• LAND REGISTRATION
situated in Barrio
Cheng vs. Genato & Sps. Da Jose
G.R. NO. 129760 December 29, 1998
FACTS: Genato is the owner of two parcels of land. He entered into
an agreement with the Da Jose Spouses over said land. The
agreement culminated in the execution of a contract to sell in a public
instrument and contained the stipulation that: “after 30 days, after
having satisfactorily verified and confirmed the truth and authenticity
of documents… vendee shall pay the vendor the full payment of the
purchase price.” The Da Jose Spouses asked for an extension of 30
days. Pending effectivity of said extension period, and without due
notice to Spouses Da Jose, Genato executed an affidavit to annul the
Contract to Sell. This was not annotated at the back of his titles.
Cheng expressed interest in buying the properties. Genato showed
Cheng the copies of his titles and the annotations at the back thereof
of his contract to sell with the Da Jose Spouses, and the affidavit to
annul contract to sell. Cheng issued a check for P50,000 upon the
assurance that the previous contract will be annulled.
Genato later continued with the contract for Da Jose spouses, and
informed Cheng of his decision and returned to the latter, the
downpayment paid. Cheng however contended that their contract to
sell said property had already been perfected.
Lower Court – There was a sale between Cheng and Genato, and
there was a valid rescission of the Contract to Sell (between Genato
and Spouses Da Jose)
CA – Reversed the lower court declaring that the Contract to Sell in
favor of Spouses Da Jose was not validly rescinded.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right to the land?
HELD:
The Spouses Da Jose. The contention of the Da Jose spouses that no
further condition was agreed when they were granted the 30-day
extension period from October 7, 1989 in connection with clause 3 of
their contract to sell should be upheld. Also, Genato could have sent
at least a notice of such fact, and there being no stipulation authorizing
him for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the encumbrance
on his titles and make it available to other would be buyers, it bolstered
that there was no default on the part of the Da Jose Spouses. Genato
is not relieved from the giving of a notice, verbal or written, to the Da
Jose spouses for his decision to rescind their contract.
The Court ruled that if it was assumed that the receipt is to be treated
as a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force
since it was subject to suspensive condition that the earlier contract to
sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be
cancelled or rescinded — a condition never met.
Note: "Registration", as defined by Soler and Castillo, means any entry
made in the books of the registry, including both registration in its
ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even
marginal notes. In its strict acceptation, it is the entry made in the
registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of
ownership and other real rights.
Spouses Da Jose made annotation on the title of Genato. Since
Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had chosen to inquire,
of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell duly
annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, Cheng was in
bad faith when he registered his claim.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
AND SANTOS DEL RIO
G.R. No. L-43105, August 31, 1984
Facts: A lot with an area of 17,311 sq.m.
Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna and 20 meters from the shore of Laguna
de Bay; was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on 19
April 1909. The Deed of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly
recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The land
was declared for tax purposes beginning the year 1918, and the realty
taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. When Benedicto del Rio died
in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the subject
parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in
the inheritance. Santos del Rio filed his application for registration of
said parcel on 9 May 1966. The application was opposed by the
Director of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners. Petitioner
Director of Lands claims that the land sought to be registered is part
of the public domain and therefore not registerable.
The CFI Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant
appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of
Appeals, setting aside that of the trial court. The Director of Lands and
the private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said
decision.
Issue:
Whether the parcel of land in question is a public land.
Held:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment affirmed from, and ordered
the registration of the land described in the application in favor of
Santos del Rio, applicant private respondent.
The Director of Lands claimed that since a portion of the land sought
to be registered is covered with water four to five months a year, the
same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a
foreshore land, which brings it within the enumeration in Art. 502 of
the New Civil Code quoted above and therefore it cannot be the
subject of registration.
However, the extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of
Waters of 1866, as follows:
The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the
ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary
depth.
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been
interpreted in the case of Government of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose
to be the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry
season, such depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs
always or most of the time during the year."
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion
of the land in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing
into Laguna de Bay from different sources. Since the inundation of a
portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be
considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited
by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not
being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land
as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore
capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant
proves that he has a registerable title.
• PURPOSES OF TORRENS SYSTEM
October 2, 1915 , G.R. No. L-8936
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants. D.R. Williams for
appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
FACTS: Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby are owners of adjoining
lots in Ermita, Manila . Between their lots is a stone wall which is
located on the lot of the plaintiffs. On March 2, 1906, Consuelo and
her husband presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration to
register their lot. The registration was allowed on October 25, 1906.
They were then issued an original certificate and the title was
registered. Both included the wall. On March 25, 1912, the
predecessor of N.M. Saleeby presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for registration. The court decreed the registration o f the
land which also included the wall. The plaintiffs Consuelo and Mauro,
her husband, discovered that the wall has also been registered to N.M.
Saleeby. They presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for adjustment and correction of the error where the wall was indicated
in both registrations. However, the lower court contended that during
the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant’s land,
they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot,
including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
ISSUE: WON the defendant is the owner of the wall and the land
occupied by it?
RULING: NO. The lower court’s decision would call for the plaintiffs to
be always alert and see to it that no other parties will register the wall
and its land. Else, if they spotted someone registering such wall in
their own name, plaintiff must immediately oppose. Such would
become defeat the real purpose of the Torrens system of land
registration.
“The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put
a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto o. That being
the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals o f the court, or sitting in the ‘mirador de
su casa’ to avoid the possibility of losing his land. ”
So who owns the land? According to Torrens system, the plaintiffs.
Under our law, once a party registers the land, final and in good faith,
no third parties may claim interest on the same land. “The rights of all
the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration.” The
registration, under the Torrens system, does not give the owner any
better title than he had. The registration of a particular parcel of land
is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties. It
is a notice to the world and no one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the
purposes an d the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the
opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the
Land Registration Act in the name o f two different persons, the earlier
in date shall prevail. The presumption is t hat the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. T his
presumption is IRREBUTABLE. It cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the
law requiring a record would be destroyed. The rule is that all persons
must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule
of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.
DECISION: Judgment of the lower court was revoked. The wall and
the land where it sits is awarded to the plaintiffs.
Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115402. July 15, 1998
Arciaga, Ana Liza B.
FACTS: After his mother's death Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng filed a
complaint against his father, Lee Tek Sheng to partition the conjugal
properties of his parents. Lee in his answer with counterclaim alleged
that the four parcels of land registered solely in petitioner's name
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal properties.
It was registered in Leoncio’s name only as a trustee since he was
then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, Lee prayed for
the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots
to its rightful owner — the conjugal regime.
To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of
the case, Lee caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT
8278. Leoncio moved for the cancellation of said annotation which
was denied by the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the
purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the
property within the power of the court pending litigation. Leoncio
appealed to CA, but to no avail.
Leoncio resort to the SC contending primarily that in the resolution of
an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it
was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots
since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, otherwise,
(b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than
28 years ago. He argues that his sole ownership as shown in the TCT
would be improperly assailed in a partition case and should be done
through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits
that evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is
not a probate or land registration proceedings where the court's
jurisdiction is limited.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278 would
amount to a collateral attack to the Certificate of Title.
2. Whether the denial of motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens is valid.
HELD:
1. No. The court held petitioner's claim is not legally tenable.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot
be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to this
case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in
any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a
collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land.
The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on Section
48 of P.D. 1529 which states that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. — A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership
which is represented by that document. Ownership is
different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best
proof of ownership of a piece of land and cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may
be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that
other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is
not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence
thereof. In this case petitioner's certificate of title is not being
assailed by private respondent. What the latter disputes is
the former's claim of sole ownership. Thus, although
petitioner's certificate of title may have become
incontrovertible one year after issuance, yet contrary to his
argument, it does not bar private respondent from
questioning his ownership.
2. Yes. The court held that a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled only on two grounds, which are: (1) if the
 annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the
adverse party, or, (2) when the annotation is not necessary
to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly
shown to concur in this case. The annotation of a notice of
lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing "to the
whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over
said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on
the result of the litigation over said property." The parties are
still locked in a legal battle to settle their respective claims of
ownership. The lower court allowed the annotation pending
litigation only for the purpose of giving information to the
public that parcel of land is involved in a suit and that those
who deal with the property is forewarned of such fact.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA
JOY, all surnamed CAPAY and RAMON A. GONZALES
G.R. No. 114299. September 24, 1999
FACTS: A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay
was mortgage to and subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed by
Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public auction,
the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the
mortgage was void because they did not receive the proceeds of the
loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was filed before the
Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book.
Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB as the sole
and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new one
was entered in TRB’s name without the notice of lis pendens carried
over the title. The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages.
Court rendered a decision declaring the mortgage was void for want
of consideration and thus cancelled TRB’s title and issued a new cert.
of title for the Capays.
Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land
to Santiago who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who
were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the subsequent buyers
cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good faith since they
purchase the land after it became a subject in a pending suit before
the court. Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the
titles, its recording in the Day Book constitutes registering of the land
and notice to all persons with adverse claim over the property. TRB
was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while knowing it
is pending for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the
land in dispute while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.
ISSUE:
1. Who has the better right over the land in dispute?
2. Whether or not TRB is liable for damages
RULING:
The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which
purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real properties. When the
subsequent buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens
annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a registered land may
safely rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret
what is beyond the face of the registered title. Hence the court ruled
that the subsequent buyers obtained the property from a clean title in
good faith and for value. On one hand, the Capays are guilty of
latches. After they filed the notice for lis pendens, the same was not
annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action for 15 years
to find out the status of the title upon knowing the foreclosure of the
property. In consideration to the declaration of the mortgage as null
and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure proceeding has no
legal effect. However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real
owner of the property it has already been passed to purchasers in
good faith and for value. Therefore, the property cannot be taken away
to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair
market value of the property at the time they sold it to Santiago.
MARIANO AVILA and MAGDALENA AVILA, petitioners, vs. HON.
LAURO L. TAPUCAR, Presiding Judge, Branch 1, Court of First
Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, JULITO BAHAN,
CRISTINA BAHAN PANIS, LUCITA CARTERA, BOY CARTERA and
CANDELARIA BAHAN MENDOZA, respondents.
August 27, 1991
DOCTRINE:
It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that “while land registration
is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole world, the simple
possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens Systems does not
necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property described
therein. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system which
includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be
registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said
certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included.”
In registration proceedings, a cadastral court has no authority
to award a property in favor of persons who have not put in any claims
to it and have never asserted any right of ownership thereon
FACTS:
In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure
acquired a 1.8340 hectares parcel of coconut land. Said property was
inherited in 1965 by private respondents, as successors-in-interest.
In 1960, petitioner Avila bought a 4,371 square meter parcel
of land which is part of the subject property inherited by the Bahans
from their predecessor, under a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land.
On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan filed Free
Patent Application for a lot which has a total area of 6.9027 hectares
in its entirety. Sometime later, private respondent Julito Bahan and
company gathered coconuts from the land purchased by petitioner
Magdalena Avila.
They filed an action for quieting of title and damages against
the Avilas. In their answer, the petitioners Avilas raised the defense
of having purchased the land from a certain Luis Cabalan and from
then on has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the same.
The Avilas filed a motion for a preliminary writ of injunction
praying that the Bahans be enjoined and ordered to refrain and desist
from gathering or continue harvesting the fruits on the land in
controversy until the termination of the case.
In the meantime, the Bahans' application for free patent was
approved and the free patent was issued , and on the same date an
Original certificate of title was issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro
Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan.
ISSUE:
W/N the subsequent approval of the application for free
patent for 6.9027 hectares in favor of the Bahans (the land which
rightfully pertains to the Avilas being embraced and included therein),
the issuance of free patent and original certificate of title in favor of the
Bahans during the pendency of the case for quieting of title is proper
RULING:
No.
The free patent that was issued to the Bahans is erroneous
as it embraced and comprised in portions thereof lands which belong
to the Avilas. The subsequent registration of the portion of land
belonging to the Avilas by the Bahans could not make the latter
owners thereof.
A cadastral court has no authority to award a property in favor
of persons who have not put in any claims to it and have never
asserted any right of ownership thereon, and the certificate of title
issued under the circumstances to such persons would be declared
null and void subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value.
 While land registration is a proceeding in rem and binds the
whole world, the simple possession of a certificate of title under the
Torrens Systems does not necessarily make the holder a true owner
of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title under
the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not,
by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the
lands illegally included.
Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring
ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a particular
property. It does not give the holder any better right than what he
actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith. The
effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all.
TORBELA VS. SPOUSES ROSARIO GR 140528 Dec. 07, 2011
FACTS:
The issue is over a parcel of land inherited by the Torbela siblings from
their parents.
They executed a deed of absolute quitclaim over the property in favor
of Dr. Rosario. Four days after, a TCT was issued in Dr. Rosario’s
name covering the property.
Another deed of absolute quitclaim was subsequently executed twelve
days after by Dr. Rosario acknowledging that he only borrowed the lot
from the Torbela siblings and was already returning the same. This
deed was notarized but not immediately annotated.
Dr. Rosario used the land as mortgage for a loan he obtain through
DBP for P70,000.00. He used the proceeds of the loan to build a 4
storey building which was initially used as a hospital but later
converted into a commercial space. Part was leased to PT&T and the
rest to Rosario ’s sister who operated the Rose Inn Hotel and
Restaurant.
Dr. Rosario fully paid the loan from DBP and the mortgage was
cancelled and ratified by a notary public. However, Dr. Rosario took
another loan from PNB. He later acquired a third loan from Banco
Filipino and bought out the loan from PNB cancelling the mortgage
with PNB. Rosario failed to pay their loan in Banco Filipino and the
property was extrajudicially foreclosed.
Meanwhile, back in 1965, the Torbela siblings sought to register their
ownership over the lot and to perfect their title but couldn’t because
the title was still with DBP. They showed as proof the deed of absolute
quitclaim presented executed by Rosario himself. In 1986, they filed a
civil case for recovery of ownership and possession and damages.
They tried to redeem the lot from Banco Filipino but failed. TCT was
issued to BancoFIilipino.
The Torbela’s claim they have right over the rents of the building
through accession because they are the land owners.
ISSUE: Who has right over the improvements made on the lot and the
rents thereof.
RULING: According to Art. 440, the accessory follows the principal.
Ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which
is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto,
either naturally or artificially.
However, in the case at bar, both Torbela siblings and Rosario are
deemed in bad faith. The Torbelas knew Rosario built on the land and
even allowed him to use the land to obtain a loan from DBP. Rosario
on the other hand consciously built on land he knew was not his. They
both had knowledge and did not oppose.
Art. 453 states that when both parties are in bad faith, the case shall
be treated as though both were in good faith thus the application of
Art. 448. 448 allows the Land Owner 2 options in the case at bar.
Either indemnify Rosario and appropriate the lot to himself or ask
Rosario to buy the lot or the rent rate. This case was remanded to the
RTC for the Torbelas to make such decision.
Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits such as rent belong to
the owner of the building. Rosario has rights over the rent and
improvements and shall continue until the Torbela siblings have
chosen an option from 448.
NOTES: In contrast, Dr. Rosario presented TCT No. 52751, issued in
his name, to prove his purported title to Lot No. 356-A. In Lee Tek
Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction between
title and the certificate of title:
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of
Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the
law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of
land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different
from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership
of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of
the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with
persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be
a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent
to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not
the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably
used. x x x.54 (Emphases supplied.)
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title.
Land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what
he actually has.55 Consequently, Dr. Rosario must still prove herein
his acquisition of title to Lot No. 356-A, apart from his submission of
TCT No. 52751 in his name.
HERMOGENA SANTOSvs. MIGUEL ROBLEDO ET AL., 28 Phil.
245, October 22, 1914
FACTS: On March 1, 1905, Santiago Herrera and his wife
BasiliaTolentino, in an instrument ratified before a notary, donated to
plaintiff Hermogena Santos a building lot with three warehouses, the
boundaries and area of the said land being described in the complaint.
On the same date, the plaintiff entered into possession of this property
andheld the same without opposition or interruption of any sort and
collected the rents therefrom until January 28, 1913, when Miguel
Robledo, who was found to be a creditor of the said Santiago Herrera
by a judgment rendered in case No. 9874 against the said Herrera,
prayed for the execution of the said judgment. At the instigation of
Robledo, the sheriff proceeded to seize the said lot and, after the
publication of notice, sold the same at public auction on February 17,
1913.
Although the plaintiff had intervened and prayed for the recall of the
writ for the reason that the lot levied upon was her property, the sheriff,
under security of the bond furnished by the creditor Robledo, sold the
said lot, and Robledo himself purchased it. The plaintiff was thus
deprived of her property and of the rents accruing therefrom from the
said January 28, 1913 up to the date of the complaint, and that she
had suffered considerable damage because she had missed the
opportunity to sell the property for P1,200, the price she had been
offered for it.
The plaintiff prayed that the defendants immediately return and deliver
to her the said lot, together with the uncollected rents therefrom, and
to pay an indemnity of P1,200 and the costs. On the other hand, the
defendants prayed that theplaintiff’s petition be denied on the ground
that they took possession of the property in good faith and was now
peaceably holding the same and that the conveyance made to the
plaintiff by Herrera and his wife Tolentino was effected by them with
intent to defraud their creditors and could in no wise prevail as against
the creditor Robledo, and that for this reason, the latter had suffered
losses and damages to the amount of P200.
The defendant also alleged that Santiago Herrera sold and conveyed
to him on March 24, 1913, through a public instrument and for the sum
of 1*85, Herrera's right to redeem the property in litigation within the
period of one year counting from February 17, 1913, the date of the
sale of the lot at public auction.
The trial court ruled against the plaintiff.
ISSUE: WON the levy and sale of the lot and improvements in dispute,
effected on petition of the creditor, Miguel Robledo, can prevail against
the right of ownership plaintiff acquired by virtue of the gift made in her
favor by the spouses Santiago Herrera and BasiliaTolentino
HELD: Yes. The gift was invalid and could have no effect whatever,
for the Civil Code prescribes, in article 629, that a gift does not bind
the donor nor produce any effect until it has been formally accepted
by the donee in accordance with law. The acceptance of that gift by
the plaintiff Santos does not appear in the instrument of conveyance
and the record reveals no other instrument that evidences such
acceptance and notification to the donors thereof in an authentic
manner.Because of this essential defect, the gift was not perfected
and the donee could not acquire any real and positive right in the
warehouse (land) and its improvements.
Furthermore, on March 1, 1905, when the said instrument was
executed, Santiago Herrera had owed Miguel Robledo, from March
12, 1903, the sum of 1*1,170, with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum. For the collection of this debt, the creditor had to bring suit
against the debtor. As the record does not show that the donors had
reserved sufficient funds or property to satisfy the debt, nor that they
possessed property other than the lot given away by them, the Court
held that the conveyance or gift made to the plaintiff by the spouses
Herrera and Tolentino was for thepurpose of defrauding the creditor,
Miguel Robledo, by preventing him from collecting his credit.
It is therefore unquestionable that this gift is null and void in itself and
can produce no effect whatever, since it fails to comply with the
requirements of article 633 of the Civil Code, and because the said gift
was made without proper consideration and for the purpose of
defrauding the defendant creditor, whom it is to be presumed the
donors intended seriously to prejudice when bestowing the property
upon the plaintiff (Arts. 643 and 1297, Civil Code). This intended injury
to the defendant would be iniquitously consummated, should the
plaintiff obtain a decision contrary to the judgment appealed from,
which, moreover, is in accordance with the law and the merits of the
case.
Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing reasons whereby the
errors assigned to the lower court have been refuted, the said
judgment should be and is hereby affirmed, and the defendants are
absolved from fhe complaint, with the costs against the appellant.
• 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of
REPUBLIC VS CA AND RIBAYA GR No. 113549
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: court of Appeals and Heir so Luis Ribaya
Short background:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals Resolution which
declared null and void the OCT issued pursuant to a decree and
decision in a land registration case decided on
September 18, 1925.
Contention of the petitioner:
(1) the indefeasibility of title does not lie against the State in an action
for reversion of land;
(2) the spouses-applicants failed to prove possession of the land for
the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their
possession was not open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under
a bona fide claim of ownership;
(3) the amended survey plan was not published,
(4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part of the forest land,
hence, inalienable; and
(5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful.
Private Respondents:
(1) allege that the petition merely raises factual matters and argue that
OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering that the land
was no longer part of the public forest when it was decreed in favor of
their parents.
(2) They further contend, invoking Benin, that the issue of
republication is inapplicable since the publication of the original survey
plan was already had in compliance with law.
(3) Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-
applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor
of the government and the compensation they received from the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for
damages sustained by the land during the war sufficiently proved that
they were the legitimate owners of the land.
(4) Finally, the original survey plan could no longer be questioned by
the petitioner.
ISSUES AND RULING:
As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:
(1) Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by
prescription to bring the action for annulment of OCT No. 3947
and all its derivative certificates of title
- We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses
Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on 31
December 1930, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction
over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the
State's action to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and
for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.
- In Republic vs. Animas, we ruled: Public land fraudulently included
in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the
state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public
Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for
the Statute of Limitation does not run against the state. The right of
reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.
2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over
the four parcels of land subject of the amended survey plan (Plan
II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926
by the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision
of the said court of 18 September 1925.
- The land registration court in LRC Case No. 52 never acquired
jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan or the
amended plan for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want
of publication of the second
- As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court
of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the spouses
Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan was
published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short,
there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the
governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of
the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one
of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court; it is a
jurisdictional requisite. Land registration is a proceeding in rem and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive
seizure of the Land through publication and service of notice.
- Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an
alleged original survey plan. The fact remains; however, that in
November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan II-13961-
Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no
evidence that the court amended its decision to conform to the
amended plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even
attempted publication thereof. However, the decree that was
subsequently issued was based on the amended plan insofar as the
four lots were concerned.
- A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the
land. On the basis of the decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows
then that the land registration court may have amended its decision to
conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found
their way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration
Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the
General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to
conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to
the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land
registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by
the amended plan.
• BURDEN OF PROOF
REPUBLIC vs. ENCISO
FACTS: The respondent averred, inter alia, that he acquired title to the
said lot by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of estate and quitclaim
on March 15, 1999; the said property is not tenanted or occupied by
any person other than the respondent and his family who are in actual
physical possession of the same; and the respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, peaceful, open,
notorious, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the
concept of an owner for not less than 30 years immediately preceding
the filing of the application.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG,
opposed the application. The trial court issued an Order of Default
against all persons with the exception of the government.
The respondent presented tax receipts to show that the
property was declared for taxation purposes in his name. He also
testified that he acquired the property by inheritance from his
deceased father, Vicente Enciso, who died on May 18, 1991. He then
immediately took possession of the property and constructed a house
thereon in 1991. On March 15, 1999, he and his siblings executed an
extrajudicial settlement of estate where the land was adjudicated in
his favor.
The respondent further narrated that the property was originally
owned by the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales.
The trial court ruled in favor the respondents. The CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred on a question of law in granting
respondent’s petition for registration sans any showing that the subject
property was previously declared alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain.
RULING: The petition is meritorious.
While it is the rule that findings of fact of appellate courts are
conclusive upon this Court, among the recognized exceptions is
where the findings of fact are not supported by the record or are
conspicuously erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion. This is the situation in this case.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Applicants for registration of title must therefore prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial, or since June 12, 1945.
The evidence on record shows that a house was constructed on the
subject property only in 1991.
Evidently, the respondent failed to prove that (1) Lot No. 2278-A was
classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public
domain; and (2) he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owners since time immemorial, or
from June 12, 1945.
• REGALIAN DOCTRINE
(REPUBLIC VS SANTOS GR 180027) : NO DIGEST
PAGKATIPUNAN V. CA (379 SCRA 621, G.R. No. 129682, March
21, 2002)
FACTS: Petitioners (Nestor Pagkatipunan and Rosalina Mañagas-
Pagkatipunan) were able to register a parcel of land. 18 years later,
the Republic of the Philippines filed with the CA an action to cancel
the registration for the certificates of title therein are null and void
alleging that at the tile of the filing of the land registration, the subject
land was still classified as timberland, hence inalienable and not
subject to registration. Petitioner on the other hand raised the
defenses of indefeasibility of title for it took the government 18 years
to assail the validity of the certificate of title issued to them.
ISSUE:WON the republic is barred by prescription? NO.
HELD: Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as
a title. Furthermore, evidence extant on record showed that at the time
of filing of the application for land registration and issuance of the
certificate of title over the disputed land in the name of petitioners, the
same was timberland and formed part of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the
land has been reclassified as disposable or alienable. Before any land
may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable
or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain. Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act
of Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored
nor deemed waived. It calls for proof.
The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter,
is descriptive of its legal nature or status, and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. A person cannot enter
into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that
land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title.
The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
As ruled in the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY VS. VILLAREAL
GR No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
Cruz, J.
Facts: The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of the several
persons who opposed the application for registration of a parcel land
classified as mangrove swamps in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz
with an area of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps, to the
applicant Ruperto Villareal. He alleged that he and his predecessors-
in-interests had been in possession of the said parcel of land for more
than forty years (40). Both parties agreed in one point that the
disputed land was a mangrove swamp. The respondent argued that
mangrove swamp are agricultural land but the petitioner contended
that it is a forestall land therefore not disposable.The Court of the First
Instance of Capiz however grants the application of the respondent.
The decision of the lower court was later affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence the Director of Forestry elevated the case to the
Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not, mangrove swamps are agricultural land or forest land.
Held: The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Furthermore the
legislative definition embodied in section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps
or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines hence
they are not alienable. The evidence presented by the respondent in
its claim were not sufficient to prove its possession and ownership of
the land, he only presented tax declaration. Wherefore the decision of
the Court of Appeals was set aside and the application for registration
of title by the respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.
COLLADO v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Edna Collado applied for registration of a parcel of
land (120 hectares in Antipolo, Rizal) with the land registration court.
She attached a technical description of the Lot, signed by Robert
Pangyarihan1, stating “this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed.” About a year later, Collado amended the application to
include additional co-applicants and more applicants joined
(“petitioners”).
The Republic through the SG, and the Municipality of Antipolo,
through the Municipal Attorney and Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed
oppositions to petitioners’ application.
ISSUES:
1. WON Petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
Petitioners: They have occupied the Lot for a long time and their
possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept
of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of one of their
predecessors-in-interest2 as early as 1902. There have been 9
transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest.
Also, they have declared the Lot for taxation and paid all the real
estate taxes.
1 2
Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands
The land is not covered by any form of title or any public land
application. It is also not within any government reservation.
Private rights were vested on Leyva before the issuance of EO 33
(establishing the Marikina Watershed Reservation). Since EO 33
contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to
existing private rights, the Lot is excluded from such reservation.
Assuming no private rights attached prior to the issuance of EO
33, the President had subsequently segregated the Lot from the
public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable through
Proclamation No. 1283. They say that the proclamation expressly
excluded an area of 3780 hectares from the MWR and made the
area part of the Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation. They contend
that the Lot in question is part of the excluded town site are and
that under CA 141, town sites are considered alienable and
disposable.
2. WON the petition for annulment of judgment should
have been given due course.
Petitioners: The petition for annulment of judgment was filed long
after the decision of the land registration court had become final
and executor and is no longer available because of res judicata.
The land registration court had jurisdiction over the case, which
involves private land. The Republic is stopped from questioning
the court’s jurisdiction because the Republic participated in the
proceedings before the court.
Solicitor General: The decision of the land registration court was
null and void because the land registration court had no
jurisdiction over the case. The land in question was not alienable
and disposable.
3. WON the petition-in-intervention is proper. (more on
procedural)
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT: Petitioners presented sufficient
evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot.
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
CA annulled the decision of the Trial Court. Under the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands of public domain belong to the State. An applicant
for registration of a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. The petitioners failed to present evidence that the Lot
has been segregated from the public domain and declared by
competent authority to be alienable and disposable.
The technical description which the petitioners attached to their
application said that the survey is inside in the Mariquina Watershed.
This has been confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land
Titles and Deeds in a Report.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Petition is DENIED.
1. PETITIONERS HAVE NO REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER
THE LOT.
Sesinando Leyva
 Petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession
under CA 141 3 (Public Land Act) or under the amendment by RA
19424 and PD 10735 (the law prevailing at the time the petitioners
applied for registration. When EO 33 was issued (1904), Leyva
had been in possession of the Lot for only 2 years. There is no
proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33, the petitioners had
acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed, acquisitive
prescription, or any other mode of acquisition from the State.
Also, even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to the
issuance of EO 33, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Thus,
ever since, the land has become non-disposable and inalienable
public land. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33
could no longer be counted because the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation.
CA 141 only applies to alienable and disposable public
agricultural land and not to forest lands, including watershed
reservations. Possession of forest lands or other inalienable
public lands cannot ripen into private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1283 has been amended by Proclamation No.
1637, revising the area and location of proposed townsite. The
new proclamation excluded the Lot in question and reverted it to
MWR coverage.
The certification presented by the petitioners that says that the
Lot is covered by the reclassification is contradicted by the several
documents submitted by the Solicitor General. In a Report, the
Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration confirmed that the Lot forms part of MWR and re
commended the dismissal of the application for registration. Also,
in a Letter, the Deputy Land Inspector of the DENR, confirmed
that it is within the MWR. Lastly, Collado’s application attached a
technical description stating that the Lot is inside the Mariquina
Watershed. Once a parcel of land is included within a watershed
reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, there is
the presumption that the land continues to be part of such
Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
declassification is shown.
2. ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION
COURT INVOLVING THE LOT ARE NULL AND VOID.
The Lot is proven to be not alienable and disposable public land.
The Land Registration court has no jurisdiction over non-
registrable properties.
The doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the
Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental ights.
Estoppel or laches does not validate an act that contravenes law
or public policy. Res judicata must be disregarded if its application
would sacrifice justice to technicality. Also, the right of reversion
or reconveyance to the State of public properties registered and
which are not capable of private appropriation or private
acquisition does not prescribe.
REPUBLIC V SIN
G.R. NO. 157485, MARCH 16, 2014
3 5
Possession and occupation of lands of public domain since July 26, 1894.
4 A simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect
title.
Facts: Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late
Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land
situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan. On
August 26, 1991, they respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against Aklan National College of
Fisheries (ANCF) for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and
declaration of ownership with damages claiming that the latter
usurped their rights over the property.
ANCF countered that the subject land was the subject of
Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
allocating the area of said property as civil reservation for
educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent
furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland
and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
The respondents presented evidence that they inherited a
bigger parcel of land from their mother who acquired it by virtue
of a deed of sale. That in 1988 a potion thereof was occupied by
ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose.
Respondent heirs asserted that they were previously in
possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. To
prove possession, respondents presented several tax
declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously
held that respondents retain private rights to the disputed property
by virtue of their and their predecessors’ open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title,
which should be respected and protected.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of the respondents amounts to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Held: No. At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have
not filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration
Decree. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree provide the requisites for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors–in–interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to
a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of
owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure.
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government,
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have
the burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since
respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and
by their predecessors–in–interest is inconsequential and could
never ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be
considered to have private rights within the purview of
Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said
proclamation to the subject property.
REPUBLIC V TRI-PLUS
G.R. NO. 150000, 503 SCRA 91
Facts: On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation filed with the MTC
an Application for Registration of Title over two parcels of land
designated as Lots 1061 and 1062 of the cadastral survey of
Consolacion, Cebu and located at Barangay Tayud, Consolacion.
Tri-Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject
parcels of land, including the improvements thereon, having
acquired the same through purchase; and that it is in actual,
continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession
of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for more than
30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.
The Republic opposed the application stating that the tax
declarations and receipts of tax payments, do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the land applied for or of its open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of
owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant
may no longer be availed of by the applicant because it failed to
file an appropriate application for registration in accordance with
the provisions P.D. No. 892; and that the subject parcels of land
are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines and are not subject to private appropriation.
The MTC and CA ruled in favor of the respondents. Petitioner
contends that a mere notation appearing in the survey plans of
the disputed properties showing that the subject lands had been
classified as alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963 is not
sufficient to establish the nature and character of these lands.
