Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a
client. There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find
validation in the proceeding at bench, at least.

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law
books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles
and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has,
for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal
proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts,
including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque language of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando,
he has "with all the valor of ignorance," 1 been verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse
litigations; or in the words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to tread." Under
the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence to undertake litigation, he
has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the results
have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite unreasonable
resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many scurrilous statements
against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to
account.

Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic transactions
with three (3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure
to comply with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own terms and
conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation
from them, to secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables belonging to him or members of
his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these obligations, and when demands were made for him to
do so, laid down his own terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon
with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the banks refused to let him have his way,
he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously, against said banks, its officers, and
even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him. He sued, as well,
the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as
well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he
has initiated or spawned in different fora the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or
review proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has
been continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints
and contentions.

I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS

ROYAL BANK (TRB)

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB).
On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate
mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned,
respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16,
1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as
security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT
No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney
executed by their respective owners.

Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of P80,000.00,
in consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980. 2

Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. Consequently, TRB caused the
extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by the
sheriff on September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as the highest
bidder, for P73,529.09.

Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to redeem the properties
at their auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have to
settle his outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred,
and this disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits commenced by him against the Bank, its officers
and counsel, as aforestated.

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.

CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306

On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific
performance and damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-
22506. The complaint sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties only
at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without need of paying the obligation secured
by the trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by
Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals — docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of
Appeals held that the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel
defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."

Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By
Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . .
to sufficiently show that the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is supported by substantial
evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution
dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated January
30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated April 19, 1989. The last resolution also
directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt execution of
judgment. Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the Court
denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment; and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989,
the Court merely noted without action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court
of Appeals be overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . shall be entertained . . . ."

2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;

CA-G.R. SP No. 22356

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil action in
the same Cebu City Regional Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues. The
action, against the new TRB Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by Order
dated May 18, 1990,3 on the ground of res judicata, the only issue raised in the second action — i.e.,
Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been ventilated in Civil Case No. R-
22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided
with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein.

The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;

CA-G.R. SP No. 28221

In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its ownership
over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense,
Borromeo filed complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and
lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office. Borromeo
then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and
Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta
Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action
was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and
Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just mentioned; and faulted TRB
and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in
favor of the bank despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On defendants'
motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC. (Branch 22) on the ground of res
judicata (being identical with Civil Case Nos. R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in
favor of TRB), and lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).

Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that
Court's 16th Division4 on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;

CA-G.R. SP No. 27100

Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another civil action
for the same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the
HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10368, and was described as
one for "Recovery of Sums of Money, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as
the others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the RTC (Branch 145) on
the ground of litis pendentia.

The RTC ruled that —

Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely the
Honorable Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli
Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the same persons or
nearly all of them who are impleaded as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-
 10368, namely, the Traders Royal Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW.
The only difference is that more defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485,
namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva
Igot. The inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-
9485 was however merely incidental as apparently they had nothing to do with the
questioned transaction in said case. . . .

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case No.
CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent
foreclosure and consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to TRB.

For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by another Judge
on November 11, 1991 6 — the Judge who previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but this
Order of November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by Decision
promulgated on March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M.
Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T. Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's
complaint.

5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452

When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith made
that event the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's attorneys —
Mario Ortiz, Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This action was
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for "Annulment of Title with Damages." The
complaint, dated October 20, 1987, again involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables above
mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and premature consolidation of titles in
TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. On defendant's motion, the trial
court 8 dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right to
seek annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will ultimately
and finally win Civil Case No. R-22506."

6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236

Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause against TRB
and its officers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and thus also venting his
ire on) the members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in the Cebu City
RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties he had theretofore
been suing — TRB and its officers and lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) — but also the Chairman and
Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who had repeatedly rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306
(SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of
Appeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August 22, 1989,
aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for —

. . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding evidence and
pertinent laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions bereft of
signatures, facts or laws in support thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due
process and against deprivation of property without said process, tolerating, approving
and legitimizing the patently illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendants
TRB, (which) constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER
emanating from the people, b) FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION,
CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208,
REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for which defendants must be held liable under said
laws.
The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by
TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and
P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On motion of
defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated November 7, 1989, 9 dismissed the
case.

7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069

It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2) prior actions
instituted by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo
Navarro and Mario Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, 10 on the ground
of res judicata — the subject matter being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. No.
83306 11 — and litis pendentia — the subject matter being also the same as that in Civil Case No. CEB-
8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 22356. 12

8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;

CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928

On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22)
against Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 13 The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the ground of
denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated
April 10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the
case "under a continuous trial system on the dates as may be agreed by the defense and prosecution."
Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his motion was again found without merit, by Order dated
May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to nullify
these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28275.

Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that there had
been unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and denied his petition for being without
merit. 14

Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated
January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of
Circulars Numbered 1-88 and 19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
Resolution dated March 23, 1994.

a. Clarificatory Communications to
Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-
Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a
mere clerk and . . . (failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on MERITS nor
by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 15

The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some patience
drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of
Appeals and Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the same issue he now
raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994, after reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of
the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions simply advise of and quote the resolution actually adopted by
the Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally stated that Borromeo "knew, as well, that
the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of Court start with the opening clause —
 Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court
dated. _________,

thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the resolutions."

This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The record
shows that on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's
Third Division) dealing with the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was also dealt
with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4, 1989, and in the
letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989.18 And the same
subject was treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which was in due course served on
him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897.19

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor of ignorance" — to fasten not
only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his part
to cause criminal prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with here.

1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188

On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor against
Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe and officers of Traders Royal Bank." The
complaints (docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and Falsification of
Public Documents." He claimed, among others that the bank and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto
Jamero, sold properties not owned by them: that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents
negotiated and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from his (Borromeo's) mother, who "in
duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed to the sale thereof for only P671,000.00, although in
light of then prevailing market prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.

In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the complaints
observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but between
the bank and Mrs. Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties; and that
Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled
that the bank's ownership of the foreclosed properties was beyond question as the matter had been
raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of the document
allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.

a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234

Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal also
adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo — involving the same foreclosed
properties and directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former Manager,
Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of which were dismissed for lack of merit. These were:

a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD
SY) for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses."
— This case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 19, 1988 of the City
Prosecutor's Office because based on nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985,
sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a portion of the foreclosed
immovables, advising the latter to remit all rentals to the bank as new owner thereof, as
shown by the consolidated title; and there was no showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz
was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the
 period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the transaction to the
prejudice of complainant; and

b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa
Through False Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." — This case was
dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990.

2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme Court, 22 an
affidavit was executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire
insurance claim over property registered in its name — one of two immovables formerly owned by
Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said bank. 23 In that affidavit, dated
September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real
property together with the improvements thereon which property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City
covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was notarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.

Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over the
foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant fasehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation
was premature, illegal and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office
against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for "falsification of public document,
false pretenses, perjury." On September 28, 1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It found
no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any malice in its execution, considering that Bustamante's
statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty.
Inso notarized was legally in order.

3. OMB-VIS-89-00136

This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988 — sustaining the
judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra,
was made the subject of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman, Visayas,
docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint — against "Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court
of Appeals Justice (10th Div)" — was dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on February 14,
1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as follows:

It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available under the
Rules of Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative
of this Office to make a review of Decisions and Resolutions of judicial courts, rendered
within their competence. The records do not warrant this Office to take further
proceedings against the respondents.

In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act states that the Office of the
Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of if it believes that (1) the complainant had adequate remedy in
another judicial or quasi-judicial body;" and Sec. 21 the same law provides that the Office
of the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary authority over members of the Judiciary.

II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT

PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The
mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in
Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K.
Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the
vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.

A. CIVIL CASES

Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit accommodations he had obtained
from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB.

Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of the
latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had
purchased from Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but imposed several
conditions on him, one of which was for Lao to consolidate his title over the property. Lao accordingly
instituted a suit for consolidation of title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be
narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's application
for a loan and itself commenced proceedings foreclose the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the
property.

This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against Lao, but also against
UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court war
with Traders Royal Bank.

1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R.

No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273

The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action initiated by Samson Lao in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his
favor over the 122-square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with Article 1007 of the
Civil Code. In this suit Lao was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty.
Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested Lao's application.

Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding) denying
consolidation because the transaction between the parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de
retro being in law an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum of
P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao for capital
gains and other taxes in connection with the transaction (P10,497.50).

Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure of his
lawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal — AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a Decision by
the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.

The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third Division) in a four-page
Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken by
Borromeo. Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the
resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the
Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of the Division, and there was "no way of knowing which
justices had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at least three of the members."
Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of judgment, Borromeo having failed to
move for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the same was simply noted without action, in a
Resolution dated November 27, 1989.

Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule and practice, sent to
Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y.
CARREON and Alfredo MARASIGAN, respectively).
 a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679

Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo
attempted to vent his resentment even against the Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given
him notices of the adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No. CEB-8679 in
the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against "Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo
Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I.
Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office." He charged them with usurpation of judicial functions, for
allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and
'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273."

Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, presiding). These
processes were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the
matter as an incident in G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By
Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the Court En Banc ordered Judge
Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or
otherwise to entertain cases of similar nature which may in the future be filed in his court." Accordingly,
Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the summonses and dismissing the complaint in
said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.

The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the nature and purpose of
notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in
this wise:

This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials
of the Court. In several letter complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman,
Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition
of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute
resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases
do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and
resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained that the
resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the facts
and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and
therefore "unconstitutional, null and void."

xxx xxx xxx

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its
cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as were a case is
patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision
appealed from is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is
clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course
always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA
382, 417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It
has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal
basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . This is the only way whereby it
can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions.
...

. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and
states that the questions raised are factual, or no reversible error in the respondent
 court's decision is shown, or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement . . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution "that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis thereof").

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the
Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the
parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular case. It is the
Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the
resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations
of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court
merely transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case — G.R. No. 56280,
"Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated July 6,
1981, the Court
said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions
like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the
members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial
functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel.
When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged
decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions.

Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to
require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay
the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on
functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be more
profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of
important nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still
struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the years and meet the ever
increasing number of cases coming to it. . . .

b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501)

6740; G.R. No. 84054

It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the UCPB,
TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo
against administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one of the cases
adversely to him.

The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action for damages against
a certain Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12,
1988, the trial court dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action and
prematurity (for non-compliance with P.D. 1508).

What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same Court, on March 18, 1988.
This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu
presided by Hon. Mario Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the case,
in an order dated May 28, 1988. His first and second motions for reconsideration having been denied,
Borromeo filed a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo
vs. Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).

In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by submitting
a verified statement of material dates and paying the docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred
him to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was eventually dismissed by
Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure on his part to show any reversible
error in the trial court's judgment. His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution
dated January 18, 1989.

Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division) on April 27, 1989 once
more remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had not been signed by any Justice, set forth no
findings of fact or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied to him on May 19,
1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions of this Court denying dismissing petitions, like the petition
in the case at bar, which was denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had committed any reversible error in the questioned
judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the result of a thorough deliberation among the
members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial function to its Clerk
of Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by the Court, it sustains the
challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."

Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R. No.
82273, supra (or the earlier communications to him on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out
that minute resolutions of the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-blown
decisions or resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consists merely in the ministerial and
routinary function of communicating the Court's action to the parties concerned.

c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042

What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an already long
series, was to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J.
Garma and Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent him notices of
the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, filed on June 1, 1990, was docketed as
Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo Salas presiding). Therein he complained essentially of the
same thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to G.R. No. 91030 — in which the Supreme
Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons" and failure to demonstrate any reversible error in the
challenged judgment — the notice sent to him — of the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution of February
19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been signed only by the defendant clerks of court
and not by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants demanding an
explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which they ignored; defendants
had usurped judicial functions by issuing resolutions signed only by them and not by any Justice, and
without stating the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and patently
abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral shock, embarrassment, sleepless
nights and worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral damages of no less than P20,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.

On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case transmitted to the Supreme
Court conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra — directing that all complaints against
officers of that Court be forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28

Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court to "rectify the injustices"
committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered
expunged from the record (Resolution, July 19, 1990).

2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R.

CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897

Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his property. In the Cebu City RTC,
he filed a complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880
(Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in the complaint
were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager) and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was
represented in the action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being
then resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented by Atty. Antonio Regis. Once again,
Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr. presiding) dismissed the
complaint, upheld UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in the sum
of P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of P1,000.00.

Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951.
That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring),
dismissed his appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.

Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed it for
insufficiency in form and substance and for being "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for
reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of judgment (effected on August
1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First Division) said:

The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by
petitioner himself and Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit, the motion having
been filed without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court) apart from
being a reiteration merely of the averments of the Petition for Review dated April 14,
1989 and the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989. It should be noted that
petitioner's claims have already been twice rejected as without merit, first by the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu and then by the Court of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is
to have a third ruling on the merits of his claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is
advised that a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there is a special and important
reason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review may be dismissed
summarily on the ground that "the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for
delay or the question raised is too unsubstantial to require consideration" (Section 3,
Rule 45), or that only questions of fact are raised in the petition, or the petition otherwise
fails to comply with the formal requisites prescribed therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45;
Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is further advised that the first sentence of Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to a decision, and has no application to
a resolution as to which said section pertinently provides that a resolution denying a
motion for reconsideration need state only the legal basis therefor; and that the resolution
of June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989
does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent signification of the
grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989 is that the petitioner's
arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the resolution denying the petition for review
and consequently bringing about a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals — had
failed to persuade the Court that the errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed
been committed and therefore, there was no cause to modify the conclusions set forth in
that judgment; and in such a case, there is obviously no point in reproducing and
restating the conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.

Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the Court's
First Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and
ABSURD SELF-SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power which it has
forgotten emanates from the people," aside from being "patently UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of
signatures and facts and law: . . . and characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of
ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . ." To the letter
Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting
the Court's "issuing UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'" (2) his
"Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News
Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the
record because containing "false, impertinent and scandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court)." Another letter of the same ilk, dated November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by
Resolution promulgated on December 13, 1989.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R.

SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999

In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another action to invalidate the
foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No.
CEB-21880. This was Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB,
et al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez,
in consultation with Atty. Deen.

On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding) dismissed the
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and
litigation expenses (P1,000.00).

Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R. SP No.
14519); but his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to
comply with that Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of the Trial
Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and its Order of February 26, 1988, and for statement of "the
dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . . order."

Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution
dated October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for review by the
respondents therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of counsel. On November 9,
1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's
petition was dismissed, by Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned
judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1989, again complaining that the resolution
contained no findings of fact and law, was denied.

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178

Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu
City, this time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso
Juaban. Also impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then Chairman, First
Division), Estrella G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant
Clerk of Court of the First Division), and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court — to
which the case was raffled — caused issuance of summonses which were in due course served on
September 22, 1989, among others, on said defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En
Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 — in G.R. No. 84999 — this Court, required Judge Lee and the
Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them for issuing said summonses.

Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for a time represented Borromeo
in G.R. No. 84999 — filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was "no
compatibility" between him and his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been filing pleadings,
papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and advice" — and declaring that he had "not advised and . . .
(had) no hand in the filing of (said) Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the
other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23, 1989, apologized to the Court and
informed it that he had already promulgated an order dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of
the principal defendants therein, namely, Judge Generoso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the Court
in its Resolution dated November 29, 1989.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R.

CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248

It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which gave rise
to another action that ultimately landed in this Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of
Borromeo's known as the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another person
(Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional Trial Court on the theory that his contract with the latter was not
an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. Judgment
was rendered against him by the Trial Court (Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the purchase of the
property by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial Court's judgment, by
Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986.

Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By
Resolution of the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason that
"a) the petition as well as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late; and (b) the
issues raised are factual and the findings thereon of the Court of Appeals are final." He moved for
reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution dated June 3, 1987.

He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said adverse resolutions through
various motions and letters, all of which were denied. One of his letters — inter alia complaining that the
notice sent to him by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any Justice — elicited the following
reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as
follows:

Dear Mr. Borromeo:

This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the actual resolution
with the signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division in Case G.R. No. 77243
whereby the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied for lack
of merit.

In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated July 6, 1981
in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the
Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing
unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the
exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should
be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court
sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal
conclusions." It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties of the action taken on their
case by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court.

Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y. CARREON
B. CRIMINAL CASES

Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly without
foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally
liable.

1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181

In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts to overturn the judgment of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 21880, 30 Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on
August 18, 1989, a complaint against the Chairman and Members of the Supreme Court's First Division;
the Members of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez,
Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, charging them
with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.

By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's complaint,
opining that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried and their merits determined by different
courts including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987). The resolution inter
alia stated that, "Finally, we find it unreasonable for complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to
acknowledge the authority of the decree rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . ."

2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418

A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January
12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others,
charging them with a violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for supposedly
usurping judicial functions in that they issued Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions)
in connection with G.R. No. 82273 which did not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a Resolution dated
March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter
alia that "in all the questioned actuations of the respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot
be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones rendering them," and "it is not the
prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial resolutions." 33

III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY

BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA-

G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the
Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate
sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment
thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00
on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB,
Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City
RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch 10, Judge Leonardo
Cañares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was
substituted by the law firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.
Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendents were sentenced to
pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less
than P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of execution issued in due
course pursuant to which an immovable of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction
on October 19, 1989 in favor of the highest bidder, SBTC.

On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, but the same was
denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to
the Court of Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition. Failing in his bid
for reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court on certiorari — his appeal being docketed as G.R.
No. 94769. On September 17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with
finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on December 26, 1990.

However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light of his history of
recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning Borromeo's
aforesaid contractual commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another congeries of actions
and proceedings, civil and criminal concerning the same matter, instituted by Borromeo.

2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267

While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of his own in
the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 — HERSINLAW,
Atty. Wilfredo Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the suit,
Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9267, as one for
"Damages from Denial of Due Process, Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining
Order and Injunction." His complaint accused defendants of "wanton, malicious and deceitful acts" in
"conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him through excessive attorney's fees," which acts
caused him grave mental and moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe
anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses.

By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto, presiding)
granted the demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since
plaintiff failed to introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it would be
superfluous to still require defendants to present their own evidence as there is nothing for them to
controvert."

2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458;

CA-G.R. CV No. 39047

Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still another suit against the
same parties — SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares — but now including Judge Godardo
Jacinto, 34 who had rendered the latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial of
Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo
faulted Judges Cañares and Jacinto "for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB NO.
9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton, malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to
defraud plaintiff and deny him equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he had
been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights, and embarrassment for which
the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch
15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of
judges from liability in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.
Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.

In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of
court. The motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April
13, 1993. 35 Said the Court:

Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject motions, in fact,
proffer nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be
considered res judicata under the circumstances.

xxx xxx xxx

By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent penchant
for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on the contrary the appellant who precariously treads
the acceptable limits of argumentation and personal advocacy. The Court, moreover,
takes particular note of the irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored and finds
them highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation
of the Courts. That he is not a licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his
otherwise contumacious behavior is presently accorded the patience and leniency it
probably does not deserve. Considering the temperament he has, by far, exhibited, the
appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar displays in the future shall
accordingly be dealt with with commensurate severity.

IV. OTHER CASES

A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,

CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929

One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent. This is
Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo
was granted a loan of P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the security
of a lot belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 34785. 36 Later, Borromeo
obtained a letter of credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as
co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations; Lao agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's obligations to
both banks (PBCom and Republic), in consideration of which a deed of sale was executed in his favor by
Borromeo over two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as above stated. Lao
then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of P240,000.00.

Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial
Court alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered
against him by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where his appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21, 1990, said Court rendered judgment affirming the
Trial Court's decision, and on February 7, 1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for
reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was given short shrift. On May 29,
1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a Resolution denying his petition for review "for being factual
and for failure . . . to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment."

Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the resolutions sent to him were
unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures of the Justices who had taken part in approving
the resolution therein mentioned.

B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528

What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against Borromeo, at least as of date of
this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu
City (Branch 18), which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the theory that a
judgment promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third Division) was wrong and "unjust."
Impleaded as defendant in the action was former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the
Third Division at the time in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O.
Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing Borromeo's complaint "on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the following pertinent observations:

. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court has indeed no
jurisdiction to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable
Supreme Court. The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff against the herein
defendant and the other personnel of the highest Court of the land as alleged in
paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond the sphere of this humble
court to consider and pass upon to determine their propriety and legality. To try to review,
interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court would appear
not only presumptuous but also contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer for the
defendant, a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint clearly shows that all
material allegations thereof are directed against a resolution of the Supreme Court which
was allegedly issued by the Third Division composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is
made directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity. That being
the case, how could this Court question the wisdom of the final order or judgment of the
Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiff himself had issued a
resolution denying plaintiffs petition and affirming the Lower Court's decision as reflected
in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such violation of the Rules of Court, due
process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate
remedy should not have been obtained before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse,
interpret or review the acts of a superior court might be construed to a certain degree as
a show of an uncommon common sense. Lower courts are without supervising
jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher courts.

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied "for lack of sufficient factual
and legal basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433

A. Complaint Against Lawyers

of his Court Adversaries

Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers who had appeared for
his adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao — in the actions above mentioned, and others. As already
mentioned, these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato Hermosisima,
Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them, docketed as Administrative Case No.
3433, prayed for their disbarment. Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived with their
clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of sale with pacto de retro as a genuine sale, although it
was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently depriving complainant of his proprietary rights
subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3) defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath
to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged that respondents Perez
and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.

B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers

The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely baseless and nothing but
pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite
Joaquin Borromeo in Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Cebu City Chapter, signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses
Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B. Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U.
Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase (Director),
and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The lawyers made the following observations:

It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary with
deferential awe and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before the might of the
courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and unmitigated insolence, has
cast aspersions and shown utter disregard to the authority and name of the courts.

And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that here is a non-lawyer who
uses the instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who crosses his path more
especially if their actuations do not conform with his whims and caprices.

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan with supposed infidelity and violation of the constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the
following:

The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and other
members of the Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and
contemptuous. They tend to bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the public
confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will undermine the dignity
of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence in the country's judicial system and
administration of justice.

. . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the legal
profession. So many baseless badmouthing have been made by Borromeo against this
Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go scot-free would certainly be
demoralizing to members of the profession who afforded the court with all the respect
and esteem due them.

Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading protesting the alleged "refusal" of
the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed
against its members."

C. Decision of the IBP

On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted to this
Court the notice and copy of the decision in the case, reached after due investigation, as well as the
corresponding records in seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and
Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP, Cebu City
Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint
as against all the respondents and the issuance of a "warning to Borromeo to be more cautious and not
be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers." 37

VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS

Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters ("open" or otherwise),
"circulars," flyers or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or
directives against him and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as well as the
judges and court employees involved in the said adverse dispositions — some of which scurrilous
writings were adverted to by the respondent lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and
circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently undertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity to
his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant
for argumentum ad hominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . . (which
were found to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of
the Courts."

In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of
the Constitution and the laws, etc.

Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the reported
conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award from the University of Texas for his
contributions in upholding the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court
persist in rendering rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due Process and Rule of Law,
particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . .
." He sent a copy of his letter in the Supreme Court.

He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered INJUSTICE
after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND
INSTEAD OF RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits' while
failing to refute the irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" in the same letter, he specified what he considered
to be some of "the terrible injustices inflicted on me by this Court."

In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA, your pledges have not
been fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being
saviours and defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute resolutions)
even the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, many times, sanctions injustice and the trampling of the
rule of law and due process, and does not comply with the Constitution when it should be the first to
uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open
Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having
"been the victim of many . . . 'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and landgrabbing
and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, AND
one TOMAS B. TAN — all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases,
despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or laws (during our talk in
your house last March 12 1989);" and that "you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply want to ram
down a most unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ."

In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he mentions
what he regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the
landgrabbing by Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the center the caricature
of a person, seated on a throne marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by such statements as, "Sa
TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another "circular"
proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute resolutions w/o facts, law, or signatures
violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition: "Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP
VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 38

One other "circular" reads:

SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!!

— CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS

by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO

NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in the
judiciary. Adding "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance Of the
supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving denials and another "self-
exoneration" belied by evidence which speak for themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) —
the SCRA itself.

It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued UNSIGNED,
UNCLEAR, SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWS in
patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. It is precisely through said
TYRANNICAL, and UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co. have
CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake
resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that
CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through
said despotic resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of
court orders and naked land grabbing — What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).

Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first resolving the
motion for reconsideration (G.R No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of power for
the SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-8679) and declare justices
and said clerks "immune from suit" — despite their failure to file any pleading? Were
Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule of law and rules of court and DUE
PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. 82273).

TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for themselves!
NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGES OR
RESIGN!!

IMPEACH NARVASA

• ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL

"MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8,
Constitution

• VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN ORDERING

CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679) DISMISSED DESPITE THE
LATTER'S FAILURE TO FILE PLEADINGS; HENCE IN DEFAULT

• CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN

RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION, CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN RULINGS —
TO ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TO STEALS LOTS WORTH P3
MILLION

• CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWO LAWFUL

COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH
P4 MILLION

• BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME AND

PREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW CORRUPT
JUSTICES

• DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKS TO BE

IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and
REFUSING TO ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST
HIMSELF
 JOAQUIN T.
BORROMEO

VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS

OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR

A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter

IBP, dated June 21, 1992

Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some members of
the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a letter
to this Court, dated June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them — that last quoted, above — "
. . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and probably other officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing
"highly libelous and defamatory remarks against the Supreme Court and the whole justice system"— and
(2) in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and members," strongly urged the Court "to impose sanctions
against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act."

B. Resolution of July 22, 1993

Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring comment by Borromeo
on the letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently
reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

 The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the Acting Clerk
of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning
G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal Bank [referred to by Borromeo
in the "circular" adverted to by the relator herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2)
other cases also filed with the Court by Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo
v. Samson Lao and Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon.
Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to him by different Divisions of the
Court. In that letter Atty. Puno explained to Borromeo very briefly the legal principles
applicable to his cases and dealt with the matters mentioned in his circular.

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other cases
instituted by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court
of Appeals, et al.) and No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals and Samson
Lao), as well as the existence of other communications made public by Borromeo
reiterating the arguments already passed upon by the court in his cases and condemning
the court's rejection of those arguments.

Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines thru its above named, President, and taking account of the related facts
on record, the Court Resolved:

1) to REQUIRE:

(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for contempt
against Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City Chapter,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of
this resolution and copies of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993 together with its
annexes; and

(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice of
resolution and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with its
annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo, Cebu City; and

2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such notice
and the IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a comment on the
letter and its annexes as well as on the other matters set forth in this resolution, serving
copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.

SO ORDERED.

1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989

Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the first paragraph of the resolution
just mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the second time, precisely the principles and
established practice relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other
communications and resolutions sent to him by the Supreme Court, to wit: the letter received by him on
July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R No.
77243 39) the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19,
1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due course served on him, to wit:
that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA
1), 42 and that dated June 11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43

C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993

In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment dated August 27, 1993 in
which he alleged the following:

1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment) violates the Constitution which
requires "signatures and concurrence of majority of members of the High Court;" hence,
"a certified copy duly signed by Justices is respectfully requested;"

2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves "since they
cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this case should be heard
by an impartial and independent body;"

3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu
Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out
"what particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and
does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of
those accused in the "libelous circular;"

4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech,
of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by
the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountability of public
officials;" the circular merely states the truth and asks for justice based on the facts and
the
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and encouraged; .
. . Atty. Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which statements are false and lies;

5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them with pertinent
facts, evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice and members of
the High Court to either refute said charges or dispense the justice that they are duty
bound to dispense.

D. Resolution of September 30, 1993

After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest opportunity to explain his side,
and be reprsented by an attorney, the Court promulgated the following Resolution on September 30,
1993, notice of which was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.

. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk of Court
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and the Comment of Joaquin
Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President Manuel P. Legaspi of the
relator dated June 21, 1993, are both NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of
said Comment, the Court Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period
of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof within which to engage the services or otherwise
seek the assistance of a lawyer and submit such further arguments in addition to or in
amplification of those set out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so minded.

SO ORDERED.

E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment

of October 15, 1992

Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, reiterating the arguments and
allegations in his Comment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and amplification
to . . . (said) Comment," viz.:
 1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the alleged
'libelous' remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be ordered to file a
VERIFIED COMPLAINT . . .(failing in which, they should) be cited in contempt of court for
making false charges and wasting the precious time of this Highest Court by filing a
baseless complaint;

2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are based on the
TRUTH and the LAW", namely:

a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws are
patent violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution;

b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to the

Appelate Court's ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of redemption
price, since no less than this Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that
CONSIGNATION IS UNNECESSARY in right of redemption;

c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's frauds and
defiance of court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.

F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993

Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, 1993, adverting to "the failure of
the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath and the failure of the concerned Justices
to refute the charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these as "and admission of the
thruth in said circular," theorized that it is "incumbent on the said Justices to rectify their grave as well as
to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's baseless and false charges."

VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS

A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court

Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for
abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and
improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. 44 He has
stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many
rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and
executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual version of the
rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and
the law; he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his
adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and
court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and
motions. He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court employees who
have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his unmeritorious cases. More
particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to the egregious error of his theory that
the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
should be signed or certified by the Justices promulgating the same, 45 he has mulishly persisted in
ventilating that self-same theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance and
vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.

1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses

The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit
themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time . . . (and) this case should be
heard by an impartial and independent body, is still another illustration of an entirely unwarranted,
arrogant and reprehensible assumption of a competence in the field of the law: he again uses up the time
of the Court needlessly by invoking an argument long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is
axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt against itself, without the
intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the
respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the prosecuting officer
required and judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the prosecuting officer,
in order to bring the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to
perform their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges by the
prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial
and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court
and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by
the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. . . ." 46

His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu
Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out what particular
statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appear that Atty.
Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the 'libelous' circular" —
is in the premises, plainly nothing but superficial philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment.

Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the allegations claimed to be
contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the
government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in
accordance with the accountablity of public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no
justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court
employees; and other persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and
bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.

B. Basic Principles Governing

the Judicial Function

The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the principles
governing finality of judgments and of the paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to
lay down definite postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection on the part of
lawyers and litigants — like Borromeo — to resort to administrative prosecution (or institution of civil or
criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by
law from court judgments or orders.

1. Reason for courts; Judicial

Hierarchy

Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every country there is a more
or less established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more or less comprehensive system of
review of judgments and final orders of lower courts.

The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of
evidence by the parties — a trial or hearing in the first instance — as well as a review of the judgments of
lower courts by higher tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and legal
issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, and is in the very nature of
things, exclusive to the courts.
 2. Paramount Need to end
Litigation at Some Point

It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the
procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have
been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure,
there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the
conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but
the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the
issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality. 47 As observed
by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his
intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack
of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that
courts are the temples of right."

3. Judgments of Supreme Court

Not Reviewable

The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments
of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or
official of Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision
should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or modified on
the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or
language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. 49 This, on the indisputable and unshakable
foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle.

In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an
attempt by a lawyer to prosecute before the Tanod bayan "members of the First Division of this Court
collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust extended minute Resolution' with
deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing
"undue injury" to respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, in
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . — the following pronouncements were made in
reaffirmation of established doctrine: 50

. . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the
Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the
third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s
has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263
[1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the
courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining
controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law,
or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even
of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into
which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the
courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to
the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. (Luzon Brokerage Co.,
Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)

xxx xxx xxx

 Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether an en banc or
division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the
legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine
that "(I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there
has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who
unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democractic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court
orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs.
Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).

The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of powers calls for
the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their
duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the
same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress
would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from
speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate
branch into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes
mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government. (Tecson vs.
Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287).

4. Final and Executory Judgments of

Lower Courts Not Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court

In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a party who
is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule
37, and an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whether questions
of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiar rules and
conformably with the hierarchy of courts. 51Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the
ground that it was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may
be had through the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to review by higher
tribunals — become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too,
become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in anyway
modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other
official, branch or department of Government. 52

C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action

against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic

Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a regrettable increase in the
resort to administrative prosecution — or the institution of a civil or criminal action — as a substitute for or
supplement to appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates as a form of
threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of their prerogatives, or a reluctance to
exercise them. With rising frequency, administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of the
Court Administrator; criminal complaints are being filed with the Office of the Ombudsman or the public
prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against
trial judges, and justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.

1. Common Basis of Complaints

Against Judges

Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or
Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory orders 53 — i.e., judgments or orders which
are allegedly not in accord with the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse
of discretion — thereby causing injustice, and actionable and compensable injury to the complainants
(invariably losing litigants). Resolution of complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common
requirement for the fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision or order of the
respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or erroneousness, as basic premise for a
pronouncement of liability.

2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for

Correction of Judgments and Orders

The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not in lieu of the prescribed
recourses for appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, a party may file an administrative or
criminal complaint against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for appeal, may
nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or criminal remedies.

Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and
the lower courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the administrative or
criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available,
and must wait on the result thereof.

Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary postulation
can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or
decision not yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust
judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step, confer the
prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the
determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of
law, or both. If he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set
off a proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility here after more fully explored.

Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the power of
public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or vicariously, to review judgments or final
orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review — by appeal or special civil action —
is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance with a well-
defined and long established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No other review is
allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.

These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code
as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual judge who does so "in
any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would
pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper
appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the
Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no
application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who
reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment
 after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust"
cannot prosper.

xxx xxx xxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a
member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the
regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that
very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it
is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that
a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to
answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be
inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence
without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.
S. 335).

xxx xxx xxx

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted
"with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of
the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and
judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and
conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the
presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would
destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of
powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this
Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to
and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine and
adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law.

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have become final and executory.
Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other
body or authority.

3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed

Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust

To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or order is unjust — or was (or
was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his
jurisdiction and powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially judicial
function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the
highest court of the land. To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service or any other branch; nor any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial
order or decision — whether final and executory or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the
basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative
belongs to the courts alone.
 4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness
and Leads to Absurd Consequences

Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments or
interlocutory orders of the type above described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that
the decisions or interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are
tainted by grave abuse of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of corruption, or immorality, or
other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would
also result in a futile and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd consequences.

Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is
rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the
latter's judgment is appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally, the
appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the Supreme Court. The prosecution of the
municipal trial court judge who rendered the original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust
judgment) would appear to be out of the question; it would mean that the Office of the Ombudsman or of
the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary investigation, not only that the judge's decision
was wrong and unjust, but by necessary implication that the decisions or orders of the Regional Trial
Court Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who affirmed the
original judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most certainly an act of supreme arrogance and very
evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public prosecutor or
Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in question — despite its
having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels — and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all
four (4) courts, file an information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the
fate of such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court would be fairly
predictable.

Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a Regional
Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result:
given the antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness of the judgment in
question, already passed upon and finally resolved by the same appellate courts, would necessarily be
sustained.

Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from filing a
criminal action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict
him of the offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices of the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court who should affirm his conviction.

The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be modified, and regardless of
whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute the
judge for supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order.

5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative

Criminal Prosecution

This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an
unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the
indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate
proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be
also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in
rendering said judgement or order. That final declaration is ordinarily contained in the judgment rendered
in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial court in the civil or criminal action in
question is challenged.
What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or dismissal in a criminal
action, as to which — the same being unappealable — it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the
victim of the crime (or even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such charges
as they might see fit to press that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate design, through
inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an
authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust character of the judgment or order in
question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher
court impugning the validity of the; judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the prosecution; or (b) if
this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for
promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicialdeclaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or criminal action
against the judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want of an indispensable
requisite.

D. Judges Must be Free from

Influence or Pressure

Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should
not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do
and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is sound rule,
which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done
within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith.

This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable
for every erroneous order or decision he renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 56 The error must
be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is only in these cases
that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court.

As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and general
jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may do in the exercise of
their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction." 58 Based on Section 9, Act
No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with any subsequent legislative issuance or court
rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of
damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits
of his legal powers and jurisdiction."

Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public officer or
employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which rights are the
same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the Constitution); — shall be liable to the latter
for damages. However, such liability is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extent that the offenses
therein described have "unjust judgment or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need
only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat already mentioned:
that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a final judicial
pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.

E. Afterword

Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well be asked why it took no
less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent Borromeo
in the different rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present administrative
measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the unnecessary work occasioned by respondent's
crass adventurism are self-evident and require no further elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with him
with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the repeated rebuffs he suffered, with the attendant lectures
on the error of his ways, would somehow seep into his understanding and deter him from further forays
along his misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the power of contempt is exercised
on the preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately the Court's forbearance had no effect
on him.

Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness and
impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened
others to just as flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings against the
courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of even involving the legislative and
executive departments, the Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of
personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end, and it is time for the Court to now
draw the line, with more promptitude, between reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense. The Court
accordingly serves notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal with
them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely impose such punitive sanctions as
may be appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.

WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly
committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder
his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is
hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to
pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses
of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or court
employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, 106; Peo v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389, 407.

2 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 7, Infra.

3 Per Judge Benigno G. Gaviola, Branch 9, RTC, Cebu.

4 Ramirez, J., ponente, with whom concurred Francisco (Cezar) and

Vailoces, JJ.

5 Judge Renato C. Dacudao, presiding.

6 Judge Celso M. Gimenez, Branch 5.

7 Guingona, J., ponente, with whom concurred Javellana and Imperial, JJ.

8 Branch 24, Hon. Priscila S. Agana, presiding.

9 Per Judge Jose P. Burgos, Branch 17.

10 Per Judge (now CA Associate Justice) Godardo Jacinto.

11 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 1, supra.

12 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 2, supra.

13 SEE Sub-Head I, supra.

14 Decision dated May 21, 1993: Austria-Martinez, J., ponente, with whom
concurred Puno and Ramirez, JJ.

15 As every lawyer knows, the Clerk of Court of a Division or of the Court En

Banc is, of course, not a "mere clerk," but the highest administrative officer in the
Division or Court, next only to the Justices.

16 Sub-Head II, A, 1, infra.

17 Sub-Head II, A, 4, infra Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1,c, infra.

18 Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra, respectively.

19 Sub-Head II, A, 3, infra.

20 See sub-head I, A, 3, supra —Because TRB consolidated its ownership over

the foreclosed immovables during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506,
Borromeo filed criminal complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu
against the bank officers and lawyers, which were however, and quite correctly,
given short shrift by that Office.

21 Per 3rd Assistant Fiscal Enriqueta Roquillano-Belarmino.

22 See sub-head I, A, 1, supra.

23 See sub-head I, supra.

24 By resolution of Fiscal Rodulfo T. Ugsal, approved by City Fiscal Jufelinito R.

Pareja.

