FIRST SARMIENTO PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC.
,Petitioner, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan dismissed the
v.PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Facts:
On June 19, 2002, First Sarmiento obtained from Philippine
Bank of Communications (PBCOM) a P40,000,000.00 loan, which
was secured by a real estate mortgage over 1,076 parcels of land.
On January 2, 2006, PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage.11 It claimed in its Petition that it
sent First Sarmiento several demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still
failed to pay the principal amount and accrued interest on the loan.
This prompted PBCOM to resort to extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties.
First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment
of real estate mortgage with the Regional Trial Court. the Regional
Trial Court of City of Malolos, Bulacan, granted First Sarmiento's
Urgent Motion to Consider the Value of Subject Matter of the
Complaint as Not Capable of Pecuniary Estimation, and ruled that
First Sarmiento's action for annulment of real estate mortgage was
incapable of pecuniary estimation
On January 2, 2012, First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage and its amendments. In its
Opposition (Re: Application for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order), PBCOM asserted that the Regional Trial Court failed to
acquire jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint because the
action for annulment of mortgage was a real action; thus, the filing
fees filed should have been based on the fair market value of the
mortgaged properties
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction:
Following the High Court's ruling in the case of Home Guaranty
Corporation v. R. II Builders, Inc. and National Housing Authority,
G.R. No. 192549, March 9, 2011, cited by the bank in its Rejoinder,
which appears to be the latest jurisprudence on the matter to the
effect that an action for annulment or rescission of contract does not
operate to efface the true objective and nature of the action which is
to recover real property, this Court hereby RESOLVES TO DISMISS
the instant case for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff having failed to pay
the appropriate filing fees.
On August 17, 2012, First Sarmiento sought direct recourse
to this Court with its Petition for Review under Rule 45. It insists that
its Complaint for the annulment of real estate mortgage was
incapable of pecuniary estimation
In its Comment, respondent contends that petitioner's action
to annul the real estate mortgage and enjoin the foreclosure
proceedings did not hide the true objective of the action, which is to
restore petitioner's ownership of the foreclosed properties
Petitioner reiterates that its Complaint for annulment of real
estate mortgage was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation
because it merely sought to remove the lien on its properties, not the
recovery or reconveyance of the mortgaged properties. Respondent
in its Memorandum restates its stand that petitioner's Complaint
involved a real action; hence, the estimated value of the mortgaged
properties should have been alleged and used as the basis for the
computation of the docket fees
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint of First Sarmiento for
annulment of real estate mortgage is incapable of pecuniary
estimation?
Held:
 The petition is meritorious.
Lapitan v. Scandia79 instructed that to determine whether the
subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
established. However, Lapitan stressed that where the money claim
is only a consequence of the remedy sought, the action is said to be
one incapable of pecuniary estimation:
This Court indicates that in determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance
A careful reading of petitioner's Complaint convinces this
Court that petitioner never prayed for the reconveyance of the
properties foreclosed during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted
its ownership or possession over them. Rather, it assailed the validity
of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it entered into with
respondent because it supposedly never received the proceeds of
the P100,000,000.00 loan agreement
Finally, there is a need to reassess the place of Home
Guaranty v. R-II Builders102 in our jurisprudence.
In numerous decisions where this Court proclaimed that
the test to determine whether an action is capable or incapable
of pecuniary estimation is to ascertain the nature of the
principal action or relief sought. Thus, if the principal relief
sought is the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then
the action is capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the
principal relief sought is not for the recovery of money or real
property and the money claim is only a consequence of the
principal relief, then the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation
Considering that the principal remedy sought by R-II Builders
was the resolution of the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance, the
action was incapable of pecuniary estimation and Home Guaranty
erred in treating it as a real action simply because the principal
action was accompanied by a prayer for conveyance of real property.
NOTE: Sa Home Guaranty vs R-II Builders, yung action ni R-II
Builders for the Resolution and Annulment of Deed of Assignment na
consider ng Court as capable of pecuniary estimation kasi may
incidental relief na conveyance of real property. Eto ata yung sinabi
ni sir na abandoned na yung ruling na to dahil dito sa bagong case
na First Sarmiento.
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY
and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH)
bonding company and defendant-appellant.
Facts:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of
money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by
Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948.
Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ
of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved
for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved
to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the
issue on lack of jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in
view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the
filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not
exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior
court is in issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Surety can raise the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time on appeal?
