ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as

Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, Respondents.

B06: Mapa

FACTS:

1. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal filed this petition contending that declaration that certain

provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer

from constitutional infirmity.

2. He claims that he has actual and material legal interest in this case in seeing to it

ensuring that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated. Hence, he

filed this petition as a taxpayer and lawyer.

3. He alleges that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of

the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding an election.

4. He also referred to Caasi vs. Court of Appeals ruling which held that a green card holder
immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the
Philippines.

5. Macalintal also argued that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise.

6. RA 9189 should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right
of suffrage by providing a condition which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence
requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote.

7. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the
election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:

1. Whether RA 9189 is valid and constitutional? — YES but some sections were declared

Consti D2 Page 1
unconstitutional

RULING:

1. SC ruled that Section 5(d) does not circumvent the Constitution; Congress only enacted

the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional
mandate. Such mandate expressly requires Congress to provide a system of absentee voting for
“qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country.

2. The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared
VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a. The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;

b. The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review and approval of
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”

c. The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue
of this Act for prior approval;” and

d. The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It shall review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission”
of the same law;

3. The foregoing were held to be inconsistent with Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution
mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.

4. The rest of the provisions of RA9189 shall remain in full force and effect

Consti D2 Page 2
Kabataan Partylist v. COMELEC

B07: Beramo

Facts: Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RA 10637 or “An Act Providing for
Mandatory Biometrics Voters Registration” which shall disqualify the electorate who have failed
to validate their biometrics and other data in the Voter’s Registration Records (VRRs) and have
likewise attained a deactivated status in the said VRR. COMELEC Resolution 9863 also directed
the deactivation of VRRs upon failure to submit or validate their records on or before October
31, 2015. Petitioners argue that the biometrics is an additional requirement that is beyond what is
prescribed in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution; and its imposition of disqualification is not
the same disqualification contemplated in the same provision.

Issues: WON that RA 10637 is Constitutional.

Held: Yes, it is constitutional. Said procedure pertains only to “registration” and not to
“qualification”. Registration is a procedure for voting that maybe determined by law as in RA
10637; it does not make one person qualified or disqualified to vote. Registration regulates the
exercies of the right to suffrage; it is not a qualification to such right. Registration is a necessary
requisite to right to vote, the States, in its police power, may enact laws to safeguard and regulate
the act of voter’s registration for purpose of conducting and honest, orderly, and peaceful
election.

Consti D2 Page 3
In RE Bosque, GR 666
B08 : Mangsat
Facts: Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, studied law, became a lawyer and practiced law in
Spain. Later, he applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without taking the
Philippine bar examinations. He cited the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain and argued that he is entitled to
practice the law profession in the Philippines even without submitting to the required bar
examinations.

Issue: Can the petitioner validly invoke the subject treaty to justify his petition to be admitted to
the practice law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar examinations?

Held: The Court DENIED the petition.

NO, the petitioner CANNOT validly invoke the subject treaty to justify his petition to be
admitted to the practice law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar examinations.

The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State cannot be invoked by applicant. Under Article
11 thereof:

The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the validity of
their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions
within the territory of the Other, . . . (Emphasis supplied).

from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their
professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not
entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.

Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides

The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice the
liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities,
shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to
the laws and regulations of the latter. . .

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made
expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is

Consti D2 Page 4
desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections
2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the
legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish
State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not
encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or supplement such
rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

Consti D2 Page 5
In re Petition of Gloria Baldello for Naturalization as a Philippine Citizen.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

G.R. No. L-45375 April 12, 1939

B09: Garcia

Facts: Gloria Baldello, a Filipino citizen, married Gabino Ordorica, a native of Mexico, then
serving in the United States Army in the Philippines on November 12, 1921, one, with whom she
had been living continually until August 24, 1924, when she was abandoned by him. On
December 31, 1935, she sued out and obtained an order from the Court of First Instance of
Manila, declaring Ordorica presumptively dead for purposes of law, his whereabouts being then
unknown for more than eleven years. On June 29, 1936, she filed a petition in the court below
wherein she sought a return to the Filipino citizenship. The petition was denied and she appealed.

