CHAPTER-3

HEGEL. * S CONCEPT OE L.XBERTY

 HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY

Hegel, one of the chief protagonists of idealism,

worts out a sound philosophical base for Idealism. Idealism

as a philosophical theory is broad based on the assumption

that ideas or the universals are the building blocks of the

knowledge. In other words, any knowledge claim whatsoever,

is ultimately analysable in terms of ideas or universals.

But unlike Berkeley, according to whom, ideas are

universals or subjective impressions of the mind, Hegel

maintains that they are objectively real. The dictum, 'Real

is rational' and 'Rational is real', constitutes the corner

stone of Hegelian philosophy. The expression, Real is

Rational means that anything that passes off as rea lity, is

nothing but a congeries of universals. Lest this might lead

one to suppose that ideas or universals are mental

constructs, as it was so m case oP Berkeley, Hegel goes on

to add that 'Rational is real '. It means that the ideas are

obj ect1vely real X ■ €» a they exist in and through

particulars. He begins with refutation of kantian

agnosticism which states that there is something unknown

and unknowable.

According to Hegel, anything that can meaningfully be

said to exist must be an item of experience and therefore,

definable in terms of concepts or categories. There can be

 71
nothing in the universe which is not comprehensible by
human mind. This constitutes the core of Hegelian
metaphysics on which his views on Politics, Soc lety and
Religion are broad based.

The profound and momentous influence of Hegelian

doctrines on European philosophy can hardly be exaggerated,,

As E.Cassirer describes,

No other philosophical system has

exerted such a strong and enduring
influence upon political life as the
metaphysics of Hegel. Yet Hegelianism
has had a rebirth not in the field of
Logic and metaphysical thought, but in
the field of political thought. There
has hardly been a single great
political system that has resisted its
influence.*

Hegel's views on the State and Individual Liberty are

the logical expressions of his metaphysics. The political

philosophy of Hegel is grounded in his metaphysical

presuppositions. LiPe Kant and Fichte the political

philosophy of Hegel brings into focus the idea of the

State, the relation between Individual and Society, nature

1. E. Cassirer, Myth of the state, yale University Press,

New Haven, 1950, p.E48.
 72

of social change etc. He dwells at length, on the

philosophical issues pertaining to Freedom, Obligation,

Authority, Alienation, Duty, Right etc. Hegel's concept of

Freedom has affinity with the Greet idea of finding the

true self. Hegel regards freedom as the very essence of

man. It is the distinctive characteristic of human species.

Freedom is the ideal to be realised by one and all. In

Hegelian theory, Progress means the gradual realisation of

the idea of Freedom. Freedom does not mean the mere absence

of external restraints nor is it not synonymous with the

unrestricted Liberty of the individuals. It stands for the

unhindered development of man’s power? moral, intellectual

and spiritual, according to the fundamental laws of one’s

own nature.

Hegel's treatment of the concept of Freedom is unique

and different from those of other German idealists who

conceive Freedom as an attribute or faculty, of an

individual. Freedom, according to Hegel is meaning ful only

in the context of social living. It does not consist in

obeying the d1ctates of self -imposed categorical

imperatives. It i s rather, the Hill. whi ch wills the Free-

will. Freedom 15 manifested only m the exercise of the

Rational Hill. It consists in overcoming the limitations

u

the material and the

t

imposed by the lower self

m
■
 73
egoistic self. Besides, what is necessary is that the

individual must realise the social obligations and feel the

urgency of attending to them.

It suggests that the urge for Freedom goes hand in

hand with the progressive unfoldment of the rational

faculty. In the absence of Rationality, the instinctive

urges or sentiments, hold the personality at ransom= The

individual falls a prey to the dictates of the whims and

impulses. Besides, there are dogmas which hold their sway

on human mind. The vision of the individual is blurred and

thereby, perception of things are prejudiced. Consequently,

one’s actions go wrong. When the thinking is clouded,

actions are bound to go wrong. Hegel’s view of Freedom is

patently different from that of Mill who defines Freedom,

negatively, as implying the absence of restraints. Hegelian

notion of Freedom marks a fundamental departure from the

papular notion of Freedom. In common parlance, Freedom is

achieved only when man escapes from the family and the

social obligations which bind him in different ways. A free

life is perhaps a life when one is left to oneself like an

ascetic and one has no other obligation or duty to attend

to. For Hegel, Freedom has two essential features. Firstly,

it implies self-determination. In this sense, it refers to

the positive power of an individual to determine his

 74

actions actively, deliberately and consciously and

secondly, Freedom has to be exercised only m a corporate

body. It is to be realised only in relation to others.

