Banawa v Marano

Full Title DOROTEO BANAWA, JULIANA MENDOZA, CASIANO AMPONIN and GLICERIA
ABRENICA, petitioners, vs.
PRIMITIVA MIRANO, GREGORIA MIRANO, JUANA MIRANO and MARCIANO
MIRANO, respondents.
Date: May 16, 1980
Case Number: G.R. No. L-24750 Ponente: FERNANDEZ, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis

Maria Mirano, niece of Julia Mendoza, was extra-judicially adopted by spouses, Doroteo Banawa and
Juliana Mendoza, treated, and reared her up like their own child. A few years later, the spouses opened
up a store from which they derived considerable income and which enabled them to acquire several
parcels of land that were bought in the name of Maria Mirano. After a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died
and left as her only nearest relatives the herein respondents who are claiming ownership over the lands
in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court.

The issue is W/N the construction of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court can be applied to the
present case.

The court ruled that the particular provision cannot be applied because Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old
Rules of Court specifically provides for the case of a judicially adopted child. It is not applicable to Mario
Mirano, an extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule of construction that when the language of the
law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

 Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:
... In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall
be his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of
his parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives
who shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates.

The submission of the petitioners is that extrajudicial adoption is within the contemplation and
spirit of this rule of reversion adoptive. However, the rule involved specifically provides for the
case of the judicially adopted child. It is an elementary rule of construction that when the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.

 CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY vs ACTUAL DELIVERY

 Constructive delivery is a general term comprehending all those acts which, although not
conferring physical possession of the thing, have been held by construction of law equivalent to
acts of real delivery, as for example, the giving of the key to the house, as constructive delivery of
the house from the vendor to the vendee.

 Actual delivery consists in the giving of actual possession to the vendee or his agent, as for
example, in manually transferring the possession of a thing from the vendor to the vendee.

 The petitioners submit that since there was transfer of title to the land in litigation to Maria Mirano
when the purchase price was in fact actually paid by the petitioners-spouses, an implied trust was
created. The present law on implied trust is Article 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides:
 Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one
party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having beneficial interest of the property.
The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the
title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no
trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.

The transactions in question took place before the Civil Code of the Philippines became effective
on August 30, 1950. Hence Article 1448 of said Code is not applicable.

 DONATION: INTER-VIVOS v MORTIS CAUSA

 Inter Vivos - takes effect during the lifetime of the donor

 Mortis Causa - takes effect upon the death of the donor.

FACTS

 Banawa and Mendoza took their niece Maria Mariano to Mahabang Ludlod, Taa, Batangas. The
spouses reared the child because they were childless and treated her as their own.
 The spouses opened a store for general merchandise, which enabled them to generate income to
acquire parcel of lands.
 On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died in Taal, Batangas while still living
with the spouses. At the time of her death she left as her only nearest relatives the herein
plaintiffs, namely Primitiva Mirano, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano,
all surnamed Mirano, who are the children of a deceased brother, Martin Mirano.
 Two parcels of land are in dispute in this case: a parcel of land in Barrio Iba in Taal Batangas (Iba
property) and a parcel of sugar land in Carsuche (Carsuche property). The petitioners assert that
the Iba property were sold to Maria Mariano. Defendant, on the other hand, claim that the money
used in buying said land pertained to the spouses.
 The Carsuche property brought a conflict of evidence between petitioners and respondent.
Petitioners assert that the sale of the property was made in a public instrument in favor of Maria
Mariano. The defendants, on the other hand, assert that it was made in writing by Biscocho who
is the original owner of the property.
 The CFI declared Maria Mariano the owner of the two parcels of land. Defendants appeal to the
CA but it affirmed the decision of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied which led to this petition.

ISSUE

 Whether or not the construction of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court can be applied
to the present case. - NO
 Whether or not Maria Mariano is entitled to both Iba and Carsuche property. - NO

RULING

 No. Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court specifically provides for the case of a judicially
adopted child. It is not applicable to Mario Mirano, an extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary
rule of construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be
taken to mean exactly what it says.

Sec. 5 of Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court provides that "in case of death of the child, his
parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to
 property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents by adoption, which
shall become property of the latter or their legitime relatives who shall participate in the order
established by the Civil Code for intestate estates"

 Banawas cannot reclaim ownership of the IBA property because the rule on reversion adoptiva
can only be applied if there is judicial adoption and not an extrajudicial adoption. In Maria
Mirano’s case she was not legally adopted by the Banawas.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

 In the instant case, the oral donation of the gift consisting of pre-existing obligations of the
vendor, Placido Punzalan, was simultaneous or concurrent with the constructive delivery thereof
to Maria Mirano when the spouses consented to the execution of the deed of sale of the Iba
property in favor of Maria Mirano. The execution of the said deed of sale constituted payment by
the vendor, Placido Punzalan, of his outstanding obligations due to the spouses, Doroteo Banawa
and Juliana Mendoza. Consequently, there was constructive transfer of possession of the
incorporeal rights of the spouses over the property in question to Maria Mirano.

 The Court of Appeals nor the Court of First Instance of Batangas categorically stated that the
placing of the properties in the name of Maria Mirano was in the nature of a donation inter-vivos.
In rejecting the petitioners' contention that a donation mortis causa was executed, the Court of
Appeals said that, under the facts and circumstances narrated by the petitioners, the placing of
the Iba property in the name of Maria Mirano-if it was to be called a donation at all - was not in the
nature of a donation mortis causa, but rather it would be in the nature of a donation inter-vivos,
giving its reasons and citing the applicable law and decisions of this Court on the matter. The
Court of First Instance made the same hypothetical conclusion.