1
65.7 (Certiorari 7) order of dismissal. CA held in favour of the
Joaquin Ga, Jr., Judith Ga Gadnanan And Jesusa
Ga Esmaña, Vs. Spouses Antonio Tubungan And
Rosalinda Tubungan And Norberto Ga
G.R. No. 182185, September 18, 2009, YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J
Petition For Review On Certiorari
ER: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Property and Ownership of a parcel of land before the
COSLAP. It ruled in petitioner’s favour. Respondents
filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Preliminary
Injunction, Quieting of Title and Damages with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional
Trial Court, which dismissed the petition on the ground
that COSLAP is a co-equal body. Respondents later
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which ruled
in their favour. It ruled that although respondents
should have filed the petition for certiorari before the
CA, nevertheless COSLAP decision could not attain
finality because it lack jurisdiction.
SC: The CA is correct. In Sy v. COSLAP, if Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy due to
grave abuse of discretion it should have been brought
to the CA. In this case, while respondents availed of
the correct remedy, they sought the same from the
wrong court (RTC). This mistake would have rendered
the assailed COSLAP decision final and executory,
were it not for its patent nullity and invalidity because
COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the case, making its
decision void. A nullity is correctible only through a
petition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari that seeks
the nullification of a void judgment cannot be
dismissed for timeliness as the same does not
prescribe. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body
without jurisdiction is void. It can never become final
and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question.
FACTS:
Petitioner Joaquin Ga, Jr. filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Property and Ownership of a parcel of
land, known as Assessor's Lot No. 117, against
respondent Norberto Ga before the COSLAP. The
complaint was subsequently re-filed by petitioner
Joaquin's daughters. COSLAP rendered judgment
declaring petitioner Joaquin and his heirs as the lawful
owners of the disputed lot.
Norberto, together with the Tubungans filed a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Preliminary
Injunction, Quieting of Title and Damages with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the
Regional Trial Court, which dismissed the petition. It
held that it had no jurisdiction to nullify the COSLAP
decision, as the same would be an interference with a
co-equal and coordinate body.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court's
respondents. CA noted that respondents erred in filing
a petition for certiorari before the trial court when they
assailed the validity of the COSLAP. According to the
appellate court, respondents should have directly filed
the petition with the Court of Appeals, and not the trial
court. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that
suspension of the rules on appeal was warranted,
considering that the determination of respondents'
substantive rights over the disputed lot far outweighs
any procedural lapse that may have been committed. It
also held that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the
case.
Due to respondents' procedural lapse,
petitioners contend that the COSLAP decision had
become final and executory.
ISSUE: W/N the appellate court erred in relaxing the
rules on appeal considering its findings that
respondents failed to avail of the proper remedy before
the appropriate court from the adverse decision of the
COSLAP
HELD: NO, CA is correct.
In Sy v. Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems, the Court held that all appeals from
orders, resolutions or decisions of the COSLAP should
be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. If a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
is the prescribed remedy due to grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction, the same should also
be brought to the Court of Appeals, as the said court
cannot be bypassed without running afoul of the
doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this case, respondents
did not timely appeal the COSLAP decision to the
Court of Appeals via Rule 43, and instead filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, although with the
Regional Trial Court, a body that is co-equal with the
COSLAP. Only later did they file a petition for certiorari
with the appellate court assailing the trial court's
dismissal of their petition.
In other words, while respondents availed of the
correct remedy, they sought the same from the
wrong court. This mistake would have rendered the
assailed COSLAP decision final and executory, were it
not for its patent nullity and invalidity.
A nullity is correctible only through a petition for
certiorari. A petition for certiorari that seeks the
nullification of a void judgment cannot be
dismissed for timeliness as the same does not
prescribe. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial
body without jurisdiction is void. It can never
become final and executory, hence, an appeal is
out of the question.
In the instant case, COSLAP had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of petitioners' complaint. The
disputed lot was not shown to be public land and the

nature of the dispute is not among those which fall
under the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Executive Order
No. 561 enumerates the instances when COSLAP
may exercise adjudicatory functions.
As stated earlier, a void judgment can never be final
and executory and may be assailed at any time. It is
thus clear that the Court of Appeals did not err in
taking cognizance of respondents' petition for certiorari
as the judgment of the COSLAP could not have
attained finality. In other words, the failure of
respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP
decision before the appropriate court was not fatal to
the petition for certiorari that they eventually filed with
the Court of Appeals. The latter remedy remained
available despite the lapse of the period to appeal from
the void COSLAP decision.
65.8 (Certiorari 8)
BANK OF COMMERCE vs. RADIO PHILIPPINES
NETWORK, INC., INTERCONTINENTAL
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, and BANAHA W
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, THRU BOARD
OF ADMINISTRATOR, and SHERIFF BIENVENIDO
S. REYES, JR., Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 98
G.R. No. 195615, April 21, 2014, ABAD, J
ER: TRB and Bancommerce entered into a
Purchase and Assumption Agreement, whereby
Bancommerece acquired TRB’s specified assets
and liabilities, excluding liabilities arising from
judicial actions which were to be covered by the
BSP-mandated escrow of ₱50 million (placed in
by TRB at Metrobank). In a case, SC ordered
TRB to pay respondents RPN et.al damages of
P9M. But, RPN filed a Supplemental Motion for
Execution where they described TRB as "now
Bank of Commerce" based on the assumption
that TRB had been merged into Bancommerce.
