1) PICART vs. SMITH, JR.

GR 12219, 3/15/1918 = (Rain Cabana)

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge.
Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he
pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to
the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to
get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so
doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and
turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and
its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff
received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention
for several days.From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability, Picart
has appealed.

ISSUE: Whether Smith was guilty of negligence

HELD: YES. The judgment of the lower court was reversed, and SC rendered that Picart can
recover damages from Smith.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would
constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined
in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful
to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is
clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course.
Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent
is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of
the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who
has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

2) Smith Bell -GR 143008, 6/10/2002 = (Richcelyn Marquez)

Facts: Smith Bell, petitioner, requested the Bureau of Customs to inspect vessel M/T King Family
which was due to arrive at the port of Manila. Customs Inspector Borja, respondent, was
instructed to inspect said vessel. At about 11 o’clock in the morning on September 27, 1987, while
MT King Family was unloading chemicals unto two barges owned by ITTC, a sudden explosion
occurred setting the vessel afire. Seeing the fire and fearing for his life, Borja hurriedly jumped
over board to save himself. He survived but became permanently disabled due to the incident.
He made demands against Smith Bell and ITTC for damages caused by explosion but both denied
liabilities and attributed to each other negligence. Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of Borja and
held Smith Bell liable for damages.

Issue: Whether or not Smith Bell is liable for Borja’s injuries.

Ruling: Smith Bell is liable. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the fire and the explosion had
originated from petitioner's vessel, supported by the testimonies of the witnesses and
investigation conducted by the Special Board of Marine Inquiry, and affirmed by the Secretary of
the Department of National Defense. Negligence is a conduct that creates undue risk of harm to
another. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the
circumstances justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury. Smith Bells’ vessel was
carrying chemical cargo. While knowing that their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable
chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all the precautionary measures to prevent an
accident. Smith Bell was therefore negligent.

The three elements of quasi delict are: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence
of the defendant, and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages inflicted on the plaintiff.All these elements were established in this
case. Knowing fully well that it was carrying dangerous chemicals, petitioner was negligent in
not taking all the necessary precautions in transporting the cargo.

As a result of the fire and the explosion during the unloading of the chemicals from the vessel,
Borja suffered damages and injuries. Hence, the owner or the person in possession and control of
the vessel is liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to the persons and property by
reason of negligent management or navigation.

3) Delsan -GR 156034, 10/1/2003 = (Tom Estrella)

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC. VS. C & A CONSTRUCTION, INC.

PARTIES: Capt. Demetrio Jusep, as employee of Delsan Transport, and C & A Construction

FACTS: C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to
construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila. The project was
completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned over to NHA.

M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc.,
anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the
cargo oil tank. Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio
head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about eight (8) hours. Capt.
Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already
congested. Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from
a NAPOCOR power barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt.
Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards
the NAPOCOR power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. He
succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was
maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent. The damage caused
by the incident amounted to P456,198.24.

Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, petitioner claimed that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event. The trial court
dismissed the complaint. It ruled that petitioner was not guilty of negligence because it had taken
all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident. Applying the "emergency rule", it absolved
petitioner of liability because the latter had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution
to a threatening situation. It further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a
wrong move, it cannot be held liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent was
typhoon "Katring", which is an act of God.

The Court of Appeals, reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It found Capt. Jusep
guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of
October 21, 1994 and thus held petitioner liable for damages. Hence, petitioner filed the instant
petition contending that Capt. Jusep was not negligent in waiting until 8:35 in the morning of
October 21, 1994 before transferring the vessel to the North Harbor inasmuch as it was not shown
that had the transfer been made earlier, the vessel could have sought shelter.

ISSUE(S):
1. WON Capt. Jusep was negligent.
2. WON Delsan Transport is solidarily liable of the acts of Capt. Jusep.

HELD:

1. YES. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence.

The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer
the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00 midnight of October
20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to
hit Manila after 8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of
October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which unfortunately was
already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could
not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the
speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of negligence in the
present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances.
Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently
waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction. He
cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight
immediately after receiving the report because of the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of
8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because,
according to him, it was not very cloudy and there was no weather disturbance yet.

When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep
showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
observed in the same situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater
chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they
docked was very near North Harbor. Even if the latter was already congested, he would still have
time to seek refuge in other ports.

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Clearly, the emergency
rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was
caused by his own negligence.

2. YES. Article 2180 states that the obligation imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible,
and that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry, unless they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines
for the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and
monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner should therefore be
held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
Also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondent’s failure to allege in its
complaint that the former did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

4) SPS. AMADOR C. ONGO vs.METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT -GR 7664,

8/29/1958 = (Enteng Magbanua)

FACTS: Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters,
Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a nominal fee of P0.50 for adults
and P0.20 for children is charged. The main pool it between two small pools of oval shape known
as the "Wading pool" and the "Beginners Pool." There are diving boards in the big pools and the
depths of the water at different parts are indicated by appropriate marks on the wall. The care
and supervision of the pools and the users thereof is entrusted to a recreational section composed
of Simeon Chongco as chief, Armando Rule, a male nurse, and six lifeguards who had taken the
life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in Manila. For the safety of its
patrons, defendant has provided the pools with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and
a resuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic established for the
benefit of the patrons. Defendant has also on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and
regulations governing the use of the pools, one of which prohibits the swimming in the pool alone
or without any attendant. Although defendant does not maintain a full-time physician in the
swimming pool compound, it has however a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer
injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise.

