MICHAEL W.

HOWARD

MARKET SOCIALISM AND POLITICAL PLURALISM:

THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA

As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, the choice is not between multiparty pluralism

or a one-party system, but rather between self-management, i.e. the democratic
system of a pluralism of self-management interests, or the multiparty or one-
party system which negates self-management. . . . The pluralism of interests is
incomparably closer to the individual and immeasurably more democratic than
any form of political party pluralism which alienates society as a whole from the
real man and citizen, even though it decides ostensibly on behalf of the citizen.
– Kardelj1
Do we want to have 1941 all over again? That would be a catastrophe.
– Tito, during the Croatian crisis of 19712

Many writers on worker self-managed market socialism assume

that a worker-managed market economy can be grafted onto a
multi-party parliamentary democracy. Such a model might be char-
acterized by worker-managed enterprises, a market in consumer
goods, a democratically managed investment fund, and conven-
tional multi-party political democracy.3 This assumption about the
compatibility of self-management and political pluralism was rejec-
ted by the one model of worker managed market socialism we
have seen, the Yugoslav experiment, until the very end. And when
multiple parties were introduced, it was on the heels of an enter-
prise law opening the door to the restoration of capitalism. While
one cannot discount the role of external forces such as the IMF in
this coalescence of political pluralism and capitalism, the example
nonetheless provokes a question about the compatibility of political
pluralism and self-management. In this paper I hope to vindicate the
thesis that self-management, and market socialism, are compatible
with political pluralism. Further, I will argue that political pluralism
is not only compatible with, but a necessary alternative to the one-
party state. But first it will be necessary to examine the Yugoslav
political system, particularly the delegate system as it was developed

Studies in East European Thought 53: 307–328, 2001.

© 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
308 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

between 1974 and 1990, and assess the claim that what was being
developed was a different kind of democracy, a non-party system
based on functional representation of workers, local communities,
and other social groups, which was held to be more democratic than
both multi-party democracy and the one-party state.
I will comment only briefly on the tragedy unfolding in the
former Yugoslavia. But I hope that this paper will contribute to
an assessment of the causes leading to breakup of that state and
the subsequent civil war, by disentangling some of the elements
of the Yugoslav experiment in self-managed market socialism still
worth emulating from any that may have contributed to its demise.
Apart from its relevance to an understanding of the current crisis
in Yugoslavia, the experiment is worth studying for its relevance to
any socialist, or former socialist, state wrestling with the dilemmas
posed by market reforms and political pluralism.

1974 REFORMS

Self-management of enterprises was introduced in Yugoslavia in

the early 1950s. As a result of the constitution of 1963, the
influence of the Party and state in enterprises was diminished,
and a greater role for the market was established in coordinating
production. A number of undesirable trends developed, prompting
further reforms in 1974. Strata began to develop within the work-
ing class. The autonomy of some service enterprises, particularly
banks, constituted new constraints on enterprises. Office holding
in enterprises was dominated by professionals and technicians. In
the communes, policy was dominated by local oligarchies, and
executive and administrative personnel of the commune. The repub-
lics became stronger at the expense of the federal government. At
the republic and federal levels assemblies were weakened to the
advantage of conciliation committees and executives. In the political
system participation of professionals and managers outstripped that
of workers.4
The guiding idea of the reforms was that “new impediments
preventing the worker from ruling were to be removed with the help
of the League [of Communists], the Socialist Alliance of Working
People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) and other socio-political forces”
 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA 309

(Potts, 621). Edvard Kardelj, the chief theoretician of the reforms,

proposed a delegate system, with delegates to each commune from
workplaces, local communities, and socio-political organizations,
organized into single-issue assemblies coordinated on a “partner-
ship” basis (see Appendix I). The idea was to empower ordin-
ary workers and citizens by decentralizing decision-making. Their
self-management interests would thus be directly expressed, rather
than represented and distorted by political parties in a struggle
for power or pre-empted by a single party. Even enterprises were
disaggregated into basic organizations of associated labor (BOALs),
which reorganized themselves into enterprises through a complex
system of social contracts. These BOALs – typically workplaces
– were the basis for direct election of worker delegates to work-
ers’ councils, to the chamber of associated labor of the commune,
and to self-managed interest communities (SMICs), responsible for
social services (education, health, etc.). Delegates were also elected
to two other chambers from local communities and from socio-
political organizations (including trade unions, veterans association,
the socialist alliance, the party, and the youth league). The delega-
tions would elect from their members delegates to the assemblies
on the republican and federal levels. The idea, modelled on the
Paris Commune, was that these delegates would consult with their
constituencies prior to deliberations and report back. They would
also reflect the diversity of the population with respect to gender
and occupation. They were to be delegates, not representatives,
and the system was to articulate functional interests, not merely
territoriality.5