25 Per Investigator Mario E. Camomot, recommended for approval by Director IV

V. V. Varela, and approved by Juan M. Hagad, Deputy Ombudsman, Visayas.

26 In the third paragraph of this opinion.

27 Like the letter written to Borromeo, dated July 10, 1987, Sub-head A, 1,
5, supra.

28 Rollo G.R. 82273.

29 This concerned a fourth bank, the Philippine Bank of Communications.

30 Sub-head II, A ,3, supra.

31 Written by Felicito C. Latoja, Asso. Graft Investigation Officer II, and approved
by Juan M. Hagad, DOMB.

32 SEE Sub-Head II, A, 1, supra.

33 SEE also sub-head II, A, 2, supra.

34 Judge Jacinto has, to repeat, since been promoted to the Court of Appeals.

35 Rollo, Vol. VII, p. 115.

36 SEE Sub-Head II, A, 5, supra.

37 During the entire period that the administrative case was pending (1990 to
1994), Borromeo wrote an unceasing stream of letters, leaflets, flyers to IBP,
harshly critical of the courts and the lawyers who had in one way or-another
taken measures adverse to him. One of the last was an "OPEN LETTER to IBP
Prexy Manuel Legaspi" dated April 19, 1994.

38 There are at least ten (10) other such."circulars, flyers, or letters in the record,
all amounting more or less the same errors and defamatory imputations.

39 Sub-Head II; A, 1, infra.

40 Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1 c, infra, respectively.

41 Sub-Head II, A, 3, infra.

42 Sub-Head II, A, 1, a, infra.

43 Sub-Head I, A, 7, supra.

44 Rule 71, Sec, (c) and (d), Rules of Court.

45 SEE Sub-head II, A, 1, a, supra.

46 Peo v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211, cited in Gavieres v. Falcis, 193 SCRA
649, 660 (1991); see also Fernandez v. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140.

47 Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250, G.R. No. 100474, September 10,
1993; GSIS v. Gines, 219 SCRA 724, G.R. No. 85273, March 9, 1993; Gesulgon
v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993; Paramount Insurance
Corporation v. Japson, 211 SCRA 879, G.R. No. 68073, July 29, 1992; Cachola
v. CA, 208 SCRA 496, G.R. No. 97822, May 7, 1992; Enriquez v. CA, 202 SCRA
487, G.R. No. 83720, October 4, 1991; Alvendia v. IAC, 181 SCRA 252, G.R. No.
72138, January 22, 1990; Turqueza v. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483, G.R. No. L-
51626, April 30, 1980; Lee Bun Ting v. Aligaen, 76 SCRA 416, G.R. No. L-
30523, April 22, 1977.

48 20 SCRA 441, 444.

49 Against judgments of the Supreme Court since obviously no appeal to a
higher court or authority is possible, the only remedies are those set forth in the
Rules of Court, particularly Rule 56 in relation to Rules 52 and 53, with regard to
civil cases and proceedings, and Rule 125 in relation to Rule 124, in respect of
criminal cases. SEE Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 208 SCRA 215, G.R. No.
76265, April 22, 1992; Tan v. Court of Appeals 199 SCRA 212 G.R. No. 97238,
July 15, 1991; Church Assistance Program v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408 G.R. No.
76552, March 21, 1989; Ver v. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80, G. R. No. 77526, June
29, 1988 Ang Ping v. RTC of Manila, 154 SCRA 77, G.R. No. 75860, September
17, 1987; Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577,
G.R. Nos. L-58011-2, November 18. 1983; Tugade v. CA 83 SCRA 226; Barrera
v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, G.R. No. L-31589, July 31, 1970; Albert v. CFI, 23
SCRA 948, G.R. No L-23636, May 29 1968; Shoji v. Harvey, 43 Phil.
333(1922); SEE also Concurring Opinion of Gutierrez J. in Enrile v. Salazar, 186
SCRA 217, G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990.

50 148 SCRA 382, 417-418.

51 Against a final and executory judgment, the extraordnary, equitable remedy of

relief from judgment under Rule 38 may be availed of, or in extreme situations,
an action to annul the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud.

52 Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 302, G.R. No. L-59370, February 11, 1986, citing
Malia v. IAC, 138 SCRA 116, G.R. No. L-66395, August 7, 1985; Castillo v.
Donato, 137 SCRA 210, G.R. No. L-70230, June 24, 1985; Bethel Temple, Inc. v.
General Council of Assemblies of God, Inc., 136 SCRA 203, G.R. No.
L-35563, April 30, 1985; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union
(IBAAEU) v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663, G.R. No. L-52415, October 23, 1984 and
the cases cited therein pertaining to "immutability of judgments;" Heirs of Pedro
Guminpin v. CA, 120 SCRA 687, G.R. No. L-34220, February 21, 1983;
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 696, G.R.
No. L-24921, March 31, 1967; Daquis v. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913; Sawit v. Rodas, 73
Phil. 310.

53 Articles 204-206 of the Revised Penal Code define and penalize offenses
which have "unjust judgment" or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential
element.

54 148 SCRA 283, 418, 419, 420-42155 Rodrigo v. Quijano, etc., 79 SCRA 10
(Sept. 9, 1977).

56 Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 (Alug. 31, 1977); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-
Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 (Oct. 18, 1990).

57 Quizon v Baltazar, Jr., 65 SCRA 293 (July 25, 1975).

58 Alzua, et. al v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 326.

59 The old Code of Civil Procedure.

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. MTJ-98-1147. July 2, 1998

JESUS S. CONDUCTO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ILUMINADO C. MONZON, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated 14 October 1996,1 complainant charged respondent Judge Iluminado
C. Monzon of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Pablo City, with ignorance of law, in that he
deliberately refused to suspend a barangay chairman who was charged before his court with the crime of
unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.

The factual antecedents recited in the letter-complaint are not controverted.

On 30 August 1993, complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City
against one Benjamin Maghirang, the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for abuse
of authority, serious irregularity and violation of law in that, among other things, said respondent
Maghirang appointed his sister-in-law, Mrs. Florian Maghirang, to the position of barangay secretary on
17 May 1989 in violation of Section 394 of the Local Government Code. At the same time, complainant
filed a complaint for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Office of the City
Prosecutor against Maghirang, which was, however, dismissed2 on 30 September 1993 on the ground
that Maghirangs sister-in-law was appointed before the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which prohibits a punong barangay from appointing a relative within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity as barangay secretary. The order of dismissal was submitted to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

On 22 October 1993, complainant obtained Opinion No. 246, s. 19933 from Director Jacob Montesa of
the Department of Interior and Local Government, which declared that the appointment issued by
Maghirang to his sister-in-law violated paragraph (2), Section 95 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government
Code prior to the Local Government Code of 1991.

In its Revised Resolution of 29 November 1993,4 the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
dismissed the case, but ordered Maghirang to replace his sister-in-law as barangay secretary.

On 20 December 1993, complainant moved that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
reconsider5 the order of 29 November 1993, in light of Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 of Director Montesa.
Acting on the motion, Francisco Samala, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order6 on 8 February 1994 granting the motion for reconsideration and
recommending the filing of an information for unlawful appointment (Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code) against Maghirang. The recommendation was duly approved by Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon.

In a 3rd indorsement dated 4 March 1994,7 the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon transmitted the record of
the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City and instructed the latter to file the
corresponding information against Maghirang with the proper court and to prosecute the case. The
information for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was forthwith filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities in San Pablo City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 26240. On 11 April 1994, the
presiding judge, respondent herein, issued a warrant for the arrest of Maghirang, with a recommendation
of a P200.00 bond for his provisional liberty.

With prior leave from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, on 4 May 1995, the City Prosecutor
filed, in Criminal Case No. 26240, a motion for the suspension8 of accused Maghirang pursuant to
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, which reads, in part:

SEC. 13. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a single or as complex offense and in whatever stage
of execution and mode of participation, is pending in Court, shall be suspended from office.

In his Order of 30 June 1995,9 respondent judge denied the motion for suspension on the ground that:

[T]he alleged offense of UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was
committed on May 17, 1989, during [Maghirangs] terms (sic) of office from 1989 to 1994 and said
accused was again re-elected as Barangay Chairman during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994,
hence, offenses committed during previous term is (sic) not a cause for removal (Lizarez v. Hechanova,
et al., G.R. No. L-22059, May 17, 1965); an order of suspension from office relating to a given term may
not be the basis of contempt with respect to ones (sic) assumption of the same office under a new term
(Oliveros v. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1971) and, the Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would deprieve (sic) the people of
their right to elect their officer. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct (sic), if he had been guilty if any. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 94115, August 21,
1992).

The prosecution moved for reconsideration10 of the order, alleging that the court had confused removal
as a penalty in administrative cases and the temporary removal from office (or suspension) as a means of
preventing the public official, while the criminal case against him is pending, from exerting undue
influence, intimidate (sic) witnesses which may affect the outcome of the case; the former is a penalty or
sanction whereas the latter is a mere procedural remedy. Accordingly, while a re-elected public official
cannot be administratively punished by removing him from office for offenses committed during his
previous term, said public official can be temporarily removed to prevent him from wielding undue
influence which will definitely be a hindrance for justice to take its natural course. The prosecution then
enumerated the cases decided by this Court reiterating the rule that what a re-election of a public official
obliterates are only administrative, not criminal, liabilities, incurred during previous
terms.11cräläwvirtualibräry

In his order of 3 August 1995,12 respondent denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:

There is no dispute that the suspension sought by the prosecution is premised upon the act charged
allegedly committed during the accused [sic] previous term as Barangay Chairman of Brgy. III-E. San
Pablo City, who was subsequently re-elected as Barangay Chairman again during the last Barangay
Election of May 9, 1994. Certainly, had not the accused been re-elected the prosecution will not file the
instant motion to suspend him as there is no legal basis or the issue has become academic.

The instant case run [sic] parallel with the case of Lizares vs. Hechanova, et al., L-22059, May 17, 1966,
17 SCRA 58, wherein the Supreme Court subscribed to the rule denying the right to remove from office
because of misconduct during a prior term.

It is opined by the Court that preventive suspension is applicable only if there is [sic] administrative case
filed against a local official who is at the same time criminally charged in Court. At present, the records of
the Court shows [sic] that there is no pending administrative case existing or filed against the accused.

It was held in the concluding paragraph of the decision by the Honorable Supreme Court in Lizares v.
Hechanova, et al., that Since petitioner, having been duly re-elected, is no longer amenable to
administrative sanctions for any acts committed during his former tenure, the determination whether the
respondent validly acted in imposing upon him one months suspension for act [sic] done during his
previous term as mayor is now merely of theoretical interest.

Complainant then moved that respondent inhibit himself from Criminal Case No. 26240. In his order of 21
September 1995,13 respondent voluntarily inhibited himself. The case was assigned to Judge Adelardo
S. Escoses per order of Executive Judge Bienvenido V. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo
City.

On 15 October 1996, complainant filed his sworn letter-complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator.

In his comment dated 14 February 1997, filed in compliance with the resolution of this Court of 27
January 1997, respondent asserted that he had been continuously keeping abreast of legal and
jurisprudential development [sic] in the law since he passed the 1955 Bar Examinations; and that he
issued the two challenged orders only after due appreciation of prevailing jurisprudence on the matter,
citing authorities in support thereof. He thus prayed for dismissal of this case, arguing that to warrant a
finding of ignorance of law and abuse of authority, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an
inference of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision.14 He
emphasized, likewise, that the error had to be so grave and on so fundamental a point as to warrant
condemnation of the judge as patently ignorant or negligent;15 otherwise, to hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be
nothing short of harassment and that would be intolerable.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent further alleged that he earned complainants ire after denying the latters Motion for the
Suspension of Barangay Chairman Maghirang, which was filed only after Maghirang was re-elected in
1994; and that complainant made inconsistent claims, concretely, while in his letter of 4 September 1995
requesting respondent to inhibit from the case, complainant declared that he believed in respondents
integrity, competence and dignity, after he denied the request, complainant branded respondent as a
judge of poor caliber and understanding of the law, very incompetent and has no place in Court of
Justice.

Finally, respondent Judge avowed that he would not dare soil his judicial robe at this time, for he had only
three (3) years and nine (9) months more before reaching the compulsory age of retirement of seventy
(70); and that for the last 25 years as municipal judge in the seven (7) towns of Laguna and as presiding
judge of the MTCC, San Pablo City, he had maintained his integrity.

In compliance with the Courts resolution of 9 March 1998, the parties, by way of separate letters,
informed the Court that they agreed to have this case decided on the basis of the pleadings already filed,
with respondent explicitly specifying that only the complaint and the comment thereon be considered.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommends that this Court hold respondent liable for
ignorance of the law and that he be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. In support thereof, the OCA makes the following
findings and conclusions:

The claim of respondent Judge that a local official who is criminally charged can be preventively
suspended only if there is an administrative case filed against him is without basis. Section 13 of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) states that:

Suspension and loss of benefits Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office.

It is well settled that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan (or the Court) to
suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of this law, Book II, Title 7
of the RPC, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed in court.
The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is
required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution
or continue committing malfeasance in office. All that is required is for the court to make a finding that the
accused stands charged under a valid information for any of the above-described crimes for the purpose
of granting or denying the sought for suspension. (Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503 [August
4, 1994], 235 SCRA 103).
In the same case, the Court held that as applied to criminal prosecutions under RA 3019, preventive
suspension will last for less than ninety (90) days only if the case is decided within that period; otherwise,
it will continue for ninety (90) days.

Barangay Chairman Benjamin Maghirang was charged with Unlawful Appointment, punishable under
Article 244, Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, it was mandatory on Judge Monzons
part, considering the Motion filed, to order the suspension of Maghirang for a maximum period of ninety
(90) days. This, he failed and refused to do.

Judge Monzons contention denying complainants Motion for Suspension because offenses committed
during the previous term (is) not a cause for removal during the present term is untenable. In the case of
Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo vs. Hon. Luis Santos and Melvin Vargas, 212 SCRA 768, the Court held that the
rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior
term since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct
committed during a prior term, to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing
rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise, it was specifically declared in the case of Ingco vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-23220, 18 December
1967, 21 SCRA 1292, that The ruling, therefore, that when the people have elected a man to office it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any refers only to an action for removal from
office and does not apply to a criminal case. (Underscoring ours)

Clearly, even if the alleged unlawful appointment was committed during Maghirangs first term as
barangay chairman and the Motion for his suspension was only filed in 1995 during his second term, his
re-election is not a bar to his suspension as the suspension sought for is in connection with a criminal
case.

Respondents denial of complainants Motion for Reconsideration left the complainant with no other judicial
remedy. Since a case for Unlawful Appointment is covered by Summary Procedure, complainant is
prohibited from filing a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition involving an interlocutory order
issued by the court. Neither can he file an appeal from the courts adverse final judgment, incorporating in
his appeal the grounds assailing the interlocutory orders, as this will put the accused in double jeopardy.

All things considered, while concededly, respondent Judge manifested his ignorance of the law in denying
complainants Motion for Suspension of Brgy. Chairman Maghirang, there was nothing shown however to
indicate that he acted in bad faith or with malice. Be that as it may, it would also do well to note that good
faith and lack of malicious intent cannot completely free respondent from liability.

This Court, in the case of Libarios and Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48, ruled:

In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be
disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly
imperative that they should be conversant with basic principles.
A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a
given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of
litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles.

The findings and conclusions of the Office of the Court Administrator are in order. However, the penalty
recommended, i.e., reprimand, is too light, in view of the fact that despite his claim that he has been
continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in law ever since he passed
the Bar Examinations in 1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recall that as early as 18
December 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez,17 this Court explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public official
extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term
of office, thus:

The ruling, therefore, that -- when the people have elected a man to his office it must be assumed that
they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct if he had been guilty of any -- refers only to an action for removal from office and does not
apply to a criminal case, because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere
misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious
not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminal liability, does not
include reelection to office as one of them, at least insofar as a public officer is concerned. Also, under
the Constitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense.

In Ingco, this Court did not yield to petitioners insistence that he was benefited by the ruling in Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija18 that a public officer should never be removed for acts done prior to his
present term of office, as follows:

There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. The basis of the investigation which has been
commenced here, and which is sought to be restrained, is a criminal accusation the object of which is to
cause the indictment and punishment of petitioner-appellant as a private citizen; whereas in the cases
cited, the subject of the investigation was an administrative charge against the officers therein involved
and its object was merely to cause his suspension or removal from public office. While the criminal cases
involves the character of the mayor as a private citizen and the People of the Philippines as a community
is a party to the case, an administrative case involves only his actuations as a public officer as [they]
affect the populace of the municipality where he serves.19cräläwvirtualibräry

Then on 20 June 1969, in Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al.,20 this Court likewise categorically
declared that criminal liabilities incurred by an elective public official during his previous term of office
were not extinguished by his re-election, and that Pascual v. Provincial Governor and Lizares v.
Hechanova referred only to administrative liabilities committed during the previous term of an elective
official, thus:

1. The first problem we are to grapple with is the legal effect of the reelection of respondent municipal
officials. Said respondents would want to impress upon us the fact that in the last general elections of
November 14,1967 the Makati electorate reelected all of them, except that Vice-Mayor Teotimo Gealogo,
a councilor prior thereto, was elevated to vice-mayor. These respondents contend that their reelection
erected a bar to their removal from office for misconduct committed prior to November 14, 1967. It is to be
recalled that the acts averred in the criminal information in Criminal Case 18821 and for which they were
convicted allegedly occurred on or about July 26, 1967, or prior to the 1967 elections. They ground their
position on Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466, and Lizares vs. Hechanova, 17
SCRA 58.

A circumspect view leaves us unconvinced of the soundness of respondents' position. The two cases
relied upon have laid down the precept that a reelected public officer is no longer amenable to
administrative sanctions for acts committed during his former tenure. But the present case rests on an
entirely different factual and legal setting. We are not here confronted with administrative charges to
which the two cited cases refer. Here involved is a criminal prosecution under a special statute, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019).

Then again, on 30 May 1974, in Oliveros v. Villaluz,21 this Court held:

The first question presented for determination is whether a criminal offense for violation of Republic Act
3019 committed by an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a
subsequent term in the event of his reelection to office.

Petitioner concedes that "the power and authority of respondent judge to continue trying the criminal case
against petitioner may not in any way be affected by the fact of petitioner's reelection," but contends that
"said respondent's power to preventively suspend petitioner under section 13 of Republic Act 3019
became inefficacious upon petitioner's reelection" arguing that the power of the courts cannot be placed
over that of sovereign and supreme people who ordained his return to office.

Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija that "each
term is separate from other terms and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor" is misplaced.

The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that the Pascual ruling (which dealt with administrative
liability) applies exclusively to administrative and not to criminal liability and sanctions. Thus, in Ingco vs.
Sanchez the Court ruled that the reelection of a public officer for a new term does not in any manner wipe
out the criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term.

In Luciano vs. Provincial Governor the Court stressed that the cases of Pascual and Lizares are authority
for the precept that "a reelected public officer is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for acts
committed during his former tenure" but that as to criminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are not barred by reelection of the
public officer, since, inter alia, one of the penalties attached to the offense is perpetual disqualification
from public office and it "is patently offensive to the objectives and the letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practice Act . . . that an official may amass wealth thru graft and corrupt practices and thereafter use the
same to purchase reelection and thereby launder his evil acts."
Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and the body politic. The small
segment of the national electorate that constitutes the electorate of the municipality of Antipolo has no
power to condone a crime against the public justice of the State and the entire body politic. Reelection to
public office is not provided for in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability incurred by a public officer prior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of the Anti-
Graft Act imposes as one of the penalties in case of conviction perpetual disqualification from public office
and Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that such penalty of perpetual disqualification entails
"the deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if
conferred by popular election."

It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a previous expired
term by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply only to his administrative
and not to his criminal guilt. As succinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice) Felix Q.
Antonio's memorandum for the State, "to hold that petitioner's reelection erased his criminal liability would
in effect transfer the determination of the criminal culpability of an erring official from the court to which it
was lodged by law into the changing and transient whim and caprice of the electorate. This cannot be so,
for while his constituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt official by returning him back to office, a
criminal action initiated against the latter can only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his nefarious
act having been committed against the very State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey and uphold.
A contrary rule would erode the very system upon which our government is based, which is one of laws
and not of men."

