CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 116 | ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
1 Kummer vs People
Facts: An information was filed against petitioner Leticia Kummer and her son,
Johan, a minor, for homicide. According to the prosecution's evidence, on June
19, 1988 Jesus Mallo, the victim, accompanied by Amiel Malana went to the
house of Kummer. When Kummer opened the door, her son Johan shot Mallo
twice.
Kummer denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children
were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988.
The prosecution filed an information for homicide on January 12, 1989 against
the petitioner and Johan. Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits
accordingly followed.
Meanwhile, the prosecutor made some amendment in the date of the complaint
that was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month.
Both RTC and Court of Appeals found both the petitioner and Johan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Petitioner questioned the
sufficiency of prosecution’s evidence. She claimed that she was not arraigned on
the amended information for which she was convicted.
Issue: Whether or not the change in the date of commission of crime requires
formal amendment of complaint
Ruling: No. The change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the
disparity is not great, is merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is
required.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a
complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and
provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused. However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of
the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case
evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to
June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with
the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in the
date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment — it
does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the
offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment,
and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is
still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses
used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence
presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature and did
not need a second plea.
2 Gamas vs Oco
FACTS: This is a complaint for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law
filed by complainants Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobrio ("complainants")
against Judge Orlando A. Oco ("respondent judge"), former Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato ("MTC Polomolok") and
SPO4 Willie Adulacion ("respondent Adulacion"), a "police prosecutor" in the MTC
Polomolok.
Complainants allege that they are the accused in a case for theft which was
pending in the sala of respondent judge. According to them, respondent Adulacion
enticed them to plead guilty to the charge, apply for probation, and thus avoid
imprisonment.
Respondent Adulacion, who had allegedly prepared a draft decision embodying
his suggestion, conferred with respondent judge, and handed the draft decision to
respondent judge. After reading the document, respondent judge signed it, told
complainants "O, plead guilty man kamo" ("O, you're pleading guilty"), and handed
the document to a clerk. Respondent judge told the clerk to read the contents of
the decision to complainants and to instruct them on what to do. The clerk read the
contents of the document to complainants and asked them to sign it. Complainants
signed the document upon respondent Adulacion's assurance that once the police
apprehend the rest of the accused, 3 the police will revive the case and respondent
Adulacion will present complainants as "star witnesses." Complainants later found
out that what they signed was an Order ("3 October 1996 Order") finding them
guilty of theft and sentencing them each to imprisonment for six (6) months and
one (1) day.
Finding the proceedings highly irregular, complainants sought the assistance of a
lawyer. Upon motion of complainants' counsel, respondent judge vacated the 3
October 1996 Order, ostensibly on the ground that complainants had entered
improvident guilty pleas. Respondent judge scheduled complainants' re-
arraignment on 2 February 1997.
In the present complaint, complainants contend that respondent judge is
administratively liable for rendering judgment against them without the
benefit of an arraignment and in violation of their right to be represented by
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counsel.
Respondent judge maintains that there was no irregularity in the issuance of the 3
October 1996 Order. Respondent judge adds that he decided to set aside his ruling
merely out of compassion for complainants.
ISSUE: Whether or not complainants were properly arraigned. NO.
Respondent Judge Failed to Properly Apprise
Complainants of their Right to Counsel.
The Constitution mandates that "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall .
. . enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." Indeed, the accused has a
right to representation by counsel from the custodial investigation all the way up to
the appellate proceedings. At the arraignment stage, Section 6 of Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. — Before
arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him
if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in
person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de
oficio to defend him. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Rule 116 means that:
[W]hen a defendant appears [at the arraignment] without [an] attorney, the court
has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it
is his right to have [an] attorney before being arraigned; 2 — After giving him such
information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of attorney; 3 — If he
desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign [an] attorney de
oficio to defend him; and 4 – If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his
own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
Compliance with these four duties is mandatory. The only instance when the court
can arraign an accused without the benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such
right and the court, finding the accused capable, allows him to represent himself in
person. However, to be a valid waiver, the accused must make the waiver
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In determining whether the accused can
make a valid waiver, the court must take into account all the relevant
circumstances, including the educational attainment of the accused. In the present
case, however, respondent judge contends that complainants waived their right to
counsel and insisted on their immediate arraignment.