Under paragraph 2, article 37, of the Constitution of Mexico, Ordorica had forfeited his Mexican
citizenship by his service in the United States Army. On the other hand, he failed to comply with
the requirements of the Act of Congress of the United States of May 9, 1918 by which he might
become a naturalized citizen of the United States. Thus, at the time of his marriage with Gloria
Baldello, he was neither a Mexican nor an American citizen — a stateless individual in the
contemplation of the Law of Nations.

Issue: Whether or not the wife, by that marriage, follow this anomalous condition of her
husband?

Ruling: No. that there being no new citizenship imposed upon her by marriage, nothing could
have divested her of her original citizenship, and, therefore, her Philippine citizenship remained
unchanged. The general rule that a married woman follows the nationality of her husband
presupposes a nationality in the husband. Where no such nationality exists, the rule does not
apply.

Filipino woman does not lose her citizenship by marrying a foreigner belonging to a nation the
laws of which do not allow her to acquire the husband's nationality. Were it not for this rule, if a
Filipino woman loses her nationality simply by marrying a foreigner, even without acquiring the
foreigner's citizenship, then she would become destitute of nationality. And evidently the
purpose of the said rule is to prevent such condition of statelessness in a Filipino woman married
to an alien, a policy that is perfectly applicable in the present case.

Consti D2 Page 6
JOSE TAN CHONG v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

G.R. No. 47616. October 15, 1941

B0A: Abeja

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Tan Chong, was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in July 1915 of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother, who were legally married. Sometime in 1925 when Chong was
about ten years old he was taken by his parents to China. On January 25, 1940, he arrived at the
port of Manila and sought entry as a native born citizen. The Board of Special Inquiry assigned
to hear his case, denied him admission on the alleged ground that he is a Chinese citizen. On
appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Board and ordered the deportation of
Chong to the port from whence he came. Chong sued for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of
First Instance of Manila which was granted.

ISSUE: WON Chong is a Filipino citizen.

RULING: Yes, Chong having been born in the Philippines before the approval of our
Constitution, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a Filipino citizen. His sojourn in China
did not adversely affect his Philippine citizenship, it appearing that ever since he was twelve
years old he wanted to return to the Philippines but his father would not allow him to come, and
he did not have the means to pay for his transportation back to the Philippines until the date of
his return. Animus revertendi existed here.

Consti D2 Page 7
TECSON v. COMELEC
GR 161434, March 3, 2004
B0B: Olasiman
FACTS: Fernando Poe, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of
Republic of Philippines in the national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

A year after however, Victorino Fornier initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
FPJ and for his certificate of candidacy to be cancelled upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father Allan Poe was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, since FPJ is allegedly and illegitimate
child of an alien mother.

After the presentation of documents, COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Three
days later, Fornier filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition
questioning the decision of COMELEC as well as its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON FPJ’s Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled on the allegation that he is not a
Filiipino citizen

HELD:

1. No, it should not be cancelled as FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The term ‘natural-born citizens’, is defined to include “those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship.

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be August 20, 1939 during the
regime of 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship-
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata, and jus sanguinis—had been vogue. Only two: jus

Consti D2 Page 8
 soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.

The fact of the matter — perhaps the most significant consideration — is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions,the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there are clearly none provided.

Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Poe could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Poe would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine
bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Poe), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.

Consti D2 Page 9
Bengson v. HRET, GR. No. 142840
B0C: Galanza
FACTS: Teodoro C. Cruz (RESPONDENT) was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
was born of Filipino parents in 1960, in San Clemente, Tarlac. In 1985, Cruz enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the U.S. Thus under Common Wealth Act No. 63, he lost his Filipino
citizenship.