Petitioner asserts that there should be a positive act on the part
of the government, such as a certification from the DENR, to
prove that the said lands are indeed alienable and disposable.
Petitioner further contends that even if the subject properties were
classified as alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963, the law,
nonetheless, requires that such classification should have been
made on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Issue: Whether or not the lands in question are alienable or
disposable.
Held: No. Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
provides that the classification and reclassification of public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian
doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated
to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of
the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in
the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are
alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof
required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and
a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the lands applied for are
alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance
Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical
correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing
to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the
proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for
registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC.
(GR.NO. 163766, June. 22, 2006)Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed
Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker,
Inc. for a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake
elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay.
Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an application with the MTC
of Taytay, Rizal for registration of its alleged title over the lot. The
CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the
alienable and disposable zone. On the other hand, the Land
Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no.
3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for
public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001,
the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its opposition which
alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may
not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the
Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, its jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the property subject of the amended application
is alienable and disposable property of the State, and if so,
whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence
to prove its ownership over the property?
Held: The property subject of this application was alienable and
disposable public agricultural land. However, respondent failed to
prove that it possesses registrable title over the property. The
statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does
not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves
possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership
for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to
give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the
foregoing, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is
granted.
CARINO V. INSULAR GOVERNMENT (1909) : EXCEPTION TO
THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE
FACTS:
▪ Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land
lies filed for writ of error because the CFI and SC dismissed
his petition for application
▪ For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11,
1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as recognized
owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for
holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for
pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)
▪ 1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no
avail
▪ 1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law
and the lands were registered to him but process only
established possessory title
▪ Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered,
because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903,
excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its
operation
ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.
HELD: YES. Petition Granted.
▪ Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not
always, public land.
▪ Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to
produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show
that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For
cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For
uncultivated, 30.
▪ Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at
any such proceedings against him or his father ever was
made.
▪ Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.
▪ There must be a presumption against the government when
a private individual claims property as his or her own. It went
so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent
contrary proof.
▪ TITLE
TIRO VS PHIL ESTATES CORP (NO DIGEST)
CASTILLO VS ESCUTIN
FACTS: Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K.
Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course
of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor,
petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw
(Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot
13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters,
situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She
was able to secure an Orderdated 4 March 1999 issued by
Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit Point Golf &
Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural
landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by Perla K. Mortilla, et
al. and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential,
commercial, and recreational uses. She was also able to get from
the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification[if stating
that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was in
the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified
true copy of Tax Declaration No. 00554-A itself.Lastly, the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a Certificationattesting that
Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla,
was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent,
or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot
13713, and the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on
14 May 2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled
public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside
the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit
Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit
Realty to meet with its Vice President, Orense. However, she
claimed that Orense did not show her any document to prove
ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even threatened
her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too
powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle with.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF
THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY
REGISTRATION ACT
RULING: From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to
identify correctly the positions held by respondents Mistas and
Linatoc at the Office of the City Assessor. How then could she
even assert that a particular action was within or without their
jurisdiction to perform? While it may be true that petitioner should
have at least been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A
was being cancelled, she was not able to establish that such
would be the responsibility of respondents Mistas or Linatoc.
Moreover, petitioner did not present statutory, regulatory, or
procedural basis for her insistence that respondents should have
done or not done a particular act. A perfect example was her
assertion that respondents Mistas and Linatoc should have
annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the
name of Catigbac. However, she failed to cite any law or rule
which authorizes or recognizes the annotation of an adverse
interest on a tax declaration. Finally, absent any reliable
evidence, petitioners charge that respondents conspired with one
another and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing
more than speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Just because the
acts of respondents were consistently favorable to Summit Realty
does not mean that there was a concerted effort to cause
petitioner prejudice. Respondents actions were only consistent
with the recognition of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B,
transferred by sale to Summit Realty, registered under the
Torrens system, and accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.
▪ PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INC. vs CA
G.R. No. 88883 January 18, 1991
FACTS: Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated
in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located sometime between
December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a period of six (6)
days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the Philippine
Bill of 1902, in a so-called Declaration of Location.
The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim was duly
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime on
January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other mineral
claims, was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company,
the earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company,
Inc. (Atok for short; herein petitioner) in a Deed of Sale executed
on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has been in
continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim
up to the present .
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia
mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim together with other
mineral claims owned by Atok has been declared under Tax
Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential Decree No.
1214 an application for lease was filed by Atok covering the
Fredia mineral claim.
On the other hand, private respondent LiwanConsi has a lot
below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon,
Benguet. He constructed a house thereon sometime in 1964. The
lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first
constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that
it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was
only a nipa hut. And no one prohibited him from entering the land
so he was constructing a house thereon. It was only in January
1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house that
people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to
Atok. Private respondent Consi has been paying taxes on said
land which his father before him had occupied .
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed Feliciano
Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a construction was being
undertaken at the area of the Fredia mineral claim by private
respondent LiwanConsi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier
to go and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes
himself and other security guards went to the place of the
construction to verify and then to the police to report the matter.
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and
detainer against LiwanConsi , which was dismissed after due
hearing by the MTC of Itogon in favor of LiwanConsi. Petitioner
ATOK appealed to the RTC of Baguio, which reversed the
decision of the MTC, ordering defendantLiwanConsi to vacate
the premises of the Fredia Mineral claim, restoring possession
thereof to the plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
Defendant LiwanCosi was further ordered to remove and
demolish the house he constructed in the premises of the land of
Fredia Mineral claim.
In a petition for review filed by LiwanConsi with the CA, the CA
rendered its decision dismissing the subject forcible entry action,
and further rule in part that: LiwanConsi had a possessory right
over the property which may mature into ownership on the basis
of long-term possession under the Public Land Law. Thus, it held
that both Consi and ATOK are of equal footing with regards to the
subject lot, holding possessory titles to the land. The petitioner
through its long term occupancy while respondent mining firm
being the claim locator and applicant for lease on the mineral
claim.
ATOK filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not an individual's long term occupation of
land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the same
as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim.
HELD: It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had
secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corporation
case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not
required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the
petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all the requirements of
the law regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral
Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the
public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights
over the land, against even the government, without need of any
further act such as the purchase of the land or obtaining of a
patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to
Benguet and Atok.
As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in question
was acquired through a Deed of Sale executed between Atok and
Fredia Mineral Claim.
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive
rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective
mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution
of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain
except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them
and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes
(Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private respondent contends that
his predecessor-in-interest has been in possession of said lot
even before the war and has in fact cultivated the same.Since the
subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's possession of the
subject lot no matter how long did not confer upon him possessory
rights over the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the
same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-
possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are
two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all
these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in
continuous and exclusive possession of the Fredia mineral claim
while private respondent's possession started only sometime in
1964 when he constructed a house thereon. Clearly, ATOK has
superior possessory rights than private respondent, LiwanConsi,
the former being "the one longer in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was really
petitioner who was in actual physical possession of the property.
Having been deprived of this possession by the private
respondent, petitioner has every right to sue for ejectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be declared
and held that petitioner Atok has the exclusive right to the property
in question.
▪ MODES OF ACQUIRING TITLE
Republic vs. Maria Lee and IAC, G.R. No. 64818, May 13, 1991
(197 SCRA)
“failure to prove bonafide claim to land through tacking
possession from predecessor-in –interest to
meet requirements provided by law”
FACTS: Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a
parcel of land in her favor which was opposed by the Dir. Of
Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor-in-interest
acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of
title; they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30
years prior to the filing of application and the land in dispute is a
public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court
rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP,
it affirmed the lower court decision thus this appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by
conclusive evidence that she has ownership of the land by fee
simple title and her testimony as to the ownership of her
predecessor-in-interest is self serving after claiming that she
obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Laureana
Mataban and Sixto Espiritu who obtained their title from the
previous owners of the land, Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan.
From the time of filing the application of registration, the
respondent was in possession of the land for 13 years but she
sought to tack her possession on the said land from her
predecessor-in-interests who were in possession of the land for
20 years. Conditions provided by Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 where one is under a bonafide claim of acquisition of
ownership through their predecessor-in-interest or by themselves
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the agricultural land in public
domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a certificate of title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is able to provide sufficient
and substantial evidence as complying with the requirement of
law for confirmation of her ownership of the land in dispute?
RULING: In is held that it is incumbent upon the respondent to
prove that her predecessor-in-interest is the persons of Urbano
Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan have been in adverse, continuous,
open, public, peaceful possession in the concept of an owner for
20 years which she failed to provide a clear and convincing
evidence to prove. Her bare allegations do not constitute
substantial proof. Respondent failed to comply with the
requirements of the law to confirm her title on the land applied for
registration. Lower court decision was set aside.
