JULY 22, 2019 2. ZABAL vs. DUTERTE, G.R. No. 238467, Feb.
12, 2019
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
1. Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,
2018
Facts:
OSG tries to oust Chief Justice Sereno through a
petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto. During the deliberations for Chief Justices in
2012, The Executive Officer informed the JBC that
Serreno had not submitted her SALNs for a period of ten
(10) years, that is, from 1986 to 2006. She was later on
appointed by President Aquino. 5 years after her
appointment an impeachment case was filed against her.
During the hearings it was revealed that respondent
purportedly failed to file her SALNs when she was a
member of the UP College of Law, and only filed her SALN
for the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. The hearing spawned
two actions, one of these actions was a request to the
OSG to initiate quo warranto proceedings against
Sereno.
Issue: Is the Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction
over a quo warranto petition violative of the doctrine
of separation of powers?
Ruling:
No, the argument that impeachment cases
should be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate
and therefore the proceedings are violative of the
separation of powers holds no merit. Impeachment and
quo warranto are two different concepts. Impeachment
concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue
exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves
matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the
position to begin with. An action for quo warranto does
not try the person's culpability of an impeachment
offense, neither does writ of quo warranto conclusively
pronounce such culpability.
FACTS: Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool,
President Duterte first made public his plan to shut it
down during a business forum held in Davao sometime
February 2018. This was followed by several speeches
and news releases stating that he would place Boracay
under a state of calamity. True to his words, President
Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a
cabinet meeting held on April 4, 2018.
Following this pronouncement, petitioners contend that
around 630 police and military personnel were readily
deployed to Boracay including personnel for crowd
dispersal management. They also allege that the DILG
had already released guidelines for the closure.
Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's
closure came about, fewer tourists had been engaging
the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their
earnings were barely enough to feed their families. They
fear that if the closure pushes through, they would suffer
grave and irreparable damage.
ISSUE: If it was a police power measure, did the President
usurp legislative power by temporarily closing Boracay
through Proclamation No. 475?
RULING: NO. Since Proclamation No. 475 does not
actually impose a restriction on the right to travel, its
issuance did not result to any substantial alteration of
the relationship between the State and the people. The
proclamation is therefore not a law and conversely, the
President did not usurp the law-making power of the
legislature.
3. CoTesCUP vs. Sec. of Education, G.R. No. 216930, etc.,
Oct. 09, 2018
FACTS: Claiming that the K to 12 Basic Education Program
violates various constitutional provisions, petitions were
filed before the Court praying that the Kindergarten
Education Act, K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31, Joint
Guidelines, and CMO No. 20, be declared
unconstitutional. The consolidated petitions pray for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the
implementation of the K to 12 Law and other
administrative issuances in relation thereto.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the public
respondents, opposed these petitions. On April 21,
2015, the Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 217451,
enjoining the implementation of CMO No. 20 insofar only
as it excluded from the curriculum for college the course
Filipino and Panitikan as core courses.However, in G.R.
Nos. 216930, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218923 and
218465, the Court denied petitioners' prayer for issuance
of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on the
implementation of the K to 12 Law, its implementing
rules, the Kindergarten Education Act, and other
administrative issuances in relation thereto, for lack of
merit.
ISSUE: Is there undue delegation of legislative power in
the enactment of the K to 12 Law?
RULING: No, there is no undue delegation of legislative
power in the enactment of the K to 12 Law. In
determining whether or not a statute constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate,
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate must be set forth therein. The sufficient
standard test, on the other hand, mandates adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate's
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify
the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
The K to 12 Law adequately provides the
legislative policy that it seeks to implement. Moreover,
scattered throughout the K to 12 Law are the standards
to guide the DepEd, CHED and TESDA in carrying out the
provisions of the law, from the development of the K to
12 BEC, to the hiring and training of teaching personnel
and to the formulation of appropriate strategies in order
to address the changes during the transition period.
Hence, under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and
appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all essential
terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters
on the power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and TESDA.
4. Trillanes vs. Judge Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451,
March 14, 2018
FACTS: The Petitioner Senator Antonio Trillanes filed
Proposed Senate Resolution No. 826 (P.S. Resolution No.
826) directing the Senate's Committee on Accountability
of Public Officials and Investigations to investigate, in aid
of legislation, the alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of
the new 11-storey Makati City Hall II Parking Building, the
reported overpricing of the 22-storey Makati City Hall
Building at the average cost of P240,000.00 per square
meter, and related anomalies purportedly committed by
former and local government officials.
Petitioner alleged that at the October 8, 2014
Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-Committee (SBRS) hearing on
P.S. Resolution No. 826, former Makati Vice Mayor
Ernesto Mercado (Mercado) testified on how he helped
former Vice President Jejomar Binay (VP Binay) acquire
and expand what is now a 350-hectare estate in
Barangay Rosario, Batangas, which has been referred to
as the Hacienda Binay.
The petitioner averred that private respondent
thereafter claimed “absolute ownership” of the estate.
Furthermore, he further asserted that private
respondent testified before the SBRS on the so-called
Hacienda Binay on October 22 and 30, 2014.
Petitioner admitted that during media
interviews at the Senate, particularly during gaps and
breaks in the plenary hearings as well as committee
hearings, and in reply to the media's request to respond
to private respondent's claim over the estate, he
expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of
the documents, private respondent appears to be a
"front" or "nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of the
actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay.
On October 22, 2014, private respondent filed a
Complaint for Damages against petitioner for the latter's
alleged defamatory statements before the media from
October 8 to 14, 2014, specifically his repeated
accusations that private respondent is a mere "dummy"
of VP Binay. Private respondent alleged that he is a
legitimate businessman and his reputation was severely
tarnished as shown by the steep drop in the stock prices
of his publicly listed companies. He averred that
petitioner’s accusations were defamatory, as they
dishonored and discredited him, and malicious as they
were intended to elicit bias and prejudice his reputation.
He sought to recover P4 Million as moral damages,
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
in the amount of P500,000.00.
