Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc v Robredo

Facts

 The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and

Corazon de Jesus Homeowners’ Association as well as the individual petitioners
were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of San
Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs).
 These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation
and construction of infrastructure projects in the areas illegally occupied by the
petitioners.
 Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without
any court order when: persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other
public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and persons or
entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available
funding are about to be implemented.
The Petition

Petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court,
seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the
public respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the
court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.
The petitioners justify their direct recourse before this Court by

1. generally averring that they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
2. respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently unconstitutional.
3. They are injured by the respondents’ threats of evictions and demolitions.

4. transcendental public importance of the issues raised in this case clothes

them with legal standing.

5. The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their
constitutional right to due process because they warrant evictions and
demolitions without any court order

 They point out that Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution

expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of abode unless there is
a court order.
  Moreover, Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate their right to
adequate housing, a universal right recognized in Article 25 of
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279.

 The petitioners further complain that the respondents had previously

conducted evictions and demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to
Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution

The Respondents’ Case

Mayor of Navotas, Mayor of San Juan, Mayor of Quezon and Secretary of
Interior and Local Government and the General Manager of the National
Housing Authority

1. the petitioners ignored the hierarchy of courts when they directly filed a
Rule 65 petition before the Court (SC)

2. petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and

mandamus in assailing the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279; petition is procedurally infirm and that the liberty of abode is not
illimitable and does not include the right to encroach upon other person
properties.

3. the petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of discretion that
the Mayor of Navotas allegedly committed.

4. the petition does not present any justiciable controversy since the City of
Navotas had already successfully evicted the petitioners in San Roque,
Navotas on November 28, 2011.

a) Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution allows evictions and

demolitions to be conducted even without a court order provided
they are done in accordance with the law and in a just and
humane manner. RA 7279 is precisely the law referred to by
Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution.

b) The Mayor also disputes the petitioners’ claim that RA 7279 does not
afford the informal settlers procedural due process prior to evictions
and demolitions.

 They argued that they were faithful implementation of

Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, which are presumed to be
constitutional, cannot be equated to grave abuse of
discretion.
Issues
(1) Whether the petition should be dismissed for serious procedural defects; and
(a) Whether the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts;
(b) Whether the petitioners correctly availed themselves of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus;
(2) Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Sections 1
and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution (relevant to the topic)
- Can the court judicial review?

The Court’s Ruling

The Court DISMISS the petition for its serious procedural defects

1. The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they

directly filed the petition before the Court.

2. The petitioners wrongly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition

and mandamus.

3. The resolution of the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA

7279 is not the lis mota of the case.

The petition assails the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, the
petition failed to show the essential requisites that would warrant the Court’s
exercise of judicial review. It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that
the courts will not determine the constitutionality of a law unless the requisites are
present.

 this case no longer presents a justiciable

controversy with respect to the Mayors of
Navotas and San Juan

1. What further constrains this Court from touching on the issue of

constitutionality is the fact that this issue is not the lis mota of this case.

 Lis mota literally means “the cause of the suit or action”; it

is rooted in the principle of separation of powers and is thus
merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded
the executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of
the government.

 This means that the petitioner who claims the

unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first
that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the
 constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable. If there
is some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of
constitutionality should be avoided. Thus, to justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative.

2. The petitions failed to compellingly show the necessity of examining the

constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of
Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

In Magkalas v. NHA, this Court had already ruled on the validity of evictions and
demolitions without any court order. In that case, we affirmed the validity of
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1472 which authorizes the NHA to summarily
eject all informal settlers’ colonies on government resettlement projects as well as
any illegal occupant in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or
administered by the NHA. In that case, we held that Caridad Magkalas’ illegal
possession of the property should not hinder the NHA’s development of Bagong
Barrio Urban Bliss Project.

The court noted that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished,
except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. Paragraph 1,
Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases
where persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons or entities
occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are
about to be implemented.

 To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane
manner, paragraph 2, Section 28 of RA 7279

 This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council carry out the provision.

- In short, stare decisis on the case at bar provides that Section 28 (a) and (b)
of RA 7279 are constitutional; eviction and demolition are exercise of their
constitutional rights provided that it is conducted in a just and humane
manner

3. The petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public

respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section
 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, they merely imputed jurisdictional
abuse to the public respondents through general averments in their
pleading, but without any basis to support their claim.

 To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain

of the executive department, the petitioners must establish facts
that are necessarily linked to the jurisdictional problem they
presented in this case, i.e., whether the public respondents
exercised their power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility in implementing Section 28
(a) and (b) of RA 7279.