RTC ruled in RPN’s favour. CA affirmed the RTC
with modification, by deleting the phrase that
there is merger between TRB and Bancommerce.
However, RTC still issued alias writ of execution
on the premise that the CA Decision allowed it to
execute on the assets. Bancommerce sought
reconsideration of RTC order, but RTC issued
assailed ordering the sheriff to garnish
Bancommerce monies. Bancommerce
immediately elevated the RTC Order to the CA
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail
the Orders. The CA dismissed the petition
outright for the supposed failure of Bancommerce
to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
order.
SC: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides that a petition for certiorari may only be
filed when there is no plain, speedy, and
2
adequate remedy in the course of law. Since a
motion for reconsideration is generally regarded
as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the
failure to first take recourse to is usually regarded
as fatal omission. But Bancommerce invoked
certain recognized exceptions to the rule. In this
case, the records amply show that
Bancommerce’s action fell within the recognized
exceptions to the need to file a motion for
reconsideration before filing a petition for
certiorari.First, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration would be redundant. Second, an
urgent necessity for the immediate resolution of
the case by the CA existed because any further
delay would have greatly prejudiced
Bancommerce. The Sheriff had been resolute and
relentless in trying to execute the judgment and
dispose of the levied assets of Bancommerce.
FACTS:
In late 2001 the Traders Royal Bank
(TRB) proposed to sell to petitioner Bank of
Commerce (Bancommerce) for ₱10.4 billion its
banking business consisting of specified assets
and liabilities. Bancommerce agreed subject to
prior Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' (BSP's)
approval of their Purchase and Assumption (P &
A) Agreement. BSP approved that agreement
subject to the condition that Bancommerce and
TRB would set up an escrow fund of P5O million
with another bank to cover TRB liabilities for
contingent claims that may subsequently be
adjudged against it, which liabilities were
excluded from the purchase. TRB placed ₱50
million in escrow with Metrobank to answer for
those claims and liabilities that were excluded
from the P & A Agreement and remained with
TRB. Accordingly, the BSP finally approved such
agreement.
In the case of TRP v Radio Phil Network,
SC ordered TRB to pay respondents actual
damages of ₱9,790,716.87. RPN, et al.filed a
motion for execution against TRB before RTC
QC. But rather than pursue a levy in execution of
the corresponding amounts on escrow with
Metrobank, RPN, et al. filed a Supplemental
Motion for Execution where they described TRB
as "now Bank of Commerce" based on the
assumption that TRB had been merged into
Bancommerce. Bancommerce denied the merger.
RTC issued an Order granting and issuing
the writ of execution to cover any and all assets of
TRB, "including those subject of the
merger/consolidation in the guise of a Purchase
and Sale Agreement with Bank of Commerce,
and/or against the Escrow Fund established by
TRB and Bank of Commerce with the
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company."
This prompted Bancommerce to file a
petition for certiorari with the CA. CA denied the

petition. The CA pointed out that the Decision of
the RTC was clear in that Bancommerce was not
being made to answer for the liabilities of TRB,
but rather the assets or properties of TRB under
its possession and custody. CA modified the
Decision of the RTC by deleting the phrase that
the P & A Agreement between TRB and
Bancommerce is a farce or "a mere tool to
effectuate a merger and/or consolidation between
TRB and BANCOM." (note: CA affirmed RTC but
with modification)
RPN, et al. filed with the RTC a motion to
cause the issuance of an alias writ of execution
against Bancommerce based on the CA Decision.
The RTC granted the motion on the premise that
the CA Decision allowed it to execute on the
assets that Bancommerce acquired from TRB
under their P & A Agreement.
Bancommerce sought reconsideration of
the RTC Order considering that the CA Decision
actually declared that no merger existed between
TRB and Bancommerce.
RTC issued the assailed Order denying
Bancommerce pleas and, among others, directing
the release to the Sheriff of Bancommerce’s
"garnished monies and shares of stock or their
monetary equivalent.
Bancommerce immediately elevated
the RTC Order to the CA via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the Orders.
The CA dismissed the petition outright for the
supposed failure of Bancommerce to file a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed
order.
ISSUE: W/N the CA gravely erred in holding that
Bancommerce had no valid excuse in failing to
file the required motion for reconsideration of the
assailed RTC Order before coming to the CA
HELD: YES
Direct filing of the petition for certiorari by
Bancommerce
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides
that a petition for certiorari may only be filed when
there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the course of law. Since a motion for
reconsideration is generally regarded as a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy, the failure to first
take recourse to is usually regarded as fatal
omission.