In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00 o'clock, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school
student and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to defendant's swimming
pools. This was not the first time that the three brothers had gone to said natatorium for they had
already been there four or five times before. They arrived at the natatorium at about 1:45 p.m.
After paying the requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools where
the water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going
to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben
and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see
the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards
on duty in the pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva. The tour of duty
of Abaño was from 8:00 to 12:00 in the morning and from 2:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon, and of
Villanueva from 7:30 to 11:30 a.m. and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. Between 4:00 to 5:00 that afternoon,
there were about twenty bathers inside the pool area and Manuel Abaño was going around the
pools to observe the bathers in compliance with the instructions of his chief.

Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed a bather by the name
of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time. Another
boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same happening and Abaño immediately jumped
into the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from
the bottom. The body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño immediately applied manual
artificial respiration. Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed
by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one
of the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and
upon arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep
in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño continued
the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator
until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted. Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another
resuscitator, but the same became of no use because he found the boy already dead. The doctor
ordered that the body be taken to the clinic.

In the evening of the same day, July 5, 1952, the incident was investigated by the Police
Department of Quezon City and in the investigation boys Ruben Ong and Andres Hagad, Jr. gave
written statements. On the following day, July 6, 1952, an autopsy was performed by Dr. Enrique
V. de los Santos, Chief, Medico Legal Division, National Bureau of Investigation, who found in
the body of the deceased the following: an abrasion on the right elbow lateral aspect; contusion
on the right forehead; hematoma on the scalp, frontal region, right side; a congestion in the brain
with petechial subcortical hemorrhage, frontal lobe; cyanosis on the face and on the nails; the lung
was soggy with fine froth in the bronchioles; dark fluid blood in the heart; congestion in the
visceral organs, and brownish fluid in the stomach. The death was due to asphyxia by submersion
in water.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable for the death of the child.

RULING: No because Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable
negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of
proving that the damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the
damage is claimed, or of one of his employees. There is no question that appellants had striven
to prove that appellee failed to take the necessary precaution to protect the lives of its patrons by
not placing at the swimming pools efficient and competent employees who may render help at a
moment's notice, and they ascribed such negligence to appellee because the lifeguard it had on
the occasion minor Ong was drowning was not available or was attending to something else with
the result that his help came late. Thus, appellants tried to prove through the testimony of Andres
Hagad, Jr. and Ruben Ong that when Eusebio Ong and Hagad, Jr. detected that there was a
drowning person in the bottom of the big swimming pool and shouted to the lifeguard for help,
lifeguard Manuel Abaño did not immediately respond to the alarm and it was only upon the
third call that he threw away the magazine he was reading and allowed three or four minutes to
elapse before retrieving the body from the water.

5) Marikina -GR 152040, 3/31/2006 = (Carlo Inocentes)

FACTS: Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31
Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the
owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was
assigned as the regular driver of the bus.

The Bus driven by Suelto suddenly swerved right and hit the establishment owned by Valdellon
causing severe damage thereof. Photographs of the damaged terrace were taken. Valdellon
commissioned Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. to estimate the cost of repairs, inclusive of labor and
painting, and the latter pegged the cost at P171,088.46

Valdellon filed for criminal and civil cases against Suelto.

Issue: W/N Suelto is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property?

W/N Suelto and MALTC shall pay damages?

The Court Ruled:

2. YES

Sudden Emergency Rule:

[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.

In this regard, respondents failed to prove to the contrary that there was a passenger jeepney
which they claim to be the cause of the accident because of inconsistencies in Suelto's statement
in court.

The Court further declared that "where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant,
the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money
which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a
proper case, damages for the loss of the use during the period before replacement.

2. YES

As for the Damages:

Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural
justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury
inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages
include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There
are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already
possesses (daño emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would
have pertained to him (lucro cesante).

In addition, the claimant shall prove by preponderance of evidence the damage caused by the
respondent. Actual damages are not presumed. The claimant must prove the actual amount of
loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable. Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne must be pointed out. Actual damages cannot be
anchored on mere surmises, speculations or conjectures

6) Africa -GR 12986, 3/31/1966 = (Maria Mazell)

G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA
ONG, petitioners-appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for the respondents.
Bernabe Africa, etc. for the petitioners.
 MAKALINTAL., J.:

Facts: The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. In the
afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at Manila. It started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage. The fire spread to and
burned several neighboring houses. Petitioners sued Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the
first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence
on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and
that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of
their employees.
The report (police and fire department) reproduced information that Flores, the driver of the
truck was unloading the gasoline from the truck to the underground storage. That there are a
stranger who light a cigarette and the threw the burning match stick near the underground valve.
The foregoing reports were ruled out as "double hearsay" by the Court of Appeals and hence
inadmissible.

