ALBANO v.

GAPUSAN
FACTS: Redentor Albano in a verified complaint dated August 18, 1975 charged Municipal Judge Patrocinio
C. Gapusan of Dumalneg and Adams, Ilocos Norte (1) with incompetence and Ignorance of the law for
having prepared and notarized a document providing for tile personal separation of husband and wife
and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership and (2) with having allegedly influenced
Judge Zacarias A. Crispin of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte in deciding two criminal cases.

Malpractice as a notary. - In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench, respondent Gapusan
notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo
Maligta of Barrio 6, Vintar, Ilocos Norte and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal
partnership.
It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as the
case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other.

Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. He explained that the spouses had been separated
for a long time when they signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children with
her paramour. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live together
in case of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent
incidents between the spouses.

ISSUE: WON GAPUSAN SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR MALPRACTICE AS A NOTARY FOR HAVING NOTARIZED
AND PREPARED SAID DOCUMENT.

HELD: YES AS A NOTARY PUBLIC AT THAT TIME

There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are contrary to law,
morals and good customs. Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family,
"Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution". "The family is a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects." (Arts. 52 and 216, Civil Code). Marriage and the family are
the bases of human society throughout the civilized world.

To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for
personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code). Before the new Civil
Code, it was held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction
was void.

A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely
censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family.
Respondent Gapusan as a member of the bar should be censured for having notarized the void separation
agreement already mentioned.

SAMOSA v. VAMENTA

FACTS: (June 18 1971) Lucy Somosa-Ramos (petitioner) filed an action for Legal Separation, on
concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by him against her life being alleged. She likewise
sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed
to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of
respondent Clemente Ramos.

There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, dated July 3, 1971, based on Article 103 of the
Civil Code. It was further manifested by him in a pleading dated July 16, 1971, that if the motion asking
for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would
become even more dim.

Then, the petitioner received an Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos
to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction.

This this Order suspending the hearing of the WPI is in question

ISSUE: whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code (NOW ARTICLE 58 of the FAMILY CODE) prohibiting
the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the
petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit.

HELD: No. Not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of
the six-month period.

It is understandable why there should be a period during which the court is precluded from acting.
Ordinarily of course, no such delay is permissible. Justice to parties would not thereby be served. The
sooner the dispute is resolved, the better for all concerned. A suit for legal separation, however, is
something else again. It involves a relationship on which the law for the best reasons would attach the
quality of permanence. That there are times when domestic felicity is much less than it ought to be is not
of course to be denied. Grievances, whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or both of the
spouses. There may be constant bickering. The loss affection on the part of one or both may be discernible.
Nonetheless, it will not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow
them to go their respective ways. Where there are offspring, the reason for maintaining the conjugal
union is even more imperative. It is a mark of realism of the law that for certain cases, adultery on the
part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband, or an attempt of one spouse against the life
of the other, it recognizes, albeit reluctantly, that the couple is better off apart. A suit for legal separation
lies. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all together abandoned. The
healing balm of time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her ways,
and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a six-month period
before an action for legal separation is to be tried.

The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties
alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view
of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be
acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal
provision. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to
assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of
the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and
manage their respective property.

The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it
proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the
same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital
except in accordance with the orders of the court."

There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective
property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be
appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from
which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile
be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this
response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and
an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to
be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. What was held by this

Court in Araneta v. Concepcion,3 thus possesses relevance: "It is conceded that the period of six months
fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a
reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only
fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give
them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out
legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of
the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance ... The
law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If
these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused."4 At any rate,
from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months
certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion
of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

Ko et al v. Arambulo GR No. 190995

FACTS: Respondent Virginia Dy Aramburo (Virginia) and Simeon Aramburo (Simeon) were married.
Corazon Aramburo Ko's (Corazon) is the sister-in-law of respondent and sister of Simeon. Corazon and
Simeon have another sibling, Augusto Aramburo (Augusto), who predeceased them. Virginia's co
respondents herein are the heirs of Augusto, while the petitioners in the instant case are the heirs of
Corazon who substituted the latter after she died while the case was pending before the CA.

On November 26, 1993, Virginia, together with her co-respondents herein, filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership with Declaration of Nullity and/or Alternatively Reconveyance and Damages
with Preliminary Injunction against Corazon, docketed as Civil Case No. T-1693.[4]

Subject of this case are seven parcels of land located in Tabaco City, Albay. The complaint alleged that
Virginia and her husband Simeon (Spouses Simeon and Virginia), together with Corazon and her
husband Felix (Spouses Felix and Corazon), acquired the subject properties from Spouses Eusebio and
Epifania Casaul (Spouses Eusebio and Epifania) through a Deed of Cession dated April 10, 1970.

