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3. US V QUINAHON  The law prohibits common carriers from subjecting any person, etc.

, or locality,
or any particular kind of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
discrimination whatsoever.
 MAY DISCRIMINATION, MAHAL SINGIL SA GOV
LOADSTAR V CA  It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience
 the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one
shipper, appears to be purely co-incidental-=COMM CARRIER
HOME INSURANCE V  Stipulation for NON LIABILITY IS VALID IF Private carrier (charter)
AMERICAN STEAMSHIP
SAN PABLO V PANTRANCO  a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of the highway
when crossingrivers or even lakes, which are small body of waters – separating
the land, however, in this case the two terminals, separated by an open sea
HENCE iba pang CPC DAPAT
NAT STEEL V CA NASA TAAS OKS NA (CHECK TOPIC ON INCOMPLETE CHARTER YUNG DAPAT PATI CREW
KASAMA)
PLANTERS PRODUCT V CA  common carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole
or part of the vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to
the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter (DAPAT BOAT
AND CREW PARA MAGING PRIVATE
LOADSTAR V PIONEER ASIA  this charter is only a voyage-charter, not a bareboat charter.DAPAT CREW AND
BOAT PARA MAGING PRIVATE
 records reveal that petitioner took a shortcut route, instead of the usual route,
which exposed the voyage to unexpected hazard HENCE liable
KMU V GARCIA  to give provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to
transport operators can increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or
when they deem it necessary
 doctrine of Potestas delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot
be delegated- is applicable)
 . To delegate this power is a negation of the duty in violation of the trust
reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge such duty
TATAD V GARCIA  The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately
from the ownership of the facilities thereof
 What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the
public HENCE THO FOREIGN CORP OWNS NOT VIOLATIVE OF CONSTI
4. SAMAR MINING V  The liability of the common carrier for the loss, destruction or deterioration of
NORDEUTSCHER goods transported from a foreign country to the Philippines is governed primarily
by the New Civil Code
 The Bill of Lading in question stipulated that Nordeutscher Lloyd only undertook
to transport the goods in its vessel only up to the port of discharge from ship,
which is Manila.
 By unloading the shipment in Manila and delivering the goods to the warehouse
of AMCYL, the appellant was acting within the contractual stipulations
contained in the Bill of Lading
4. EASTERN SHIPPING V IAC  Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by
law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must
present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by
Article 1733 in order to escape liability
 “that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration” (Article 1753, Civil Code).
4. NATIONAL DEV V CA  “that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration” (Article 1753, Civil Code). Thus, the rule was specifically laid down
that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the
carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated
by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed
by the Code of commerce and by laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the
provision of the Civil Code.
 It is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise
Bay, Japan
GELISAN V ALDAY  the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that
may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused
to any of the passengers therein.
 if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without
obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the public and
third persons.
 Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however without recourse. He
has a right to be indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be
required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday, since the
lease contract in question, although not effective against the public for not
having been approved by the Public Service Commission, is valid and binding
between the contracting parties.
BENEDICTO V IAC  registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of the
carrier, even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been
transferred to another person. THEFT OF LUMBER
PHILTRANCO V CA  The liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like Philtranco, for
damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint
and several or solidary with the driver (Legal basis: Art. 2194 which provides:
“The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.”
Philtranco’s only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to
recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or
negligence
EQUITABLE V SUYON  Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was
the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has
consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons
are concerned.
5. CARAVAN TRAVELS V  These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the
ABEJAR employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of
two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner;
and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.
On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
 the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule
and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully
proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements
of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
 AFTER MAPATUNAYAN NA EMPLOYER IS REG OWNER – IT IS up to petitioner to
establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do by
presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it had no employment
relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his
assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Bautista. –e di professional license nung
driver hence liable
5. GREENSTAR EXPRESS V  SAME NUNG NASA TAAS
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP  In the present case, it has been established that on the day of the collision - or
on Februaruy 25, 2003 - URC was the registered owner of the URC van
 when by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong's employment were
proved, the presumption of negligence on respondents' part attached, as the
registered owner of the van and as Bicomong's employer. The burden of proof
then shifted to respondents to show that no liability under Article 2180 arose. This
may be done by proof of any of the following: 1. That they had no employment
relationship with Bicomong; or 2. That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his
assigned tasks; or 3. That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Bicomong
 Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of negligence, having
shown that when the collision took place, Bicomong was not in the performance
of his work
3. US V QUINAHON  The law prohibits common carriers from subjecting any person, etc., or locality,
or any particular kind of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
discrimination whatsoever.