Finally, on 21 August 1992, in Aguinaldo v. Santos,22 this Court stated:

Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed from administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds
no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the
failed coup.

Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrine enunciated in the above-mentioned
cases. If respondent has truly been continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development
[sic] in the law, it was impossible for him to have missed or misread these cases. What detracts from his
claim of assiduity is the fact that he even cited the cases of Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos in
support of his 30 June 1995 order. What is then evident is that respondent either did not thoroughly read
these cases or that he simply miscomprehended them. The latter, of course, would only manifest either
incompetence, since both cases were written in plain and simple language thereby foreclosing any
possibility of misunderstanding or confusion; or deliberate disregard of a long settled doctrine pronounced
by this Court.

While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judges --
and, of course, members of the Bar -- comprehending the decisions is a different matter, for it is in that
area where ones competence may then be put to the test and proven. Thus, it has been said that a judge
is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative
doctrines.23 He should strive for excellence, exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be
the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.24cräläwvirtualibräry
Needless to state, respondent was, in this instance, wanting in the desired level of mastery of a revered
doctrine on a simple issue.

On the other hand, if respondent judge deliberately disregarded the doctrine laid down in Ingco v.
Sanchez and reiterated in the succeeding cases of Luciano v. Provincial Governor, Oliveros v. Villaluz
and Aguinaldo v. Santos, it may then be said that he simply wished to enjoy the privilege of overruling this
Courts doctrinal pronouncements. On this point, and as a reminder to all judges, it is apropos to quote
what this Court said sixty-one years ago in People v. Vera:25cräläwvirtualibräry

As already observed by this Court in Shioji vs. Harvey [1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in
subsequent cases if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling
decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result. A
becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.

Likewise, in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Appeals:26cräläwvirtualibräry

The spirit and initiative and independence on the part of men of the robe may at times be commendable,
but certainly not when this Court, not once but at least four times, had indicated what the rule should be.
We had spoken clearly and unequivocally. There was no ambiguity in what we said. Our meaning was
clear and unmistakable. We did take pains to explain why it must be thus. We were within our power in
doing so. It would not be too much to expect, then, that tribunals in the lower rungs of the judiciary would
at the very least, take notice and yield deference. Justice Laurel had indicated in terms too clear for
misinterpretation what is expected of them. Thus: A becoming modesty of inferior court[s] demands
conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated
judicial system of the nation.27 In the constitutional sense, respondent Court is not excluded from such a
category. The grave abuse of discretion is thus manifest.

In Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras,28 this Court affirmed that by tradition and in our system of
judicial administration, this Court has the last word on what the law is, and that its decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution and laws form part of this countrys legal system.29 All other courts should
then be guided by the decisions of this Court. To judges who find it difficult to do so, Vivo v. Cloribel30
warned:

Now, if a Judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the
application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his
conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance
with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest
Court of the Land, and that any deviation from the principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably
cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of
what is here said, a Judge, still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other
alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render
judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.
Finally, the last sentence of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to administer his
office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a
depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.

That having been said, we cannot but conclude that the recommended penalty of reprimand is not
commensurate with the misdeed committed. A fine of P5,000.00, with a warning that a commission of
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely is, at the very least, appropriate, considering
respondent is due for compulsory retirement on 29 November 2000 and that this is his first offense.

WHEREFORE, for incompetence as a result of ignorance of a settled doctrine interpreting a law, or

deliberate disregard of such doctrine in violation of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent
Judge Iluminado C. Monzon is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and
warned that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts
unbecoming a judge."

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia
Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this
case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition
filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant,
concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of
the plaintiff and defendant.

In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things
that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes;
b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the only
offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining
plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene
Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter
and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the deceased during
his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties
should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to
defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the
other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally
among his children by his two marriages.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case
3010, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a

preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders
judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene
Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an
illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474,
 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa
Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging
to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common
partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging
exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir
of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of each
of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the
remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892,
5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring
Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304
and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-
half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4)
of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8)
Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in
such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of
Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the
whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par
2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided
among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share
of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed
the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the
other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the
latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs.
Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33);
(9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have
become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of
the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such
manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and
equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind, quality,
nature and value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the
costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named
and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other
claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16,
1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A.
Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties
themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge
Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is
quoted hereunder in full:

The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for
approval the following project of partition:

COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled

case, to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of
Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively
to Bernardita Reyes Macariola;

2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along

the eastern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R.
Macariola;

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes
Bales;

4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along

the western part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-
Bales;

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares;

6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking
the portions awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to
Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes
and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the
remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla
Reyes.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition

indicated above which is made in accordance with the decision of the
Honorable Court be approved.

Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have
signed this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both
counsels of the respective parties to this Court that the Project of
Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a conference and
agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above
Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the Court
that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of
Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of
Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby approves the same. The
parties, therefore, are directed to execute such papers, documents or
instrument sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of the rights,
interests and participations which were adjudicated to the respective
parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the
respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project of
Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and necessary to
effectuate the said Project of Partition.

SO ORDERED.
 Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

EXH. B.

The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the
purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the
corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with
the project of partition (see Exh. U).

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half
thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was
the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project
of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed
Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court
the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot
1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's

court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq.
meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued
transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh.
12).

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an
area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion
(Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh.
F).

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective
shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries
Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were
Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and
the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs.
Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as
"TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on
January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968
alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph
5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14,
paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum
by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as
a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is
not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter
disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on
October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to
then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation.
After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that
respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in
the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that
he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice
Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein
instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff,
versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the
annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two
orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the
subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from
the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a
real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a
portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was
dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil
Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza
Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P.
Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A.
Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was
directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister
of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit
"B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B.
Asuncion,

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for

moral damages;

(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for

exemplary damages;

(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal

damages; and

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

 B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN,
FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED
GERARDO VILLASIN —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of
the deceased Gerardo Villasin;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo
Villasin the cost of the suit.

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES,

ET AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer,
Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon
perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first
cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties
involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes
the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue
of their profession [emphasis supplied].

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the
subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de
Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of
the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer
subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order
dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16,
1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was
no appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E
from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality
of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half
thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes
and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated
as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which
he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a
portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only.
The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective
shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which
respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project
of partition.

While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition
and the two orders approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent
conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case
No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the
property was no longer subject of litigation.

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or
affect the aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice,
was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year
after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of
partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the New Civil Code.

It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio
Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the
illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the
project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:

And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the
acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the
whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wife the
Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the project of
partition, Exh. A.
 Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between
the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no
evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E,
in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).

xxx xxx xxx

On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that
Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E
from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen,
credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in
good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or
previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).

On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of
partition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating
Justice, as follows:

1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the
parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him
for approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was
done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio
Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client to
submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is
true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in
evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his
affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain
actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents
of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the
following documents:

1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban
Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a).
On tills certificate of title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the
project of partition was duly entered and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);

2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes

Macariola on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of
the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she
was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to
her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was
duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh.
9-e).

In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of

partition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23,
1963, followed by an amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4
thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which
complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation
of the project of partition.

Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth
share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the
 project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C,
it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother,
Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth
of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the
owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh.
A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other
reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased
father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola
admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with
the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can
deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010
relative to the project of partition.

Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties
adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however,
did not present any direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in
the choice and distribution of the real properties when she could have easily done so by
presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market value of said
properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that there were
inequalities in the distribution of the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).

Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however,
improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in
his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it
was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece
of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of
which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted
position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in
the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such as
not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular
case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his
actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no
longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties
to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a
corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his
acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of
respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the
public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of
justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).

II

With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated
paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having
been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:

Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor
can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in
commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in
which they discharge their duties:
 1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public
prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal
judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily
discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a
determinate territory.

It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce
which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political
law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees,
like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants
of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law
embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public
officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an
administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect
to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885,
with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which
was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this
jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to
the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been
abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign,
whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either
following a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and
pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer
of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the
new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the
conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such
political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or
institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so
declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in
time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the
case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542,
7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the
relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their
relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are
 created between them and the government which has acquired their
territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the
allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which
regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in
force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle
of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated. "

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of
the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the
Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding
effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals.

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any

business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes
or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing
that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in
which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The
business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the
Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly
becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not
enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has
to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or
transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40
O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its
business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited
in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case
filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either
party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus
Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the
aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9
or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent
Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January
31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting
members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.

It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948,
does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal
judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but
with the permission of the district judge concerned.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as
heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
America, because it is political in nature.

Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by
judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot
apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the
property was no longer subject of litigation.

In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service
Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the
purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of
said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any
interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the
aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without
a written permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined
by law.

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules
promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the
Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by
Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7,
Article X, 1973 Constitution.

Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of
the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious
misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is
authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct
the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the
special procedure for the discipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline
judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of
the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the
service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him
for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus,
a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and
employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the
head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and
the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec.
20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second
branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule
XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize the
same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as
aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely,
serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who
has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it,
all administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except
as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and
upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and
prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis
supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have
already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only
permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-
Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).

Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the
provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the
Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to
be involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not
retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to
dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably
possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that
such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the
administration of his judicial duties. ...

WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January
31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears
also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as
there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of
the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on
January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation.
Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the
incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the
commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it became
involved in any court litigation
III

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of
coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of
the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating
Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and
WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:

The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated
and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised
himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said
Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of
the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and
claims that all the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I
see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by
complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-
law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law"
(Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent and any
person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with
respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with
Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's
child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of
violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A.
Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge where said persons
were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave any
undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his
practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence,
if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador
Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as

possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in
his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship
constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial
Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a
ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be
clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405,
rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not
violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in
engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities,
because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must
always be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY

REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote with Justice Aquino.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote with Justice Aquino.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997.]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, Petitioner, v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA

HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DEFINED. — A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for

the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except
by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered.

2. ID.; ID.; DEEMED WRITTEN IN EVERY STATUTE AND CONTRACT. — Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose
their reason for being.

3. ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED SELF-EXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING. — In case of

doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them
entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Cruz, Isagani A.,
Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10)

4. ID.; ID.; SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS; LEGISLATURE NOT PRECLUDED FROM ENACTING

LAWS ENFORCING PROVISIONS. — Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in
such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision
so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it
was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does
not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PROVISION MAY BE SELF-EXECUTING IN ONE PART AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING
IN ANOTHER. — Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of
Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing
because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully
owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require
any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

6. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION ON PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, SELF-

EXECUTING. — Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is
per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES THE NATIONAL, RESOURCES AND CULTURAL, HERITAGE. — When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as
the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, EMBRACED THEREIN; FILIPINO FIRST POLICY
PROVISION, APPLICABLE IN SALES OF HOTEL STOCKS. — For more than eight (8) decades Manila
Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its
existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands.

9. ID.; STATE; SALE BY THE GSIS OF 51% OF ITS SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL CORP., A STATE
ACTION, SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND. — In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when
the activity it engages in is a" public function", (2) when the government is so-significantly involved with
the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and. (3) when the government has
approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share
in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State
and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
10. ID.; CONSTITUTION; WHEN THE CONSTITUTION ADDRESSES THE STATE, IT REFERS TO
BOTH PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT. — When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to
the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of
three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate
directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable
that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

11. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; SALE OF STOCKS
OF MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION BY THE GSIS; FILIPINOS ALLOWED TO MATCH THE BID OF
FOREIGN ENTITY. — In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to
match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should
go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a
perilous skirting of the basic law.

12. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FOREIGN BIDDERS WITHOUT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST GSIS
BEFORE ACCEPTANCE OF BID. — The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a
foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were
invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the
qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while
petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate,
petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or
personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the
bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner’s matching bid did the
latter have a cause of action.

13. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, CERTIORARI; FAILURE OF THE GSIS TO EXECUTE
CORRESPONDING DOCUMENTS WHERE PETITIONER HAD MATCHED THE BID PRICE BY
FOREIGN BIDDER, A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Since petitioner has already matched the
bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the
bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

14. ID.; SUPREME COURT; DUTY BOUND TO MAKE SURE THAT CONTRACTS DO NOT VIOLATE
THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAWS. — While it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of
the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden
duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no
matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the
Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any
economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.

PADILLA, J., concurring opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION, CONSTRUED. — A study of the

1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" originated, would show that its framers
decided to adopt the even more comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the
phrase encircles a concept embracing not only the natural resources of the country but practically
everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and
the spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with
conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved
only through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership,
but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony. Moreover, the concept of national patrimony
has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony
and, as such deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This
institution has played an important role in our nation’s history, having been the venue of many a historical
event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of
state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.

2. ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL, PART OF OUR NATIONAL PATRIMONY. — There is no doubt in my mind
that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional
protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This institution has played an important
role in our nation’s history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as
it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries. celebrities, and
others.

3. ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; APPLIED TO SALES OF SHARE OF STOCKS

OF MANILA HOTEL. — "Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful, must refer not only to things
that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the existing order."
In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national patrimony, preference
to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino, the
preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in
which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional
preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-
Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all. While government
agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and
even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from
reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the
hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the
Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of
the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with
the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural
heritage in the hands of Filipinos.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION GIVING PREFERENCE

TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, SELF-EXECUTORY. — The provision in our fundamental law which provides
that" (i)n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is self-executory. The provision verily does not need,
although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PATRIMONY INCLUDES CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE COUNTRY; MANILA HOTEL,
EMBRACED THEREIN. — The term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country’s natural resources
but also to its cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres,
Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM; SALE OF ITS SHARE IN

MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, AN ACT OF THE STATE; CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
SHOULD BE COMPLIED WITH. — The act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a
government entity which derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be
considered an act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.
4. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS; DOES NOT REFER TO ALLOWING QUALIFIED FILIPINOS TO MATCH FOREIGN BID. —
On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos" I find it somewhat difficult to take
the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before us, the
only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign
bid for, as a practical matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to
the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the
competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of
preference.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS; FILIPINO BIDDERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO EQUAL BID OF FOREIGN FIRM IN SALE
OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION. — I take the view that in the context of the present
controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that" [i]n the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is to
allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the
purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a
qualified Filipino or Philippine corporation can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or
concession given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national or corporation. Under the rules on
public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and the Malaysian firm had
offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder seeking the larger ownership
interest in MHC," so that if petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian
corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases
like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential treatment of the
Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks. That, to me, is what "preference to
qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a
disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.

TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION; MANILA HOTEL, EMBRACED

WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF; SALE OF ITS STOCKS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. — Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution should be read in conjunction with Article II
of the same Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain — "The
State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy, effectively controlled by Filipinos."
(Sec. 19), Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in
the 1987 Constitution Commission proceedings. The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution
reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973
Constitution. I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is
the product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance
by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people. The Manila Hotel is part of our
history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to historic events (too numerous to
mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years. The history of the Manila Hotel should not be
placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical
values of our people. The Filipino should be first under his Constitution and in his own land.

PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; AS A RULE PROVISIONS THEREOF ARE SELF-EXECUTING.

— A Constitution provides the guiding policies and principles upon which is built the substantial
foundation and general framework of the law and government. As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-
executing and can be enforced without further legislative action. Some of its provisions, however, can be
implemented only through appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing. Courts
as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than as requiring future
legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern For if they are not treated as self-
executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and
nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may
give breath to constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.

2. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTING WHERE IT MERELY ANNOUNCES A POLICY
AND EMPOWERS THE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT LAWS TO CARRY THE POLICY INTO EFFECT. —
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which
the policy shall be carried into effect.

3. ID.; ID.; FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12 NOT SELF-EXECUTING. — The first
paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country to Filipino citizens or to
corporations sixty per cent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to
enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned
enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the national economy and patrimony. The
third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign investments in line with our national goals and
well-set priorities. The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a
categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of
investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino
enterprises.

4. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS UNDER PARAGRAPHS

2 AND 3 OF SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12, SELF-EXECUTING. — The second and third paragraphs of
Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the
three great branches of our government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the national
economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not merely
"certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the exclusive
power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights
and privileges covering our national economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of
the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any
reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the third
paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, PART OF THE NATIONAL PATRIMONY. — The
second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the
disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that the
Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo,
"patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. By
this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony.

6. ID.; STATE; GSIS, EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF. — The third issue is whether the
constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that
GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the
monthly contributions of government employees and the government. The funds are held in trust for a
distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. They are to be used to finance the retirement,
disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of
the GSIS. Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the
benefit of the employees. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public corporation
created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is subject to the
jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit. As a state-owned and
controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution especially
those designed to promote the general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First
policy which the people elevated as a constitutional command.

7. ID.; CONSTITUTION; PROVISIONS THEREOF DEEMED INCLUDED IN ALL LEGISLATIONS AND

ALL STATE ACTIONS. — The constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is addressed to
the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be understood as limited to
legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and regulations adopted by agencies and
instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-making power.

8. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; STATE NOT

PROHIBITED FROM GRANTING RIGHTS TO FOREIGN FIRM IN THE ABSENCE OF QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. — In the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these rights,
privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of
Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder,
should be preferred. It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to
match the bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner’s submission must be supported by the rules but even if we
examine the rules inside-out a thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the
right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded the
block of shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It deserves the
award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino the
privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand.
Our sympathies may be with petitioner but the court has no power to extend the latitude and longtitude of
the right of preference as defined by the rules. We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if
we differ with the wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the
grant for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a
denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.

10. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; PARTY ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE WINNING
BID OF FOREIGN FIRM FROM BEING AWARE OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
BIDDINGS IT AGREED TO RESPECT. — I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning
bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the
rules and regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid after
submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even
during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It
cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained,
petitioners’ stance will wreak havoc on the essence of bidding.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS; LOSING FILIPINO NOT GIVEN RIGHT TO EQUAL THE HIGHEST FOREIGN BID. — The
majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is
concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to
win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . . . covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority
concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically, no statute
empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the
absence of such empowering law, the majority’s strained interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes
unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and
where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines! Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such
judicial legislation is short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests.
In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the
constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids are equal. In
this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without being unfair to the
foreigner. In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are
tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, 1 is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether
the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/ reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51%
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42
more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will
instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest
Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel . . . .

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions
are met

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained." 3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October
1995 petitioner sent a manager’s check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . .
5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18
October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by
the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and
capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a
part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-
owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the
shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the
bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
price per share. 8

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s). . . . Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to lay
down conditions under which business may be done." 9

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs
of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who
have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these
alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own
separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.chanrobles

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the
shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the
beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1, of the bidding rules which provides that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege
of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is
premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition
giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent
GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its
discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no
clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of
a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an
outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. 13

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions
has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
. . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-
executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style.
If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a
preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear?
To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against
aliens or over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the
existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For
example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera
(Emphasis supplied by respondents).

MR RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes. 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that
it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares
with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe
a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-
executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-
executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and
make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned
by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require
any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements
of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as
moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v.
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on personal
dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building, 23 the promotion of
social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to
constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the
vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and development.
33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that
they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce
such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no
statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is
a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains —

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences
and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources
but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as
the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino.
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which
have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930’s. It was the site of the
festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House
of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality. 36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. 37 During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a
military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by
the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950’s
and 1960’s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political
convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international
recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a
failed coup d’etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine
Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission —

THE PRESIDENT.

Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE.

I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in
substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR
CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY
OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

MR. MONSOD.

Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a
corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE.

The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by
Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD.

At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE.

Is that the intention?

MR MONSOD.

Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent
Filipino.

MR. DAVIDE.

I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to
juridical personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD.
We agree, Madam President. 39

x x x

MR. RODRIGO.

Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO.

The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will include
not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. FOZ.

Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that
I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO.

"IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS."cralaw virtua1aw library

MR. FOZ.

In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO.

Obviously.

MR. FOZ.

If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO.

The answer is "yes."cralaw virtua1aw library

MR. FOZ.

Thank you. 41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —

MR NOLLEDO.
Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That
means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights
covering the national patrimony. 42

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision
was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —

"Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is better
known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy. . . . This provision was never found in previous Constitutions. . . .

The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make
a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly
does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are
incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and
inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
"qualified foreigner" and a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and
selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its
own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel
company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila
Hotel. 44

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision
is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a
clear constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of
reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the
provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own
and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that
arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the
discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even
before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When
the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of
applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the
sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court,
for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates. 45

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best
specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a
"state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
function;" (2) when the government is so-significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes
under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction, although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command. 46

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder.
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after
it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the
Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder.
Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should
be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for
being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts
must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason
for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.
47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution.
For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional
fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities
is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding
is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be
awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid
tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid
offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS
to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent
disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner’s matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing
to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the
Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy
the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced.
This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth
emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the
influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business
opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained
by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately
articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the
Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress
and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court’s First Division
against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal
system can be a major obstacle to doing business here."cralaw virtua1aw library

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts
of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden
duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no
matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A
commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will
always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is
involved. 49

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state,
with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In
nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no
higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept.
Protection of foreign investments, while laudable, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important
events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of
states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the
highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country.
51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation’s soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified
Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-
Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is
safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the
clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will
continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.

SO ORDERED

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a bit more
on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions such as the
Manila Hotel.

It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which qualified
Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision on point
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." 1

Petitioner’s argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony" consists
of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article 1) consisting of land,
sea, and air. 2 A study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" originated,
would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the
Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only the natural resources of the
country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as well
as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers
did not stop with conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this
may be achieved only through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the
exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony. 3

Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. 4

There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as
such deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This
institution has played an important role in our nation’s history, having been the venue of many a historical
event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of
state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. 5

It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President Manuel
L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we should do so with an
eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of today are the trustees of the
patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos was the intent of the
distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for nationalization
of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should "put more teeth into our laws, and; not
make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary legislation but of
constitutional enactment." 6 To quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and trespassers in
their own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens
and encumbrances." 7

Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful, must refer not
only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the
existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national
patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid
of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-
Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The
Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid
of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.

It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our country,
stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While government
agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and
even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from
reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the
hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the
Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels This should not stop us from retaining 51% of
the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with
the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural
heritage in the hands of Filipinos.

VITUG, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that" (i)n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos" 1 is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be amplified or
regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.

Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country’s natural resources but also to its
cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel
has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.

Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which derives
its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of the State
subject to the Constitutional mandate.

On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat difficult to take
the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before us, the
only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign
bid for, as a practical matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to
the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the
competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of
preference.

It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdown that
it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the peculiar
constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at times is seen
to, instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequacies which create the perception that it even takes on
non-justiciable controversies.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the Petition.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional
mandate that" [i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" 1 is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the
bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila
Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino or Philippine corporation can be given
preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State, by favoring it over a
foreign national or corporation.

Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and the
Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder seeking the
larger ownership interest in MHC," 2 so that if petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the
Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is
only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential
treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks. 3 That, to me, is
what "preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos whenever
they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.

This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 4 to a 1947 statute giving "preference to Filipino
citizens in the lease of public market stalls." 5 This Court upheld the cancellation of existing leases
covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award thereafter of the stalls
to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado v. De
la Fuente, 6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the statute
(R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and granting preference to Filipino
citizens in the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo, 7 the
preference granted under the statute was held to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the
same stalls occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even if there were available other stalls as
good as those occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of
interest between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the
right to preference immediately arises." 8

Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the 1970s in
America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse discrimination programs
designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such areas as employment, contracting
and licensing. 9 Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy, there are situations in which the only way
to place Filipinos in control of the national economy as contemplated in the Constitution 10 is to give them
preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal footing with aliens.

There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or deprive the
country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with common trades or
common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of government
property, which is like the grant of government largess or benefits. In the words of Art. XII, sec. 10, we are
dealing here with "rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy" and therefore no
one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citizens. That at any rate is the command
of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the Government. It is being privatized.
Privatization should result in the relinquishment of the business in favor of private individuals and groups
who are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.

Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be trading
competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are qualified, having
hurdled the pre-qualification process. 12 It is only the result of the public bidding that is sought to be
modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.

Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of
an alien could encourage speculation, since all the Filipino entity would then do would be not to make a
bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest bid,
make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on public bidding of
the GSIS. Under these rules there is minimum bid required (P36.67 per share for a range of 9 to 15
million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other hand, if the Filipino
entity, after passing the pre-qualification process, does not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to match
the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly
submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.

TORRES, JR., J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are confronted in the case at bar
with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the side of history. The reason
perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of history is
worth a volume of logic."cralaw virtua1aw library

I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and cultural
aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of the nation."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national goals and
priorities."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution pertaining
to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —

"The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy, effectively controlled by
Filipinos." (Sec. 19).

Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the 1987
Constitution Commission proceedings, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"MR. NOLLEDO.

The Amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will include
not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities fully controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III,
Records of the Constitutional, p. 608)

MR. MONSOD.

We also wanted to add, as Commissioner Villegas said, this committee and this body already approved
what is known as the Filipino First policy which was suggested by Commissioner de Castro. So that it is
now in our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 225).

Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"MR. NOLLEDO.

In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

MR. FOZ.

In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise shall be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO.

Obviously.

MR. FOZ.

If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO.

The answer is "yes" (Vol. III p. 616, Records of the Constitutional Commission).

The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have not reneged on this
nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest cases, this Court said —
"The ‘nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. . . . It cannot therefore
be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the
Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional (Ichong, Et. Al. v. Hernandez, Et Al., 101 Phil.
1155)."cralaw virtua1aw library

I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is the product of
events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the collective
mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.

The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to
historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years.

As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the legal
largesse which have given rise to the controversy, as I believe that has been exhaustively discussed in
the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the
auction block of a purely business transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical values of our
people.

As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in the words
of philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga, (tradition) is "more of a river than a stone, it keeps flowing, and
one must view the flow in both directions. If you look towards the hill from which the river flows, you see
tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the river or people towards the future; if you look the
other way, you progress."cralaw virtua1aw library

Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not
jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.

I grant, of course, that men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.

I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that he makes
mistakes." On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding the belief that
the Filipino is first under his Constitution and in his own land.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

PUNO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a domestic
corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the second paragraph
of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the Manila
Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel was included in
the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buyers 30% to
51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel Corporation. After
the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale was increased from a
maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner" of the GSIS was
required to "provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel." 1 The proposal was
approved by respondent Committee on Privatization.

In July 1995, a conference was held where pre-qualification documents and the bidding rules were
furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, pre-qualified. 2
The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Pre-qualification and
Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic
Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First — Pass the prequalification process;

Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares;

Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995.

x x x

IV. GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

A. PARTIES WHO MAY APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION

The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing reservation, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance
of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting to the prequalification process any local and/or
foreign corporation, consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of the following
qualifications:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Proven management expertise in the hotel industry; or

b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board representation) in another hotel company; or

c. Overall management and marketing expertise to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.

Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide access to the requisite management
expertise and/or international marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.

x x x

D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

x x x

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE

1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE

The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM
during working days within the period specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists of the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization
b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila Hotel Corporation

c. Letter of Invitation to the Prequalification and Bidding Conference

x x x

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The Manila Hotel on the date specified in Section
III to allow the Applicant to seek clarifications and further information regarding the guidelines and
procedures. Only those who purchased the prequalification documents will be allowed in this conference.
Attendance to this conference is strongly advised, although the Applicant will not be penalized if it does
not attend.

5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

The Applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification documents (1 original set plus 4 copies) at the
Registration Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in
Section III.

F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS

1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with the assistance of the TEC based on the Information
Package and other information available to the PBAC.

2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the evaluation will consider the overall qualifications of
the group, taking into account the contribution of each member to the venture

3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the results of the PBAC evaluation will be final.

4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the criteria set forth below:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Business management expertise, track record, and experience

b. Financial capability

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic plan for the Manila Hotel

5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may deem appropriate.

6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding — ITT Sheraton, Marriot International Inc.,
Renaissance Hotels International Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in the
Public Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification process again.

G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be posted at the
Registration Office at the date specified in Section III.

2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by a member whose qualification was a
material consideration for being included in the shortlist is a ground for disqualification of the Applicant.

V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING

All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to participate in the Public Bidding.

B. BLOCK OF SHARES

A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hundred Thousand (15,300,000) shares of
stock, representing Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and outstanding shares
of MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qualified Bidders will have the option of
determining the number of shares within the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract bidders with
different preferences and objectives for the operation and management of The Manila Hotel.

C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS

1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum bid required on a price per share basis
for the Block of Shares is Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).

2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.

3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the minimum required will not considered.

D. TRANSFER COSTS

x x x

E. OFFICIAL BID FORM

1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a copy of which is attached as Annex IV.
The Official Bid Form must be properly accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment may be a
sufficient basis for disqualification.

2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the Official Bid Form, which will indicate the
offered purchase price, in a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."cralaw virtua1aw library

F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be submitted along with the bid in a separate
envelop marked "SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS" :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH)

If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the Qualified Bidder should submit a Board
resolution which adequately authorizes such representative to bid for and in behalf of the corporation with
full authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each member of the Consortium/Joint Venture
should submit a Board resolution authorizing one of its members and such member’s representative to
make the bid on behalf of the group with full authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind
the Qualified Bidder.

2. BID SECURITY

a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos (P33,000.00), in Philippine currency as
Bid Security in the form of:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
i. Manager’s check or unconditional demand draft payable to the "Government Service Insurance System"
and issued by a reputable banking institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and
acceptable to GSIS; or

ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable banking institution acceptable to the GSIS.

b. The GSIS will reject a bid if :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

i. The bid does not have a Bid Security; or

ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less than the required amount

c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager’s check or unconditional demand draft, the interest
earned on the Bid Security will be for the account of GSIS.

d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner, the Bid Security will be applied
as the downpayment on the Qualified Bidder’s offered purchase price.

e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned immediately after the Public Bidding if the
Qualified Bidder is not declared the Highest Bidder.

f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the Highest Bidder is unable to negotiate and
execute with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract
or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.

g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor of GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after
negotiating and executing the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila
Hotel, fails or refuses to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or

ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price not later than October 23, 1995; or

iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for any other reason.

G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS

1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the following location:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area

Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila

2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bidding to accept any and all bids and
supporting requirements. Representatives from the Commission on Audit and COP will be invited to
witness the proceedings.

3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid Form. The accomplished Official Bid
Form should be submitted in a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents in another sealed envelope marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS"
a. Written Authority Bid

b. Bid Security

5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and "SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be
submitted simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, Philippine Standard Time, on
the date of the Public Bidding. No bid shall be accepted after the closing time. Opened or tampered bids
shall not be accepted.

6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submission of the two sealed envelopes. The
actual time of submission will also be indicated by the Secretariat on the face of the two envelopes.

7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in the corresponding bid boxes provided for
the purpose. These boxes will be in full view of the invited public.

H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS

1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bidding, the PBAC will open all sealed
envelopes marked "SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those
who submitted incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which is/are not substantially in the form
required by PBAC will be disqualified. The envelope containing their Official Bid Form will be immediately
returned to the disqualified bidders.

2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened at 3:00 PM. The name of the bidder and
the amount of its bid price will be read publicly as the envelopes are opened.

3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will formally announce the highest bid and the
Highest Bidder.

4. The highest bid will be determined on a price per share basis. In the event of a tie wherein two or more
bids have the same equivalent price per share, priority will be given to the bidder seeking the larger
ownership interest in MHC.

5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed period; or

b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and acceptable to the PBAC.

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 or the Highest
Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares
to the other Qualified Bidders:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/ Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest
Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is intending to provide only financial
support to The Manila Hotel, a separate institution may enter into the aforementioned contract/s with
GSIS/MHC.

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of which
will be distributed to each of the Qualified Bidder after the prequalification process is completed.

2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management Contract for The Manila Hotel, the
maximum levels for the management fee structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in the
Management Contract are as follows :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross revenues.(1)

b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating profit (1) after deducting undistributed overhead
expenses and the basic management fee.

c. Fixed component of the international marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of gross
room revenues.(1) The Applicant should indicate in its Information Package if it is wishes to charge this
fee.

Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.

The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters for the hotel management fees to
facilitate the negotiations with the Highest Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public Bidding.

A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The Manila Hotel should determine whether or
not the management fee structure above is acceptable before submitting their prequalification documents
to GSIS.

J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share.

2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will be in accordance with the equivalent
price per share of their respective bids in the Public Bidding, i.e. first and second priority will be given to
the Qualified Bidders that submitted the second and third highest bids on the price per share basis,
respectively, and so on.

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions
are met:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995; and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP/OGCC are obtained.

I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES

1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must
fully pay, not later than October 23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of Shares after
deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.

2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager’s Check or unconditional Demand Draft,
payable to the "Government Service Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking institution
licensed to do business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.

M. GENERAL CONDITIONS

1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all applications, waive any formality
therein, or accept such application as maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS
similarly reserves the right to require the submission of any additional information from the Applicant as
the PBAC may deem necessary.

2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding prior to acceptance of the bids and call
for a new public bidding under amended rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any or all the
Qualified Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid Security.

3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline
for the submission of the prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or other pertinent
activities at least three (3) calendar days prior to the respective deadlines/target dates.

4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it has on the Block of Shares.

5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidders, except the Bid Security, may be
returned upon request.

6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public Bidding is final. The Qualified Bidders, by
participating in the Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed to accept and abide by these results.

7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless from any liability, suit or allegation arising out of the Public
Bidding by the Qualified Bidders who have participated in the Public Bidding." 3

The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for
15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares. The GSIS
declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner’s bid security.

On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the bid
price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second paragraph of
Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager’s check for thirty-three million pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as bid security.

Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and conditions of the
contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain petitioner’s request.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 18, 1995.

Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution 4 on the
"National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

x x x"

The vital issues can be summed up as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision and
does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

(2) Assuming section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement section 10, paragraph 2
of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to petitioner, a qualified
Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;

(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation.

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies and
principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government. 5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further
legislative action. 6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws
enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to hoe. The
key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its language. A
searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment,
complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and enforcement. 7 The
inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in question. 8

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, 9 rather than as requiring
future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated
as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily
ignored and nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that
legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate
them. 12

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and
seizures, 13 the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an accused, 15 and the
privilege against self-incrimination. 16 It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection
of property. 17 The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or
damaging of property for public use without just compensation. 18

Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which
the policy shall be carried into effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our
Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed as mere
statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions of Article XIII on "Social
Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and
Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the
discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their policy
content. 24

Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and
in accordance with its national goals and priorities."cralaw virtua1aw library

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country 25 to Filipino
citizens or to corporations sixty per cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further
commands Congress to enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred
percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State
to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the national economy
and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign investments in line with our
national goals and well-set priorities.

The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical
command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of investments in the
country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right
granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right by means of
legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from section 3, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution. 27 The provision in the 1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao
Ichong v. Hernandez, 28 where we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain
areas of investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of section 10 affirmed the
power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not to
Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is also
broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the]
national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read
as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to qualified
Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy and patrimony. Their
language does not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to
refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is
now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.

This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that" [T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy in our
fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its enforcement by the whole State
without any pause or a half-pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves
the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that
the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo,
"patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. 30 By
this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The
unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The
value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first
opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular Government for Americans
living in, or passing through, Manila while travelling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino
craftsmanship were utilized in its construction. For sometime, it was exclusively used by American and
Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the American Insular Government for
visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth
period. When the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for the
highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their
last stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and
Filipinos alike. Presidents and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and
sports celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and
conferences. In the local scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political
parties. The Hotel has reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from
international hotel and travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and
ingenuity. These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act No.
4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No 486, "he Cultural
Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural
property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property." 32 Approved
on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot be read as
the exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law does
not equate cultural treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the
nation."cralaw virtua1aw library

The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A look
at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that administers
funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the government. 33 The
funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. 34 They are to be
used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the
administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS. 35 Excess funds, however, are allowed to be
invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the employees. 36 It is thus contended that the
GSIS’ investment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the
contemplation of section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public
corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is subject to
the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As a state-owned
and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution
especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the
Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constitutional command.

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of the phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their
"preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for a
Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which can be bent to meet today’s manifest
needs and tomorrow’s unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a
living constitution.

Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo brushed aside a
suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained that present and prospective "laws" will
take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

THE PRESIDENT.

What is the suggestion of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO.

No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO.

Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or
the prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done, for example,
qualifications on capital, qualifications or the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera.

MR. RODRIGO.
It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO.

Yes.

MR. RODRIGO.

If we say, "PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as giving preference to

qualified Filipinos as against Filipinos who are not qualified.

MR. NOLLEDO.

Madam President, that was the intention of the proponents. The committee has accepted the
amendment.

x x x"

As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is addressed to
the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be understood as limited to
legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and regulations adopted by agencies and
instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-making power. In the case at bar, the bidding
rules and regulations set forth the, standards to measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and
foreigners alike. It is not seriously disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39

Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of preference gives it a second
chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.

With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner’s submission. I prescind from the premise that the second
paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Filipino but not anti-alien. It is pro-Filipino for
it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely bar aliens in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. Indeed, in
the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these rights, privileges and
concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.

In implementing the policy articulated in Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task of our
State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the need to develop
our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our
economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define the degree of the
right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to serve the general
welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing
needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as
time dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the degree
of the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice versa.

Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at any
given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right primarily
belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other branches of government,
and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the limits
of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of this right of
preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national economy and judicial duty. On
the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the State that violate the policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently, we
must turn to the rules and regulations of respondents Committee on Privatization and GSIS to determine
the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless
look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential right to be
accorded a qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean that they
do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, Section 10, Article XII of the
Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics which demand
that we interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of
petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, and
petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder, should be preferred.

It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. Petitioner’s submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine the rules
inside-out a thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the
highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded the block of shares . . ."
No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as a bidder. It complied
with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the
GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly
did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner.
What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our sympathies may be with petitioner but the
court has no power to extend the latitude and longitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules.
The parameters of the right of preference depend on a galaxy of facts and factors whose determination
belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of the State. We are duty-bound to
respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be
little but we must uphold the grant for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a
State action amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as
unconstitutional.

Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner
was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and regulations do not
provide that qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that
the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot
be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it
wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners’ stance will wreak havoc on the essence
of bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest bidding to raise as much funds as possible for
the government to maximize its capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty that
must be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding contest and the rules are
carefully written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to insure their financial
capability. The bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the parties. This
objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner the privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to
match it. For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in
the first bidding.

We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro M. Recto
has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own land. The
Constitution has embodied Recto’s counsel as a state policy and our decision should be in sync with this
policy. But while the Filipino First policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we
wrong an alien. Our policy makers can write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we
are not free to be unfair to a foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they
must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigners.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, may
I just add:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is
concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to
win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . . . covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority
concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically, no statute
empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the
absence of such empowering law, the majority’s strained interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes
unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and
where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!