How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission
in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident
thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of
his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is presen:….. (Sec. 1,
Par. 4 of CA No. 63)

In 1990, he was a naturalized U.S. citizen. However in 1994 Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through REPATRIATION under Republic Act No. 2630. In 1998, he ran and won as
the representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. He won over Antonio Bengson
(PETITIONER) by 26,671 votes. This led Bengson to file a case for quo warranto ad cautelam
with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of Congress since he is not a NATURAL-BORN citizen as
required by ART. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution.

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

In 2000, HRET dismissed his petition as well as his motion for reconsideration. Bengson elevated
the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/N Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American Citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his REPATRIATION of Philippine citizenship.

RULING: Yes. Petition is without merit.

Filipinos who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. Repatriation, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1) Desertion of armed forces;
(2) Services in the armed forces of the Allied Forces in WW II;
(3) Services in the armed forces of the US at any other time;
(4) Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and

Consti D2 Page 10
 (5) Political economic necessity
REPATRIATION simply consists the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided. Therefore, repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Note: Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam - A legal proceeding during which an individual's right to hold
an office or governmental privilege is challenged

Consti D2 Page 11
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NORA FE SAGUN, respondent.

G.R. No. 187567. February 15, 2012.

B0D: Tee

Facts: Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta

Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not

elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and

after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17,

1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her

application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation

on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she

sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the

Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth

certificate.

In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano

and Tagalog Duently and attended local schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family

Academy and the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-Chinese

ancestry, she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct

No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national

elections as shown in the Voter Certification issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the

Commission on Elections of Baguio City.

She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine

citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to

the issuance of a Philippine passport.

Consti D2 Page 12
On August 7, 2007, the OEce of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance

as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio

City to appear in the above mentioned case. However, no comment was filed by the City

Prosecutor.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3,2009
granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen

Issues: (1) whether respondent's petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence;

(2) whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in

accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

Held: (1.) For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by

law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no

specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a

given person is part of our citizenry.

(2.) formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:

(1) a statement of election under oath;

(2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and

(3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil
registry.

Respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements, and also given the fact she only elected
Philippine citizenship 12 years after reaching the age of majority, which was not within
reasonable time which has been interpreted to be 3 years.

The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other
similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of
Philippine citizenship

Consti D2 Page 13
Casan Macode Maquiling vs COMELEC

B0F: Dela Cruz

FACTS: Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again
took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship.

The COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on the ground that
the use of a US passport....... does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to
his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does
not operate to “unrenounce” what he has earlier on renounced. Maquiling files a petition before
the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects
one’s qualifications to run for public office.

HELD: Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November
2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to
the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights
and privileges granted by the United States of America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship
is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of
all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. While
the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No.
63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not
divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a
foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public
office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Consti D2 Page 14
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which
violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

Consti D2 Page 15
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA

G.R. No. 195649 , April 16, 2013

B0E: Andrada

Facts: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte which contains statement claiming he is not permanent resident or immigrant to
other country.

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections on
the grounds that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.’

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Comelec First Division granted the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado and annulled proclamation of the same as winning candidate.

Consti D2 Page 16
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground
that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary
to law." Restating he complied substantially with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 and other
requirements.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan,
and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the
case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Opposition to Arnado's Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the
First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the
Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado's candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
the winner.

The COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado's Motion for Reconsideration

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run
for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts
to undoing a renunciation earlier made?

Ruling: The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify
one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

xxx

Consti D2 Page 17
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the
Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public
office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008
when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of
Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run
for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless
of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing
his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether
he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy,
thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009,
the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights
and privileges granted by the United States of America.

` The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed
at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of
the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

Consti D2 Page 18
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared
in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant
civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant
duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship
by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public
office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust.
Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

Dissenting Opinion of Brion (baka tanungin):

The ponencia fails to consider that under RA 9225, natural-born citizens who were deemed to
have lost their Philippine citizenship because of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country and who subsequently complied with the requirements of RA 9225, are deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship. RA 9225 cured and negated the presumption made under
CA 63. Hence, as in Japzon, Arnado assumed "pure" Philippine citizenship again after taking the
Oath of Allegiance and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his American citizenship under RA
9225.