After reviewing the records and taking into account the circumstances obtaining in
this case, we find that respondent judge did not properly apprise complainants of
their right to counsel prior to their arraignment. Consequently, there was no basis
for complainants' alleged waiver of such right.
In his Answer, respondent judge does not deny that when he "arraigned"
complainants, no lawyer assisted the complainants. However, respondent judge
asserted that the attendance of a "lawyer was their (complainants') problem."
Respondent judge stated that before arraigning complainants, he gave a
"discourse [of] their rights as accused." Respondent judge also stated that since
the police caught complainants in flagrante delicto, complainants told him "a lawyer
would not have much use." Respondent judge further stated that complainants
"expressed that they have no money to pay for a lawyer." Respondent judge
informed complainants "he can give them a PAO lawyer" if they so desired.
However, respondent judge did not appoint a PAO lawyer despite being informed
by complainants that they could not afford a lawyer.
These do not amount to compliance with Section 6 of Rule 116. Respondent judge
has the duty to insure that there is no violation of the constitutional right of the
accused to counsel. Respondent judge is grossly mistaken in saying that securing
a "lawyer was their (complainants') problem." Once the accused informs the judge
that he cannot afford a lawyer and the court has not allowed the accused to
represent himself, or the accused is incapable of representing himself, the judge
has the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio to give meaning and substance to the
constitutional right of the accused to counsel.
Respondent judge knew that complainants are mere tricycle drivers. Respondent
judge could not have expected complainants to be conversant with the rules on
criminal procedure. 15 Respondent judge should not only have followed Section 6
of Rule 116 to the letter, but should also have ascertained that complainants
understood the import of the proceedings. Respondent judge should not have
proceeded with complainants' arraignment until he had ascertained that
complainants' waiver of their right to counsel was made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently and that they were capable of representing themselves.
Indeed, by subsequently vacating his 3 October 1996 Order, respondent judge
tacitly admits that complainants were in no position to represent themselves during
their arraignment, causing them to enter guilty pleas improvidently.
Respondent Judge's Arraignment of
Complainants Highly Irregular
Section 1(a), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 116 | ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
Arraignment and plea; how made. — The accused must be arraigned before the
court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The
arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the
accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not
guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in
the complaint or information.
We have explained the rationale, requirements, and compliance of this rule in this
manner: [S]ection 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made
in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court [1] furnishing the accused
a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then
[2] reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and [3] asking
him what his plea is to the charge.
The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused
understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said
Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused
by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the
right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled
at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary
defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under
the Constitution.
Respondent judge similarly failed to comply with the requirements of Section 1(a)
of Rule 116. Complainants deny respondent judge's claim that he arraigned
complainants by "read[ing] to them [the information] in the dialect they understand
and inform[ing] them [of] the nature of the evidence arrayed [against them].
However, there is no disputing that respondent judge failed to furnish complainants
a copy of the information with the list of the witnesses.
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals
that a judge can take lightly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial
stage in criminal litigation "where the issues are joined . . . and without which the
proceedings cannot advance further." Respondent judge may have genuinely
desired to spare complainants the travails of being detained in jail, thus the rush in
arraigning them, accepting their guilty pleas, imposing a light sentence, and
granting them probation. While well-intentioned, such conduct unjustifiably short-
circuited the mandatory arraignment procedure in Section 1(a) of Rule 116.
3 People vs Mala
4 Cabangan vs Concepcion
5 People vs Pangilinan
FACTS:
 Two charges of rape of his own daughter was filed to the accused.
 1st, the testimony of the victim herself and 2nd, by the appellant's
admission that his daughter is below 12 y/o.