Elucidating this C.E.Vaughan observes,

That by Freedom is meant not the mere

absence of external restraints; not the
liberty of the individual to do what he
wills with his own faculties and his
own possessions but the untrammelled
development of man's powers,
moral,mtellectual and spiritual,
according to the fundamental laws of
our own nature.®

Freedom is a social phenomenon. It is necessarily

bound up with life m society. It is objective in character

and positive m its connotation. An action is said to be

free only when it is m keeping with what one wills.

Freedom is said to be thwarted only when one fails to act

according to one's desire either because of external

constraints or because of inner compulsions. It means that

outward self must be m consonance with the inner self i„e.

the rational self. The manifestation of the Rational Hill

2. C.E.Vaughan, Studies in the History of Political

Philosophy, (Vol-n), Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1939, p.153.
 75
may tate three distinct forms, i.e. Law. Inward morality

and Social ethics. The first manifestation of Mill is Law.

Popper remarts,

Every genuine law is a liberty, for it

contains a reasonable principle.3

To be free is the essence of Human existence. A living

creature becomes a person m so far as he exercises his

Free will. For instance, a slave is no better than a mere

property because he lacts the Free will. Hegel does not

define Laws and Rights in terms of any fixed standard. He,

does not leave room for absolutism. He undertakes the

analysis of Laws and Rights with references to the

different stages of culture and the progressive development

of the rational consciousness. The second manifestation of

the Will is in the forms of the inward morality. Inward

morality has to be understood through the concept of self-

determination. There are two distinguishable aspects of

self-determination, namely, the External law and the

dictates of moral self. Self-determination is possible only

when the external laws and inward morality are reconciled.

3. Karl Popper, The open society and its enemies,

(Vol-ii),Third Revised Edition, Oxford University
Press, London,1957, p.44.
 76

The Hill finally manifests itself m the whole system

of social, political, economic and religious institutions

and produce righteousness in the nation-state» The

reconciliation between inward morality and external law

attain their consummation m the State. It is expressed m

the form of laws, customs etc. In nutshell, the nation­

state represents the social morality in its perfected form.

In conforming to the social morality the rational-will of

the individual is fully realised. In the nation-state man,

has fully raised his outward self to

the level of the inward self of thought
i his free will has found its broadest
expansion which its positive quality
demands, and the highest expression
which its objective character
requires

Hegel analyses the concept of Freedom by means of two

concepts, namely, thinking and willing. He also goes on to

distinguish between negative and positive freedom, on the

one hand and subjective and objective freedom, on the

other. In his attempt to concretise the notion of freedom,

4. E.Barker, The political Thought in England, Oxford

University Press, London, 1951, p.19.
 77

he tal-es the economic order as having bearing on the

individual freedom.

In spelling out the nature of rational-wi12 Hegel

equates it with the nature of self-consciousness, Se 1 f-

consciousness is the awareness of one's own self, It is

simple and is of the form of self identity, Seif-

consciousness is negative in its connotation, in so far as

it involves the exclusion of anything objective, It is

negative in the sense that it is indeterminate. Hegel

observes that,

..... the will contains th e element of

pure indeterminacy or that pure
reflection of the ego into itself,*

In elucidating the nature of pure indeterminacy, he

adds,
the dissipation of every restriction
and every content either immediately
presented by nature, by needs, drives,
and impulses, or given and determined
by any means whatever.*

and defines this aspect of Mill more abstractly as,

3. Wilfned Ver Eecke, Hegel on Economics and freedom and

the state, Ed by william Maker, Mercer University
Press, Macon, Ga,1987, p.1E8

6. Ibid, p.129
 78

the unrestricted infinity of absolute

abstraction or universality, the pure
thought of one self.-7.

The above interpretation of Hill has often led the

scholars to construe Freedom negatively and they have gone

to the extent of treating the acts of destruction as the

means of affirming the self. It is of course the case that

the Hill which is self-restrictive and indeterminate lacks

self-determination. The will, therefore, according to

Hegel, must be,

.... the dissipation of restriction and

the posting of a determinacy as a
content and object.®

This is called as the Paradox of Hill and freedom.

According to Hegel, to be free is to be provided with

proper object of thought. The proper object of thought has

been identified as the unmoved mover, the platonic ideas,

happiness or the contemplation of God. The identification

of the proper object of the Hill requires right thought.

