RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE

CARIAGA v CA
Facts:
Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light & Power Company (DLPC). He
received reports that some private electricians were involved in the sale of DLPC supplies. He
initiated a covert operation to ascertain the matter and catch the perpetrators. In October 1988, he
sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robber Section of METRODISCOM-
Davao. He also hired Florencio Siton as an undercover agent under the pseudonym “Canuto
Duran”.

‘Duran’ became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he said that
his ‘boss’ needs some electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold panning area. Ricardo
offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can supply the same to him. ‘Duran’ was
able to purchase some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his cousin named Jonathan
Cariaga (accused). Jonathan was the driver of a DLPC service truck. On November 1988,
‘Duran’ and Jonathan were introduced to each other. After which, more transactions were made
between the two. ‘Duran’s undercover work came to an end when Sgt. Villasis ‘apprehended’
him on February 1989.

‘Duran’ then ‘confessed’ in order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved to come
out with the truth. Ricardo and another person came to the police station and confessed to their
participation as “fence” for Jonathan Cariaga. The prosecution, however, was unable to present
Ricardo as witness as the subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in Sultan
Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn statement pertaining to the stealing for a labor case
between Jonathan and DLPC for the latter’s alleged illegal dismissal.

Issue: WON Ricardo’s sworn statement is admissible as evidence and Siton is a credible
witness.

Ruling:
The sworn statement of Ricardo is not admissible and Siton is a credible witness. The
RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant
case. Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure both speak of admissibility of a testimony of a witness “unable to testify” in
court. In Tan v. CA , the Court has held that “unable to testify” does not cover cases of witnesses
subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He was neither dead nor out
of the country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat which is merely 4 hours drive away from Davao.
The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest, but, it did not in the present case.

The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga
without him taking the witness stand since it violates the fundamental right of the accused to
meet the witnesses against him face to face. Hence, Ricardo Cariagas sworn statement is not
admissible under Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court for failure of the
prosecution to comply with the strict requirements of said rule, to wit:
a] Ricardo Cariaga did not orally testify in the labor case;
b] Inability to testify must be for a grave cause almost amounting to death and the prosecution
must exhaust all available remedies to secure the presence of its witnesses at the trial;
c] That the former proceeding must also be criminal in nature.
The appellate court erred in holding that the lone testimony of the prosecutions alleged
eyewitness who is a paid witness and whose testimony was admittedly corrected or revised on
the witness stand and which materially and significantly varies with his previous sworn statement
on very vital and pivotal details is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.

The appellate court erred in failing to appreciate the reasonable doubt engendered by the
exculpatory statements of the superiors of the accused in favor of the latter.
]
 RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE

PP v ONG
Facts:
Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the
afternoon of July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division
(SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the
alleged illicit drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per
order of Chief Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. Once, CI
confirmed the meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped
packages rendered of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused
Ong and boodle money placed in a “W. Brown” plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the
latter arrested Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming.

The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking
sheets and arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance, was
referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for
methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

However, the appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a
Chinese citizen from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), claimed that he came to the
Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. Initially, he worked in a pancit factory in Quezon City, but
later hunted for another job, was referred by his friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job as
a technician in a bihon factory owned by Sin. Subsequently, without any knowledge of his new
job, William Ong was later taken to the police station and there he met the other accused Ching
De Ming for the first time. He maintained innocence to the crime charged.

On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman

engaged in the RTW business. On that same date of the commission of the crime, while waiting
for his girlfriend and her mother, whose mother Avenlina Cardoz, testified in De Ming’s favor
and corroborated with his story, that he was approached by persons unknown to him. He was
misidentified as one of the accused and dragged him out of his car and brought to the other car,
took his clutch bag, then after a few hours, at Camp Crame, they removed his blindfold. He
denied knowing Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila,
Quezon City.

Trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of death. It
likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos. However, the case was on
automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:WON the arraignment of appellants violates Rule 116, Section (a) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure?