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE: All lands not acquired from the
government belong to the state as part of public domain.
ANGELITA F. BUENAVENTURA and PRECIOSA F.
BUENAVENTURA vs .REPUBLIC
Facts: Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on
5 June 2000 before the RTC of Parañaque City of the subject property,
more particularly described as Cadastral Lot No. 5001-B, Csd-
007604-000176-D, located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City.
Petitioners alleged that they and their predecessors-in-
interest acquired title to the said parcel of land thru inheritance,
transfer, and possession as owner of the same since time immemorial
and/or within the period provided for by law. The court a quo issued
an Order granting the application for registration of title of the subject
property. However, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals.
According to the Republic, petitioners failed to prove
continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession by their
predecessors-in-interest and by themselves. The Republic further
argues that petitioner’s own evidence tends to show that the subject
property is not alienable and disposable because it was a salt bed and
a fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, except
for agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision in favor of the Republic, thus, overturning the Order of the
court a quo, and the parcel of land subject matter of the application is
declared public land.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Decision, but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition for
Certiorari.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the
Decision of the trial court confirming petitioners􀀀 title over the subject
property for not being allegedly supported by substantial evidence as
required by law.
RULING1: YES. The Court found out that petitioners offered in
evidence a certification from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, National Capital Region dated 29 October 2001,
to prove that the subject property was alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. Said certification is sufficient to establish the true
nature or character of the subject property. The certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.
ISSUE2: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
declaring the subject property as pubic land and ignoring petitioner’s
evidence of over 50 year possession in the concept of an owner and
completely unmolested by any adverse claim.
RULING2: YES. Even if the possession of alienable lands of the public
domain commenced only after 12 June 1945, application for
registration of the said property is still possible by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks of
prescription. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable
land, and whose possession has been characterized as open,
continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to
register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of
the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.
In the present case, while petitioners􀀀 possession over the subject The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the Court of Appeals on the
property can be reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date when possession of the Calalungs of the property since 1933-1934, openly,
according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing
disposable, they can still have the subject property registered in their of the action in 1958. The Court pointed out that it is the provisions of
names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. Act No. 190, particularly Sec. 41, that governs this case, since the
WHEREFORE, the court granted petitioners􀀀 application for provisions of the Old Civil Code were not yet in effect. Sec. 41 provides
registration of the subject property and directing the issuance of a an acquisitive prescriptive period of only ten years, meaning the
decree of registration in petitioner’s favor. Calalung acquired ownership as early as 1943-1944.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied, and CA decision is upheld.
(ONG VS SPS CABUCOS : NO DIGEST)
Vda. De Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, Salasalan, Rabaya, Labis
Grande v. Court of Appeals GR No. 98045
June 26, 1996
SUMMARY: Owners of a parcel of land filed a suit for quieting of
title and recovery of possession over a portion of property that FACTS:
was added to the original parcel of land via accretion. The Antonio Nazareno is an owner of a titled property situated
defendants claim ownership by acquisitive prescription, being in beside an accretion area along the banks of Cagayan River. Jose
open, continuous and undisturbed possession of the property Salasalan & Leo Rabaya leased parcels of land from Nazareno. When
for over 30 years prior to the filing of this case. Salsalan & Rabaya stopped paying rentals, Nazareno filed an
ejectment suit. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of Nazareno;
the RTC affirmed the decision. Thus, Nazareno filed an application
DOCTRINE: Alluvial deposits become part of the property to with the Bureau of Lands to perfect his title over the accretion area
which it becomes attached, and ownership of the alluvial portion being claimed by him.
belongs to the owner of the attached property. However, this land
is not automatically covered by the Torrens title of the land ISSUE:
owned prior to the accretion, and is considered unregistered Whether or not the subject land is a public land?
land, making it susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
ARGUMENTS:
FACTS: Petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia
Grande filed a suit for quieting of title and recovery of possession over VDA. DE NAZARENO SALASALAN AND RABAYA
a parcel of land that came about through alluvial deposits from the ▪ The subject land is a ▪ They contend the
Cagayan River. Their original lot, defined in OCT No. 2982 (issued in private land being an public character of the
1934) provides their northeastern boundary as the Cagayan River, accretion to Antonio subject land.
from a survey conducted in 1930. It is to this boundary that the Nazareno’s titled ▪ Mere application of the
accretion occurred. The Grandes allege that they have been in property. Miscellaneous Sales
possession of this property until 1948, when defendants Domingo and ▪ Art. 457 of the Civil Patent by Nazareno is
Esteban Calalung entered the land on a claim of ownership. On the Code which provides an admission that the
issue of filing the case only in 1958, the Grandes claim they could not that “To the owners of land being applied is a
acquire a copy of their title as they could not afford a surveyor. lands adjoining the public land.
banks of rivers belong
The Calalungs, on the other hand, claim to have been in open, the accretion which
continuous, and undisturbed possession of the contested property they gradually receive
since 1933, and argue that they are now the owners of the property from the effects of the
through acquisitive prescription, since the case was filed more than 30 current of the waters”.
years after they first took possession of the property. The Calalungs ▪ The accumulation was
had declared the property for taxation purposes in 1944, and again in gradual and
1948 when the municipality changed its name. The Calalungs allege imperceptible,
that the only reason the Grandes filed a case was because a survey resulting from the
commissioned by the Calalungs inadvertently included a part of the action of the waters or
property covered by OCT No. 2982 - property which they readily ceded current of the
back to the Grandes in 1958. Two owners of adjoining lots, Laman Balacanas Creek and
and Bacani, both testified in support of the Calalungs. Cagayan River.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Grandes, but the Court of Appeals RULING:
reversed the decision below and upheld the Calalungs’ argument on The Court ruled that the subject land is part of the public domain since
acquisitive prescription. the accretion was man-made or artificial. Under Article 457 of the Civil
Code:
ISSUES/HELD: WON the contested property can be acquired by
prescription “To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
RATIO: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Calalungs and of the waters.”
upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals.
But the Court provides the following requisites of accretion (Rules of
The Supreme Court acknowledged that by Article 457 of the New Civil Alluvion):
Code and Article 366 of the Old Civil Code, the Grandes are the
owners of the alluvial property. However, this does not operate to 1. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
automatically include the alluvial property under OCT No. 2892. While imperceptible;
ownership is governed by the Civil Code, imprescriptibility of 2. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or
registered land is provided in the registration law. As the Grandes sea); and
never sought to have the alluvial property titled, it is considered 3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to
unregistered land. the banks of rivers (or sea coast).
In Republic v. CA, “the requirement that the deposit should be due to
the effect of the current of the river is indispensable”. In Hilario v. City
of Manila, “the word “current” indicates the participation of the body of
water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide”.
Here, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust
by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.
▪ TORRENS SYSTEM
SOTTO V. SOTTO GR NO. L-17768
FACTS OF THE CASE
The case involves a petition under Section 513 of the Code
of Civil Procedure to reopen the land registration proceedings with
regard to Lot No. 7510 of the Cadaster (i.e. an official register of real
property in a district) of Cebu.
Petitioner, owner of the lot, alleges that he left Respondent
in charge of the lot when he left Cebu in 1907. In April 1921, Petitioner
learned from the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Cebu that the
Respondent had fraudulently obtained registration of the lot in his own
name, and that:
1. Certificate of Title for that lot had been issued to Respondent on
January 24, 1920.
2. As he was in Cebu, the Petitioner was unable to appear in court
during the land registration proceedings to defend his property rights
3. Such appearance was his only remedy to recover the property in
question
Petitioner moves to annul the decision of the Court of First Instance
and requests for a new trial.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure1 is
applicable to decisions pertaining to land registration proceedings
covered by a Final Decree.
HELD
Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is NOT applicable to
decisions pertaining to land registration proceedings covered by a
Final Decree.
Looking into the brief history of Section 513 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which was mentioned in Section 14 and Section 38
of the Land Registration Act as amended by Act No. 1108, it can
be construed that a final “decree of confirmation and registration”
is not a “judgment” within the meaning of Section 513 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and such decree cannot be reopened under said Code
except for reasons and in the manner stated in Section 38 of the said
Act.
The Land Registration Act itself distinguishes between a
judgment and the final decree. The decision rendered by the court is
styled a "judgment." The final "decree of confirmation and registration"
cannot be entered until at least thirty days after such judgment has
been rendered
To hold that the Legislature, by a mere reference in Act No.
1108 to Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure intended to include
such “final decrees” in the term “judgment” as employed in that
section would be equivalent to holding that it proposed in this casual
manner to abolish the Torrens system. If a final decree of confirmation
and registration should be reopened and cancelled, it is, of course,
obvious that all certificates of title issued under the decree would fail
whether the holders were guilty of bad faith or not.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ISSUE:
As Act No. 1108 only amended certain sections of the Land
Registration Act and did not amend the Act as a whole or introduce
any new principle, the amended section should be read in connection
with the other sections of the original Act as if all had been enacted in
the same statute, and as far as possible, effect should be given to
them all in furtherance of the general design of the Act.
“A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts of section and is
animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently each
part or section should be construed in connection with every
other part or section and so as to produce a harmonious whole.
It is not proper to confine the attention to the one section to be
construed.”
JOSEPHINE WEE VS. FELICIDAD MARDO
G.R. NO. 202414, JUNE 4, 2014
FACTS: Respondent Felicidad Mardo was granted a registered Free
Patent covering a lot situated in Silang, Cavite. She allegedly
conveyed a portion of the said lot to petitioner, Josephine Wee,
through a deed ofabsolute sale. However, respondent refused to
vacate and turn over the subject property claiming that the alleged
sale was falsified.
Relying on the aforementioned deed of absolute sale, petitioner filed
an Application for Original Registration of the said parcel of land. The
respondent opposed such application alleging 1] that she is the true
and lawful owner of the parcel of land; and 2] that petitioner’s deed of
absolute sale is surreptitious.
During the pendency of the case, respondent managed to
register the land in her name.
The RTC rendered a Decision granting the application of
petitioner. The trial court held that Josephine Wee isqualified to
register the subject land in her name, and directed the Administrator
of LRA to issue the corresponding decree in her name based on the
plan and technical description of said land as submitted by the
applicant and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to issue
title in her name.
The Court of Appeals, upon appeal by respondent, reversed
the decision of the trial court, thereby denying the application for
registration by petitioner.
The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to
comply with the requirement of possession and occupation under Sec.
14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the subject lot was not
physically turned over to her due to some objections and oppositions
to her title suggested that she was not exercising any acts of dominion
over the subject property, an essential element in the requirement of
possession and occupation contemplated under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D.
No. 1529.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the adverse, open and notorious possession
and occupation of a person and his predecessor-in-interest over a
parcel of land can defeata certificate of title.
RULING: The petition deserves no merit.
In the case of Republic vs. Umali, this Court ruled that once
a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is
issued, the land ceases to be part of public domain and becomes
private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control
nor jurisdiction. A public land patent, when registered in the
corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and
becomes as indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the
date of issuance thereof. Said title, like one issued pursuant to a
judicial decree, is subject to review within one (1) year from the date
of the issuance of the patent. This rule is embodied in Section 103 of
PD 1529, which provides that:
Section 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents. –
Whenever public land is by the Government alienated, granted or
conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Decree. x x x After due registration and issuance
of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registered
land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.
Accordingly, respondent’s registered patent in the
corresponding Registry of Deeds is a veritable Torrens title and
becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title upon the expiration of one
(1) year from the date of its issuance.
For said reason, the order of the RTC directing the
Administrator of LRA to issue a corresponding decree in petitioner’s
name is null and void. A land registration court has no jurisdiction to
order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another
in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land
would be null and void, since the principle behind the original
registration is to register a parcel of land only once.
Verily, once a title is registered, as a consequence either of
judicial or administrative proceedings, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court sitting in the
mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. The
certificate of title cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious
possession. Neither can it be defeated by prescription. As provided
under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of
the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
LU VS MANIPON
“The registration of a sale of real estate will not protect a buyer in bad
faith, for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud. On the other
hand, the preferential right of a first registrant in a double sale is
always qualified by good faith.”
Facts
• May 9, 1981 - Juan Peralta executed a Deed of Sale by
installment in favor of spouses Orlando and Rosita Manipon
. The deed covered 350 square meters of the 2,078 square-