In the present case, other than the use of his US passport in two trips to and from the United
States, the record does not bear out any indication, supported by evidence, of Arnado’s intention
to re-acquire US citizenship. To my mind, in the absence of clear and affirmative acts of re-
acquiring US citizenship either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the re-establishment
of permanent residency in the United States), Arnado’s use of his US passport cannot but be
considered an isolated act that did not undo his renunciation of his US citizenship. What he
might in fact have done was to violate American law on the use of passports, but this is a matter
irrelevant to the present case. Thus, Arnado remains to be a "pure" Filipino citizen and the loss of
his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed or inferred from his isolated act of using his US
passport for travel purposes.

I completely agree with the ponencia that the Oath of Renunciation is not an empty or formal
ceremony that can be perfunctorily professed at any given day, only to be disregarded on the
next. As a mandatory requirement under Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it allows former natural-born
Filipino citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of

Consti D2 Page 19
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country to enjoy full civil and political rights, foremost
among them, the privilege to run for public office.

I disagree however, with the conclusion that Arnado effectively negated his Oath of
Renunciation when he used his US passport for travel to the United States. To reiterate if only
for emphasis, Arnado sufficiently justified the use of his US passport despite his renunciation of
his US citizenship; when he travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had
no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States to attend to the
business and other affairs that he was leaving. If at all, he could be faulted for using his US
passport by the time he returned to the Philippines on November 24, 2009 because at that time,
he had presumably received his Philippine passport. However, given the circumstances explained
above and that he consistently used his Philippine passport for travel after November 24, 2009,
the true character of his use of his US passport stands out and cannot but be an isolated and
convenient act that did not negate his Oath of Renunciation.

Consti D2 Page 20
RENATO M. DAVID v. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015] VILLARAMA, JR.:

B10: Isubol

Facts: In 1974, petitioner David migrated to Canada and had himself naturalized as a Canadian
citizen. He and his wife returned to the Philippines. In 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter
lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro and there they constructed a
residential house. They found out that the portion where they built their house is a public land.
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Soccorro. He indicated in his application that he is a
Filipino Citizen. Respondent Agbay opposed his application contending that petitioner is
disqualified to own a land because he is Canadian and then filed a criminal complaint against
him for falsifying a public document. Meanwhile, petitioner reacquired his Filipino citizenship
under R.A. 9225 as evidenced by the Identification Certificate issued by the Consulate General
of the Philippines in Toronto. In petitioner’s defense, he argued that he intended to reacquire
Philippine citizenship at the time he filed his application and that a CENRO officer assured him
that he could declare himself as a Filipino citizen. CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA and held
that petitioner’s subsequent reacquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his
MLA. An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a
warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. After the filing of the Information and before
his arrest, petitioner filed an urgent motion. The MTC denied his motion and held that petitioner
is still a Canadian citizen. Petitioner brought the case before the RTC alleging that there is grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC, but the same was denied by the RTC. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a
Filipino in his MLA despite his subsequent reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225

Held: Yes. Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under Commonwealth Act 63, the governing law at the time he was
naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by
which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act,
the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The
MTC did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document. Wherefore, the
petition is denied with costs against the petitioner.