But Bancommerce invoked certain recognized
exceptions to the rule. It had to forego the filing of
the required motion for reconsideration of the
assailed RTC Order because a) there was an
urgent necessity for the CA to resolve the
questions it raised and any further delay would
prejudice its interests; b) under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would have been useless; c) Bancommerce
had been deprived of its right to due process
when the RTC issued the challenged order ex
3
parte, depriving it of an opportunity to object; and
d) the issues raised were purely of law.
In this case, the records amply show that
Bancommerce’s action fell within the recognized
exceptions to the need to file a motion for
reconsideration before filing a petition for
certiorari.
First. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration would be redundant since
actually the RTC’s August 18, 2010 Order
amounts to a denial of Bancommerce motion for
reconsideration of the February 19, 2010 Order
which granted the application for the issuance of
the alias writ.
Significantly, the alias writ of execution itself, the
quashal of which was sought by Bancommerce
two times (via a motion to quash the writ and a
supplemental motion to quash the writ) derived its
existence from the RTC’s Order. Another motion
for reconsideration would have been superfluous.
The RTC had not budge on those issues in the
preceding incidents. There was no point in
repeatedly asking it to reconsider.
Second. An urgent necessity for the
immediate resolution of the case by the CA
existed because any further delay would have
greatly prejudiced Bancommerce. The Sheriff
had been resolute and relentless in trying to
execute the judgment and dispose of the levied
assets of Bancommerce. Indeed, the Sheriff
started garnishing Bancommerce’s deposits in
other banks.
Further, the Sheriff forcibly levied on
Bancommerce’s Lipa Branch cash on hand
amounting to ₱1,520,000.00 and deposited the
same with the Landbank. He also seized the
bank’s computers, printers, and monitors, causing
the temporary cessation of its banking operations
in that branch and putting the bank in an
unwarranted danger of a run. Clearly,
Bancommerce had valid justifications for
skipping the technical requirement of a
motion for reconsideration.
OTHER ISSUE: (Corporation Law)
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in failing to
rule that the RTC’s Order of execution against
Bancommerce was a nullity because the CA
Decision of December 8, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP
91258 held that TRB had not been merged into
Bancommerce as to make the latter liable for
TRB’s judgment debts.—YES
Indubitably, it is clear that no merger took place
between Bancommerce and TRB as the
requirements and procedures for a merger
were absent. A merger does not become
effective upon the mere agreement of the
constituent corporations. All the requirements
specified in the law must be complied with in
order for merger to take effect. Section 79 of the
Corporation Code further provides that the merger

shall be effective only upon the issuance by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of a
certificate of merger. Here, Bancommerce and
TRB remained separate corporations with distinct
corporate personalities.
The transaction between TRB and Bancommerce
was neither a merger nor a de facto merger (as
argued by dissenting Justices) but a mere "sale of
assets with assumption of liabilities,".
Dissenting opinions argued that the CA’s
modification of the RTC Order merely deleted an
opinion there expressed and not reversed such
order.
However, it should be the substance of the CA’s
modification of the RTC Order that should control,
not some technical flaws that are taken out of
context. Clearly, the RTC’s basis for holding
Bancommerce liable to TRB was its finding
that TRB had been merged into
Bancommerce, making the latter liable for
TRB’s debts to RPN, et al. Since it has been
concluded that there is no merger, there’s no
basis for making Bancommerce liable.
B.PROHIBITION
65.9 (Prohibition #1)
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF
MANDALUYONG CITY
G.R. No. 156684 ; April 6, 2011;BERSAMIN, J.
Appeal
ER: Sps Yusay owned a parcel of land. Sangguniang
Panglusod of Mandaluyong adopted Resolution 552
authorizing Mayor Abalos to take the necessary legal
steps for expropriation of the land. Sps Yusay filed
petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC,
praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552. The
City countered that the case is premature. RTC at first
dismissed the petition opining that certiorari does not
lie against a city’s legislative act, but it later reversed
its decision and held that Resolution 552 is null and
void.
SC: Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of
a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod.
Resolution No. 552 is a legislative and policy-making
act, not a judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Furthermore, there can be no abused of discretion in
expressing its opinion or sentiment. Prohibition does
not lie against expropriation. Aside from the fact that
the Resolution is not a judicial function, there is a bar
for prohibition against expropriation. This bar against
prohibition comes from the nature of the power of
eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private
land intended for public use, and the interest of the
affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the
power of the State. Only when the landowners are not
given their just compensation for the taking of their
property or when there has been no agreement on the
4
amount of just compensation may the remedy of
prohibition become available. Moreover, the case is
premature because the LGC requires an ordinance for
expropriation not a mere resolution.
FACTS:
Sps Yusay owned a parcel of land, half of their
land they used as their residence, and the rest they
rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land
was their only property and only source of income.
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552,
Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin
S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the
expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the
purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the
less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
Notwithstanding that the enactment of
Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the City’s
exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under
Section 19 of the LGC , the petitioners became
alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of
Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional,
confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.
The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a
mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate
the legal steps towards expropriation, thus case is
premature.