THE COMMUNE

The Commune is the linchpin of the entire system. It is here that

the various interests were to be coordinated, and that direct delegate
democracy was to take the place of one party monopoly and multi-
party power struggles among clashing interests. Here also was to be
coordinated the public provision of services – education, health care,
utilities, etc. Such coordination was to be the result of agreement
between users and providers of services, eliminating the need for
and dominance by state bureaucracy. Although delegates at repub-
310 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

lican and federal levels were overwhelmingly party members, in

the communes 34% were not, indicating a relative openness. And
while socio-political organizations tended to initiate nominations
in workplaces, they were the local organizations, not those outside
the workplace. In local communities nominations proceeded from
voters’ meetings.
The Socialist Alliance, a kind of umbrella organization for socio-
political organizations, had a mandate under the new constitution
to ensure a better proportion of women, youth and workers among
the delegates, and were successful at the commune level, especially
in delegations from state agencies and from socio-political organ-
izations. Blue collar workers were a majority in the chamber of
associated labor, and had parity in that of the local communities. But
they constituted only 25% of delegates from socio-political organ-
izations, and in all cases tended to be more highly educated and
qualified.
Decision-making was divided among the three chambers and the
SMICs, with some joint decision-making. The chamber of associ-
ated labor decided approval of funds. Most actions were initiated
by Executive Committees, but delegations often initiated matters
of concern to them. According the Potts, “The Executive Commit-
tee is the most significant agency in the power distribution within
the Commune Assembly . . . [It is] perceived as a predominantly
‘harmonizing’ agency (60%), though almost a third of . . . respond-
ents saw it as dominating.” Over time, all categories of actors were
seen as less significant in decision-making, indicating a “lack of
clear responsibility . . . one of the weaknesses of the system” (Potts,
492–500). All in all,
Associated labor is not decisive, executives predominate in most phases of
decision-making, the supervision and evaluation dimension is weakly exercised
and report back is ineffective or negligible. Yet when compared with most
other political systems the levels of involvement are actually very high, the
decision making processes are relatively open to many influences, with the local
communities having a clear impact and clearer relationship than the other two
more diffuse sectors, and compared with the pre-1974 system the coordinated
commune approach is much more effective in broadening involvement. (Potts,
506)

While on the commune level the state and party have not exactly
withered away, all the internal evidence shows that the influence of
 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA 311

socio-political organizations, including the party, “has been found

to be negligible.”

THE DELEGATE SYSTEM BEYOND THE COMMUNE

If the Paris Commune model was adopted with mixed success on

the level of the Yugoslav commune, it was not extended consist-
ently to the republic and federal levels. George Potts has identified
structural, procedural and behavioral reasons for the failure of
self-management at higher levels.
Structurally, there is no formal representation of associated labor
at the federal level. Ironically, with the 1974 reforms all representa-
tion of workers as such on the federal level was abolished. “The one
step relationship from citizen or worker via delegation to delegate,
in authoritative bodies, almost never prevails” (Potts, 580). Instead,
delegates to federal level chambers were either answerable to repub-
lican/provincial assemblies, or “represented such a broad range of
territory that they too became in fact coordinated by their republics.”
Consequently, territoriality prevails over functional representation.
In matters of economic development, autarkic protectionism occurs,
regulation of wages and prices for regions, and socialization of
profits and losses (the latter undermining efficiency) (Potts, 583–
584). This is consistent with a gradual shift in power from the
federation to the republics.6
Although the League of Communists is not highly influential
in the commune, “in the rest of the system it plays a much more
orthodox role, in that it seeks to have a direct input into policy and
personnel questions at republic and federal level and has a range of
entitlements that it avails itself of in the policy process.”7
On the republican and federal levels, procedures reinforce the
separation of these levels from the rest of the system. Executive
and administrative bodies set the agendas for parliamentary discus-
sion. Assembly members are conventional parliamentarians on the
republican level and “one more dimension of the republican-driven
bargaining process at federal level” (Potts, 586). The Yugoslav
parliament is “in almost permanent deadlock”, and the execut-
ive agencies and socio-political organizations are instrumental for
getting “any agreement at all” (Potts, 589–590). The Executive
312 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

Committee is formally answerable to the assembly, but is itself

the main policy initiator, “the one cohesive force in the political
system” but leaving “delegates in a subsidiary position” (Potts, 590–
593). Many of the most important policy matters are worked out
in the executive committee, by the Presidencies, or in the party,
confronting delegates with a fait accompli.
In the conclusion of his study George Potts considers the two
main problems to have been the leading role of the LCY (League
of Communists of Yugoslavia), and the inconsistency with self-
management at the republican and federal levels. It is these that
block the effective influence of delegates, and render them repres-
entatives of territorial – and specifically republican – interests. Thus
he is agnostic in his verdict on the delegate system as a non-party
alternative to both the one party state and political pluralism. The
delegate system and functional representation simply haven’t been
developed fully, so we are not in a position to draw definitive conclu-
sions. The suggestion is that if the party had stepped out of the
way earlier, the system might have flourished as a new type of non-
party democracy. Whether this could have occurred in the peculiar
historical circumstances of Yugoslavia is another matter.
I wish to develop a more critical position, against functional
representation, and in favor of multiple parties. While I will not
make the argument here, I am in favor of worker self-management
of enterprises, democratic control over investment, and other aspects
of economic democracy. What I am criticizing is the attempt to
establish functional representation of workers and other groups,
allegedly extending direct democracy from the base upward through
the political system.8
It is no accident that the chief theoretician of the delegate system,
Edvard Kardelj, also defends the leading role of the LCY, and
polemicizes against multiparty democracy. His fear is that a multi-
party system would restore power to the reactionary forces of the
old pre-revolutionary society, and unleash nationalism. At least
the second of these appears to be born out by recent experience.
But he also claims that a new and superior form of democracy is
being cultivated, offering wider scope for participation in economic
and social life, and that the LCY has an essential role to play in
guiding and defending this process of democratization. As Kardelj
 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA 313