 On May 1997, the accused was arrested and he then filed a petition for
bail.
 In the hearings the prosecution presented the victim (AAA), BBB (Mother
of AAA), and Dr. Melinda Layug.
 The testimony of the daughter was on the month of Sept. 1995, his father
thru force and intimidation, countlessly raped her while she was sleeping
with her siblings and while she was left at home washing the dishes. His
father warned her that if she report to the authorities she will kill them. It
stopped but continued on Jan. 1997, despite of the fact that her mother
already arrived from Singapore and was sleeping downstairs at the sala.
Before going back to Singapore, DDD, grandmother of AAA, advised BBB
not to leave her children because the appellant had been molesting AAA.
Shocked by it, she asked her daughter and the latter confessed
everything. BBB confronted the appellant but he denied the accusations.
She brought her daughter to Dinalupahan District Hospital, and examined
by Dr. Melinda Layug, the results revealed non-parous introitus with an
old healed laceration at 4'oclock position. Thus, the instant case was filed.
 The appellant presented his defence as sole witness. Back when he left
for Saudi, his wife was having an affair and that the youngest daughter
was not his own, he lost interest on going to back to work and stayed at
home. He stated that his daughter was sweet to her, she hugs and kiss
him and she even became sweeter. While BBB was in Singapore, he
claimed that AAA approached him pointing finger at her palm. Now, he
claimed that he had no sexual relationship with her although she seduced
him.
 The trial court declared its decision in favour of the victim. It disregarded
the defence of the accused because it's unbelievable for a ten-year old
girl to be as malicious and that minor inconsistencies in private
complainant's testimony did not in any way affect her credibility. The
charge was guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases and sentencing
him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
 The trial court forwarded the case to the Supreme Court for review, but it
was forwarded to CA for appropriate actions.
 The accused filed petition for errors in trial court's decision.
ISSUES:
1. WON the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of 2 counts of
rape, that he was not properly arraigned and was not informed by the nature of the
accusation against him?
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2. WON the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable despite the insufficiency of the evidence?
HELD:
1. No.
2. No.
RATIO:
1. The accused claimed that he was arraigned only after the case was submitted,
he claimed it as a procedural error, against his constitutional right and prejudicial
to his part. Arraignment is manner of implementing a constitutional right to be
inform of the nature of a cause of accusation against him regarding his possible
loss of freedom and even life. The court answered that it was not prejudicial in his
part. First, that the procedural error was cured when he participated in the trial
without raising objection about his status of not being arraigned. Second, there
was no protest during the trial, only after the accused is convicted of two death
sentences. Thus, it is already too late to raise the procedural defect. In People v.
Cabale and People v. Atienza, under the same circumstances. Since appellant's
rights and interests were not prejudiced by lapse in procedure, it only follows that
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was not violated.
2. First, the alleged accusation regarding the impossibility of the rape wherein she
is sleeping with her siblings in invalid because it is been said that lust don't respect
time and place. There is no rule that a woman can only be raped in seclusion.
Second, the court said that the failure of the victim to report the incident and the
delay of more than one year of the alleged accusation is particular in incestuous
rape, and due to death threats of victim. Thus, it does not necessarily mean of
discrepancies or non-credibility. Third, though the declaration of the victim's sworn
statement is contradictory to his testimony on how she reported the incident but
she fully explained to the court the said discrepancy due investigator who did not
change it, but her credibility was not impaired. Fourth, the alleged inconsistencies
in the victim's testimony refer to minor matters, The gravamen of the felony is the
carnal knowledge by the accused in Article 335, RPC. Where the inconsistency is
not an essential element of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and
cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified. Fifth, regarding the alleged
accusation of the medical result that there were no signs of violence on the victim's
private part means she is not a victim of rape but the court states that it was only
after 2 years and 2 months that she had an examination and whatever physical
violence may healed at that time. The accused defense and allegations is deemed
to invalid and unsubstantial. With that, he is guilty beyond reasonable death with
2 counts of rape. Under the RPC, sexual intercourse below 12 years old is statutory
rape, and is always rape and justified with death penalty under Art. 335 but with
the effectivity of R.A. 9346, "an act prohibiting death penalty". it shall reduced to
reclusion perpetua. Thus, the court's decision declared the accused, Pangilinan,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape is affirmed with the
modification that each penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
And payment for civil, moral and examplary damages to the victim.