meter lot located at Barrio Dilan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The
said Deed was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.
• June 10, 1981 - Juan Peralta mortgaged the aforesaid lot to
Thrift Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (TSLAI). Since he
failed to pay the loan, the mortgage was judicially foreclosed
and sold to TSLAI for P62,789.18 which was the highest
bidder.
• July 15, 1988 – TSLAI sold the lot in the amount
of P80,000.00 to Francisco Lu. Thereafter, he caused the
subdivision of the said lot into five (5) lots, one of which
includes the portion earlier sold by installment to the
Manipons. In the interim, or on July 30, 1983, Juan Peralta
executed another Deed of Sale covering a 339 sq m lot in
favor of the Manipons after the couple paid a total amount
of P8,000.00. The aforesaid Deed was however also not
registered.
• February 26, 1990 - Lu filed the present action alleging
therein that he is the owner of the lot in question including
that which was being occupied by the respondents.
• In the Answer filed by respondents, they claim that Lu is a
buyer in bad faith because even before he bought the 2,078
square-meter lot, he knew for a fact that they already bought
a portion of it from the original owner of the said lot and have
been residing therein since 1981.
• RTC ruled in favor of the Manipons. The trial court ruled that
Lu was not a buyer in good faith despite the fact that he was
able to register his ownership of the disputed lot. He admitted
knowing that respondents had constructed a house on the
disputed lot.
• CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Who between petitioner and respondents have a better right of
ownership over the lot in question?
Ruling: The Manipons have a better right.
Lu claims to have a better right to the disputed portion of the
real property. First, although respondents had bought it first, he was
the first to register his purchase of the mother lot. Second,
respondents’ ownership follows that of their vendor who mortgaged to
the bank his title to the mother lot and failed to redeem it. But the
Supreme Court was not convinced.
Registration is not the equivalent of title. Under the Torrens
system, registration only gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien
upon the land. It was not established as a means of acquiring title to
private land because it merely confirms, but does not confer,
ownership.. Moreover, the RTC and the CA have correctly ruled that
the preferential right of the first registrant of a real property in a case
of double sale is always qualified by good faith under Article 1544 of
the Civil Code. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled
to the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for
fraud.
When the registration of a sale is not made in good faith, a
party cannot base his preference of title thereon, because the law will
not protect anything done in bad faith. Bad faith renders the
registration futile.
Equally important, under Section 44 of the Property
Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No. 1529), every registered
owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking
such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free
from all encumbrances, except those noted on the certificate and
enumerated therein. Petitioner is evidently not a subsequent
purchaser in good faith. Therefore, between the parties, respondents
have a better right to the property based on the concurring factual
findings of both the trial and the appellate courts.
NATALIA REALTY CORP. v. VALLEZ
GR No.G.R. No. 78290-94
Date:May 23, 1989
FACTS
• In these appeals in five consolidated ccases, Natalia Realty
alleged that the 5 defendants impleaded unlawfully occupied
portions of the parcels of land belonging and registered to its
name.
• After filing their consolidated answer, Vallez et.al. sought the
dismissal of all the aforesaid complaints for ejecment on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Their motion was denied.
• Natalia Realty moved for a summary judgment on the
consolidated cases under Rule 34 on thr ground that the only
issue for resolution, if any, is strictly legal;
• And that there is no genuine issue or issues as to any
material fact averred in the complaint and Vallez's et.al.
defenses were sham and mere pretended denials.
• The RTC granted the summaray judgment because-No valid
issue was raised by Vallez but only conclusions that because
they have been in actual possession for over 39 years of their
respective farm lots.
• RTC ruled in favor of Natalia Realty on thr complaint.
• CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC thst no question of fact was
raised by Vallez.
• Vallez's contention-That Natalia's act of filing a motion for
summary judgment is an admission of the prescription of
their action because said motion is applicable only to inferior
courts.
ISSUE/S: Whether the trial court correctly rendered a summary
judgment on the consolidated cases? YES.
RULING: The very allegations of Vallez prove that no valid issue has
been tendered by them. Because they relied mainly on two points, the
alleged invalidity of the title of the Nataliaand their supposed
acquisition of the properties by adverse possession
After the issuance of the certificates of title in the name of
Natalia, it cannot be annulled or questioned after the expiration of one
year from the entry of thr decree of registration.It becomes
incontrovertible, and is binding upon and conclusive against all
persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the
registration proceedings.
MELENCIO VS CA
GR No. 148846, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 62
FACTS: The subject property is a 30,351 square meter parcel of land
particularly denominated as Lot No. 3368, located at Suba-basbas,
Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and part of total area of 30,777
square meters covered by TCT No. 20626 in the name of the late
petitioner Go Kim Chuan. The entire property was originally owned by
Esteban Bonghanoy who had only one child, Juana Bonghanoy-
Amodia, mother of the late Leoncia Amodia and petitioners Amodias.
The entire property was brought under the operation of the Torrens
System. However, the title thereto was lost during the Second World
War.
On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale whereby they
extra-judicially settled the estate of Esteban Bonghanoy and conveyed
the subject property to respondent Aznar Brothers Realty Company
for a consideration of P10,200.00. On August 10, 1964, the said Extra-
Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was
registered under Act 3344 as there was no title on file at the Register
of Deeds of Lapiu-Lapu City. Thereafter, AZNAR made some
improvements and constructed a beach house theron.
On February 18, 1989, petitioners executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Absolute Sale, conveying the subject property in favor
of Go Kim Chuan for and in consideration of P70,000.00. Aznar then
filed a case against petitioners Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for
Annulment of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 20626 alleging that
the sale to Go Kim Chuan was an invalid second sale.
ISSUE: WON there is a valid certification and verification by only one
of the plaintiffs?
HELD: Yes, the Court reiterated the ruling in the case of Iglesia ni
Cristo, 505 SCRA 828, that Commonality of interest is material and
crucial to relaxation of the Rules. The Rules may be reasonably and
liberally construed to avoid a patent denial of substantial justice,
because it cannot be denied, that the ends of justice are better served
when cases are determined on the merits- after all parties are given
full opportunity to ventile their causes and defenses – rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections.
The same liberality should likewise be applied to the
certification against forum shopping. The general rule is that the
certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature
of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also
stressed in a number of cases that the rules on forum shopping were
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice
and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of
substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents
of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions merely underscored its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or
its requirements completely disregarded.
REPUBLIC VS CA AND RIBAYA GR No. 113549
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: court of Appeals and Heir so Luis Ribaya
Short background:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals Resolution which
declared null and void the OCT issued pursuant to a decree and
decision in a land registration case decided on
September 18, 1925.
Contention of the petitioner:
(1) the indefeasibility of title does not lie against the State in an action
for reversion of land;
(2) the spouses-applicants failed to prove possession of the land for
the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their
possession was not open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under
a bona fide claim of ownership;
(3) the amended survey plan was not published,
(4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part of the forest land,
hence, inalienable; and
(5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful.
Private Respondents:
(1) allege that the petition merely raises factual matters and argue that
OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering that the land
was no longer part of the public forest when it was decreed in favor of
their parents.
(2) They further contend, invoking Benin, that the issue of
republication is inapplicable since the publication of the original survey
plan was already had in compliance with law.
(3) Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-
applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor
of the government and the compensation they received from the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for
damages sustained by the land during the war sufficiently proved that
they were the legitimate owners of the land.
(4) Finally, the original survey plan could no longer be questioned by
the petitioner.
ISSUES AND RULING:
As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:
(1) Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by
prescription to bring the action for annulment of OCT No. 3947
and all its derivative certificates of title
- We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses
Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on 31
December 1930, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction
over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the
State's action to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and
for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.
- In Republic vs. Animas, we ruled: Public land fraudulently included
in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the
state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public
Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for
the Statute of Limitation does not run against the state. The right of
reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.
2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over
the four parcels of land subject of the amended survey plan (Plan
II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926
by the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision
of the said court of 18 September 1925.
- The land registration court in LRC Case No. 52 never acquired
jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan or the
amended plan for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want
of publication of the second
- As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court
of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the spouses
Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan was
published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short,
there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the
governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of
18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of
the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one
of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court; it is a
jurisdictional requisite. Land registration is a proceeding in rem and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive
seizure of the Land through publication and service of notice.
- Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an
alleged original survey plan. The fact remains; however, that in
November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan II-13961-
Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no
evidence that the court amended its decision to conform to the
amended plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even
attempted publication thereof. However, the decree that was
subsequently issued was based on the amended plan insofar as the
four lots were concerned.
- A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the
land. On the basis of the decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows
then that the land registration court may have amended its decision to
conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found
their way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration
Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the
General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to
conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to
the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land
registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by
the amended plan.
VAGILIDAD VS VAGILIDAD G.R. NO. 116136
FACTS: A parcel of land, Lot No. 1253, situated in Atabay, San Jose,
Antique, measuring 4,280 square meters, was owned by Zoilo
[Labiao] (hereafter ZOILO) as per Original Certificate of Title No. RO-
2301 issued on March 3, 1931. Sometime in 1931, ZOILO died.
Subsequently, on May 12, 1986, Loreto Labiao (hereafter LORETO),
son of ZOILO, sold to Gabino Vagilidad Jr. (hereafter GABINO JR.) a
portion of Lot No. 1253 (hereafter Lot 1253-B), measuring 1,604
square meters as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by LORETO.
In view of the death of ZOILO, his children, LORETO, Efren
Labiao (hereafter EFREN) and Priscilla Espanueva (hereafter
PRISCILLA) executed an Extrajudicial x x x Settlement of Estate dated
January 20, 1987, adjudicating the entire Lot No. 1253, covering 4,280
square meters, to LORETO. On January 29, 1987, Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T -16693 was issued in favor of LORETO, EFREN
and PRISCILLA, but on even date, TCT No. T16693 was cancelled
and TCT No. T-16694, covering the said property, was issued in the
name of LORETO alone. Transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT
No. 18023 as Entry No. 186876. Subsequently, the xxx real estate
mortgage was cancelled under Entry No. 191053 as per inscription
dated November 17, 1992 in x x x TCT No. 18023.
On July 31, 1987, GABINO, JR., as petitioner, filed a Petition
for the Surrender of TCT No. T-16694, covering Lot No. 1253, with the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Sixth Judicial Region, against
LORETO, docketed as Cadastral Case No. 87-731-A. The plaintiff
alleged that, being the owner of x x x Lot No. 1253-B, under TCT No.
T-16694, by virtue of the sale that took place on May 12, 1986, he is
entitled to ask for the surrender of the owners copy of TCT No. T-
16694 to the Register of Deeds of Antique in order to effect the transfer
of title to the name of the petitioner. However, as per motion of both
counsels[,] since the parties seemed to have already reached an
amicable settlement without the knowledge of their counsels, the trial
court issued an Order dated March 21, 1994 sending the case to the
archives.
On September 29, 1995, spouses GABINO and Ma. Dorothy
Vagilidad (hereafter DOROTHY), as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages, with the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Sixth Judicial Region, Branch 11,
against spouses WILFREDO and Lolita Vagilidad (hereafter LOLITA),
docketed as Civil Case No. 2825. The plaintiffs claimed that they are
the lawful owners of Lot No. 1253-B which was sold to him by
LORETO in 1986. They alleged that [GABINO JR.] is a nephew of
defendant WILFREDO. They likewise raised that when GABINO SR.
died, defendant WILFREDO requested GABINO JR. to transfer the
ownership of Lot No. 1253-B in defendant WILFREDOs name for
loaning purposes with the agreement that the land will be returned
when the plaintiffs need the same. They added that, pursuant to the
mentioned agreement, plaintiff GABINO JR., without the knowledge
and consent of his spouse, DOROTHY, executed the Deed of Sale
dated December 7, 1989 in favor of defendant WILFREDO receiving
nothing as payment therefor. They pointed out that after defendant
WILFREDO was able to mortgage the property, plaintiffs demanded
the return of the property but the defendants refused to return the
same. The plaintiffs claimed that the same document is null and void
for want of consideration and the same does not bind the non-
consenting spouse. They likewise prayed that the defendant be
ordered to pay the plaintiffs not less than P100,000.00 as actual and
moral damages, P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and P5,000.00 as
litigation expenses.
On September 21, 1988, [GABINO JR.] paid real estate
taxes on the land he bought from LORETO as per Tax Declaration No.
1038 where the property was specified as Lot No. 1253-B. GABINO
JR. thereafter sold the same lot to Wilfredo Vagilidad (hereafter
WILFREDO) as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989.