put it, features of the one-party system survive, but “only to the
extent that they are objectively required to safeguard the revolution”
(119). Thus the suspicion can arise that self-management demo-
cracy, when counterposed to multiparty democracy, is simply an
ideological mask for one-party dominance.9 To the extent that one
disentangles the delegate system from such one-party dominance,
the case against multiparty democracy unravels, and with it the case
for functional representation.

PLURALISM OF SELF-MANAGEMENT INTERESTS VERSUS

POLITICAL PLURALISM

At the heart of Kardelj’s defense of the delegate system, and his

critique of political pluralism, is the concept of the pluralism of
self-management interests. In the first place, by creating assemblies
in workplaces and local communities, direct democratic decision-
making is established over a range of issues otherwise determined
oligarchically by either capitalists or state bureaucrats, in capitalist
and etatist systems respectively. In addition, by sending delegates
from the workplace, the local community, or other social groups,
people are represented, not as abstract citizens, but in their concrete
social roles. In contrast, “political pluralism actually serves to
suppress the true interests of the individual and above all the class
interests of workers. To reduce a multitude of genuine specific and
concrete interests into general, abstract political formulas, and then
to establish just as general and abstract political representation for
these formulas in the form of one or more parties . . . is in fact to
deny the proponents of these interests the right to appear as their
direct and authentic spokesmen” (Kardelj, 90).
Two points need to be disentangled here. First, Kardelj objects
to the centralization of state systems, whether multiparty or one-
party, that do not allow for direct democracy in workplaces and
local communities. One can agree with him on this without thereby
either favoring the delegate system or opposing a multiparty system,
since what is at issue is the autonomy of decision-making at a local
level.10
The second point is that self-management interests, those
expressed by workers as such, or local residents as such, or members
314 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

of organizations as such, and reflected in the delegates chosen from

workplaces, local communities, and socio-political organizations
are true interests. Loyalties arising from one’s functional role are
genuine. Whereas party loyalties and differentiations are “artifi-
cial” (Kardelj, 165, 193), springing from false consciousness and
giving rise to undesirable antagonisms. Self-management interests
“are propounded directly, and decision-making on them is under
the constant and direct control of the working people and citizens”
(Kardelj, 173). As we shall see, if this principle were adhered to, it
would rule out not only political pluralism, but also any special role
for the party. But Kardelj does not consistently adhere to this vision
of direct control by the working people and citizens.
The reason for this is that interests as spontaneously expressed at
the base do not automatically harmonize into a consensus on general
principles or policy. Kardelj himself inveighs against the “theory
of spontaneity”, defending the role of the party and other socio-
political organizations in showing workers and others their “real
interests” (225).

In principle, authority derives directly from the self-management democracy of

the working people, through the delegate system; the League of Communists, as
part of the system of self-management, is simply one of the most important social
influences moulding the consciousness of self-managers and the delegate bodies.
In performing this role, the League of Communists acts primarily as the spokes-
man for a specifically public interest within the pluralism of self-management
interests. (Kardelj, 126)

The party in other words takes on the role of Hegel’s universal class,
influencing the plural and subjective groups of civil society, taking
a hand in appointments, and, in the case of the League of Commun-
ists, seeing to it “that the crucial levers of power are firmly in the
hands of those politically-conscious forces which stand on the side
of socialism and socialist self-management” (Kardelj, 166).
Now Kardelj cannot have it both ways, with the Party as simply
an influence, and the Party as determining who is in power. He
wants to avoid at one extreme the one party system, and at the
other extreme the demotion of the LCY to the sidelines as a mere
propaganda association (236). Hence the party and other socio-
political organizations must “be an organized and component part of
the system of self-management democracy”, i.e., they should send
 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA 315