Hence, he insists that as a thin!ing faculty, the Hill is a

genuine instance of Free Hill. It is therefore, observed

that,

7. Ibid, p.129

8. Ibid, p.129
 79

true liberty consists in the will

■finding its purpose in a universal
content, not in subjective or selfish
interest. But such a content is only
possible in thought and through
thought .**

In his philosophy of right, Hegel undertakes elaborate

discussion on the concept of right, morality, ethics, which

are nothing but the different modal expressions of freedom

and constitute the proper object of Free Mill* Right is

understood as the immediate relation of will to external

things. It deals with the problems relating to property,

which is the first externalization of Free Mill. In

property, one's Free Hill becomes an object of one's self

but the Right is only the realisation of Freedom in limited

degree. Morality, as an expression of Freedom is higher

than Freedom, embodied m property-r1ghts, because-rlghts

require an external enforcement, whereas morality is a

commitment by the individual to himself.

9. G.W.F., Hegel's Phenomenology of mind, translated by

J.B.Baillie, Humanities Press, New Delhi, 1949, p.469
 80

In the Philosophy of right, Hegel describes Morality

as the Hill reflected from its external embodiment into

itself."10

In the Philosophy of £aw, Hegel expresses his

conception of freedom as natural and social. It provides

ley to the understanding of his political thought. This

concept of freedom is intelligible m a society where the

people, by and large, are committed to a life of dedication

and sacrifice. It is lucidly remarked,

Se1f-sacrif 1ce is the real existence of

one ’ s freedom.*
11

According to Hegel, Freedom consists in obedience. The

exercise of Liberty therefore, consists in doing one’s

Duty. Duty may appear to be incompatible with Freedom. It

may be supposed that Duty is a restriction on indeterminate

subjectivity or impulses of the natural will. Freedom is

not licentiousness. Freedom does not consist in doing what

one's liPes. The rational will, which manifests itself m

true freedom is worth its name, so long as it helps one to

10. Helgel's Philosophy of Right, Trans. by T.M.Knox,

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 194S, p.33

11. William Ebenstein, Modern Political Thought, the great

issues, Second Edition, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co.,
New Delhi, 1954, p.323.
 81

liberate oneself from dependence on mere natural impulses.

As far as one falls a victim to the call of the instinctive

drives, whims and fancies, one’s freedom is constrained.

In doing one's Duty the individual acquires his

substantive Freedom. Duty is a restriction only on the self

will of subjectivity. It stands on the way of abstract

Freedom. When we say,

We want to be free, the primary meaning

of the words is simply, We want
abstract freedom. Every institution and
every organ oF the state passes as a
restriction on freedom of that hind.
Thus duty is not a restriction on
freedom, but only Freedom in the
abstraction i.e. an un-freedom. Duty is
the attainment of essence i.e. the
winning of positive freedom. '•*

According to Hegel, freedom is obedience to the moral

will of the community. The will is free only when it has

the proper object. It is genuinely free when it finds a

purpose in universal content, not in subjective or selfish

interest.

12. Ibid, p.333-334

 82

Hegel’s idea of Freedom has affinity with the old

Gree^ notion of an Individual who finds his true

personality and freedom in the state. Hegel explains the

origin of the state m terms of the dialectical evolution

of the triad, i.e. the family, the civil society and the

state. Man is a social animal and lives in association with

others. Man learns how to live m association in the family

which consists in mutual love and co-operation and is

characterised by the principle of unity. In human evolution

which is dialectical, the family becomes the thesis but the

family has its own imperfections. It can not fulfil all the

needs of the individual. It generates its anti-thesis i.e,

the civil society which is based on contract and self-

interest and is characterized by the principle of universal

competition. So, there follows a struggle between the

thesis i.e. family and its anti-thesis i.e., the civil

society. Thus, there is a tension between the principles of

unity and competition. This struggle becomes resolved by

the appearance of the synthesis i.e., the state which is

characterised by the principle of universality. According

\

to him, individual freedom is a gift of the state. The

state not only secures the freedom of the individual but

also enlarges it.

 83

The concept of Freedom is not intelligible without the

state. While explaining the relationship between state and

individual, Hegel appears to be a totalitarlan. Freedom

becomes a value, only when it makes the individual

discharge his obligation to the state. The exercise of

Freedom on the part of the individuals to safeguard the

interest of the collective body is the supreme duty of the

individual. It is in this sense that liberty can be said to

be the basis of the state. It is Liberty which generates

the rules of inward morality, the external law and

eventually finds its fruition m the form of the state,,

The State maintains the individual and promotes his

welfare and protects his social life. Besides, the state

also educates one to transcend the individuality by giving

one’s total devotion to something beyond oneself. So

naturally m Hegel’s thought the individual enjoys utmost

pleasure and attains perfection, only within the state.

Without the state, man is nothing but a stupid and a

limited creature.