 MAY DISCRIMINATION, MAHAL SINGIL SA GOV
LOADSTAR V CA  It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience
 the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one
shipper, appears to be purely co-incidental-=COMM CARRIER
HOME INSURANCE V  Stipulation for NON LIABILITY IS VALID IF Private carrier (charter)
AMERICAN STEAMSHIP
SAN PABLO V PANTRANCO  a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of the highway
when crossingrivers or even lakes, which are small body of waters – separating
the land, however, in this case the two terminals, separated by an open sea
HENCE iba pang CPC DAPAT
NAT STEEL V CA NASA TAAS OKS NA (CHECK TOPIC ON INCOMPLETE CHARTER YUNG DAPAT PATI CREW
KASAMA)
PLANTERS PRODUCT V CA  common carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole
or part of the vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to
the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter (DAPAT BOAT
AND CREW PARA MAGING PRIVATE
LOADSTAR V PIONEER ASIA  this charter is only a voyage-charter, not a bareboat charter.DAPAT CREW AND
BOAT PARA MAGING PRIVATE
 records reveal that petitioner took a shortcut route, instead of the usual route,
which exposed the voyage to unexpected hazard HENCE liable
KMU V GARCIA  to give provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to
transport operators can increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or
when they deem it necessary
 doctrine of Potestas delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot
be delegated- is applicable)
 . To delegate this power is a negation of the duty in violation of the trust
reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge such duty
TATAD V GARCIA  The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately
from the ownership of the facilities thereof
 What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the
public HENCE THO FOREIGN CORP OWNS NOT VIOLATIVE OF CONSTI
4. SAMAR MINING V  The liability of the common carrier for the loss, destruction or deterioration of
NORDEUTSCHER goods transported from a foreign country to the Philippines is governed primarily
by the New Civil Code
 The Bill of Lading in question stipulated that Nordeutscher Lloyd only undertook
to transport the goods in its vessel only up to the port of discharge from ship,
which is Manila.
 By unloading the shipment in Manila and delivering the goods to the warehouse
of AMCYL, the appellant was acting within the contractual stipulations
contained in the Bill of Lading
4. EASTERN SHIPPING V IAC  Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by
law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must
present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by
Article 1733 in order to escape liability
 “that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration” (Article 1753, Civil Code).
4. NATIONAL DEV V CA  “that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration” (Article 1753, Civil Code). Thus, the rule was specifically laid down
that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the
carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated
by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed
by the Code of commerce and by laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the
provision of the Civil Code.
 It is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise
Bay, Japan
GELISAN V ALDAY  the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that
may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused
to any of the passengers therein.
 if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without
obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the public and
third persons.
 Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however without recourse. He
has a right to be indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be
required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday, since the
lease contract in question, although not effective against the public for not
having been approved by the Public Service Commission, is valid and binding
between the contracting parties.
BENEDICTO V IAC  registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of the
carrier, even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been
transferred to another person. THEFT OF LUMBER
PHILTRANCO V CA  The liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like Philtranco, for
damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint
and several or solidary with the driver (Legal basis: Art. 2194 which provides:
“The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.”
Philtranco’s only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to
recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or
negligence
EQUITABLE V SUYON  Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was
the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has
consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons
are concerned.
5. CARAVAN TRAVELS V  These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the
ABEJAR employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of
two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner;
and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.
On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
 the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule
and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully
proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements
of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
 AFTER MAPATUNAYAN NA EMPLOYER IS REG OWNER – IT IS up to petitioner to
establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do by
presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it had no employment
relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his
assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Bautista. –e di professional license nung
driver hence liable
5. GREENSTAR EXPRESS V  SAME NUNG NASA TAAS
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP  In the present case, it has been established that on the day of the collision - or
on Februaruy 25, 2003 - URC was the registered owner of the URC van
 when by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong's employment were
proved, the presumption of negligence on respondents' part attached, as the
registered owner of the van and as Bicomong's employer. The burden of proof
then shifted to respondents to show that no liability under Article 2180 arose. This
may be done by proof of any of the following: 1. That they had no employment
relationship with Bicomong; or 2. That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his
assigned tasks; or 3. That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Bicomong
 Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of negligence, having
shown that when the collision took place, Bicomong was not in the performance
of his work
3. US V QUINAHON  The law prohibits common carriers from subjecting any person, etc., or locality,
or any particular kind of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
discrimination whatsoever.