Issue: whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply to presume negligence on the part of appellees.

Ruling: Trial court and the appellate court refused to apply the doctrine in this case on the
grounds that "as to (its) applicability ... in the Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite."
There was no practical use of the doctrine in the case. It does need to be summarily dismissed.
Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be
taken. On the other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably
from some act of man.

The principle enunciated applies with equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its
appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. The persons who
knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they
gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.

The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties
on the basis of his own personal observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as
an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts, descriptive of the location and objective
circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called
for more stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy the standard of due
diligence under ordinary circumstances.

Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for
another negligent omission on the part of defendants, their failure to provide a concrete wall high
enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer that "the fire was caused
through the acts of a stranger who, without authority, or permission of answering defendant,
passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in the premises." No
evidence on this point was adduced, but it does not extenuate his negligence.

Issue: Whether or not Caltex should be held liable for the damages caused to appellants.

Ruling: This issue depends on whether Boquiren was an independent contractor or an agent of
Caltex.
(1) Boquiren made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex; (2) at the time of the fire Caltex
owned the gasoline station and all the equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised control over
Boquiren in the management of the state; (4) the delivery truck used in delivering gasoline to the
station had the name of CALTEX painted on it; and (5) the license to store gasoline at the station
was in the name of Caltex, which paid the license fees.
Boquiren denied that he directed one of his drivers to remove gasoline from the truck into the
tank and alleged that the "alleged driver was not in his employ, the driver being an employee of
the Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and/or the owners of the gasoline station." It is true that Boquiren later on
amended his answer, and that among the changes was one to the effect that he was not acting as
agent of Caltex. Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment therein,
but claims that the business conducted at the service station in question was owned and operated
by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any contract with Boquiren that would reveal the nature
of their relationship at the time of the fire. Presented only a license agreement.
But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can hardly be considered an
independent contractor. Under that agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal
sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the equipment therein.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-appellees are held liable
solidarily to appellants, and ordered to pay them the aforesaid sum of P9,005.80 and P10,000.00,
respectively, with interest from the filing of the complaint, and costs.

7) Rodriguez -GR 121964, 6/17/1997 =(Krishiena Merilles)

Facts: A fire broke out which razed 2 apartment buildings, owned by Rodriguez and partially
destroying a commercial building. Rodriguez with Prietos and Antig, who were lessees of the
apartment units, filed a case for damages against Harry John and Margarita, both surnamed
Viloria, who are the owners of the building being constructed, and against John Young, the
building contractor. The complaint alleged that by reason of the gross negligence and want of
care of the construction workers and employees of the defendants, the bunkhouse in the
construction site caught fire spreading rapidly, burning the adjacent buildings owned by the
plaintiffs. Due to this negligence, plaintiffs suffered actual damages representing the value of the
buildings and other personal property. RTC, after trial found that the fire was not caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendants and rendered a decision against
petitioners, condemning the plaintiffs to pay defendants moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees. Petitioners appealed to the CA, the CA affirmed the RTC decision but deleted
and set aside the award of damages.
Issue: WON there is negligence on the part of the defendants that would warrant the award of
damages to the plaintiffs.

Ruling: No. The trial court discussed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and its requisites as follows:

It is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoing may be inferred from the
mere fact that the accident happened, provided that: (1) the occurrence is the kind of thing that
does not ordinarily happen without negligence; (2) the occurrence must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was not
due to contribution or voluntary action by the plaintiff (Gifi's Law Dictionary); it is used to state
the fact that the situation itself implies negligence or a duty to compensate whether negligence is
in fact proved or not (Radin's Law Dictionary); it is [a] rebuttable presumption that defendant
was negligent, which arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of
negligence (Black's Law Dictionary).

The trial court itself concluded that the fire could not have started at the generator and that the
bunkhouse was not burned.It then declared that "the fire was not caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of defendants," which is one of the requisites for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the law of negligence. It may further be emphasized that this
doctrine is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable
negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie
evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent or not readily available. More damaging to petitioners, which could have been
enough reason for them to desist from insisting that the Report of Major Enriquez be admitted as
an exception to the hearsay rule, are the officer's conclusion and recommendation in his report
stating that the cause of the fire was ACCIDENTAL in nature.

8) FGU - GR 141910, 8/6/2002 = (Rhiz Bantillo)

FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking

Corporation G.R. No. 141910. August 6, 2002.

FACTS: G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on June 18, 1994
thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by
Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc. While the truck was traversing
the north diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it
collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the
cargoes. FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum of P204, 450.00. FGU, in turn, being
the subrogee of the rights and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of
the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. Since the trucking company failed to heed the
claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its
driver Lambert Eroles with the Regional Trial Court. Respondents asserted that GPS was the
exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in
business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely
accidental. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed with leave of court a motion to dismiss
the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove
that it was a common carrier. The trial court, in its order granted the motion to dismiss. The
subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, plaintiff interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court had erred in holding that the appellee
corporation was not a common carrier defined under the law and existing jurisprudence. The
Court of Appeals rejected the appeal of petitioner and ruled in favor of GPS. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: 1. WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A COMMON CARRIER.

2. WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON CARRIER OR A PRIVATE

CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT WHEN THE GOODS IT
UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED WHILE IN ITS
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.

3. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS APPLICABLE IN THE

INSTANT CASE.

RULING: 1. No. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
hire or compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a
limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. GPS, being an exclusive contractor
and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other individual
or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier.

2. Yes. The above conclusion notwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from liability.

In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance
justify, prima facie, corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of
contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of
the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract
confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or
suffered. Respondent Trucking Corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage
between it and petitioner’s assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have
been lost or damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of
compliance with, the obligation—in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the place
of destination—gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part
of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do
so.

Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his negligence or fault,
may not himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The driver, not-being a party to the contract of
carriage between petitioner’s principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the
agreement. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who
have assumed their personality or their juridical position. Petitioner’s civil action against the
driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the
claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant.

3. No. Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by petitioner, holds a defendant liable
where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the latter’s
management and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected
to happen if those who have its management or control use proper care. It affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant that the accident arose from want of
care. It is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, it does not create an independent ground of
liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it
furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of the burden of producing specific proof of
negligence.

The maxim simply places on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.
Resort to the doctrine, however, may be allowed only when (a) the event is of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the
indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff. Thus, it is not
applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some
of which the defendant could not be responsible. In the case of the truck driver, whose liability in
a civil action is predicated on culpa acquiliana, while he admittedly can be said to have been in
control and management of the vehicle which figured in the accident, it is not equally shown,
however, that the accident could have been exclusively due to his negligence, a matter that can
allow, forthwith, res ipsa loquitur to work against him. However, clearly this is not the case.

9) Perla Compania -GR 147746, 10/25/2005 =(Agatha Edillor)

FACTS: Respondent spouses (Gaudencio & Primitiva) owned a commercial building

(Super A Building) subdivided into three doors, each of which was leased out. Their residence
was behind the second and third doors of the building.
 Petitioner Perla Compania, through branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido
Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the Super A Building. Petitioner-
corporation renovated the space and a part of which was used as a garage for a 1981 Ford Cortina,
a company vehicle used by Pascual. When Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga, he did not
bring the car with him.

Upon his return to Santiago, he decided to warm up the car, but when he pulled the
handbrake and switched on the ignition, it made an odd sound and did not start. He stepped on
the accelerator and started the car. This revved up the engine and petitioner again heard an
unusual sound. He saw a small flame coming out of the engine. When he tried to push the car
out of the garage, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual
was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.

While respondents were watching television, they heard two loud explosions and the
smell of gasoline permeated the air. In no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their
belongings, furniture and appliances. Upon investigation, the provincial fire marshall concluded
that the fire was accidental. The report also disclosed that the petitioner-corporation had no fire
permit as required by law.

A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property was filed
against Pascual. Petitioner-corporation was asked to pay damages. Pascual moved for the
withdrawal of the complaint which was granted.

Respondents later on filed a civil complaint based on quasi-delict, alleging that Pascual
acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses.
It declared that Pascual was negligent based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Both Pascual and
Perla Compania failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they employed the necessary
care and diligence in the upkeep of the car.

On appeal to the CA, the court ruled again in favor of the respondents but modified the
award of damages.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the present care

2. Whether or not the CA erred when it found Perla negligent in the supervision of Pascual and
consequently, vicariously liable for the fire

HELD:
1. NO. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge
thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. It is the defendant’s responsibility to
show that there was no negligence on its part. The requisites for the doctrine to apply had been
met.

Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. The
fact that Pascual failed to submit any proof that he had the car periodically checked revealed his
negligence. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary
inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car. There was no caso fortuito
because of his want of care and prudence in maintaining the car.

The car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone
had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. The burden of evidence
has shifted to defendant to establish that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the
accident from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed.

There is nothing in the records to show that respondent spouses contributed to the incident. They
had no access to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked
in a building they owned.

2. NO. The relationship between Perla Compania and Pascual was based on the principle of pater
familias, according to which the employer becomes liable to the party aggrieved by its employee
if he fails to prove due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
his employees. While Perla does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position,
its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire. It clearly did not
exert effort to be apprised of the condition of Pascual’s car or its serviceability.

Petition is DENIED. Decision of the CA is affirmed in toto. Costs against the petitioners.

10) Ramos -GR 22533, 2/9/1967; Ramos MR -5/16/1967 = (Bemarjayson Martinez)

10 : Placido Ramos and Augusto L. Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the PI and Andress
Bonifacio

Facts: On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.and
Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May
10, 1958, involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said
car was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido.
PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres
Bonifacio.After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961, finding
Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. PEPSI-COLA and
Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffsP2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00 moral
damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00attorney's fees, with costs

Issue: WON Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.