2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is short-sighted and, viewed
properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. It encourages other countries — in the guise of
reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by
authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino enterprises solely,
while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their
nationals. The majority’s thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as pariahs in the global marketplace with
absolutely no chance of winning any bidding outside our country. Even authoritarian regimes and hermit
kingdoms have long ago found out that unfairness, greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-
term, self-destructing.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you.

3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution,
the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids are equal.
In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without being unfair to the
foreigner.

In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied. But
not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

Endnotes:

1. See Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

2. Par. I. Introduction and Highlights; Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalifications and Public
Bidding of the MHC Privatization; Annex "A," Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents; Rollo, p.
142.

3. Par. V. Guidelines for the Public Bidding, id., pp. 153-154.

4. Annex "A," Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order; Rollo, pp. 13-14.

5. Annex "B," Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order; id., p. 15.

6. Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order, pp. 5-6; id., pp. 6-7.

7. Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, p. 17; id., p. 133.

8. Par. V. J. 1, Guidelines for Public Bidding, Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalifications and
Public Bidding Of the MHC Privatization, Annex "A," Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents;
id., p. 154.

9. Respondents’ Joint Comment with Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order, p. 9; Rollo, p.
44.

10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 138 (1803).

11. 11 Am Jur. 606.

12. 16 Am Jur. 2d 281.

13. Id., p. 282.

14. See Note 12.

15. Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10.

16. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p. 608.

17. 16 Am Jur 2d 283-284.

18. Sec. 10, first par., reads: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned
by Filipinos.

Sec. 10, third par., reads: The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within
its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

19. State ex rel. Miller v. O’Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117 SW2d 319.

20. G.R No. 91649, 14 May 1991, 197 SCRA 52.

21. Sec. 11, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

22. Sec. 12, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the government.

23. Sec. 13, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.

24. Sec. 1, Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), provides that [the] Congress shall give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments.
Sec. 2, Art. XIII, provides that [t]he promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

25. Sec. 2, Art. XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), provides that [T]he
State shall:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to
the needs of the people and society;

(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels.
Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for
all children of school age;

(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other
incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to
the underprivileged;

(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning, independent, and out-of-school study
programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and

(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational
efficiency, and other skills.

26. G.R No. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630.

27. See Note 25.

28. Sec. 1, Art. XIV, provides that [t]he State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels of education and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to
all.

29. G.R No. 118910, 17 July 1995.

30. Sec. 5, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

31. See Note 23.

32. See Note 24.

33. Sec. 17, Art. II, provides that [t]he State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total
human liberation and development.

34. Nolledo, Jose N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 72.

35. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1986 ed., p. 1656.

36. The guest list of the Manila Hotel includes Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Duke of Windsor, President
Richard Nixon of U.S.A., Emperor Akihito of Japan, President Dwight Eisenhower of U.S.A., President
Nguyen Van Thieu of Vietnam, President Park Chung Hee of Korea, Prime Minister Richard Holt of
Australia, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, President Lyndon Johnson of U.S.A., President
Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico, Princess Margaret of England, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser of Australia,
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau of Canada, President
Raul Alfonsin of Argentina, President Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita of
Japan, Prime Minister Hussain Muhammad Ershad of Bangladesh, Prime Minister Bob Hawke of
Australia, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, Premier Li Peng of China, Sultan Hassanal
Bolkiah of Brunei, President Ramaswami Venkataraman of India, Prime Minister Go Chok Tong of
Singapore, Prime Minister Enrique Silva Cimma of Chile, Princess Chulaborn and Mahacharri Sirindhorn
of Thailand, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama of Japan, Sultan Azlan Shah and Raja Permaisuri Agong
of Malaysia, President Kim Young Sam of Korea, Princess Infanta Elena of Spain, President William
Clinton of U.S.A., Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia of
Spain, President Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina, Prime Ministers Chatichai Choonhavan and Prem
Tinsulanonda of Thailand, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, President Vaclav Havel of Czech
Republic, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf of U.S.A., President Ernesto Perez Balladares of Panama, Prime
Minister Adolfas Slezevicius of Lithuania, President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran, President Askar
Akayev of Kyrgyztan, President Ong Teng Cheong of Singapore, President Frei Ruiz Tagle of Chile,
President Le Duc Anh of Vietnam, and Prime Minister Julius Chan of Papua New Guinea, see
Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 16-19.

37. Authored by Beth Day Romulo.

38. See Note 9, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp. 50-51.

39. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p. 607.

40. Id., p. 612.

41. Id., p. 616.

42. Id., p. 606.

43. Nolledo, J.N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., pp. 930-931.

44. Bidders were required to have at least one of the these qualifications to be able to participate in the
bidding process; see Note 2.

45. Memorandum of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 6.

46. Id., pp. 3-4.

47. See Note 8.

48. Keynote Address at the ASEAN Regional Symposium on Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights
held 23 October 1995 at New World Hotel, Makati City.

49. Speech of Senior Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla at the Induction of Officers and Directors of
the PHILCONSA for 1996 held 16 January 1996 at the Sky-Top, Hotel Intercontinental, Makati City.

50. Memorandum of Authorities submitted by former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, p. 5.

51. 8 March 1996 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. B13.

PADILLA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, 1987 Constitution

2. Padilla, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Volume III, p. 89.

3. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed., p. 112

4. Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines, Annotated, 1990 ed, p. 72.

5. Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 1.

6. Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention (1934-1935), p. 507.

7. Id., p. 562.

VITUG, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Second par., Section 10, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Art. XII, Sec. 10, second paragraph.

2. GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES: SECOND PREQUALIFICATION AND PUBLIC BIDDING OF THE

MHC PRIVATIZATION (hereafter referred to as GUIDELINES), Part. V, par. H(4).

3. Id.

4. 83 Phil. 242 (1949).

5. RA. No. 37, sec. 1.

6. 87 Phil. 343 (1950)

7. 104 Phil. 302 (1958).

8. Id. at 309

9. For an excellent analysis of American cases on reverse discrimination in these areas, see GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 780-819 (1991).

10. Art 11, sec. 19: "The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos." (Emphasis added)

11. See Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978) (invalidating an ordinance imposing a
flat fee of P500 on aliens for the privilege of earning a livelihood)

12. Petitioner passed the criteria set forth in the GUIDELINES, Part IV, par. F(4), of the GSIS relating to
the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Business management expertise, track record, and experience

b. Financial capability

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic plan for The Manila Hotel

13. GUIDELINES, Part V, par. C (1) (3) in relation to Part I.

14. Id., Part V, par. V (1).

PUNO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Introduction and Highlights, Guidelines and Procedures: Second Pre-qualification and Public Bidding of
the MHC Privatization, Annex "A" to Petitioner’s Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, Rollo,
p. 142.

2. The four bidders who previously pre-qualified for the first bidding, namely, ITT Sheraton, Marriot
International, Inc., Renaissance Hotel International, Inc., and the consortium of RCBC and the Ritz
Carlton, were deemed prequalified for the second bidding.

3. Annex "A" to the Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, Rollo, pp. 140-155.

4. Former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando and Commissioner Joaquin Bernas were invited by the Court
as amicus curiae to shed light on its meaning.

5. Lopez v. de los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170, 190 [1930].

6. 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 139 p. 510 [1979 ed.]; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 52 , p. 57[1915]; see also
Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation Co., 48 Minn. 140, 50 N.W. 1110, 31 A.J.R. 626, 16 L.R.A. 281 [1892]; State
ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P. 2d 844, 225 Kan 13 [1978].

7. Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation, supra, at 1110-1111; see also Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional
Limitations 167, vol. 1 [1927].

8. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 100.

9. Cooley, supra, at 171; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 53, pp. 57-58; Brice v. McDow, 116 S.C. 324, 108 S.E. 84, 87
[1921]; see also Gonzales, Philippine Constitutional Law p. 26 [1969].

10. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 101.

11. Way v. Barney, 116 Minn. 285, 133 N.W. 801, 804 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 648, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 719
[1911]; Brice v. McDow, supra, at 87; Morgan v. Board of Supervisors, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P. 2d 236, 241
[1948]; Gonzales, supra.

12. Ninth Decennial Digest Part I, Constitutional Law, (Key No. 28), p. 1638.

13. Article III, Section 2; see Webb v. de Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995]; People v. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325
[1994]; Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 [1994]; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Yee Sue
Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 [1940]; Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 [1938]; and a host of
other cases.

14. Article III, Section 12, pars. 1 to 3; People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]; People v. Bandula, 232
SCRA 566 [1994]; People v. Nito, 228 SCRA 442 [1993]; People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 [1981]; People
v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 [1985]; and a host of other cases.

15. Article III, Section 14; People v. Digno, 250 SCRA 237 [1995]; People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676
[1995]; People v. Colcol, 219 SCRA [1993]; Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 [1977]; People v. Dramayo,
42 SCRA 59 [1971]; and a host of other cases.

16. Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 [1985]; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 [1968];
People v. Otadura, 86 Phil. 244 [1950]; Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 [1937]; and a host of other
cases.

17. Harley v. Schuylkill County, 476 F. Supp. 191, 195-196 [1979]; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79, 56
Atl. 327, 99 A.S.R. 783, 63 L.R.A. 534 [1903]; see Ninth Decennial Digest Part I, Constitutional Law, (Key
No. 28), pp. 1638-1639.
18. City of Chicago v. George F. Harding Collection, 217 N.E. 2d 381, 383, 70 Ill. App. 2d 254 [1966];
People v. Buellton Dev. Co., 136 P. 2d 793, 796, 58 Cal. App. 2d 178 [1943]; Bordy v. State, 7 N.W. 2d
632, 635, 142 Neb. 714 [1943]; Cohen v. City of Chicago, 36 N.E. 2d 220, 224, 377 Ill. 221 [1941].

19. 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 143, p. 514; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 100; 6
R.C.L. Sec. 54, p. 59; see also State ex rel. Noe v. Knop La. App. 190 So. 135, 142 [1939]; State ex rel.
Walker v. Board of Comm’rs. for Educational Lands and Funds, 3 N.W. 2d 196, 200, 141 Neb. 172
[1942]; Maddox v. Hunt, 83 P. 2d 553, 556, 83 Okl. 465 [1938].

20. Article II, Sections 11, 12 and 13 (Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA
52, 68 [1991]); Sections 5, 12, 13 and 17 (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, 564 [1995]).

21. Article XIII, Section 13 (Basco, supra).

22. Article XIV, Section 2 (Basco, supra);

23. Kilosbayan v. Morato, supra, at 564.

24. Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, supra, at 68.

25. Congress had previously passed the Retail Trade Act (R.A. 1180); the Private Security Agency Act
(R.A. 5487; the law on engaging in the rice and corn industry (R.A. 3018, P.D. 194), etc.

26. Or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe.

27. Article XIV, section 3 of the 1973 Constitution reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 3. The Batasang Pambansa shall, upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations wholly
owned by such citizens, certain traditional areas of investments when the national interest so
dictates."cralaw virtua1aw library

28. 101 Phil. 1155 [1957].

29. See Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 450, vol. II [1988]. The Lao Ichong
case upheld the Filipinization of the retail trade and implied that particular areas of business may be
Filipinized without doing violence to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

30. Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines, Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 72. The word "patrimony"
first appeared in the preamble of the 1935 Constitution and was understood to cover everything that
belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual
assets and possessions of the nation (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concepts [1962 ed.],
p. 112; Speech of Delegate Conrado Benitez defending the draft preamble of the 1935 Constitution in
Laurel, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, vol. III, p. 325 [1966]).

31. Commissioned by the Manila Hotel Corporation for the Diamond Jubilee celebration of the Hotel in
1987; see The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.

32. Section 7 of R.A. 4846 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 7. In the designation of a particular cultural property as a "national cultural treasure," the following
procedure shall be observed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Before the actual designation, the owner, if the property is privately owned, shall be notified at least
fifteen days prior to the intended designation, and he shall be invited to attend the deliberation and given
a chance to be heard. Failure on the part of the owner to attend the deliberation shall not bar the panel to
render its decision. Decision shall be given by the panel within a week after its deliberation. In the event
that the owner desires to seek reconsideration of the designation made by the panel, he may do so within
thirty days from the date that the decision has been rendered. If no request for reconsideration is filed
after this period, the designation is then considered final and executory. Any request for reconsideration
filed within thirty days and subsequently again denied by the panel, may be further appealed to another
panel chairmanned by the Secretary of Education with two experts as members appointed by the
Secretary of Education. Their decision shall final and binding.

(b) Within each kind or class of objects, only the rare and unique objects may be designated as "National
Cultural Treasures." The remainder, if any, shall be treated as cultural property.

x x x."cralaw virtua1aw library

33. P.D. 1146, Sec. 5; P.D. 1146, known as "The Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977"
amended Commonwealth Act No. 186, the "Government Service Insurance Act" of 1936.

34. Beronilla v. Government Service Insurance System, 36 SCRA 44, 53 [1970]; Social Security System
Employees Association v. Soriano, 7 SCRA 1016, 1023 [1963].

35. Id., Secs. 28 and 29.

36. Id., Sec. 30.

37. Constitution, Article IX (B), section 2 (1).

38. Constitution, Article IX (D), section 2 (1).

39. It is meet to note that our laws do not debar foreigners from engaging in the hotel business. Republic
Act No. 7042, entitled the "Foreign Investments Act of 1991" was enacted by Congress to "attract,
promote and welcome . . . foreign investments . . . in activities which significantly contribute to national
industrialization and socio-economic development to the extent that foreign investment is allowed by the
Constitution and relevant laws." The law contains a list, called the Negative List, specifying areas of
economic activity where foreign participation is limited or prohibited. Areas of economic activity not
included in the Negative List are open to foreign participation up to one hundred per cent (Secs. 6 and 7).
Foreigners now own and run a great number of our five-star hotels.
 EN BANC

April 18, 2017

G.R. No. 213948

KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, Petitioner.

vs.
DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF MANILA, NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

Bury me in the ground, place a stone and a cross over it.

My name, the date of my birth, and of my death. Nothing more.
If you later wish to surround my grave with a fence, you may do so.
No anniversaries. I prefer Paang Bundok.

- Jose Rizal

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Injunction, with Applications for Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and Others 1 filed by the Knights of Rizal (KOR) seeking, among others, for an
order to stop the construction of respondent DMCI Homes, Inc. 's condominium development project
known as the Torre de Manila. In its Resolution dated 25 November 2014, the Court resolved to treat the
petition as one for mandamus. 2

The Facts

On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) 3 acquired a 7,716.60-square meter lot
in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-Alai Building and
Adamson University.4The lot was earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila
condominium project.

On 2 April 2012, DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to start the construction of its project. It then
obtained a Zoning Permit from the City of Manila's City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) on 19
June 2012.5

Then, on 5 July 2012, the City of Manila's Office of the Building Official granted DMCI-PDI a Building
Permit, allowing it to build a "Forty Nine (49) Storey w/ Basement & 2 penthouse Level
Res'l./Condominium" on the property. 6

On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building
Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that "the Torre de
Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the
back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights,
would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point[.]" 7

Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City of Manila's City Legal Officer on
whether he is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121.8 In his letter dated 12 September 2012, City
Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is "no legal justification for the temporary suspension
of the Building Permit issued in favor of [DMCI-PDI]" since the construction "lies outside the Luneta Park"
and is "simply too far to I be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on the artistic and
historical significance" of the Rizal Monument. 9 He also pointed out that "there is no showing that the
[area of subject property has been officially declared as an anthropological or archeological area. Neither
has it ' been categorically designated by the National Historical Institute as a heritage zone, a cultural
property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure."

Subsequently, both the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the opinion or the National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) on the matter. In the letter10 dated 6 November 2012 from NHCP I
Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno addressed to DMCI-PDI and the letter 11 dated 7 November 2012
from NHCP Executive Director III Ludovico D. Bado)f addressed to then Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim, the
NHCP maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries of the Rizal f.ark and
well to the rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the National
Monument.

On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Torre de Manila project that garnered
about 7,800 signatures, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive in
Resolution No. 121 1 enjoining the City of Manila's building officials to temporarily suspend ~MCI-PDI's
Building Permit. 12

In a letter to Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada dated 18 December 2013, DMCI-PIDI President Alfredo R.
Austria sought clarification on the controversy surrounding its Zoning Permit. He stated that since the
CPDO granted its Zoning Permit, DMCI-PDI continued with the application for the Building Permit, which
was granted, and did not deem it necessary to go through the process of appealing to the local zoning
board. He then expressed DMCI-PDI's willingness to comply with the process if the City of Manila
deemed it necessary. 13

On 23 December 2013, the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning
Board Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013, 14 recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's application for
variance. ;The MZBAA noted that the Torre de Manila project "exceeds the prescribed maximum
Percentage of Land Occupancy (PLO) and exceeds the prescribeµ Floor Area Ratio (FAR) as stipulated
in Article V, Section 17 of City Ordinance No. 8119[.]" However, the MZBAA still recommended the
approval of the variance subject to the five conditions set under the same resolution.
After some clarification sought by DMCI-PDI, the MZBAA issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06-A,
Series of 2013, 15 on 8 January 2014, amending condition (c) in the earlier resolution. 16

On 16 January 2014, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, 17 adopting
Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06- A. The City Council resolution states that "the City Council of
Manila find[ s] no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the [MZBAA]
and hereby ratif[ies] and confirm[s] all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the
City [Council] of Manila for Torre de Manila[.]"

Arguments of the KOR

On 12 September 2014, the KOR, a "civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan, non-sectarian and non-profit
organization" 18 created under Republic Act No. 646, 19 filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary
restraining I order, and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of DMCIPDI's Torre de
Manila condominium project. The KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is one of
"transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of overarching significance to society, or with far-
reaching implication" involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument.

The KOR asserts that the completed Torre de Manila structure will "[stick] out like a sore thumb, [dwarf]
all surrounding buildings within a radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal
Monument in Luneta Park: Torre de Manila building would loom at the back I and overshadow the entire
monument, whether up close or viewed from a distance. ''20

Further, the KOR argues that the Rizal Monument, as a National Treasure, is entitled to "full protection of
the law"21and the national government must abate the act or activity that endangers the nation's cultural
heritage "even against the wishes of the local government hosting it." 22

Next, the KOR contends that the project is a nuisance per se23 because "[t]he despoliation of the sight
view of the Rizal Monument is a situation that annoy's or offends the senses' of every Filipino who honors
the memory of the National Hero Jose Rizal. It is a present, continuing, worsening and aggravating status
or condition. Hence, the PROJECT is a nuisance per se. It deserves I to be abated summarily, even
without need of judicial proceeding. "24

The KOR also claims that the Torre de Manila project violates the NHCP's Guidelines on Monuments
Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and Other Personages, which state that historic
monuments should assert a visual "dominance" over its surroundings, 25 as well as the country's
commitment under the International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and
Sites, otherwise known as the Venice Charter. 26

Lastly, the KOR claims that the DMCI-PDI's construction was commenced and continues in bad faith, and
is in violation of the City of Manila's zoning ordinance. 27

Arguments of DMCI-PDI

In its Comment, DMCI-PDI argues that the KOR's petition should be dismissed on the following grounds:

I.

THXS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THIS ACTION.

II.

KOR HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT OR INTEREST TO FILE OR PR0SECUTE THIS ACTION.

 III.

TORRE DE MANILA IS NOT A NUISANCE PER SE.

IV.

DMCI-PDI ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN CONSTRUCTING TORRE DE MANILA; AND

V.

KOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORPER AND/OR A WRIT OF

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 28

First, DMCI-PDI asserts that the Court has no original jurisdiction over actions for injunction. 29 Even
assuming that the Court has concurrent jurisdiction, DMCI-PDI maintains that the petition should still have
been filed with the Regional Trial Court under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and because the petition
involves questions of fact. 30

DMCI-PDI also contends that the KOR's petition is in actuality an opposition' or appeal from the
exemption granted by the City of Manila's MZBAA, a matter which is also not within the jurisdiction of the
Court. 31 DMCI-PDI claims that the proper forum should be the MZBAA, and should the KOR fail there, it
should appeal the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 32

DMCI-PDI further argues that since the Rizal Monument has been declared a National Treasure, the
power to issue a cease and desist order is lodged with the "appropriate cultural agency" under Section 25
of Republic Act No. li0066 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009. 33 Moreover, DMCI-PDI asserts
that the KOR availed of the wrong remedy since an action for injunction is not the proper remedy for
abatement of a nuisance. 34

Second, DMCI-PDI maintains that the KOR has no standing to institute this proceeding because it is not a
real party in interest in this case. The purposes of the KOR as a public corporation do not include the
preservation of the Rizal Monument as a cultural or historical heritage site.35 The KOR has also not
shown that it suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the City of
Manila. If there is any injury to the KOR at all, the same was caused by the private conduct of a private
entity and not the City of Manila. 36

Third, DMCI-PDI argues that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. DMCI-PDI reiterates that it
obtained all the necessary permits, licenses, clearances, and certificates for its construction. 37 It also
refutes the KOR's claim that the Torre de Manila would dwarf all other structures around it; considering
that there are other tall buildings even closer to the Rizal Monument itself, namely, the Eton Baypark
Tower at the corner of Roxas Boulevard and T.M. Kalaw Street (29 storeys; 235 meters from the Rizal
Monument) and Sunview Palace at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and T.M. Kalaw Streets (42 storeys; 250
meters from the Rizal Monument). 38

Fourth, DMCI-PDI next argues that it did not act in bad faith when it started construction of its Torre de
Manila project. Bad faith cannot be attributed to it since it was within the "lawful exercise of [its]
rights." 39 The KOR failed to present any proof that DMCI-PDI did not follow the proper procedure and
zoning restrictions of the City of Manila. Aside from obtaining all the necessary permits from the
appropriate government agencies,40 DMCI-PDI also sought clarification on its right to build on its site from
the Office of the City Legal Officer of Manila, the Manila CPDO, and the NHCP.41 Moreover, even if the
KOR proffered such proof, the Court would be 1 in no position to declare DMCI-PDI's acts as illegal since
the Court is not a trier of facts. 42
Finally, DMCI-PDI opposes the KOR's application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction. DMCI-PDI asserts that the KOR has failed to establish "a clear and unmistakable
right to enjoin I the construction of Torre de Manila, much less request its demolitior."43 DMCI-PDI further
argues that it "has complied with all the legal requirements for the construction of Torre de Manila x x x
[and] has violated o right of KOR that must be protected. Further, KOR stands to suffer o damage
because of its lack of direct pecuniary interest in this petiti1 on. To grant the KOR's application for
injunctive relief would constitute an unjust taking of property without due process of law. "44

Arguments of the City of Manila

In its Comment, the City of Manila argues that the writ of mandamus cannot issue "considering that no
property or substantive rights whatsoever in favor of [the KOR] is being affected or x x x entitled to judicial
protection[.]"45

The City of Manila also asserts that the "issuance and revocation of a Building Permit undoubtedly fall
under the category of a discretionary act or duty performed by the proper officer in light of his meticulous
appraisal and evaluation of the pertinent supporting documents of the application in accordance with the
rules laid out under the National Building Code [and] Presidential Decree No. 1096," 46 while the remedy of
mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. 47

Further, the City of Manila maintains that the construction of the Torre de Manila did not violate any
existing law, since the "edifice [is] well behind (some 789 meters away) the line of sight of the Rizal
Monument."48 It adds that the City of Manila's "prevailing Land Use and Zoning Ordinance [Ordinance No.
8119] x xx allows an adjustment in Floor Area Ratios thru the [MZBAA] subject to further final approval of
the City Council."49 The City Council adopted the MZBAA's favorable: recommendation in its Resolution
No. 5, ratifying all the licenses and permits issued to DMCI-PDI for its Torre de Manila project.

In its Position Paper dated 15 July 2015, the City of Manila admitted that the Zoning Permit issued to
DMCI-PDI was "in breach of certain provisions of City Ordinance No. 8119."50 It maintained, however, 1
that the deficiency is "procedural in nature and pertains mostly td the failure of [DMCI-PDI] to comply with
the stipulations that allow an excess in the [FAR] provisions." 51 Further, the City of Manila argued that the
MZBAA, when it recommended the allowance of the project's variance, imposed certain conditions upon
the Torre de Manila project in order to mitigate the possible adverse effects of an excess FAR. 52

The Issue

The issues raised by the parties can be summed up into one main point: Can the Court issue a writ of
mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de
Manila project?

The Court's Ruling

The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed.

There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.

In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission,53 the Court held that "what is not expressly
or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs
and I public order." This principle is fundamental in a democratic society, to protect the weak against the
strong, the minority against the majority, and the individual citizen against the government. In essence,
this principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society under the rule of law, prescribes that the
freedom to act can be curtailed only through law. Without this principle, the rights, freedoms, and civil
liberties of citizens can be arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by the shifting passions of those who
can spout the loudest, or those who can gather the biggest crowd or the most number of Internet trolls. In
other instances,54 the Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not expressly prohibited by statutes
when it determined that these acts were not contrary to morals, customs, and public order, or that
upholding the same would lead to a more equitable solution to the controversy. However, it is the law
itself - Articles 130655 and 1409(1)56 of the Civil Code - which prescribes that acts not contrary to morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also not contrary to law.

In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals,
customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the contrary,
the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent
laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.

There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre
de Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal Monument.

Specifically, Section 47 reads:

SEC. 47. Historical Preservation and Conservation Standards. - Historic site and facilities shall be
conserved and preserved. These shall, to the extent possible, be made accessible for the educational
and cultural enrichment of the general public.

The following shall guide the development of historic sites and facilities:

1. Sites with historic buildings or places shall be developed to conserve and enhance their heritage
values.

2. Historic sites and facilities shall be adaptively re-used.

3. Any person who proposes to add, to alter, or partially demolish a designated heritage property will
require the approval of the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) and shall be required to
prepare a heritage impact statement that will demonstrate to the satisfaction of CPDO that the proposal
will not adversely impact the heritage significance of the property and shall submit plans for review by the
CPDO in coordination with the National Historical Institute (NHI).

4. Any proposed alteration and/or re-use of designated heritage properties shall be evaluated based on
criteria established by the heritage significance of the particular property or site.

5. Where an owner of a heritage property applies for approval to demolish a designated heritage property
or properties, the owner shall be required to provide evidence to satisfaction that demonstrates that
rehabilitation and re-use of the property is not viable.

6. Any designated heritage property which is to be demolished or significantly altered shall be thoroughly
documented for archival purposes with! a history, photographic records, and measured drawings, in
accordance with accepted heritage recording guidelines, prior to demolition or alteration.

7. Residential and commercial infill in heritage areas will be sensitive to the existing scale and pattern of
those areas, which maintains the existing landscape and streetscape qualities of those areas, and which
does not result in the loss of any heritage resources.

8. Development plans shall ensure that parking facilities (surface lots residential garages, stand-alone
parking garages and parking components as parts of larger developments) are compatibly integrated into
heritage areas, and/or are compatible with adjacent heritage resources.
9. Local utility companies (hydro, gas, telephone, cable) shall be required to place metering equipment,
transformer boxes, power lines, conduit, equipment boxes, piping, wireless telecommunication towers
and other utility equipment and devices in locations which do not detract from the visual character of
heritage resources, and which do not have a negative impact on its architectural integrity.

10. Design review approval shall be secured from the CPDO for any alteration of the heritage property to
ensure that design guidelines and standards are met and shall promote preservation and conservation of
the heritage property. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 only serve as guides, as it
expressly states that "the following shall guide the :development of historic sites and facilities."
A guide simply sets a direction 'or gives an instruction to be followed by prope1iy owners and developers
in order to conserve and enhance a property's heritage values.

On the other hand, Section 48 states:

SEC. 48. Site Performance Standards. - The City considers it in the public interest that all projects are
designed and developed in a safe, efficient and aesthetically pleasing manner. Site development shall
consider the environmental character and limitations of the site and its adjacent properties. All project
elements shall be in complete harmony according to good design principles and the subsequent
development must be visually pleasing as well as efficiently functioning especially in relation to the
adjacent properties and bordering streets.

The design, construction, operation and maintenance of every facility shall be in harmony with the
existing and intended character of its neighborhood. It shall not change the essential character of the said
area but will be a substantial improvement to the value of the properties in the neighborhood in particular
and the community in general.

Furthermore, designs should consider the following:

1. Sites, buildings and facilities shall be designed and developed with1 regard to safety, efficiency and
high standards of design. The natural environmental character of the site and its adjacent properties shall
be considered in the site development of each building and facility.

2. The height and bulk of buildings and structures shall be so designed that it does not impair the entry of
light and ventilation, cause the loss I of privacy and/or create nuisances, hazards or inconveniences to
adjacent developments.

3. Abutments to adjacent properties shall not be allowed without the neighbor's prior written consent
which shall be required by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) prior to the granting of a
Zoning Permit (Locational Clearance).

4. The capacity of parking areas/lots shall be per the minimum requirements of the National Building
Code. These shall be located, developed and landscaped in order to enhance the aesthetic quality of the
facility. In no case, shall parking areas/lots encroach into street rights-of-way and shall follow the Traffic
Code as set by the City.

5. Developments that attract a significant volume of public modes of transportation, such as tricycles,
jeepneys, buses, etc., shall provide on-site parking for the same. These shall also provide vehicular
loading and unloading bays so as street traffic flow will not be impeded.
6. Buffers, silencers, mufflers, enclosures and other noise-absorbing I materials shall be provided to all
noise and vibration-producing machinery. Noise levels shall be maintained according to levels specified in
DENR DA9 No. 30 - Abatement of Noise and Other Forms of Nuisance as Defined by Law.

7. Glare and heat from any operation or activity shall not be radiated, seen or felt from any point beyond
the limits of the property.

8. No large commercial signage and/or pylon, which will be detrimental to the skyline, shall be
allowed.

9. Design guidelines, deeds of restriction, property management plans and other regulatory tools that will
ensure high quality developments shall be required from developers of commercial subdivisions and
condominiums. These shall be submitted to the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) for review
and approval. (Emphasis supplied)

Se9tion 4 7 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the "development of historic sites and
facilities."Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is nothing in Sections
47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a building outside the boundaries
of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the1 background of a historic site. In this
case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and "cannot
possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument." 57 Likewise, ;the Torre de Manila is not in an
area that has been declared as an "anthropological or archeological area" or in an area designated as a
heritage zone, cultural property, historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP. 58

Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject of arts and culture, provides that
"[t]he State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation's historical and cultural heritage and
resources x x x." Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress passed laws dealing with the
preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage.

One such law is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers
the National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and desist
order "when the physical integrity of the national cultural treasures or important cultural properties [is]
found to be in danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state." 60 This law
declares that the State should protect the "physical integrity" of the heritage property or building if there is
"danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state." Physical integrity refers to the
structure itself - how strong and sound the structure is. The same law does not mention
that another project, building, or property, not itself a heritage property or building, may be the subject of
a cease and desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista, or sightline of a heritage
property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to the Torre de Manila condominium
project.

Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.

The Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 1property without due process
of law x x x." 61 It is a fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away from an individual
without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The dispossession of property, or in this case
the stoppage of the construction of a building in one's own property would violate substantive due
process.

The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty
imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party
seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that
matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the
background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of
Manila "to consider," in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, "the standards set under Ordinance No.
8119" in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these
standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park has been
declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned
property that is "not pap: of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site in 1095,"
and the Torre de Manila area is in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr.
Maria Serena I. Diokno. 62 Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a "heritage
zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure."63

Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 would
involve making a finding of fact. A finding lot fact requires notice, hearing, and the submission of evidence
to ascertain compliance with the law or regulation. In such a case, it is the Regional Trial Court which has
the jurisdiction to hear the case, receive evidence, make a proper finding of fact, and determine whether
the Torre de Manila project properly complied with the standards set by the ordinance. In Meralco v.
Public Service Commission, 64 we held that it is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative
proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the
proper court or tribunal.

To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 to the Torre de Manila
project will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot apply outside of the Rizal Park - and the
Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only if the officials

The KOR also invokes this Court's exercise of its extraordinary certiorari power of review under Section 1,
Article VIII65 of the Constitution. However, this Court can only exercise its extraordinary certiorari power if
the City of Manila, in issuing the required permits and licenses, gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Tellingly, neither the majority nor minority opinion in this
case has found that the City of Manila committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the permits and
licenses to DMCI-PDI. Thus, there is no justification at all for this Court to exercise its
extraordinary certiorari power.

Moreover, the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power is limited to actual cases and
controversies that necessarily involve a violation of the Constitution or the determination of the
constitutionality or validity of a governmental act or issuance. Specific violation of a statute that does not
raise the issue of constitutionality or validity of the statute cannot, as a rule, be the subject of the Court's
direct exercise of its expanded certiorari power. Thus, the KOR's recourse lies with other judicial
remedies or proceedings allowed under the Rules of Court.

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc., 66we held that in cases where the question of constitutionality of a governmental action
is raised, the judicial power that the courts exercise is likewise identified as the power of judicial review -
the power to review the constitutionality of the actions of other branches of government. As a rule, as
required by the hierarchy of courts principle, these cases are filed with the lowest court with jurisdiction
over the 1subject matter. The judicial review that the courts undertake requires:

1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the case.

The lower court's decision under the constitutional scheme reaches the Supreme Court through the
appeal process, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the KOR elevated this case immediately to this Court in an original petition for
injunction which we later on treated as one for mandamus under Rule 65. There is, however, no clear
legal duty on the City of Manila to consider the provisions of Ordinance No. 8119 for applications for
permits to build outside the protected areas of the Rizal Park. Even if there were such legal duty, the
determination of whether the City of .Manila failed to abide by this legal duty would involve factual matters
which have not been admitted or established in this case. Establishing factual matters is not within the
realm of this Court. Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.

There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining the background sightline that is
supposed to be protected or that is part of the "physical integrity" of the Rizal Monument. How far should
a building like the Torre de Manila be from the Rizal Monument - one, two, three, four, or five kilometers?
Even the Solicitor General, during the Oral Arguments, conceded that the ordinance does not prescribe
how sightline is determined, neither is there any way to measure by metes and bounds whether al
construction that is not part of the historic monument itself or is outside the protected area can be
said to violate the Rizal Monument's physicalintegrity, except only to say "when you stand in front of the
Rizal Monument, there can be no doubt that your view is marred and impaired." This kind of a standard
has no parameters and can include a sightline or a construction as far as the human eyes can see when
standing in front of the Rizal Monument. Obviously, this Court cannot apply such a subjective and non-
uniform standard that adversely affects property rights several kilometers away from a historical sight or
facility.

The Dissenting Opinion claims that "the City, by reason of a mistaken or erroneous construction of its own
Ordinance, had failed to consider its duties under [Ordinance No. 8119] when it issued permits in DMCI-
PDI's favor." However, MZBAA Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06-A67 easily dispel this claim.
According to the resolutions, the City of Manila, through the MZBAA, acted on DMCI-PDI's application for
variance under the powers and standards set forth in Ordinance No. 8119.

Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily in issuing said
resolution, the Court should respect MZBAA's exercise of discretion. The Court cannot "substitute its I
judgment :for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light
of the authority specifically vested in them by law." 68 Since the Court has "no supervisory power over the
proceedings I and actions of the administrative departments of the government," it "should not generally
interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions.; 69 The power of the Court in mandamus
petitions does not extend "to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either." 70

Still, the Dissenting Opinion insists on directing the re-evaluation by the City of Manila, through the
CPDO, of the permits previously issued in favor of the Torre de Manila project to determine compliance
with the standards ]under Ordinance No. 8119. It also declares that the circumstances in this case
warrant the prohacvice conversion of the proceedings in the issuance of the permits into a "contested
case" necessitating notice and hearing with all the parties involved.

Prohac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent because the decision is for the
specific case only, not to be followed in other cases. A prohac vice decision violates statutory law - Article
8 of the Civil Code - which states that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." The decision of the Court in this case
cannot be prohac vice because by mandate bf the law everydecision of the Court forms part of the legal
system of the Philippines. If another case comes up with the same facts as the present case, that case
must be decided in the same way as this case to comply with the constitutional mandate of equal
protection of the law. Thus, a prohac vice decision also violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the discretionary executive acts of the executive branch
unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Mandamus does not lie against the legislative and executive branches or their members acting in the
exercise of their official discretionary functions. This emanates from the respect accorded by the judiciary
to said branches as co-equal entities under the principle of separation of powers.

In De Castro v. Salas,71 we held that no rule of law is better established than the one that provides that
mandamus will not issue to control the discretion of an officer or a court when honestly exercised and
when such power and authority is not abused.

In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to compel action in matters involving
judgment and discretion, only "to act, but not to act lone way or the other," 72 and only in cases where
there has been a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable
excess of authority.73

In this case, there can be no determination by this Court that the City of Manila had been negligent or
remiss in its duty under Ordinance No. 8119 considering that this determination will involve questions of
fact. DMCI- PDI had been issued the proper permits and had secured all approvals and licenses months
before the actual construction began. Even the KOR could not point to any law that respondent City of
Manila had violated and could only point to declarations of policies by the NHCP and the Venice Charter
which do not constitute clear legal bases for the issuance of a writ of mandam1s.

The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and restoration of
ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings I together principles in the field of historical
conservation and restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and and laid down by experts over
the years. Each country, however, remains "responsible for applying the plan within the framework of its
own culture and traditions."74

The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law. The Philippines is
not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are not directives but mere guidelines - a set of
the best practices and techniques that have been proven over the years to be the most effective in
preserving and restoring historical monuments, sites and buildings.

The City of Manila concedes that DMCI-PDI's Zoning Permit was granted without going through the
process under Ordinance No. 8119. However, the same was properly rectified when, faced with mounting
opposition, DMCI-PDI itself sought clarification from the City of Manila and immediately began complying
with the procedure for applying for a variance. The MZBAA did subsequently recommend the approval of
the variance and the City Council of Manila approved the same, ratifying the licenses and permits already
given to DMCI-PDI. Such ratification was well within the right of the City Council of Manila. The City
Council of Manila could have denied the application had it seen any reason to do so. Again, the
ratification is a function of the City Council of Manila, an exercise of its discretion1 and well within the
authority granted it by law and the City's own Ordinance No. 8119.

The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience, and welfare. There is
no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm, danger, or hazard to the people in the
surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses an unsightly view on the taking of photos or
the visual appreciation of the Rizal Monument by locals and tourists. In fact, the Court must take the
approval of the MZBAA, and its subsequent ratification by the City Council of Manila, as the duly
authorized exercise of discretion by the city officials. Great care must be taken that the Court does not
unduly tread upon the local government's performance of its duties. It is not for this Court to dictate upon
the other branches bf the government how their discretion must be exercised so long as these branches
do not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Likewise, any violation of Ordinance No. 8119 must be determined in the proper case and before the
proper forum. It is not within the power of this Court in this case to make such determination. Without
such determination, this Court cannot simply declare that the City of Manila had failed to consider its
duties under Ordinance No. 8119 when it issued the permits in DMCI-PDI's favor without making a finding
of fact how the City of Manila failed "to consider" its duties with respect to areas outside the boundaries of
the Rizal Park. In the first place, this Court has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact in an original action
like this before this Court. Moreover the City of Manila could not legally apply standards to sites outside
the area covered by the ordinance that prescribed the standards. With this, I taken in light of the lack of
finding that there was grave abuse of discretion I on the part of the City of Manila, there is no basis to
issue the writ of mandamus against the City of Manila.