Consti D2 Page 21
Lee vs Republic, GR 128195

B14: Dayandante

Facts: 11 Filipino citizens all surnamed Dinglasan sold a parcel of land situated in the corner of
Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, sometime in May 1938. In 1948,
the former owners of the land institute an action for annulment of sale and recovery of such land
against the heirs of Lee Liong. They alleged that the sale was violative of the Constitution
because aliens cannot acquire nor own agricultural land, including residential, commercial or
industrial land. The Dinglasans raised the matter (annulment of sale and recovery of land) to
Supreme Court but they were denied by virtue of pari delicto; the parties ignored the
constitutional prohibition against ownership, hence the parties were set to default and were not
afforded protection. The action for the reconstitution of title was initiated by the widows of Lee’
heirs. They alleged the original title was burned during World War II. The lower court granted
the petition for reconstitution but was challenged by the Office of the Solicitor General in the
Court of Appeals averring that they were not the proper party to institute such proceeding
because, in the first place, Lee Liong did not have acquired ownership of the parcel of land due
to him being an alien; only Filipino citizens can acquire or own land of private or public domain.

Issue: Whether or not the (1) reconstitution of the title was valid; and (2) Lee Liong acquired
ownership of a parcel of land.

Ruling: Yes, the reconstitution of title was valid. Reconstitution of title denotes restoration in the
original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a
piece of land. Since the title was destroyed during World War II, there is a justification that
reconstitution is the proper remedy.

No, Lee Liong did not acquire ownership of a parcel of land. The sale was consummated during
the effectivity of 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not acquire
agricultural lands, save in cases of succession. Lee Liong, being a Chinese citizen, is barred from
acquiring or owning land which either belongs to the private or public domain; only qualified
Filipino citizen can do so.

Consti D2 Page 22
Muller vs. Muller

GR No. 149615 | August 29, 2006

B15: Foja

Facts:

• Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and German national, Helmut Muller got married
in Germany on 1989 and subsequently resided therein at a house owned by the respondent’s
parents

• In 1992, they decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines. By this time,
the respondent had inherited the house in Germany, which he sold and thereafter used the
proceeds to purchase a parcel of land amounting to P528K and the construction of a house
amounting to P2.3M in Antipolo.

• In 1994, the spouses separated and filed for separation of properties at the RTC of QC.

• In 1996, RTC rendered a decision terminating the ACP between the spouses and ordering
the equal partition of personal property. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that
it was acquired using the paraphernal funds of the respondent, however, respondent cannot
recover such funds because the property was purchased in violation of Art XII, Sec. 7 of the
Constitution:

o “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed

except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.”

• Respondent appealed and the CA reversed the decision, stating that what the respondent
is asking for is the reimbursement of the purchase of the subject property, not the acquisition or
transfer of ownership to him. Furthermore, it also considered the petitioner’s ownership over the
property in trust for the respondent.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in holding that the respondent is entitled to reimbursement? YES.

Held: Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of
public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary
purpose of this provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.

The court ruled that to allow reimbursement would, in effect, permit the respondent to enjoy the
fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. It also cannot be held that there was an
implied trust because the disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute.

Consti D2 Page 23
Matthews v. Taylor

G.R.: 164584, June 22, 2009

B16: Banzon

FACTS: Benjamin Taylor, a British national, and Joselyn Celestino were married in June 1988.
The following year, Joselyn bought property in Boracay and began renovations, with Benjamin
financing the endeavour under the name of Joselyn’s sister, Ginna. The couple, however, had a
falling out, after which Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney in favour of Benjamin,
authorizing the latter to enter contracts with third parties in regards to said property. Shortly
afterwards, Joselyn and Philip Matthews entered an Agreement of Lease involving the property.
In protest, a Declaration for Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages was filed by
Benjamin, having financed the property and Joselyn having entered the contract without his
consent. With no immediate answer from Joselyn or Philip, the RTC ruled in favour of Benjamin
by default. The CA, however, ordered the RTC to allow them to file his Answer, in which it was
stated that the contract was entered in good faith since Joselyn was the owner of the Boracay
property and that Benjamin had affixed his signature as a witness, indicating his knowledge and
implying consent to the transaction. The RTC ruled in favour of Benjamin, which was affirmed
by the CA, on the grounds that the property was the community property of Benjamin and
Joselyn, that the agreement should have been signed “with my consent” instead of “signed in the
presence of”, and how Joselyn had prepared an SPA in favour of Benjamin, making it
unnecessary for her to participate in the execution of agreements regarding the land.