The RTC at first ruled in favor of the City and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit, opining that
certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City
Government, because the special civil action of
certiorari was only available to assail judicial or quasi-
judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; that the special civil action of
prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances
considering that the act of passing the resolution was
not a judicial, or quasi-judicial, or ministerial act. But
RTC later reversed its decision, thus declaring
Resolution 522 as null and void.
City appealed to the CA. CA ruled in favour of the City
based on presumption of regularity.
ISSUE: W/N the action for certiorari and prohibition
commenced by the petitioners in the RTC was a
proper recourse of the petitioners.
HELD: NO
1. Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of a
resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod
For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the petitioner must
allege and establish the concurrence of the following
requisites, namely:
(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;
(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and
(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law
Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against
the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part
of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving
legally demandable and enforceable rights when it
adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and
policy-making body declaring its sentiment or opinion.
Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its
discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552. To
demonstrate the absence of abuse of discretion, it is
well to differentiate between a resolution and an
ordinance. No rights can be conferred by and be
inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an
embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in
the light of attendant circumstances. In simply
expressing its sentiment or opinion through the
resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in
no way abused its discretion, least of all gravely, for its
expression of sentiment or opinion was a
constitutionally protected right.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local
Government Code) required the City to pass an
ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation proceeding.
2. Prohibition does not lie against expropriation
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful
and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to
provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice.
The writ of prohibition is directed against proceedings
that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal
or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The petitioner must further
allege in the petition and establish facts to show that
any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.
A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects
of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior
court.
The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that
prohibition was not available to the petitioners as a
remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552, for
the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by such adoption, was
not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, but only expressing its collective sentiment
or opinion.
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure
whereby the immediate possession of the land under
expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided
always that due provision is made to secure the
prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation
to the owner. . This bar against prohibition comes
from the nature of the power of eminent domain as
5
necessitating the taking of private land intended
for public use, and the interest of the affected
landowner is thus made subordinate to the power
of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its
power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review
becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to
determine the appropriate amount of just
compensation to be paid to the affected landowners.
Only when the landowners are not given their just
compensation for the taking of their property or
when there has been no agreement on the amount
of just compensation may the remedy of
prohibition become available.
Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not
called for, because the case is premature considering
that only a resolution expressing the desire of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the
petitioners’ property was issued.
65.10 (Prohibition 2)
FRANCISCO Q. AURILLO, JR., vs. NOEL RABI, and
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 9, Tacloban
City,
G. R. No. 120014 - November 26, 2002- CALLEJO,
SR., J
Petition For Review On Certiorari
ER: Rabi was arrested without a warrant for violation
of PD 1866. The Public Prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause,
however, Regional State Prosecutor Aurillo order the
conduct of a new preliminary investigation. Upon
knowing of such action when he received the
subpoena, Rabi filed with the RTC of Tacloban City a
petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order, but it
failed to resolve the matter of writ of preliminary
injunction, instead asked the parties to submit their
memoranda. Nevertheless, the assistant regional state
prosecutor continued with his preliminary investigation
and thereafter, filed an Information against Rabi . The
trial court nullified the preliminary investigation of I.S.
No. 95-043 by the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor and the Information filed with the RTC
against Rabi.
SC: RTC did not commit any error in nullifying not only
the preliminary investigation but also the Information.
The RTC is possessed of residual power to restore the
parties to their status before Aurillo proceeded with the
preliminary investigation, and grant in favor of the
aggrieved party such other relief as may be proper.
Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give complete
relief not only by preventing what remains to be done
but by undoing what has been done. Although the
general rule is that a writ of prohibition issues only to
restrain the commission of a future act, and not to
undo an act already performed, where anything

remains to be done by the court, prohibition will give
complete relief, not only by preventing what remains to
be done but by undoing what has been done
FACTS:
Noel Rabi was arrested without a warrant of
arrest and charged in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Tacloban City with violation of PD No. 1866
(possession of unlicensed firearm). The matter was
docketed as I.S. No. 95-043. Public Prosecutor
Zenaida Camonical Isidro conducted an inquest
investigation of the case and issued a resolution
recommending that the case be dismissed for lack of
probable cause.
However, Regional State Prosecutor
Francisco Aurillo, Jr. decided to assume jurisdiction
over the case and to order the conduct of a new
preliminary investigation thereof. He issued a Regional
Memorandum Order to the City Prosecutor of
Tacloban City directing him to elevate to his office the
complete records of I.S. No. 95-043. Aurillo designated
the assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct the
new preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor of
Tacloban complied with the order of Aurillo, the
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor issued a
subpoena notifying Rabi of the preliminary
investigation.
When served with the subpoena, Rabi was
aghast at the sudden turn of events. On the same date
his counsel filed with the RTC of Tacloban City a
petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, he
alleged that the a regional state prosecutor was vested
only with administrative supervision over the city
prosecutor and had no power to motu proprio review,
revise, or modify the resolution of the city prosecutor.