Held: Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers. The uncontracted
testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company, was to the effect that
defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department;
that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking
him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to
the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: First, theoretical examination
and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the
defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. In view hereof, we are of the sense that
Defendant Company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or
selection of defendant driver. In the case of Campo vs. Camarote (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in
appellee's brief, our Supreme Court had occasion to put it down as a rule that "In order that the
defendant may be considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he
should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he
should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experiences and record of service. “Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia: The owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion
of their functions. The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage; hence, Pepsi Cola shall be relieved from liability.

11) Batiquin -GR 118231, 7/5/1996 = (Angela Parado)

Facts: Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital,
Dumaguete City... she was also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology
at the said Hospital. Mrs. Villegas... submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's
private patientDr. Batiquin... with the assistance of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy... and O.R. Nurse Arlene
Diones and some student nurses.

Villegas... after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child

Plaintiff remained confined at the Hospital... during which period of confinement she was
regularly visited... by Dr. Batiquin.

Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of
being feverish... consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain
medicines
Mrs. Villegas was given a Medical Certificate by Dr. Batiquin on October 31, 1988 . . . certifying
to her physical fitness to return to her work

The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring

When the pains become unbearable and she was rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma.
Salud Kho at the Holy Child's Hospital in

Dumaguete City

Upon examination she felt an abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus... which she
suspected to be either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of which could be cancerous.

A blood count showed that Mrs. Villegas had [an] infection... inside her abdominal cavity. The
result of all those examinations impelled Dr. Kho to suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit to another
surgery to which the latter agreed.

When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside,
an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the
uterus, and a piece of rubber materials on the right side of the uterus

This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho described as a "foreign body" looked like a piece of
a "rubber glove"... this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries

The piece of rubber allegedly found near private respondent Flotilde Villegas' uterus was not
presented in court, and although Dr. Ma. Salud Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in
Cebu City for examination,[8] it was not mentioned in the... pathologist's Surgical Pathology
Report.

unluckily I don't know where the rubber was.

Dr. Victoria Batiquin's testimony that when she confronted Dr. Kho regarding the piece of rubber,
"Dr. Kho answered that there was rubber indeed but that she threw it away."... the trial court held
in favor of the petitioners herein.

the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court

The petitioners prefer the trial court's interpretation of the above testimony, i.e., that Dr. Kho's
knowledge of the piece of rubber was based on hearsay.

Issue: Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable

Held: Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The rule, when applicable to the facts
and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and
regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of
proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire
proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light,
the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause
of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body, which, needless to
say, does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the
cesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have
caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could
only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners,
in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece
of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.

The court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the medical profession plays in the lives of the
people and State's compelling interest to enact measures to protect the public from "the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat
our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. Indeed, a physician is bound to serve the interest of
his patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill." Through
her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her
profession's rigid ethical code and in contravention of the legal standards set forth for
professionals, in the general and members of the medical profession, in particular.

12) LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA vs. WILFRED L. PASCASIO -GR 118141, 9/5/1997 = (Jje
Descartin)

Facts: Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical

operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by
Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the
anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of complications of
"unknown cause," according to officials of the UST Hospital. Not satisfied with the findings of
the hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an
autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencio's death was due to
lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the
NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor. The case was
initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit himself because he was
related to the counsel of one of the doctors. As a result, the case was re-raffled to Prosecutor
Norberto G. Leono who was, however, disqualified on motion of the petitioner since he
disregarded prevailing laws and jurisprudence regarding preliminary investigation. The case
was then referred to Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending that
only Dr. Reyes be held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed.
The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson, in
the "interest of justice and peace of mind of the parties," recommended that the case be re-raffled
on the ground that Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was
transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where a volte face occurred again with the
endorsement that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead, a corresponding
information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
questioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba. Pending the resolution of petitioner's motion
for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba's resolution, the investigative "pingpong"
continued when the case was again assigned to another prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who
recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal information of Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case
was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr.
Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio
G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.

Issue: Whether or not there exist a Medical Negligence between Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reye as the
attending Surgeon and Anaesthesiologist of Florencio Rudeda

Ruling: Yes, there exist a Medical Negligence exercised by Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes. There are
four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.

Evidently, when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a physician-
patient relationship was created. In accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect
represented that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field, they will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of their
patients. They have a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. The breach of
these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper performance, by a physician surgeon
whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice.
Consequently, in the event that any injury results to the patient from want of due care or skill
during the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for negligence.

Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia, the

necessity of expert testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff;
have been applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable for the death
or injury of a patient under excessive or improper anaesthesia. Essentially, it requires two-
pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical community in the
particular kind of case, and a showing that the physician in question negligently departed from
this standard in his treatment.

Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two inquiries:
whether the doctor's actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and whether these were the
proximate cause of the patient's injury. Indeed here, a causal connection is discernible from the
occurrence of the victim's death after the negligent act of the anaesthesiologist in administering
the anesthesia, a fact which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal
case. To be sure, the allegation of negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI deduced
that the attending surgeons did not conduct the necessary interview of the patient prior to the
operation. It appears that the cause of the death of the victim could have been averted had the
proper drug been applied to cope with the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia. Also, we
cannot ignore the fact that an antidote was readily available to counteract whatever deleterious
effect the anaesthesia might produce. Why these precautionary measures were disregarded must
be sufficiently explained

13) Ramos vs CA GR 124354, 12/29/1999 = (Rain Cabana)

Facts: Erlinda Ramos was experiencing occasional pains allegedly caused by stones in her gall
bladder. She was told to undergo an operation and after some tests and exams, she was indicated
fit for surgery. Dr. Orlino Hozaka, defendant, decided that Erlinda should undergo a
“cholecystectomy” operation. Rogelio, husband of Erlinda, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good
anesthesiologist.