In petitioner Trillanes’ Answer with Motion to Dismiss, he
raised the following Special and Affirmative Defenses: (1)
that private respondent failed to state and substantiate
his cause of action since petitioner's statement that
private respondent was acting as a "front," "nominee" or
"dummy" of VP Binay for his Hacienda Binay is a
statement of fact; (2) petitioner posited that his
statements were part of an ongoing public debate on a
matter of public concern. For these reason, he argued
that his statements are protected by his constitutionally
guaranteed rights to free speech and freedom of
expression and of the press; and (3) his statements,
having been made in the course of the performance of
his duties as a Senator, are covered by his parliamentary
immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: Are the statements of Trillanes been made in the
course of the performance of his duties as a Senator and,
thus, are covered by his parliamentary immunity?
RULING: No. Petitioner's statements in media interviews
are not covered by the parliamentary speech or debate"
privilege.
Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned
statements, describing private respondent as former VP
Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-
called Hacienda Binay, in response to media interviews
during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee
hearings in the Senate. With Jimenez as our guidepost, it
is evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the
privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly
not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of
its committees. They were also not spoken in the course
of any debate in said fora. It cannot likewise be
successfully contended that they were made in the
official discharge or performance of petitioner's duties as
a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to
the legislative process.
It is, thus, clear that parliamentary non-accountability
cannot be invoked when the lawmaker's speech or
utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates
in Congress, extraneous to the "due functioning of the
(legislative) process."49 To participate in or respond to
media interviews is not an official function of any
lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it
a component of the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a
lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and
legislate without having to communicate with the press.
A lawmaker's participation in media interviews is not a
legislative act, but is "political in nature,"50 outside the
ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or
Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution. Contrary to
petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot invoke
parliamentary immunity to cause the dismissal of private
respondent's Complaint. The privilege arises not because
the statement is made by a lawmaker, but because it is
uttered in furtherance of legislation.
5. Lagman vs. Pimentel, etc., G.R. No. 235935, Feb. 6,
2018
FACTS:Petitioners question the manner that the
Congress approved the extension of martial law in
Mindanao and characterized the same as done with
undue haste. Petitioners premised their argument on the
fact that the Joint Rules adopted by both Houses, in
regard to the President's request for further extension,
provided for an inordinately short period for
interpellation of resource persons and for explanation by
each Member after the voting is concluded.
The assailed provisions refer to Section 7 of Rule V and
Section 14 of Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Session of
Congress on the Call of the President to Further Extend
the Period of Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017,
which provide:
Rule V (CONSIDERATION OF THE LETTER OF
THE PRESIDENT DATED DECEMBER 9, 2017
CALLING UPON THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO FURTHER EXTEND THE
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF
MINDANAO FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR,
FROM 01 JANUARY 2018 TO 31 DECEMBER
2018, OR FOR SUCH OTHER PERIOD OF TIME
AS THE CONGRESS MAY DETERMINE, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION)
Section 7. Any Member of
the Congress may
interpellate the resource
persons for not more than
three minutes excluding
the time of the answer of
the resource persons.
xxxx
Rule VIII (VOTING ON THE MOTION TO
FURTHER EXTEND THE PERIOD OF THE
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS)
Section 14. After the conclusion of voting, the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House shall
forthwith announce the results of the voting.
Thereafter, any Member of the Congress who wishes
to explain his/her vote may consume a maximum of
one (1) minute: Provided, that a Member who does
not want to explain may yield his/her allotted time to
another Member of the same House: Provided,
further, that any Member of the Congress shall be
allowed a maximum of three (3) minutes.
ISSUE: Is the manner in which Congress deliberated on
the President’s request for extension subject to judicial
review?
RULING: NO. This freedom from judicial interference was
explained in the 1997 case of Arroyo v. De
Venecia,1wherein the Court declared that:But the cases,
both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to Inquire into allegations
that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the
rights of private individuals.
In other words, the Court cannot review the rules
promulgated by Congress in the absence of any
constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that
the above-quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any
provision or right under the Constitution.
The rules in question do not pertain to quorum, voting or
publication. Furthermore, deliberations on extending
martial law certainly cannot be equated to the
consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The
Congress may consider such matter as urgent as to
necessitate swift action, or it may take its time
investigating the factual situation. This Court cannot
engage in undue speculation that members of Congress
did not review and study the President's request based
on a bare allegation that the time allotted for
deliberation was too short.
6. Reyes vs. HRET, G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018
FACTS: Reyes alleges that she has two pending quo
warranto cases before the HRET. They are (1) Case No.
13-036 (Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac
v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes) and (2) Case No. 130037 (Eric
D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes). On 1 November
2015, the HRET published the 2015 Revised Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (2015 HRET
Rules). One, Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides:
Rule 6.
Meetings; Quorum; Executive Committee
Actions on Matters in Between Regular Meetings
. - (a) The Tribunal shall meet on such days and
hours as it may designate or at the call of the
Chairperson or of a majority of its Members. The
presence of at least one (1) Justice and four (4)
Members of the Tribunal shall be necessary to
constitute a quorum. In the absence of the
Chairperson, the next Senior Justice shall
preside, and in the absence of both, the Justice
present shall take the Chair. (b) In the absence of
a quorum and provided there is at least one
 Justice in attendance, the Members present,
who shall not be less than three (3), may
constitute themselves as an Executive
Committee to act on the agenda for the meeting
concerned, provided, however, that its action
shall be subject to confirmation by the Tribunal
at any subsequent meeting where a quorum is
present. (c) In between the regular meetings of
the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or any three (3) of
its Members, provided at least one (1) of them is
a Justice, who may sit as the Executive
Committee, may act on the following matters
requiring immediate action by the Tribunal: 1.
Any pleading or motion, (a) Where delay in its
resolution may result in irreparable or
substantial damage or injury to the rights of a
party or cause delay in the proceedings or action
concerned; (b) Which is urgent in character but
does not substantially affect the rights of the
adverse party, such as one for extension of time
to comply with an order/resolution of the
Tribunal, or to file a pleading which is not a
prohibited pleading and is within the discretion
of the Tribunal to grant; and (c) Where the
Tribunal would require a comment, reply,
rejoinder or any other similar pleading from any
of the parties or their attorneys; 2.