Thus, he averred that Aurillo acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction. Rabi thus prayed that, pending
resolution of his plea for a writ of preliminary
injunction, a temporary restraining order be issued to
enjoin Aurillo.
The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining
Order, enjoining and prohibiting Aurillo and all others
acting for and in his behalf from taking over and
conducting a new preliminary investigation of I.S. No.
95-043 until the court shall have resolved the motion
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC failed to resolve the matter of writ of
preliminary injunction. Instead, the RTC issued an
order directing the parties to file their respective
memoranda Nevertheless, the assistant regional
state prosecutor continued with his preliminary
investigation of I.S. No. 95-043. Thereafter, with
Aurillos approval, he filed with the RTC an Information
against Rabi for violation of PD 1866.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Rabi.
The trial court nullified the preliminary
6
investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 by the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor and the Information
filed with the RTC against Rabi. It also ordered
Aurillo to pay moral damages, exemplary damages an
attorneys fees.
ISSUE: W/N the Information filed by Aurillo against
Rabi with the RTC for violation of PD 1866 may be
nullified by said court
HELD:YES
Aurillo argues that although the RTC had issued a
Temporary Restraining Order, the same had lapsed
without the court issuing any preliminary injunction.
There was thus no legal bar for the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor to proceed with and
terminate the preliminary investigation and thereafter
to file the Information against private respondent even
while the petition for prohibition was still pending
before the RTC.
The pendency of the special civil action for
prohibition before the trial court did not interrupt
the investigation in I.S. No. 95-043. It goes without
saying, however, that in proceeding with the
preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and
terminating the same, Aurillo did so subject to the
outcome of the petition for prohibition. In this case,
the RTC granted the petition of Rabi, declared Aurillo
bereft of authority to take over the preliminary
investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and nullified the
preliminary investigation conducted by Aurillo as well
as the Information thereafter filed by him. The RTC is
possessed of residual power to restore the parties
to their status before Aurillo proceeded with the
preliminary investigation, and grant in favor of the
aggrieved party such other relief as may be proper.
Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give
complete relief not only by preventing what
remains to be done but by undoing what has been
done. The Court has authority to grant any
appropriate relief within the issues presented by
the pleadings of the parties:
Generally, the relief granted in a prohibition proceeding
is governed by the nature of the grievance proved and
the situation at the time of judgment. Although the
general rule is that a writ of prohibition issues only
to restrain the commission of a future act, and not
to undo an act already performed, where anything
remains to be done by the court, prohibition will
give complete relief, not only by preventing what
remains to be done but by undoing what has been
done. Under some statutes, the court must grant the
appropriate relief whatever the proceeding is called if
facts stating ground for relief are pleaded. Although
prohibition is requested only as to a particular
matter, the court has authority to grant any
appropriate relief within the issues presented by
the pleadings. If the application for prohibition is too
broad, the court may mould the writ and limit it to as

much as is proper to be granted. In the exercise of its
jurisdiction to issue writs, the court has, as a
necessary incident thereto, the power to make such
incidental order as may be necessary to maintain its
jurisdiction and to effectuate its final judgment. The
court may retain jurisdiction of the cause to enable it to
make an appropriate order in the future, even though
the petition for a writ of prohibition is dismissed.
Hence, the RTC did not commit any error in nullifying
not only the preliminary investigation by the Office of
the Regional State Prosecutor in I.S. No. 95-043 for
want of authority but also the Information approved by
Aurillo and filed with the Regional Trial Court.
OTHER ISSUES
1. W/N the petition filed by Rabi with the RTC
was premature; -YES
As a general rule, the aggrieved party is mandated to
first exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a
judicial action for redress from acts of administrative
bodies or offices in the performance of their quasi-
judicial functions; otherwise, said action may be
dismissed for prematurity. However, the principle is not
without exceptions. The present case calls for the
exception. It is because time is of the essence, where
judicial intervention was imperative, and Aurillo acted
without authority and with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when he
took over motu proprio the preliminary investigation.
2. W/N Aurillo is empowered to motu proprio take
over and conduct a preliminary investigation of I.S
No. 95-043 –NO
Aurillos reliance on Section 8, paragraph (b) of PD
1275 is misplaced. Said law provides that a regional
state prosecutor exercises immediate administrative
supervision.Supervision is different from control. In this
case, when Aurillo motu proprio took over the
preliminary investigation, he exercised not only
administrative supervision but control over the city
prosecutor in the performance of the latters quasi-
judicial functions
3. W/N Aurillo is liable for damages and
attorneys fees to Rabi.—NO
The fact is that the RTC did not issue any writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining Aurillo from proceeding
with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043.
Aurillos act of proceeding with the preliminary
investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and of filing the
Information were not in disregard of the authority of the
RTC, but were done in the belief that, absent any
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction, he was authorized to do so.
65.11 (Prohibition 3)
THE NACIONALISTA PARTY vs. FELIX ANGELO
BAUTISTA, Solicitor General of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-3452;December 7, 1949; PADILLA, J
7
ER: While, Bautista holds the office of the SolGen, he
was designated by the President as acting member of
the COMELEC, he intend to exercise both functions.