All the worth which the human being

possesses, all spiritual reality he
possesses only through the state.'13

13. G.W.F.Hegel, Philosophy of History (Published in

1837), (Trans, by J.Sibree, revised ed. 1900), Copy
right, 1900, by the Colonial Press, p.37,
 84

In the Philosophy of history, Hegel defines the state

as,
.... the realisation of freedom, the
state exists for its own sake.14

Hegel has delineated several characteristics of the

state. It is divine as it is the highest embodiment, that

/

the Spirit has reached in its progress through the ages.

It is the divine idea as it exists on

earth.

State is glorified to the extent of being a mystic

entity which is above good or bad. It is absolute and

demands unconditional obedience from the citizens. The

individuality of the individuals are relegated to the bad-

ground and individuals have their identity in so far as

they, as the integral parts of the state, promote the good

of the state. The interest of the state is taken care of

only when the individual-will acts in obedience to the will

of the state. Conversely, any action which is not in

accordance with the good of the state, is bound to be

14.. Ibid, p.38

15. C.L.Wayper, Political Thought, B.I. Publication,

Bombay, 1974, p.163.
suicidal for the individual and prejudicial to the well

being of the state. Hegel remarts,

In considering freedom, the starting

point must not be individuality, the
single self-consciousness, but only the
essence of se1f-consc3ousness, for
whether man knows it or not, this
essence is extremely realised as a
self-subsistent power in which single
individuals are only moments. The march
of God in the world, that is what the
state is.1*

Thus one finds that one's duty consists in wilful

submission of the individual will, before the will of the

state. One can easily see how the platonic concept of

Republic, do reappear in the Hegelian concept of State and

Individual. He conceives of state as the consummate

expression of spirit and an end in itself.

State is an end m itself.

It is not only the highest expression which the

spirit has yet attained,

16. Hegel's Philosophy of History, Op. Cit., p.36.

17. Ibid, p.36.

 86

It is the final embodiment of spirit on

Earth. '•*

There can be thus, no spiritual evolution beyond the

state, any more than there can be any physical evolution

beyond man. He subscribes to an organic conception of

state. The state too, is an organic whole which is far

greater than the parts which compose it and which have

significance only in it. The state is an individual m

relation to history.

It is to history what an individual is

to biography.'1‘5'

Individuals therefore, must obviously be completely

subordinated to the state.

It has the highest right over the

individual whose highest duty is to be
a member of the state.

Liberty consists m voluntary or creative

participation in the formation of the state. Nothing is

superimposed by the state on the individual. Rather it

18. C.L.Wayper, Op.Cit., p.163

19.Ibid, p.164.

20.Ibid, p.164
 87

proceeds From the individual awareness that the good of the

individual is implied by the good of the state.

Liberty as creative participation m

the formation of state authority means
to us, not the bringing forth of
governmental will out of individual
wills, not control of the mandatory by
the principal, but the free, conscious
and dutiful dedication of one self to
the whole, as it has been moulded by
history, state and nation.® ’

Thus, Hegel is found to be subscribing to the

organisnuc conception of the state. The state is an organic

whole of which the individuals are the integral parts. The

parts must wori m subordinated co-operation to the whole.

The citizens of the state must act m free and dutiful

dedication to the whole. The individual acts for the state

and in turn, the freedom of the individual is protected by

the state.

Duty is to be undeirstood in terms of one's action for

state. Duty implies Rights . Hence, the rights are also

hsafed by the state. Since the rights are derived from

the state, one cannot have any right against the state. It

21. William Ebenstein, Op.Cit., pp.325-326.

 88

is an absolute, fined end in itself. The state is the end

and the individuals are its means. Hegel has thus

completely subordinated the individual to the authority of

the state. For Hegel, the state is the crystallization of

this social morality. The collective good is a prerequisite

for individual good. The state is not merely an association

of ordinary human beings. It is a divine idea or a mystic

entity incapable of doing any wrong. It is infallible,

supreme and omnipotent and is entitled to secure every

sacrifice which its interest may require of the individual.

Hegel insists that every account of the nature of state is

inadequate until it postulates that the individual, can

utilise his potentialities by creative participation m the

affairs of £he great whole, which is the State.

State is the sovereign. There is nothing to curb its

authority, not even the moral laws, because the state

itself is the creator of morality. Whatever the state does

is right and this holds good not merely m relation to its

subjects but also m relation to other states. That is to

say, the state has an absolute sovereignty both internally

and externally and there can be nothing higher than the

state. Thus, one finds how the state and individual are

organically related. Hegel rejected the idea of the origin

of the state in social contract. The state is a natural

 89

organism and is a whole, of which the individuals and

associations are ^integral parts. These parts get their

meaning and significance by their identification with the

State and wo rJ-ing for it. In the metaphysics of Hegel, the

individual is a cypher but the state is everything.