delegations alongside those of workers and local communities. But

such an “organized pluralism” does not escape domination of the
single party, even if the party is not governing everything from the
center. In order to insure that consensus will emerge, the Party must
be dominant among the other socio-political organizations (Kardelj,
255).11 This is accomplished despite mass membership – over 80%
of the available population was in the Socialist Alliance – by having
delegates to the communes and other assemblies chosen at delegate
conferences rather than by election from the base, insuring party
control.12 By giving such controlled organizations a place alongside
chambers of associated labor and local communities, the Party is
insured a share not just of influence but of power in the decision-
making process.13 Now this can only be described as a situation
in which decisions are taken in self-management organs “under the
influence of people’s party affiliation” – albeit only one party –
which Kardelj considers to be the destruction of self-management
(193).
If the role of the party is to be allowed, with a view to achieving
a consensus, then one cannot consistently proscribe the influence
of other parties. If points of view on the solution of problems that
deviate from the party line are prohibited, or marginalized through
party dominance of other socio-political organizations, then influ-
ence becomes manipulation, a form of power.14 So if the special
role of one party is admitted, then the door must be opened to
other parties as well, whether or not they formally stand in elections
as such. (Kardelj comes close to conceding this when he says, in
the context of a sustained critique of multiparty systems, that “in
countries which have deep traditions of parliamentarism, the multi-
party system probably can also perform the function of the guiding
social factor in a self-managing system”(269). But he rules out this
possibility for Yugoslavia.)
Potts criticizes the Party for blocking the development of self-
management beyond the commune level, envisaging a non-party
delegate system, but he does not explain how such a consensus
might be forged in the absence of the single party, or a plurality
of parties.
316 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

However if we admit multiple parties in the self-management

system, its distinctive functional representation is undermined.
Speaking of the changes in 1988, Potts observes:
The delegations were abolished and direct election to assemblies from work-
based communities, local communities and socio-political communities were
introduced. This change might have made the interests of the constituencies much
more sharply defined than before. However, what took place was the emergence
of competing parties, who then fought in all three constituencies (seen in the
elections in Slovenia and Croatia). This development undermined the notion of
separate interest spheres, and demonstrated that in a multi-party system, party
identification comes first and the functional representation of separate interest
arenas becomes undermined. (Potts, 631–632)

It is now time to draw some conclusions from this discussion of

the theory and practice of Yugoslav self-management democracy.
The most important theoretical point is that in any society with
social differentiation and distinct spheres of activity, there will be
distinctions between particular interests, group or class interests,
and the general interest. Collective agents with common interests do
not emerge spontaneously, but are the result of political practice.15
In the self-management system such harmonized interests as emerge
are no less artificial than those of a multi-party system. And they
are no more democratic, since the necessary articulation occurs in
delegate conferences, executive deals, and by exclusion of influ-
ences inconsistent with those determined as acceptable by the
party.16 Indeed the complete absence of party-like pluralism at the
base indicates a de-politicization of the base and is a symptom that
real power lies elsewhere. For if workplaces were really the scene
of discussion about and control of decisions on the national level,
then political divisions of the sort arising on the national level would
be manifest in decision-making about choice of delegates from the
workplace. In fact the choice of delegates to higher levels is largely
out of the hands of workers, since such election is indirect. And
as one moves up the governmental hierarchy one finds increasing
dominance of party members, until in the federal assembly one finds
only them.17
In conclusion, the choice is not between self-management on the
one hand and party systems – single or multiple – on the other. The
choice is between single and multiple party systems, and demo-
cracy begs for the latter. The question of self-management is a
 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA 317

distinct question, having to do with whether workers should have

democratic rights in the workplace. But granting such rights and
other rights implied by economic democracy does not involve doing
away with multiple parties. On the contrary, democratic decision-
making in the economy opens up a new range of debates, requiring
articulation, both in the intellectual sense of the word, and in the
sense of building political coalitions in support of various altern-
atives. (To cite one example, should there be a market in labor,
as John Roemer argues, or should labor markets be abolished
as David Schweickart maintains?18 ) Hence, market socialism and
worker self-management, far from being an alternative to political
pluralism, require it.
Can such a multi-party system be limited to parties “within the
revolution,” i.e., affirming socialism and self-management?19 If the
aim is to insure that there will be no restoration of capitalism, this
is hard to do without the hegemony of a single party, much like the
hegemony of the LCY within the Socialist Alliance. Human rights
groups, politically organized religious groups, and others may be
suppressed, even if they advocate socialism, if they are considered
to be unwitting tools of foreign interests, and even, or perhaps
especially, if they have majority support (Kardelj, 214–15, 218,
228). The organ empowered to make judgments about the subjective
intentions and objective meaning of other groups has hegemony of
an unavoidably arbitrary kind.
On the other hand, if the censoring power of the party is removed,
and it is enough that parties be “subjectively” socialist, i.e., that they
call themselves “socialist”, then it will be impossible to screen out
parties (e.g., social democrats) that, intentionally or otherwise, will
take steps toward capitalist restoration, nationalism, or worse. After
all, Hitler’s party was called “national socialist.”
The dilemma may be stated thus: One cannot legislate subject-
ive intentions. But if one allows one party in “organized pluralism”
to pass judgment on the “objectively socialist” character of other
groups, one still has one-party dominance. Therefore, a multi-
party system cannot be effectively limited to parties “within the
revolution.”
It should be noted that there is no insurance against capitalist
restoration or loss of popular support for socialism within a one-
318 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

party system. For years many critics have accused the LCY of
capitalist restoration, and it was a communist government that intro-
duced the law making possible capitalist enterprises. Moreover, as
George Potts observed, the dominance of the party in the socio-
political organizations was a contributing factor towards the frus-
tration which led to the weakness of party support in some regions
of Yugoslavia during the 1990 election (Potts, 443–444).20