Petitioner contend that the designation is unlawful
because there is no vacancy to begin with and in
addition, the petitioner cannot hold both office at the
same time. Thus, petitioner prayed for issuance of writ
of prohibition commanding the respondent Solicitor
General to desist from acting as acting member of the
COMELEC.
SC: Prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de
facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent
a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court. The
proper remedy should be in the nature of quo
warranto. In the case at bar, however, the
respondent's designation to act temporarily a member
of the Commission on Elections is unlawful and as
such no one is entitled now to the office and a party
who is not entitled to the office may not institute quo
warrant proceedings, and the respondent as Solicitor
General, the only other party who may institute the
proceedings, would not proceed against himself. It is
incumbent upon and the duty of this Court to grant a
remedy, which is prohibition to prevent the exercise of
powers.
FACTS:
On 9 November 1949, while the respondent
held, as he still holds, the office of Solicitor General of
the Philippines, the President designated him as acting
member of the Commission on Elections, and on that
same date the respondent took the oath of office and
proceeded to assume and perform the duties of the
office; that at the time of the respondent's designation
he had not resigned from the office of Solicitor General
of the Philippines nor does he intend to do so but
continues to exercise all the powers and duties of the
last mentioned office.
It is contended that such designation invalid,
illegal, and unconstitutional, because there was on 9
November 1949 no vacancy in the Commission on
Elections, for the acceptance, approval, or granting of
the application for retirement filed by Commissioner
Francisco Enage on such date constitutes or amounts
to abuse of discretion and was done in bad faith by the
President and therefore null and void; and because
Commissioner Enage is entitled to leave and until after
the expiration of such leave he does not cease to be a
member of the Commission on Elections. In addition,
membership in the Commission is a permanent
constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and therefore,
no designation of a person or officer in an acting
capacity could and can be made; because a member
of the Commission cannot at the same time hold any
other office; and because the respondents as Solicitor
General belongs to the executive department and
cannot assume the powers and duties of a member in
the Commission.

The respondent contends that his designation
is lawful and valid, not only because the power to
appoint vested in the President includes the power to
designate, but also because it is expressly so provided
in Commonwealth Act No. 588; and that the offices
held by him, one permanent and the other temporary,
are not incompatible.
Petitioner now prays that after due hearing a
writ of prohibition issue commanding the respondent
Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting
member of the Commission on Election under the
designation rendered to him by President Quirino on
November 9, 1949 unless he is legally appointed as
regular member of the said Commission on Elections
ISSUE: W/N writ of prohibition is the proper remedy in
this case
HELD:YES
Strictly speaking, there are no proceedings of the
Commission on Elections in the exercise of its judicial
or ministerial functions, which are being performed by
it or without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of its discretion. The only basis for the
petition is that the designation of the respondent as
temporary member of the Commission on Elections is
illegal and invalid because it offends against the
Constitution. This special civil action as our Rule call it,
or this extraordinary legal remedy following the
classical or chancery nomenclature, is in effect to test
the validity or legality of the respondent's designation
in a temporary capacity as member of the Commission
on Elections pending the appointment of a permanent
member or Commissioner. It is in the nature of a quo
warranto, and as such it may only be instituted by the
party who claims to be entitled to the office. The
authorities and decisions of courts are almost
unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine
the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only
function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction
by a subordinate court In the case at bar, however,
as we have found that the respondent's designation to
act temporarily a member of the Commission on
Elections is unlawful because it offends against the
provision of the Constitution creating the Commission
on Elections, the dismissal of the petition would deny
and deprive the parties that are affected by such
designation of a remedy and relief, because no one is
entitled now to the office and a party who is not
entitled to the office may not institute quo warrant
proceedings, and the respondent as Solicitor General,
the only other party who may institute the proceedings,
would not proceed against himself. In these
circumstances, it is incumbent upon and the duty
of this Court to grant a remedy. There are cases
involving a situation similar to the one under the
consideration wherein it was ruled that the remedy
of prohibition may lie. In his treatise entitled "
8
Extraordinary Legal Remedies," High on this point
says:
Thus, when the legislature have, by an unconstitutional
statute, referred to a body of judges the determination
of the validity of a statute concerning the liability of the
state upon bonds issued in aid of railways, prohibition
will lie to prevent such body from acting upon the
matters thus submitted. So when an act of legislature
delegates to a judge powers partly judicial and partly of
a legislative character, as regards the determination of
petitions for the incorporation of villages, the act being
held unconstitutional because assuming to
delegate legislative powers to a court or judicial
body, prohibition will lie to prevent the exercise of
the powers thus conferred.
OTHER ISSUES:
· The position of the Commissioner is vacant
because Commissioner Enage filed an application
for retirement without filing for leave.