On even date, Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land involving
the opt-described property was also executed by LORETO in favor of
WILFREDO. The aforementioned deeds, which were both executed
on December 7, 1989 [and] notarized by Atty. Warloo Cardenal[,]
[appear] to have been given the same entry number in his notarial
books as both contained the designation Document No. 236, Page No.
49, Book No. XI, Series of 1989[.]
Corollarily, on February 14, 1990, the sale of Lot No. 1253-B
to WILFREDO was registered with the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Antique under Entry No. 180425. Consequently, TCT No.
T18023, cancelling TCT No. 16694, was issued in favor of WILFREDO
pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989.
For their part, the defendants, on January 15, 1996, filed their
Answer, denying the material allegations of the plaintiffs. Defendants
claimed that they are the lawful owners of Lot No. 1253-B. They
alleged that LORETO, with conformity of his wife, sold to them Lot No.
1253 on December 7, 1989 for P5,000.00 and the transaction was
registered with the Register of Deeds of the Province of Antique under
Entry No. 180425. They added that, subsequently, TCT No. T18023,
covering Lot No. 1253- B, was issued in favor of the defendants.
Hence, they claimed that the plaintiffs be directed to pay the
defendants damages sustained.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court Of Appeals erred in not
applying the provision of Article 1544 of the new Civil Code and the
doctrine of double sale that the buyer who is in possession of the
torrens title and had the deed of sale registered must prevail.
HELD: No, the Court of Appeals did not erred in applying the provision
of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners title was issued
pursuant to the purported Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land
dated December 7, 1989. Second, WILFREDO did not see any
encumbrance at the back of the title of the subject lot when he
purchased it from LORETO on December 7, 1989. Thus, since he is
not bound to go beyond the certificate of title, he has acquired the
subject property in due course and in good faith.
“We disagree. Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been
sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.”
Petitioners reliance on Article 1544 is misplaced. While title
to the property was issued in WILFREDOs name on February 15,
1990, the following circumstances show that he registered the subject
parcel with evident bad faith.
Co-ownership is the right of common dominion which two or
more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or
physically divided. Before the partition of the property held in common,
no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof.
All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate
share in the entire property.
LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of Lot No. 1253 to
GABINO, JR. Consequently, when LORETO purportedly sold to
WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 the same portion of the lot, he was
no longer the owner of Lot No. 1253- B. Based on the principle that no
one can give what he does not have,26 LORETO could not have
validly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 what he no longer
had. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the sale made by
LORETO in favor of WILFREDO is void as LORETO did not have the
right to transfer the ownership of the subject property at the time of
sale.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANYvs.AYING
G.R. No. 144773 May 16, 2005
FACTS: Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a
cadastral decree in her favor over Lot No. 4399 located in Lapu-Lapu
City.
Crisanta Maloloy-on died, so the Cadastral court issued a decision
directing the issuance of a decree of title in the name of her 8 children,
namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe,
Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying.However, the certificate
was lost during the war.
All the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition
of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the lot in issue
to the Aznar Brothers Realty Company. The deed was registered with
the ROD of Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1994 under Act. No. 3344
(the law governing registration of unregistered land, and since then,
the realty company religiously paid the real property taxes on the
property.
Later, Aznar Brothers Realty Companyfiled a Petition for
Reconstitution of the Original Titlesince the original title of the
lotwas lost during the war. This was granted by the court and the
ROD of Lapu-Lapu was directed to issue a reconstituted title in the
name of the Aying Siblings. Thus, OCT No. RO-2856 was issued.
The Aznar Brothers Realty Company then sent out notices, to vacate
the lot, to the persons occupying the property, reasoning that they
were the rightful owner. The occupants refused to vacate, hence an
ejectment case was filed against them before the MTC. The MTC
ordered the occupants to vacate. Eventually, this case reached the
Supreme Court and a decision was rendered in favor of the realty
company declaring them as the rightful possessor of the land.
Meanwhile, persons claiming to be the descendants of the eight Aying
siblings, numbering around 220 persons submitted an amended
complaint before the RTC and alleged that they are co-owners of the
land being the descendants of the registered owners under OCT No.
RO-2856; that they had been in actual, peaceful, physical, open,
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession in concept of
owner of subject parcel of land since time immemorial; and that the
deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the realty company by
the alleged heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on is a fraud and is null and
void ab initio because not all the co-owners of subject property
affixed their signature on said document and some of the co-
owners who supposedly signed said document had been dead at
the time of the execution thereof; that Aznar Brothers Realty
Company held the land in bad faith, knowing fully well that it did not
have any right to the land and used force, threat and intimidation
against them thus suffering moral damages.
Aznar Brothers Realty Company denied that the Ayings are the lawful
owners of the land and alleged it had been in actual possession of
subject land as owner thereof by virtue of the extra-judicial partition of
real property and deed of absolute sale executed in its favor; that in
fact, it had been paying taxes thereon religiously. The realty company
further alleged that they are barred by prescription to file an action
for recovery of property which should be instituted within 4years
from discovery of the fraud. It took the Aying heirs 27years to file
their action against the realty company.
ISSUE: Is the registration of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate
with Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the lot in issue to the Aznar
Brothers Realty Company with the ROD binding and consequently,
results in the running of the prescriptive period for reconveyance?
Held:No. The sale of registered property, recorded in the ROD, cannot
be considered as registered.
Rationale: Jurisprudence dictates that that registration of instruments
must be done in the proper registry, in order to affect and bind the land
and, thus, operate as constructive notice to the world. In this case,
the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale
was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496,
therefore the document cannot be deemed registered. As
consequence of non-registration, the 10year prescriptive period
cannot be reckoned from the date of registration of the document
under Act. No. 3444 since no constructive notice to the world was
perfected by such registration. The prescriptive period only began to
run from the time the Aying heirs had actual notice of the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale which was not
proven by clear and convincing evidence in this case.
Issue: Is the extra-judicial partition with deed of absolute sale null and
void, as claimed by the Aying Descendants, because not all the co-
owners of subject property affixed their signature on said document
and some of the co-owners who supposedly signed said document
had been dead at the time of the execution thereof?
Held: No. The extra-judicial partition with deed of absolute sale is
VALID but only between the heirs who participated in the execution
thereof. Therefore, the heirs who undisputedly did not participate
therein, cannot be bound by said document.
Issue: Does the realty company’s defense, that they acquired the
entire parcel of land with the mistaken belief that all the heirs have
executed the document, entitle them to ownership over the land by
prescription?
Held: No, Aznar Brothers Realty Company cannot be entitled
ownership over the land based on mistaken belief.
Rationale: The law provides that if property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining itis considered a trustee
of an implied trustfor the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.Based on this rule, a trustee cannot acquire by
prescription ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless
he repudiates the trust. However, in constructive implied trusts,
prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the
relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a condition
precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.
Notes:
1. Who has the burden of proving that prescription has begun to
run?
-Aznar Brothers Realty Company has the burden of proving the
running of prescription because it was the realty company that set up
the defense that of prescription which was denied by the Aying heirs.
2. Does laches apply here?
-No laches will not apply here because the three heirs took action to
protect their interest well within the period prescribed by law.
ACABAL VS ACABAL
G.R. NO. 148376 - MARCH 31, 2005
FACTS: “Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasabas, owned a parcel
of land situated in Barrio Tanglad, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental,
containing an area of 18.15 hectares more or less, described in Tax
Declaration No. 15856. By a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 6,
1971, his parents transferred for P2,000.00 ownership of the said land
to [Villaner Acabal], who was then married to Justiniana Lipajan.” On
April 19, 1990, Villaner executed the deed in question, by which the
lot was transferred to his nephew and godson Leonardo Acabal, who
later sold it to Ramon Nicolas. On October 11, 1993 Villaner filed a
case for annulment of the sale to Leonardo and to Nicolas. Villaner
claimed that he did not know the contents of the deed he signed, which
he claimed was a Deed of Sale (earlier in the proceedings he said it
was a Lease Contract). The RTC dismissed the complaint. Villaner
appealed to the CA, who reversed the RTC and held that the deed in
question was simulated and fictitious. Leonardo and Ramon thus
appealed to the SC on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1) W/N the deed is valid
2) W/N the property in question is conjugal property
HELD/RATIO:
1) YES. The failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an
actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against
it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of
limitations, estoppel, and want of consideration. It is a basic rule in
evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the
allegations. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove it by
competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and
not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. Villaner failed to prove
his allegations for he failed to adduce evidence to support his claims
of simulation and lack of knowledge as to the nature of the deed.
Leonardo’s witness (the drafter of the actual deed) on the other hand
was able to prove that the deed was duly drafted, read and signed by
Villaner.
“Even assuming that the disposition of the property by Villaner was
contrary to law, he would still have no remedy under the law as he and
Leonardo were in pari delicto, hence, he is not entitled to afirmative
relief – one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean
hands. In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.”
2) YES. The issue arose when Villaner’s co-heirs denied the validity
of the transfer as to their shares because they did not consent to such
transfer. Art. 160 of the Civil Code gives rise to a presumption that
properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal. In this case it
was clear that Villaner was married when he acquired the land. A tax
declaration or “[r]egistration of the properties in the name of the
husband does not destroy the conjugal nature of the properties. What
is material is the time when the land was acquired by Villaner, and that
was during the lawful existence of his marriage to Justiniana”. Upon
his wife’s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved and Villaner
became entitled to a ½ undivided share. The other share accrued to
Justiniana’s heirs: Villaner and their 8 children. They are now the co-
owners of the lot in question. “With respect to Justiniana’s one-half
share in the conjugal partnership which her heirs inherited, applying
the provisions on the law of succession, her eight children and Villaner
each receives one-ninth (1/9) thereof. Having inherited one-ninth (1/9)
of his wife’s share in the conjugal partnership or one eighteenth (1/18)
of the entire conjugal partnership and is himself already the owner of
one half (1/2) or nine-eighteenths (9/18), Villaner’s total interest
amounts to ten-eighteenths (10/18) or five-ninths (5/9). While Villaner
owns five-ninths (5/9) of the disputed property, he could not claim title
to any definite portion of the community property until its actual
partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to partition, all that he
has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the property.
Villaner, however, as a co-owner of the property has the right to sell
his undivided share thereof”, by virtue of NCC 493; but such sale will
only be valid as to the portion pertaining to Villaner. In effect, the
buyer becomes a co-owner of the property. “The proper action in
cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or the
recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the
third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who
alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property
as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners
who possessed and administered it.” The proper action is partition
under Rule 69. The rule in Cruz v. Leis, which held that “[w]here a
parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed properties of the
dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a
purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title
thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser
acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the
deceased spouse” does not apply because the land subject of that
case was unregistered. “The issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer
is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land but
not where the property is an unregistered land.”
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court
of Appeals February 15, 2001 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 56148 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is rendered declaring the
sale in favor of petitioner Leonardo Acabal and the subsequent sale in
favor of petitioner Ramon Nicolas valid but only insofar as five-ninths
(5/9) of the subject property is concerned. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Intestate of San Pedro v CA (265 SCRA 733)
FACTS: The case involves two petitions which were consolidated by
the court in its decision.
1. GR 103727
Engracio San Pedro, as heir-judicial administrator of Plaintiff Intestate,
filed a complaint for recovery of real property/ reconveyance with
damages and prayer for preliminary injunction against private
defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz.
San Pedro alleged that defendants acquired portion of the subject
estate by employing fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation.
RTC of QC dismissed the complaint saying that the defendants are
already the registered owners covered by the Torrens Title - which
cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish Title of San Pedro. The
Spanish Title also stated that the estate shall be excluded from the
coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. The court ordered Plaintiff
Intestate to pay each defendant the amount of 5,000 and atty fees.
Motion for Recon was denied. Petitioner filed an appeal, CA
dismissed.
2. GR 106496
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito filed a petition for letter of
administration over the intestate to be appointed as administrator and
co-administrator. Judge Echeverri appointed San Pedro as
administrator and the court issued letter of administration in his favor
upon posting a bond of 10,000.
Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for intervention and
opposition to the petition, claiming that the Titulo de Propriedad is
inadmissible and ineffective proof of ownership in court and it is
invalid.
Republic filed a motion to suspend the proceedings but the Republic‘s
opposition to the petition for letter of administration was dismissed.
Republic filed Motion for Recon.
The Judge declared Titulo de Propriedad as null and void and
excluded all lands covered from the inventory of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro.
Petitioner-heirs appealed to CA. CA dismissed.