The state is an all comprehending entity. In reality,

the Ends oP the individual can not be contrary to with

those of the state. The individual realises Freedom as far

as he identifies himself with Reason manifested m form of

the state and its institutions. The Freedom of the

individual thus, lies m treating the Hill of the state as

one's own. In analysing the Hegelian notion of the State,

Wayper suggests that the state,

... is the school master which brings

his Knowledge of the spirit of absolute
reason. His real will impels him to
identify himself with the spirit. The
spirit is embodies in the state.
Therefore, it is the real will to obey
the dictates of the state.**

The state is the highest embodiment that the spirit

has attained in course of its progress through ages. Beyond

22. C.L.Wayper, Op.Cit., p.168.

 90

it, there can be no further spiritual evolution. The state,

therefore, represents the complete whole and is rational.

It embodies the true Freedom and achieves the identity of

general and particular will.

The universal is to be found in the

state,S3

Whatever spiritual reality one possesses one can have

it only through the state. It is the fundamental duty of

the individual to gracefully submit to the authority of the

state because m the life of the state alone he may have a

universal life and can remain a free and rational agent.

State, according to Hegel is divine and determines morality

and is a means of enlarging Freedom. It is only in the

state that the individual can find Freedom, while without

it he is completely in subjection. Freedom, he adds is the

outstanding characteristic of the modern state.

The history of the world is none other

than the progress of the consciousness
of freedom.®'*

23. Karl Popper, Op.Cit., p.31.

24. C.L.Wayper, Op.Cit., p.167.

 91

The Spirit, he says, is free for it has its centre in

itself and the self-containedness is the very essence of

Freedom. Popper states,

Freedom is the sole truth of sprit.

Accordingly, the development of spirit
must be the development of 'freedom1,
and the history of the world is nothing
but the history of the freedom.8285

The perfect state is truly a free state and the

individuals who live in willing obedience to the laws of

the state enjoy perfect freedom. Man is not beyond the

state. It is at the behest of the state that the activities

and ways of life of different individuals are regulated and

co-ordinated m the direction of the common interest. In

other words, the interests of the individuals are regulated

by reason so that they are in agreement with the interest

of the state and give birth to a kind of unity impossible

to be achieved by individuals on their own. The state,

therefore, represents the victory of Reason and Reason

itself is free in the sense of being self-determined and

having its centre in itself. The state obviously, signifies

the fullest realisation of Freedom.

25. Karl Popper, Op.Cit., p.48.

 92

The state affords man the opportunity to find Freedom,,

It does not follow however that he necessarily avails

himself of this opportunity. He may obey the state because

he is afraid of the consequences of disobedience. If he

obeys because of fear, he is not free. He is still subject

to an alien force. But if he obeys because he has

consciously identified himself with the will of the state,

then he is subject only to his own Will and he is truly

free. Therefore, state is necessary to make men free and

free men are necessary to mate the state perfect. In

Hegel's theory of state, Freedom and Authority are

reconciled. Hegel reconciles freedom and authority by

insisting that the state is not mere brute force. Rather

the laws of the state are rational and provide favourable

conditions for the complete expression of Liberty. Freedom,

is not license. He believes that an individual living a

private life outside the 'Authority' of the state is not

free because he is chained down to his natural impulses and

'indeterminate subjectivity’. It is the state which

rationalizes human emotions, impulses and instincts etc.

What men really need is what the state commands through its

laws. The state embodies the perfection of rational and

ethical Will. Bereft of state control, the individual is

left to the vagaries of instinctive impulses. It is m

obeying the laws of the state that an individual becomes

 93

free and moral, because he is no more guided by impulses

but by Reason. Reason dlalect 1 cal 1 y realises itself in form

of the State. The mofal worth of the individual and all his

spiritual reality flow from the state. Morality and

Spiritualism lie in the unity of the universal and the

subjective will. The universal is to be found m the state

in form of its laws.

Hegel is considered as the most outstanding advocate

of the organic theory of the state and one of the most

important and influential thint ers of modern history. He

reminds us that history is the record of the march of the

Spirit through the world. He explains in detail the process

by which the spirit changes from one state to another. In

doing so, he introduces the principle of dialectic. He is

of the view that a dialectical movement runs through

everything and explains how history is a story of

continuous development of Spirit. It is assumed that the

universe is a coherent whole. The underlying unity is

variously called as the Idea or Spirit or Reason or the

Divine mind. It is aptly said,

 94

Reason is the sovereign of the

world.