OBJECTIONS

There are additional arguments against multiparty systems, and

in considering them I hope to clarify my position, and make it
clear that I am not calling for the imposition of North American
style bourgeois democracy on every socialist experiment. My point
hitherto might be rephrased as saying that whatever you may say
against multiple parties, it is not an argument in favor of greater
democracy. Where democracy is at issue, pluralism must be given
scope, to the extent of competing for political power, even in a
classless society.
Branko Horvat considers political parties unnecessary in a self-
managed society.
Interest articulation and aggregation need no additional special institutions apart
from those already existing: the press and other mass media, research insti-
tutes, universities, political societies (such as the Fabian Society), professional
associations, and, of course, the self-governing machinery proper.21

Political recruitment should be guided by two principles, a) that

“the selection of candidates for political offices is a prerogative of
the voters, not of parties or any other intermediaries” and b) “candid-
ates must have direct access to the electorate . . . equal access to
political positions.” Horvat holds that the latter principle “implies
the elimination of political parties”, arguing that a party in politics is
like a cartel in the market: it restricts access and competition. There
is some point to the analogy, particularly in a capitalist society, and
to his claim that “All that need be done is to forbid donations and
the selection of candidates by party bosses” (316–321). However,
these measures are consistent with the continuation of parties. What
Horvat is really objecting to is not party pluralism, but inequality of
 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA 319

access to and control over the selection process. In a socialist society

where inequalities associated with ownership and income have been
very substantially reduced, there is no longer reason to associate
political parties with class differences and with differential power in
the political process.
As an aside, it is worth noting that a market socialist society may
encounter special difficulties, insofar as the market tends to generate
inequalities spontaneously, which in turn provide the basis for polit-
ical differentiation and differential political power that progressively
takes on a class character. It is a question beyond the scope of this
paper, but well worth discussing, whether, or what kind of, reli-
ance on the market would give rise to political parties tending with
increasing strength toward the restoration of capitalism.
Other arguments against political pluralism appeal to particular
historical antagonisms incompatible not only with socialism but
with stable and peaceful civil life. In the case of Yugoslavia, nation-
alist tendencies always threatened to erupt, even within the LCY, and
did in fact predominate once multiple parties were permitted after
1989. Seeing the result, one can sympathize with those who resisted
a multiparty system for this reason. The point of this paper has not
been to dispute such reasons, but rather to refuse to call such histor-
ical expedients democratic. While it may be the case that the degree
of popular participation allowed under Yugoslav self-management,
the degree of pluralism permitted, and even the degree of democracy
enjoyed were greater than what has emerged in Croatia or Serbia
today, it is a mistake to call the delegate system a different and
superior kind of democracy than a multiparty system.22

THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA

My principle concern in this paper has been with the theoretical

compatibility of market socialism and political pluralism. I chose
the case of Yugoslavia as a concrete instance for more theoretical
reflection, and criticized the argument against political pluralism
made by its chief theoretician, Kardelj. But the issues I have
discussed are relevant in other communist states in flux, such as
Cuba. When I considered the idea of a multi-party system limited
to parties “within revolution,” I had the ideas of Jose Marti and the
320 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

Cuban Revolution in mind as much as the Yugoslav case. While

multiple parties in Cuba do not open the door to ethnic conflicts,
there are civil conflicts, potentially violent, that such a reform would
risk, over the restoration of capitalism, foreign investment and influ-
ence, and the relationship between the island population and the
Cuban diaspora.
Still, my argument has focused sufficiently on the Yugoslav case
to warrant some closing remarks on the extent to which multiple
parties, the lack of them, or aspects of Yugoslavia’s version of
market socialism, were or were not contributing factors in the
violent breakup of that state.
This is not the place for even a cursory survey of all the factors
contributing to the Yugoslav tragedy. Certainly Mihailo Crnobrnja is
correct in saving that “there was no one single cause or one source
of explanation for the disappearance of the second Yugoslavia – or
for the tragic war through which it disappeared.”23
Nor should we succumb to the facile theory, favored by those
bystanders who wish to do nothing, that the breakup and/or the viol-
ence were inevitable consequences of ancient ethnic hatreds, spring-
ing forth after Communist repression was lifted. Serbs, Croats, and
Muslims lived side by side for decades and intermarried frequently
before the recent wars. The ethnic violence was at least as much
a product of opportunistic political leadership and media manipula-
tion as of any traditional mistrust. Also, there were other dimensions
of the conflicts – struggle over land, urban culture versus rural, and
economic inequality between regions, that got defined in national-
istic terms, but need not have been. And foreign powers were far
from innocent bystanders in the breakup and its violent form. For
example, Germany’s recognition of Slovenia before the status of
the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was negotiated put the JNA
in the anomalous position of being a legitimate defense force one
day, and a de facto occupying power the next. The Slovenian War,
brief as it was, should not have been a surprising outcome, not
to mention the subsequent secession of Croatia.24 The recognition
of Croatia’s independence without any strings attached concern-
ing the human rights of ethnic minorities – particularly Serbs –
could only fuel the mistrust of the Serbs inside and outside of
Croatia, and give support to armed resistance. While Serbia, under
 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA 321