Ruling:
The aforementioned provision on Arraignment and Plea provides that (a) The accused
must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for
trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge of clerk by furnishing the accused
with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known
to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the
trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

The trial court held that the arraignment of appellants violated the above rule. Appellants
are Chinese nationals. Their Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the
accusations against them. It does not, however, indicate whether the information was read in the
language or dialect known to them.

Both accused Ong and De Ming were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, and both
entered a plea of not guilty. From the records, it was clear that appellants only knew the Chinese
language, however the appellants were arraigned on an information written in the English
language. The requirement that the information should be read in a language or dialect known to
the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause the of the accusation
 RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE

against him. The constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules
necessarily nullifies the arraignment. After the arraignment and in the course of the trial, the
lower court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter.

Hence, it is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, and he was likewise
the one who closed the deal with accused William Ong, and set the venue and time of the
meeting. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the court held
that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the “poseur-buyer” but merely the deliveryman. His
testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot
be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.

The buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a
valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. However, to determine whether
there was valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken by the police officers,
in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details
of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent
evidence.

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
confidential information who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started
and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by
SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same and not part of the buy-bust
operation.

Although, the court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential
informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. Likewise, once the identity of the
informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the
privilege is no longer applicable.

In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The
problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the state interest in
protecting the people from crimes against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. The
balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the
crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the possible significance of the informer’s
testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.

In the present case, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can result
in the imposition of the death penalty. The prosecution has to prove all the material elements of
the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the
informer is indispensable. It should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high
importance in our scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher
significance. Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged confiscated
methyl amphetamine hydrochloride further shattered the case of the prosecution. There is no
crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on whether the substance
confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be regulated drug.

The court decided to reverse and set aside its former decision. Appellants Ong and De Ming @
Tiu are acquitted of the crime of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
and are ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.

PP v BOHOL
Facts:
On August 2, 2002, at around 8:30 p.m., a confidential informant came to the police
station and tipped P/Sr. Insp. Jessie Nitullano that a certain Ricardo Bohol is engaged in illegal
drug trade in Isla Puting Bato, Tondo, Manila. Nitullano then formed a team of six police
operatives to verify the informant’s tip, and, if found positive, to launch then and there a buy-
bust entrapment of Bohol.

The team proceeded to the site of the operation and then PO2 Estrada, the poseur-buyer,
and the informant told Bohol of their purpose. Estrada handed the former a Php100 marked bill
and then Bohol handed him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules which the latter
suspected to be shabu. Estrada then gave the signal and PO2 Luisito Gutierrez and his
 RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE

companions arrested Bohol. Gutierrez frisked Bohol and recovered from him the buy-bust money
and three plastic sachets containing similar white crystalline granules suspected to be shabu.
On August 7, 2002, two Informations were filed against Bohol before the RTC of Manila,
Branch 35, for violations of Rep. Act No. 9165. One charge for unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance commonly known as "shabu" and another charge
for selling, administering, delivering, transporting or distributing any dangerous drug,
Upon arraignment, Bohol entered a plea of "not guilty" to both charges and hence trial ensued.
During trial, the confidential informants were not presented as witnesses. The accused was
convicted on both charges, with the penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon him for the
charge of selling shabu. Because of this, the case was forwarded for automatic review.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification on the penalty only. Thus, Bohol filed a notice of appeal.

Issue: WON the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:
No, the trial court did not gravely err in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Bohol contends that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
faults the trial court for giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. He raised the failure of the prosecution to present the confidential informant as a
witness during the trial, thereby preventing him from confronting said witness directly.The
Office of the Solicitor General counters that the prosecution established Bohol’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt given that the police officers who testified against Bohol were not shown to
have been actuated by improper motives, nor were they shown not properly performing their
duty.

With regard to his argument that the confidential informant was not presented thus
preventing him from confronting the witness directly, the appellate court correctly ruled that
Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the informant in the case. During trial, the informant’s
presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases.
Police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround
their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are
presented in court.The SC held that what is material to the prosecution for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti and both requirements were sufficiently proven in this
case.

The police officers were able to testify positively and categorically that the transaction or
sale actually took place. The subject shabu was likewise positively identified by the prosecution
when presented in court. Hence, we agree that Bohol’s guilt has been established by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.