Administrative matters which do not involve
new applications or allocations of the
appropriations of the Tribunal; and 3. Such other
matters as may be delegated by the Tribunal.
However, any such action/resolution shall be
included in the order of business of the
immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal
for its confirmation.
Reyes alleges that the requirement under Rule 6 of the
2015 HRET Rules that at least one Justice should be
present to constitute a quorum violates the equal
protection clause of the 1987 Constitution and gives
undue power to the Justices over the legislators. Two,
Rule 69 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides:
Rule 69.
Votes Required
. - In resolving all questions submitted to the
Tribunal, all the Members present, inclusive of
the Chairperson, shall vote. Except as provided in
Rule 5(b) of these Rules, the concurrence of at
least five (5) Members shall be necessary for the
rendition of decisions and the adoption of formal
resolutions, provided that, in cases where a
Member inhibits or cannot take part in the
deliberations, a majority vote of the remaining
Members shall be sufficient. This is without
prejudice to the authority of the Supreme Court
or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, to designate Special Member or Members
who should act as temporary replacement or
replacements in cases where one or some of the
Members of the Tribunal inhibits from a case or
is disqualified from participating in the
deliberations of a particular election contest,
provided that: (1) The option herein provided
should be resorted [to] only when the required
quorum in order for the Tribunal to proceed with
the hearing of the election contest, or in making
the final determination of the case, or in arriving
at decisions or resolutions thereof, cannot be
met; and (2) Unless otherwise provided, the
designation of the Special Member as
replacement shall only be temporary and limited
only to the specific case where the inhibition or
disqualification was made.
Reyes likewise questions Rule 6 in relation to Rule 69 of
the 2015 HRET Rules for being ambiguous, questionable,
and undemocratic. Rules 15 and 17 of the 2015 HRET
Rules provide:
Rule 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of
the House of Representatives. To be considered
a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper
oath; and (3) assumption of office. Rule 17.
Election Protest. - A verified election protest
contesting the election or returns of any
Member of the House of Representatives shall
 be filed by any candidate who had duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for
the same office, within fifteen (15) days from
June 30 of the election year or the date of actual
assumption of office, whichever is later. x x x x
Reyes alleges that the HRET unduly expanded the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Reyes states that Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives. According to Reyes, Rule
15 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides for the requisites to
be considered a member of the House of
Representatives, as follows: (1) a valid proclamation; (2)
a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. In addition
to these requisites, Rule 17 fixed the time for the filing of
an election protest within 15 days from June 30 of the
election year or the date of actual assumption of office,
whichever is later. Reyes alleges that these Rules will
allow the COMELEC to assume jurisdiction between the
time of the election and within 15 days from June 30 of
the election year or the date of actual assumption of
office, whichever is later. Further, the requirements of a
valid proclamation and a proper oath will allow the
COMELEC to look into these matters until there is an
actual assumption of office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules,
which requires the presence of at least one Justice in
order to constitute a quorum, is unconstitutional?
RULING: No. Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires
the presence of at least one Justice and four members of
the Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This means that
even when all the Justices are present, at least two
members of the House of Representatives need to be
present to constitute a quorum. Without this rule, it
would be possible for five members of the House of
Representatives to convene and have a quorum even
when no Justice is present. This would render ineffective
the rationale contemplated by the framers of the 1935
and 1987 Constitutions for placing the Justices as
members of the HRET.
Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not make
the Justices indispensable members to
constitute a quorum but ensures that
representatives from both the Judicial and
Legislative departments are present to
constitute a quorum. Members from both the
Judicial and Legislative departments become
indispensable to constitute a quorum. The
situation cited by petitioner, that it is possible for
all the Justice-members to exercise denial or
veto power over the proceedings simply by
absenting themselves, is speculative. As pointed
out by the HRET, this allegation also ascribes bad
faith, without any basis, on the part of the
Justices.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 15, paragraph 2, in relation
to Rule 17 of the 2015 HRET Rules is unconstitutional for
unduly expanding the jurisdiction of the COMELEC?
RULING: NO NEED TO RESOLVE. The Court takes judicial
notice that in its Resolution No. 16, Series of 2018, dated
20 September 2018, the HRET amended Rules 17 and 18
of the 2015 HRET Rules. As amended, Rules 17 and 18
now read:
RULE 17.
Election Protest. - A verified protest contesting
the election or returns of any Member of the
House of Representatives shall be filed by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same
office within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the
election year, if the winning candidate was
proclaimed on or before said date.
Xxx
RULE 18.
Quo Warranto. - A verified petition for quo
warranto on the ground of ineligibility
may be filed by any registered voter of
the congressional district concerned, or
any registered voter in the case of
party--list representatives, within fifteen
(15) days from June 30 of the election
 year, if the winning candidate was
proclaimed on or before said date.
However, if the winning candidate was
proclaimed after June 30 of the election
year, a verified petition for quo warranto
shall be filed within fifteen (15) days
from the date of proclamation. The party
filing the petition shall be designated as
the petitioner, while the adverse party
shall be known as the respondent.
However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed after
June 30 of the election year, a verified election protest
shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of
proclamation.
The recent amendments, which were published in The
Philippine Star on 26 September 2018 and took effect on
11 October 2018, clarified and removed any doubt as to
the reckoning date for the filing of an election protest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 6, in relation to Rule 69 of
the 2015 HRET Rules is unconstitutional for being
ambiguous, questionable, and undemocratic?
RULING: NO. The ambiguity referred to by Reyes is
absurd and stems from an erroneous understanding of
the Rules. As pointed out by the HRET in its Comment, a
member of the Tribunal who inhibits or is disqualified
from participating in the deliberations cannot be
considered present for the purpose of having a quorum.
In addition, Rule 69 clearly shows that the Supreme Court
and the House of Representatives have the authority to
designate a Special Member or Members who could act
as temporary replacement or replacements in cases
where one or some of the Members of the Tribunal
inhibit from a case or are disqualified from participating
in the deliberations of a particular election contest when
the required quorum cannot be met. There is no basis to
Reyes's claim that a member who inhibits or otherwise
disqualified can sit in the deliberations to achieve the
required quorum.