Milošević’s leadership, has a primary responsibility for the violent

breakup of Yugoslavia, and the atrocities in Bosnia, Croatia, and
now Kosovo, it must not be forgotten that ethnic cleansing of Serbs
began in Croatia after the victory of HDZ in the first multi-party
elections, Bosnian, Croat, and Croatian forces have participated, on
a smaller scale, in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and in Kraina and
Croatia’s leader, Franjo Tudjman, has been complicit with Milošević
in the partitioning of Bosnia along ethnic lines. Furthermore, the
Vance-Owen agreements provided a blueprint for cantonization of
Bosnia and ethnic cleansing, in effect, rewarding such conquests
and inciting fighting between Muslims and Croats.25 US policy has
supported nationalist politics to the neglect of opportunities for non-
nationalist alignments, and has only inconsistently supported the
Bosnian government.
There are numerous reasonable conjectures about how the
breakup could have been avoided, or at least conducted in a just and
peaceful manner rather than through a war that has left every nation
worse off, and sowed seeds of distrust and resentment for decades
to come.
If Tito had not purged the parties in Serbia, Slovenia, and
Macedonia of their liberal reformist leaders after the Croatian crisis
in 1972, there might have been a more orderly transfer to demo-
cracy after Tito’s death. “There had never been a Serbian leadership
more tolerant of Croatian demands, and less prone to nationalist
demagoguery. . . . They probably represented the last leadership
that could have assured an orderly and democratic transition to
democracy.”26
Had Milošević not fueled nationalism, and taken control of the
autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, leading to greater
Serb dominance of the federation, there might have been less
impetus for Slovenia and Croatia to leave. Indeed, these republics
pressed for modifications of the constitution before taking the path
of secession. Had they been more assertive against Milošević over
the autonomous provinces, his aggrandizement might have been
stopped.27
Had the Croatian League of Communists opted for proportional
representation instead of trying to dominate the left in the first free
322 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

elections, the victory of, or at least the domination by the HDZ might
have been avoided.28
Had Yugoslavia, perhaps with more enlightened international
aid, solved the problem of growing inequalities between regions,
while making clear to all republics what they gained from union,
there would have been less economic underpinning of nationalist
divisiveness.29
Had Western Europe held out a promise of entry into the
European Union on generous terms for a united Yugoslavia, or a
Yugoslavia peacefully divided and with human rights guarantees for
minorities in the successor states instead of waiting passively while
the crisis approached and then rushing to recognize Slovenia and
Croatia, the war, and possibly even the breakup, might have been
averted.
Once Croatia and Slovenia were out, the further dissolution of
Yugoslavia was nearly unavoidable, as well as war among the vari-
ous groups. In the case of Bosnia, it is hard not to side with those
who favored a much stronger support for the Bosnian side, against
Serbian and Croatian partition (de jure or de facto). Bosnia began as
a multi-ethnic state, and the first government was to have included
all the major parties, until the SDS walked out. A strong defense of
Bosnia from the outset, either in the form of arms or military inter-
vention, might have prevented the siege of Sarajevo, the massacres
at Srebrenica and elsewhere, the destruction of Mostar, etc.30 The
Bosnian government was encouraged to think it could win, but was
not adequately supported. The Serb forces effectively manipulated
the UN, holding UN troops hostage while bombarding and conquer-
ing “safe areas.” Opposition to military intervention and/or to a
lifting of the embargo only prolonged the agony.
On the other hand, rigid adherence to republican borders in the
breakup of Yugoslavia could only trigger fears, with grounding in
living memory of the genocide during WWII, of the oppression
of national minorities in the new states. While these fears were
played upon by the propagandistic media, they nonetheless had
some basis in history.31 For better or for worse, the same position
on the inviolability of borders that framed US policy toward Bosnia
is framing its policy toward the crisis in Kosovo.32 For these reasons,
 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA 323

among others, I do not think the violent breakup of Yugoslavia was

inevitable.
While the introduction of multiple parties was a prelude to
elections that ushered in nationalists in Croatia, nationalist compet-
itors to Milošević’s already nationalistic Socialist Party in Serbia,
and voting along nationalist lines in Bosnia, the terrible results
were more the result of forces already at work, not least in
Milošević’s one party state, than of multiple parties per se.33 The
League of Communists as a Yugoslav wide entity collapsed into
its republican constituents in 1989. Thus there was at that point
no prospect for maintenance of a one-party state, even if it were
desirable. If anything, the failure to introduce multiple parties at an
earlier date contributed to the catastrophe more than did political
pluralism. As Denitch put it, “The LCY’s systematic prevention of
the normal development of responsible opposition groups, journals,
and parties had created an intellectual and moral desert. That man-
made desert became a veritable oasis for charlatans, adventurers,
and demagogues who came to prominence overnight as the system
collapsed.”34
The market aspect of Yugoslavia’s market socialism created an
ambiguous legacy. On the one hand, it made for a more efficient
and prosperous socialism, more attuned to the consumer needs than
the command economies, and perhaps contributed to greater legit-
imacy of the Communists in Yugoslavia than in many other East
European states.35 On the other hand, the market economy defin-
itively exacerbated regional disparities.36 The 1974 Constitution,
aspects of which I have discussed at length above, was designed in
part to reign in market forces and strengthen worker participation.
But the resulting system of BOALs and contractual agreements was
“a cumbersome and slow decision making process with detrimental
consequences for enterprise efficiency,” and by the mid-eighties was
slated for abandonment.37
It was the political more than the economic dimensions of the
1974 convention that paved the way for the breakup. “[The] repub-
lics and provinces obtained the greatest degree of independence in
Yugoslavia’s short history,” with major economic policy decisions
requiring consent of all eight republics and provinces.38
324 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