 MAY DISCRIMINATION, MAHAL SINGIL SA GOV
LOADSTAR V CA  It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience
 the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one
shipper, appears to be purely co-incidental-=COMM CARRIER
HOME INSURANCE V  Stipulation for NON LIABILITY IS VALID IF Private carrier (charter)
AMERICAN STEAMSHIP
SAN PABLO V PANTRANCO  a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of the highway
when crossingrivers or even lakes, which are small body of waters – separating
the land, however, in this case the two terminals, separated by an open sea
HENCE iba pang CPC DAPAT
NAT STEEL V CA NASA TAAS OKS NA (CHECK TOPIC ON INCOMPLETE CHARTER YUNG DAPAT PATI CREW
KASAMA)
PLANTERS PRODUCT V CA  common carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole
or part of the vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to
the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter (DAPAT BOAT
AND CREW PARA MAGING PRIVATE
LOADSTAR V PIONEER ASIA  this charter is only a voyage-charter, not a bareboat charter.DAPAT CREW AND
BOAT PARA MAGING PRIVATE
 records reveal that petitioner took a shortcut route, instead of the usual route,
which exposed the voyage to unexpected hazard HENCE liable
KMU V GARCIA  to give provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to
transport operators can increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or
when they deem it necessary
 doctrine of Potestas delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot
be delegated- is applicable)
 . To delegate this power is a negation of the duty in violation of the trust
reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge such duty
TATAD V GARCIA  The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately
from the ownership of the facilities thereof
 What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the
public HENCE THO FOREIGN CORP OWNS NOT VIOLATIVE OF CONSTI
4. SAMAR MINING V  The liability of the common carrier for the loss, destruction or deterioration of
NORDEUTSCHER goods transported from a foreign country to the Philippines is governed primarily
by the New Civil Code
 The Bill of Lading in question stipulated that Nordeutscher Lloyd only undertook
to transport the goods in its vessel only up to the port of discharge from ship,
which is Manila.
 By unloading the shipment in Manila and delivering the goods to the warehouse
of AMCYL, the appellant was acting within the contractual stipulations
contained in the Bill of Lading
4. EASTERN SHIPPING V IAC  Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by
law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must
present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by
Article 1733 in order to escape liability
 “that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration” (Article 1753, Civil Code).
4. NATIONAL DEV V CA  “that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration” (Article 1753, Civil Code). Thus, the rule was specifically laid down
that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the
carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated
by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed
by the Code of commerce and by laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the
provision of the Civil Code.
 It is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise
Bay, Japan
GELISAN V ALDAY  the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that
may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused
to any of the passengers therein.
 if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without
obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the public and
third persons.
 Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however without recourse. He
has a right to be indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be
required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday, since the
lease contract in question, although not effective against the public for not
having been approved by the Public Service Commission, is valid and binding
between the contracting parties.
BENEDICTO V IAC  registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of the
carrier, even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been
transferred to another person. THEFT OF LUMBER
PHILTRANCO V CA  The liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like Philtranco, for
damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint
and several or solidary with the driver (Legal basis: Art. 2194 which provides:
“The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.”
Philtranco’s only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to
recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or
negligence
EQUITABLE V SUYON  Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was
the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has
consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons
are concerned.
5. CARAVAN TRAVELS V  These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the
ABEJAR employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of
two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner;
and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.
On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
 the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule
and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully
proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements
of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
 AFTER MAPATUNAYAN NA EMPLOYER IS REG OWNER – IT IS up to petitioner to
establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do by
presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it had no employment
relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his
assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Bautista. –e di professional license nung
driver hence liable
5. GREENSTAR EXPRESS V  SAME NUNG NASA TAAS
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP  In the present case, it has been established that on the day of the collision - or
on Februaruy 25, 2003 - URC was the registered owner of the URC van
 when by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong's employment were
proved, the presumption of negligence on respondents' part attached, as the
registered owner of the van and as Bicomong's employer. The burden of proof
then shifted to respondents to show that no liability under Article 2180 arose. This
may be done by proof of any of the following: 1. That they had no employment
relationship with Bicomong; or 2. That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his
assigned tasks; or 3. That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Bicomong
 Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of negligence, having
shown that when the collision took place, Bicomong was not in the performance
of his work
3. US V QUINAHON  The law prohibits common carriers from subjecting any person, etc., or locality,
or any particular kind of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
discrimination whatsoever.