· By the very nature of their functions, the
members of the Commission on Elections must be
independent. That independence and impartiality
may be shaken and destroyed by a designation of
a person or officer to act temporarily in the
Commission on Elections. It would be more in
keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the
framers of the Constitution to appoint a
permanent Commissioner than to designated,
tested by the nature and character of the
functions he has to perform in both offices, but
in the broad sense there is an incompatibility,
because his duties and functions as Solicitor
General require that all his time be devoted to
their efficient performance.
65.12 (Prohibition 4)
MARCELO ENRIQUEZ v. HIGINIO B. MACADAEG,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
MELITON YBURAN, and THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. L-2422. September 30, 1949. REYES, J
Petition For A Writ Of Mandamus
ER: In a civil case, Yburan filed a suit before RTC
Cebu to declare himself as owner of a real property
located in Negros Oriental. Enriquez moved to
dismissed the case on the ground of improper venue.
The motion having been denied, Enriquez filed the
present petition for mandamus to compel the
respondent judge to dismiss the action.
SC: The venue is improperly laid and the motion to
dismiss should be granted. However, when a motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue is
erroneously denied, mandamus is not the proper
remedy for correcting the error. It being a case where a
judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court
by refusing to dismiss an action which should not be
maintained in his court, the remedy is prohibition. But,

the petition for mandamus may be treated as
prohibition in the interest of a speedy administration of
justice.
FACTS:
The civil case in question is for the recovery of a piece
of real property situated in Negros Oriental, the
complaint alleging that the said property had been
bought by Yburan at an execution sale but that,
notwithstanding the sale, the judgment debtor, as
supposed owner of said property, subsequently
mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank
and refused to surrender possession thereof to
Yburan, whereupon, the latter brought suit (Yburan v
Enriquez) before RTC Cebu to have himself declared
owner of said property and placed in possession
thereof. Before filing their answer, the Enriquez in that
case moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground, among others, that, as the action concerned
title to and possession of real estate situated in Negros
Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. The motion having been
denied, Enriquez filed the present petition for
mandamus to compel the respondent judge to
dismiss the action.
ISSUE:W/N mandamus is the proper remedy
HELD: NO. It is prohibition.
Rule 5 (old rule) requires that actions affecting title to
or recovery of possession of real property be
commenced and tried in the province where the
property lies, while Rule 8, provides that defendant
may, within the time for pleading, file a motion to
dismiss the action when "venue is improperly laid." As
the action sought to be dismissed affects title to and
the recovery of possession of real property situated in
Oriental Negros, it is obvious that the action was
improperly brought in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The motion to dismiss was therefore proper and
should have been granted.
But, while the respondent judge committed a
manifest error in denying the motion, mandamus
is not the proper remedy for correcting that error,
for this is not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office"
or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right." (Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of
Court.) It is rather a case where a judge is
proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by
refusing to dismiss an action which would not be
maintained in his court. The remedy in such case
is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is
available in the present case because the order
complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature,
is not appealable.
9
While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well
be treated as one for prohibition by waiving strict
adherence to technicalities in the interest of a speedy
administration of justice pursuant to section 2, Rule 1,
Rules of Court.
C.MANDAMUS
65.13 (Mandamus 1)
NEMESIO M. CALIM vs. THE HONORABLE JESUS
F. GUERRERO, THE HONORABLE EMILIO A.
GONZALEZ III, THE HONORABLE ADORACTION A.
AGBADA, in their respective capacities as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, Director and Graft
Investigation Officer II, THE HONORABLE
ROBERTO J. ACOBA, Vice-Mayor, Siniloan,
Laguna, PAUL SIMON Z. GO, HOMER R.
SERRANO, FELIPE A. EM, ELIGIO R. DE LEON,
FELIPE V. CASTRO, GAUDENCIO C. SALAY,
ANDRES V. QUINTERO, HECTOR A. MANEJA,
SEDFREY B. REALEZA, all members of the
Sangguniang Bayan, Siniloan, Laguna
G.R. No. 156527; March 5, 2007; CHICO-NAZARIO,
J
Petition for Mandamus
ER: Calim operates Eastern Laguna Tours in
Siniloan. However, the private respondents
(members of the Sanggunian) recommended the
cancellation of his business permits. Calim filed a
complaint with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon for violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Sec 5 of RA 6713.
For the matter of RA 6713 violation, the
respondents failed to reply with Calim’s request to
clarify the basis for the cancellation of his permit.
The Ombudsman admonished the private
respondents for such failure, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with
more severely. Calim filed this Petition for
Mandamus before the SC to compel the
Ombudsman to file an Information against the
respondents.
SC: Mandamus will not issue to control or review
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where
the law imposes upon said public officer the right
and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any matter in which he is required to act. The
discretion to prosecute or dismiss a complaint
filed before it is lodged in the Office of the
Ombudsman itself. Furthermore, Calim availed
the wrong remedy, jurisprudence provides that
Rule 43 should be the remedy for Ombudsman’s
decisions on administrative disciplinary cases,
and Petition for Certiorari for criminal cases,
neither provides for mandamus,
FACTS:
Calim operates Eastern Laguna Tours and
Tourist Services in Siniloan, Laguna. Private
respondents are the vice mayor and councillors of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan. Calim filed a

Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon against private
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713.