On April 13, 1970, Spouses Simeon and Virginia and Spouses Felix and Corazon executed a Deed of
Cession in favor of Augusto's heirs, subject of which is the one-third pro-indiviso portion of the subject
properties.

However, allegedly with the use of falsified documents, Corazon was able to have the entire subject
properties transferred exclusively to her name, depriving her co-owners Virginia and Augusto's heirs of
their pro-indiviso share, as well as in the produce of the same.

For her part, Corazon admitted having acquired the subject properties through cession from their uncle
and auntie, Spouses Eusebio and Epifania. She, however, intimated that although the said properties were
previously registered under Spouses Eusebio and Epifania's name, the same were, in truth, owned by their
parents, Spouses Juan and Juliana Aramburo (Spouses Juan and Juliana). Hence, when her parents died,
Spouses Eusebio and Epifania allegedly merely returned the said properties to Spouses Juan and Juliana
by ceding the same to their children, Corazon and Simeon. She further averred that the said properties
were ceded only to her and Simeon, in that, her husband Felix's name and Virginia's name appearing in
the Deed were merely descriptive of her and Simeon's civil status, being married to Felix and Virginia,
respectively.

Corazon alleged that she and Simeon thought of sharing a third of the subject properties with the heirs of
their brother Augusto who predeceased them, hence they executed a Deed of Cession on April 13, 1970
but later on decided to recall and not implement the same. In fine, thus, Corazon insisted that only she
and Simeon share one-half portion each of the subject properties.

Corazon further alleged that on December 14, 1974, Simeon sold and conveyed his entire one-half share
in the co-owned properties in her favor. Hence, Corazon became the sole owner thereof and
consequently, was able to transfer the titles of the same to her name. Corazon argued that the subject
properties belong to Simeon's exclusive property, hence, Virginia's conformity to such sale was not
necessary.

Corazon also raised in her Answer to the complaint, that respondents' action was barred by prescription.

RTC: During trial, it was established that Simeon and Virginia's marriage had been on bad terms. In fact,
since February 4, 1973 Simeon and Virginia had lived separately. Simeon lived with his sister Corazon in
Tabaco City, Albay, while Virginia and their children lived in Paco, Manila. From these circumstances, the
trial court deduced that it is highly suspicious that thereafter, Virginia would sign a deed of sale,
consenting to her husband's decision to sell their conjugal assets to Corazon.
PALANCA v. SMITHBELL
FACTS: Smith, Bell & Co. obtained a judgment against the said Emiliano Boncan for a sum of money. Later
the said Smith, Bell & Co. obtained an execution out of said court which was levied upon the property in
question in this case, which property was known as No. 16, situated in an alley without name running
toward the old Santa Mesa race track, upon property belonging to the hacienda of Tuason & Co.

After said execution was levied upon the property in question, the plaintiff and appellant herein
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the defendant herein,
asking that said court dictate a sentence declaring her to be the only and exclusive owner of the property
described in the complaint, with a right to the possession of the same, and that said attachment be
dissolved. To this petition the defendants filed a general denial.

RTC: denied

One of the assignment of errors by Palanca was that the Trial court erred when it did not allow the transfer
of the property in favor of Palanca since it was proven that said transfer was made on September 20,
1904, by Emiliano Boncan Yap in favor of his wife, Alejandra Palanca de Boncan. and in not finding that
she is the sole and exclusive owner thereof, Emiliano Boncan Yap having no interest whatever in the
property in question.

ISSUE: WON Plaintiff was the owner of the property in question the same belonging to her husband? YES

HELD: An examination of the evidence brought to this court shows that the said Alejandra Palanca was
the owner of certain property in the city of Manila, which was given by the said Emiliano Boncan, as a
guaranty for the payment of the sum of P14,000, which Emiliano Boncan borrowed from the International
Banking Corporation. (DONE WITH THE CONSENT OF THE WIFE).

With the money so borrowed the said Emiliano Boncan constructed the house in question, and later, by
a public document executed on the 20th of September, 1904, conveyed the house in question to the
plaintiff and appellant herein as a guaranty for the payment of the debt to the International Banking
Corporation, for the guaranty of the payment of which the said plaintiff and appellant had given her
private property. This P14,000, borrowed by the said Emiliano Boncan upon the credit of the property
of his wife, became conjugal property (paragraph 3, art. 1401, Civil Code), and when the same was
reinvested in the construction of a house, the house became conjugal property and was liable for the
payment of the debts of the husband. (Art. 1408, Civil Code.)

Believing that the foregoing conclusions in effect answer the assignments of error made by the appellant,
and without discussing the same in detail, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment of the
lower court should be affirmed, with costs.