Around 7:30 AM of June 17, 1985, Herminda (sister-in-law of Erlinda) accompanied Erlinda to
the operating room and saw Dr. Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer
anesthesia. Dr. Hosaka only arrived around 12:15 PM, three hours late. Nonetheless, the
operation continued and Herminda then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient and heard her
saying “and hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok”. Thereafter, bluish discoloration of
the nailbeds appeared on the patient. Hence, Dr. Hosaka issued an order for someone to call Dr.
Calderon, another anesthesiologist. The patient was placed in a trendelenburg position for
decrease of blood supply in her brain. At 3:00 PM, the patient was taken to the ICU. Four months
after, the patient was released from the hospital. However, the patient has been in a comatose
condition. Hence, the petition filed a civil case for damages against herein private respondents
alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. Petitioners contended that the
faulty management of her airway casused the lack of oxygen in the patient’s brain. On the
respondent’s part, they contended that the brain damage was Erlinda's allergic reaction to the
anesthetic agent.

1) Will the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply in this case?

Yes. The Court finds the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown
to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care.

In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court
from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
Erlinda submitted herself soundly and fit for surgery. However, during the administration of
anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to
her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already
decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an
injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation.

Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed
while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians,
we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur.

2) Did the negligence of the respondents cause the unfortunate comatose condition of
petitioner Erlinda Ramos? Yes.

Anesthesiologist: With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, the court find her negligent during the
anesthesia phase. As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate
the patient which she admitted.

During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through
the esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would certainly
cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the
wrong place. Even granting that the tube was successfully inserted during the second attempt, it
was obviously too late. An experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough pre-
operative evaluation, would have had little difficulty going around the short neck and protruding
teeth. Hence, she was negligent.

Head Doctor: For Dr. Orlino Hosaka, as the head of the surgical team and as the so-called captain
of the ship, it is the surgeons responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in
the proper manner.

Dr. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the captain
of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia
protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if
respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape the
court that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the
same time as Erlinda's operation, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation.
Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia
delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus,
he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlindas condition.

Hospital: As for the hospital (employer) itself, the Court ruled that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
In the instant case, the hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent
physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the
degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or
proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the
last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, the hospital is consequently solidarily
responsible with its physicians for Erlindas condition.

14) Nogales -GR 142625, 12/19/2006 = (Mary Domatog)

Facts: The parties in this case are petitioner Rogelio P. Nogales, husband of Corazon Nogales,
and respondents Capitol Medical Center, Drs. Estrada, Villaflor, Uy, Enriquez, Lacson, Espinola
and Nurse Dumlao.

Corazon Nogales was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada. While Corazon was
on her last trimester of pregnancy , Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure and
development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a dangerous complication of
pregnancy. Corazon was admitted at Capitolo Medical Center (CMC). Rogelio Nogales, the
husband of Corazon, executed and signed the “Consent on Admission and Agreement” and
“Admission Agreement”

Both release forms consist of two parts. The first part gave CMC permission to administer to
Corazon any form of recognized medical treatment which the staff deemed advisable. The second
part of the documents , which may properly described as the releasing part, releases CMC and
its employees “from any and all claims “ arising from or by reason of the treatment and operation.

In the delivery room, Corazon’s bag of water ruptured spontaneously. Corazon’s cervix was fully
dilated and started to experience convulsions. Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, ordered 10g
of magnesium sulfate , however, only 2.5g of magnesium sulfate was administered.

Dr. Estrada and Dr. Villaflor applied low forceps to extract Corazon’s baby. In the process,
1x2.5cm piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn. After the baby came out, Corazon began to
manifest vaginal bleeding which became continuous. The assisting nurse administered hemacel
through a gauge 19 needle side drip to the ongoing intravenous injection of dextrose.

Rogelio was made to sign “Consent to Operation” for the immediate hysterectomy to be
conducted by Dr. Espinola. Due to the inclement weather then, Dr. Espinola who was fetched by
an ambulance arrived at the CMC about an hour later or at 9:00 a.m. Despite efforts, Corazon
died due to “hemorrhage , post partum.”
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the RTC. Petitioners contended that defendant
physicians and CMC personnel were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon’s
condition. Petitioners charged CMC with negligence in the selection and supervision of
defendant physicians and hospital staff.

The RTC rendered Dr. Estrada as solely liable. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The SC
partly granted the petition. Capitol Medical Center was also found liable for negligence of Dr.
Oscar Estrada. The court also affirmed the decision of the RTC and CA.

Issue: Whether or not CMC is released from liability for the death of Mrs. Nogales based on
Consent on Admission and Consent of Operation.

