I-CRIMINAL LAW

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 99355 August 11, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DOMINGO SALAZAR y SEROMA, alias "INGGO," MONCHITO GOTANGUGAN y
SEVILLA alias "MONCHING" and JOHN DOE, accused, DOMINGO SALAZAR y
SEROMA alias "INGGO" and MONCHITO GOTANGUGAN y
SEVILLA alias "MONCHING," accused-appellants.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Although homicide (a crime against persons) is independently a graver offense than robbery (a
crime against property), it is treated in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide as a
mere incident committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Unless the prosecution
convincingly proves that the main purpose of the cluprit(s) was the asportation of personal
property and that the death was merely incidental to such asportation, there can be no conviction
for this special complex crime.

Statement of the Case

This principle is stressed by the Court as it rules on this appeal from the Judgment 1 dated April 1,
1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 2 which, acting as a special criminal
court, convicted Appellants Domingo Salazar y Seroma alias "Inggo" and Monchito Gotangugan y
Sevilla alias "Monching" of robbery with homicide.

In an Information dated July 31, 1989, Asst. Quezon City Prosecutor Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo
accused Appellants Salazar and Gotangugan, together with one "John Doe," of robbery with
homicide committed as follows: 3

That on or about the 10th day of March 1989, in Quezon City, Metro-Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain
and by means of violence upon person, rob one CRISPIN GATMEN Y CEYAS of
his service firearm, a Squires Bingham Cal. 38 Revolver with Serial No. 1096012
valued at P6,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended party thereof in the aforementioned amount; and that by reason of
or on the occasion of the said robbery, said accused with intent to kill and without
any justifiable cause, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully ad feloniously attack,
and assault the person of said CRISPIN GATMEN Y CEYNAS, by stabbing the
latter, hitting him on the different parts of his body by the use of bladed weapon,
 thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of said victim in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of
the Civil Code.

Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. After trial proceeded in due course, the court a
quo rendered the assailed Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: 4

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding both accused, Domingo

Salazar y Seroma and Monchito Gotangugan y Sevilla, guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide as charged in the information. They are both sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to pay the heirs of the
deceased damages in the amount of P30,000.00, plus the sum of P6,500.00
representing the value of the revolver taken by both accused, plus all the
accessory penalties provided for by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The Facts

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Pfc. Jose Antonio of the Quezon City Police,
Eyewitnesses Vicente Miranda, Jr. and Pedro Soriano, Dr. Dario L. Gajardo of the PC/INP Crime
Laboratory and Ben Felipe Dangza, Consultant/Manager of PUMA Security Agency. The Solicitor
General, on behalf of the People, summarized the facts as viewed by the prosecution: 5

On March 10, 1989, at or about 3:30 (a.m.), Vicente Miranda, Jr. and his friend
Nestor Arriola were standing in the corner of Road 1 and Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City, about 12 meters from Linda's Supermarket (TSN, October 31,
1989, pp. 3 and 21). At about the same time, Pedro Soriano, who was himself
waiting for a ride, was standing in front of the Kambinan Restaurant along
Visayas Avenue and beside Linda's Supermarket (TSN, November 6, 1989, p. 2-
3). Moments later, they saw appellants Domingo Salazar and Monchito
Gotangugan together with an unidentified companion approach the security
guard of Linda's Supermarket (TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 3-4, 27).

Salazar, Gotangugan and their companion talked to the security guard, who was
later identified as Crispin Gatmen. Thereafter, Miranda saw Salazar pull out a 9-
10 inches long dagger from his pocket, and pass the same to Gotangugan (Ibid.,
pp. 5, 15, 22). Armed with the dagger, Gotangugan suddenly started stabbing
Gatmen (Ibid., p. 5, 15, 16).

At that precise moment, Pedro Soriano, who was only about 10 to 15 meters
from Linda's Supermarket heard moans coming from the guardhouse in front of
Linda's Supermarket. He turned his head towards the place where the moans
were coming from and saw Gatmen inside the guardhouse being repeatedly
stabbed by Gotangugan (TSN, November 6, 1989, pp. 2-6, 15-16).

Both Miranda and Soriano were able to witness and identify the malefactors
because the place where the incident happened was well-lighted (TSN, October
31, 1989, p. 22; November 6, 1989, pp. 4-5).
While Gotangugan was stabbing Gatmen, Salazar stood close to Gotangugan,
while their unidentified companion acted as a lookout (TSN, October 31, 1989,
pp. 8, 15; November 6, 1989, p. 16).

Out of fear, Miranda and Arriola ran towards Tandang Sora. While running,
however, they saw Salazar and Gotangugan get the revolver of Gatmen (TSN,
October 31, 1989, pp. 7-8). Soriano, on the other hand, left slowly but saw
Salazar get the gun of Gatmen (TSN, November 6, 1989, pp. 6-7).

After getting the gun, Salazar, Gotanguga, and their unidentified companion left
the scene of the crime (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 8; November 6, 1989, p. 7).

Gatmen died as a consequence of the following stab wounds, to wit:

(1) Hacked wound, frontal extending to the right pre-auricular

region, measuring 10 by 1 cm, 8 cm from the anterior midline,
fracturing the frontal bone.

(2) Stab wound, right zygomatic region, measuring 3 by 0.7 cm,

10 cm from the anterior midline, directed posteriorwards and
medialwards, fracturing the right zygomatic bone.

(3) Incised wound, chin, measuring 1.2 by 0.3 cm, 2 cm right of

the anterior midline.

(4) Stab wound, neck measuring 5 by 1.2 cm, crossing the

anterior midline, 4 cm to the right and 1 cm to the posteriorwards
and medialwards, lacerating the trachea, larynx and esophagus.

(5) Stab wound, right clavicular region, measuring 8 by 2 cm, 7

cm from the anterior midline, 3 cm deep, directed posteriorwards
and medialwards, fracturing the right clavicle.

(6) Stab wound, interclavicular region, measuring 3 by 0.1 cm, 6

cm from the anterior midline.

(7) Linear abrasion, left mammary region, measuring 3 by 0.1

cm, 6 cm from the anterior midline.

(8) Lacerated wound, palmar aspect of the left hand, measuring

5 by 2 cm, 3 cm lateral to its anterior midline.

(9) Lacerated wound, palmar aspect of the right hand, measuring

4 by 2 cm, along its anterior midline.

(10) Lacerated wound, middle phalange of the left small finger,

measuring 1 by 0.1 cm.

(11) Stab wound, proximal phalange of the left index finger,

measuring 2.2 by 1 cm.

(12) Incised wound, middle phalange of the right middle finger,

measuring 1 by 0.5 cm.
 (Exhibit "E")

Evidence for the Defense

Appellants, testifying for themselves, set up the defense of alibi. The court a quo summarized
their testimonies as follows: 6

DOMINGO SALAZAR, 30 years old, and residing at c/o Bureau of Animal

Industry, Visayas Avenue, Quezon City, testified that he had been in that place for
ten (10) years and that during the early morning of July 27, 1989, he was at their
house sleeping, when all of a sudden he was awakened because two persons
kicked him and with guns pointed at him, he was ordered to stand up. The two
persons searched his things inside the house and asked him where he hid his
gun. Then, they dragged him out of his house. Outside the house, he was kicked,
boxed and hit with the butt of the gun. There were about five (5) people who went
to his house, all armed. He denied any participation in the killing of the deceased
because according to him, he was at his house, all sleeping. He slept at 7:00
(p.m. on) March 9 and woke up at dawn, March 10. He was with his wife Juanita
Salazar, and his father-in-law. They were sleeping side by side. He did not see
Vicente Miranda and Pedro Soriano before he was arrested on July 27, 1989.
However, he admitted having seen Miranda and Soriano at the police
headquarters at Sikatuna, peeping at their cell. He often saw them at City Hall
with policemen accompanying newly arrested persons.

MONCHITO GOTANGUGAN, 23 years old, married, vendor, and with residence

at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City testified that he was not at the scene of the
crime when the said incident took place and that on March 10, 1989, he was at
Lucena City. On July 27, 1989, he was at the house of his sister located at Baex
Compound, Visayas Avenue, Quezon City, arriving in that place during the first
week of May 1989. In the morning of July 27, 1989, policemen forcibly entered
his house and dragged him outside, ransacking his belongings and bringing him
at Sikatuna Police Headquarters. He was accuse of being a "Sparrow", hold-
upper and "akyat bahay", and ordered to bring out firearms, but they did not find
anything. They mauled him at Sikatuna headquarters. While still at their house,
he was kicked and hit with the butt of the armalite. At the Sikatuna headquarters,
he was never informed by the police that he participated in the killing of the
security guard in front of Linda's Supermarket in the morning. He had never seen
the witnesses presented by the prosecution, however, he saw them at the City
hall together with policemen and other detainees.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court brushed aside the alibi interposed by appellants, branding it as an inherently weak
defense. It gave full credence to the accounts of the eyewitnesses for the prosecution, as no
evidence was adduced to refute them or to show why said eyewitnesses would testify falsely
against appellants. Quite the contrary, the "prosecution evidence (was) clear and convincing."
The bare allegation of the defense that they were "assets and informants" of the apprehending
policemen was disbelieved. Thus, it rendered the aforementioned six-page Judgment of
conviction.

Hence, this appeal direct to this Court, the penalty being reclusion perpetua.

Assignment of Errors
In their Brief, 7 appellants attack the prosecution evidence for its lack of probative value to
outweigh their alibi and to sustain their conviction. They allege that the eyewitnesses' testimonies
suffer from material inconsistencies and contradictions that cast serious doubt on their credibility.
Specifically, the following errors were imputed to the court a quo: 8

The lower court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Vicente Miranda and Pedro Soriano since a more
conscientious scrutiny of their testimonies will show that they are highly
incredible and consistently contradicting and improbable.

II

The lower court erred in convicting both the accused-appellants since the
evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the offense charged.

III

The lower court erred in refusing and failing to find that the herein accused-
appellants were arrested without warrant and therefore all evidence obtained
after such illegal arrest are inadmissible.

IV

The lower court committed serious error amounting to grave abuse of discretion
in finding that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Vicente Miranda and
Pedro Soriano were not refuted because the defense interposed by the accused
is alibi.

These alleged errors will be discussed by the Court under the general heading "Credibility of
Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence." In addition, the Court will tackle, motu proprio, the issue
of whether appellants may be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
in the light of the proven facts.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds appellants guilty of two separate felonies; namely, homicide and theft, but not of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Credibility of Witnesses and

Sufficiency of Evidence

As in most criminal cases, appellants contend that the court a quo erred in bestowing credence
on the testimony of prosecution witnesses. Appellants assail the credibility of the eyewitnesses by
pointing out several inconsistencies in their testimonies which render them "highly improbable
and consistently impossible.

Two Different Persons Produced the

Dagger and Stabbed the Victim
per Miranda's Testimony
We disagree with appellants' contention that, during the direct examination, Prosecution Witness
Miranda wobbled particularly on who between the appellants stabbed the victim. The defense
segregated Miranda's testimony, quoting and highlighting separate portions thereof to show
alleged inconsistencies. According to the defense, Miranda was thus not credible as he was not
clear as to who between the two appellants actually pulled out the dagger and stabbed the victim.
But when questioned specifically on this point, the witness clarified the sequence of events from
the act of pulling out the dagger to the actual stabbing. Said the witness: 9

Q You said one of the three men pulled out a bladed instrument.
Will you tell the Honorable Court how far were you from these
three persons who were then in these conversation with the
security guard?

A From the witness stand up to that corner, sir.

FISCAL BELTRAN:

About a distance of 12 meters. I am proposing that the distance

pointed to by the witness is about 12 meters.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL BELTRAN:

Q You said that one of the three persons pulled out a bladed
instrument. What did you do after pulling out this bladed
instrument?

A I saw him, sir, stab the guard.

Q The same person who pulled out this bladed instrument was
the same one who stabbed the security guard?

A No, sir. He handed the bladed instrument to the other person,

sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Were you able to see the face of this person whom you said
pulled out this bladed instrument?

A Yes, sir.

Nor are we persuaded by appellants' contention that the witness' sworn statement to the police
shows that the one who pulled out the dagger was the same person who stabbed the victim. The
pertinent portion of his statement reads: 10

06. T — Anong kinalaman mo sa pangayaring yon, kung

mayroon?

S — Mangyari po, ay napadaan ho ako noon, kasama ko yong

mga kaibigan ko, sa may harap ng Linda's Grocery sa may kanto
 ng Road 1, at Visayas Avenue. Noong mga oras na yon
(3:30AM) ay nakita ko na yong guardya na nakabantay don sa
may grocery ay parang may sinita na tatlong lalaki, tapos
mamaya-maya, yong isang lalaki ay tinapik niya sa puwit yong
kasama at bigla na lamang bumunot ng dagger at inundayan ng
saksak yong guwardya, mga tatlong sunud-sunod, tapos atras
ng atras naman yong guwardya hanggang napasandal doon sa
may guard house at doon siya natumba tapos hinablot niya yong
baril ng gwardya tapos nag-takbohan na sila patungo sa
squatteros (sic) area sa may likoran ng Agriculture building, yong
BAEX ho.

07. T — Bale ilan ka-tao ang sumaksak sa guardia, noong

makita mo?

S — Yong isa lang na maliit, na medyo kalbo, at yong isa naman

medyo pa-pilay-pilay ay siya tumapik sa kalbo na parang nag-
uutos na saksakin yong guardya, yong isa naman ay doon sa
may pinto ng Linda's Grocery na tinitingnan naman niya yong
kandadado (sic) ng pinto.

While there may have been some vagueness in the answer to Question "06," the clarification in
the succeeding statement, i.e., the reply to Question "07," sufficiently explains the witness' story.
It must be remembered that ex parte affidavits are generally considered incomplete and
inaccurate and will not prevail over the witness' statements on the stand. 11 That the defense
labels Miranda's answers as inconsistencies" appears to this Court to be merely a strained
interpretation of the witness' testimony.

The Number of Stabs Inflicted

Is a Minor Matter

Appellants make a mountain out of Miranda's admission on cross-examination that he was not
sure how many times Gotangugan stabbed the victim vis-a-vis his earlier statement that one of
appellants stabbed the victim thrice. There is really no inconsistency here. And even if we grant
that there is, the alleged conflict pertains to an insignificant detail that is not material to the
question of who killed the deceased. The general rule is that inconsistencies and contradictions in
minor and trivial matters do not impair a witness' credibility. 12 The ambivalence of a witness on
the exact number of stabs inflicted on the victim does not detract from the obvious fact that the
victim was killed by Gotangugan, as clearly and positively testified to by Miranda. Indeed, in a
startling event like a killing, it is difficult for a witness o keep tab of the exact number of strokes
the killer made. It is enough tat the witness gives a fair estimate. The important thing is that the
stabbing took place, the victim died and the witness identified the culprit(s).

Distance Did Not Necessarily

Hinder Perception

The contention that Miranda did not really see the culprits' faces deserves scant consideration.
The distance of the witness from the stabbing incident was only 12 meters. That the crime
happened before dawn (about 3:30 a.m.) is immaterial because the place was lighted. 13 The
witness' remark that he was far from the situs of the crime merely meant that he was not near
enough to hear the culprits' whispered conversation, but he was near enough to hear the culprits'
whispered conversation, but he was near enough to see their faces and their felonious deed. 14
Appellants denigrate the witness' story that he ran closer to the locus criminis while witnessing he
stabbing. They claim that the natural tendency would be to run farther away. However, under the
circumstances, the witness did not really intend to come closer to the scene of the crime. What he
did was to go to the area of Tandang Sora where there was a public market and where,
expectably, there would be people even at such an early hour. The area towards the city hall, on
the other hand, was unlit and deserted, as the government buildings there were still closed.
Besides, since the witness was on his way to his house in Teachers' Village, he had to go to
Tandang Sora, at that time, to get a ride. Hence, the witness' reaction was not unnatural. In fact, it
was most prudent under the circumstances.