For Hegel, the universe is a coherent, organic and

rational whole m which Reason stands as the only reality.

Everything, including the material world, is a creation and

embodiment of reason. Reason and Matter are not

antithetical but co-ordinate. Everything that exists m the

world is the embodiment or outcome of Reason.

History is the process m which the spirit passes from

the state of imperfection to perfection, from ignorance to

full knowledge of itself. The progressive march of

civilisation is an increasing revelation of the rational

mind. Historical process therefore, is not a random or

bland process. Every change is for the better and the

higher. It is goal approximating or teleological. Hegel

explicitly states that the history of the world is a

rational process. The expression Real is rational suggests

that the universal mind is at work in the world. Everything

that exists, is an expression of Reason. The changing

phenomena disclose the underlying rational principles, at

work. It is the rational principle which lends meaning to

26.. C.L.Wayper, Op.Cit., p.156.

 95

the social process and therefore, the political, religious

and economic institutions are the inevitable resultants of

the social process. That which is said to be the natural

universe, is in fact a rational universe. Therefore, all

the naturalistic explanations must make room for rational

explanation. It has the further suggestion that the

motivating power behind change is not inert matter, but the

self propelling thought. The concept of Real does not refer

to the matters of fact but the underlying power that brings

everything into being. In this respect, there is a

divergence of opinion between Fichte and Hegel. According

to former, it is only the ideal state which is rational,

where as the existing states are irrational. But for Hegel,

everything actual and possible is an expression of Reason,,

Hegel has the implicit conviction that changes take place

because the Spirit needs them and whatever the Spirit

needs, is right. It is the principle of universal Reason

that explains the phenomena of change.

This metaphysical pre-supposition led him to perceive

a pattern m the change. It is the principle of Dialectic»

Hegel, time and again, reminds that the dialectic is not an

a priori model through which reality is to be viewed but it

is denotative of a process which takes place objectively.

The dialectical process is to be discovered. The

 96

understanding of dialectic not only reveals the nature of

reality, but also enables one to understand whether or to

what extent, the individuals are free to think and act.

Dialectic is derived from the Greel word Dialogue

which means, to debate. Although Dialectic as a method, was

used much before Hegel, it is he who gave a precise

philosophical articulation to the concept and used it m a

novel sense. The dialectic begins with most abstract

conception of Logic i.e. Being and culminates m the most

concrete concept i.e. Absolute. It means that the dialectic

process admits of a beginning and a terminus and the

different stages of dialectic therefore, are indicative of

the different stages of Change.

According to Hegel, there are three distinct stages m

the Dialectics i.e. Thesis, Anti-thesis and Synthesis« The

Reason moves from thesis to synthesis in and through anti­

thesis. This is therefore, true of the changes m Nature

and human Society. It is based on the assumption that an

Idea or a state of affair contains not only itself but also

its Negation. In other words, the thesis entails what it is

not. The Negation or Contradiction which issues out of the

thesis is simply indicative of the inadequacy or

incompleteness of the thesis.

 97

The dialectic process continues, as long as the idea

or the state of reality is not self-contained or all

comprehensive. All ideas are explicitly manifested in the

Absolute. Hence, it is the most concrete idea. Since there

is nothing beyond or outside the Absolute, there is no

possibility of otherness or anti-thesis. The synthesis is

suggestive of a state, where the thesis and antithesis are

accommodated as complimentaries. If X and not-X are

mutually contradictory, they point to a state, Y in which

both X and not-X are not only compatible but exist as

necessary complimentaries. The relationship between thesis

and antithesis is not contingent but necessary because the

dialectic process has its genesis m the very nature of

Reality. Dialectic signifies conflicts and resolution of

conflicts m the philosophical parlance. The core meaning

of the dialectic is retained in so far as the dialectic m

the Hegelian framewort- refers to conflicts and

contradictions which characterise the essence of Reality»

In the sociological sphere, Hegel considers 'Family'

as a unity incorporating the rational idea of mutual love

and is the 'thesis’ from which Hegel begins his analysis of

the state. However, Hegel's system of triad tates the

Family as a unity, the Civil Society as particularity and

the State as universality. The tension between the unity of

 98

the family and particularity of the civil society is

resolved with the appearance of the state which is the

actuality oP the universal order. Hobhouse observes,

The state (nation) represents the synthesis of

family and civil society and is a prefect
embodiment of reason.®'7’

The process of dialectic stops here because the

process of reconciliation reaches the stage of

consummation. So, the dialectical process begins from civil

society and culminates m the nation-state. The law of

dialectical idealism not only lays down that the ideas are

original, primary and self-operating but also that it

confirms the role of the absolute spirit in the mating of

history. In this way Reason or Idea is inter-changeable

with God.