7. Balag vs. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608,
July 03, 2018
FACTS:
On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III
(Horacio III), a first year law student of the University of
Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing conducted
by the Aegis Juris Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same
university. SR No. 504, was filed by Senator Zubiri
condemning the death of Horacio III and directing the
appropriate Senate Committee to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, to hold those
responsible accountable.
The Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous
Drugs chaired by Senator Lacson together with the
Committees on Justice and Human Rights and
Constitutional Amendment and Revision of Codes,
invited petitioner and several other persons to the Joint
Public Hearing. Petitioner, however, did not attend.
Senator Lacson as Chairman issued another Subpoena Ad
Testificandum addressed to petitioner directing him to
appear before the committee on October 18, 2017 and
to testify as to the subject matter under inquiry. On said
date, petitioner attended the senate hearing.
In the course of the proceedings, at around 11:29 in the
morning, Senator Grace Poe (Senator Poe) asked
petitioner if he was the president of AJ Fraternity but he
refused to answer the question and invoked his right
against self-incrimination. Senator Poe repeated the
question but he still refused to answer. Senator Lacson
then reminded him to answer the question because it
was a very simple question, otherwise, he could be cited
in contempt. Senator Poe manifested that petitioner's
signature appeared on the application for recognition of
the AJ Fraternity and on the organizational sheet,
indicating that he was the president. Petitioner, again,
invoked his right against self-incrimination. Senator Poe
then moved to cite him in contempt, which was
seconded by Senator Villanueva and Zubiri. Senate
Sergeant-at-arms was ordered to place petitioner in
detention after the committee hearing.
A few minutes later, at around 12:09 in the afternoon,
Senators Lacson and Poe gave petitioner another chance
to purge himself of the contempt charge. Again, he was
asked the same question twice and each time he refused
to answer.
Thereafter, around 1:19 in the afternoon, Senator
Villanueva inquired from petitioner whether he knew
whose decision it was to bring Horacio III to the Chinese
General Hospital instead of the UST Hospital. Petitioner
apologized for his earlier statement and moved for the
lifting of his contempt. He admitted that he was a
member of the AJ Fraternity but he was not aware as to
who its president was because, at that time, he was
enrolled in another school.
Senator Villanueva repeated his question to petitioner
but the latter, again, invoked his right against self-
incrimination. Petitioner reiterated his plea that the
contempt order be lifted because he had already
answered the question regarding his membership in the
AJ Fraternity. Senator Villanueva replied that petitioner's
contempt would remain. Senator Lacson added that he
had numerous opportunities to answer the questions of
the committee but he refused to do so. Thus, petitioner
was placed under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-
arms.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner prays for the issuance of TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction because the Senate illegally
enforced and executed SR No. 504 and the Contempt
Order, which caused him grave and irreparable injury as
he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
He contends that respondents did not exercise their
power of contempt judiciously and with restraint.
ISSUE: Being a continuing body, can the Senate
indefinitely detain a person held in contempt in
connection with its investigation in aid of legislation?
RULING: NO. (see underlined portions)
The period of detention under the Senate's inherent
power of contempt is not indefinite.
The Court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place
a limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be
imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of
contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation. Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution states that Congress, in
conducting inquiries in aid of legislation, must respect
the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein…
The constitutional right to liberty that every citizen
enjoys certainly cannot be respected when they are
detained for an indefinite period of time without due
process of law.
Thus, the Court must strike a balance between the
interest of the Senate and the rights of persons cited in
contempt during legislative inquiries. The Court finds
that the period of imprisonment under the inherent
power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid
of legislation should only last until the termination of
the legislative inquiry under which the said power is
invoked.
Moreover, the apprehension – that the Senate will be
prevented from effectively conducting legislative
hearings during recess – shall be duly addressed because
it is expressly provided that the Senate may still exercise
its power of contempt during legislative hearings while
on recess provided that the period of imprisonment shall
only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry,
specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the
Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of
contempt is still potent and compelling even during its
recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons
appearing are respected because their detention shall
not be indefinite.
In addition, if the Congress decides to extend the period
of imprisonment for the contempt committed by a
witness beyond the duration of the legislative inquiry,
then it may file a criminal case under the existing statute
or enact a new law to increase the definite period of
imprisonment.
8. Agcaoili vs. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 03, 2018
FACTS:
The House Rules railroaded to initiate the inquiry.
Referral of House Resolution No. 882 from the
Committee on Rules to the Committee on Good
Government and the scheduling for hearing on 02 May
2017 all took place on 16March 2017, without the
conduct of preliminary determination before the
Committee on Rules (for determination of whether it is
the proper subject of legislative inquiry) and before the
respondent Committee on Good Government (for
determination of jurisdiction over the subject matter).
The subpoena ad testificandum for petitioners Ilocos 6 to
appear at the hearing scheduled on 16 May 2017 were
only served on them on 15 May 2017 - one (1) day prior
to the scheduled hearing, instead of at least three (3)
days as required under Section 8 of the House Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
Despite lack of sufficient notice, the Committee of Good
Government and Public Accountability cited petitioners
Ilocos6 in contempt for failure to appear at the 16 May
2017 hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject legislative inquiry on House
Resolution No. 882 may be enjoined by a writ of
prohibition?
RULING:
NO, Under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the remedy
of prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, but while there is no question that a writ of
prohibition lies against legislative functions, the Court
finds no justification for the issuance thereof in the
instant case.
In this case, co-petitioner Marcos primordially assails the
nature of the legislative inquiry as a fishing expedition in
alleged violation of her right to due process and to be
discriminatory to the Province of Ilocos Norte. However,
a perusal of the minutes of legislative hearings so far
conducted reveals that the same revolved around the
use of the Province of Ilocos Norte's shares from the
excise tax on locally manufactured virginia-type
cigarettes through cash advances which co-petitioner
Marcos herself admits to be the "usual practice" and was
actually allowed by the Commission on Audit (COA). In
fact, the cause of petitioners' detention was not the
perceived or gathered illegal use of such shares but the
rather unusual inability of petitioners to recall the
transactions despite the same having involved
considerable sums of money.