ISSUE: Was Benjamin the actual owner of the property since he provided funds used in the
original purchase of the property? Did Benjamin have the right to nullify the agreement?

RULING: In the SC, the Court determined the validity of an Agreement of Lease entered into
by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. While the trial and appellate courts
both focused on the property relations of the involved parties in regards to the Civil Code and
Family Code provisions, they failed to consider the constitutionality of said agreement. In Sec. 7,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it states, “Aliens... have been disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain... and private lands... in the conservation of national patrimony. The
right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens...” This denied
Benjamin Taylor from asserting a right to the said property and the right to nullify the
Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and Philip. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if
Benjamin financed the property, having entered a contract which he knew was illegal, no trust
was created in his favour; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration
can be made that the property was conjugal. The SC reversed the decisions of the RTC and CA,
upholding the validity of the lease between Joselyn and Philip.

Consti D2 Page 24
WILLEM BEUMER v. AVELINA AMORES G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012

B17: Gozon

F act s: The marriage between petitioner Willem Beumer (Dutch) and respondent Avelina
Amores (Filipino) was declared void by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental on the
ground of Beumer’s psychological incapacity. The declaration of nullity of their marriage was
followed by a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership filed by petitioner Beumer before
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental. He prayed for the distribution of the properties they
acquired by purchase and inheritance at the time their marriage was subsisting.

Respondent claimed that she and Beumer did not acquire any conjugal properties during their
marriage except their two residential houses in Dumaguete City; she acquired the lots by way of
inheritance and purchased the same using her personal funds. These lots are registered in the
name of respondent Amores as clearly shown in the joint affidavit they executed. She also
asserted that petitioner transferred to their second house and brought with him his personal
properties consisting of different tools which cost PHP500,000 when she filed for annulment of
their marriage. She sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution and payment for attorney’s
fees.

The trial court granted Beumer’s petition and awarded respondent Amores all the parcels of land
and petitioner Beumer his tools and equipment. Petitioner Beumer brought the case before the
Court of Appeals contesting the RTC decision and insisting that the reason why the lots are
registered in the name of respondent Amores is that the foreigners are prohibited to acquire lands
in the Philippines under the Constitution; petitioner Beumer prayed for reimbursement of 1⁄2 of
the value of what he paid for the properties. The appellate court promulgated a decision
affirming the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Beumer can invoke equity to support his claim for
reimbursement.

Held: The Supreme Court held in negative. Petitioner Beumer admitted that he has knowledge
that our Constitution prohibits aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines thereby registering the
properties in the name of his former Filipino spouse. It is evident that petitioner’s actuations
showed his palpable intent to skirt such constitutional prohibition. The Court cannot grant
reimbursement to petitioner considering that the mode of acquisition of properties is by virtue of
an unconstitutional purchase. Hence, he cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity.

Legal Basis: Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: “Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

Consti D2 Page 25
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y. LIM, respondent

B18: Mapa

FACTS:

1. Chule Lim filed a petition for correction of entries in her birth certificate as it indicated
the following errors:
a. Her surname “Yu” mispelled as “Yo”
b. Father’s name was written as “Yo Diu To (Co Tian)” supposedly should be “Yu
Dio Tian (Co Tian)”
c. Nationality is Chinese which should have been Filipino since her parents were
never married. Her being a registered voter is a proof that she is a Filipino.
2. Her mother testified that she is Filipino citizen and that she was never married to her
father. She also presented certification from Iligan City LCR officials of no marriage
between her parents.
3. RTC granted her petition to which CA also affirmed. Hence, this petition.
4. RP contends that Chule Lim did not comply with constitutional requirement of electing
Filipino citizenship upon reaching age of majority as provided in Art IV Sec. 1(3) of
1935 Constitution and expressing such intention in an instrument to be sworn to and filed
with LCR as required under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
ISSUES:1. Whether CA erred in allowing correction of cif citizenship from Chinese to Filipino
despite Chule never demonstrated any compliance with legal requirements for election of
citizenship. — NO

