
comply with the terms and conditions of their promissory notes
and mortgage contracts, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed all
their mortgaged properties. Consequently, on 14 April 1983
these properties, including Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) were sold at
public auction for P88,650.00 and awarded to petitioner as the
highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was thereafter executed in
favor of petitioner and an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership registered in its name. However, when petitioner
tried to register the sale and the affidavit of consolidation and to
have the tax declaration transferred in its name it was discovered
that Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) had already been divided into two (2)
parcels, one-half (1/2) now known as Lot 2029-A and covered
by OCT No. P-27,361 in the name of Jesusa Christine Chupuico,
while the other half known as Lot 2029-B was covered by the
same OCT No. P-27,361 in the name of Mylo O. Quinto.
In view of the discovery, petitioner filed an action for
Quieting of Title and Cancellation or Annulment of Certificate
of Title against respondents. After trial the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, rendered judgment
against petitioner.6 The court ruled that the contracts of
mortgage entered into by petitioner and the subsequent
foreclosure of subject property could not have vested valid title
to petitioner bank because the mortgagors were not the owners
in fee simple of the property mortgaged. The court also found
the mortgages over Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) of no legal
consequence because they were executed in violation of Art.
2085, par. 2, of the New Civil Code which requires that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged.
According to the court a quo there was no evidence to prove that
the mortgagors of the land in dispute were its absolute owner at
the time of the mortgage to petitioner.
The factual findings of the lower court disclose that when
the Olidiana spouses mortgaged Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) to
petitioner it was still the subject of a miscellaneous sales
application by the spouses with the Bureau of Lands. Since there
was no showing that the sales application was approved before
the property was mortgaged, the trial court concluded that the
Olidiana spouses were not yet its owners in fee simple when they
mortgaged the property. The lower court also said that with the
subsequent issuance of the Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands
in the name of respondents Chupuico and Quinto, it could be
gleaned that the property was indeed public land when
mortgaged to petitioner. Therefore petitioner could not have
acquired a valid title over the subject property by virtue of the
foreclosure and subsequent sale at public auction.
Resultantly, the trial court declared the following as null
and void insofar as they related to Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) being
a public land: the real estate mortgage dated 4 April 1978, the
second mortgage dated 23 April 1979, the foreclosure sale on 14
April 1983, the certificate of sale registered with the Register of
Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur on 1 September 1983, and the
affidavit of consolidation of ownership registered with the
Register of Deeds on 2 August 1985.
Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which
likewise ruled in favor of respondents, hence the instant petition.
Petitioner now seeks to overturn the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals holding that Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61)
could not have been the subject of a valid mortgage and
foreclosure proceeding because it was public land at the time of
the mortgage, and that the act of Jesusa Christine S. Chupuico
and Mylo O. Quinto in securing the patents was not tainted with
fraud. The crux of this appeal thus lies in the basic issue of
whether the land in dispute could have been validly mortgaged
while still the subject of a Free Patent Application with the
government.
We agree with the court a quo. We hold that petitioner
bank did not acquire valid title over the land in dispute because
it was public land when mortgaged to the bank. We cannot
accept petitioner’s contention that the lot in dispute was no
longer public land when mortgaged to it since the Olidiana
spouses had been in open, continuous, adverse and public
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years.10 In Visayan
Realty, Inc. v. Meer11 we ruled that the approval of a sales
application merely authorized the applicant to take possession of
the land so that he could comply with the requirements
prescribed by law before a final patent could be issued in his
favor. Meanwhile the government still remained the owner
thereof, as in fact the application could still be canceled and the
land awarded to another applicant should it be shown that the
legal requirements had not been complied with. What divests the
government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent
and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. It is
the registration and issuance of the certificate of title that
segregate public lands from the mass of public domain and
convert it into private property. Since the disputed lot in the case
before us was still the subject of a Free Patent Application when
mortgaged to petitioner and no patent was granted to the
Olidiana spouses, Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) remained part of the
public domain.
 With regard to the validity of the mortgage contracts
entered into by the parties, Art. 2085, par. 2, of the New Civil
SO ORDERED.
Code specifically requires that the pledgor or mortgagor be the
absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged. Thus, since
the disputed property was not owned by the Olidiana spouses
when they mortgaged it to petitioner the contracts of mortgage Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
and all their subsequent legal consequences as regards Lot No.
2029 (Pls-61) are null and void. In a much earlier case we held
that it was an essential requisite for the validity of a mortgage
that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
mortgaged, and it appearing that the mortgage was constituted
before the issuance of the patent to the mortgagor, the mortgage
in question must of necessity be void and ineffective. For, the Notes.—The certificate of sale of real property issued by sheriff
law explicitly requires as imperative for the validity of a is merely a memorial of the fact of sale and does not authorize
mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of what is taking possession of property auctioned. (Yap vs. Intermediate
mortgaged. Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245 [1993])

Finally, anent the contention of petitioner that
respondents fraudulently obtained the property in litigation, we
also find for the latter. As correctly found by the lower courts,
no evidence existed to show that respondents had prior
knowledge of the real estate mortgages executed by the Olidiana
spouses in favor of petitioner. The act of respondents in securing
the patents cannot therefore be categorized as having been
tainted with fraud.
In the case of an investment and financing corporation,
ascertainment of the status and condition of properties offered to
it as security for the loans it extends must be a standard and
indispensable part of its operations and that it cannot simply rely
on an examination of a Torrens certificate to determine what the
subject property looks like. (Uy vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA
703 [1995])

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the

questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
 G.R. No. 193618. November 28, 2016.
HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN and SOLEDAD DELFIN,
namely EMELITA D. FABRIGAR and LEONILO C. DELFIN,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
respondent.
Acquisitive Prescription; For acquisitive prescription to set in
pursuant to Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529,
two (2) requisites must be satisfied: first, the property is
established to be private in character; and second, the
applicable prescriptive period under existing laws had
passed.—For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, two (2)
requirements must be satisifled: first, the property is established
to be private in character; and second, the applicable prescriptive
period under existing laws had passed.
Public Dominion; Land is considered of public dominion if it
either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State,
without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.—“Land is
considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public
use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.” Land that belongs to the
state but which is not or is no longer intended for public use, for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth, is patrimonial property; it is property owned by the State
in its private capacity. Provinces, cities, and municipalities may
also hold patrimonial lands.
Private Property; Private Property consists of all property
belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively,
as well as the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities,
and municipalities.—Private property “consists of all property
belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively,”
as well as “the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities,
and municipalities.”
Acquisitive Prescription; Only publicly owned lands which are
patrimonial in character are susceptible to prescription under
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.—
Accordingly, only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial
in character are susceptible to prescription under Section 14(2)
of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Consistent with this, Article
1113 of Civil Code demarcates properties of the state, which are
not patrimonial in character, as being not susceptible to
prescription.
Public Dominion; Patrimonial Property; For land of the public
dominion to be converted into patrimonial property, there must
be an express declaration that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.—For land of the public domain to be converted
into patrimonial property, there must be an express declaration continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of the land since
— “in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a June 12, 1945.
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law” — that “the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
national wealth or that the property has been converted into resolution of the Court of Appeals.
patrimonial.”

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Public Land Act; Section 48 of the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act [C.A.] No. 141) enabled the confirmation
of claims and issuance of titles in favor of citizens occupying or Eltanal, Maglinao, Ugat & Partners for petitioners.
claiming to own lands of the public domain or an interest
therein.—Section 48 enabled the confirmation of claims and
issuance of titles in favor of citizens occupying or claiming to Mary Joy De Guzman-Baybay for respondent.
own lands of the public domain or an interest therein. Section 48
(b) specifically pertained to those who “have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation LEONEN, J.:
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.”
Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, a claimant may
acquire alienable and disposable public land upon evidence of
Same; Two (2) requisites must be satisfied before claims of title exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12,
to public domain lands may be confirmed: first, that the land 1945. The period to acquire public land by acquisitive
subject of the claim is agricultural land; and second, open, prescription under Presidential Decree No. 1529 begins to run
continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of the land since only after the promulgation of a law or a proclamation by the
June 12, 1945.—Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act therefore President stating that the land is no longer intended for public
requires that two (2) requisites be satisfied before claims of title use or the development of national wealth.
to public domain lands may be confirmed: first, that the land
subject of the claim is agricultural land; and second, open,
 This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the
They further alleged that, sometime in 1982, respondent
assailed February 26, 2010 Decision and July 2, 2010 Resolution
National Housing Authority forcibly took possession of a 10,798
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 80017 be reversed,
square meter portion of the property. Despite their repeated
and that the May 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
demands for compensation, the National Housing Authority
in Civil Case No. II-1801 be reinstated.
failed to pay the value of the property. The Delfin Spouses thus,
filed their Complaint.
The Regional Trial Court’s May 20, 2002 Decision
awarded compensation to Leopoldo and Soledad Delfin (Delfin
They asserted that the property’s reasonable market
Spouses) for an Iligan City property subsequently occupied by
value was not less than P40 per square meter and that its
respondent National Housing Authority.
improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees should be valued
at P13,360.00 at the time of taking. They similarly claimed that
because the National Housing Authority occupied the property,
The assailed Court of Appeals’ Decision reversed the
they were deprived of an average net yearly income of
Regional Trial Court’s May 20, 2002 Decision and dismissed the
P10,000.00.
Delfin Spouses’ complaint seeking compensation. The assailed
Court of Appeals’ Resolution denied their Motion for
Reconsideration.
In its Answer, the National Housing Authority alleged
that the Delfin Spouses’ property was part of a military
reservation area. It cited Proclamation No. 2151 (actually,
In a Complaint for “Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and
Proclamation No. 2143, the National Housing Authority made
Improvements and Damages” the Delfin Spouses claimed that
an erroneous citation) as having supposedly reserved the area in
they were the owners of a 28,800 square meter parcel of land in
which property is situated for Iligan City’s slum improvement
Townsite, Suarez, Iligan City (the “Iligan Property.”) They
and resettlement program, and the relocation of families who
allegedly bought the property in 1951 from Felix Natingo and
were dislocated by the National Steel Corporation’s five-year
Carlos Carbonay, who, allegedly, had been in actual possession
expansion program.
of the property since time immemorial. The Delfin Spouses had
been declaring the Iligan Property in their names for tax
purposes since 1952, and had been planting it with mangoes,
coconuts, corn, seasonal crops, and vegetables.
 According to the National Housing Authority,
Proclamation No. 2151 also mandated it to determine the
improvements’ valuation. Based on the study of the committee
it created, the value of the property was supposedly only P4.00
per square meter, regardless of the nature of the improvements
on it.
It emphasized that among all claimants, only the Delfin
Spouses and two others remained unpaid because of their
disagreement on the property’s valuation.
The National Housing Authority failed to appear during
the pretrial conference. Upon the Delfin Spouses’ motion, the
Regional Trial Court declared the National Housing Authority
in default. The case was set for the ex parte reception of the
Delfin Spouses’ evidence.
On May 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
Decision in favor of the Delfin Spouses. The dispositive portion
of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and by virtue of the
existence of preponderance of evidence, the Court
hereby enters a judgment in favor of spouses-plaintiffs
Leopoldo Delfin and Soledad Delfin against defendant
National Housing Authority, its agents or
representative/s ordering to pay the former the following,
to wit:
1) P400,000.00 representing the reasonable market
value of a portion of the land taken by the defendant
containing an area of 10,000 square meters at the rate
of P40.00 per square meters plus legal interest per
annum from the filing in Court of the complaint until
fully paid;
2) P13,360.00 representing the value of the permanent
improvements that were damaged and destroyed plus
legal interest per annum from the time of the filing of this
case until fully paid;
3) P10,000.00, representing attorney’s fees;
4) The costs of this suit.
The Regional Trial Court stated that it had no reason to
doubt the evidence presented by the Delfin Spouses:
On this regards (sic), the Court finds no reason to doubt the
veracity of the plaintiff[’s evidence], there being none to
controvert the same. If said evidence did not ring true, the
defendant should have and could have easily destroyed their
probatory value. Such indifference can only mean that defendant
had not (sic) equitable rights to protect or assert over the
disputed property together with all the improvements existing
thereon. This, the defendant did not do so and the Court finds no
cogent reasons to disbelieve or reject the plaintiff’s categorical
declarations on the witness stand under a solemn oath, for the
same are entitled to full faith and credence. Indeed, if the
defendant National Housing Authority have been blinded with
the consequence of their neglect and apathy, then defendant
have no right to pass on to the spouses-plaintiffs of their
negligence and expect the Court to come to their rescue. For it
is now much too late in the day to assail the decision which has
become final and executory.
The National Housing Authority filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but this was denied in the Regional Trial
Court’s September 10, 2002 Resolution.
On the National Housing Authority’s appeal, the Court
of Appeals rendered the assailed February 26, 2010 Decision
reversing the Regional Trial Court:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently,
appellees’ complaint for compensation is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The property taken by appellant NHA
and for which compensation is sought by appellees is
hereby DECLARED land of the public domain.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the characterization of
the property is no longer an issue because the National Housing
Authority already conceded that the property is disposable
public land by citing Proclamation No. 2151, which
characterized the property as “a certain disposable parcel of
public land.” However, the Delfin Spouses supposedly failed to
establish their possession of the property since June 12, 1945, as
required in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
During the pendency of their petition before the Court of
Appeals. Both Leopoldo and Soledad Delfin both passed away.
Leopoldo passed away on February 3, 2005 and Soledad on June
22, 2004. Their surviving heirs, Emelita D. Fabrigar and Leonilo
C. Delfin filed a Motion for Substitution before the Court of
Appeals, which was not acted upon.
In its assailed July 2, 2010 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the heirs
of the Delfin Spouses.
 Hence, this petition which was filed by the surviving acquired ownership of the property through acquisitive
heirs of the Delfin Spouses, Emelita D. Fabrigar and Leonilo C. prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No.
Delfin (petitioners). 1529.