Held: NO
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case,
the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
However, considering the facts and circumstances of the
present case, We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred
by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of
annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
became a quasi-party July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI to take cognizance of
the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several
stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court
of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the
merits.
It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations,
is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief , repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.
NOTE: Nag Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
lang si Surety almost 15 years nung nagsimula case. 14 years and 6
months to be exact.
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Facts:
On August 19, 1998, RTC convicted the petitioner of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In his appeal before the
CA, the petitioner questioned for the first time the RTC’s jurisdiction.
CA, however, considered the petitioner to have actively
participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction
of RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the
RTC’s lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General
acknowledge the fact that RTC did not have jurisdiction, they
nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by
laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC, the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner
actively participating therein and without him ever raising the
jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the
lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at
any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further
absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.
Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC?
Held: YES
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is the
exception rather than the general rule. For it to be invoked, laches
should clearly be present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been
raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
SC clarified that in its past decisions concerning the same
issue, it wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in
Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as
early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The
general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the
issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by
laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of
jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the
factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person
attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop
him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere
consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person
seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not
thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer
any harm.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner
is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the
RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before
the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet
elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though
unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of estoppel by laches
unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not
sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading
laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be
restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss
of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other
causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the
patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment
creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years.
The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.
G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO
MAGALI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN,
BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO RAMOS, respondents.
Facts:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the
respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the
owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation.
Not being the registered owner and the title not being in his
possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the
Court directing him to surrender the said title. This prompted
Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to
declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its
name. The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name
of the corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that
her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed
a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court,
praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the court
dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for
the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed
therein. Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a complaint in for
the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made
with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138, against
Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from
Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private respondent Francisco
Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property in his
name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the
title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco
Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the same is
barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the
said Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the
ground of estoppel by prior judgment.
In the order of the respondent Judge dated September 29,
1971 denying the second motion for reconsideration, he cited the
case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to uphold the view that
the petitioners are deemed estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the respondent Court in having taken cognizance of
the petition for cancellation of TCT No. 68568, they being the ones
who invoked the jurisdiction of the said Court to grant the affirmative
relief prayed for therein.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the Court?
Held:
NO
The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling
in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the
court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by
estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having
been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost
fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered,
such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As
defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has
abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with
laches. When they learned that the title to the property owned by
them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and registered in
the name of another entity or person who had no right to the same,
they filed a petition to cancel the latter's title. It is unfortunate that in
pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke the authority of the
respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity as a
court of general jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the
name of Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a
finding by the respondent Court that the same was "without merit."
No explanation was given for such dismissal nor why the petition
lacked merit. There was no hearing, and the petition was resolved
solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the parties which do not
appear of record. It is even a possibility that such dismissal was in
view of the realization of the respondent Court that, sitting as a
cadastral court, it lacked the authority to entertain the petition
involving as it does a highly controversial issue. Upon such petition
being dismissed, the petitioners instituted Civil Case No. SCC-180
on January 1, 1971, or only two and one-half years after the
dismissal of their petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Hence, we see
no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their
right to claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They can
hardly be presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by
inaction within an unreasonable length of time or inexcusable
negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in
itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings
had in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by
estoppel by laches.
MANGALIAG VS CATUBIG-PASTORAL GR NO. 143951- 10-25-
2005
Facts:
Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the RTC
against petitioners Mangaliag and Solano. Serquina alleges that him
and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and permanent
deformities from the collision of their tricycle with the petitioners’
dump truck and the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence
of the petitioners in driving the dump truck.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. They alleged
that since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of
P71,392.00, falls within the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners maintain
that the court’s jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the
amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts
claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorney’s fee,
etc.
The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the
claim for damages is the main action, the totality of the damages
sought to be recovered should be considered in determining
jurisdiction. He relied on Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which
provides that “in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court” Also, the petitioners’
defense of lack of jurisdiction has already been barred by estoppel
and laches. He contends that after actively taking part in the trial
proceedings and presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would
be unfair and legally improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of
the case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are barred from raising the
defence of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction?
Held: NO
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in
the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception,
best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction
did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings
had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was
defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
In the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by
the RTC. As a matter of fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered
the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the
appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of
laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the
present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings
must apply. Therefore, petitioners are not estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
G.R. No. 169700 July 30, 2009
APOLONIA BANAYAD FRIANELA, Petitioner,
vs.
