Capili vs Spouses Cardaña

Facts: Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary
School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing
her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents - Dominador and Rosalita Cardaña - filed a case for
damages.

The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of
the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby.
Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principal’s office. The Cardañas
averred that petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their
daughter.

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardana

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardana

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2)
the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.

As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the school’s premises.1âwphi1
The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she
failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.

Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises
supervision over her assignee. The record shows that more than a month had lapsed from the
time petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaña on December 15, 1992, to the time the
incident occurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly, she failed to check seasonably if the danger
posed by the rotting tree had been removed. Thus, we cannot accept her defense of lack of
negligence.
Bataclan vs. Medina

Facts: At about 2:00 o clock in the morning, bus no. 30 of Medina transportation, operated by its
owner defendants, was running within Cavite. That, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle
began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be
helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara
and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the
overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch
made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning
and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it.

Issue: whether or not the defendant is liable for the death of Bataclan, Lara, Visayan and
Villanueva.

Ruling: Yes. The Defendant is liable for the death of Bataclan, Lara, Visayan and Villanueva.

Proximate Cause is that cause , which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.

Here, the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from
the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver
and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the
rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns
and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In
other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence
of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
Champman vs. Underwood

Facts: The plaintiff had been visiting his friend, a man by the name of Creveling, in front of
whose house the accident happened. He desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming
from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he
immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed from the gate into the street for the purpose of
signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the
rear flatform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reached
it without extra exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for
it to come abreast of him in order to board. While in this position he was struck from behind and
run over by the defendant's automobile.

The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his
chauffeur, a competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana being immediately
in front of him, he followed along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the
street car which was following took the switch — that is, went off the main line to the left upon
the switch lying alongside of the main track. Thereupon the defendant no longer followed that
the street car nor went to the left, but either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a
bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in
an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. When the front of the "San
Marcelino" car, the one the plaintiff attempted to board, was almost in front of the defendant's
automobile, defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff, as
above described.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the defendant’s driver is liable.

(2) whether or not the defendant is liable.

Ruling: (1) Yes. The Defendant’s drivers is liable.

that the defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He
was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, in common out to board the car,
was not obliged, for his own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his
left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to
the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his
side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only
ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.

(2) No. The Defendant is not liable.

An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself
responsible for such acts. . On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and
without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures
a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the
time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act
complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the
owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

Here, the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of
the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the
driver.
BJDC Construction vs Lanuzo

Facts: Respondent alleged that Lanuzo’s Honda motorcycle sideswiped the road barricade
placed by the company in the right lane portion of the road, causing him to lose control of his
motorcycle and to crash on the newly cemented road, resulting in his instant death; and that the
company’s failure to place illuminated warning signs on the site of the project, especially during
night time, was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino.

On the other hand, the company insisted that the death of Balbino was an accident brought about
by his own negligence, as confirmed by the police investigation report that stated, among others,
that Balbino was not wearing any helmet at that time, and the accident occurred while Balbino
was overtaking another motorcycle; and that the police report also stated that the road
sign/barricade installed on the road had a light.

Issue: whether or not the Petitioner company is liable for the death of lanuzo.

Ruling: No. The company is not liable.

Res ipsa loquitor is not applicable in this case. Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo
heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed to the company considering that it has shown its
installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal
accident was not caused by any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In
contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The
records disclose that he himself did not take the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared,
Balbino overtook another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not avoid
hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly
cemented road. SPO1 Corporal’s investigation report corroborated Zamora’s declaration. This
causation of the fatal injury went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs.

Moreover, by the time of the accident, the project, which had commenced in September 1997,
had been going on for more than a month and was already in the completion stage. Balbino, who
had passed there on a daily basis in going to and from his residence and the school where he then
worked as the principal, was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Nor could the
Lanuzo heirs justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for it cannot be denied that
Balbino’s motorcycle was equipped with headlights that would have enabled him at dusk or
night time to see the condition of the road ahead. That the accident still occurred surely indicated
that he himself did not exercise the degree of care expected of him as a prudent motorist.