Republic v N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc.

The Facts
 The Guadalupe Commercial Complex is a commercial building owned and
operated by Dela Merced & Sons. Situated alongside the Pasig River, the
complex operates a wet market and houses eateries or kitchenettes in the
same building.
 On 13 July 2006, the Environmental Management Bureau-National Capital
Region (EMB-NCR) of the DENR inspected the Guadalupe Commercial
Complex. The inspection team found that Dela Merced & Sons had violated
the following:
1. Section 1 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2004-26 for operating air
pollution source installations (generator set) without a permit to operate; and
2. Section 27(i) of R.A. 9275 for operating a facility that discharged regulated
water pollutants without a discharge permit.
 Thus, the EMB-NCR served a notice of violation (NOV) upon Dela Merced &
Sons, ordering the latter to comply with the requirements. Dela Merced &
Sons requested and was granted an extension of time to comply with the
NOV requirements.
 The EMB-NCR conducted another inspection of the building to check its
compliance with R.A. 8749 (The Clean Air Act of 1999) and R.A. 9275, as
well as their respective Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs)
 the sample failed to conform to the DENR Effluent Standards.
 Consequently, on 6 February 2007, the DENR Secretary, upon the
recommendation of the EMB-NCR, issued a cease and desist order
 execute the CDO by sealing the kitchen sinks of the locators identified as
sources of wastewater
 On 9 August 2007, the EMB-DENR issued a Certificate of Non-Coverage
(CNC) to Dela Merced & Sons pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1586 (Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System).
 By 14 November 2007, another inspection was conducted but now effluent
conformed to the DENR Effluent Standards.
 Held a discussion of the imposition of fines during the period of violation
of R.A. 9275
  Dela Merced & Sons prayed that the fine be discarded for being imposed
without due process of law. It argued that the fine was violative of Sections 1
and 19(1), Article III of the Constitution (Bill of Rights). It also contended
that the period from the issuance of the TLO (3 July 2007) up to the date it
had complied with the requirements (13 November 2007) should not be
included in the computation. (very important fact related to the topic)

Petition Before This Court

The DENR-PAB filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court on 5 June
2012/. The petition is contesting the downgraded fine imposed by the CA on Dela
Merced & Sons. In turn, the latter party filed its own Petition for Review on
Certiorari
 petition is questioning the fine imposed upon it and is contesting the
constitutionality of the provision on the imposition of the fine.
Issues
1. Whether Dela Merced & Sons was denied due process.
2. Whether the issuance of a CNC means exemption from compliance with R.A.
9275.
3.Whether Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 on the imposition of fines is unconstitutional under
Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution for being excessive.
4. Whether the amount of the fine imposed was correct, assuming that its
imposition was proper.
Our Ruling (points 3 and 4 are the only relevant but i included other points
para makasagang ta)

We deny Dela Merced & Sons' petition, but grant that of the DENR-PAB.
 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as to the amount of fine imposed.
1. Respondents were Not Denied Due Process
SC quotes CA on this matter:
The opportunity to be heard was made completely available to petitioner, Dela
Merced & Sons who participated in all stages of the administrative proceeding
before the DENR-PAB. The respondent [PAB] after issuing the notice of violation
and possible imposition of fines to the petitioner, gave it time to comply with the
requirements of the environmental laws

Subsequent inspection of the facility showed that the petitioner still failed to
comply with the DENR effluent standards despite the extension given by
respondent. Thus, the respondent was compelled to issue a cease and desist order.

Whatever procedural defect there may have been in the subject proceedings was
cured when Dela Merced & Sons moved for reconsideration.

2. No Exemption from Compliance with Environmental Laws, Even if Issued

a CNC
  Dela Merced & Sons contends that it was exempt from complying with the
environmental requirements of R.A. 9275 because it was issued a CNC.
 The CNC only exempts Dela Merced & Sons from securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate. It does not exempt it from complying with other
environmental laws. Section 5 of P.D. 1586 is clear on this matter:
Based on the law, environmentally non-critical projects such as the
Guadalupe Commercial Complex are still expected to provide additional
environmental safeguards as deemed necessary. Hence, Dela Merced & Sons
is still bound to abide by environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act,
even if it possesses a CNC.
3. (Relevant to the topic) The Constitutionality of Section 28 of R.A. 9275
Was Not Properly Questioned
Another main contention of Dela Merced & Sons is that Section 28 of R.A. 9275
violates Section 19 (1), Article III of the Constitution, because the former section
provides for the imposition of excessive fines.