For resolution is the issue of whether petitioners are
entitled to just compensation for the Iligan City property
occupied by respondent National Housing Authority.
I
Petitioners also assert that the Court of Appeals
disregarded certifications and letters from government agencies,
which support their claims, particularly, their and their
predecessors-in-interest’s possession since June 12, 1945.

Respondent counters, citing the Court of Appeals’

The right to be justly compensated whenever private
Decision, that petitioners cannot rely on Section 14(2) of
property is taken for public use cannot be disputed. Article III,
Presidential Decree No. 1529 because the property was not yet
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution states that:
declared private land when they filed their Complaint.

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use

II
without just compensation.

Petitioners are erroneously claiming title based on

The case now hinges on whether the petitioners and their
acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential
predecessors-in-interests have been in possession of the Iligan
Decree No. 1529.
Property for such duration and under such circumstances as will
enable them to claim ownership.
Section 14 reads in full:
Petitioners argue that they and their predecessors-in-
interests’ open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file
of the Iligan Property for more than 30 years converted the
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
property from public to private. They then posit that they
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
other manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file
the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor
a retro may file an application for the original registration of
the land, provided, however, that should the period for
redemption expire during the pendency of the registration
proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the
vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant
and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited
by the instrument creating the trust. [Emphasis supplied]
For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section
14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, two (2) requirements
must be satisifled: first, the property is established to be private
in character; and second, the applicable prescriptive period
under existing laws had passed.
Property — such as land — is either of public dominion
or private ownership.
“Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is
intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being
for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.” Land that belongs to the
state but which is not or is no longer intended for public use, for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth, is patrimonial property; it is property owned by the State
in its private capacity. Provinces, cities, and municipalities may
also hold patrimonial lands.
 Private property “consists of all property belonging to law” — that “the public dominion property is no longer intended
private persons, either individually or collectively,” as well as for public service or the development of the national wealth or
“the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and that the property has been converted into patrimonial.”
municipalities.”
This Court’s 2009 Decision in Heirs of Malabanan v.
Republic explains:
Accordingly, only publicly owned lands which are
patrimonial in character are susceptible to prescription under
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Consistent with
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that
this, Article 1113 of Civil Code demarcates properties of the
“[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for
state, which are not patrimonial in character, as being not
public use or for public service, shall form part of the
susceptible to prescription:
patrimonial property of the State.” It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial properly susceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men
After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property “which
are susceptible of prescription, unless provided. Property of the
belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
intended for some public service or for the development of the
not be the object of prescription.
national wealth” are public dominion property. For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
Contrary to petitioners’ theory then, for prescription to
dominion if when it is “intended for some public service or for
be viable, the publicly-owned land must be patrimonial or
the development of the national wealth.”
private in character at the onset. Possession for thirty (30) years
does not convert it into patrimonial property.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
For land of the public domain to be converted into
public service or the development of the national wealth or that
patrimonial property, there must be an express declaration — “in
the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands
are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that
the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
This was reiterated in this Court’s 2013 Resolution in Heirs of
Malabanan v. Republic:
[W]hen public land is no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect.
Attached to the present Petition was a copy of a May 18,
1988 supplemental letter to the Director of the Land
Management Bureau. This referred to an executive order, which
stated that petitioners’ property was no longer needed for any
public or quasi-public purposes:
That it is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive
Secretary dated April 24, 1954 the portion thereof that will not
be needed for any public or quasi-public purposes, be disposed
in favor of the actual occupants under the administration of the
Bureau of Lands (copy of the Executive Order is herewith
attached for ready reference).
However, a mere indorsement of the executive secretary
is not the law or presidential proclamation required for
converting land of the public domain into patrimonial property
and rendering it susceptible to prescription. There then was no
viable declaration rendering the Iligan property to have been
patrimonial property at the onset. Accordingly, regardless of the
length of petitioners’ possession, no title could vest on them by
way of prescription.
III
While petitioners may not claim title by prescription,
they may, nevertheless, claim title pursuant to Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act).
Section 48 enabled the confirmation of claims and
issuance of titles in favor of citizens occupying or claiming to
own lands of the public domain or an interest therein. Section
48(b) specifically pertained to those who “have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945”:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
....
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (As amended by PD 1073)
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act therefore requires
that two (2) requisites be satisfied before claims of title to public
domain lands may be confirmed: first, that the land subject of
the claim is agricultural land; and second, open, continuous,
notorious, and exclusive possession of the land since June 12,
1945.
The need for the land subject of the claim to have been
classified as agricultural is in conformity with the constitutional
precept that “[a]lienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands.” As explained in this Court’s 2013
Resolution in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic:
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and
disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands
made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,
lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral. Section 10, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber,
and mineral, but added national parks. Agricultural lands may
be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. The identification of lands according to their
legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive
act of the Executive Department.
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the
type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of
the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources
may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the
Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but
with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing
laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.
As the Court of Appeals emphasized, respondent has
conceded that the Iligan property was alienable and disposable
land:
As to the first requirement: There was no need for appellees to
establish that the property involved was alienable and
disposable public land. This characterization of the property is
conceded by [respondent] who cites Proclamation No. 2151 as
declaring that the disputed property was a certain disposable
parcel of public land.
That the Iligan property was alienable and disposable,
agricultural land, has been admitted. What is claimed instead is
that petitioners’ possession is debunked by how the Iligan
Property was supposedly part of a military reservation area
which was subsequently reserved for Iligan City’s slum
improvement and resettlement program, and the relocation of
families who were dislocated by the National Steel
Corporation’s five-year expansion program.
Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2143 (erroneously
referred to by respondent as Proclamation No. 2151) certain
parcels of land in Barrio Suarez, Iligan City were reserved for
slum improvement and resettlement program purposes.59 The
proclamation characterized the covered area as “disposable
parcel of public land”:
WHEREAS, a certain disposable parcel of public land situated
at Barrio Suarez, Iligan City consisting of one million one
hundred seventy-four thousand eight hundred fifty-three
(1,174,853) square meters, more or less, has been chosen by
National Steel Corporation and the City Government of Iligan
with the conformity of the National Housing/Authority, as the
most suitable site for the relocation of the families to be
affected/dislocated as a result of National Steel Corporation’s
program and for the establishment of a slum improvement and
resettlement project in the City of Iligan.
Whatever rights petitioners (and their predecessors-in-
interest) may have had over the Iligan property was, thus, not
obliterated by Proclamation No. 2143. On the contrary, the
However, even if the Iligan Property was subsumed by
Proclamation itself facilitated compensation.
Proclamation No. 2143, the same proclamation recognized
private rights, which may have already attached, and the rights
of qualified free patent applicants:
More importantly, there is documentary evidence to the
effect that the Iligan Property was not even within the area
claimed by respondent. In a letter to the Director of Lands, dated
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
December 22, 1987, Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero,
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law,
Jr. noted that:
do hereby reserve for relocation of the families to be
affected/dislocated by the 5-year expansion program of the
National Steel Corporation and for the slum improvement and
That this land known as Lot No. 5258, Cad. 292, Iligan Cadastre
resettlement project of the City of Iligan under the
which portion was claimed also by the Human Settlement and/or
administration and disposition of the National Housing
National Housing Authority; but the area applied for by
Authority, subject to private rights, if any there be, Lot 5258
Leopoldo Delfin is outside the claim of the said agency as per
(portion) of the Iligan Cadastre, which parcel of land is of the
certification issued dated June 10, 1988; copy of which is
public domain, situated in Barrio Suarez, City of Iligan and
herewith attached for ready reference.
more particularly described as follows:

The same letter likewise indicated that the Iligan

....
Property was already occupied by June 1945 and that it had even
been released for agricultural purposes in favor of its
occupants.Accordingly, the Deputy Public Land Inspector
This Proclamation is subject to the condition that the qualified
recommended the issuance of a patent in favor of petitioner
free patent applicants occupying portions of the aforedescribed
Leopoldo Delfin:
parcel of land, if any, may be compensated for the value of their
respective portions and existing improvements thereon, as may
be determined by the National Housing Authority.
Upon investigation conducted by the undersigned in the
premises of the land, it was found and ascertained that the land
applied for by Leopoldo Delfin was first entered, occupied,
possessed and cultivated by him since the year June, 1945 up to
the present; he have already well-improved the land and
introduced some considerable improvements such as coconut
trees and different kinds of fruit trees which are presently all
fruit-bearing trees; declared the same for taxation purposes and
taxes have been paid every year; and that there is no other
person or persons who bothered him in his peaceful occupation
and cultivation thereof;
Records of this Office show that said land was surveyed and
claimed by the Military Reservation, but the portion of which
has been released in favor of the actual occupants and the area
of Leopoldo Delfin is one of the portions released for
agricultural purposes;
....
That the applicant caused the survey of the land under Sgs-12-
000099, approved by the Regional Land Director, Region XII,
Bureau of Lands, Cotabato City on April 3, 1979 (see approved
plan attached hereof);
In view hereof, it is therefore respectfully recommended that the
entry of the application be now confirmed and that patent be yet
issued in favor of Leopoldo Delfin.
A May 18, 1988 supplemental letter to the Director of
the Land Management Bureau further stated:
That the land applied for by Leopoldo Delfin is a portion of Lot
No. 5258, Cad. 292, Iligan Cadastre which was entered,
occupied and possessed by the said applicant since the year June
1945 up to the present; well-improved the same and introduced
some considerable improvements such as different kinds of fruit
trees, coconut trees and other permanent improvements thereon;
....
That is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive
Secretary dated April 24, 1954 the portion thereof that will not
be needed for any public or quasi-public purposes, be disposed
in favor of the actual occupants under the administration of the
Bureau of Lands[.]
Clearly then, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan
Property pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
 First, there is no issue that the Iligan Property had already
been declared to be alienable and disposable land. Respondent
has admitted this and Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero,
Jr.’s letters to the Director of Land attest to this.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.

Second, although the Delfin Spouses’ testimonial

evidence and tax declarations showed that their possession went
only as far back as 1952, Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio
Lucero, Jr.’s letters to the Director of Land nevertheless attest to
a previous finding that the property had already been occupied
as early as June 1945.
Note.—Lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national
parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they
are reclassified as agricultural. (Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 561 [2013])

Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the

Public Land Act have been satisfied and having established their
rights to the Iligan Property, it follows that petitioners must be
compensated for its taking.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court

of Appeals’ Decision dated February 26, 2010 and Resolution
dated July 2, 2010 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 80017 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court’s Decision dated
May 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. II-1801 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 179987. September 3, 2013.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.
Malabanan), petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Civil Law; Property; Public Dominion; Private Ownership;
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as
either of public dominion or of private ownership.—Land,
which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of
public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of
public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended
for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth. Land belonging to the State that is not of such character,
or although of such character but no longer intended for public
use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property
of the State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial
property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of
private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Same; Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; Pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the
Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State.—Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine
(Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.
This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. All lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public
lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them
to private persons.
Same; Same; Same; Agricultural Lands; The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks; Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated;
all other natural resources may not be.—Whether or not land of
the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on
the classification of public lands made under the Constitution.
Under the 1935 Constitution, lands of the public domain were
classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands
of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the
law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks. Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. The
identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive
Department. Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a
limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural
lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Agricultural
Lands; Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the
Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but
with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.—
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the
Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but
with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing
laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is
no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from
the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or
by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify
lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State
no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
applicable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 11 of the Public Land Act
(CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands,
can be disposed of.—Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No.
141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be
disposed of, to wit: Section 11. Public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise: (1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By
lease; and (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or (b) By administrative legalization
(free patent).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent proof that the land is already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that
the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act.—Taking into consideration that
the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify
lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable
and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Alienable public land held by a
possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of the period.—An examination of
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the
registration should have been classified as agricultural since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of
the property subject of the application as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its
eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.
In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire
lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result
of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the
Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the property subject of
the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the
entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules Relative to the Disposition of
Public Land or Lands of the Public Domain.—We now observe
the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or
lands of the public domain, namely: (1) As a general rule and
pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly
under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State
and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed; (2) The
following are excepted from the general rule, to wit: (a)
Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable
and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated
under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs
only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of
the application, provided the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant
arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue
of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become
private property. (b) Lands of the public domain subsequently
classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for
the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere
of public dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the
requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua
non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
Brion, J., Separate Opinion:
Civil Law; Property; Public Land Act; View that Section 7 of the
Public Land Act delegates to the President the authority to
administer and dispose of alienable public lands.—Section 7 of
the PLA delegates to the President the authority to administer
and dispose of alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the
public lands open to disposition or concession, an the
requirement that they should be officially delimited and
classified and, when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very
significant provision, states that — Section 11. Public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows, and not otherwise: (1) For homestead settlement (2) By
sale (3) By lease (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title: (a) By judicial legalization (b) By administrative
legalization (free patent).
Same; Same; Public Lands; View that the Constitution classifies
public lands into agricultural, mineral, timber lands and
national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands can be
alienated.—The Constitution classifies public lands into
agricultural, mineral, timberlands and national parks. Of these,
only agricultural lands can be alienated. Without the requisite
classification, there can be no basis to determine which lands of
the public domain are alienable and which are not. Hence,
classification is a constitutionally-required step whose
importance should be given full legal recognition and effect.
Otherwise stated, without classification into disposable
agricultural land, the land continues to form part of the mass of
the public domain that, not being agricultural, must be mineral,
timber land or national parks that are completely inalienable and,
as such, cannot be possessed with legal effects. To recognize
possession prior to any classification is to do violence to the
Regalian Doctrine; the ownership and control that the Regalian
Doctrine embodies will be less than full if the possession — that
should be with the State as owner, but is also elsewhere without
any solid legal basis — can anyway be recognized.
Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; View that no
imperfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet classified as
disposable or alienable because, in the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified public land that
fully belongs to the State.—No imperfect title can be confirmed
over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable because,
in the absence of such classification, the land remains
unclassified public land that fully belongs to the State. This is
fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the PLA. If the
land is either mineral, timber or national parks that cannot be
alienated, it defies legal logic to recognize that possession of
these unclassified lands can produce legal effects.
Same; Same; Forest Lands; Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No.
705); View that P.D. No. 705 confirms that all lands of the public
domain that remain unclassified are considered as forest land.
As forest land, these lands of the public domain cannot be
alienated until they have been reclassified as agricultural
lands.—Parenthetically, PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code states that “Those [lands of public domain] still to be
classified under the present system shall continue to remain as
part of the public forest.” It further declares that public forest
covers “the mass of lands of the public domain which has not
been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purposes and
which are not.” Thus, PD No. 705 confirms that all lands of the
public domain that remain unclassified are considered as forest
land. As forest land, these lands of the public domain cannot be
alienated until they have been reclassified as agricultural lands.
For purposes of the present case, these terms confirm the
position that re/classification is essential at the time possession
is acquired under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; View that the Regalian
Doctrine was incorporated in all the Constitutions of the
Philippines (1935, 1973 and 1987) and the statutes governing
private individuals’ land acquisition and registration.—The
Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in all the Constitutions of
the Philippines (1935, 1973 and 1987) and the statutes governing
private individuals’ land acquisition and registration. In his
Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Sec. of Environment and Natural
Resources, 347 SCRA 128 (2000), former Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno made a brief yet informative historical discussion on
how the Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in our legal system,
especially in all our past and present organic laws. His historical
disquisition was quoted in La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association,
Inc. v. Sec. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148 (2004), and the consolidated
cases of The Secretary of the DENR et al. v. Yap and Sacay et
al. v. The Secretary of the DENR, 568 SCRA 164 (2008), which
were also quoted in Justice Lucas P. Bersamin’s Separate
Opinion in his very brief discussion on how the doctrine was
carried over from our Spanish and American colonization up
until our present legal system.
Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Possession; View
that prior to the declaration of alienability, a land of the public
domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession
cannot have legal effects.—Possession is essentially a civil law
term that can best be understood in terms of the Civil Code in
the absence of any specific definition in the PLA, other than in
terms of time of possession. Article 530 of the Civil Code
provides that “[o]nly things and rights which are susceptible of
being appropriated may be the object of possession.” Prior to the
declaration of alienability, a land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal
effects. In fact, whether an application for registration is filed
before or after the declaration of alienability becomes
immaterial if, in one as in the other, no effective possession can
be recognized prior to and within the proper period for the
declaration of alienability.
Separation of Powers; Statutes; View that if the Supreme Court
believes that a law already has absurd effects because of the
passage of time, its role under the principle of separation of
powers is not to give the law an interpretation that is not there
in order to avoid the perceived absurdity.—If the Court believes
that a law already has absurd effects because of the passage of
time, its role under the principle of separation of powers is not
to give the law an interpretation that is not there in order to avoid
the perceived absurdity. If the Court does, it thereby intrudes
into the realm of policy — a role delegated by the Constitution
to the Legislature. If only for this reason, the Court should avoid
expanding — through the present ponencia and its cited cases —
the plain meaning of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by
PD No. 1073.
Same; Supreme Court; View that the Supreme Court should be
very careful in delineating the line between the constitutionally-
allowed interpretation and the prohibited judicial legislation,
given the powers that the 1987 Constitution has entrusted to this
Court.—In the Philippines, a civil law country where the
Constitution is very clear on the separation of powers and the
assignment of constitutional duties, I believe that this Court
should be very careful in delineating the line between the
constitutionally-allowed interpretation and the prohibited
judicial legislation, given the powers that the 1987 Constitution
has entrusted to this Court. As a Court, we are given more
powers than the U.S. Supreme Court; under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, we are supposed to act, as a matter
of duty, on any grave abuse of discretion that occurs anywhere
in government. While broad, this power should nevertheless be
exercised with due respect for the separation of powers doctrine
that underlies our Constitution.
Civil Law; Land Registration; View that the act of registration
merely confirms that title already exists in favor of the
applicant.—The act of registration merely confirms that title
already exists in favor of the applicant. To require classification
of the property only on application for registration point would
imply that during the process of acquisition of title (specifically,
during the period of possession prior to the application for
registration), the property might not have been alienable for
being unclassified land (or a forest land under PD No. 705) of
the public domain. This claim totally contravenes the
constitutional rule that only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated.
Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: possession or prescription, but still, as yet, undocumented. The
original majority’s opinion in this case presents some examples.