SERVILLANO BANAYAD, JR., Respondent.
Facts:
Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises F.
Banayad, petitioner, who was named as devisee in the will, filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, on June 3,
1991, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P for the allowance of the November 18,
1985 holographic will of the decedent. Respondent, a cousin of the
petitioner, filed his opposition and counter-petitioned for the
allowance of two other holographic wills of the decedent, one dated
September 27, 1989 and another dated September 28, 1989. RTC
rendered its Decision declaring the September 27, 1989 holographic
will as having revoked the November 18, 1985 will. On appeal, the
CA ruled the September 27, 1989 holographic will had only revoked
the November 18, 1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of
Moises’s real property was concerned. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied. Petitioner elevated the case before us
via the instant petition. The SC notes that the trial court focused all of
its attention on the merits of the case without first determining
whether it could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and
decide over such probate proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC could have validly exercised
jurisdiction to hear and decide such probate proceedings?
Held: NO
Section 19 and 33 of BP 129 provides that jurisdiction over a
probate proceeding is conferred to the appropriate court depending
on the gross value of the estate and such value must be alleged in
the complaint or petition to be filed. In this case, Nowhere in the
petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises’s estate.
Hence, the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the
exception laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 and clarified recently
in Figueroa v. People cannot be applied. First, because, as a general
rule, the principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the
government. No injustice to the parties or to any third person will be
wrought by the ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
instituted probate proceedings.
 Second and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed
invocation of lack of jurisdiction has been made during the execution
stage of a final and executory ruling of a court. In Figueroa, the Court
has emphasized that estoppel by laches only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu in Tijam.
Clearly, then, in Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has
only been raised during the execution stage, specifically when the
matter of the trial court’s denial of the surety’s motion to quash the
writ of execution has been brought to the appellate court for review.
Here, the trial court’s assumption of unauthorized jurisdiction over
the probate proceedings has been discovered by the Court during
the appeal stage of the main case, not during the execution stage of
a final and executory decision. Thus, the exceptional rule laid down
in Tijam cannot apply.
G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002
GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL,
respondents.
Facts:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradel
entered and occupied petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration
No. A1613302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As
shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of
P5,240. Petitioner informed respondent that the land was his, and
requested the latter to vacate the land. However, despite repeated
demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to
leave the land. On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a
complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages
and Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two others,
namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner and the Ruenas
executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's
basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this
agreement, the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to
respect the ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private
respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was
declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On
May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and private
respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the lot.
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial,
alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio
Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the
complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as
landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible
to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the
motion for new trial.
Private respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for
Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion
for New Trial. The RTC again denied the Petition. Private respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he alleged that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the case since the value of the land is only
P5,240, which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, the
RTC denied the MR. Private respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals, a petition for certiorari which the latter granted.
Issues: 1) Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
2) WON the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of RTC after he has successfully sought affirmative
relief therefrom ?
Held:
1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on
Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129.
2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be
unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may
become a tool of injustice. Private respondent, an unschooled
farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of
the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a
Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did
not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the
complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He then filed
a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He
filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the
same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration
of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first
time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied.
Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction,
not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case, was
still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for
new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his
two motions for reconsideration. The fundamental rule is that, the
lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by
the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by
their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of
the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even
on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC
should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE
LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Facts
Present case is an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. ---i.e.,
petitioner MDC filed a complaint for specific performance against
City Land to compel the latter to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of
the former. Petitioner also alleged that respondent City Land forfeited
their tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing
damages amounting to P78,750,000.00. Said amount was alleged in
the BODY of the complaint but was not reiterated in the PRAYER.
Petitioner paid a docket fee of P410.00 based on the allegation that
their action is primarily for specific performance and is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The Court ruled that there is an under-
assessment of docket fees, and thus ordered petitioner to amend its
complaint. With leave of court petitioner complied and lowered the
amount of claim for damages to P10M, which was again not state in
the PRAYER (but stated in the BODY).
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was
possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the
prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering
the amount of damages as alleged in the original complain
Issue:
Whether jurisdiction is acquired when correct docket fee has
not been paid?
Held: NO
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled
"that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court . Thus, in the present
case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the
payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment
of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For an
legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed
which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the
amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions
taken by the trial court are null and void.
 To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi
case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.