In continual deadlock, and at the same time threatened with

increasing Serbian dominance, the political arrangements were
unsustainable. While proposed 1989 Constitutional Amendments
for the reform of the economy could have continued Yugoslavia’s
experiment with market socialism, “with the separation of Croatia
and Slovenia and the ensuing civil war, these plans were completely
disrupted.”39
As for self-management itself, I know of no evidence suggest-
ing that workplace democracy contributed to the collapse of the
system.40 Worker cooperatives have emerged as a popular form
of privatization of enterprises in Slovenia. The privatization law
in Serbia and Montenegro favors share ownership by workers.41
Many huge enterprises in Croatia and Serbia were nationalized. I
have not been able to find evidence of the extent to which self-
management survives at the enterprise level there or in other states
of the former Yugoslavia. But of all the factors possibly contributing
to the economic, social and political collapse of Yugoslavia, this
would appear to be the most remote. The connection, if there is one,
is the vague association between economic and political crises. The
Yugoslav economy suffered from rising unemployment, massive
foreign debt, and hyper inflation, which, whatever their causes, were
bound to generate discontent that could be exploited by political
leaders.42
Some critics of the Yugoslav economy aptly call attention to
party influence, insufficient reliance on the market, corruption of
the banking system, the nebulous status of “social property,” and
the lack of real self-management rights as factors in the economic
failure of the former Yugoslavia, none of which, with the possible
exception of social property, count against self-management.43
In conclusion, reflection on the Yugoslav experience of self-
managed market socialism in the context of a one-party state does
not support the view that market socialism and political plural-
ism are incompatible. Nor does it appear that the breakup was the
product of either self-managed market socialism or the belated intro-
duction of multiple parties. It would further compound the tragedy
of Yugoslavia if societies elsewhere were to draw the rash conclu-
sion that either self-managed market socialism self-destructs, or
it requires a one-party state for its survival. For their efforts and
sacrifices the Yugoslavs deserve a more fruitful legacy.
 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA 325

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For comments on this paper I want to thank my colleague Doug

Allen, and the participants at both the 1993 Meeting of the Interna-
tional Institute for Self-Management at Long Island University, and
the Fifth Meeting of Cuban and North American Philosophers at the
University of Havana, where a shorter version of this paper was read.
I am particularly indebted to the late George Potts, whose thorough
and painstaking research on the Yugoslav delegate system, along
with his criticism and encouragement, made this paper possible.

APPENDIX I

Source: Potts, 1996, p. 286.

Membership of Assemblies at Commune,

Republic and Federal Level
326 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

NOTES

1 Edvard Kardelj, Self-Management and the Political System (Belgrade: Socialist

Thought and Practice, 1980), 176–7. This work was written in 1977. Subsequent
references will be by author and page number in the text.
2 Quoted in Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment: 1948–1974

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 299.

3 David Schweickart, Against Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1993).
4 George A. Potts, The Development of the System of Representation in

Yugoslavia with Special Reference to the Period Since 1974 (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, Inc., 1996), 619–621. Potts’ work is my principle
source for information about the Yugoslav delegate system.
5 The Commune was a unit of regional government. Yugoslavia consisted of

about 500 communes, which altogether contained about 65,000 BOALs and
12,000 local communities. Rusinow, 331; Potts, 451.
6 In 1963, new powers were granted to republics, which were consolidated in

1967–71, and then confirmed at the expense of the federation in the reforms
of 1974. In 1988 the strengthening of the republics was reinforced vis-à-vis the
communes as Croatia and Slovenia made communes more answerable to repub-
lics, and Croatia centralized health and education, abolishing the SMICs (Potts,
579).
7 For example, in the 1974 Constitution, a place was reserved in the Presidency

for the head of the League of Communists.

8 A strong prima facie objection to functional representation is that it establishes

unequal status for citizens. A worker who is also a party member, a veteran and
belongs to the youth association will have several votes, whereas a peasant or
(typically female) homemaker will have only one. One motivation for introdu-
cing special chambers for workers in the socialized sector was to strengthen the
political power of workers over peasants (Rusinow, 69–70). While this will seem
an advantage to those who view the state as an instrument of class domination,
it is hare to reconcile with a pluralistic perspective that does justice to forms of
oppression distinct from class.
9 Cf. Bogdan Denitch, Limits and Possibilities: The Crisis of Yugoslav Socialism

and State Socialist Systems (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990),

pp. 120–121.
10 For an excellent critique of local autonomy as a means of disempowerment,

see Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1990).
11 A majority of citizens either regard the Socialist Alliance as allowing insuffi-

cient participation or consider themselves unable to judge. Party members

predominate in activity and office holding (Potts, 181, 576).
12 Potts, 572, 591–2; Harold Lydall takes this figure as evidence that member-

ship is compulsory. Yugoslav Socialism: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1984), 129.
 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA 327
13 Rusinow regarded the creation of a third chamber in the communes for
socio-political organizations as “another striking token of the return to a direct,
undisguised political role for the Party and its network of pre-emptive mass
organizations” (331).
14 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974), 32.
15 See Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1985).