Civil Law; Property; Regalian Doctrine; View that our present

Constitution does not contain the term, “regalian doctrine.”—I MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the
do not agree that all lands not appearing to be clearly within Court of Appeals.
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State or that
lands remain part of the public domain if the State does not
reclassify or alienate it to a private person. These presumptions The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
are expressions of the Regalian Doctrine. Our present
Constitution does not contain the term, “regalian doctrine.”
What we have is Article XII, Section 2, which provides: Section Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioners.
2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other The Solicitor General for respondent.
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated x x x.

Same; Same; View that there could be land, considered as
property, where ownership has vested as a result of either
possession or prescription, but still, as yet, undocumented.—
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection
of the laws. This section protects all types of property. It does
not limit its provisions to property that is already covered by a
form of paper title. Verily, there could be land, considered as
property, where ownership has vested as a result of either
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling
of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the
petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration
in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is
a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more
particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area
of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario
Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the
property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City,
Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of
the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title.
To prove that the property was an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented
during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.
Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described
on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable
or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under
FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration,
disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this
application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A
and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three
Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description now forming part
of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of
legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
 Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith
issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration
of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto
(Herbieto), the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to
the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation
of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable
and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession
prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of
computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the
appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of
February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on
certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Corazon Naguit (Naguit) remains the controlling
doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land.
In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural
land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be
counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect
title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141)
and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the
ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land
subject of the application for registration as alienable and
disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was
a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab
initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the
property had been ipso jure converted into private property by
reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land
of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them,
what was essential was that the property had been “converted”
into private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the
public domain.
 As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on
certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient
evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part
and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners
submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, Menguito v. Republic and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it
to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan
had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in
good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had
been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit
title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year
period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation
to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in
their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in
possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982,
the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by
the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order
to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the
rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the
decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be
imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according
to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified
as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Land is
considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public
use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State
that is not of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other than part
of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal
concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State. This means that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and
is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands
not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part
of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is
shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and
disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands
made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, lands
of the public domain were classified into three, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral. Section 10, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber,
and mineral, but added national parks. Agricultural lands may
be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. The identification of lands according to their
legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive
act of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit
on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands
of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
 Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but
with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the (1) For homestead settlement;
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing
laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, (2) By sale;
forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is
no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from (3) By lease; and
the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or
by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify
lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State
(a) By judicial legalization; or
no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
applicable.
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

Disposition of alienable public lands

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a
Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz.:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the
words “lands of the public domain” or “alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain” to clearly signify that lands
otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national
parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside
the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not
include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase “alienable
and disposable” further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to
only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind
such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must
satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to
come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken
place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
 5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department
is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land
subject of the application for registration must have been already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for
the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian
Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land
is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or
reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12,
1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by
judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was
the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that
said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no
other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing
of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should
interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written
by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that
the land subject of the registration should have been classified
as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the
applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This
means that the character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not
the ownership or title over it. Alienable public land held by a
possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of
this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public
domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private
ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the
requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.
 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire
duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should
have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land
at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also
serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that
is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government are complied with through actual
physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not
only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because
it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that
such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the
Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered
lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years
prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always
bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent
legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted
legislation (Republic Act No. 10023) in order to liberalize
stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of
alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby
converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State,
the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration
is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil
Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. As such, prescription can now run against
the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative
to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule,
to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are
rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section
11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural
land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the application, provided the applicant’s
possession and occupation of the land dated back
to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a
conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises, and the applicant
becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an
imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the
land has already ceased to be part of the public
domain and has become private property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently
classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national
wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership
that may be alienated or disposed through any of
the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in
observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession — possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier — the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against
the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration and the respondent’s Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., No part due to relationship to a party.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I submitted my vote joining the
Separate Opinion of Justice Brion.
Brion, J., In the result: See Separate Opinion.
Leonen, J., See separate concurring and dissenting
opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:
Prefatory Statement
This Separate Opinion maintains my view that, on the
merits, the petition should be denied, as the petitioners, Heirs of
Mario Malabanan, failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have a right to the property applied for
through either ordinary or extraordinary prescription. I share
this view with the majority; hence, the Court is unanimous in
the result in resolving the issue presented to us for our resolution.
As lawyers and Court watchers know, “unanimity in the
result” carries a technical meaning and implication in the
lawyers’ world; the term denotes that differing views exist
within the Court to support the conclusion they commonly
reached. The differences may be in the modality of reaching the
unanimous result, or there may just be differences in views on
matters discussed within the majority opinion. A little of both
exists in arriving at the Court’s present result, although the latter
type of disagreement predominates.
This Separate Opinion is submitted to state for the record
my own (and of those agreeing with me) view on the question of
how Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) and
(2) ofthe PRD should operate, particularly in relation with one
another, with the Constitution and with the Civil Code
provisions on property and prescription.
A critical point I make relates to what I call the
majority’s “absurdity argument” that played a major part in our
actual deliberations. The argument, to me, points to
insufficiencies in our laws that the Court wishes to rectify in its
perennial quest “to do justice.” I firmly believe though that any
insufficiency there may be — particularly one that relates to the
continuing wisdom of the law — is for the Legislature, not for
this Court, to correct in light of our separate and mutually
exclusive roles under the Constitution. The Court may be all-
powerful within its own sphere, but the rule of law, specifically,
the supremacy of the Constitution, dictates that we recognize our
own limitations and that we desist when a problem already
relates to the wisdom of the law before us. All we can do is point
out the insufficiency, if any, for possible legislative or executive
action. It is largely in this sense that I believe our differing views
on the grant and disposition of lands of the public domain should
be written and given the widest circulation.
I wrap up this Prefatory Statement with a cautionary note on how
the discussions in this Resolution should be read and appreciated.
Many of the divergent views expressed, both the majority’s and
mine, are not completely necessary for the resolution of the
direct issues submitted to us; thus, they are, under the given facts
of the case and the presented and resolved issues, mostly obiter
dicta. On my part, I nevertheless present them for the reason I
have given above, and as helpful aid for the law practitioners and
the law students venturing into the complex topic of public land
grants, acquisitions, and ownership.
Preliminary Considerations
As a preliminary matter, I submit that:
1. the hierarchy of applicable laws must be given
full application in considering lands of the public domain.
Foremost in the hierarchy is the Philippine Constitution
(particularly its Article XII), followed by the applicable special
laws — Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act
(PLA) and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree (PRD). The Civil Code and other general
laws apply suppletorily and to the extent called for by the
primary laws; and
2. the ponencia’s ruling that the classification of