No Two Versions of the Event

in Soriano's Testimony

The defense contends that the other eyewitness, Soriano, did not actually see the stabbing
incident, much less the person who stabbed the victim. Appellants claim that Soriano presented
two versions of the incident. According to one version given during direct examination, the
witness allegedly stated that the security guard was seated outside the guardhouse and that one
of the accused urinated behind him. Thereafter, the latter stabbed the victim. 15 In the other
version given during cross-examination, the victim was allegedly inside the guardhouse when one
of the culprits stabbed the victim. 16

We disagree. The guardhouse was actually an outpost, 17 a structure open on all sides. The guard
was sitting under its roof and his assailants were standing outside the roof. One of them was
behind him and relieving himself. In this light, it is easy to understand the absence of discrepancy
in the witness' testimony on this point.

Appellant Gotangugan
Stabbed the Victim

Appellants claim that the witness was uncertain as to who actually stabbed the victim. While it is
true that initially he made a mistake in pinpointing the culprits in the courtroom, this was the result
only of his lack of familiarity with appellants' names. However, despite his initial confusion, his
identification of the culprit who delivered the fatal stab wound was categorical. This is clearly
shown in the transcripts of the trial: 18

Q Earlier, you pointed to two persons inside the courtroom as

having participated in the stabbing of Crispin Gatmen, the first
one gave his name as Monchito Gotangugan, will you tell the
Honorable Court What was the special participation of Monchito
Gotangugan in the stabbing?

A The gun was handed over to him.

COURT:

Gun?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

FISCAL BELTRAN:

Q How about the other person, this Domingo Salazar, what did
he do?
 A He was the one who stabbed the victim.

Q Who stabbed the victim?

A The bald one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to a person by the name of Monchito

Gotangugan.

ATTY. OSORIO:

Your Honor, may I reiterate the witness to speak louder.

FISCAL BELTRAN:

Q Alright. You pointed to Monchito Gotangugan as the one who

stabbed Crispin Gatmen. How about the other person you
pointed to, what did he do?

A. After the bald one stabbed the victim, sir, the big one took the
gun from the security guard.

Indeed, the foregoing testimony demonstrates that while the witness was confused as to the
name of the culprit, he was certain about his identity.

Eyewitnesses' Accounts Are

Consistent with Each Other

The defense claims that the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses materially contradicted each
other in two ways. First, Miranda allegedly said that the security guard was standing when he was
stabbed while Soriano stated that he was sitting down. Second, Miranda testified that one of the
culprits produced the dagger and the other stabbed the victim with it. Soriano, on the other hand,
said that only one person produced the dagger and thereafter stabbed the victim.

We have examined the Appellants' Brief and the records of this case and we have found no
factual basis for the strained inferences of the defense. From Miranda's sworn statement, the
defense deduced that the security guard was standing outside the outpost. But this deduction is
not supported by said sworn statement or by the witness' testimony in court. Miranda never said
that the victim was standing up or was outside the guardhouse when he was stabbed.

Both witnesses agreed that the person who stabbed the victim was Gotangugan. Both
eyewitnesses corroborated each other in identifying Salazar as the one who drew the dagger
from his jacket and then handed it to Gotangugan. With the dagger, Gotangugan stabbed the
security guard. The insistence of the defense on this supposed "contradiction" simply has no
basis.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that the assessment of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their stories is well-nigh conclusive on appeal, provided it is not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. 19 In this case, the
defense has tried but failed to establish any material inconsistency or contradiction which would
justify a departure from this rule.
Compared with the evidence submitted by the prosecution, appellants' denial and alibi cannot
possibly be given more probative weight than the
clear and positive identification provided by no less than two credible eyewitnesses. 20

Granting arguendo that appellants were illegally arrested, such arrest did not invest these
eyewitness accounts with constitutional infirmity as "fruits of the poisonous tree." Considering that
their conviction could be secured on the strength of the testimonial evidence given in open court
which are not inadmissible in evidence, the court finds no reason to further belabor the matter.

Elements of Robo con Homicidio

In prosecuting robbery with homicide cases, the government needs to prove the following
elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi: and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is
committed. 21

In this case, the prosecution has convincingly proven that (1) appellants asported a gun with
violence and intimidation against the victim; (2) the gun belonged to the deceased; and (3) the
security guard was killed.Animus lucrandi is presumed when there is proof of asportation. 22 All of
these facts are supported by the testimonies of competent eyewitnesses presented by the
prosecution.

There is, however, no showing that the death of the security guard occurred merely by reason or
on the occasion of the robbery. The prosecution was silent on appellants' primary criminal intent.
Did they intend to kill the security guard in order to steal the gun? Or did they intend only to kill
him, the taking of the gun being merely an afterthought? The prosecution did not prove either of
the two propositions, and the court a quo failed to elaborate on this point. Thus, we cannot affirm
appellants' conviction of the crime charged in the Information.

In several cases, the Court has already ruled that a conviction for robbery with homicide requires
certitude that the robbery was the main purpose and objective of the criminals and that the killing
was merely incidental, resulting merely by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. 23 Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code specifically states:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties.

— Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer:

1. the penalty or reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of

the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, . . . (Emphasis
supplied)

The Spanish version of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code reads: "1.0 — Con la pena de
reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare homicidio."
Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino explains that the use of the words "con motivo. . . del robo"
permits of no interpretation other than that the intent of the actor must supply the connection
between the homicide and the robbery in order to constitute the complex offense. If that intent
comprehends the robbery, it is immaterial that the homicide may in point of time immediately
precede instead of follow the robbery. Where the original design comprehends robbery, and
homicide is perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the consummation of the former, the
crime committed is the special complex offense, even if homicide precedes the robbery by an
appreciable interval of time. On the other hand, if the original criminal design does not clearly
comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident
of the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not of a
single complex offense. Robbery with homicide arises only when there is a direct relation, an
intimate connection, between the robbery and the killing, even if the killing is prior to, concurrent
with, or subsequent to the robbery. 24

On the other hand, robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Code is distinguished from the
complex crime punished in Article 48, which contemplates a situation where one offense is a
necessary means to commit the other or where one offense is a necessary means to commit the
other or where a single act result in two or more offenses. The homicide in Article 294(1) is not
necessary for the accomplishment of the robbery. 25 However, it could be committed to avoid
future identification of the robbers or as a consequence or incident thereof.

Robo con homicidio is an indivisible offense, a special complex crime. The penalty for robbery
with homicide is more severe because the law sees, in this crime, that men placed lucre above
the value of human life, thus, justifying the imposition of a more severe penalty than that for
simple homicide or robbery. In view of said graver penalty, jurisprudence exact a stricter
requirement before convicting the accused of this crime. Where the homicide is not conclusively
shown to have been committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was
not proven, there can be no conviction for robo con homicidio. 26

In the case under consideration, appellants' primary intent remains an enigma. For this reason,
we cannot affirm appellants' conviction for robbery with homicide. The fact that appellants took
the firearm after shooting the security guard did not prove that their primary intent was to commit
robbery. It shows that they committed an unlawful taking of property, but it does not exclude the
possibility that this was merely an afterthought. Any conclusion as to their primary criminal intent
based on the proven facts is speculative and without adequate basis.

In view of the facts established and consistent with jurisprudence, the Court can convict
appellants only of the separate offenses of theft and homicide, which were both duly proven. This
Court is cognizant of the fact that the Information accused appellants of the crime of "robbery with
homicide." Nonetheless, it is axiomatic that the nature and character of the crime charged are
determined not by the designation of the specific crime but by the facts alleged in the Information.
Thus, in People vs. Ponciano, 27 the Court through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. held:

. . . In the case at bar, the direct relation or intimate connection between the
robbery and the killing was not established.

We therefore, follow the rule laid down in People v. Manalang [170 SCRA 149,
163, February 6, 1989], 28 to wit:

We already had several occasions to hold that if the original design was not to
commit robbery but that the idea of taking the personal property of another with
intent to gain came to the mind of the offender after the homicide only as an
afterthought or as a minor incident in the homicide, the criminal acts should be
viewed as constituting two distinct offenses and not as a single complex
crime; the crimes would be either homicide or murder, as the case may be, and
theft. (People v. Atanacio, et al., No. L-11844, November 29, 1960, 110 Phil.
1032; People v. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 364 [1950]; People v. Glore, 87 Phil. 739 [1950])
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, appellants should be held guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
and theft under Article 309 of the same Code. We also hold that treachery aggravated the killing.
The attack was sudden and without warning, affording the security guard no chance to defend
himself. 29 As it
was not alleged in the Information, it cannot be used to qualify the killing to murder. However,
treachery can still be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance. 30

While it was proven during the trial that the stolen pistol was worth P6,500.00, 31 the Information
placed the value at P6,000.00 only. However, the appellant did not object to the higher valuation
and is thus deemed to have waived his right to avail of the lower penalty under paragraph 3 of
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, appellants may be penalized for theft
under Article 309 (2) of the said Code. 32

It is scarcely necessary to point out that there was conspiracy between appellants, because they
clearly acted in concert and with a unified criminal design. 33 The eyewitness accounts tell us that
one of the assailants touched the other appellant's behind to signal the start of the attack against
the security guard. Salazar then pulled out the dagger which Gotangugan used to stab the victim.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(1) Appellants are hereby found GUILTY of the separate offense of homicide and SENTENCED to
the indeterminate sentence of ten years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

(2) The indemnity ex delicto imposed by the trial court is INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 34

(3) Appellants are found also GUILTY of the separate offense of theft in accordance with Article
309 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and SENTENCED to the indeterminate penalty of six months
and one day of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to four years and two months and one day also
of prision correccional, as maximum.

(4) Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. MAYOR OF

MANILA [20 SCRA 849; G.R. NO.L-24693; 31 JULY 1967]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of
its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of
the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760
against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as
such charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such
ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to
the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members
operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by
both national and city authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on
June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set
forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the
ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no
reference is made to motels. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of
such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the
City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The lower
court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent
Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional,
therefore, null and void.

Held: A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamentalcharacter ought

to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the
challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what
has been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural
and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence
to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is
all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people
cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should
not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal
or property rights under the guise of police regulation.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the

necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is
void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better
expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a
subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void
on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact
may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case,
the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24693 October 23, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR,
INC. and GO HIU,petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE, CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
J. M. Aruego, A. Tenchavez and L. U. Go for petitioners-appellees.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates for respondent-appellant.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

A Motion for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31, 1967 was filed by petitioners, followed
by a Motion for new trial. As the Motion for reconsideration is clearly without merit, there is no
occasion for this sought-for new trial. Consequently, both motions are denied.

(1) No merit in the Motion for reconsideration. —

In the decision of this Court of July 31, 1967, sought to be reconsidered, its basis was
categorically set forth in the following language:

As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against
such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of
constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity. . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of
their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject and necessitates action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance,
has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people.
. .. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face,
which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the
leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American
Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid
in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.

The O'Gorman principle1 fails to meet the approval of counsel of petitioners. They would restrain
unduly and unjustifiably its operation. In the language of the motion for reconsideration: "The U.
S. Supreme Court was not laying down as a general rule in constitutional cases that there must
be a factual foundation of record to offset the presumption of constitutionality of any and every
law."
To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, this interpretation is without support in authority or reason and
rests upon a misconception. It is to betray an almost total lack of awareness of the import and
significance of the O'Gorman doctrine in American constitutional law. Authorities on the subject of
proven competence and knowledge flatly reject such a view. Dodd, 2 Dowling,3 Freund Sutherland,
De Wolfe Howe, and Brown,4 and Kauper5 in their standard casebooks quote the same excerpt
from O'Gorman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. appearing in the opinion of this Court. Dodd entertained
no doubt: "The accepted view is that stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the O'Gorman case." 6

Frankfurter and Landis were equally explicit in their appreciation of what the O'Gorman dictum
means. "As doctrine, there is nothing new in the avowal of a need for concreteness in passing
judgment upon the legislative judgment. But perhaps last term marks a more sedulous attention
to its observance. Certainly the procedure followed by the Court in O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., if regularly observed, will affect not a little the fate of legislation. If insisted upon, it
will compel the bar to argue questions of legislative validity in the perspective of the
circumstances which gave rise to a particular statute." 7

The late Professor Hamilton of the Yale Law School, one of the most distinguished
constitutionalists, would have been appalled by the unorthodoxy of the view of counsel of
petitioners. For him, the O'Gorman opinion was a manifestation of the jurist's art at its best:

If the jurists have the feelings of other men, Monday, the fifth of January nineteen
hundred and thirty one, must have been a day of consequence in the life of Mr. Justice
Brandeis. On that day he handed down the judgment of the United States Supreme Court
in the O'Gorman case. The cause was a simple suit in contract: the result depended upon
the validity of a New Jersey statute regulating the commissions to be paid by insurance
companies to their agents for securing business. The more general question was the
tolerance to be accorded to legislative price-fixing under the Fourteenth Amendment.
And, as the fortunes of litigation broke, the issue came to be the intellectual procedure by
which the constitutionality of the acts which make up the public control of business are to
be determined. Upon that day the views of Brandeis became "the opinion of the court,"
and a new chapter in judicial history began to be written.

xxx xxx xxx

In form "the opinion of the court" is a very simple and unpretentious document. It begins
with a statement of the issue and a history of the case, continues with a brief summary of
the reasons for the statute and a statement that "the business of insurance is so affected
with a public interest that the state may regulate the rates," and concludes with a
declaration of the test for validity. As "underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character," it follows that "the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." It did not appear "upon the face of the statute, or from any facts
of which the court must take judicial notice" that in New Jersey "evils did not exist," for
which the statute was "an appropriate remedy." Accordingly the court was compelled to
declare the statute valid; in fact it was left with no alternative.

Yet the simple lines of a short opinion present a superb example of the jurist's art. . . . 8

This is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the nullity of a statute, executive order,
or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to constitutional rights, especially those
involving the freedom of the mind, present and ominous. That in such an event there should not
be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented does not argue against the
force of the above excerpts on the weight to be accorded the O'Gorman doctrine in this case.
The prop here failing, is there anything else in the Motion for reconsideration that calls for a
modification of the decision of this Court? The answer must be in the negative. It ought not to
have escaped petitioners that the opinion of the Court after noting the lack of factual foundation to
offset the presumption of constitutionality went on to discuss the due process aspects to make
clear that on its face, the Ordinance cannot be considered void.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of
protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great
public needs." It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general
welfare. Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila, traceable in great
part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine
entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to
fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all
times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the
privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of
the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

There is nothing in the Motion for reconsideration that in any wise affects adversely or impairs the
force of the above conclusion. The task of proving that the challenged Ordinance is void on its
face is one attended with difficulty. Nonetheless, with the persistence worthy of a better cause,
petitioners would cite as fatal infirmity the alleged invasion of the rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, to liberty, and to property.

As the unchallenged rule, to paraphrase Laurel, is that unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, 9 he has no standing, the
invocation of petitioners as motel operators of their alleged right to being free from unreasonable
search and seizure need not be taken seriously. Nor does their claim of the alleged infringement
of their liberty deserve any further thought, its implausibility being self-evident, except perhaps as
to the liberty to contract, which is part and parcel of their right to the property. Unfortunately for
them, in this jurisdiction the liberty to contract, except in the Pomar10 case as noted in the
decision, has never stood in the way of the enactment of police power measures when called for
by circumstances such as undoubtedly exist in this case. The same is true in the United States,
where such a concept has definitely fallen from its previously high state under the impact of the
Nebbia,11 West Coast Hotel Co.12 and Olson decisions.13
That leaves only the alleged grievance that there was an unconstitutional invasion of property
rights. It goes without saying that petitioners themselves cannot ignore that one could,
consistently with the fundamental law, be deprived of his property as long as due process is
observed. The decision makes clear that such indeed was the case as far as this Ordinance was
concerned. To that aspect, a considerable portion of the opinion was devoted, citing a number of
applicable decisions of this Court, all tending to demonstrate that there was no due process
infraction. The Motion for reconsideration is conspicuously barren of any attempt to show that
under our previous decisions referred to, the challenged Ordinance could be successfully
assailed. It would follow then that this reiteration of an argument, previously shown to be far from
persuasive, is deserving of a similar fate.