2. Whether CA erred in allowing Chule Lim to use her father’s surname despite being
an illegitimate child — NO
RULING:

1. Constitutional requirement of electing citizenship applies only to legitimate children

hence inapplicable to Chule Lim. She is automatically Filipino by birth being an
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and as such, without need to elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching age of majority.
2. Likewise, having been registered as voter, exercising such right is a positive act of
election of PH citizenship.
3. What CA allowed is the correction of father’s misspelled surname but not the use of her
father’s surname.
4. There is a doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false
impression of family relationship but only to the extent that the proposed change
of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the
family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general.
5. Petition denied, CA affirmed

Consti D2 Page 26
Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

B19: Beramo

Facts: Petitioner Co is a losing candidate for Congressman in Laoang Samar, against respondent
Jose Ong, Jr. Petitioner questions the respondent’s natural-born Filipino citizenship that qualifies
him to hold such public office. Per records of the court, it was determined that petitioner’s
grandfather was from China who moved to the Philippines in 1895, making him a Spanish
subject. Respondent’s father was born in China in 1905 but lived in Samar in 1915, married in
1932 to a Filipina, and bore respondent in 1948. In April 1955, respondent’s father was declared
a Filipino citizen. During that time, respondent was schooling in Samar, then went to Manila for
higher studies and eventually work, but returned to Samar to manage the hardware business of
his family. In 1984 and 1986, he registered himself as a voter and on 1987 he won as
representative in 2nd district of Northern Samar. Petitioner argues that the respondent is not a
Filipino citizen as can be traced in his family roots and that he has not taken elected his
Philippine citizenship upon attaining the age of majority.

Issue: WON respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a Filipino citizen.

Held: Yes, respondent is Filipino. Article IV of the Constitution is curative. It identifies citizens,
among others, as those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. In the present
case, respondent’s father is a naturalized Filipino, and his mother is a Filipina; thereby making
respondent a Filipino citizen. Election of Philippine citizenship was already unnecessary because
the respondent was born to both Filipinos. The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is
a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship.

Consti D2 Page 27
So v RP, 513 SCRA 267 (2007)
EDISON SO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
B1A: Mangsat
Facts: He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in
No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average
annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is
single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of
Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of
December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if
any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the
order, were ordered published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette
and also in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered
that copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila
City Hall Building.9
During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know
petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s business. He would
usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner
to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all the
qualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10)
years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of
some school organizations and mingled well with friends.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the decision to the CA on the following grounds:
Issue: W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Ruling: The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation
by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there
are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative
naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as
amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all
aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the
Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were
Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs

Consti D2 Page 28
and traditions.52 To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to
make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more
encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature
believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing
from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A.
No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring
Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is
that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization,
subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good
moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible
persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an
individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and
has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not
incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This
implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be
honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be
taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness.
e do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize
the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent
to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship,
with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its
failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.

Consti D2 Page 29
NICOLAS-LEWIS vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006 9 Dual Citizenship Law

B1B: Garcia

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as
“duals” or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003, be
allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the COMELEC accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and
register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.

ISSUE: Does RA 9225 require “duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote?

RULING: No. There is no provision in the dual citizenship law requiring “duals” to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right
to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely
non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee
voter under RA 9189. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, the
strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos
abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

Consti D2 Page 30
AZNAR VS. COMELEC

GR No. 83820, May 25, 1990

B1C: Abeja

FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner challenged respondent’s right to hold public office on the
ground that the latter was an alien. Respondent maintains that he is a son of a Filipino, was a
holder of a valid subsisting passport, a continuous resident of the Philippines and a registered
voter since 1965. He was, however, also a holder of an alien registration certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is an alien.