 the attempt to assail the constitutionality constitutes a collateral attack

 issues of constitutionality must be pleaded directly

Even if the issue of constitutionality was properly presented, Dela Merced

& Sons still failed to satisfy the fourth requisite for this Court to undertake
a judicial review.
 the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 is not the lis mota of
this case.
The lis mota requirement means that the petitioner who questions the
constitutionality of a law must show that the case cannot be resolved unless
the disposition of the constitutional question is unavoidable. Consequently, if
there is some other ground (i.e. a statute or law) upon which the court may
rest its judgment, that course should be adopted and the question of
constitutionality avoided.
In this case, Dela Merced & Sons failed to show that the case cannot be legally
resolved unless the constitutional issue it has raised is resolved. Hence, the
presumption of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 stands.
4. The Fine Imposed Is Not Excessive Under the Constitution
a) Even if the court were to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275
despite the procedural lapses, Dela Merced & Sons' petition would still be
denied.
 The constitutional prohibition on the imposition of excessive fines applies
only to criminal prosecutions. In contrast, this case involves an
administrative proceeding and, contrary to the supposition of Dela Merced
& Sons, the fine imposed is not a criminal penalty. Hence, the proscription
under Article III, Section 19 is inapplicable to this case.
 Even if the Bill of Rights were applicable, the fines under R.A.
9275 still cannot be classified as excessive.

 In questioning the constitutionality of the fine, Dela Merced & Sons merely
alleges that the amount is "exorbitant” and "too excessive as to cause grave
 impact on the business operations, the very survival of petitioner as a
business entity and its employees as a whole."
 unsubstantiated allegations are not enough to strike down the fine
as unconstitutional for being excessive.
b) Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 cannot be declared unconstitutional simply because the
fine imposed may cause grave impact on Dela Merced & Sons' business operations.
 the possibility that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional.

c) the basis for the amount of fine imposed by the PAB and the CA (i.e. P10,000 per
day of violation) is the minimum imposable amount under the law. Since penalties
are prescribed by statute, their formulation is essentially and exclusively
legislative.
 Having no authority to modify the penalties already prescribed, the
courts can only interpret and apply them.

U.S. v. Borromeo:

"the fixing of penalties for the violation of statutes is primarily a legislative

function, and the courts hesitate to interfere, unless the fine provided for is so far
excessive as to shock the sense of mankind."

During the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2115 (which was the origin of R.A.
9275), one of the senators made the following statement:
The lack of usable, clean water resources is a problem that confronts us today. This
is the reason, Mr. President, this committee thought of submitting this measure as
our humble contribution in finding alternative solutions. This bill is not lacking in
incentives and rewards and it has muscle to penalize acts that further pollute all our
water sources as well. We increased the fines so that with strict implementation, we
can curb the damage we continue to inflict, ironically, to our life source.

Clearly, the legislature saw the need to protect and conserve our water
resources. To this end, it formulated rules with concomitant penalties to
ensure compliance with the law. We will not interfere with its wisdom in
drafting the law, especially since the presumption of its constitutionality
has not been overturned.

Laude v Ginez-Jabalde
Facts
 On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude (Jennifer) was killed in
Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott
Pemberton
 Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer's sibling, Marilou S. Laude,
against Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office of the City
Prosecutor. Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo, the general
headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
  On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused
to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage.
 On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners'
Urgent Motion for lack of merit
 Petitioners argued that Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to an excess or absence of jurisdiction when
she dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
based on mere technicalities.
 Petitioners advance that Philippine authorities ought to "have primary
jurisdiction over Respondent Pemberton's person while he is being
tried in a Philippine Court" in accordance with Article V, paragraph (3)
(b) of the Visiting Forces Agreement:
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent,
the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by
United States personnel . . .

Petitioner’s Arguments (1 is relevant)

1. Petitioners argue that the custody of Pemberton must be ordered

transferred to the Olongapo City Jail, considering that the crime involved is
murder, which is non-bailable.
 "undermines the Constitutional Powers of [the Court] to hear a jurisdictional
matter brought before it" and to promulgate rules for the practice of law.
 even though the Visiting Forces Agreement gives the United States the "sole
discretion" to decide whether to surrender custody of an accused American
military personnel to the Philippine authorities, "the Court still has control
over any proceeding involving a jurisdictional matter brought before it, even
if it may well involve the country's relations with another foreign power."
2. Petitioners argue that the Public Prosecutor's refusal to sign the Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody
of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail rendered the requirement for
conformity superfluous and quoted Justice Secretary Leila De Lima:
Pemberton should be under the custody of Philippine authorities,
following the filing of charges.
 in cases of extraordinary circumstances, the Philippine
government can insist on the custody
3. Petitioners pray in this Petition that procedural requirements be set
aside.
Respondent’s Arguments (1 and 2 are relevant)