That is all there is to the Motion for reconsideration. That and what Justice Cardozo aptly referred
to as reference to "grotesque or fanciful situations," which if they would arise could then be
appropriately dealt with. As the famed jurist aptly noted: "That they are conceivable though
improbable ought not to govern our construction." 14 That is not the way then to impugn the validity
of an ordinance. Neither could it be rightfully looked upon as laying a foundation for setting aside
a decision. The Motion for reconsideration, to repeat, is palpably lacking in merit.

(1) No occasion for new trial. —

Subsequently, a supplemental Motion for new trial dated September 25, 1967, was filed the same
day. As earlier pointed out, with the Motion for reconsideration having been shown to be devoid of
merit, the supplemental Motion for new trial should likewise be denied. In the main, what was so
unsuccessfully put forth by counsel for petitioners was adhered to. Additional counsel would bring
in new points, namely, the alleged denial of equal protection and the repugnancy to "the laissez
faire principle underlying our economic system, as it would substantially reduce return on the
investment." Neither suffices to justify any modification of the decision, much less its
reconsideration. A new trial would therefore be an exercise in futility.

The alleged denial of equal protection was predicated on the greater advantages that the motels
in the suburbs of Manila would enjoy as against those within the city limits. On its face, such
argument is clearly unfounded. If the legislative power of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
were not limited to its boundaries, if it could apply to the suburban area, then perhaps plausibility
could be imparted to such a claim. Since, as is undeniable, the challenged Ordinance applies to
all the motels in Manila, an assertion that there is denial of equal protection would, to put it at its
mildest, be extremely far-fetched.

Nor does the invocation of the laissez faire concept as bar against the enactment of regulatory
measures, which undoubtedly would result in the diminution of income and the loss of business,
occasion any misgiving as to the conformity of the decision arrived at by this Court with
controlling constitutional law principles. Did not petitioners take note of the view announced by
Justice Laurel quoted in the decision to the effect that the policy "of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest." The decision likewise cited this jurist, speaking
for the Court inCalalang v. Williams:15 "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of
said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Perhaps and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure, the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the state. . . . To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated." That was in 1940. Then in 1955, came Co Kiam v. City of Manila,16 where Justice
Reyes, A., for a unanimous Court categorically declared: "And surely, the mere fact that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of
earning a living can not prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons
licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the
exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages which
may result from the legal exercise of that power. (City of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann.
417)."

Nor does the reference by new counsel to American state court decisions call for a different
conclusion. The United States Supreme Court in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,17 decided in 1943, was equally explicit, saying "the laissez-faire concept or
principle of non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social
advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through
expanded and strengthened governmental controls." Two names of great repute, Freund and
Learned Hand, were cited by petitioners. Neither if properly understood, could help their cause at
all. According to Freund: "In short, when freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that
commands a momentum of respect, when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that
commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of
constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the
due process clause."18 The illustrious Learned Hand writing on Chief Justice Stone's concept of
the judicial function had occasion to note the "discredited attitude" of what he referred to "as the
old apostles of the institution of property. . . ."19

What then is left? Clearly nothing to call for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31, 1967.
Nor is there the least justification for a new trial and reception of evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for reconsideration of petitioners of September 16, 1967 and
supplemental Motion for new trial of September 25, 1967, are denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Angeles, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

January 26, 1910

G.R. No. L-5060

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.

Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

Carson, J.:

The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao
described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasure of the
municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30
and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter
of large cattle.

It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal
was slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant
contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not
prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal
treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:

SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal
slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before
issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the
municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the original
certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person
applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said
treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been
requested.

SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal
treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes,
and in no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind
which is not fit for human consumption.

SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter
issued by him, and such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and
the class, sex, age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or
cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the animal for the slaughter of which
permit is issued and the date on which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall
be alphabetically arranged in the record, together with date of permit.

A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to
the provincial treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name
of the owner, together with date of permit.

SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human

consumption or killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle
except upon permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by
a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or
by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by both
such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits
the prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to
cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal
slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases
of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the municipality of Carmen
not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the
penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that
municipality.

We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to
the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit
duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the
killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and
that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a
municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.

It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by
itself and examined apart from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one
whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and
restricting both the word "slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section 30,
and the words "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption"
and the words "killing for food" in section 33; and the other whereby the phrase "at
the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting merely the
words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a
reading of the whole Act, and keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose
and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction is that which
should be adopted.

The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against
theft and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners
when lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it provides an elaborate and compulsory
system for the separate branding and registry of ownership of all such cattle
throughout the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to establish
their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle unaccompanied by
certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality where the
contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons
unlawfully in possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this,
manifestly, in order to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such
cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others. But the
usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of identification, resting as it
does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each separate animal
throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such
animals were requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates of
registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and this
especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner
outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33
prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a
municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal
treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such
permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer oIox.

If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by
the appellant, it will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for
the registry and record of the brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in
the Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully
in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by
slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of
their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of detection incident to
the bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other
identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required smzY.

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions,

that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the
manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was
enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive
other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to
attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the
Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section
30.

It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these
sections of the "killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals,
despite the fact that this prohibition is clearly included in the general prohibition of
the slaughter of such animals for human consumption anywhere; but it is not
improbable that the requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was
expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to
avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities
should be disposed to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the
passage of local ordinances or regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouse
wuug3.

Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to
the same conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that
section, is to prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft
purposes, and of all animals unfit for human consumption. A construction which
would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of
such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and unpenalized
their slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the
purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the
language of the statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the
language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction which we have
placed upon it, which tends to make effective the provisions of this as well as all the
other sections of the Act.

It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao,
and that it was denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for
agricultural work or for draft purposes." Counsel for appellant contends that the
statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in
the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or draft purposes," is
unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of
Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this
provision of the statute constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise
of the right of eminent domainwithout providing for the compensation of the owners,
or that it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But
whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with
necessary modifications understood, the language of that great jurist, Chief Justice
Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55, where the question involved
was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying
away by any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of
the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that the law in question "is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such
particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights
of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall
not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public
rights and interest of the community."

It may be conceded that the beneficial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property
of all carabao owners in these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with
by the provisions of the statute; and that, without inquiring what quantum of interest
thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which
detracts from their right and authority, and in some degree interferes with their
exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if the regulations in
question were enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these
regulations are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill
relied on be appellant; but we are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an
interference with the right and title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise by
the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to
compensation, and that it is no more than "a just restrain of an injurious private use
of the property, which the legislature had authority to impose."

In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush. 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down
in Com. vs. Tewksbury(supra) was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist
who wrote the former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent
domain from the exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:

We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society,
that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title,
holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights
of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may
think necessary and expedient.

This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to
take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency
requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable
compensation therefor. The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power
vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than
to mark its boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.

Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the
slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft
purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and is not,
therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent
domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the
legislature deemed to be detrimental to the public welfare. And we think that an
examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest
which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no
room for doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of
rights of ownership by the particular provisions of the statute under consideration
were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general
welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign police power which
every State possesses for the general public welfare and which "reaches to every
species of property within the commonwealth."

For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or
infectious disease had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in
many sections sweeping away seventy, eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety
and even one hundred per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the principal
occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively
in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with
which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the
country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the production of
rice, the staple food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that
the impoverished people were compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its
importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate
the fields the arable rice lands of the country could easily be made to produce a
supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon the resources of the
Islands was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast
of the people, and in many provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be
paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle for existence with which they were
confronted.

To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government
in relieving the immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were
voted by the Congress of the United States as a relief or famine fund, public works
were undertaken to furnish employment in the provinces where the need was most
pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread
failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of
animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.

Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an
agricultural community material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be
hoped for in the absence of the work animals upon which such a community must
necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the products
of the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to
increase the supply of these animals by importation, but, as appears from the official
reports on this subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of
those animals which had been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their
redistribution throughout the Islands where the need for them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the
discovery and applications of preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that
these measures have proved in some degree successful in protecting the present
inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the gradual increase and redistribution of
these animals throughout the Archipelago, in response to the operation of the laws of
supply and demand, will ultimately results in practically relieving those sections
which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.

As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase
from the three to five fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the
conservative measures now adopted prove entirely successful, the scant supply will
keep the price of these animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall have
more nearly equalized the supply to the demand UCxC.

Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price
of cattle, the crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the
Islands, necessitating the enactment of a special law penalizing with the severest
penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property by roving bands; and it
must be assumed from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the
Islands necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat burdensome provisions
for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of
their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute
touching the branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing
the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and proper exercise
of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the
circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter
for human consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the
due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing
conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming
disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes.

It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the
official reports and records of the administrative and legislative departments of the
Government, that not merely the material welfare and future prosperity of this
agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept
away the work animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law under
consideration, but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of these Islands
as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of
large cattle by disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no
doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the
preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what
would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of
rights of ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. The police
power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of
private property by police regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable
restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under
discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that
power.

As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152
U.S. 133, 136):

The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful
subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is
universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and
morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of
whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held
that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise
endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a
conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or
unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of
railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds;
the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsory
vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afflicted with
contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the
suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of
gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this,
however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this
particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not
only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for
the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27; Kidd vs.
Pearson, 128 U.S. 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of
the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise
of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other
words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not
final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of
the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition
of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit
for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such
animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of
momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so
doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously
affected.

Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt. 140), said
(p. 149) that by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to
do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever
can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:

It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power
is or may be exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one
individual of his rights may conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be
detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And
there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public authorities to
interfere with the control by individuals of their property, and even to destroy it,
where the owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and
to the State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the
interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it becomes
necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the
spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any
other great public calamity. Here the individual is in no degree in fault, but his
interest must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The establishment of
limits within the denser portions of cities and villages within which buildings
constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired may also, in
some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for
this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also
be established for the general good, even though they prevent the owners of water-
fronts from building out on soil which constitutes private property. And, whenever
the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal
of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that
effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally
with other persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of
property, which the legislature have authority" to impose.

So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of

circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful,
proper, and unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the
public health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this
grounds; and churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be
detrimental to the public health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed
against further use for cemetery purposes.

These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the
United States clearly indicate the wide scope and extent which has there been given
to the doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of the statute in question being a
proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the
Philippine Bill, which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," a provision which
itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United States, and is found in substance
in the constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered mQMB.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur. .

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26222 July 21, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte;
and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO and RUFINO BORRES, respondents.

Dominador L. Padilla for petitioner.

Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Borres for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court
of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for murder, viz:

Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza.

The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his
investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a full-dress
trial on the merits.

The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:

On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and
Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle,
caliber 22) and paliuntod(homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house.
Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered
therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, — all minor children of the couple
— and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.

Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas Narbasa and
Tambak Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that
"said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse."

Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13, 1966, directed
the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246.
He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the
docket."

The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground
that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was
killed." The defense opposed.

On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that
the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not
by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as
one crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information
for multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."

Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as having been
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, the People came
to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.

This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.

The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either for the
complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with multiple
homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as they are?

1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, which reads:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.

Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be
imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (delito
complejo).1

Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in the death of
two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting, the complex crime
defined in the first part of Article 48 finds application. 2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed
another and the weapon pierced the latter's body through and wounded another. The first died
instantaneously; the second, seven days later. This Court convicted the assailant of double
murder.3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result
that a number of persons are killed, that single act again produces a complex crime. 4
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted
is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.5 Thus, where the six defendants, with others (armed with pistols,
carbines and also a submachine gun and Garand rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven
and wounding several others, each of the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as
there were deaths (eleven).6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for quadruple murder — with
the use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo — of a man, his common-law
wife, and their two children in cold blood. The accused were found guilty by the trial court of such
offense. This Court, in reversing this ruling below, held that "[t]he four victims were not killed by a
single act but by various acts committed on different occasions and by different parties"; that such
acts "may not be regarded as constituting one single crime"; and that "[t]hey should be held as
separate and distinct crimes."7 And a third. At the commencement exercises of an elementary
school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots" — from a pistol. Two persons
lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died. This Court there ruled that
there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by appellant Juan Mones. 8 And
finally, in People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and
Maxima Capule — who were asleep — were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by
a second burst of machinegun fire, two of the couple's children — also asleep — were killed. The
accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal,
this Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders." 9

The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955. There,
on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards. It was held that
there was only one complex crime. In that case, however, there was no conspiracy to perpetuate
the killing. In the case at bar, defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge
conspiracy amongst them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all. 10 Not material here,
therefore is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by
each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply the first half
of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of
criminalimpulse is not written into the law.11

The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the five
cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases
instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial
judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge
could easily be remedied.12

Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five
separate informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder.

2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of one of the
witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit robbery, and that the
acts constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance
thereof. If true, this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48,
which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other.

A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly performed. 13 If
the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal
properties (transistor radio and money) were taken away by the culprits after the shooting, we are
not to jettison the prosecutor's opinion thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For
one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the elements of that offense — robbery. For
another, the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be
noted here is that all the informations charged evident premeditation. With ponderables and
imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal's action. We
are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney,
by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where
he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence
at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of
abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney
should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give
him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped
with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process — the sporting
idea of fair play — may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this
Court made the pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the
one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and
cannot be controlled by the off ended party."14

3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the
prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a
criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The
information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry
made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did
not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the
defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be
subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be
blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement
of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid
multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper
cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' " 15 Nothing in the
record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just
recited.1äwphï1.ñët

And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we are loathe to
tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and
frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and
frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that
matter, for multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion
should not be controlled.

Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders of
respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void,
and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent
insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes
his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as
they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.

Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.

Footnotes
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

January 27, 1948

G.R. No. L-539

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELITON BUYCO, defendant-appellant.

C. Golez and Espeleta & Espeleta for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Carmelino G. Alvendia and Acting Solicitor Isidro C.
Borromeo for appellee.