public lands as alienable and disposable does not need to date
back to June 12, 1945 or earlier is incorrect because:
a. under the Constitution’s Regalian Doctrine,
classification is a required step whose full import should
be given full effect and recognition. The legal
recognition of possession prior to classification runs
counter to, and effectively weakens, the Regalian
Doctrine;
b. the terms of the PLA only find full application from
the time a land of the public domain is classified as
agricultural and declared alienable and disposable.
Thus, the possession required under Section 48(b) of this
law cannot be recognized prior to the required
classification and declaration;
c. under the Civil Code, “[o]nly things and rights
which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of possession.” Prior to the classification of a
public land as alienable and disposable, a land of the
public domain cannot be appropriated, hence, any
claimed possession prior to classification cannot have
legal effects;
d. there are other modes of acquiring alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under the PLA.
This legal reality renders the ponencia’s absurdity
argument misplaced; and
e. the alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom
of the law and is a matter for the Legislature, not for
this Court, to address.
In these lights, I submit that all previous contrary rulings
(particularly, Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals
[Naguit]) should — in the proper case — be abandoned and
rejected for being based on legally-flawed premises and as
aberrations in land registration jurisprudence.
I. THE LAWS AFFECTING PUBLIC LANDS
I likewise submit the following short overview as an aide
memoire in understanding our basic public land laws.
A. The Overall Scheme at a Glance
1. The Philippine Constitution
The Philippine Constitution is the fountainhead of the
laws and rules relating to lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. It starts with the postulate that all lands of the
public domain — classified into agricultural, forests or timber,
mineral lands and national parks — are owned by the State.
This principle states the Regalian Doctrine, and classifies land
according to its nature and alienability.
By way of exception to the Regalian Doctrine, the Constitution
also expressly states that “[w]ith the exception of agricultural
lands [which may be further classified by law according to the
uses to which they may be devoted], all other natural resources
shall not be alienated.” Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands.
2. The Public Land Act
How and to what extent agricultural lands of the public domain
may be alienated and may pass into private or non-State hands
are determined under the PLA, which governs the classification,
grant, and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain and, other than the Constitution, is the
country’s primary substantive law on the matter.
As a rule, alienation and disposition of lands of the public
domain are exercises in determining:
a. whether a public land is or has been classified as
agricultural (in order to take the land out of the mass of
lands of the public domain that, by the terms of the
Constitution, is inalienable);
b. once classified as agricultural, whether it has been
declared by the State to be alienable and disposable. To
reiterate, even agricultural lands, prior to their
declaration as alienable, are part of the inalienable lands
of the public domain; and
c. whether the terms of classification, alienation or
disposition have been complied with. In a confirmation
of imperfect title, there must be possession since June
12, 1945 or earlier, in an open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious manner, by the applicant himself or by his
predecessor-in-interest, of public agricultural land that
since that time has been declared alienable and
disposable, as clearly provided under PD No. 1073.
The Civil Code provides that “[o]nly things and rights
which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of possession.”8 Prior to the classification of a
public land as alienable and disposable, a land of the
public domain cannot be appropriated, hence, any
claimed possession cannot have legal effects;
d. upon compliance with the required period and
character of possession of alienable public agricultural
land, the possessor acquires ownership, thus converting
the land to one of private ownership and entitling the
applicant-possessor to confirmation of title under
Section 48(b) of the PLA and registration under Section
14(1) of the PRD.
 3. Classification under the Civil Code
Separately from the classification according to the nature
of land under the Constitution, another system of classification
of property is provided under the Civil Code.
The Civil Code classifies property (as a general term,
compared to land which is only a species of property, labeled
under the Civil Code as immovable property) in relation with
the person to whom it belongs.
Property under the Civil Code may belong to the (or
property pertaining to the State for public use, for public service
or for the development of the national wealth) or it may be of
private ownership (which classification includes patrimonial
property or property held in private ownership by the State).
Significantly, the Civil Code expressly provides that “[p]roperty
of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State.”
What is otherwise a simple classification from the point
of view of the person owning it, assumes a measure of
complexity when the property is land of the public domain, as
the Constitution, in unequivocal terms, requires classification
and declarations on the means and manner of granting,
alienating, disposing, and acquiring lands of the public domain
that all originally belong to the State under the Regalian
Doctrine.
In a reconciled consideration of the Constitution and the
Civil Code classifications, made necessary because they have
their respective independent focuses and purposes, certain
realities will have to be recognized or deduced:
First. As a first principle, in case of any conflict, the
terms of the Constitution prevail. No ifs and buts can be
admitted with respect to this recognition, as the
Constitution is supreme over any other law or legal
instrument in the land.
Second. A necessary corollary to the first principle is
that all substantive considerations of land ownership,
alienation, or disposition must always take into account
the constitutional requirements.
Third. The classification and the requirements under the
Constitution and under the Civil Code may overlap
without any resulting violation of the Constitution.
A piece of land may fall under both classifications (i.e.,
under the constitutional classification based on the legal nature
of the land and alienability, and under the civil law classification
based on the ownership of the land). This can best be appreciated
in the discussion below, under the topic “The PLA, the Civil
Code and Prescription.”
4. Prescription under the Civil Code
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is a mode
of acquiring ownership provided under the Civil Code, but is not
mentioned as one of the modes of acquiring ownership of
alienable public lands of the public domain under the PLA.
A point of distinction that should be noted is that the PLA,
under its Section 48(b), provides for a system that allows
possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier to ripen into
ownership. The PLA, however, does not refer to this mode as
acquisitive prescription but as basis for confirmation of title,
and requires a specified period of possession of alienable
agricultural land, not the periods for ordinary or extraordinary
prescription required under the Civil Code. Ownership that vests
under Section 48(b) of the PLA can be registered under Section
14(1) of the PRD.
The PRD, under its Section 14(2), recognizes that
registration of title can take place as soon as ownership over
private land has vested due to prescription — “[t]hose who
have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.” Thus, prescription was
introduced into the PRD land registration scheme but not into
the special law governing the grant and alienation of lands of the
public domain, i.e., the PLA.
An important provision that should not be missed in
considering prescription is Article 1108 of the Civil Code,
which states that prescription does not run against the State
and its subdivisions. Article 1113 of the Civil Code is a
companion provision stating that “[a]ll things which are within
the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.”
The above-cited rules express civil law concepts, but
their results are effectively replicated in the scheme governing
lands of the public domain since these lands, by constitutional
fiat, cannot be alienated and are thus outside the commerce of
man, except under the rigid terms of the Constitution and the
PLA. For example, confirmation of imperfect title — the
possession-based rule under the PLA — can only take place with
respect to agricultural lands already declared alienable and
possessed for the required period (since June 12, 1945 or earlier).
 5. The PRD
The PRD was issued in 1978 to update the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496) and relates solely to the
registration of property. The law does not provide the means for
acquiring title to land; it refers solely to the means or procedure
of registering and rendering indefeasible title already acquired.
The PRD mainly governs the registration of lands and
places them under the Torrens System. It does not, by itself,
create title nor vest one. It simply confirms a title already
created and already vested, rendering it forever indeafeasible.
In a side by side comparison, the PLA is the substantive
law that classifies and provides for the disposition of alienable
lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the PRD refers to
the manner of bringing registerable title to lands, among them,
alienable public lands, within the coverage of the Torrens
system; in terms of substantive content, the PLA must prevail.18
On this consideration, only land of the public domain that has
passed into private ownership under the terms of the PLA can be
registered under the PRD.
II. THE CASE AND THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
The Case.
Before the Court are the motions separately filed by the
petitioners and by the respondent Republic of the Philippines,
both of them seeking reconsideration of the Court’s Decision
dated April 29, 2009 which denied the petitioners’ petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Underlying Facts
The present case traces its roots to the land registration
case instituted by the petitioners’ predecessor, Mario Malabanan
(Malabanan). On February 20, 1998, Malabanan filed an
application for the registration of a 71,324-square meter land,
located in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite, with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite — Tagaytay City, Branch 18.
Malabanan alleged that he purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco. The property was originally part of a 22-hectare land
owned by Lino Velazco (Velazco), who was succeeded by his
four sons, among them, Eduardo Velazco.
 Apart from his purchase of the property, Malabanan
anchored his registration petition on his and his predecessors-in-
interest’s open, notorious, continuous, adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than 30 years. Malabanan
claimed that the land is an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, presenting as proof the Certification dated June
11, 2001 of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
The Certification stated that the land was “verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map
No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as
such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.”
The Issue Before the Court.
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners
submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses de Ocampo v. Arlos, Menguito v. Republic, and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it
to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan
had purchased the property from Velazco, believing in good
faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the
real owners of the land, with the right to validly transmit title
and ownership thereof; that consequently, the 10-year period
prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation with
Section 14(2) of the PRD, applied in their favor; and that when
Malabanan filed his application for registration on February 20,
1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost
16 years, reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was
declared inalienable and disposable by the State.
The respondent seeks the partial reconsideration in order
to seek clarification with reference to the application of the
rulings in Naguit and Republic of the Phils. v. Herbieto. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only
when the land subject of the application had been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945.
As presented in the petition and the subsequent motion
for reconsideration, the direct issue before the Court is whether
there had been acquisition of title, based on ordinary or
extraordinary prescription, over a land of the public domain
declared alienable as of March 15, 1982. The issue was not
about confirmation of an imperfect title where possession started
on or before June 12, 1945 since possession had not been proven
to have dated back to or before that date.
The Antecedents and the Ruling under Review
On December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment
favoring Malabanan, approving his application for registration
of the land “under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or PD
1529.”
 The respondent, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision with the
Court of Appeals (CA). The OSG contended that Malabanan
failed to prove: (1) that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and (2) that he had not
been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
During the pendency of the appeal before the CA, Malabanan
died and was substituted by the petitioners.
In its decision dated February 23, 2007, the CA reversed
the RTC decision and dismissed Malabanan’s application for
registration. Applying the Court’s ruling in Herbieto, the CA
held that “under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the
lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.”
Since the land was classified as alienable and disposable only on
March 15, 1982, any possession prior to this date cannot be
considered.
The petitioners assailed the CA decision before this
Court through a petition for review on certiorari. On April 29,
2009, the Court denied the petition. The Court’s majority
(through Justice Dante Tinga) summarized its ruling as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the PRD,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and
confirms that “those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as
soon as it is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of
the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only
with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And
only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of
the government. The person acquires ownership
of patrimonial property by prescription under the
Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which
patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under
ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in
good faith and with just title. Uner extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless
of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
Based on this ruling, the majority denied the petition, but
established the above rules which embody principles contrary
to Section 48(b) of the PLA and which are not fully in accord
with the concept of prescription under Section 14(2) of the
PRD, in relation with the Civil Code provisions on property and
prescription.
In its ruling on the present motions for reconsideration,
the ponencia essentially affirms the above ruling, rendering this
Separate Opinion and its conclusions necessary.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENTED ISSUES
A. Section 48(b) of the PLA: Confirmation of
Imperfect Title
Section 48(b) of the PLA is the core provision on the
confirmation of imperfect title and must be read with its
related provision in order to fully be appreciated.
Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the President the
authority to administer and dispose of alienable public lands.
Section 8 sets out the public lands open to disposition or
concession, and the requirement that they should be officially
delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed.
Section 11, a very significant provision, states that —
 Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural Section 48. The following-described citizens of
purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
otherwise: claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
(1) For homestead settlement where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(2) By sale