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of
the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136?

2. Whether or not the lower court committed error in excluding from

the inventory of the estate all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 on the ground that it is null and void?

RATIO:

1.NO. It is within the jurisdiction of the lower court functioning as

probate court. The jurisdiction of the Probate Court is not limited to the
determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them.
Their main function is to settle and liquidate the estate of the deceased
so as to rule on whether the inventory of the estate properly included
them for distribution of the net assets estate to lawful heirs.

2.NO. The lower court did not commit any error when it declared Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all
lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate.

Under PD 892, the system of registration under Spanish Mortgage

Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish Titles should cause their
lands to be registered under Land Registration Act within 6 months
from date of effectivity or until August 16, 1976.

In both cases, petitioner-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that

Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 was brought under the operation of PD
892. There was no certificate of title shown.

Also, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under PD 892, is inadmissible

and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in special
proceedings case. Since the Titulo was not registered under Land
Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered title of
defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz. Torrens title of the latter
enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity.

Petitioner-heirs failed to present neither the original Titulo nor a

genuine copy thereof (only an alleged illegible copy was presented).
Even the secondary evidence presented was also not admissible.

RULING: The Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and no rights can
be derived therefrom. All lands covered by said Titulo are excluded
from inventory of the estate. The petition for letter of administration
closed and terminated. The heirs are disallowed to exercise any act of
possession or ownership and ordered to vacate.