Hilado, J.:

Appellant was charged in and convicted by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in
Criminal Case No. 405, now subject of this appeal, wherein the information alleged
that on or about February 22, 1946, in the municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, said appellant, being a first class private of the Military Police in said
province, with deliberate intent, treachery and abuse of authority, and with a decided
purpose to kill, did then and there fire several shots with a Thompson submachine
gun against Ireneo Gellangala, Apolonio Ikoy, and Napoleon Zambales, hitting them
on different parts of their bodies and as a result Irineo Gellangala and Apolonio Ikoy
died and as a result Irineo Gellangala and Apolonio Ikoy died instantaneously and
Napoleon Zambales died a few days later. The trial court, presided over by his
Honor, Judge Jose Quisumbing, after due trial, rendered judgment on May 8, 1946,
finding the following facts as proven through the testimony of the eye-witnesses
Eusebio Davila, Pedro Zambales, and Juanito Espera, and that of Doctor Ramon V.
Ferrer, who performed the autopsy of the corpse of Apolonio Ikoy and examined that
of Irineo Gellangala, and Manuel F. Cartagena, who operated upon the now deceased
Napoleon Zambales: that during a dance on the occasion of the feast of the patron
saint of barrio Trapiche, municipality of Oton above mentioned, "between 12 and 12
of the midnight of February 22, 1946," there was a verbal brawl followed by a fist
fight between Cornelio Soliman and an unknown individual who later resulted to be a
resident of Iloilo City; that Eusebio Davila, chief of the Municipal Police of Oton, and
Juanito Espera, a municipal policeman, who were at the place of the incident,
intervened to pacify the fighters; that the latter had been scarcely pacified when a
third party intervened delivering fist blows upon Cornelio Soliman which knocked him
to the ground; that Eusebio Davila attempted to help Cornelio Soliman to his feet, at
which moment the accused Meliton Buyco, now appellant, who was on patrol with his
six companions, fired in the air two discharges from his Thompson submachine gun;
that Eusebio Davila, who saw Meliton Buyco fire, approached the latter and
prohibited him from firing again to avoid personal injury among those present; that
Meliton Buyco replied that Davila leave him alone because he was an agent of the
law; that minutes later Meliton Buyco got hold with is left hand of the back around
the left shoulder of Apolonio Ikoy, who was the one who had boxed Cornelio
Soliman, and pushed him forward, firing at him with a discharge from his Thompson
submachine gun which killed him right then and there. Another bullet of the same
discharge by Meliton Buyco found its mark in the body of Irineo Gellangala, who was
in almost a straight line from the spot from which Apolonio Ikoy was; that Irineo
Gellangala fell and died instantaneously; that the accused appellant Meliton Buyco
fired another shot aimed at a group of persons, among them Pedro Zambales and his
son Napoleon Zambales, and a bullet of this last shot hit Napoleon Zambales, who
died after six days in St. Paul's Hospital, City of Iloilo; that Eusebio Davila tried to
place Meliton Buyco under arrest but the latter threatened him with his Thompson
submachine gun, and when Eusebio Davila attempted to succor the three wounded
persons, Meliton Buyco warned him to withdraw from the spot, and in view of this
attitude on the part of the accused, Eusebio Davila desisted from his purpose
through fear that he might be another victim of Meliton Buyco.

Upon examination of the corpse of the deceased Apolonio Ikoy by Doctors Ferrer and
Cartagena, there were found three wounds in his body, one which entered the found
three wounds in his body, one which entered the back on the level of the right
scapula, another a little below toward the angle of the right scapula, and a third on
the left side near the lumbar region, which wounds caused the instantaneous death
of Apolonio Ikoy (Exhibit C); on the corpse of Irineo Gellangala there was found one
wound in the head penetrating the upper part of the hind occipital bone emerging
through the frontal bone, which likewise caused the instant death of said deceased
(Exhibit D); and in the corpse of Napoleon Zambales there were found the following
wounds according to the medical certificate, Exhibit B:

A bullet wound allowing entrance of 45 cal. bullet situated at the epigastric region
with the bullet lodging just anterior to the skin of the lumbar region to the left side of
the eight vertebrae;

Two wounds in the stomach, one at its anterior and another at its posterior aspect;
and three wounds at different loops of the small intestines.

The defense, through the testimony of the appellant Meliton Buyco and of his
companions, the MP soldier Enrique Bernales and Corporal Braulio Taleon, and Lt.
Jose M. F. Pelo, and the musician Antonio Herradura, attempted to prove that on the
night in question Corporal Braulio Taleon, the appellant Meliton Buyco, and Pvt.
Enrique Bernales, and four other companions, arrived at barrioTrapiche from their
station in Guimbal, near the auditorium where a dance was being held; that the jeep
used by them developed engine trouble, and while they where fixing it, they heard
that a fight was going on inside the auditorium causing public disorder which the
municipal policemen under the command of Chief Eusebio Davila could not pacify;
that the accused Meliton Buyco, followed by Cpl. Braulio Taleon and Private Enrique
Bernales, entered the auditorium, intervened in the fight to pacify the combatants,
but were unsuccessful; that one of the combatants hurled himself against Corporal
Taleon, wrested from the latter his rifle and aimed the same at him, who had fallen
on the ground; that the appellant, upon seeing this, fired a shot from his Thompson
submachine gun at the individual who afterwards resulted to be Apolonio Ikoy, the
latter falling dead; that after these events, and for fear of reprisal which might come
from the relatives of Apolonio Ikoy, the MP patrolmen fled from the place and finally
reached their detachment station in Guimbal, where they reported the incident to
their chief, Lt. Belo.

The trial judge, who saw, heard and observed the testify, did not believe the version
given by the latter. Below we quote the analysis that His Honor made of the defenses
version as related by its witnesses:

E juzgado no de credito a la version presentada por la defensa mediano (mediante)

el testimonio de Meliton Buyco, y de sus compañeros Enrique Bernales y Braulio
Taleon y del musico Antonio Herradura.

El testimonio de teniente Jose M. F. Belo no tiene materialidad al caso de autos ni

constituye defensa a favor del acusado Meliton Buyco.

El testigo Antonio Herradura, a quien el juzgado estuvo observando en todo el curso

de su declaracion, no ha infundido confianza alguna en el animo del juzgado; pues
desde el comienzo de su testimonio ha estado mintiendo hasta el exretmo de decir
que no revelo a ninguno lo que el habia visto en la noche de autos y que solo lo
revelaba por primera vez en aquel dia cuando declaraba en la vista como tesigo;
Ilego tambien a afirmar que no se vio ni se entrevisto con cualquiera de los
abogados de la defensa y que estos le presentaron a el como testigo sin saber de lo
que el tenia que declarar; lo cual el juzgado cree que es una falsedad. Ningun
abogado, por mas leve que sea el delito o falta atribuido a su cliente, cometera la
imprudencia de presentar a su testigo sin antes anterarse de lo que el testigo tiene
que declarar.

Sobrer el testimonio del acusado Meliton Buyco y de sus compañeros Enrique

Bernales y Braulio Taleon, el juzgado tampoco les da credito. El Exhibit E,
presentado en contrapruebas, que es la transcripcion fiel by correcta de las notas
taquigraficas tomadas por el taguigrafo Sr. Alfredo b. Coruña de la declaracion del
cabo Braulio Taleon el febrero 23, 1946, ante la (el) fiscal Sr. Jose M. Zambarrano,
que se constituyo en el lugar del suceso para investigar el caso de autos, y en el que
entre otras cosas Braulio Taleon declara que:

. . . I just feel he was trying to grab my Thomson, but he was notable to get the
Thompson. . . . (El subrayado es nuestro);

contradice la pretension de la defensa de que Apolonio Ikoy arrebatoel Thompson

submachine gun de Braulio Taleon, cuando este estaba caido en tierra, y que le
apunto con dicha arma.

Braulio Taleon trato de explicar esta contradiccion, diciendo que cuando le

investigaba el fiscal Zambarrano no se acordaba de todo lo ocurrido en la noche de
autos por haberse desvelado aquella noche, y que en el dia la vista, Mayo 2, 1946,
ya se acordaba muy bien de los detalles del suceso. Al efecto, cuando el juzgado le
hizo repetir Braulio Taleon, druante la sesion de la tarde, lo que el habia de clarado
en ingles durante la sesion de la mañana el testigo lo repitio rapidamente en el
mismo lenguaje ingles palabra por palabra y sin parar hasta terminar. Esto
demuestra, como lo ha observado el juzgado, que la declaracion de Braulio Taleon
estaba preparada de antemano y bien estudiada de memoria con el proposito de no
equivocarse en su testimonio.

En cuanto a la declaracion del acusado Meliton Buyco, estando la misma amoldada al

testimonio de sus testigos a quienes el juzgado no da credito, no merece favorable
consideracion del juzgado.

Es un hecho no discutido que la causa de la muerte de Apolonio Ikoy, Ireneo

Gallangala y Napoleon Zambales se (ha) debido a las heridas causadas por el
acusado Meliton Buyco al disparar descargas de su Thompson submachine gun
contra ello. (Appendix, Appellant's Brief, pp. VII-X.)
On page 70 of the stenographic transcript there appear, indicating the way the trial
judge was impressed by the testimony of the defense witness Herradura, the
following question and answer:

JUZGADO: ¿Debe usted tener en cuenta que el Juzgado esta observando su actitud
y manera de declarar en este asunto? — R. Si, Señor.

There is much in what the Solicitor General says in his brief about the unlikelihood of
the defense's version to the effect that Ikoy attacked Corporal Taleon, felling him
down, wrested from him his Thompson submachine gun, and was aiming the weapon
against the corporal when he (Ikoy) was shot by the accused. Among other things,
the Solicitor General points out that Taleon testified before the fiscal on the very day
following the incident to the effect that Ikoy did not succeed in getting hold of his
gun (see also t.s.n., PP. 79-80). That Taleon's gun allegedly wrested from him by
Ikoy was not exhibited as evidence at the trial although it appears that immediately
after the incident it was taken by Taleon with him, is also mentioned by the Solicitor
General as another indication of the improbability of the version of the defense. It is
stated in this connection that if Ikoy really was holding Taleon's gun when appellant
fired at him, it must have been hit "by the bullets aimed at Ikoy." From the evidence,
even that of the defense, it appears that the accused so fixed the firing mechanism
of his submachine gun that a single pull at the trigger would fire several bullets
automatically in succession. It is also pointed out that the admitted flight of the
"MP's after the fall of Ikoy, from fear of retaliation from the latter's relatives, is
indicative of guilty conscience, for otherwise, since they were all armed with
Thompson submachine guns, surely better armed than those relatives could possibly
be, that fact would have enabled them to stand their ground if they really were
legally performing their duty.

It seems very unlikely that Ikoy, a plain citizen, who had had no trouble with
Corporal Taleon, from aught that appears in the record, should assault this officer of
the law, who was armed with a weapon no less deadly than a Thompson submachine
gun and was accompanied by several members of the MPC all likewise armed. And it
is still harder to conceive under such circumstances that Ikoy, not satisfied with
allegedly downing the corporal, should wrest from him his gun and attempt to fire at
him with it, within sight and near presence of the latter's companions. For these and
other reasons not necessary to set forth, it is no wonder that the trial judge not only
was not favorably impressed by the version of the defense but positively believed
that the witnesses who gave that version were not telling the truth.

On the other hand, the accused admits the killing and his counsel frankly asserts in
his brief (p. 7) that his client, acting in defense of the person of Corporal Taleon
"directed a burst of TG (Thompson Gun) shots to Taleon's assailant." Here, then, is
an admission that the accused discharged more than one shot at the deceased.
Having thus admitted that he killed the victim, it was incumbent upon the accused to
offer a justification satisfactory to the courts to exculpate him. He endeavored to do
this — to carry the burden of proof that had been shifted on him — through the
witnesses that he presented at the trial and himself. The trial judge who saw, heard,
and observed the witnesses testify was impressed by them in the manner described
in his own words quoted above. A careful review of the evidence and the record has
failed to indicate sufficient reasons for our disturbing the findings of fact made by the
trial judge. Defense counsel strenuously argues in effect that it is unbelievable that
the appellant should have killed the victim if it had not been for the purpose of
defending his corporal from the alleged threat of Ikoy to shoot. However, here is a
case where the defense thus setup has failed to be established to the satisfaction of
the courts of justice. In such a case, the killing being admitted, the law presumes
that there was therefor (U.S. vs. Ricafort, 1 Phil. 173, U.S. vs. McMann, 4 Phil. 561;
U.S. vs. Reyes, 18 Phil. 495; U.S. vs. Balmori, 18 Phil. 578; People vs. Francisco, 44
O.G. 4847.) The law must be applied to the facts. In the mind and eyes of the law in
such cases, even though the motive might have been successfully cancelled from the
human perception of others, and might be known only to the agent and to his God,
still there it was impelling the agent to the criminal transgression. The defense would
have us deem it strange that the appellant should have willfully killed the three
victims above named. But truth is at times stranger than fiction, and under the
established facts the actual case is one of those instances Se10L.

As said in the Ricafort case, supra, ". . . In this, as in almost every crime apparently
without motive, the motives which might exist are innumerable — motives unknown
perhaps to the relatives of the deceased who testified at the trial and not even
disclosed to the three who cooperated in a certain measure in the crime."

In the McMann case, supra, the court said: "The question of motive is of course very
important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the
person who committed the act, but in this case, where it is proved beyond all doubt
that the defendant was the one who caused the death of McKay, it is not so
important to know the exact reason for the deed." In the case at bar the accused
admits having caused the death of the victims, aside from the evidence against him
kYOJmZVN.

In the Balmori case, supra, we find the same idea expressed in a different way thus;

But, argues counsel, why should they set the fire in the presence of Agapita Rivera,
well knowing that their act was seen. We do not definitely know. Neither did we
know, in a case before us some months ago, why the accused, in apparent cold
blood, killed three grown persons and a little babe in plain view of several persons.
We know only that he did it. While motive is generally of great importance in a
criminal case, it is not absolutely indispensable. The evidence in the case relating to
the actual commission of the crime may be so overwhelming that the question of
motive may become secondary. (U.S. vs. Balmori, 18 Phil. 578, 590.)

The trial judge found and held that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged;
namely, triple murder, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
indemnity to the heirs of Apolonio Ikoy in the sum of P2,000, to the heirs of Irineo
Gellangala in the sum of P2,000, and to the heirs of Napoleon Zambales also in the
sum of P2,000, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. In this we do
not fully concur with his Honor 0NsvwtSf.

The evidence discloses, as found by the same judge, that Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo
Gellangala died from bullets discharged by the same shot which was aimed at the
former. It will be remembered that the shot was fired from a submachine gun and,
as already stated, it appears that the appellant to fixed the mechanism of his
submachine gun that a single pull at the trigger would fire several bullets
automatically in succession. Viada (Vol. II, 5th ed., p. 529), commenting on article
90 of the Spanish Penal Code, corresponding to article 48 of our Revised Penal Code,
gives an example of the first case mentioned therein of a single act constituting two
or more grave or less grave felonies as follows: A person fire a gun against another
with intention to kill the latter, and not only kills him but also a third person who was
beside the victim: here, he says we have a single act, a single shot, which produces
two homicides. In the instant case, as regards Apolonio Ikoy, the evidence discloses
that, while Apolonio Ikoy had his back towards Meliton Buyco, the defendant-
appellant, the latter got hold of the former's right shoulder, pushed him forward and
while Ikoy's body was moving in the direction of the push, Buyco fired at this back
(t.s.n., p. 14). It, therefore, appears that the aggressor employed means, methods
or froms in the execution of the crime which tended directly and specially to insure
its execution without risk to himself from the defense which the offended party might
make — that the act was committed with treachery. This qualified the killing of
Apolonio Ikoy as murder (Rev. Penal Code, art. 248).

The killing of Irineo Gellangala under the evidence must be classified as homicide,
because the wrongful act done consisting in the killing of Ireneo Gellangala
constituted a felony (delito) for which said agent is criminally liable, pursuant to
article 4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code (see also U.S. vs. Diana, 32 Phil.
344), which act is presumed to be voluntary (U.S. vs. Gloria, 3 Phil. 333, 335).

It makes no difference whether the defendant's intention was to strike Dionisio

Legara with the butt of the billiard cue or not, for the blow fell on the head of
Cayetano Gomez. . . AM3snc.

The same crime would have been committed if the injured man and the deceased
had been Dionisio Legara, instead of the defendant's nephew, Cayetano Gomez; the
crime of homicide would have been committed just the same and one man would
have been deprived of his life by the criminal act of another. (U.S. vs. Diana, 32 Phil.
344, 348.)
. . . Although the wrongful act be committed against a person other than the one
whom it was intended to injure, this fact does not excuse the offender from criminal
liability for the voluntary commission of a wrongful act or misdemeanor, according to
paragraph 3 of article 1 of the Penal Code (Now art. 4 of Revised Penal Code. — per
Arellano, C.J. in U.S. vs. -Maisa, 8 Phil. 597).