The reason m most concrete form of

God, governs the world, the actual
worting of his government - the
carrying out of plan is the history of
the world.®®

27. L.T.Hobhouse, The metaphysical theory of state, Gerge

Allen and Unwin, London, 1918, p.17

28. Hegel's Philosophy of History, Op.Cit., p.38

 99

Hegel metres a fundamental departure from the views of

his predecessors like Plato, Kant and his contemporary

thinkers lite Green. In expounding the concept of Freedom,

Hegel seems to be indebted to the views of Rousseau. Both

Kant and Hegel conceive the individual as essentially free.

The judicious exercise of Freedom consists in acting in

obedience to the will of the state. But Kant interprets

Freedom as self imposed imperatives. In this respect, both

Kant and Hegel have their affinity with the concept of

moral Freedom as conceived by Rousseau. For Kant Freedom is

negative m its import but according to Hegel Freedom is

positive m its connotation.

The fundamental difference between Hegel and Kant is

that, for Kant Freedom consists in obedience to the Moral

Mill but according to Hegel, Freedom consists in obedience

*■

to the dictates of Social morality or the Moral Mill of the

communlty. Hegel agrees with Kant in saying that freedom

consists m obedience to the dictates of universal reason

but identifies the dictates of Universal Reason with Social

Morality but not with the isolated moral will of the

individual. Besides, there is one notable difference in the

attitude of the two thinkers on the concept of Freedom.

Kant talks about freedom as an ethical problem, the

solution of which is independent of political

 100

circumstances. Hegel accepts and agrees with Kant that

Freedom as an ethical problem, is concerned with the

essence and existence of the individual 6u~t he—rejects the

so called Kantian separation of Ethics from Politics in

respect of individual Freedom. For Hegel, Freedom is an

ethical problem and it cannot be solved without reference

to the political circumstances. The individual finds his

true freedom only m obeying the laws of the stat and in

statef

Hegel's view state is not only a political

cal unity but is

representative of God on Earth. Like Hegel, G een

Gr is

concerned with the problem of Freedom and his v' lew of

Freedom bears a striding resemblance with

ith Hegel.
Hegel Gr e en

states,

Freedom is not being left alone to do

what one likes, since all depends on
what one likes to do. Han is free only
when he is following his 'true* good
and his true good is also social
good .s‘5'

Like Hegel, Green believe that Freedom being positive,

can be realised only in and through participation in the

activities of the state. For Hegel the state is the

realization of moral principles. It is the pre-condition of

29. T.H.Green,Principles of Political Obligation, Longmans

Green, London, 1955, p.32-33
 101

all social life. For Marx, the state is a product of social

life, not its condition. It is a historic outgrowth of

society. There are societies without states. The first must

therefore be logically and historically prior to the

second. Society is an organism m which the state functions

as a principle of organisation.

In the Communist Manifesto, Marx declares that the

modern state power is merely a committee which manages the

common business of the bourgeoisie. History reveals that

the ruling class has always been partisan, its chief aim

being to seine power and monitor the state mechanism to

promote and perpetuate their interest. The difference

between the ruler and the ruled is an expression of the

basic disparity and incompatibility of their respective

economic interests. The state as a social phenomenon, shall

persist as long as there is inequality of economic

interest. The state represents the principle of absolute

Reason and promotes the best in man. The state sublimates

the rational egoism of the bourgeoisie and helps them to

transcend their vested interest and reconciles economic

contradictions underneath. For Hegel, the state has an

independent character grounded in logical, ethical

formulae, but for Marx, the state is rooted m the class

disparities of the existing society. As the state is the

 102

institutional sublimation of all social differences he

seets to discover what men have m common, by closing his

eyes to what practically separates them. The fundamental

opposition between Hegel and Marx is focused most sharply

in their respective philosophies of history. For Hegel

history is the march of the spirit towards freedom. Freedom

can be Pound only in selF-consciousness. Absolute self-

consciousness is God. The logic of the system demands not

only that Reason pervades the universe but that the rule of

reason is established in the chronicle of human experience.

There is an objective meaning in history. It is to be

traced to the development of idea of Freedom.

Marx shares with Hegel the belief that the order of

historical events is more than a confused record of chance

occurrences. But he disputes the fact of teleology and

sect's causal explanation of historical activity not in

terms of abstract ideas but m terms of their concrete

needs. While accepting the Hegelian determinism? he rejects

the idea of Pre-determinism in Hegel.