Ruling: No. A blanket release in favor of hospitals “from any and all claims”, which includes
claims due to bad faith or gross negligence , would be contrary to public policy and thus void.

Even simple negligence is not subject to blanket release in favor of establishments like hospitals
but may only mitigate liability depending on the circumstances.

When a person needing urgent medical attention rushes to a hospital , he cannot bargain on equal
footing with the hospital on the terms of admission and operation. Such a person is literally at the
mercy of the hospital. There can be no clearer example of a contract of adhesion than one arising
from such a dire situation. Thus, the release forms of CMC cannot relieve CMC from liability for
the negligent medical treatment of Corazon.

Doctrine:

Doctrine of Apparent Authority

It is a species of the doctrine of estoppel.

An exception to the general rule that a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor-physician is when the physician is the “ostensible “ agent of the hospital, which
exception is also known as the “doctrine of apparent authority”.

15) PSI vs. Agana -GR 126297, 1/31/2007 = (Roland Aquino)

FACTS: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City
Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of
medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from “cancer of the
sigmoid.” Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed an
anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had
spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil
obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes,
respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform hysterectomy on her. Thereafter, Dr. Ampil took over,
completed the operation and closed the incision. However, based on the record of the hospital,
the attending nurses indicated nota bene that 2 sponges were missing. The same was reported to
Dr. Ampil but were not found after “diligent seach”.

After couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted
both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence
of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the
cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. Natividad went to the United
States for four months but she was only declared free of cancer. In Natividad’s return to the
Philippines, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being
informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a
piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon
vanish. But instead the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic
General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another
foreign object in her vagina — a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly
infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which
forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Natividad underwent another surgical operation to
remedy the damage. Civil and administrative complaints, for damages and gross negligence
respectively, were filed against Professional Services Inc., owner of Medical City Hospital, Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.

ISSUE(S):

Are the following liable?

(1) Professional Services Inc., based on

(a) “employer-employee relationship”;

(b) “doctrine of apparent authority”;

(c) “corporate negligence”;

(2) Dr. Ampil,

(a) for medical negligence;

(b) under the “captain of the ship doctrine”;

(3) Dr.Fuentes, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor;

HELD:

(1)

(a) YES.

[P]rivate hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting ‘consultant’
staff. While ‘consultants’ are not, technically employees, x x x, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship
in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule
that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.

(b) YES.

Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the “holding out” theory, or doctrine of
ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes liability,
not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a
principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship
or the authority exists. xxx In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City
Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including
those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it “is
now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in
the public directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.”
Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out to the public that Medical City Hospital, through
its accredited physicians, offers quality health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they
were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected,
these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that
such were being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants.
(c) YES.

Hospital’s corporate negligence extends to permitting a physician known to be incompetent to

practice at the hospital. xxx [A] patient who enters a hospital does so with the reasonable
expectation that it will attempt to cure him. The hospital accordingly has the duty to make a
reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by the
physicians practicing in its premises. In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates
the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive
medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed
to perform such duty.

(2)

(a) YES.

This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To

successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that
he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or
action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects,
such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it
was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused
injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another
surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced
from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two
pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina
established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further
aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge
of Natividad and her family.

(b) YES.

Under the “Captain of the Ship” rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of
the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders.
As stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the “Captain of the
Ship.” That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes
to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3)
granting Dr. Fuentes’ permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. To our
mind, it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of
gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad’s body. Clearly, the control and
management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.

(3) NO.

The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an
injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of
explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the “control
and management of the thing which caused the injury.”

We find the element of “control and management of the thing which caused the injury” to be
wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.

It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad.
He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil)
found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes
performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter
examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating
room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure
when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A “diligent
search” was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that
the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room
and had, in fact, left the hospital.

16)Del Mar -GR 139008, 3/13/2002 = (Martha Ilagan)

Petitioner Robert del Mar alleges as follows:

The private respondent, Norma Ebersole Del Mar, and her sister, Florence Ebersole Finch,
inherited three (3) parcels of land situated in Mabini, Santiago City.
 On December 6, 1974, Florence Ebersole Finch, a resident of New York, USA, executed a general
power of attorney naming and constituting Norma as her attorney-in-fact with regard to the
subject property.

Private respondent, acting for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Florence Ebersole Finch, executed
Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner covering the three aforementioned parcels of land.
The private respondent is the mother of herein petitioner.

Florence Ebersole Finch executed a Deed of Confirmation in New York, USA, confirming and
ratifying all the acts and deeds executed by Norma Ebersole del Mar.

Said parcels of land were subdivided into several lots

After the peaceful and continuous possession by petitioner of the subject properties for more
than twenty-two (22) years, a complaint for reconveyance was filed by Norma on Robert on May
15, 1997, alleging, petitioner obtained the aforementioned Certificates of Title through fraud and
deceit.

Private respondent claimed that said properties were left by her under the administration of
petitioner, who allegedly transferred the ownership of said realty in his name by causing the
issuance of Certificates of Title in his name without her knowledge and consent.