By virtue of article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 4000, the
murder and homicide thus resulting from that single discharged should be punished
with the capital penalty, i.e., the penalty for the more serious offense in the
maximum period or degree.

As to the death of Napoleon Zambales, the evidence reveals that it resulted from
another and different shot by the same defendant-appellant from the same gun. The
evidence discloses that after discharging the shot which killed Apolonio Ikoy and
Irineo Gellangala, the accused holding his gun with the barrel pointing the direction
where he was facing, changed his position to face toward one side and fired another
burst from the gun, which shot hit Napoleon Zambales (t.s.n. p. 5). Six days later
this third victim died in St. Paul's Hospital. Under art. 249, in relation to article 4,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, the instant defendant must be held to have
thereby committed the crime of homicide. In U.S. vs. Gloria. 3 Phil. 333, 335, this
Court held that:

. . . All acts punishable by the law are presumed to be voluntary in the absence of
proof to the contrary. With respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law
looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the
aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.

This last killing is a separate homicide also included in the charge and proven without
objection on the part of defense counsel. The Supreme Court of Spain held in a
dispute, discharges four shots from a pistol, mortally wounding with the first one of
the combatants and inflicting with the second physical injuries upon another, should
be punished for the said crimes separately in accordance with article 88 of the
Spanish Penal Code upon the ground that, although the shots were fired
successively, they did not constitute one single but two diverse act, for the two
different persons at whom they were directed (II Viada, 5th ed., pp. 633-634). The
same Tribunal in its judgment of February 7, 1879, held that a person who, posting
himself in front of four individuals, fires four shots with a pistol saying: "toma tu
toma tu," wounding two of them, is guilty of four different crimes of discharged of
firearm against a determinate person, two complexed with that of physical injuries,
since the four shots were produced by four distinct acts (III Viada, 5th ed., p. 636).

The penalty corresponding to the killing of Napoleon Zambales, there being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, is reclusion temporal in its medium period
(Revised Penal Code. art. 249).

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified so that appellant Meliton
Buyco, as he is hereby, convicted of the crime of murder complexed with homicide
for the deaths of Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala, for which, pursuant to article
48 of the Revised Penal Code, in the opinion of a majority of this Court the penalty of
death should be imposed upon him, but there being no unanimity in this respect,
said penalty is hereby lowered to reclusion perpetua; and he is hereby convicted of
the crime of homicide, without any modifying circumstance, for the death of
Napoleon Zambales, for which the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor to 14 year, 8 months and 1 day ofreclusion temporal is hereby
imposed on him, pursuant to article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with
section 1 of Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended by section 1 of
Act No. 4225. In all other respects, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. So
ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ.,
concur. .
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaEN BANC
G.R. No. L-32205 August 31, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee
,
vs.
(
1) EMERITO ABELLAalias Kulot,
(
2) GORGONIO AÑOVER
(
3) RODOLFO APOLINARIO,
(4
) MAXIMOAPOLONIAS,
(
5) DOMINGO ASTROLOGIA alias Blackie,
(6
) JOSE BARBAJO,
(
7)PERFECTO BILBAR alias Porping,
(8
) CATALINIO CABCABAN alias Inday,
(
9)RODOLFO CARBALLO,
(
10) RUSTICO CIDRO,
(
11) CRESENCIO CUIZON,
(
12)FRANCISCO DIONISIO alias Satud,
(
13) ELINO DURAN,
(
1
4
) ABSALON ENRIGAN,
(
15) JOSE FRANCISCO alias Karate,
(
1
6
) SINDOLFO GALANTO,
(
17) LEOCADIOGAVILAGUIN alias Cadio,
(
1
8
) ALFREDO GAYLAN.
 (
19) ROMULO GELLE,
(
20)FELIX HERNANDEZ,
(
21) GUILLERMO IGNACIO,
(
22) ALFREDO LAGARTO,
(
23)BENEDICTO LORAÑA alias Payat,
(
2
4
) ELEUTERIO MALDECIR alias Aswang,
(
25)CIRIACO OPSIAR alias Simaron,
(
2
6
) ROBERTO PANGILINAN,
(
27) ROLANDOPANGILINAN,
(
2
8
) EUGENIO PROVIDO, JR.,
(
29) VICENTE QUIJANO,
(
30)JUANITO REBUTASO,
(
31) ROMEO RICAFORT alias Romy,
(
32) MARCELOSARDENIA,
(
33) ELEUTERIO TABOY,
(
3
4
) ANGEL TAGANA,
(
35) AGUSTINVILLAFLOR alias Tisoy,
(
3
6
) JOSE VILLARAMA and
(
37) SOFRONIO VILLEGAS,accused.
(
1) EMERITO ABELLA,
(
2) MAXIMO APOLONIAS,
(
3) JOSE BARBAJO,
(4
 )CATALINO CABCABAN,
(
5) RODOLFO CARBALLO,
(6
) FRANCISCO DIONISIO,
(
7)ELINO DURAN,
(8
) ABSALON ENRIGAN,
(
9) JOSE FRANCISCO,
(
10) LEOCADIOGAVILAGUIN,
(
11) FELIX HERNANDEZ,
(
12) GUILLERMO IGNACIO,
(
13)BENEDICTO LORAÑA,
(
1
4
) EUGENIO PROVIDO, JR.,
(
15) VICENTE QUIJANO,
(
1
6
)ELEUTERIO TABOY,
(
17) ANGEL TAGANA,
(
1
8
) JOSE VILLARAMA and
(
19)SOFRONIO VILLEGAS,
accused whose death sentences are under automatic review.Review of death
sentence on those who pleaded guilty. - It may be recapitulated that of thenineteen
accused in the death row
,
ten
,
namely (1) Abella
,
an escapee
,
(2) Dionisio
,
(3) Enrigan(4) Gavilaguin. (5) Hernandez
,
(6) Loraña (7) Quijano
,
(8) Taboy
,
(9) Villarama (he allegedlykilled on February 12
,
1976 a fellow prisoner in the national penitentiary
,
page 712
,
Volume IIof Rollo)
,
and (10) Villegas
,
an escapee
,
pleaded guilty upon arraignment and in open courtratified their extrajudicial
confessions which were sworn to before the municipal judge. Theywere sentenced
to death in the trial court's 1966 partial decision.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Nine of the ten were among the sixteen "close-confined" prisoners in the three small
cells whoinvaded the big cell. The tenth Dionisio
,
was confined in the big cell.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
After a perusal of their confessions
,
we find that their admission of guilt therein is corroborated by evidence of the
cor
pus deli
c
ti
or the fact that the massacre described therein actually took place
,

The requirements of section 20

,
Article IV of the Constitution with respect to extrajudicialconfessions are not
applicable to the confessions herein because they were taken before theeffectivity of
the Constitution or before January 17
,
1973
,

M
agt
o
t
o
vs.
M
angue
r
a
,
L- 37201-02
,
Sime
o
n vs. Villaluz
,
L-37424 and
Pe
o
ple vs. Isnani
,
L-38929
,
all decided on March 3
,
1975
,
63SCRA 4).
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Counsel de oficio contends that the accused made an improvident plea of guilty
because thelower court did not apprise them of the meaning and consequences of
their plea. Reliance is placed on the dictum that in capital cases "it is advisable for
the court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of
culpability of the defendant" (U.S. vs.Talbanos
,
6 Phil. 541
,
543).
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Also cited is the admonition that "judges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it thatwhen an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of
his plea and the import of aninevitable conviction" (People vs. Apduhan
,
Jr.
,
19491
,
August 30
,
1968
,
24 SCRA 798
,
817).
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
And the long settled rule is that in case a plea of guilty is made in capital cases "the
proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and
necessary in support of thematerial allegations of the information
,
including the aggravating circumstances thereinenumerated
,
rot only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court
indetermining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended
the meaning
,
fun significance and consequences of his plea" (People vs. Bulalake
,
106 Phil. 767
,
770. SeePeople vs. Baluyot
,
L-32752-3
,
January 31
,
1977
,
75 SCRA 148).
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
As already indicated in our recital of the proceedings below
,
the trial court
,
in order to complywith the procedure in capital cases when a plea of guilty is entered
,
required the fiscal to presentevidence. The latter presented the confessions of those
who pleaded guilty.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
It is true that the trial judge did not adhere to the ritualistic formula of explaining to
the accusedthe meaning and consequences of their plea of guilty and the nature of
the aggravatingcircumstances.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Presumably
,
the trial court did not do so
,
not only because the judicial confessions of the accused(pleas of guilty) were
reinforced by their extrajudicial confessions
,
but also because it wascognizant of the fact that all the accused were quasi-
recidivists who had already acquiredexperience in criminal proceedings and had
,
therefore
,
some comprehension of what a plea of guilty signifies.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
We hold that in this case the accused did not make an improvident plea of guilty. As
held in U.S.vs. Jamad
,
37 Phil. 305
,
318
,
it lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge whether he issatisfied that a plea
of guilty has been entered by the accused with fun knowledge of the meaningand
consequences thereof.Motion for new trial. - On October 30
,
1973 or after the Solicitor General had filed his brief
,
twenty of the thirty accused
,
who were sentenced to death
,
filed
,
personally or without theassistance of counsel
,
a motion for new trial. Those twenty movants are Anover alias Abarca

(who died on June 18

,
1976)
,
Barbajo
,
Cabcaban
,
Carballo
,
Cuizon (who died on November 6
,
1977)
,
Dionisio
,
Duran
,
Enrigan Francisco
,
Gavilaguin
,
Hernandez
,
Ignacio
,
Lorana
,
Opsiar
,
(who died on April 2
,
1974)
,
Provide
,
Quijano
,
Tagana
,
Taboy
,
Villarama and Villegas.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Of those twenty
,
ten accused
,
namely
,
Dionisio
,
Enrigan
,
Gavilaguin
,
Hernandez
,
Lorana
,
Opsiar
,
Quijano
,
Taboy
,
Villarama and Villegas had pleaded guilty
,
Nine of the ten were "close-confined" prisoners in the three cells. The tenth
,
Dionisio
,
was in the big cell. The other ten of the twenty accused were from the big cell. They
pleaded not guilty and they were tried.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
The twenty movants alleged in their motion for new trial that those who pleaded
guilty did sodue to "the coercion
,
harassment and intimidation applied by the prison authorities" or due to"third
degree" and other brutalities. They further alleged that one of the "fabricated
(prosecution)witnesses" was Guillermo Ignacio who made a retraction and that
another witness
,
Elino Duran
,
was forced to sign his affidavit.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
The Solicitor General commented that the grounds relied upon by the movants
are not thegrounds for a new trial under sections 2 and 3
,
Rule 121 and section 13
,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. He correctly observed that Ignacio and Duran were
not utilized as prosecution witnesses.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Action on the motion for new trial was deferred until the case is decided on the
merits. After anevaluation of the said motion
,
we find that it is devoid of merit and is not in order.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
The record does not show that Ignacio retracted his statement. Duran never claimed
that he wasintimidated into making his statement. Those movants who pleaded
guilty were convicted on the basis of their confessions which they ratified during the
trial. On the other hand
,
those who pleaded not guilty were given a fair trial. They testified and they had the
opportunity to provetheir innocence. Their testimonies (except Apolonias' testimony)
did not generate any reasonabledoubt as to their guilt.-->

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32205 August 31, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
(1) EMERITO ABELLA alias Kulot, (2) GORGONIO AÑOVER (3) RODOLFO
APOLINARIO, (4) MAXIMO APOLONIAS, (5) DOMINGO ASTROLOGIA alias Blackie, (6)
JOSE BARBAJO, (7) PERFECTO BILBAR alias Porping, (8) CATALINIO CABCABAN
alias Inday, (9) RODOLFO CARBALLO, (10) RUSTICO CIDRO, (11) CRESENCIO
CUIZON, (12) FRANCISCO DIONISIO alias Satud, (13) ELINO DURAN, (14) ABSALON
ENRIGAN, (15) JOSE FRANCISCO alias Karate, (16) SINDOLFO GALANTO, (17)
LEOCADIO GAVILAGUIN alias Cadio, (18) ALFREDO GAYLAN. (19) ROMULO GELLE,
(20) FELIX HERNANDEZ, (21) GUILLERMO IGNACIO, (22) ALFREDO LAGARTO, (23)
BENEDICTO LORAÑA alias Payat, (24) ELEUTERIO MALDECIR alias Aswang, (25)
CIRIACO OPSIAR alias Simaron, (26) ROBERTO PANGILINAN, (27) ROLANDO
PANGILINAN, (28) EUGENIO PROVIDO, JR., (29) VICENTE QUIJANO, (30) JUANITO
REBUTASO, (31) ROMEO RICAFORT alias Romy, (32) MARCELO SARDENIA, (33)
ELEUTERIO TABOY, (34) ANGEL TAGANA, (35) AGUSTIN VILLAFLOR alias Tisoy, (36)
JOSE VILLARAMA and (37) SOFRONIO VILLEGAS, accused. (1) EMERITO ABELLA, (2)
MAXIMO APOLONIAS, (3) JOSE BARBAJO, (4) CATALINO CABCABAN, (5) RODOLFO
CARBALLO, (6) FRANCISCO DIONISIO, (7) ELINO DURAN, (8) ABSALON ENRIGAN, (9)
JOSE FRANCISCO, (10) LEOCADIO GAVILAGUIN, (11) FELIX HERNANDEZ, (12)
GUILLERMO IGNACIO, (13) BENEDICTO LORAÑA, (14) EUGENIO PROVIDO, JR., (15)
VICENTE QUIJANO, (16) ELEUTERIO TABOY, (17) ANGEL TAGANA, (18) JOSE
VILLARAMA and (19) SOFRONIO VILLEGAS, accused whose death sentences are under
automatic review.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and
Solicitor Felix M. de Guzman for appellee.

Picazo, Agacaoili, Santayana & Reyes for accused.

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the massacre of certain prisoners in the Davao Penal Colony. It was a
reprise of a similar riot which occurred in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa Rizal on
Sunday morning February 16, 1958 (People vs. De los Santos, L-19067-68, July 30, 1965,
14 SCRA 702).

The record reveals that in the morning of Sunday, June 27, 1965 Numeriano Reynon a
prisoner-trustee, was performing guard duty at the jailhouse of the penal colony in Panabo,
Davao del Norte.

The jailhouse (bartolina) was a two-story building whose second floor was divided by a
corridor or passageway one and half meters wide. On one side was a single cell about ten
meters long and eight meters wide. On the opposite side were three small cells.

Around seventy (seventy-five, according to defendant Cabcaban) prisoners were

incarcerated in the big cell. It was indubitably congested. The prisoners used a drum to
dispose of their waste matter. Confined ill the three small cells were seventeen prisoners
who liad committed grave misconduct and who were known as "close-confined" prisoners to
distinguish them from the prisoners in the big cell who were just undergoing punishment.

The prisoners belonged to two gangs: the Oxo gang, whose members were Visayans with an
Oxo mark tattooed on their bodies, and the Sigue-Sigue gang whose members hailed from
Luzon. The name Sigue-Sigue was tattooed on their thighs or buttocks. The existence of
these gangs in the New Bilibid Prison was traced by Judge (now Justice) Andres Reyes in
the De los Santos case, supra. See People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759.

Shortly before noontime of that Sunday, June 27, 1965, or after the inmates of the big cell
had taken their lunch, Reynon locked that cell. The seventeen inmates of the three small
cells, all members of the Oxo gang, had also taken their lunch but Reynon did not lock their
cells because he was waiting for the prisoner-janitor to bring out from those cells the cans
used as urinals.