Marx does not deny that there is an

ordet to be found in history. He denies
only that there is a teleological
order. On the other hand Marx does not
deny that there is determinism in
 103

history but he denies only pre-

determinism or fatalism.530

The compulsions of existence generate the class

consciousness which later takes the form of preparedness

for revolution. Marx was quiet aware that, though history

can be explained rationally, it is not made by Reason. For

Marx, the achievements and failures of the individuals are

subordinate to the behaviour of group or class. The

society, hitherto, has been class based. The history of

human society is a record of class struggle accompanied by

the rise and fall of classes. But for Hegel Rationality is

embedded in the social process. It is amenable to rational

understanding because it is a product of Reason. Though

both Hegel and Marx consider the mode of change to be

dialectical in nature, they radically differ with regard to

the end and the pre-suppositions. According to Marx, the

historical development commensurates with the socialisation

of production and distribution, whereas for Hegel, it is

the progressive realisation of Freedom. Besides, Marx

considers matter and the economic factors to be the

motivating force behind change, whereas for Hegel it is the

Spirit or Idea. In pronouncing his difference from Hegel,

Marx observes,

30. C.L.Wayper, Qp.Cit., p.2Q0.

 104

It is not the consciousness of men that

determines their beings but on the
contrary, it is their social beings
that 1 determines their
consciousness.3’

The Hegelian concept of liberty, could not escape the

attention of its critics. According to some, the notion oP

Freedom is nebulous because of the implicit paradox. On the

one hand, Hegel affirms that man is essentially free and on

the other hand, he holds that individual is free only when

he pursues the Rational Nil! embodied in the state.

Acceptance oP» the later involves the rejection of the

former. Choice is the essence of freedom. If one has to

choose necessarily for the state, the individual has to

cease to choose for himself. Hence, it is self­

contradictory to mal^e the advocacy of freedom and m the

same breath to hold that Freedom is not worth the name, if

it doesn’t coincide with the Mill of the state.

The Hegelian concept of Freedom has far reaching

consequences m the field of social engineering and

politics. For all practical purposes, the Freedom of the

Individual Mill constrains one so far as one has to act in

subordination to the will of the majority. The

31 Ibid, p.201
 105

philosophical reflections of Hegel, thus leaves room for

state absolutism or total 1 tarlanism. Therefore, Berlin

accuses Hegel of the act of Monstrous impersonation a*3**

Besides, by negating the individual Mill he perhaps leaves

no room for the expression of individual creativity.

Hegel identifies the state with society. This is a

profound mistake. Howsoever closely interrelated the state

and society may be, the distinction between the two should

be [ ept clearly m view if we are to avoid state despotism.

It leads to the absolutism and omnipotence of the state. It

leaves no room for individual liberty. It forces the

individual to find his Freedom in submission to state

authority. As Joad remarks,

The state exists for the individual,

individuals do not exist for the state.
Liberty has meaning only for the
individual and the welfare of the
society has neither meaning nor value
unless it carries with it the welfare
of individuals who compose the state.
In other words, the state, and the

3E. Sir Issiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty m

Political Philosophy, Ed, A. Quinton, Oxford
University Press, London, 1967, p.151
 106

community are not ends in

themselves.3S

Elucidating it further Barker remarks,

Heg el exal ted the nat lonal state to a

mystlca 1 he lght . Th e s tate is conceived
by him or an end in i tse If and the
Clt l sen is call ed u pon to f all down and
wo r ship it . Such sa cr if l c e of the
md lvidual to the s tate is not m
con sonance with our ideas of liberty
and democra cy

Coplestone goes on to add that it is an unpleasant

feature of Hegel’s theory of state and considers it as a

Hobbesian, Leviathan in a metaphysical garb.

But the above obj ect ions do n ot seem to hold much

water. By def ining the rat lonal will 0 f the individua 1 in

terms of the will of the state , he do es not suggest that

the freed om of will of the indi vidua 1 is to be suppre ssed

or sacri f l ced in favour of the s tate but that the

conscious ness of the inter est or wi 11 of the state h elps

the indiv idual to perceive how one can mak e the judic lOUS

33. C.E.M. Joad, Introduction to Modern Political

theory, Onford University Press, Delhi, 1950, p.18

34. E.Barter, 0p.Cit.,p.91

 107

use of it. In other words, the will of the state lends a

sense of purpose to the exercise of the rational will. Free

will is not to be confused with the capricious use of the

rational faculty. That is why, Hegel holds that whenever

the individual interest appears to be at loggerheads with

the collective interest, the former is to be sacrificed for

the latter and the real Freedom would lie in mating the

individual subserve the ends of the Collective Hill or the

Social Hill.