HELD: No, because by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino, it is presumed that he was a
Filipino and remained Filipino until proof could be shown that he had renounced or lost his
Philippine citizenship. In addition, possession of an alien registration certificate unaccompanied
by proof of performance of acts whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost is not adequate
proof of loss of citizenship.

Consti D2 Page 31
Valles v. Comelec

GR 137000, August 9, 2000

B1D: Olasiman

FACTS: Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for governor of Davao Oriental. Her
citizenship was questioned before the Comelec which ruled that private respondent is a Filipino
citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office. Petitioner, however, seeks a review of
the decision claiming that respondent was born in Australia, is married to an Australian citizen
and holds an Australian passport.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s claim that Lopez should not run for governor due to her
citizenship will prosper?

HELD: Private respondent Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the
1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29,
2016, also known as the Jones Law.

1. Under both economic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects
on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybanez, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Norte. Thus, under the organic acts, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines. So also, the principle of JUS SANGUINIS, which confers citizenship by virtue
of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus,
the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to
a Filipino father.

2. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing of Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also
claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. Thus, the mere fact
that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had
an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship
and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result
in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Thus, at the most, private respondent had
dual citizenship – she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Consti D2 Page 32
3. In the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified “dual citizenship”as used in the
Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may , without
performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
“the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160 … (d) and in RA No. 7854 must be understood as
referring to ‘dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification.”

4. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because
in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in
1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

5. It is significant to note that on January 15, 1992, the private respondent executed a
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11,
1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second
Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila.

6. In the case of Burca vs. Republic, an exception to the Moya Lim Yao doctrine on res
judicata was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res
judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

a. A person’s citizenship was raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person
is a party.

b. The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof;

c. The finding on citizenship is affirmed bu this Court.

There have been prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA – No. 95-066 and EPC 92-
54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence
adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases.
Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening effect to warrant a reversal of such
prior resolutions. The petition cannot prosper.

Consti D2 Page 33
Mercado v. Manzano, GR No. 135083
B1E: Galanza
FACTS: Eduardo B. Manzano (RESPONDENT) was born in 1955 of Filipino mother and father
in San Francisco, California USA. Under ART. 4, Sec.2 of our Constitution (1987), Manzano
is a Filipino citizen. And since USA follows the doctrine of jus soli he is also a US citizen.
Therefore, Manzano possesses dual citizenship. In the May 1998 elections, Manzano and Ernesto
Mercado (PETITIONER) run for vice mayor of the city of Makati. As a result of the elections,
Manzano was the winning candidate with less than 3,000 more voter than Mercado. However his
proclamation as the winning vice mayor was suspended in view of a pending disqualification
case filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril (wag mailto, dalawa silang Ernesto dito). Mamaril
alleged that since Manzano possesses dual citizenship, under the Local Government Code he is
disqualified from running for any elective position.

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(d) those with dual citizenship
(LGU Code/ RA 7160)

COMELEC then declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for Vice Mayor of Makati. He
immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioner Mercado,the losing candidate,
sought to intervene in the disqualification case. COMELEC en banc reversed its previous
decision and declared Manzano as qualified to run. Thus, Mercado filed petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court seeking to set aside COMELEC’s en banc decision.
ISSUE:
(1) W/N Manzano possesses dual citizenship;
(2) If so, W/N he is disqualified
RULING:
1. Yes. Since U.S. follows the doctrine of jus soli, Manzano possesses dual citizenship.
HOWEVER, considering the fact that Manzano has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
Futhermore, filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen
as held in Frivaldo v. Comelec.

2. No, Manzano is not disqualified. DUAL CITIZENSHIP is different from DUAL

ALLEGIANCE. The latter refers to refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states while the former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Clearly in

Consti D2 Page 34
 ART. IV, Sec. 5 of the Constitution, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was
with dual allegiance and not dual citizenship per se.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law.
Therefore, the phrase “dual citizenship” in Sec. 40 of RA 7160 should be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Manzano is not disqualified from running in the elections.

Consti D2 Page 35