16 Rusinow, 215–17; Potts, 784.
17 Potts, 760.
18 John Roemer, “Can there be socialism after Communism?” Politics and

Society, v. 20, no. 3, (September 1992): 261–277.

19 Jose Marti envisioned such a pluralism within a single revolutionary party for

the Cuban revolution, and some opponents of political pluralism in Cuba consider
the factions within the Communist Party of Cuba to be true to Marti’s vision while
others favor a wider pluralism within the party.
20 See also Denitch, Limits, xxvii–xxviii.
21 Branko Horvat, The Political Economy of Socialism (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.

Sharpe, Inc., 1982), 316.

22 For a critique of a “kinds of democracy” approach, and a defense of a

“degrees of democracy” approach, see Frank Cunningham, Democratic Theory

and Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
23 “The Roots of Yugoslavia’s Dissolution,” in Rabia Ali and Lawrence

Lifschultz, eds., Why Bosnia? (Stony Creek, CT: Pathfinder Press, 1993), 269.
24 The German influence can be overstated, considering that eighty-nine percent

of Slovenian and ninety-two percent of Croatian voters voted for independence

in 1990 and 1991. Serbian policies played a major role in pushing Slovenia and
Croatia out. At the same time, EC and US support for the integrity of Yugoslavia
encouraged Milošević and the JNA to take a belligerent path. See Noel Malcolm,
Bosnia: A Short History (NY: New York University Press, 1996), 223–225.
25 Malcolm, Bosnia, 248.
26 Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia

(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 55–56.

27 Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism, 60; See also Denitch, “The Last Days of

Yugoslavia,” in Why Bosnia? 290.

28 Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism, 44–45. The LYC received thirty-two percent of

the vote, compared to HDZ’s forty-two percent, hardly a landslide for Croatian
nationalism. The electoral law designed by the LCY nonetheless gave HDZ two
thirds of the parliamentary seats, which power they used to strengthen Tudjman’s
grip on Croatia.
29 Iraj Hashi, “Regional Polarization in Postwar Yugoslavia and the Impact of

Regional Policies,” in Why Bosnia? 300–330.

30 Malcolm, Bosnia, 242.
31 Svetozar Stojanović, The Fall of Yugoslavia: Why Communism Failed

(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1997), 146–157. Stojanović claims for the
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia a “right to state self-determination,” or, in compens-
328 MICHAEL W. HOWARD

ation for the sacrifice of this right, various veto rights and regional autonomy in
areas where they are in the majority. It is unclear why this right would not also
extend to minorities within the Serb-majority areas, in a process of disintegra-
tion ad infinitum. It would also seem to justify self-determination for the Kosovo
Albanians, though Stojanović opposes this (see pages 91, 108–116).
32 George Kenny, “Caught in Kosovo,” The Nation (July 6, 1998): 31–35.
33 In Bosnia, not even Karadić’s SDS campaigned for the division of Bosnia, and

Bosnians, including many Serbs, voted overwhelmingly for a united, multi-ethnic

Bosnia (Malcolm, Bosnia, 223–233). While Tudjman had an interest in partition
of Bosnia, the Bosnian Croats only moved toward this position in response to Serb
actions.
34 Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism, 157.
35 Milan Kučan was the first popularly elected communist head of state, with

over fifty-eight percent of the vote, in Slovenia in 1989. Denitch, Ethnic Nation-
alism, 42.
36 Hashi, “Regional Polarization in Postwar Yugoslavia,” 312–13.
37 Hashi, “Regional Polarization in Postwar Yugoslavia,” 314.
38 Hashi, “Regional Polarization in Postwar Yugoslavia,” 314.
39 Hashi, 314–25; see also Vojin Dimitrijević, “The 1974 Constitution and

Constitutional Process as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” in Payam

Akhavan and Robert Howse, eds., Yugoslavia: The Former and Future (Wash-
ington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 45–74.
40 The atomization of self-managed enterprises into BOALs is another matter.

Stojanović, The Fall, 65.

41 Ljubiša Adamovich, “Economic Transformation in Former Yugoslavia, With

Special Regard To Privatization,” in S.P. Ramet and Ljubiša Adamovich, Beyond

Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995), 259–263.
42 Malcolm, Bosnia, 210.
43 Stojanović, The Fall, 65, 298–99; Adamovich, “Economic Transformation,”

253–279; Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism, 64–5, 156; Malcolm, Bosnia, 209–24.

Department of Philosophy
University of Maine
Orono, ME 04469
USA