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of

(3) By lease sovereignty from Spain to the x x x United States have
applied for the purchase, composition or other form of
grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or royal decrees then in force and have instituted and
incomplete title: prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but
have[,] with or without default upon their part, or for any
other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants
(a) By judicial legalization or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated
said lands continuously since the filing of their
applications.
(b) By administrative legalization (free
patent). [emphases ours]
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
Finally, Section 48 of the PLA, on confirmation of exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
imperfect title, embodies a grant of title to the qualified occupant agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
or possessor of an alienable public land, under the following fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as
terms: against the Government, since July twenty-sixth,
 eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted
in sub-section (b) hereof. [emphasis ours]
Subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b) has
been amended by PD No. 1073 as follows:
Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and
Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a [bona fide] claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.
Based on these provisions and a narrow reading of the
“since June 12, 1945” timeline, the ponencia now rules that the
declaration that the land is agricultural and alienable can be
made at the time of application for registration and need not be
from June 12, 1945 or earlier. This conclusion follows the ruling
in Naguit (likewise penned by Justice Tinga) that additionally
argued that reckoning the declarations from June 12, 1945 leads
to absurdity.
For the reasons outlined below, I cannot agree with these
positions and with the Naguit ruling on which it is based:
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The
Constitution classifies public lands into agricultural, mineral,
timber lands and national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands
can be alienated. Without the requisite classification, there can
be no basis to determine which lands of the public domain are
alienable and which are not. Hence, classification is a
constitutionally-required step whose importance should be
given full legal recognition and effect.
Otherwise stated, without classification into disposable
agricultural land, the land continues to form part of the mass of
the public domain that, not being agricultural, must be mineral,
timber land or national parks that are completely inalienable and,
as such, cannot be possessed with legal effects. To recognize
possession prior to any classification is to do violence to the
Regalian Doctrine; the ownership and control that the Regalian
Doctrine embodies will be less than full if the possession — that
should be with the State as owner, but is also elsewhere without
any solid legal basis — can anyway be recognized.
Note in this regard that the terms of the PLA do not
find full application until a classification into alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain is made. In
this situation, possession cannot be claimed under Section 48(b)
of the PLA.
Likewise, no imperfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet
classified as disposable or alienable because, in the absence of
such classification, the land remains unclassified public land
that fully belongs to the State. This is fully supported by
Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the PLA. If the land is either mineral,
timber or national parks that cannot be alienated, it defies legal
logic to recognize that possession of these unclassified lands can
produce legal effects.
Parenthetically, PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code states that “Those [lands of public domain] still to be
classified under the present system shall continue to remain
as part of the public forest.” It further declares that public
forest covers “the mass of lands of the public domain which
has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed
for forest purposes and which are not.”
Thus, PD No. 705 confirms that all lands of the public
domain that remain unclassified are considered as forest land.
As forest land, these lands of the public domain cannot be
alienated until they have been reclassified as agricultural lands.
For purposes of the present case, these terms confirm the
position that re/classification is essential at the time possession
is acquired under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
From these perspectives, the legal linkage between (1)
the classification of public land as alienable and disposable and
(2) effective possession that can ripen into a claim under Section
48(b) of the PLA can readily be appreciated.
The Leonen Opinion
Incidentally, Justice Marvic F. Leonen opines in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that the Regalian Doctrine
was not incorporated in our Constitution and that “there could
be land, considered as property, where ownership has vested as
a result of either possession or prescription but still, as yet
undocumented.”
I will respond to this observation that, although relating
to the nature of the land applied for (land of the public domain)
and to the Regalian Doctrine, still raises aspects of these matters
that are not exactly material to the direct issues presented in the
present case. I respond to correct for the record and at the earliest
opportunity what I consider to be an erroneous view.
The Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in all the
Constitutions of the Philippines (1935, 1973 and 1987) and the
statutes governing private individuals’ land acquisition and
registration. In his Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Sec. of
Environment and Natural Resources, former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno made a brief yet informative historical
discussion on how the Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in
our legal system, especially in all our past and present organic
laws. His historical disquisition was quoted in La Bugal-B’laan
Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos and the consolidated
cases of The Secretary of the DENR et al. v. Yap and Sacay et
al. v. The Secretary of the DENR, which were also quoted in
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin’s Separate Opinion in his very brief
discussion on how the doctrine was carried over from our
Spanish and American colonization up until our present legal
system.
I nsofar as our organic laws are concerned, La Bugal-
B’laan confirms that:
one of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935
Constitutional Convention [was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country.]
There was an overwhelming sentiment in
the Convention in favor of the principle of state
ownership of natural resources and the adoption
of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of
natural resources was seen as a necessary
starting point to secure recognition of the state’s
power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization. The delegates [to]
the Constitutional Convention very well knew
that the concept of State ownership of land and
natural resources was introduced by the
Spaniards, however, they were not certain
whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention
approved the provision in the Constitution
affirming the Regalian doctrine.
xxxx
On January 17, 1973, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos proclaimed the ratification of a new
Constitution.
Article XIV on the National Economy and
Patrimony contained provisions similar to the 1935
Constitution with regard to Filipino participation in the
nation’s natural resources. Section, 8, Article XIV
thereof[.]
 xxxx
The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian
doctrine. The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII
states: “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State.”
In these lights, I believe that, at this point in our legal
history, there can be no question that the Regalian Doctrine
remains in the pure form interpreted by this Court; it has
resiliently endured throughout our colonial history, was
continually confirmed in all our organic laws, and is presently
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of our present Constitution.
Short of a constitutional amendment duly ratified by the people,
the views and conclusions of this Court on the Regalian Doctrine
should not and cannot be changed.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially
a civil law term that can best be understood in terms of the Civil
Code in the absence of any specific definition in the PLA, other
than in terms of time of possession.
Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that “[o]nly things
and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be
the object of possession.” Prior to the declaration of alienability,
a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any
claimed possession cannot have legal effects. In fact, whether an
application for registration is filed before or after the declaration
of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as in the other, no
effective possession can be recognized prior to and within the
proper period for the declaration of alienability.
To express this position in the form of a direct question:
How can possession before the declaration of alienability be
effective when the land then belonged to the State against
whom prescription does not run?
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date —
June 12, 1945. The ponencia concludes — based on its statutory
construction reasoning and reading of Section 48(b) of the PLA
— that the June 12, 1945 cut-off is only required for purposes of
possession and that it suffices if the land has been classified as
alienable agricultural land at the time of application for
registration.
This cut-off date was painstakingly set by law and its full
import appears from PD No. 1073 that amended Section 48(b)
of the PLA. While the resulting Section 48(b) of the PLA did not
expressly state what PD No. 1073 introduced in terms of exact
wording, PD No. 1073 itself, as formulated, shows the intent to
count the alienability from June 12, 1945. To quote the exact
terms of PD No. 1073:
 effectively adopted is more apparent than real, since the use of
June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the declaration of alienability
Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and
will not render the grant of alienable public lands out of reach.
Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
The acquisition of ownership and title may still be
public domain which have been in open, continuous,
obtained by other modes under the PLA. Among other laws,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
Republic Act (RA) No. 6940 allowed the use of free patents.It
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
was approved on March 28, 1990; hence, counting 30 years
under a [bona fide] claim of acquisition of ownership,
backwards, possession since April 1960 or thereabouts qualified
since June 12, 1945. [emphases and underscores ours]
a possessor to apply for a free patent. Additionally, the other
administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA are
still open, particularly, homestead settlement, sales and lease.
In reading this provision, it has been claimed that June
12, 1945 refers only to the required possession and not to the
declaration of alienability of the land applied for. The terms of
Incidentally, the ponencia mentions RA No. 10023,
PD No. 1073, however, are plain and clear even from the
entitled “An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents to
grammatical perspective alone. The term “since June 12, 1945”
Residential Lands,” in its discussions. This statute, however,
is unmistakably separated by a comma from the conditions of
has no relevance to the present case because its terms apply to
both alienability and possession, thus, plainly showing that it
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain (necessarily
refers to both alienability and possession. This construction —
agricultural lands under the Constitution) that have been
showing the direct, continuous and seamless linking of the
reclassified as residential under Section 9(b) of the PLA.
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to June 12,
1945 under the wording of the Decree — is clear and should be
respected, particularly if read with the substantive provisions on
ownership of lands of the public domain and the limitations that Fifth. Addressing the wisdom — or the absurdity — of
the law imposes on possession. the law. This Court acts beyond the limits of the constitutionally-
mandated separation of powers in giving Section 48(b) of the
PLA, as amended by PD No. 1073, an interpretation beyond its
plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into the law an
Fourth. Other modes of acquisition of lands under the
intent that is not there even if the purpose is to avoid an absurd
PLA. The cited Naguit’s absurdity argument that the ponencia
situation.
 If the Court believes that a law already has absurd effects
because of the passage of time, its role under the principle of
separation of powers is not to give the law an interpretation that
is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity. If the Court
does, it thereby intrudes into the realm of policy — a role
delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this
reason, the Court should avoid expanding — through the present
ponencia and its cited cases — the plain meaning of Section
48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD No. 1073.
In the United States where the governing constitutional
rule is likewise the separation of powers between the Legislative
and the Judiciary, Justice Antonin Scalia (in the book Reading
Law co-authored with Bryan A. Garner) made the pithy
observation that:
To the extent that people give this view any
credence, the notion that judges may (even should)
improvise on constitutional and statutory text enfeebles
the democratic polity. As Justice John Marshall Harlan
warned in the 1960s, an invitation to judicial lawmaking
results inevitably in “a lessening, on the one hand, of
judicial independence and, on the other, of legislative
responsibility, thus polluting the bloodstream of our
system of government.” Why these alarming outcomes?
First, when judges fashion law rather than fairly derive it
from governing texts, they subject themselves to
intensified political pressures – in the appointment
process, in their retention, and in the arguments made to
them. Second, every time a court constitutionalizes a
new sliver of law – as by finding a “new constitutional
right” to do this, that, or the other – that sliver becomes
thenceforth untouchable by the political branches. In the
American system, a legislature has no power to abridge
a right that has been authoritatively held to be part of the
Constitution – even if that newfound right does not
appear in the text. Over the past 50 years especially, we
have seen the judiciary incrementally take control of
larger and larger swaths of territory that ought to be
settled legislatively.
It used to be said that judges do not “make” law
– they simply apply it. In the 20th century, the legal
realists convinced everyone that judges do indeed make
law. To the extent that this was true, it was knowledge
that the wise already possessed and the foolish could not
be trusted with. It was true, that is, that judges did not
really “find” the common law but invented it over time.
Yet this notion has been stretched into a belief that
judges “make” law through judicial interpretation of
democratically enacted statutes. Consider the following
statement by John P. Dawson, intended to apply to
statutory law:
It seems to us inescapable that judges
should have a part in creating law – creating it as
they apply it. In deciding the multifarious
disputes that are brought before them, we believe
 that judges in any legal system invariably adapt
legal doctrines to new situations and thus give
them new content.
Now it is true that in a system such as ours, in
which judicial decisions have a stare decisis effect, a
court’s application of a statute to a “new situation” can
be said to establish the law applicable to that situation –
that is, to pronounce definitively whether and how the
statute applies to that situation. But establishing this
retail application of the statute is probably not what
Dawson meant by “creating law,” “adapt[ing] legal
doctrines,” and “giv[ing] them new content.” Yet beyond
that retail application, good judges dealing with statutes
do not make law. They do not “give new content” to the
statute, but merely apply the content that has been there
all along, awaiting application to myriad factual
scenarios. To say that they “make law” without this
necessary qualification is to invite the taffy-like
stretching of words – or the ignoring of words altogether.
In the Philippines, a civil law country where the
Constitution is very clear on the separation of powers and the
assignment of constitutional duties, I believe that this Court
should be very careful in delineating the line between the
constitutionally-allowed interpretation and the prohibited
judicial legislation, given the powers that the 1987 Constitution
has entrusted to this Court. As a Court, we are given more
powers than the U.S. Supreme Court; under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, we are supposed to act, as a
matter of duty, on any grave abuse of discretion that occurs
anywhere in government. While broad, this power should
nevertheless be exercised with due respect for the separation of
powers doctrine that underlies our Constitution.
B. Registration under Section 14(1) and (2) of the PRD
Complementing the substance that the PLA provides are
the provisions of the PRD that set out the registration of the title
that has accrued under the PLA. Section 14 of the PRD provides:
SEC. 14. Who May Apply.—The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
 (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
other manner provided for by law. [emphasis and italics
ours]
As mentioned earlier, the PLA is the substantive law on
the grant and disposition of alienable lands of the public domain.
The PRD, on the other hand, sets out the manner of bringing
registrable lands, among them alienable public lands, within the
coverage of the Torrens system. In this situation, in terms of
substantive content, the PLA should prevail.
1. Section 14(1) of the PRD is practically a reiteration
of Section 48(b) of the PLA, with the difference that they govern
two different aspects of confirmation of imperfect title relating
to alienable lands of the public domain. The PLA has its own
substantive focus, while Section 14(1) of the PRD, bearing on
the same matter, defines what title may be registered. For this
reason, the discussions of Section 48(b) apply with equal force,
mutatis mutandis, to Section 14(1) of the PRD.
2. Section 14(2) of the PRD is another matter. By its
express terms, the prescription that it speaks of applies only
to private lands. Thus, on plain reading, Section 14(2) should
not apply to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
that Section 14(1) covers. This is the significant difference
between Sections 14(1) and 14(2). The former — Section 14(1)
— is relevant when the ownership of an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain vests in the occupant or possessor
under the terms of Section 48(b) of the PLA, even without the
registration of a confirmed title since the land ipso jure becomes
a private land. Section 14(2), on the other hand, applies to
situations when ownership of private lands vests on the basis of
prescription.
The prescription that Section 14(2) of the PRD speaks of
finds no application to alienable lands of the public domain —
specifically, to Section 48(b) of the PLA since this provision, as
revised by PD No. 1073 in January 1977, simply requires
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