Like so, co-petitioner Marcos' plea for the prevention of
the legislative inquiry was anchored on her apprehension
that she, too, will be arrested and detained by House
Committee. However, such remains to be an
apprehension which does not give cause for the issuance
of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition.
9. Araulo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, Feb. 03, 2015
[MR]
FACTS: On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy
Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in
the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some
Senators, including himself, had been allotted an
additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for
voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation,
Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a
public statement entitled Abad: Releases to
Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program,
explaining that the funds released to the
Senators had been part of the DAP, a program
designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to
accelerate economic expansion.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website
that the DAP releases had been sourced from
savings generated by the Government, and from
unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had
been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased
and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments also for slow-moving programs and
projects that had been earlier released to the
agencies of the National Government.
The petitioners brought to the Court’s attention
NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency
Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated
Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that
 NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the
DAP, directed the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government
agencies and offices with low levels of
obligations, both for continuing and current
allotments.
ISSUE: Does the prohibition against cross-border
transfer apply to appropriation and not to
savings?
RULING: Yes. Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution prohibits only the transfer of
appropriation, not savings. The said section
allows the President to approve the use of any
savings in the regular appropriations authorized
in the GAA for programs and projects of any
department, office or agency to cover a deficit in
any other item of the regular appropriations. As
such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section
25(5) because the latter expressly limits the
authority of the President to augment an item in
the GAA to only those in his own Department out
of the savings in other items of his own
Department’s appropriations. Accordingly,
Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to
justify cross-border transfers under the DAP.
Augmentations under the DAP which are made
by the Executive within its department shall,
however, remain valid so long as the requisites
under Section 25(5) are complied with. The
Court stood by its previous pronouncement
10. Dela Cruz vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 219683, Jan. 23, 2018
Facts:
This case was preceded by the ruling in Jacomille
v. Abaya, which involved the procurement for the
MVPSP. On May 19, 2014, Reynaldo M. Jacomille
(Jacomille) filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the legality of the procurement
under the MVPSP. He insisted therein that the MVPSP
contract was void for lack of adequate budgetary
appropriations in the General Appropriations Act of 2013
(2013 GAA) as well as for the failure of the procuring
entity to obtain the required Multi-Year Obligational
Authority (MYOA) from the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM).
In the decision promulgated on April 22, 2015, the Court
dismissed Jacomille's petition for having been rendered
moot and academic by the passage of the 2014 GAA that
already included the full appropriation necessary to fund
the MVPSP.
On September 1, 2015, the petitioners instituted
this special civil action. Initially, the Court consolidated
this case with G.R. No. 212381 (Jacomille). However, the
cases were deconsolidated and treated separately
because G.R. No. 212381 raised legal issues centering on
the procurement of the MVPSP but this case raised issues
referring to the implementation of the MVPSP.
Issue: Whether or not the use of the appropriation under
2014 GAA for the implementation of the MVPSP was
constitutional or did it involve an unconstitutional
transfer of funds?
Ruling: The Court affirms that there was an
appropriation for the MVPSP under the 2014 GAA; and
that the use of such appropriation for the
implementation of the MVPSP was constitutional.
On the use of the appropriation under 2014
GAA:
Jacomille v. Abaya, is stare decisis in this case, in
that case the court concluded that MVPSP did not follow
the timelines provided in Sec. 37 of R.A. No. 9184. As
earlier recited, the project did not have the adequate
appropriation when its procurement was commenced on
February 20, 2013, contrary to the provisions of Sections
5a, 7 and 20 of R.A. No. 9184. The DOTC and the LTO
likewise failed to secure the MYOA before the start of the
procurement process even though MVPSP is MYP
involving MYC. All these irregularities tainted the earlier
procurement process and rendered it null and void.
At the outset, however, the Court has stated that
the present petition has been rendered moot and
academic by the appropriation for the full amount of the
project fund in GAA 2014. Said appropriation "cured"
whatever defect the process had.
Further, even if G.R. No. 212381 (Jacomille)
focused on the legality of the procurement of the
MVPSP because of the inadequacy of the funding for
the project under the 2013 GAA, the Court nonetheless
determined and declared therein that the 2014 GAA
contained an appropriation for the MVPSP, and held
that the MVPSP could be validly implemented using the
funds appropriated under the 2014 GAA. With G.R. No.
212381 (Jacomille) having thus fully examined and
definitively ruled upon the existence of sufficient
funding for the MVPSP, both for procurement and
implementation, the pronouncement therein on the
applicability of the appropriation under the 2104 GAA
for the MVPSP - a question of law – now constituted
stare decisis that precluded further contention on the
same matter.
On whether there involves an unconstitutional transfer
of funds:
Under the circumstances, there was no
unconstitutional transfer of funds because no transfer
of funds was made to augment the item Motor Vehicle
Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services
to include the funding for the MVPSP.
The Court holds that the appropriation for
motor vehicle registration naturally and logically
included plate-making inasmuch as plate-making was
an integral component of the registration process.
Plate-making ensured that the LTO fulfilled its function
to "aid law enforcement and improve the motor vehicle
registration database.”
That Congress approved the request for the
₱2,489,600,100.00 increase was indubitable. This is
borne out by the fact that the final amount appropriated
for MF02 under the 2014 GAA aggregated to
₱4,843,753,000.00 (i.e.,₱2,489,600,
100.00+₱2,354,153,000.00). We can see that such final
increased amount was almost exactly identical to the
total appearing in Details of the FY 2014 Budget. Indeed,
the legislative intent to fund the MVPSP under the 2014
GAA was manifest.
Considering that Congress appropriated ₱4,843,
753,000.00 for the MF02 (inclusive of the requested
increase of ₱2,489,600,100.00) for the purpose of
funding the LTO's MVPSP, the inescapable conclusion is
that the 2014 GAA itself contained the direct
appropriation necessary to implement the MVPSP.