At that juncture, Leocadio Gavilaguin, a prisoner from the small cell, approached Reynon
and asked permission to pawn his pillow to Rodolfo Carballo, an inmate of the big cell.
Reynon told Gavilaguin. that Carballo would not accept his pillow because it was very dirty.
As it turned out, Gavilaguin was simply employing a ruse to inveigle Reynon into opening the
door to the big cell.

When Reynon refused to open the door, Gavilaguin grabbed him from behind. Then, as if on
cue, "the close-confined" prisoners from the small cells surrounded Reynon and assaulted
him. One prisoner stabbed Reynon while the others hit him on the chest and right temple
with fistic blows. Reynon lost consciousness and collapsed on the floor.

A prisoner took the bunch of keys which were in Reynon's custody and opened the door of
the big cell. (According to some extrajudicial confessions, Reynon himself opened the door.)
Led by Kulot (Emerito Abella), Tisoy (Agustin Villaflor) and Cadio (Gavilaguin), the other
thirteen prisoners from the small cells rushed into the big cell. They were (1) Gorgonio
Anover, (2) Rustico Cidro, (3) Absalon Enrigan, (4) Sindolfo Galanto, (5) Felix Hernandez, (6)
Benedicto Lorana alias Payat, (7) Eleuterio Maldecir alias Aswang, (8) Ciriaco Opsiar alias
Simaron, (9) Vicente Quijano, (10) Juanita Rebutaso, (11) Eleuterio Taboy, (12) Jose
Villarama and (13) Sofronio Villegas. They were armed with improvised weapons. So, there
were around eighty-six prisoners in the eighty- squaremeter big cell when the massacre
occurred.
The seventeenth closely confined prisoner, Perfecto Bilbar alias Proping, stayed in the small
cell. He locked its door and closed the padlock of the big cell (Page. 9, Record, Report of
Jose T. Castro).

Inside the big cell, Villaflor (Tisoy) shouted: "Tumabi ang Bisaya!" ("Visayans go to the
sides"). Guillermo Ignacio alias Pilay, an inmate of the big cell, placed pieces of wood and a
blanket on the door to keep it closed (16 tsn July 25, 1967).

According to the eyewitnesses, Arsenio Guevarra,, Juan del Rosario (a victim), and Roberto
Rodrigo, all prisoners, the, inmates from the big cell, who joined the sixteen raiders from the
three cells in assaulting the victims, were (1) Rodolfo Apolinario, (2) Maximo Apolinias alias
Max, (3) Domingo Astrologia alias Blackie, (4) Jose Barbajo alias Joe, (5) Catalino Cabcaban
alias Inday, (6) Rodolfo Carballo alias Rudy, (7) Cresencio Cuizon alias Sianong Kulot, (8)
Francisco Dionisio (he pleaded guilty), (9) Elino Duran, (10) Jose Francisco alias Karate. (11)
Guillermo Ignacio alias Pilay, (12) Roberto Pangilinan alias Pagong, (13) Rolando Pan (14)
Eugenio Provide, Jr. alias Junior, (15) Romeo Ricafort alias Romy, (16) Marcelo Sardenia
and (17) Angel Tagana.

Some of these seventeen prisoners destroyed the floor of the big cell removed the wood
therefrom and used the pieces of wood in clubbing to death some of the victims.

The assaulted prisoners, who were unarmed, did not resist the attack. Many of them were
lying flat on the floor with raised hands or clinging to the walls made of steel-matting. The
affray lasted for about an hour. Although three whistles were sounded at the start of the
massacre and prison officials rushed to the corridor near the big cell, they could not do
anything because the door was locked and the key was held by one of the raiders. No one
among the assailants was injured.

The offenders at first did not surrender to prison officials who had arrived at the scene after
the alarm was sounded. It was only after they were assured that they would not be
maltreated that Abella advise his companions to surrender.

Villaflor gathered all the weapons used by his group. He gave them and the bunch of keys to
Geronimo Jorge, the overseer of the penal colony, through the holes of the steel-matting.
Those weapons consisted of five sharp-pointed wooden daggers, seven sharp- pointed
aluminum daggers, three wire ice picks, two bamboo ice picks, two Gillete blades with
wooden handles, a stone wrapped with cloth (caburata), a wooden club (Reynon's balila)
and twenty-two pieces of wood.

Ten victims, Identified as (1) Romeo Bulatao, (2) Manalo Castillo, (3) Jose Castro, (4)
Gualberto Fuentes, (5) Jose Magpantay, (6) Severino Pacon, (7) Carlito Padilla, (8)
Generoso Palino, (9) Jacinto Refugia and (10) Delfin San Miguel, were pronounced dead on
arrival at the penal colony hospital. Salvador Abique Demetrio Camo, Manuel Cayetano and
Armando Sanchez died in that hospital. The fourteen victims died of shock, cerebral
hemorrhage and severe external and internal hemorrhage.

Three other victims survived. Reynon sustained a lacerated wound on his eyebrow and a
stab wound on the left shoulder. He was confined in the hospital for nineteen days.

Juan del Rosario, a prisoner in the big cell suffered a lacerated wound in the head and six
incised wounds on the right cheek, mid-anterior side of the neck, right side of the neck and
the left arm.
Bartolome de Guzman had a lacerated wound on the head, two incised wounds at the nape
and at the left hypochondriac region, a stab wound on the neck which penetrated the larynx
and two superficial punctured wounds on the left and right sides of the chest.

The examining physician testified that Reynon, Del Rosario and De Guzman would have
died had there been no timely medical attendance.

In July, 1965 the statements of several jail inmates were taken by the prison investigator.
They were sworn to before the municipal judge of Panabo.

On September 24, 1965 Vicente B. Afurong, supervising prison guard and senior investigator
of the Davao Penal Colony, filed in the municipal court of Panabo a complaint for multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder against thirty-seven prisoners of the penal colony who
allegedly took part in the assault (Criminal Case No. 1773).

The accused waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. On October 22, 1965,
a special counsel of the provincial fiscal's office filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Davao City Branch II, charging the thirty-seven accused with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 9405).

As specified in the information, at the time the massacre occurred the thirty-seven accused
were quasi-recidivists because they were serving sentences for different crimes after having
been convicted by final judgment, as indicated below:

(1)Abella cualified theft. murder and frustrated murder;(2) Añover - murder,

theft of large cattle and evasion of service of sentence; (3) Apolinario -
qualified theft; (4) Apolinias - homicide; (5) Astrologia - robbery, homicide,
frustrated homicide and qualified theft; (6) Barbajo - robbery with habitual
delinquency; (7) Bilbar - homicide; (8) Cabcaban - theft;

(9) Carballo - homicide; (10) Cidro - frustrated murder and evasion of service
of sentence;(11) Cuizon - murder and robbery; (12) Dionisio - murder,
robbery in an inhabited house, six counts, and theft, four counts; (13) Duran -
homicide; (14) Enrigan - homicide; (15) Francisco - robbery; (16) Galanto -
homicide; (17) Gavilaguin - murder, homicide and evasion of service of
sentence; (18) Gaylan murder; (19) Gelle - murder; (20) Hernandez -
homicide;

(21) Ignacio - murder, arson, evasion of service of sentence and frustrated

murder; (22) Lagarto - murder; (23) Lorana - murder, frustrated murder,
attempted robbery with homicide and robbery with serious physical injuries;
(24) Maldecir - murder, frustrated murder, double homicide and evasion of
service of sentence: (25) Opsiar - murder, frustrated murder and qualified
theft; (26) Roberto Pangilinan - murder and theft, two counts, (27) Rolando
Pangilinan - murder; (28) Provide, Jr. - theft, two counts and violation of
articles 157 and 178 of the Revised Penal Code;

(29) Quijano - murder; (30) Rebutaso - robbery; (31) Ricafort homicide and
attempted homicide; (32) Sardenia - robbery, four counts; (33) Taboy -
murder; (34) Tagana - robbery with physical injuries malicious mischief,
slander by deed, slander with slight physical injuries and violations of Manila
ordinances; (35) Villaflor- robbery, frustrated homicide and evasion of service
 of sentence; (36) Villarama - frustrated homicide and evasion of service of
sentence, and (37) Villegas - murder and evasion of service of sentence.

At the arraignment on March 5, 1966, the accused were represented by two lawyers de
oficio. The information was read and explained to them in the Tagalog dialect.

The nineteen accused who pleaded guilty were (1) Abella, (2) Anover, (3) Cidro, (4) Dionisio,
(5) Enrigan (6) Galanto, (7) Gavilaguin, (8) Hernandez, (9) Lorana (10) Maldecir (11) Opsiar
(12) Rolando Pangilinan (1.3) Quijano, (14) Rebutaso (15) Ricafort, (16) Taboy, (17) Villaflor,
(18) Villarama and (19) Villegas.

Of the nineteen who pleaded guilty, sixteen were "close-confined" prisoners from the three
small cells while three Dionisio Pangilinan and Ricafort were from the big cell.

The seventeen accused who pleaded not guilty were (1) Apolinario, (2) Apolonias, (3)
Astrologia, (4) Barbajo, (5) Bilbar, (6) Cabcaban, (7) Carballo, (8) Cuizon, (9) Duran, (10)
Francisco, (11) Gaylan, (12) Gelle, (13) Lagarto, (14) Roberto Pangilinan, (15) Provide, Jr.,
(16) Sardenia and (17) Tagana.

The thirty-seventh accused, Guillermo Ignacio, at first pleaded guilty but when he repudiated
his extrajudicial confession, a plea of not guilty was substituted for his plea of guilty.

After the pleas were entered, the trial court required the fiscal to present evidence as of
those who had pleaded guilty. The fiscal submitted as exhibits the extrajudicial confessions
of the nineteen accused which were sworn to before the municipal judge.

At the fiscal's behest, the trial court ordered the interpreter to ask individually the nineteen
accused whether they confirmed their confessions. In open court, all of them ratified their
confessions.

Typical of the confessions of the accused was Villaflor's statement taken by Ramon C.
Alicarte, an investigator, on July 14, 1965 at the so-called "reading center" of the penal
colony. Villaflor said:

13. Q - Will you please narrate to me what you know about that unusual
incident (in the morning of June 27, 1965)?

A. — On that particular time and date, the inmates of the big cell opposite our
cell were already inside their cell after they have eaten their noon meal and
after they were locked in the big cell, we inmates in the close- confinement
cells were also sent out to have our noon meat

But before we went out from our cells, we had already agreed that we are
going to get inside the big cell and we also made an agreement that one of
us from the close-confinement cells by the name of Cadio (Gavilaguin) would
find a way so that we can get inside the big cell.

After Cadio had finished eating, he went to his cell and got a pillow which
was to be sold to our contact inside the big cell. When Cadio was already at
the aisle between the big cell and the close-confinement cells, our contact in
the big cell by the name of Ruding Pakpak (Arsenio Guevarra) (should be
 Rodolfo Carballo) came near the door of their cell and asked Cadio if the
pillow he (Cadio) was holding is made of cotton.

Cadio then called the trusty police on duty, prisoner Numeriano Reynon, and
requested him (Reynon) that he (Cadio) is going to pledge the said pillow to
Ruding Pakpak (Carballo) but the said trusty was hesitant at first. When
Cadio's request was seconded by Emerito Abella by saying. 'Sigi na pare.
dahil sa wala kaming pangbili ng cigarilyo, Reynon opened the door of the
big cell and Ruding Pakpak said: 'Abi, Abi tingnan ko ang unan kung bulak
ang laman.'

Then, I saw that Reynon was grappled by some of my co-inmates from the
close-confinement cell and then my companions began entering the big cell
When, I also went inside the big cell Ruding Pakpak met me and said to me:
'Saan ang sa akin?' I pulled from my waist his weapon and gave it to him.

I then began looking for the inmate who had incriminated me in the previous
incident in the prison compound which caused my being jailed in the close-
confinement cells. I then asked Pakpak as to where is Jimmy (Refugia) and
he pointed Refugia to me who was then at the ceiling.

When I saw Refugia. I also climbed and pulled him down. When he fell down
the floor, I stabbed him and after that I left Jimmy (Jacinto) who was already
fatally wounded. Then, I began looking for another of our enemies. I then saw
Manuel Cayetano who was already wounded. I took the club from Emerito
Abella and began beating Cayetano with it until I stopped beating him when I
saw that he was no longer moving. I gave the club to Kulot (Emerito Abella )
and rested for a while.

I then saw Pakpak grappling with Bundat and Pakpak called for me to help
him. I went near them and I stabbed Bundat once. And Bundat lessened his
grip from Pakpak then began stabbing Bundat (sic) and when he saw that
Bundat is (was) dead, he mixed with the rest.

Then, he asked me: 'Ano ba ito Cusa (Agustin ), aamin rin ba ako?'. Then, I
told him: 'siempre tapos na rin iyon and he kept quiet. I then continued my
rest until at (sic) the employees and guards arrived at the jail. While the rest
of my companions continued stabbing and beating our victims, I rested.
(EXH. B, pp. 63-64, Record

Gavilaguin's narrative of the massacre is as follows:

15. Q. - Will you narrate to me the story of said incident?

A. — At about 11:55 a. m., June 27, 1965, we were sent out of the cell for our
lunch. After the lunch, I called the jailer (trusty police) the person of Reynon
and told him 'Pare, we finished our meal. Please come and I'll tell you
something.' Then, he approached and said: 'What?' 'I have a pillow to be
given to Rudy Pakpak for sale. You may inspect it if you wish.'
 After (he) inspected, he called Rudy Pakpak and said: 'Will you buy this
pillow?" and Rudy said. - 'Open the door so that I can see it.' Reynon opened
the door and when it was opened, Sofronio Villegas (prisoner) held him
(Reynon) tightly, and I grabbed the key from the hand of Reynon. When I got
(it), I pushed him away and opened the door. When I got inside the cell I said:
'Visaya at Ilocano ay tumabi.'

My companions followed me inside in the big cell and I told them to watch on
the door, I saw trusty police Budoy and (he) closed the door and said.-
'Mamatay kayong lahat diyan.'

When I went to the middle part of the big cell I met Abiki having Sigi- sigi
tatoo. I stabbed him and he was able to grab the weapon (sharp- pointed
stakes) taken from me. When he held my hand, he told me: 'Kalugar (sic),
Pilay, you help me. Tulongan mo ako. Malaki masyado ito.'

Pilay approached us and I gave him the blade and he used the same to cut
off the neck of Abiki. Abiki released me and I continued stabbing for several
others (sic). When I saw him down, I left him and went to the others. I saw
some Sigi-sigi members. I also stabbed them after which I told Rudy Pakpak:
'Hilahin mo dito and mga patay.'

I saw some who were still alive and I told 'Beat them on the head with the
wooden clubs.' Afterwards, the employees arrived and shouted: 'You
surrender' and we called Mr. Jorge for whom we made the surrender by
giving to him our weapons such as sharpened stakes and others.

Then, we were ordered to go down asked with hands tied and thereafter, we
were instructed to go to the place near the toilet until the Judge arrived. The
dead ones were brought down ... (Exh. E, pp. 76-77 or 55-56, Record).

The trial court forthwith rendered a partial decision convicting the nineteen accused, who
pleaded guilty, of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder,
qualified by treachery and premeditation (alleged in the information) and with the special
aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism which was not offset by their plea of guilty In
addition, recidivism, which was alleged in the information, was appreciated against Abella,
Anover, Cidro, Dionisio, Enrigan, Galanto, Gavilaguin, Fernandez, Lorana, Maldecir, Opsiar,
Rolando Pangilinan, Quijano, Ricafort, Taboy, Villaflor and Villegas.