6 Daan vs Sandiganbayan
Doctrine: Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites
upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent
of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. As regards
plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the
trial court's exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it
amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion.
Facts: Joselito Daan and Benedicto Kuizon were charged before Sandiganbayan
for three counts of malversation of public funds which they purportedly tried to
conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear
that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall and
collected their respective salaries when they did not. In addition, they were also
charged for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty
and substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating
circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said
accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of not guilty to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of guilty,
but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private
individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to
substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime
of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as
acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of
falsification of public document by a private individual for it will strengthen the
cases against the principal accused, Municipal Mayor Kuizon who appears to be
the mastermind of these criminal acts. As to the malversation cases, the
prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of Daan to plead guilty to the lesser
crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because he has
already restituted the amount involved.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied Daan’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite
favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent
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reason was presented to justify its approval. Likewise, it denied Daan’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is proper in this case
Held: YES. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer
on the ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the
proposal would redound to the benefit of the public.
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting
petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice
and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present
case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction and of its
power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, in order to
afford equal justice to petitioner.
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure
to Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the
crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds,
respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged. Given, therefore, that
some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute
the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
7 People vs Oden
Facts:
 Mario Oden was charged with twelve counts of rape.
o The victim, his 15 year old minor daughter, alleged that he had
carnal knowledge of her “by means of force and intimidation.”
 On his arraignment, Oden pleaded “guilty” to the charges.
 Trial Court found him guilty of rape and sentenced him to death through
lethal injection for each count of rape.
 Oden then claimed in the review of his case that he pleaded guilty
because he thought he would be given a lighter penalty with his plea of
guilt.
Issue: Whether or not the procedure on pleading guilty to a capital offense was
properly observed when Oden pleaded guilty?
Held: NO!
Procedure to be taken when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense.—The
trial court is mandated:
1. to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
2. to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability, and
3. to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
The records must show the events that have actually taken place during the
inquiry, the words spoken and the warnings given, with special attention to the age
of the accused, his educational attainment and socio-economic status, the manner
of his arrest and detention, the attendance of counsel in his behalf during the
custodial and preliminary investigations, and the opportunity of his defense
counsel to confer with him. All these matters should be able to provide trustworthy
indices of his competence to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The trial court
must describe the essential elements of the crimes the accused is charged with
and their respective penalties and civil liabilities. It should also direct a series of
questions to defense counsel to determine whether or not he has conferred with
the accused and has completely explained to him the legal implications of a plea
of guilt.
The process is mandatory and absent any showing that it has been duly observed,
a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been aptly undertaken. The trial court
must be extra solicitous to see to it that the accused fully understands the meaning
and importance of his plea. In capital offenses particularly, life being at stake, one
cannot just lean on the presumption that the accused has understood his plea.
IN THIS CASE: While the records of the case are indeed bereft of any indication
that the rule has sufficiently been complied with, the evidence for the prosecution
outside of the plea of guilt, nevertheless, would adequately establish the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The manner by which the plea of guilt is
made, whether improvidently or not, loses much of great significance where
the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission by the person accused of the offense charged.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision under review is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Mario Oden is convicted of twelve (12) counts of
simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count. Appellant is
further ordered to indemnify Anna Liza Oden in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) moral
damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) exemplary damages for
each count of rape.
So ordered.
NOTE: The reason why he was given a lighter sentence was because the
prosecution failed to prove that the daughter was a minor at the time of the rape
and NOT the plea of guilt.
8 People vs Talusan - PDF
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