 MAY DISCRIMINATION, MAHAL SINGIL SA GOV
LOADSTAR V CA  It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience
 the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one
shipper, appears to be purely co-incidental-=COMM CARRIER
HOME INSURANCE V  Stipulation for NON LIABILITY IS VALID IF Private carrier (charter)
AMERICAN STEAMSHIP
SAN PABLO V PANTRANCO  a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of the highway
when crossingrivers or even lakes, which are small body of waters – separating
the land, however, in this case the two terminals, separated by an open sea
HENCE iba pang CPC DAPAT
NAT STEEL V CA NASA TAAS OKS NA (CHECK TOPIC ON INCOMPLETE CHARTER YUNG DAPAT PATI CREW
KASAMA)
PLANTERS PRODUCT V CA  common carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole
or part of the vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to
the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter (DAPAT BOAT
AND CREW PARA MAGING PRIVATE
LOADSTAR V PIONEER ASIA  this charter is only a voyage-charter, not a bareboat charter.DAPAT CREW AND
BOAT PARA MAGING PRIVATE
 records reveal that petitioner took a shortcut route, instead of the usual route,
which exposed the voyage to unexpected hazard HENCE liable
KMU V GARCIA  to give provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to
transport operators can increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or
when they deem it necessary
 doctrine of Potestas delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot
be delegated- is applicable)
 . To delegate this power is a negation of the duty in violation of the trust
reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge such duty
TATAD V GARCIA  The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately
from the ownership of the facilities thereof
 What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the
public HENCE THO FOREIGN CORP OWNS NOT VIOLATIVE OF CONSTI
4. SAMAR MINING V  The liability of the common carrier for the loss, destruction or deterioration of
NORDEUTSCHER goods transported from a foreign country to the Philippines is governed primarily
by the New Civil Code
 The Bill of Lading in question stipulated that Nordeutscher Lloyd only undertook
to transport the goods in its vessel only up to the port of discharge from ship,
which is Manila.
 By unloading the shipment in Manila and delivering the goods to the warehouse
of AMCYL, the appellant was acting within the contractual stipulations
contained in the Bill of Lading
4. EASTERN SHIPPING V IAC  Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by
law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must
present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by
Article 1733 in order to escape liability
 “that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration” (Article 1753, Civil Code).
4. NATIONAL DEV V CA  “that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration” (Article 1753, Civil Code). Thus, the rule was specifically laid down
that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the
carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated
by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed
by the Code of commerce and by laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the
provision of the Civil Code.
 It is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise
Bay, Japan
GELISAN V ALDAY  the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that
may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused
to any of the passengers therein.
 if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without
obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the public and
third persons.
 Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however without recourse. He
has a right to be indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be
required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday, since the
lease contract in question, although not effective against the public for not
having been approved by the Public Service Commission, is valid and binding
between the contracting parties.
BENEDICTO V IAC  registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of the
carrier, even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been
transferred to another person. THEFT OF LUMBER
PHILTRANCO V CA  The liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like Philtranco, for
damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint
and several or solidary with the driver (Legal basis: Art. 2194 which provides:
“The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.”
Philtranco’s only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to
recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or
negligence
EQUITABLE V SUYON  Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was
the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has
consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons
are concerned.
5. CARAVAN TRAVELS V  These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the
ABEJAR employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of
two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner;
and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.
On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
 the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule
and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully
proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements
of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
 AFTER MAPATUNAYAN NA EMPLOYER IS REG OWNER – IT IS up to petitioner to
establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do by
presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it had no employment
relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his
assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Bautista. –e di professional license nung
driver hence liable
5. GREENSTAR EXPRESS V  SAME NUNG NASA TAAS
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP  In the present case, it has been established that on the day of the collision - or
on Februaruy 25, 2003 - URC was the registered owner of the URC van
 when by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong's employment were
proved, the presumption of negligence on respondents' part attached, as the
registered owner of the van and as Bicomong's employer. The burden of proof
then shifted to respondents to show that no liability under Article 2180 arose. This
may be done by proof of any of the following: 1. That they had no employment
relationship with Bicomong; or 2. That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his
assigned tasks; or 3. That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Bicomong
 Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of negligence, having
shown that when the collision took place, Bicomong was not in the performance
of his work

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