However, records show that before she left for the United States, private respondent executed
the corresponding Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Robert. This case, entitled Norma Ebersole
del Mar represented by Gerald del Mar vs. Roberto del Mar and the Register of Deeds, Province of Isabela
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City.

In his Answer, petitioner claimed that private respondent and her co-owner, Florence Ebersole
Finch, sold said properties to him before the former left for the United States. Moreover, the
properties were transferred for good, sufficient and valuable consideration, hence the sale was
lawful and valid.

(IMPORTANT)

During the pre-trial conference, neither petitioner nor his counsel, Atty. Federico Abuan,
appeared, by reason of which the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner as in default.
The non-appearance was due to the failure of Atty. Abuan, Jr. to inform petitioners attorney-in-
fact, Angelita Austria, of the scheduled hearing. Said petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied, and private respondent was allowed to adduce her evidence ex-parte.
On the same day that said motion was denied, the trial court rendered its October 21, 1997
[D]ecision in favor of x x x private respondent and against x x x petitioner.

Respondent Norma Del Mar Answers as follows

The parcels of land covered by the land titles that are sought to be nullified are all owned by
[private] respondent NORMA EBERSOLE DEL MAR by way of inheritance from her lawful
[ascendants]. The original titles were all issued in her name and favor.

Sometime in 1996, [private respondent] discovered that the properties were already in the name
of [petitioner]. [Private respondent] protested because she never had done any act of transfer of
the properties in favor of [petitioner], because her intent was to have these properties to be
eventually x x x divided into THREE (3) equal parts for her THREE (3) children x x x. The transfer
was [without] the knowledge of [private respondent]. It was fraudulent and unlawful x x x.

Private respondent also claims that petitioner had been duly served summons, but neither he
nor his counsel appeared for pretrial. Hence, petitioner was declared in default. While he did
receive the Order of Default, he never bothered to have it lifted. So, trial proceeded and
evidence ex parte for private respondent was received by the trial court.6cräläwvirtualibräry

CA Ruling

PETITION DENIED

From the allegations in the subject motion for reconsideration, this Court finds no cogent reason
to disturb the dismissal of the appellant. The appellants brief became due [i]n October 1998. The
movant claims ignorance of the fact that counsel failed to file the appellants brief. There being no
showing that counsels failure to file the appellants brief was due to gross negligence, the rule that
negligence of counsel is binding upon the client must be applied.

Besides, it appears from the records that herein appellant, as party-defendant in the proceedings
below, was declared in default for his and counsels non-appearance during the pre-trial
conference. Having lost the opportunity to present evidence in view of the default order, the
appellant, through his attorney-in-fact, should have shown more vigor in protecting his statutory
right of appeal. He should have jealously guarded this opportunity, knowing that this could well
be his last chance to protect his rights. The interest of justice so conveniently invoked by the
appellant now will be better served if this dispute will be put to an end for failure of the appellant
to observe the degree of vigilance needed to protect his remedies in law.11cräläwvirtualibräryCA

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of di[s]cretion
in ruling in favor of private respondent.

HELD: No, they did not commit grave abuse of discretion

Petitioner argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing his appeal for his mere
failure to file his Brief within the reglementary period.

We disagree. Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Revised Rules of Court, expressly authorizes the CA to
dismiss an appeal for, inter alia, failure of appellant to serve and file the required number of copies
of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of when the following requisites concur: (a) a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is
no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for annulling or
modifying the proceeding.14cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner claims that Atty. Abuans failure to file the required pleading constituted fraud
against him, and that his absence from the country while the appeal was pending constituted
a mistake that was excusable.

We disagree. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client.15 Exceptions to
this rule arise when (1) such negligence is so gross, palpable, reckless and inexcusable that the
client is deprived of the due process of law; and (2) the application of such due process results
in the outright deprivation of ones property through a technicality.16cräläwvirtualibräry

The negligence of Atty. Abuan does not fall under these exceptions. His negligence in this case
was his inexcusable failure to file the required appellants Brief, thus causing the dismissal of
the appeal of petitioner. But the latter was not without fault. He was aware of Atty. Abuans
failure to appear at the pretrial conference, a failure that had placed him in default. Because
petitioner was in default, private respondents evidence was received ex parte by the RTC. No
wonder, the trial court decided against him. Yet, he retained Atty. Abuans services for the
appeal. One is bound by the decisions of ones counsel regarding the conduct of the case,
especially where the former does not complain against the manner in which the latter handled
the case.17cräläwvirtualibräry

In effect, petitioner consented to the shabby and negligent treatment of his case by his counsel.
Hence, he should not complain now of the negligence or fraud done to him by his lawyer. A
partys counsel cannot be blamed for negligence, if the party was likewise guilty of the same.18
Clients should suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the
counsel whom they themselves hired, and whom they had full authority to fire at any time and
replace with another.19cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner cannot be said to have been denied due process, because he was afforded the
opportunity to be heard. In fact, he filed an Answer to private respondents Complaint. That
he did not present evidence in his favor was the effect of his being in default and his continued
failure to move that such status be lifted. His claim that he was abroad is unavailing.

We cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Court of Appeals which merely followed
Rule 50 in dismissing the appeal.