regardless of the period the property was occupied (although
when PD No. 1073 was enacted in 1977, the property would
have been possessed for at least 32 years by the claimant if his
possession commenced exactly on June 12, 1945, or longer if
possession took place earlier).
Parenthetically, my original April 29, 2009 Opinion
stated that the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 appeared to be
devoid of legal significance as far as the PLA was concerned.
This statement notwithstanding, it should be appreciated that
prior to PD No. 1073, Section 48(b) of the PLA required a 30-
year period of possession. This 30-year period was a
requirement imposed under RA No. 1942 in June 1957, under
the following provision:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure[.]
When PD No. 1073 was enacted in 1977, it was
recognized that a claimant who had possessed the property for
at least 30 years (in compliance with RA No. 1942) might not be
entitled to confirmation of title under PD No. 1073 because his
possession commenced only after June 12, 1945. This possibility
constituted a violation of his vested rights that should be avoided.
To resolve this dilemma, the Court, in Abejaron v. Nabasa,
opined that where an application has satisfied the requirements
of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942 (prior
to the effectivity of PD No. 1073), the applicant is entitled to
perfect his or her title even if possession and occupation do not
date back to June 12, 1945.
What this leads up to is that possession of land “for the
required statutory period” becomes significant only when the
claim of title is based on the amendment introduced by RA No.
1942. The 30-year period introduced by RA No. 1942 “did
not refer or call into application the Civil Code provisions on
prescription.” In fact, in The Director of Lands v. IAC and the
opinion of Justice Claudio Teehankee in Manila Electric Co. v.
Judge Castro-Bartolome, etc., et al., cited by the ponencia, both
pertained to the RA No. 1942 amendment; it was in this sense
that both rulings stated that mere lapse or completion of the
required period converts alienable land to private property.
In sum, if the claimant is asserting his vested right under
the RA No. 1942 amendment, then it would be correct to declare
that the lapse of the required statutory period converts alienable
land to private property ipso jure. Otherwise, if the claimant is
asserting a right under the PD No. 1073 amendment, then he
needs to prove possession of alienable public land as of June 12,
1945 or earlier. Although a claimant may have possessed the
property for 30 years or more, if his possession commenced after
January 24, 1947 (the adjusted date based on Abejaron), the
property would not be converted into private property by the
mere lapse of time.
3. As a last point, the ponencia effectively claims that
the classification of property as agricultural land is only
necessary at the time of application for registration of title.
This is completely erroneous. The act of registration merely
confirms that title already exists in favor of the applicant. To
require classification of the property only on application for
registration point would imply that during the process of
acquisition of title (specifically, during the period of possession
prior to the application for registration), the property might not
have been alienable for being unclassified land (or a forest land
under PD No. 705) of the public domain. This claim totally
contravenes the constitutional rule that only agricultural lands of
the public domain may be alienated.
To translate all these arguments to the facts of the present
case, the land applied for was not classified as alienable on or
before June 12, 1945 and was indisputably only classified as
alienable only on March 15, 1982. Under these facts, the
ponencia still asserts that following the Naguit ruling, possession
of the non-classified land during the material period would still
comply with Section 48(b) of the PLA, provided that there is
already a classification at the time of application for registration.
This claim involves essential contradiction in terms as
only a land that can already be registered under Section 48(b) of
the PLA can be registered under Section 14(1) of the PRD.
Additionally, the ponencia, in effect, confirmed that possession
prior to declaration of alienability can ripen into private
ownership of a land that, under the Constitution, the PLA, and
even the Civil Code, is not legally allowed.
The ponencia’s position all the more becomes legally
preposterous if PD No. 705 is considered. To recall, this Decree
states that all lands of the public domain that remain unclassified
are considered forest lands that cannot be alienated until they
have been reclassified as agricultural lands and declared
alienable. Applying this law to the facts of the present case, the
land applied for, prior to March 15, 1982, must have still been
forest land that, under the Constitution, cannot be alienated.
The deeper hole that the ponencia digs for itself in
recognizing possession prior to declaration of alienability
becomes apparent when it now cites Naguit as its authority.
Unnoticed perhaps by the ponencia, Naguit itself explicitly
noted PD No. 705 and expressly and unabashedly pronounced
that “[a] different rule obtains for forest lands, such as those
which form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes the
possession of which cannot ripen into ownership. It is
elementary in the law governing natural resources that forestland
cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court
of Appeals, forest land is not registrable and possession thereof,
no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,
unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable.”
How the ponencia would square this Naguit statement
with the realities of PD No. 705 and its present ruling would be
an interesting exercise to watch. It would, to say the least, be in
a very confused position as it previously confirmed in Naguit the
very same basic precept of law that it now debunks in its present
ruling, citing the same Naguit ruling.
C. The PLA, the Civil Code and Prescription
In reading all the provisions of Book II of the Civil Code
on the classification of property based on the person to whom it
belongs, it should not be overlooked that these provisions refer
to properties in general, i.e., to both movable and immovable
properties. Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do not
refer to land alone, much less do they refer solely to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. For this latter specie
of property, the PLA is the special governing law and, under the
Civil Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in
case of deficiency.
Whether, as in the present case, land of the public
domain can be granted and registered on the basis of
extraordinary prescription (i.e., possession by the applicant and
his predecessors-in-interest for a period of at least 30 years), the
obvious answer is that the application can only effectively be
allowed upon compliance with the PLA’s terms. Classification
as agricultural land must first take place to remove the land from
its status as a land of the public domain and a declaration of
alienability must likewise be made to render the land available
or susceptible to alienation; the required possession, of course,
has to follow and only upon completion does the land pass to
“private” hands.
Whether land classified as “agricultural” and declared
“alienable and disposable” can already be considered
“patrimonial” property does not yield to an easy answer as these
concepts involve different classification systems as discussed
above. To be sure, the classification and declaration of a public
land as alienable public agricultural land do not transfer the land
into private hands nor divest it of the character of being State
property that can only be acquired pursuant to the terms of the
PLA. Separate from this requirement, a property — although
already declared alienable and disposable — may conceivably
still be held by the State or by any of its political subdivisions or
agencies for public use or public service under the terms of the
Civil Code. In this latter case, the property cannot be considered
patrimonial that is subject to acquisitive prescription.
Based on these considerations, the two concepts of
“disposable land of the public domain” and “patrimonial
property” cannot directly be equated with one another. The
requirements for their acquisition, however, must both be
satisfied before they can pass to private hands.
An inevitable related question is the manner of enforcing
Article 422 of the Civil Code that “[p]roperty of the public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State,”
in light of the implication that patrimonial property may be
acquired through prescription under Article 1113 of the Civil
Code (“Property of the State or any of its subdivision not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription”).
This position, incidentally, is what the original decision in
this case claims.
A first simple answer is that the Civil Code provisions
must yield when considered in relation with the PLA and its
requirements. In other words, when the property involved is a
land of the public domain, the consideration that it is not for
public use or for public service, or its patrimonial character,
initially becomes immaterial; any grant or alienation must first
comply with the mandates of the Constitution on lands of the
public domain and with the requirements of the PLA as a priority
requirement.
Thus, if the question is whether such land, considered
patrimonial solely under the terms of Article 422 of the Civil
Code, can be acquired through prescription, the prior questions
of whether the land is already alienable under the terms of the
Constitution and the PLA and whether these terms have been
complied with must first be answered. If the response is
negative, then any characterization under Article 422 of the Civil
Code is immaterial; only upon compliance with the terms of the
Constitution and the PLA can Article 422 of the Civil Code be
given full force. If the land is already alienable, Article 422 of
the Civil Code, when invoked, can only be complied with on the
showing that the property is no longer intended for public use or
public service.
For all these reasons, alienable and disposable
agricultural land cannot be registered under Section 14(2) of the
PRD solely because it is already alienable and disposable. The
alienability must be coupled with the required declaration under
Article 422 of the Civil Code if the land is claimed to be
patrimonial and possession under Section 14(2) of the PRD is
invoked as basis for registration.
As an incidental matter, note that this PRD provision is
no longer necessary for the applicant who has complied with the
required possession under Section 48(b) of the PLA (i.e., that
there had been possession since June 12, 1945); he or she does
not need to invoke Section 14(2) of the PRD as registration is
available under Section 14(1) of the PRD. On the other hand, if
the required period for possession under Section 48(b) of the
PLA (or Section 14[1] of the PRD) did not take place, then the
applicant’s recourse would still be under the PLA through its
other available modes (because a land of the public domain is
involved), but not under its Section 48(b).
Section 14(2) of the PRD will apply only after the land
is deemed to be “private” or has passed through one of the modes
of grant and acquisition under the PLA, and after the requisite
time of possession has passed, counted from the time the land is
deemed or recognized to be private. In short, Section 14(2) of
the PLA only becomes available to a possessor of land already
held or deemed to be in private ownership and only after such
possessor complies with the requisite terms of ordinary or
extraordinary prescription. In considering compliance with the
required possession, possession prior to the declaration of
alienability cannot of course be recognized or given legal effect,
as already extensively discussed above.
To go back and directly answer now the issue that the
petitioners directly pose in this case, no extraordinary
prescription can be recognized in their favor as their effective
possession could have started only after March 15, 1982. Based
on the reasons and conclusions in the above discussion, they
have not complied with the legal requirements, either from the
point of view of the PLA or the Civil Code. Hence, the denial of
their petition must hold.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the denial of the Motions for
Reconsideration.
I concur with the original Decision penned by Justice
Dante Tinga promulgated on April 29, 2009. I also concur with
the Resolution of Justice Lucas Bersamin with respect to the
Motions for Reconsideration, but disagree with the statements
made implying the alleged overarching legal principle called the
“regalian doctrine.”
Mario Malabanan filed an application for registration of
a parcel of land designated as Lot 9864-A in Silang, Cavite
based on a claim that he purchased the land from Eduardo
Velazco. He also claimed that Eduardo Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite Tagaytay City, Branch 18. Malabanan’s witness,
Aristedes Velazco, testified that Lot 9864-A was originally part
of a 22-hectare property owned by his great-grandfather. His
uncle, Eduardo Velazco, who was Malabanan’s predecessor-in-
interest, inherited the lot.
Malabanan also presented a document issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
Department of Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR) on June 11,
2001. The document certified that the subject land had already
been classified as alienable and disposable since March 15, 1982.
The Solicitor General, through Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr., affirmed the truth of Aristedes
Velazco’s testimony. Malabanan’s application was not
challenged.
 The RTC granted Malabanan’s application on December
2, 2002.
The Republic appealed the Decision to the Court of
Appeals. It argued that Malabanan failed to prove that the
subject land had already been classified as alienable and
disposable. The Republic insisted that Malabanan did not meet
the required manner and length of possession for confirmation
of imperfect title under the law.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the RTC.
The CA held that under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree, possession before the
classification of land as alienable and disposable should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Therefore, possession before March 15, 1982 should not be
considered in the computation of the period of possession. This
is also in accordance with the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.
Malabanan’s heirs (petitioners) appealed the Decision of
the CA.11 Relying on Republic v. Naguit, petitioners argued that
the period of possession required for perfecting titles may be
reckoned prior to the declaration that the land was alienable and
disposable. Open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of an alienable land of public domain for more than
30 years ipso jure converts it into private property. Previous
classification is immaterial so long as the property had already
been converted to private property at the time of the application.
We dismissed the Petition because there was no clear
evidence to establish petitioners’ or their predecessors-in-
interest’s possession since June 12, 1945. Moreover, while there
was evidence that the land had already been declared alienable
and disposable since 1982, there was no evidence that the subject
land had been declared as no longer intended for public use or
service.
Both petitioners and respondent ask for the
reconsideration of Our Decision on April 29, 2009.
I agree that Malabanan was not able to prove that he or
his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the subject land since June 12, 1945.
We already noted in the original Decision that Malabanan
offered no deed of sale covering the subject lot, executed by any
of the alleged predecessors-in-interest in his favor. He only
marked a photocopy of a deed of sale executed by Virgilio
Velazco in favor of Leila Benitez and Benjamin Reyes.
On that note alone, no title can be issued in favor of
Malabanan or petitioners.
However, I do not agree that all lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State or that lands remain part of the public domain if the
State does not reclassify or alienate it to a private person. These
presumptions are expressions of the Regalian Doctrine.
Our present Constitution does not contain the term,
“regalian doctrine.” What we have is Article XII, Section 2,
which provides:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated
x x x.
There is no suggestion in this section that the
presumption in absolutely all cases is that all lands are public.
Clearly, the provision mentions only that “all lands of the public
domain” are “owned by the state.”
This is not the only provision that should be considered
in determining whether the presumption would be that the land
is part of the “public domain” or “not of the public domain.”
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied equal protection of the laws.
This section protects all types of property. It does not
limit its provisions to property that is already covered by a form
of paper title. Verily, there could be land, considered as property,
where ownership has vested as a result of either possession or
prescription, but still, as yet, undocumented. The original
majority’s opinion in this case presents some examples.
In my view, We have properly stated the interpretation
of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public
Land Act as amended in relation to Section 14(1) and 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree. Our ratio decidendi, therefore, should only be limited to
the facts as presented in this case. We also properly implied that
the titling procedures under Property Registration Decree do not
vest or create title. The Property Registration Decree simply
recognizes and documents ownership and provides for the
consequences of issuing paper titles.
We have also recognized that “time immemorial
possession of land in the concept of ownership either through
themselves or through their predecessors in interest” suffices to
create a presumption that such lands “have been held in the same seized the land. The argument to that effect seems to
way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been amount to a denial of native titles throughout an
public land.” This is an interpretation in Cariño v. Insular important part of Luzon, at least, for the want of
Government of the earlier version of Article III, Section 1 in the ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have
McKinley’s Instructions. The case clarified that the Spanish permitted and had not the power to enforce.
sovereign’s concept of the “regalian doctrine” did not extend to
the American colonial period and to the various Organic Acts
extended to the Philippines. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives,
Thus, in Cariño: not to exploit their country for private gain. By the
Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 12, 32 Stat. 691,
It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the
all the property and rights acquired there by the United
universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
States are to be administered “for the benefit of the
Crown… It is true also that, in legal theory, sovereignty
inhabitants thereof.”26 (Emphasis supplied)
is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the
United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute
power. But it does not follow that, as against the
And with respect to time immemorial possession, Cariño
inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts
mentions:
that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one
side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary
in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, The [Organic Act of July 1, 1902] made a bill of rights,
and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like
for it to decide. the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It
provides that

Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain,

it does not follow that, in view of the United States, ‘ no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall
[plaintiff who held the land as owner] had lost all rights deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
and was a mere trespasser when the present government
 due process of law, or deny to any person therein the of various provisions on completion of imperfect titles in earlier
equal protection of the laws.’ laws were efforts to assist in the recognition of these rights. In
my view, these statutory attempts should never be interpreted as
efforts to limit what has already been substantially recognized
§ 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted through constitutional interpretation.
from § 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was
ready to declare in the next breath that x x x it meant by
There are also other provisions in our Constitution which
“property” only that which had become such by
protect the unique rights of indigenous peoples. This is in
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the
addition to our pronouncements interpreting “property” in the
inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat
due process clause through Cariño.
as public land what they, by native custom and by long
association--one of the profoundest factors in human
thought --regarded as their own.
It is time that we put our invocations of the “regalian
doctrine” in its proper perspective. This will later on, in the
proper case, translate into practical consequences that do justice
x x x
to our people and our history.

It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that

Thus, I vote to deny the Motions for Reconsideration.
when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and respondent’s
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never
Partial Motion for Reconsideration denied.
to have been public land.

Notes.—Notwithstanding the passage of the Property

Cariño is often misinterpreted to cover only lands for
Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein,
those considered today as part of indigenous cultural
the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws
communities. However, nothing in its provisions limits it to that
commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who
kind of application. We could also easily see that the progression
“have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.” (Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic, 587 SCRA 172 [2009])

Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the

nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of
the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the
pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself
for the first time. (Id.)
 G.R. No. 137887. February 28, 2000. Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178
SCRA 708, that: ‘Unless and until the land classified as forest is
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DAMIAN
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS ERMITAÑO DE
form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules
GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs.
ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR ERMITAÑO DE
Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court
GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAÑO, NATIVIDAD
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of
ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA MANALO,
Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148
SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE ERMITAÑO, ESMERANDO
SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151
ERMITAÑO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
SCRA 679).
and FILOMENO ERMITAÑO, respondents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Land classified as forest land

Land Titles; Prescription; Natural Resources; Forest
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
Lands; Possession of a public land while still inalienable forest
domain only by a release in an official proclamation to that
land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of
effect.—–So, too, is the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the case
the public domain, could not ripen into private ownership, and
of Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals
should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open
misplaced. There, while the period of possession of the.
and continuous possession in concept of owner.—–The Court of
applicant’s predecessor-in-interest was tacked to his own
Appeals’ consideration of the period of possession prior to the
possession to comply with the required thirty year period
time the subject land was released as agricultural is in direct
possession requirement, the land involved therein was not forest
contravention of the pronouncement in Almeda vs. Court of
land but alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case
Appeals, to wit—–“The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the
before us, the property subject of private respondents’
private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section
application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such
48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land
date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation.
while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was
It was not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on
lengthy, could not convert it into private property, (unless) and
January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and
until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and
should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open
alienable. In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as
and continuous possession in concept of owner required under
alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon
Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in
cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year
possession requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in
Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on
the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until
the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Noe Zarate for Salvador E. de Guzman, et al.
Antonio Villano for S. de Guzman.
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for Filomeno Ermitaño.
Franco L. Loyola for Dominga Ermitaño.
Rogelio F. Vista for Tricom.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC Cases No.
TG-362 and TG-396.
The facts are simple:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were
filed by Norma Almanzor and private respondent Salvador De
Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial
on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent De Guzman, to wit—–
“ WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this
Court as follows:
(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies
the application for registration of the parcels of land
mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for
lack of factual and legal bases;
(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the
petition for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the
land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and
containing an area of 308,638 square meters, as
supported by its technical descriptions now forming
parts of the records of these cases, in addition to other
 proofs adduced in the names of petitioners Damian
Ermitaño De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitaño De
Guzman, Zenaida Ermitaño De Guzman, Alicia
Ermitaño De Guzman and Salvador De Guzman, all
married, of legal age and with residence and postal
addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite,
subject to the claims of oppositors Dominga Ermitaño,
Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo,
Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitaño and Esmeranso
Ermitaño under an instrument entitled “Waiver of Rights
with Conformity” the terms and conditions of which are
hereby ordered by this Court to be annotated at the back
of the certificates of title to be issued to the petitioners
pursuant to the judgment of this Court.
SO ORDERED.”
As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals,
said judgment was affirmed and the petition for registration of
private respondents over the subject parcels of land was
approved.
Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the following
assignments of error—–
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF
THEIR FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE
MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED
BY LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN
IMPERFECT TITLE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT OVERTHROWN THE
PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
We find merit in the instant Petition. It is not disputed
that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land
only in 1965 while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title
was filed by private respondents only in 1991. Thus the period
of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the
time the application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26)
years, four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period
possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A. No.
6940.
In finding that private respondents’ possession of the
subject property complied with law, the Court of Appeals
reasoned out that—–
“ (W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and
disposable only in December, 1965, however, records
indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitaño,
appellees’ predecessor-in-interest, was already in
possession of the property, cultivating it and planting
various crops thereon. It follows that appellees’
possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in
1991 when tacked to Pedro Ermitaño’s possession is 63
years or more than the required 30 years period of
possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been
converted to private property.”
We disagree.
The Court of Appeals’ consideration of the period of
possession prior to the time the subject land was released as
agricultural is in direct contravention of the pronouncement in
Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, to wit—–
“The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private
respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of
the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or
before it was declared alienable and disposable land of
the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen
into private ownership, and should be excluded from the
computation of the 30-year open and continuous
possession in concept of owner required under Section
48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et
al., 178 SCRA 708, that:
‘Unless and until the land classified as forest is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form, part of the disposable lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply
(Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701;
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
‘Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership (Vamo vs. Government, 41
Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17
Phil. 410 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court
to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court
 of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA
210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 689 [1984]).’ ” (emphasis ours)
So, too, is the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the case of
Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals misplaced.
There, while the period of possession of the applicant’s
predecessor-in-interest was tacked to his own possession to
comply with the required thirty year period possession
requirement, the land involved therein was not forest land but
alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case before us,
the property subject of private respondents’ application wafe
only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was
forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could
not convert it into private property, (unless) and until such lands
were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as
alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon
cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year
possession requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in
Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on
the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until
the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals’ finding
that private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years
at the time of the application of their petition, our hands are tied
by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in giving practical
relief to them. The fact remains that from the time the subject
land was declared alienable until the time of their application,
private respondents’ occupation thereof was only twenty six (26)
years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of
possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because
absent the fact of declassification prior to the possession and
cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by
him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could
not have acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is
replete with cases which reiterate that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property.
Possession of the land by private respondents, whether spanning
decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership. This
Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim “(d)ura lex, sed
lex.”
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and
the February 26, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite, Branch 38, in LRC Case No. TG-396 are both
REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC Case No.
396 for failure of the applicants therein to comply with the thirty
year occupancy and possessory requirements of law for
confirmation of imperfect title. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ.,

concur.

Petition granted, judgments of Court of Appeals and trial

court reversed. Case ordered dismissed.

Notes.—–It is a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves

are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property. (Reyes
vs. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296 [1998]) Possession of
forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
(Ituralde vs. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293 [1999])