Reiteration. which was also alleged in the information, was appreciated against Abella,
Gavilaguin, Maldecir, Villaflor, Villarama and Dionisio.

Eighteen accused who pleaded guilty were sentenced to death. Rebutaso the nineteenth
accused who also pleaded guilty, was sentenced to cadena perpetua (should be reclusion
perpetual. All of them were ordered to pay solidarily an indemnity of six thousand pesos to
the heirs of each of the fourteen victims (Decision of March 5, 1966, p. 238, Expediente of
Criminal Case No. 9405).

Those who were convicted were sent to the national penitentiary. The eighteen accused
(including Ignacio) who pleaded not guilty were tried. Upon motion of the fiscal, on the
ground of lack of evidence, the trial court dismissed the case as to Perfecto Bilbar (page
299, Expediente).
After trial, the lower court in its decision of September 14, 1969 convicted twelve of the said
eighteen defendants, namely, (1) Apolonias, (2) Astrologia, (3) Barbajo, (4) Cabcaban, (5)
Carballo, (6) Cuizon, (7) Duran, (8) Francisco, (9) Ignacio, (10) Pangilinan, (11) Provido, Jr.
and (12) Tagana, of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder with
the aggravating circumstances of premeditation and quasi-recidivism (treachery was not
mentioned).

The trial court sentenced to death each of the said twelve accused (in addition to the
eighteen "close-confined" prisoners who pleaded guilty and were already sentenced to death
in the trial court's 1966 partial decision) and ordered them to pay solidarily an indemnity of
six thousand pesos to the heirs of each of the fourteen victims, namely, Abique, Bulatao,
Camo, Castillo, Castro, Cayetano, Fuentes, Magpantay, Pacon, Padilla, Palino, Refugia,
Sanchez and San Miguel. The twelve defendants were further ordered to pay solidarily an
indemnity of three thousand pesos to each of the frustrated murder victims, Numeriano
Reynon, Juan del Rosario and Bartolome de Guzman.

For lack of evidence, a verdict of acquittal was rendered for six accused, namely, Apolinario,
Bilbar, Gaylan, Gelle, Lagarto and Sardenia (Decision of September 14, 1969, page
400, Expediente).

So, thirty of the thirty-seven accused were sentenced to death. The case of Rebutaso who
was sentenced tocadena perpetua and who did not appeal, is not under review.

The death sentence imposed upon Astrologia is likewise not under review because it was not
promulgated. After the trial, he was returned to the national penitentiary for security reasons.
On October 10, 1969 he was erroneously paroled because the Board of Pardons and Parole
was not informed that he was sentenced to death in the Davao court's decision of September
14, 1969 (Pages 413-4 of Expediente and pages 1, I -D 2 and 159, Rollo).

After the rendition of that decision or during the pendency of this case, death ended the
agonies of ten of the twenty- nine accused who were sentenced to death. The ten dead
defendants were Anover Cidro, Cuizon, Galanto, Maldecir Opsiar, Roberto Pangilinan,
Rolando Pangilinan, Ricafort and Villaflor (Pages 98, 125, 171, 176, 181, 212, 336-B, 662,
717 and 750, Volumes I and II of the Rollo).

The death penalty imposed on the remaining nineteen accused named in the title of this
case (Including Abella, Apolonias and Villegas who escaped from confinement, page 158,
Rollo), is the one under automatic review "as law and justice shall dictate".

Review of death sentence on those who pleaded guilty. — It may be recapitulated that of the
nineteen accused in the death row, ten, namely (1) Abella, an escapee, (2) Dionisio, (3)
Enrigan (4) Gavilaguin. (5) Hernandez, (6) Loraña (7) Quijano, (8) Taboy, (9) Villarama (he
allegedly killed on February 12, 1976 a fellow prisoner in the national penitentiary, page 712,
Volume II of Rollo), and (10) Villegas, an escapee, pleaded guilty upon arraignment and in
open court ratified their extrajudicial confessions which were sworn to before the municipal
judge. They were sentenced to death in the trial court's 1966 partial decision.

Nine of the ten were among the sixteen "close-confined" prisoners in the three small cells
who invaded the big cell. The tenth Dionisio, was confined in the big cell.
After a perusal of their confessions, we find that their admission of guilt therein is
corroborated by evidence of thecorpus delicti or the fact that the massacre described therein
actually took place,

The requirements of section 20, Article IV of the Constitution with respect to extrajudicial
confessions are not applicable to the confessions herein because they were taken before the
effectivity of the Constitution or before January 17, 1973, Magtoto vs. Manguera, L- 37201-
02, Simeon vs. Villaluz, L-37424 and People vs. Isnani, L-38929, all decided on March 3,
1975, 63 SCRA 4).

Counsel de oficio contends that the accused made an improvident plea of guilty because the
lower court did not apprise them of the meaning and consequences of their plea. Reliance is
placed on the dictum that in capital cases "it is advisable for the court to call witnesses for
the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant" (U.S. vs.
Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541, 543).

Also cited is the admonition that "judges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it
that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the
import of an inevitable conviction" (People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 19491, August 30, 1968, 24
SCRA 798, 817).

And the long settled rule is that in case a plea of guilty is made in capital cases "the proper
and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in
support of the material allegations of the information, including the aggravating
circumstances therein enumerated, rot only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid
the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and
comprehended the meaning, fun significance and consequences of his plea" (People vs.
Bulalake, 106 Phil. 767, 770. See People vs. Baluyot, L-32752-3, January 31, 1977, 75
SCRA 148).

As already indicated in our recital of the proceedings below, the trial court, in order to comply
with the procedure in capital cases when a plea of guilty is entered, required the fiscal to
present evidence. The latter presented the confessions of those who pleaded guilty.

It is true that the trial judge did not adhere to the ritualistic formula of explaining to the
accused the meaning and consequences of their plea of guilty and the nature of the
aggravating circumstances.

Presumably, the trial court did not do so, not only because the judicial confessions of the
accused (pleas of guilty) were reinforced by their extrajudicial confessions, but also because
it was cognizant of the fact that all the accused were quasi-recidivists who had already
acquired experience in criminal proceedings and had, therefore, some comprehension of
what a plea of guilty signifies.

We hold that in this case the accused did not make an improvident plea of guilty. As held in
U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305, 318, it lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge whether
he is satisfied that a plea of guilty has been entered by the accused with fun knowledge of
the meaning and consequences thereof.

People vs. Yamson and Romero, 109 Phil. 793, is a case similar to the instant case. In
the Yamson case two prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison killed their fellow convict. At their
arraignment for murder, they pleaded guilty with the assistance of a counsel de oficio. They
were forthwith convicted by the trial court and sentenced to death, being quasi-recidivists

The accused appealed. This Court, in resolving the contention of the counsel de oficio that
the accused had made an improvident plea, held that the trial judge must have been fully
satisfied that the accused entered the plea of guilty with fun knowledge of the meaning and
consequences thereof. That observation may be applied to the instant case. (Same holding
in People vs. Perete, 111, Phil. 943 and People vs. Yamson, 111 Phil. 406.)

Review of the death sentence on those who pleaded not guilty. — As to the other nine
accused, who pleaded not guilty and were tried and sentenced to death, namely, Apolonias,
Barbajo, Cabcaban, Carballo, Duran, Francisco, Ignacio, Provide. Jr. and Tagana, it is
necessary to make a painstaking examination of the evidence in order to ascertain whether
their guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Those nine accused were in the big cell (bartolina). The prosecution's theory is that they
conspired with the sixteen raiders from the three small cells to kill the fourteen victims and
inflict injuries on the three other victims.

1. Maximo Apolonias alias Max. — He was born in Barrio Anas, Dimasalang, Masbate. He
finished grade four. He was convicted of homicide by the Court of First Instance of Masbate
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision
correctional as minimum to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. He was
imprisoned in the national penitentiary on December 26, 1964. He arrived in the Davao
Penal Colony on May 8, 1965. He was twenty-four years old when he testified on March 13,
1968.

He testified that when the massacre occurred he climbed the wall of steel-matting. He
allegedly did not know what transpired when the sixteen "close-confined" raiders entered the
big cell. In his statement of August 9, 1965, he denied having joined the sixteen raiders. lie
repeatedly declared that he could not have been involved in the massacre because he was a
new arrival in the penal colony. The massacre took place fifty days after Ms arrival.

Witness Guevarra said that he did not see Apolonias assaulting the victims (109 tsn
November 16, 1966). Witnesses Del Rosario and Rodrigo implicated Apolonias but did not
state definitely the acts perpetrated by the latter during the assault.

We find that the prosecution's evidence does net establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of Apolonias. As to him, it is not sufficient to justify the judgment of conviction.

2. Jose Barbajo alias Joe.— He is a native of Mabolo, Cebu City. He finished grade three. He
was eighteen years old when he was convicted of robbery. The Court of First Instance of
Cebu imposed upon him a penalty of six years and eight months of prision mayor (as a
habitual delinquent he was not entitled to an indeterminate sentence) plus three years, six
months and twenty-one days for habitual delinquency. He was received in the national
penitentiary on July 9, 1964. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on September 13, 1964.

He was twenty-five years old when he testified on March 12, 1968. He declared that he was
sick when the massacre occurred. He climbed the wall of steel-matting. He said that he was
not a member of any prison gang.
Witness Guevarra identified Barbajo as a member —of the Oxo gang and as having beaten
with a piece of wood one "Bandes" (108, 115 and 127 tsn November 17 and 18, 1966).
Witness Del Rosario implicated Barbajo and witness Rodrigo definitely testified that Barbajo
supplied to his companions the pieces of wood which they used in beating the victims (10 tsn
July 25, 1967).

3. Catalino Cabcaban alias Inday.— He was born in Barrio Asagna, Tanjay, Negros Oriental.
He finished the fourth grade. He was convicted of theft and evasion of service of sentence.
He was confined in the national penitentiary starting August 29, 1962. He arrived in the
Davao Penal Colony on May 15, 1964. He was twenty-six years old on October 20, 1967
when he testified.

In his statement (Exh. DD), he admitted that he was a member of the Oxo gang but he
denied that he helped the sixteen raiders in assaulting the victims. He testified that at the
time the massacre was being perpetrated he was clinging to the wall made of steel-matting.
His body was examined while he was on the witness stand. It was tattooed but not with the
letters "OXO".

Witnesses Guevarra and Del Rosario, the companions of Cabcaban in the big cell, testified
that Cabcaban was a member of the Oxo gang and that he helped Abella's group in
attacking the members of the Sigue- Sigue gang in the big cell. Witness Rodrigo, a prisoner
acting as a special policeman, pointed to Cabcaban as the person who beat Cabile with a
piece of wood (4 tsn July 25, 1967). There is no victim surnamed Cabile, as reported in the
transcript, but Rodrigo was probably referring to the victim named Salvador Abique who was
also Identified by a witness as Tabique. The name "Cabile" might be an error in transcription.

4. Rodolfo Carballo alias Ruding Pakpak. — He was born in Villadolid, Negros Occidental.
He resided at 958 Antipolo Street, Tondo, Manila. He finished grade six. He was convicted of
homicide by the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced to six years and one day of
prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal.

He was brought to the New Bilibid Prison on December 8, 1962. He arrived in the Davao
Penal Colony on June 20, 1964. He escaped from the penal colony on August 12, 1964 and
was recaptured on March 15, 1965. He was twenty-seven years old when he testified on
January 8, 1968.

He admitted in his statement to the investigator that he was a member of the Oxo gang and
had the Oxo tattoo mark. He testified that during the massacre he climbed the wag of steel-
matting but someone pulled his feet and he fell down on the floor.

Witness Guevarra testified that Gavilaguin, a closely-confined prisoner, wanted to sell his
pillow to Carballo (who is Identified in the confessions as Ruding Pakpak), a prisoner in the
big cell. It was that ruse which started the commotion (9598 tsn November 16. 1966).
Guevarra Identified Carballo as one of those who helped the sixteen raiders (107 tsn
November 17, 1966). That testimony was corroborated by witnesses Del Rosario and
Rodrigo.

5. Elino Duran. — He was born in Catbalogan, Samar. He finished grade five. He was
convicted of homicide by the Court of First Instance of Samar and sentenced to six years
and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal. He
was brought to the national penitentiary on December 18, 1962. He arrived in the Davao
Penal Colony on March 5, 1963. He was twenty-nine years old when he testified on March
12, 1968.

In his statement and testimony, he denied any participation in the massacre. He said that
during the riot he climbed the wall of steel-matting. He said that he was not a member of the
Oxo gang but he believed that he was counted as an Oxo sympathizer because he is a
Visayan.

He admitted that he executed a statement and that the contents thereof were true (Exh. EE).
On the witness stand, he pointed to Ignacio alias Pilay, Tagana, Astrologia, Cabcaban and
Carballo alias Rudy as among those who took part in the massacre.

In his statement, he Identified Cuizon, Roberto Pangilinan, Rolando Pangilinan, Cabcaban,

Lagarto, Apolonias, Astrologia, Ricafort, Carballo, Ignacio, Tagana and Dionisio as having
taken part in the killings (See No. 12, Exh. EE ).

Prosecution eyewitnesses Guevarra, Del, Rosario and Rodrigo Identified Duran as having
ellaborated with the sixteen raiders in perpetrating the massacre.

6. Jose Francisco alias Karate. — He was born in Pila, Laguna and resided at San Andres
Extension, Manila. He finished the first year of high school. He used to be a judo instructor.
In 1964, he was convicted of robbery by the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced
to imprisonment for two years and four months of prision correctional as minimum to eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum (Exh. J-5). He was confined in the national
penitentiary on February 15, 1964. He was received in the Davao Penal Colony on May 15,
1964 and confined in the big cell on June 25, 1965, or two days before the riot, because he
was suspected of having smuggled deadly weapons into the prison compound (pp. 93 or
115, Record). He was twenty- five years old when he testified on January 8, 1968.

He declared that when the raiders entered the big cell he :stepped aside, climbed the wall of
steel-matting and prayed. however, witness Guevarra Identified Francisco as a member of
the Oxo gang who helped the raiders and who, armed with a wooden club, beat the victim,
Gualberto Fuentes, who died (108, 114-115 and 127 tsn November 17 and 18, 1966).
Witness Del Rosario included Francisco in his wholesale Identification of twelve assailants
who helped the raiders from the small cells.

Counsel de oficio, who filed a brief for Francisco only, contended that the trial court erred in
holding that Francisco was a co-conspirator. Said counsel alleged that Francisco was
convicted of robbery (snatching) because he was framed up by a certain Patrolman Liwanag
of the Manila police. According to counsel, Francisco and one Roberto Gonzales (an actor)
had charged Liwanag with extorting money from the Karate Club, of which Francisco was a
member, and, in revenge, Liwanag fabricated a complaint for robbery against Francisco who
was convicted and sent to the Davao Penal Colony. No evidence was presented in the lower
court by Francisco to prove that he was convicted on a trumped-up charge of robbery.

7. Guillermo Ignacio alias Pilay. — He was born in La Carlota, Negros Occidental. He

finished grade five. He was convicted of murder, frustrated murder, arson and evasion of
service of sentence. He was received in the national penitentiary on July 27, 1953. He
arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on September 22, 1961. He escaped three times from
prison (Exh. J-12). He was thirty-eight years old when he testified on March 12,1968.
He declared that when the massacre began, he stood beside the steel-matting. He saw his
fellow prisoner, Arsenio Guevarra (the prosecution witness), carrying a pillow. After the riot,
he was investigated. He said that he did not read his statement but he was just made to sign
it and he signed it so that he would not be maltreated. In his statement, he admitted he was
a member of the Oxo gang.

Guevarra said that he did not see Ignacio helping the group (108 tsn November 17, 1966).