During the Oral Arguments, it was established that the granting of a variance neither uncommon nor
irregular. On the contrary, current practice has made granting of a variance the rule rather than the
exception:

JUSTICE CARPIO: Let's go to Ordinance 8119. For residential condominium that stand alone, in other
words not part of a commercial complex or an industrial complex ...

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: The [Floor Area Ratio (FAR)] is uniform for the entire City of Manila, the FAR 4,
correct? ATTY. FLAMINIANO: I believe so, Your Honor, it's FAR 4.

JUSTICE CARPIO: So it's FAR 4 for all residential condominium complex or industrial projects.

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: There might be, the FAR might be different when it comes to condominiums in
commercial areas, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: Yes, I'm talking of stand-alone ...

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.

JUITICE CARPIO: ... residential condominiums...

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Uniform at FAR 4, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: And the percentage of land occupancy is always 60 percent.

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: 60 percent correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay ... how many square meters is this Torre de Manila?

xxx

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: The land area, Your Honor, it's almost 5,000 ... 5,556.

JUSTICE CARPIO: So, it's almost half a hectare.

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: And at FAR 4, it can only build up to 18 storeys, I mean at FAR 4, is that correct?

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: If the 60 percent of the lot...

JUSTICE CARPIO: Yes, but that is a rule.

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: That is a rule, that's the rule, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: 60 percent of...

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Of the land area.

JUSTICE CARPIO: ... buildable, the rest not buildable.

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay, so if you look around here in the City of Manila anywhere you go, you look at
stand alone residential condominium buildings...

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: There's a lot of them, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: It's always not FAR 4, it's more than FAR 4.

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: And the buildable area is to the edge of the property ...it's not 60 percent, correct?

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: So, if you look at all the ... residential buildings in the last ten years, they [have]
all variances. They did not follow the original FAR 4 or the 60 percent (of land occupancy). Every
residential building that stand alone was a variance. ATTY. FLAMINIANO: That's correct, Your
Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO: So the rule really in the City of Manila is variance, and the exception which is
never followed is FAR 4.

ATTY. FLAMINIANO: FAR 4, it appears to be that way, Your Honor.

xxxx

JUSTICE CARPIO: Every developer will have to get a variance because it doesn't make sense to
follow FAR 4 because the land is so expensive and if you can build only two storeys on a 1,000-
square meter lot, you will surely lose money, correct? ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Exactly, Your
Honor. 75 (Emphasis supplied)

This, the MZBAA's grant of the variance cannot be used as a basis to grant the mandamus
petition absent any clear finding that said act amo'1nted to "grave abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice, or palpable excess of authority."
 The KOR is Estopped from Questioning the
Torre de Manila Construction.

The KOR is now estopped from questioning the construction of the Torre de Manila project. The KOR
itself came up with the idea to build a structure right behind the Rizal Monument that would dwarf the
Rizal Monument.

In the mid-1950s, the Jose Rizal National Centennial Commission (JRNCC) l formulated a plan to build an
Educational Center within the Rizal Park. In July 1955, the KOR proposed the inclusion of a national
theater on the site of the Educational Center. The JRNCC adopted the proposal. The following[ year, a
law - Republic Act No. 142776 - authorized the establishment of the Jose Rizal National Cultural Shrine
consisting of a national theater, a national museum, and a national library on a single site. 77

To be built on the open space right behind the 12.7 meter high Rizal Monument were: the KOR's
proposed nationaltheater, standing 29.25 meters high and 286 meters in distance from the Rizal
Monument; the nationallibrary, standing 25 .6 meters high and 180 meters in distance from the Rizal
;Monument, with its rear along San Luis Street (now T.M. Kalaw Street); and facing it,
the nationalmuseum, at 19.5 meters high and 190 meters in I distance from the Rizal Monument, with its
back along P. Burgos Street. 78

However, several sectors voiced their objections to the construction for various reasons. Among them,
the need to preserve the open space of the park, the high cost of construction, the desecration of the
park's hallowed grounds, and the fact that the proposed cultural center including the 129.25 meter
high national theater proposed by the KOR would dwarf the 12.7 meter high Rizal
Monument. 79 The JRNCC revised the plan and only the National Library - which still stands today - was
built. 80

According to the NHCP, the KOR even proposed to build a Rizal Center on the park as recently as
2013.81 The proposal was disapproved by the NHCR and the Department of Tourism.

Surely, as noble as the KOR's intentions were, its proposed center would have dwarfed the Rizal
Monument with its size and proximity.

In contrast, the Torre de Manila is located well outside the Rizal Park, and to the rear of the Rizal
Monument - approximately 870 meters from the Rizal Monument and 3 0 meters from the edge of Rizal
Park. 82

It is a basic principle that "one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands.
"83 In Jenosa v. Delariarte, 84 the Court reiterated ,that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. This "signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a
court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue. " 85Thus, the KOR, having earlier proposed a national theater a
mere 286meters in distance from the back of the Rizal Monument that would have dwarfed the Rizal
Monument, comes to this I Court with unclean hands. It is now precluded from "seeking any equitable
refuge" 86 from the Court. The KOR's petition should be dismissed on this ground alone.

Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se.

In its petition, the KOR claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance perse that deserves to be summarily
abated even without judicial proceedings. 87 However, during the Oral Arguments, counsel for the KOR
argued that the KOR now believes that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens and not a
nuisance perse. 88
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition
of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or
offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with
the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of
property.

Thy Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first, nuisance perse, is on "recognized as a nuisance
under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and,
for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity." 89 The second,
nuisance peraccidens, is that which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its
existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing in law constitutes a nuisance. "90

It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre de Manila project
cannot be considered as a "direct menace to I public health or safety." Not only is a condominium project
commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the proper government agencies,
complied with health and safety standards set by law. DMCI-PDI has been granted the following permits
and clearances prior to starting the project: (1) Height Clearance Permit from the Civil Aviation Authority
of the Philippines;91 (2) Development Permit from the HLURB;92 (3) Zoning Certification from the
HLURB;93 (4) Certificate of Environmental Compliance Commitment from the Environment Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources;94 (5) Barangay Clearance95 (6) Zoning
Permit;96 (7) Building Permit;97 (8) and Electrical and Mechanical Permit.98

Later, DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance recommended by the MZBAA and
granted by the City Council of Manila. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Torre de Manila project is not
a nuisance perse.

On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance peraccidens.

By definition, a nuisance peraccidens is determined based on its surrounding conditions and

circumstances. These conditions and circumstances must be well established, not merely alleged. The
Court cannot simply accept these conditions and circumstances as established facts as the KOR would
have us do in this case. 99 The KOR itself concedes that the question of whether the Torre de Manila is a
nuisance peraccidens is a question of fact. 100

The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to estimate their force, and to
apply rules of law to the case thus made. 101 1lhis Court is no such authority. It is not a trier of facts. It
cannot simply take the allegations in the petition and accept these as facts, more so in this case where
these allegations are contested by the respondents.

The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the trial courts. The question, then, of whether
the Torre de Manila project is a nuisance peraccidens must be settled after due proceedings brought
before the proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot circumvent the process in the guise be
protecting national culture and heritage.

The TRO must be lifted.

Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent further injury102 until final
adjudication on the merits of the case. In the present case, since the legal rights of the KOR are not well-
defined, clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO lifted.

The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of I administrative agencies when they are
supported by substantial evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already acquired vested rights in the various
permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for in order to build a 49-storey building which is, and
had been, allowed by the City of Manila's zoning ordinance.

As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to review discretionary decisions or actions of
administrative agencies in the absence of proof that such decisions or actions were arrived at with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa, 103 we held that mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown
that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment be a right to
which he is clearly entitled. Only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and
certain. If the legal rights of th6 petitioner are not well-defined, definite, clear, and certain, 104 the petition
must be dismissed. Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers
nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty
already imposed. 105

In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in discretionary acts of the executive department in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion, 106 and considering that mandamus may only be issued to
enforce a clear and certain legal right, 107 the present special civil action for mandamus must be
dismissed and the TRO issued earlier must be lifted.

A FINAL WORD

It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi Ultimo Adios, the poem he left for his family
the night before he was executed, Rizal wrote:

Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora

Y al fin anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz 108

[Ako’y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas

na sa Silanganan ay namamanaag
yaong maligayang araw na sisikat
sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.] 109

[I die just when I see the dawn break,

Through the gloom of night, to herald the day] 110

Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing West towards Manila Bay, with his back to
the firing squad, like the traitor the colonial government wished to portray him. He asked to face his
executioners, facing the East where the sun would be rising since it was early morning, but the Spanish
captain did not allow it. As he was shot and a single bullet struck his frail body, Rizal forced himself, with
his last remaining strength, to turn around to face the East and thus he fell on his back with] his face to
the sky and the rising sun. Then, the Spanish captain approached Rizal and finished him off with one
pistol shot to his head.

Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a simple tomb, marked with a cross and a
stone with only his name and the date of his birth and death; no anniversary celebrations; and interment
at Paang Bundok(now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal never wanted his grave to be a burden to future
generations.

The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not carried out. The letter was discovered many
years later, in 1953. By then, his remains had been entombed at the Rizal Monument, countless
anniversaries had been . celebrated, with memorials and monuments built throughout the world.
Rizal's wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or pageantry; to the point of reaching oblivion
or obscurity in the future. 111 For Rizal's life was never about fame or vainglory, but for the country he
loved dearly and for which he gave up his life.

The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal' s own wishes. That Rizal's statue now stands facing West
towards Manila Bay, with Rizal's back to the East, adds salt to the wound. If we continue the present
orientation of Rizal's statue, with Rizal facing West, we would be like the Spanish captain who refused
Rizal's request to die facing the rising sun in the East. On the other hand, if Rizal' s statue is made to face
East, as Rizal had desired when he was about to be shot, the background - the blue sky above Manila
Bay - would forever be clear of obstruction, and we would be faithful to Rizal's dying wish.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by the Court on 16 June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

(please see concurring opinion) I join the dissent of Justice Jardeleza

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join the dissent of Justice Jardeleza

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I join separate of Justice Jardeleza

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Please see separate concurring opinion

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I concur, see separate opinion Please see dissenting opinion

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Jardeleza I join the dissent of J. Jardeleza

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Please see separate concurring opinion

NOEL G. TIJAM
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

1 1Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 3-28.

2 Id. at 418-C-418-D.

3 In a Manifestation dated 14 October 2014, DMCI-PDI informed the Court that it is the owner and
developer of the Torre de Manila project and requested to substitute for DMCI Homes, Inc. as
respondent in this case. Id. at 240-242. The Court, in its 11 November 2014 Resolution, resolved
to implead DMCI-PDI as respondent in this case. Id. at 281-282.

4 Id. at 300.

5 Id. at 301.

6 Id. at 376.

7 Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 1371-1373.

8 Id. at 1374.

9 Id. at 1375-1376.

10 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 404-405.

11 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1377.

12 Id. at 1381-1383.

13 Id. at 1384-1385.

14 Id. at 1386-1387.

15 Id. at 1388-1389.

16 Condition (c) in the 23 December 2013 resolution reads:

(c) The Project shall continuously be socially acceptable to the Barangay Council and
nearby residents by assuring that its operations shall not adversely affect the community
heritage, traffic condition, public health, safety and welfare x x x. Id. at 1387.

It was amended in the 8 January 2014 resolution to read:

(c) The proponent shall ensure that its operations shall not adversely affect community
heritage, traffic condition, public health, safety and welfare x x x. Id. at 1389.

17 Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 1390-1392.

18 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 5.

19 Id. at 4.

20 Id. at 13.

21 Id. at 16.

22 Id. at 17.

23During the Oral Arguments on 21 July 2015, the counsel for the KOR asserted that the KOR
has changed its position on the matter and now considers the Torre de Manila project a
nuisance peraccidens. TSN, 21July2015, p. 106.

24 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 18.

25 Id.at19.

26 Id. at 20.

27 Id. at 21.

28 Id. at 307.

29 Id. at 308.

30 Id. at 311-312.

31 Id. at 314.

32 Id. at 315.

33 Id.at317.

34 Id. at 318.

35 Id. at 320.

36 Id. at 321.

37 Id. at 329.

38 Id.

39 Id. at 338.

40 Id. at 336

41 Id. at 337.

42 Id. at 339.
43 Id. at 346.

44 Id. at 346-347.

45 Id. at 434.

46 Id.

47 Id. at 433.

48 Id. at 434.

49 Id. at 436.

50 Rollo. Vol. III, p. 1363.

51 Id.

52 Id. at 1365.

53 Phil. 658, 661 (1934).

54See in the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astroga Garcia, 494 Phil. 515
(2005); Summerville General Merchandising Co. v. Court of Appeals, 552 Phil. 668 (2007).

55Art 306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.

56 Art. 409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy;

57 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1377.

58 Id. at 1376.

59An Act Providing for the Protection and Conservation of the National Cultural Heritage,
Strengthening the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and its Affiliated Cultural
Agencies, and for Other Purposes. Approved on 26 March 2010.

60 Section 25, Republic Act No. 10066.

61 Section 1, Article III, Constitution.

62 TSN1September 2015, p. 34.

63 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1376.

64 120 Phil. 321, 337 (1964).

65
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

66 G.R .. No. 207132, 6 December 2016.

67 Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 1386-1389.

Zoning Board Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013, 23 December 2013.

WHEREAS, Section 78 of the Ordinance No. 8119, otherwise known as the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006, mandates the Manila
Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) to act on the applications for zoning
appeals on the following nature: variances, exceptions, non-conforming uses, complaints
and oppositions;

WHEREAS, the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) elevated the application
for Zoning Appeal regarding the Special Use Permit of the above-captioned Project to the
MZBAA in its Fourth Meeting held on December 23, 2013;

WHEREAS, the CPDO Evaluation Worksheet for Zoning Permit Processing reveals that
the Project exceeds the prescribed maximum Percentage of Land Occupancy (PLO) and
exceeds the prescribed Floor Area Ratio (FAR) as stipulated in Article V, Section 17 of
City 1 ordinance No. 8119;

WHEREAS, the Owner requested for favorable endorsement to the City Council; x x x

xxx

WHEREAS, through Barangay Resolutions and an Affidavit, the Barangay Council

together with the owners and residents of the adjacent surrounding properties interpose
no objection; x x x

WHEREAS, through Certifications from respective utility companies, the supplies of

water, power and communications are assured to be continuous and sufficient to the
community vis-a-vis supplying the utility demands of the proposed Project; x x x

NOW, THEREFORE, the MZBAA, by virtue of the powers vested in us by law hereby
RECOMMENDSAPPROVALFORVARIANCE to the City Council of Manila, the herein
Proposed Project, TORRE DE MANILA: 49-Storey High-Rise Residential Condominium
located at TAFT AVENUE, ERMITA x x x.

xxxx

68 lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, 236 Phil. 84, 95 (1987).

69 Board of Medical Education v. Alfonso, 257 Phil. 311, 321 (1989). Citations omitted.
70 Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766, 771-772 (1997). Emphasis supplied.

71 34 Phil. 818, 823 (1916).

72M.A. Jimenez Enterprises, Inc. v. Ombudsman, 665 Phil. 523, 540-541 (2011), citing Albay
Accredited Constructors Association, Inc. v. Desierto, 516 Phil. 308, 326 (2006).

73See angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, supra note 70; Kant Kwong v. PCGG, 240 Phil. 219, 230
(1987).

74The preamble of the International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments
and sites(1964), otherwise known as the Venice Charter, reads:

Imbued with a message from the past, the historic monuments of generations of people
remain to the present day as living witnesses of their age-old traditions. People are
becoming more and more conscious of the unity of human values and regard ancient
monuments as a common heritage. The common responsibility to safeguard them for
future generations is recognized. It is our duty to hand them on in the full richness of their
authenticity.

It is essential that the principles guiding the preservation and restoration of ancient
buildings should be agreed and be laid down on an international basis, with each country
being responsible for applying the plan within the framework of its own culture and
traditions.

By defining these basic principles for the first time, the Athens Charter of 1931
contributed towards the development of an extensive international movement which has
assumed concrete form in national documents, in the work of ICOM and UNESCO and in
the establishment by the latter of the International Centre for the Study of the
Preservation and the Restoration of Cultural Property. Increasing awareness and critical
study have been brought to bear on problems which have continually become more
complex and varied; now the time has come to examine the Charter afresh in order to
make a thorough study of the principles involved and to enlarge its score in a new
document.

xxxx

75 TSN, 25 August 2015, pp. 18-22, 24.

76 An Act Appropriating Funds to Carry Out the Purposes of Jose Rizal National Centennial
Commission Created by Executive Order No. Fifty-two, dated August Ten, Nineteen Hundred and
Fifty four, Approved on 14 June 1956.

77 Rollo, Vol. V, p. 2497.

78 Id. at 2500.

79 Id. at 2493.

80 Id. at 2500.

81 Id. at 2502.
82 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1283.

83Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 173134, 2 September 2015, 768 SCRA
563, 582, :citing Roque v. Lapuz, 185 Phil. 525 (1980).

84 644 Phil. 565 (2010).

85Id. at 573, citing University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal, Jr., 338 Phil. 728, 744 (1997); In
re: Petition for Separation of Property Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller, 531 Phil. 460,
468 (2006).

86 Beumer v. Amores, 700 Phil. 90, 98 (2012).

87 Rollo Vol. I, p. 18.

88 TSN 21 July 2015, p. 105.

89Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, 29 September 2014, 737 SCRA 145,
163;Salao v. Santos, 67 Phil. 547, 550 (1939). Citations omitted.

90 Id.

91 Rollo; Vol. I, p. 371.

92 Id. at 1382.

93 Id. at 1372.

94 Id. at 1385-392.

95 Id. at 373.

96 Rollo Vol. III, p. 1369.

97 Id. at 1 1370.

98 Id. at 1366.

99 TSN, 21 July2015, p. 107.

100 Id. at 106.

101
Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Municipal Council of iloilo, 24 Phil. 471, 475 (1913). Citations
omitted.

102 See Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 604 Phil. 677 (2009).

103 131 Phil. 719, 725 (1968).

104 Zamora, v. Wright, 53 Phil. 613, 629 (1929).

105 Sanson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198, 201 (1936).

106 Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 250, 277 (1913).

107
Pascua v. Tuason, 108 Phil. 69, 73 (1960), citing Zamora v. Wright, supra note 104; Sanson v.
Barrios, supra note 105; Pabico v. Jaranilla, 60 Phil. 247 (1934).

108 From the untitled poem written by Jose Rizal given to his family the night before his execution
in 1896 <http://en.wikipedia.org/org/wiki/mi_%C3%BAltimo_adi%C3%B3s > (accessed on 16
February 2017).

The poem was later given the title Mi Ultimo Adios by Mariano
Ponce. http://www.joserizal.ph/pm03.html (accessed on 16 February 2017).

109
From Pahimakas ni Dr. Jose Rizal, Tagalog translation of Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios by Andres
Bonifacio <http://en.wikipedia.org/org/wiki/mi_%C3%BAltimo_adi%C3%B3s > (accessed on 16
Febr4ary 2017).

110English translation by Charles Derbyshire

<http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php/Mi_UltiMo_Adios > (accessed on 24 April 2017).

111Were: Rizal's Burial Wishes Honored?, Dr. Pablo S. Trillana,

<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/554367/were-rizals-burial-wishes-honored >(accessed on 16
February 2017).