JULY 24, 2019
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
1. Lagman vs. Pimentel, G.R. No. 235935, Feb. 6,
2018
FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state
of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period
not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion
mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG).
On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to the Senate and the House of
Representatives his written Report, citing the events
and reasons that impelled him to issue Proclamation
No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S.
Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives
issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full
support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to
revoke the same.
Three separate petitions were subsequently filed
before the Court, challenging the sufficiency of the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. In a Decision
rendered on July 4, 2017, the Court found sufficient
factual bases for the Proclamation and declared it
constitutional.
On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress
to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a
Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending
Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.
ISSUE: Can the President be named respondent in this
sui generis proceedings challenging his declaration of
martial law?
RULING: No.
Presidential privilege of immunity from suit is a well-
settled doctrine in our jurisprudence. The President
may not be sued during his tenure or actual
incumbency, and there is no need to expressly grant
such privilege in the Constitution or law. This privilege
stems from the recognition of the President's vast and
significant functions which can be disrupted by court
litigations. As the Court explained in Rubrico v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.:
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it
is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties
and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge
of the many great and important duties imposed upon
him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government.
Accordingly, in David, the Court ruled that it was
improper to implead former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo in the petitions assailing the
constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017,
where she declared a state of national emergency, and
General Order No. 5, where she called upon the AFP
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the
country.
Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an
express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
S.J., observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued
during his or her tenure. The President is granted the
privilege of immunity from suit to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that the position
of Chief Executive of the Government requires all of the
office-holder's time and demands undivided attention
to his duties as Head of State.
2. Zabal vs. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12,
2019
FACTS: Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool,
President Duterte first made public his plan to shut it
down during a business forum held in Davao sometime
February 2018.This was followed by several speeches
and news releases stating that he would place Boracay
under a state of calamity. True to his words, President
Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a
cabinet meeting held on April 4, 2018.
Justifying their resort to prohibition and mandamus,
petitioners assert that this case presents constitutional
issues, i.e., whether President Duterte acted within the
scope of the powers granted him by the Constitution in
ordering the closure of Boracay and, whether the
measures implemented infringe upon the constitutional
rights to travel and to due process of petitioners as well
as of tourists and non-residents of the island.
ISSUE: Can the President be named respondent for
issuing Proclamation No. 475 declaring a state of
calamity in Boracay and ordering its closure for six
months?
RULING: NO. President Duterte is dropped as
respondent in this case. As correctly pointed out by
respondents, President Duterte must be dropped as
respondent in this case. The Court's pronouncement in
Professor David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo on the
non-suability of an incumbent President cannot be any
clearer, viz.:
x x x Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and
there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of
the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable
him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything
which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of
the many great and important duties imposed
upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs
the operation of the Government.
3. PSALM vs. CIR, G.R. No. 198146, Aug. 8, 2017
FACTS: Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM) is a government-owned and
controlled corporation who conducted public biddings
for the privatization of two (2) of their plants,
Pantabangan-Masiway Plant and Magat Plant. First Gen
Hydropower Corporation with its $129 Million bid and SN
Aboitiz Power Corporation with its $530 Million bid were
the winning bidders for the two plants, respectively.
Thereafter, the NPC received a letter from the BIR
demanding immediate payment of P3,813,080,4726
deficiency value-added tax (VAT) for the sale of the
plants. Subsequently, PSALM remitted under protest to
the BIR the amount representing the total basic VAT due.
PSALM then filed with the DOJ a petition for the
adjudication of the dispute with the BIR to resolve the
issue of whether the sale of the power plants should be
subject to VAT, to which the DOJ ruled in favor of PSALM.
BIR then moved for reconsideration, alleging that the
DOJ had no jurisdiction since the dispute involved tax
laws administered by the BIR and therefore within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Hence, the
current petition.
ISSUE #1: Does the Secretary of Justice have jurisdiction
to resolve the legal dispute between
PSALM and NPC?
RULING: Yes. There is no question that original
jurisdiction is with the CIR, who issues the preliminary
and the final tax assessments. However, if the
government entity disputes the tax assessment, the
dispute is already between the BIR (represented by the
CIR) and another government entity, in this case, the
petitioner PSALM. Under Presidential Decree No. 24224
(PD 242), all disputes and claims solely between
government agencies and offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be
administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary
of Justice, the Solicitor General, or the Government
Corporate Counsel, depending on the issues and
government agencies involved. As regards cases
involving only questions of law, it is the Secretary of
Justice who has jurisdiction.
ISSUE #2: Can the President’s constitutional power of
control over all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices be curtailed or diminished by law?
RULING: No. The Legislature cannot validly enact a law·
that puts a government office in the Executive branch
outside the control of the President in the guise of
insulating that office from politics or making it
independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch,
it must remain subject to the control of the President.
Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of
his constitutional power of control over "all the executive
x x x offices." If the Legislature can do this with the
Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a
similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law
putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the
review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the
system of checks and balances finely structured in the
1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial branches.
4. Degamo vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212416,
December 05, 2018
FACTS: The National Disaster Risk Reduction
Management Council, requested the release of funds to
Negros Oriental provincial government. The Office of the
President through Executive Secretary Ochoa, approved
the request charging the amount against the calamity
fund for fiscal year 2012. DBM issued a Special Allotment
Order (SARO) covering the amount.
Singson requested DPWH not to indicate the recipient
local government unit in the SARO since the DPWH
needed to evaluate the LGYs capability to implement
projects prior to the release of a fund. Thus, Budget and
Management Secretary (DBM) Abad ordered DBM
undersecretary Relapagos to withdraw the previously
issued SARO. Relampagos informed Degamo that the
Department is withdrawing the SARO because is release
did not comply with the guidelines on large-scale fund
releases for infrastructure projects and was effective
until the DPWH could determine the LGU is able to
implement the project.
Degamo was ordered to return and deposit the
previously released amount to the National Treasury.
Degamo informed Relampagos that the provincial
government would not be returning the funds, and
claimed that he was Relampagos was illegally
withdrawing funds unbeknownst to higher authorities.