1. Pemberton further argues that the custody over him "rightfully

remained with the [United States authorities"
Section 6 of the Visiting Forces Agreement:
"custody of any United States personnel over whom the
Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside
with United States military authorities, if they so request, from
the commission of the offense, until completion of all judicial
proceedings."
2. As for the issue of custody under the Visiting Forces Agreement,
Pemberton argues that there is a difference between "jurisdiction"
and "custody."
jurisdiction is "the power and authority of a court to try, hear and
decide a case."
 Pemberton does not dispute that "Philippine authorities have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by a
United States personnel
 the case is being tried a Philippine court.
custody "pertains to actual physical control over the person of the
accused and under the Visiting Forces Agreement
 Pemberton argues that custody shall reside with the United States
Military authorities, since the Visiting Forces Agreement expressly
provides that "the custody of any United States personnel . . . shall
immediately reside with United States military authorities . . . from
the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings."
3. Judge Ginez-Jabalde did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
she denied the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail.
 Marilou S. Laude, being only the private complainant, lacks the
legal personality to file the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
"without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor
Issue
1. Whether the jurisdiction and custody of respondent a challenge to
the constitutionality when it is in accordance with VFA
2. WON the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement is the
lis mota of this Petition
Decision
The Court dismiss the Petition.
 I. Petition failed to comply with notice requirement. Failure to comply
with this notice requirement renders the motion defective
consistent with protecting the adverse party's right to procedural
due process.
II. The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the
State Party to establish a system of accessible and effective
remedies through judicial and administrative mechanisms. Marilou
S. Laude, as a private complainant, indicates that there is a legal
system of redress for violated rights. That petitioners chose to act
on their own, in total disregard of the mechanism for criminal
proceedings established by this court, should not be tolerated
under the guise of a claim to justice. The accused also enjoys the
protection of these rights.
III. Procedural law basically mandates that "all criminal actions
commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor." The People is the real party in interest in a
criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the
petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the
existence of probable cause.
IV (relevant part) Petitioners argue that the Visiting Forces Agreement
should be declared "unconstitutional insofar as it impairs the . . .
power of the Supreme Court[.]"
 Declare the VFA unconstitutional insofar as it impairs the
constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules for practice before it, including the Rules of Criminal
Procedure
The constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement is not the lis
mota of this Petition.
 Petitioners started their Petition with a claim that their right to access
to justice was violated, but ended it with a prayer for a declaration of
the Visiting Forces Agreement's unconstitutionality.
 attempted to create the connection between the two by asserting that
the Visiting Forces Agreement prevents the transfer of Pemberton to
Olongapo City Jail, which allegedly is tantamount to the impairment of
this court's authority.
Why is the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement not the
lis mota of this Petition?
1) this Petition is not the proper venue to rule on the issue of whether the
Visiting Forces Agreement transgresses the judicial authority of this
court to promulgate rules pertaining to criminal cases
2) the issues of criminal jurisdiction and custody during trial as contained
in the Visiting Forces Agreement were discussed in Nicolas v. Secretary
Romulo, et al:
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are
required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms
and provisions.
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the
US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the Article V of Criminal Jurisdiction
rules apply:
1. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to
exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military
authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until
completion of all judicial proceedings.
2. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the
Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to
those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating
to the offense with which the person has been charged
3. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one
year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this
paragraph.
Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another
provision of the Constitution:
a. The exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all
courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5])

 The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed

to enter one's territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to
the extent agreed upon.
 The principle is the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction
over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed
upon by the parties.

b. To allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to

provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused; violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution (Art. Ill, Sec. 1)

 The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a

substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign
military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other
accused.
The situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of
procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally
encountered around the world, the laws of one State do not extend or apply —
except to the extent agreed upon — to subjects of another State due to the
recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign
armed forces.

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from

jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-
recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members
of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State's
territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
(Art. II, Sec. 2).

However, in the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that the moment the
accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is
Article V of Criminal Jurisdiction of the VFA:
 Sec. 10 states not only that the detention shall be carried out
in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also
that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities."
In any case, Pemberton is confined, while undergoing trial, in Camp
Aguinaldo, which by petitioners' own description is the "General Head
Quarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. "Their claim that the
detention facility is under the "control, supervision and jurisdiction of
American military authorities" is not substantiated.