Witness Rodrigo, a prisoner acting as a special policeman, identified Ignacio as a member of

the Oxo gang and as the prisoner who, during the riot, covered the door of the big cell with a
blanket and pieces of wood and who, armed with a wooden club, took part in beating the
victims (15-16 tsn July 25,1967).

Witness Del Rosario, in his wholesale Identification of the twelve prisoners who took part in
the assault, included Ignacio (222 tsn February 10, 1967).

8. Eugenie Provido, Jr. — He was born in Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. He finished the sixth grade. He
was convicted of theft and violations of articles 157 and 178 of the Review Penal Code. He
was received in the national penitentiary on December 3, 1959. He arrived in the Davao
Penal Colony on February 29, 1964 (Exh. J-17). He was twenty-six years old when he
testified on July 10, 1968.

He declared that when the sixteen raiders entered the big cell he was driven to a comer and
was shielded by the other prisoners and in that situation he heard the shouts of the rioters.
He said that he did not know what actually happened because he was solicitous about his
own personal safety. He did not climb the steel- matting. He said that during the investigation
of the case, he was told that he would be utilized as a State witness. He denied that he was
a member of the Oxo gang.

Witness Guevarra testified that he did not know Provido (90 tsn November 16, 1966).
However, when he was asked to point to his (Guevarra's) companions in the big cell who
helped Abella's group, Guevarra fingered Provido and Identified him as a member of the Oxo
gang and as having beaten the victims with a piece of wood (Ibid, 108 and 11 5; 127 tsn Nov.
18, 1966).

Witness Rodrigo Identified Provido as having beaten the deceased Jose Magpantay with a
piece of wood (10-11 tsn July 25, 1967). Witness Del Rosario included Provido as among
those who participated in the assault (222 tsn February 10, 1967).

9. Angel Tagana.—He was born in Dulag, Leyte. He finished grade two. He resided in
Pandacan, Manila. He had six convictions for robbery with physical injuries, malicious
mischief and slander by deed and violations of city ordinances. He was received in the
national penitentiary on June 15, 1963. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on May
8,1965 (Exh. J-9). He was twenty-six years old when he testified on January 9, 1968.

He declared that when the sixteen raiders entered the big cell and started stabbing his
companions he ran to the side of the cell. He was not assaulted by anyone.

In his statement, he admitted that he was a member of the Oxo gang (p. 119 or 143,
Record). Witness Guevarra Identified him as a member of that group and as having used a
piece of wood in beating one victim (115 and 127 tsn November 17, 1966). Witnesses Del
Rosario and Rodrigo also pointed to Tagana as one of those who helped Abella's group (222
tsn February 10, 1967 and 14-15 tsn July 25, 1967).

Counsels de oficio contend that the trial court erred in holding that there was a conspiracy
among the accused. That contention has no basis in the evidence. The record supports the
trial court's finding that "conspiracy can logically be inferred from the simultaneous and
concerted acts of (the) sixteen raiders who, after putting down the guard and entering the big
cell, joined and combined forces with their friends and associates-inmates of the big cell who
were waiting for the go signal to commence the attack in pursuance of their criminal
objective".

The trial court added that the acts and conduct of the accused from the start of their
aggression until the riot was suppressed were characterized "by a swift, united and
concerted movement that could easily indicate a community of purpose, closeness of
association and concurrence of will", as shown particularly by the order of the two "close-
confined" prisoners, Abella and Villaflor, that the Visayans in the big cell should stay on one
side so that it could be ascertained that they were the allies of the sixteen raiders.

The conspiracy among the accused was manifest and indubitable. The massacre had been
planned by the sixteen "close-confined" prisoners in collaboration with the other members of
the Oxo gang in the big cell.

Counsel de oficio assails the credibility of witnesses Guevarra and Del Rosario. These two
witnesses were prisoners in the big cell. They had sufficient opportunity to observe what took
place during the hour-long riot. Del Rosario was himself a victim.

Counsel de oficio contends that reiteration is not aggravating because there is no evidence
that the said accused had been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches
an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
On the contrary, according to counsel, the said accused were still serving sentence for their
prior convictions.

Counsel's contention is correct as to Abella. Dionisio, Gavilaguin, Maldecir, Villaflor and

Villarama to whom reiteration was considered aggravating. They were still serving sentence
for their previous crimes at the time the riot occurred. In order that the aggravating
circumstance of reiteration may be taken into account, it should be shown that the offender
against whom it is appreciated had already served out his sentences for the prior offenses
(People vs. Layson, 1-25177, October 31, 1969. 30 SCRA 92, 97).

But since the accused are quasi-recidivists the fact that reiteration cannot be appreciated
against them and that their Plea Of guilty is mitigating will not affect the imposition of the
death penalty for the murders and frustrated murders which they had committed.

The other contention of counsel de oficio that all the accused should be given the benefit of
the extenuating circumstance of voluntary Surrender to the authorities is not correct. The
accused did not surrender voluntarily and unconditionally. They rejected the initial requests
for their surrender. They surrendered after Prison officials armed with guns demanded their
surrender. They chose the person to whom they would surrender, namely, Jorge, the
overseer.

Defense counsel's contention that treachery and evident premeditation are not aggravating
in this case is untenable. The accused, who were all armed, unexpectedly attacked the
unarmed and defenseless Sigue-Sigueinmates in the big cell who had no means of escaping
from that cell and who could not avoid their assaults. The victims did not offer any resistance.

The accused had deliberately planned the attack as shown by the manner in which they
executed the massacre. They provided themselves with improvised weapons. No one among
the accused sustained any injuries or was exposed to any risk arising from any defense that
the victims might have made. The victims were not able to make any retaliation. Moreover,
there was abuse of superiority which absorbed cuadrilla

In People vs. Layson, L-25177, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 92, the four accused, also
inmates of the Davao Penal Colony, who were armed with bladed weapons, entered on
January 17, 1964 the cell of their fellow prisoners, locked the door thereof and stabbed him
to death. It was held that the crime was murder aggravated by treachery, evident
premeditation and quasi-recidivism.

The Layson case is similar to the instant case. The difference between the two cases is that
in the instant case, more prisoners were involved and there were seventeen victims.

Motion for new trial. — On October 30, 1973 or after the Solicitor General had filed his brief,
twenty of the thirty accused, who were sentenced to death, filed, personally or without the
assistance of counsel, a motion for new trial. Those twenty movants are Anover alias Abarca
(who died on June 18, 1976), Barbajo, Cabcaban, Carballo, Cuizon (who died on November
6, 1977), Dionisio, Duran, Enrigan Francisco, Gavilaguin, Hernandez, Ignacio, Lorana,
Opsiar, (who died on April 2, 1974), Provide, Quijano, Tagana, Taboy, Villarama and Villegas.

Of those twenty, ten accused, namely, Dionisio, Enrigan, Gavilaguin, Hernandez, Lorana,
Opsiar, Quijano, Taboy, Villarama and Villegas had pleaded guilty, Nine of the ten were
"close-confined" prisoners in the three cells. The tenth, Dionisio, was in the big cell. The
other ten of the twenty accused were from the big cell. They pleaded not guilty and they were
tried.

The twenty movants alleged in their motion for new trial that those who pleaded guilty did so
due to "the coercion, harassment and intimidation applied by the prison authorities" or due to
"third degree" and other brutalities. They further alleged that one of the "fabricated
(prosecution) witnesses" was Guillermo Ignacio who made a retraction and that another
witness, Elino Duran, was forced to sign his affidavit.

The Solicitor General commented that the grounds relied upon by the movants are not the
grounds for a new trial under sections 2 and 3, Rule 121 and section 13, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court. He correctly observed that Ignacio and Duran were not utilized as
prosecution witnesses.

Action on the motion for new trial was deferred until the case is decided on the merits. After
an evaluation of the said motion, we find that it is devoid of merit and is not in order.

The record does not show that Ignacio retracted his statement. Duran never claimed that he
was intimidated into making his statement. Those movants who pleaded guilty were
convicted on the basis of their confessions which they ratified during the trial. On the other
hand, those who pleaded not guilty were given a fair trial. They testified and they had the
opportunity to prove their innocence. Their testimonies (except Apolonias' testimony) did not
generate any reasonable doubt as to their guilt.
Propriety of the imposition of the death penalty on the eighteen accused — As to the
fourteen deceased victims, the crime is murder qualified by treachery which absorbs abuse
of superiority and cuadrilla As to those who pleaded guilty, that mitigating circumstance is
offset by evident premeditation. Recidivism is aggravating as to some accused As to all the
eighteen accused, quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance which justifies the
imposition of the penalty for murder (reclusion temporal maximum to death) in its maximum
period or death.

The fiscal and the trial court treated the fourteen killings and the injuries inflicted on the three
victims as a complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. The trial court
imposed a single death penalty.

However, the Solicitor General submits that the accused should be convicted of fourteen
separate murders and three separate frustrated murders and punished, respectively,
by fourteen death penalties and three penalties for the frustrated murders because the
killings and injuries were effected by distinct acts.

It is argued that article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable to this case. Cited in
support of that stand is the ruling in U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56 that "where the defendant has
fired two shots, killing one party and wounding another, the acts constitute two distinct
crimes, each of which must be tried separately".

We hold that the Solicitor General's submission is not well taken. In the De los
Santos case, supra, which involved two riots on two successive days in the national
penitentiary wherein nine prisoners were killed (five on the first day and four on the second
day), the fourteen members of the Sigue-Sigue gang who took part in the killing were
convicted of multiple murder (a complex crime) and not of nine separate murders. Only one
death penalty was imposed. It was commuted to reclusion perpetua for lack of necessary
votes.

There is no compelling reason for not deciding this case in the same way as the De los
Santos case. The two cases are very similar.

The ruling in the De los Santos case is predicated on the theory that "when, for the
attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an offense, various acts are executed, such
acts must be considered only as one offense", a complex one (People vs. Penas, 66 Phil.
682, 687. See People vs. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 236, 302 and 906, where the falsification of
one hundred twenty-eight warehouse receipts during the period from November 1930 to July
6, 1931, which enabled the accused to swindle the bank in the sum of one million four
hundred thousand pesos was treated as only one complex crime of estafa through multiple
falsification of mercantile documents and only one penalty was imposed).

That holding in the De los Santos case is buttressed by some precedents. Thus, in People
vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64 and 82, 102- 103, where seventy-seven Constabularymen murdered
six policemen (including the assistant chief of police) and two private citizens and gravely
wounded three civilians, they were convicted of multiple murder with grave injuries, a
complex crime. The eleven sergeants and corporals were Sentenced to death while the
sixty-six privates were sentenced to reclusion perpetua (See People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185,
re sedition and multiple murder.)

In People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27, nineteen Moros, forming part of a band of one hundred,
massacred fourteen Constabularymen. They were charged and convicted of multiple murder,
a complex crime. Their ring leader was sentenced to death. The other eighteen accused
were sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

In People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975, where on a single occasion around fifty Maranaos were
killed by a group of home guards (formerly Constabulary soldiers), the killing was held to be
only one complex offense of multiple homicide because it 4 resulted from a single criminal
impulse" and it was not possible to determine how many victims were killed by each of the
accused. (See U.S. vs. Fresnido, 4 Phil. 522 where the killing of three Constabulary soldiers
on a single occasion was punished as a single homicide.)

In People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831, around eighty persons stationed on both sides of the
highway in Sitio Salabusab, Bongabong, Nueva Ecija, fired at the group of Aurora Vda. de
Quezon riding in five cars which were proceeding to Baler, Quezon Province. The group was
going to attend the inauguration of a monument in honor of President Manuel L. Quezon.

Killed as a result of the ambuscade were eleven persons, namely, Mrs. Quezon, Baby
Quezon Felipe Buencamino III, Mayor Ponciano Bernardo of Quezon City, Primitive San
Agustin, Antonio San Agustin, Pedro Payumo, two Constabulary lieutenants, one corporal
and a soldier.

Five persons were charged with multiple murder, a complex crime, for complicity in the
ambuscade. The trial court sentenced them to death. They appealed. The case as to three of
the accused was dismissed on the ground that their confessions were taken after they had
been tortured.

Two other accused, Pedro Manantan and Raymundo Viray, executed extrajudicial
confessions. At the trial, they relied on alibis, which were not given credence.

This Court imposed upon Manantan and Viray only one death penalty for the multiple murder
but for lack of necessary votes, the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.

As persuasive authority, it may be noted that the Court of Appeals rendered the same ruling
when it held that where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose "their
individual acts in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act — the act of
execution — giving rise to a complex offense. The felonious agreement produces a sole and
solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a single being" (People vs. Leano, 1
ACR 447, 461 per Albert, J., with Justices Pedro Concepcion, Moran, Sison and Paras
concurring).

In the Leaño case, a group of twenty-five persons armed with bolos, knives, sticks and other
weapons, after shouting to one another "Remember the agreement! Don't be afraid!",
attacked a group of excursionists coming from the Vintar Dam in Ilocos Norte, who were
riding in a Ford coupe and omnibus.

As a result of the attack, one excursionist was killed, three suffered lesiones menos
graves and four suffered light injuries. The trial court convicted the assailants of homicide
only. The Solicitor General recommended that they be convicted of lesiones menos
graves and lesiones leves in addition to homicide. The Court of Appeals held that the
appellants were guilty of the complex crime of homicide with lesiones menos graves.
The holding that there is a complex crime in cases like the instant case is similar to the rule
in robbery with homicide, a special complex crime, where the number of persons killed on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery does not change the nature of the crime.

We have already stated that the conviction for multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as a complex crime, qualified by treachery (absorbing abuse of superiority
and cuadrilla and aggravated by quasi-recidivism and evident premeditation (offset by plea of
guilty) and recidivism, as to some accused, as shown in the record, should be affirmed.

The death penalty was properly imposed in conformity with articles 48, 160 and 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. The indemnity of six thousand pesos should be increased to twelve
thousand pesos for each set of heirs of the fourteen victims.

However, justice should be tempered with mercy. Considering the circumstances which
drove the accused to massacre their fellow prisoners, they deserve clemency. The death
penalty should be commuted to reclusion perpetua. The following observations of this Court
in the De los Santos case have some relevancy to this case:

But the members of the Court cannot in conscience concur in the death
penalty imposed, because they find it impossible to ignore the contributory
role played by the inhuman conditions then reigning in the penitentiary, vividly
described by the trial judge in his decision.

It is evident that the incredible overcrowding of the prison cells, that taxed
facilities beyond measure and the starvation allowance of ten centavos per
meal for each prisoner, must have rubbed raw the nerves and dispositions of
the unfortunate inmates, and predisposed them to all sorts of violence to
seize from their owners the meager supplies from outside in order to eke out
their miserable existence.

All this led inevitably to the formation of gangs that preyed like wolf packs on
the weak, and ultimately to pitiless gang rivalry for the control of the
prisoners, abetted by the inability of the outnumbered guards to enforce
discipline, and which culminated in violent riots. The government cannot
evade responsibility for keeping prisoners under such sub-human and
Dentesque conditions.

Society must not close its eyes to the fact that if it has the right to exclude
from its midst those who attack it, it has no right at all to confine them under
circumstances that strangle all sense of decency, reduce convicts to the level
of animals, and convert a prison term into prolonged torture and slow death.
(See People vs. Dahil, L-30271, June 15, 1979.)

Justice Barredo believes that in a case like the instant case, where, since the commission of
the multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder in 1965 or more than fourteen years ago,
the accused have been in confinement and in fact they have been in confinement for other
offenses even prior to 1965, the death penalty should be commuted to reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, following the precedent established in the aforecited De los Santos case, the
death penalty imposed by the lower court is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of
six thousand pesos is increased to twelve thousand pesos. The indemnities for the frustrated
murders are affirmed. Defendant Maximo Apolonias is acquitted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.