Degamo filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint for usurpation of authority or official functions
against Relampagos. Alleging that Relampagos usurped
the official functions of the Executive Secretary who had
the sole authority to write and speak for and on behalf of
the President.
Relampagos asserts that he acted upon Abad’s
instructions and the Office of the President was informed
of the withdrawal. The office of the Ombudsman
dismissed the claim.
Degamo filed a case against the Ombudsman claiming
grave abuse of discretion alleging that there was no need
for the DPWH’s prior determination before funds could
be released since the law only requires the approval of
the President and favourable recommendation of the
Council.
Relampagos on the other hand states that he withdrew
the SARO as undersectary, he claims that nowehere in his
letter did he assume acting on behalf of the President or
Executive Secretary. He signed under his own name using
words “By authority of the Secretary” and that he acted
upon Abad’s orders whom the President instructed to
comply with the 2012 GAA provisions.
ISSUE: In withdrawing the Special Allotment Release
Order (SARO), can an undersecretary invoke the qualified
political agency doctrine?
RULING: No, only the department secretaries.
Relampagos, undersecretary, was not incarcerated for
usurping official functions because he was acting under
the instructions of Abad, the secretary, who was given
instructions by the President. Under the doctrine of
qualified political agency, department secretaries may
act for and on behalf of the President on matters where,
the President is required to exercise authority in their
respective departments.
A scrutiny of the case reveals that Relampagos was not
relieved due to the doctrine of qualified political agency.
But instead, he was relieved from the crime of
usurpation of public functions because he was given
authority by Abad who is a qualified political agent of the
President and Abad was also given instructions by the
latter.
5. Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, Dec. 5, 2017
FACTS: On July 4, 2017, the Court rendered its Decision
finding sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 and declaring it as constitutional.
Petitioners timely filed these Motions for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE #1: Is the power of this Court to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the WHC
independent of the actual actions taken by Congress?
RULING: YES. The Court may strike down the presidential
proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis.
On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the
information and data available to the President prior to
or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed td
"undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings." On the other hand, Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the
CourT, which does not look into the absolute correctness
of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress
could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the
accuracy of the facts presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only
initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate
proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress'
review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to
revoke by Congress are not only totally different but
likewise independent from each other although
concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless
to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised
independently from the power of revocation of
Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on
the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court
of its power to review.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the exercise of judicial review
by this Court involves the calibration of graduated
powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?
RULING: NO. Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the
"President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of
'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power
to declare martial law." It must be stressed, however,
that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on
scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a
sequence, arrangement, or order which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called
"graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the
manner by which the President decides which power to
choose.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the
Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief;
it therefore necessarily follows that the power and
prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants
a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the
situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration
of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the
President. The power to choose, initially, which among
these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of
conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President.
As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to
include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats
that endanger the government, and the very integrity of
the State.
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review
does not extend to calibrating the President's decision
pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a
set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount
to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the
Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that
solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution
of the requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress
in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further
supports the conclusion that judicial review does not
include the calibration of the President's decision of
which of his graduated powers will be availed of in a
given situation.
The Court must similarly and necessarily refrain from
calibrating the President's decision of which among his
extraordinary powers to avail given a certain situation or
condition.
It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in
situations necessitating the proclamation of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted
the Constitutional Commission to eliminate the
requirement of 1 concurrence of the Congress in the
initial imposition by the President of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Considering that the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and
when public safety requires it, and is no longer under
threat or in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity
and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect
the country.138 The Court, as Congress does, must thus
accord the President the same leeway by not wading into
the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution
to the Executive Department.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis
for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus?
RULING: In this case, Proclamation No. 216 issued on
1vfay 23, 2017 expired on July 23, 2017. Consequently,
the issue of whether there were sufficient factual bases
for the issuance of the said Proclamation has been
rendered moot by its expiration. We have consistently
ruled that a case becomes moot and academic when it
"ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical value."2 As correctly pointed out by the
OSG, "the martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus now in effect in Mindanao no
longer finds basis in Proclamation No. 216 but in
Resolution of Both Houses No. 11 (RBH No. 11) adopted
on July 22, 2017. RBH No. 11 is totally different and
distinct from Proclamation No. 216. The former is a joint
executive-legislative act while the latter is purely
executive in nature.
The decision of the Congress to extend the same is of no
moment. The approval of the extension is a distinct and
separate incident, over which we have no jurisdiction to
review as the instant Petition only pertains to the
President's issuance of Proclamation No. 216.
Thus, considering the expiration of Proclamation No. 216
and considering further the approval of the extension of
the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Congress, we find
no reason to disturb our finding that there were sufficient
factual bases for the President's issuance of Proclamation
No. 216.
NOTE: JULY 4, 2017 Decision On Sufficiency of Factual
Basis:
It bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review
is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the
facts upon which the President anchored his declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the
factual basis as to convince the President that there is
probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be
reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and
much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the
President. As such, he is not expected to completely
validate all the information he received before declaring
martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The President deduced from the facts available to him
that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable
purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to
the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and
to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and
prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there
was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and
is being committed and that public safety requires the
imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court
to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation
No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that
actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that
there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose
of which was the removal from the allegiance of the
Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his powers
and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President
satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. After all,
what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard
of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
6. Lagman vs. Pimentel, G.R. No. 235935, Feb. 6, 2018
Facts: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216,declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not
exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion
mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG). On May 25, 2017, within the 48-
hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and
the House of Representatives his written Report, citing
the events and reasons that impelled him to issue
Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted
P.S. Resolution No. 388while the House of
Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both
expressing full support to the Proclamation and finding
no cause to revoke the same.

Acting on the recommendation of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Chief of Staff, the President, in a letter
dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the
House of Representatives to further extend the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to
December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress
may determine. On December 13, 2017, the Senate and
the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the
period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one
year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.
Issue: Did the President and the Congress had sufficient
factual basis to extend Proc. No. 216?
Ruling: Yes, the President and the Congress had
sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires
two factual bases for the extension of the proclamation
of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion
persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension. The
reasons cited by the President in his request for further
extension indicate that the rebellion, which caused him
to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its
"remnants" have been resolute in establishing a
DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through
the recruitment and training of new members, financial
and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and
continued attacks.
Public safety, which is another component element for
the declaration of martial law, "involves the prevention
of and protection from events that could endanger the
safety of the general public from significant danger,
injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters." The
events and circumstances, disclosed by the President,
the Defense Secretary and the AFP, strongly indicate that
the continued implementation of martial law in
Mindanao is necessary to protect public safety. The facts
as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress
amply establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and
public safety is significantly endangered by it.
Issue: How many times and for how long can Congress,
upon the initiative of the President, may extend the
martial law proclamation or the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus?
Ruling: While the provision does not specify the number
of times that the Congress is allowed to approve an
extension of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, Section 18,Article
VII is clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or
suspension are that the extension should be upon the
President's initiative; that it should be grounded on the
persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands
of public safety; and that it is subject to the Court's
review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the
petition of any citizen.
The framers evidently gave enough flexibility on the part
of the Congress to determine the duration of the
extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII
and the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission buttress the view that as regards the
frequency and duration of the extension, the
determinative factor is as long as "the invasion or
rebellion persists and public safety requires" such
extension.
7. Padilla vs. Congress, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017
FACTS: Resolutions separately passed by the Senate and
the House of Representatives, which express support as
well as the intent not to revoke President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216, injure their rights "to a proper
[and] mandatory legislative review of the declaration of
martial law" and that the continuing failure of the
Congress to convene in joint session similarly causes a
continuing injury to their rights.
Senator De Lima adds that she, together with the other
senators who voted in favor of the resolution to convene
the Congress jointly, were even effectively denied the
opportunity to perform their constitutionally-mandated
duty, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, to
deliberate on the said proclamation of the President in a
joint session of the Congress
Congress is required to convene in joint session to review
Proclamation No. 216 and vote as a single deliberative
body.
May revoke such proclamation or suspension" under
Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution allegedly
pertain to the power of the Congress to revoke but not
to its obligation to jointly convene and vote which, they
stress, is mandatory.
The convening of the Congress in joint session, whenever
the President declares martial law or suspends the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is a public right and
duty mandated by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory
duty to convene jointly upon the President's
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: NO. The Congress is not constitutionally
mandated to convene in joint session except to vote
jointly to revoke the President's declaration or
suspension. By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is only required to
vote jointly to revoke the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The provision in question is clear, plain, and
unambiguous. In its literal and ordinary meaning, the
provision grants the Congress the power to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and prescribes how the Congress may exercise such
power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session.
The use of the word "may" in the provision - such that
"[t]he Congress x x x may revoke such proclamation or
suspension x x x" - is to be construed as permissive and
operating to confer discretion on the Congress on
whether or not to revoke, but in order to revoke, the
same provision sets the requirement that at least a
majority of the Members of the Congress, voting jointly,
favor revocation.
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually
refer to a "joint session." While it may be conceded,
subject to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting
jointly" shall already be understood to mean that the
joint voting will be done "in joint session,"
notwithstanding the absence of clear language in the
Constitution, still, the requirement that "[t]he Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly
applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes
the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Simply put, the provision only requires Congress to vote
jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation
and/or suspension.
8. Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 243522, February 19,
2019
Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the third
extension from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019,
of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao. Petitioners further pray for the issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (WPI) to enjoin the respondents
from implementing the one-year extension.
ISSUE 1.Whether or not there exists sufficient factual
basis for the 3rdextension of martial law in Mindanao?
RULING: YES. The requirements of rebellion and public
safety are prese11t to uphold the extension of martial
law in Mintla11ao from January 1, 2019 to December 31,
2019. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis
for the extension of martial law, the Court needs only to
assess and evaluate the written reports of the
government agencies tasked in enforcing and
implementing martial law in Mindanao.
In finding sufficiency of the factual basis for the third
extension; the Court has to give due regard to the
military and police reports which are not palpably
contrived and untrue; consider the full complement or
totality of the reports submitted, and not make a
piecemeal or individual appreciation of the facts and the
incidents reported. The President's decision to extend
the declaration and the suspension of the Writ, when it
goes through the review of the Legislative branch, must
be accorded a weightier and more consequential basis.
Under these I circumstances, the President's decision or
judgment call is affirmed by the representatives of the
People
Issue 2. Whether the Constitution limits the number of
extensions and the duration for which Congress can
extend the proclamation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
Martial law in Mindanao should not be confined to the
Marawi siege. Despite the death of Hapilon and the
Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have
continued to rebuild their organization through the
recruitment and training of new members and fighters to
carry on the rebellion. Clashes between rebels and
government forces continue to take place in other parts
of Mindanao. Kidnapping, arson, robbery, bombings,
murder - crimes which are absorbed in rebellion -
continue to take place therein. These crimes are part and
parcel of the continuing rebellion in Mindanao.

RULING: NO. The Congress has the prerogative to extend

the martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution does not limit
the period for which it can extend the same. This Court
in the case of Lagmanv. Medialdea explained the 'only
limitations to the exercise of congressional authority to
extend such proclamation or suspension: a) the
extension should be upon the President’s initiative; b) it
should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or
rebellion and the demands of public safety; and c) it is
subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its
factual basis the petition of any citizen.

Issue 3. Has Proclamation No. 216 become functus

officio with the cessation of the Marawi siege?

RULING: NO. Proclamation No. 216 has not become

functus officio with the cessation o fthe Marawi siege.
While Proclamation No. 216 specifically cited the attack
of the Maute group in Marawi City as basis for the
declaration of martial law, rebellion was not necessarily
ended by the cessation of the Marawi siege. Rebellion in
Mindanao still continues, as shown by the violent
incidents stated in reports to the President, and was
made basis by the Congress in approving the third
extension o f martial law. These violent incidents
continuously pose a serious threat to security and the
peace and order situation in Mindanao.