Calim alleged that he was given a mayor’s
permit from the municipal government of Siniloan,
Laguna, for his tours and tourist services
business but when he applied for registration he
was advised to register as Eastern Laguna Tours
instead of Mabuhay Tours, which was his first
priority. The Sangguniang Bayan due to a letter-
complaint filed against Eastern Tours issued a
Kapasiyahan Blg 81 and unanimously
recommended the cancellation of the municipal
license and permit issued to Eastern Laguna
Tours and Tourist Services. Thus, the operations
of his business ceased, thereby, causing him
injury, and giving unwarranted benefits and
advantage to his competitor, Van on the Run. The
president of Van on the Run is Felipe Castro, who
was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Siniloan, Laguna, and one of the private
respondents herein.
Sanggunian contended that there was
nothing irregular in the issuance of Kapasiyahan
Bilang 81, as the same was merely a request to
the municipal mayor for cancellation of the
mayor’s permit after a finding on their part that
the petitioner violated the terms and conditions
set in the permit.
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon issued a resolution recommending the
dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint for lack of
probable cause. The recommendation was
approved by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,
Jesus F. Guerrero.
Upon Calim’s reconsideration the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman issued a Joint Order.
While dismissing the complaint for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for lack of
probable cause, it however acknowledged that it
committed a reversible error in not taking
consideration of the charge for the violation of
Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713. Ruling on
the matter, the Deputy Ombudsman found that
there was no justification on private respondents’
part in ignoring to reply to petitioner’s letter within
the prescribed time, as specified in Republic Act
No. 6713, and, hence, admonished the private
respondents for such failure, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with
more severely. (note: Sanggunian did not reply to
Calim’s letter requesting to clarify basis for
cancelling his permit, so Ombudsman
admonished them. The Ombudsman refused to
accept private respondents reason for failure to
reply is due to computer problems)
10
Calim filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus, seeking to compel the public
respondents to file the appropriate information for
violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713,
against private respondents Sangguniang Bayan
members of Siniloan, Laguna. According to him,
the Complaint was for a criminal offense, and not
simply a case of administrative misfeasance.
(note: Calim was not satisfied with mere
admonishment)
ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman can be compelled
by mandamus to file an Information against the
private respondents
HELD: NO
It is elementary that mandamus applies as a
remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded
clearly on law and not when it is doubtful. A writ of
mandamus can be issued only when petitioner’s
legal right to the performance of a particular act
which is sought to be compelled is clear and
complete. A clear legal right is a right which is
indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a
matter of law. Mandamus, therefore, is employed
to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a
discretionary duty.
Mandamus will not issue to control or review the
exercise of discretion of a public officer where the
law imposes upon said public officer the right and
duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
matter in which he is required to act.
Essentially, what petitioner attacks in the instant
Petition for Mandamus is the order of the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in
admonishing the private respondents. The case
partakes of an administrative disciplinary nature.
Herein, petitioner was not able to establish his
entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Petitioner fails
to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to
compel the public respondents to file a criminal
information against the private respondents.
Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not
interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without
good and compelling reasons to indicate
otherwise. The discretion to prosecute or dismiss
a complaint filed before it is lodged in the Office of
the Ombudsman itself. To compel the
Ombudsman to further pursue a criminal case
against the private respondents, as petitioner
would have it, is outside the ambit of the courts.
A graver reason that impels this court to reject
petitioner’s plea is the mode taken by petitioner in
elevating the case to this court. In the case of
Fabian v. Desierto, this court ruled that appeals, if
availing, from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be brought to the Court of Appeals under
the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Meanwhile, the Court in Kuizon v. Ombudsman

instructed that petitions for certiorari questioning
the Ombudsman’s orders or decisions in criminal
cases should be filed in the Supreme Court and
not the Court of Appeals. This is the prevailing
rule. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, in
admonishing the private respondents, deemed
the matter to be one in the nature of an
administrative disciplinary case. The petitioner, in
filing the instant Petition for Mandamus before
this Court, took a route that is antagonistic to
prevailing rules and jurisprudence. (note: criminal
cases-Ombudsman-Petition for Certiorari;
administrative disciplinary cases-Rule 43, thus,
petitioner availed the wrong remedy of
mandamus)
65.14 (Mandamus 2)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, GENER C. ENDONA, and
RHANDOLFO B. AMANSEC vs. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
G.R. Nos. 174902-06, February 15, 2008,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Petition For Mandamus
ER: FFIB,Ombudsman filed complaints against
petitioners with administrative and criminal offenses.
However, years later, the Ombudsman failed to
resolve the case. More than four (4) years after the
parties formally offered their evidence on January 29,
2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss all the
cases against them as respondent’s “inordinate delay”
constitutes a violation of their constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of their cases. Yet, the case
remained unresolved. Petitioners filed the present
petition for mandamus, invoking their constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of their cases. The
Ombudsman averred that mandamus cannot be
resorted to because it is a discretionary function.
SC: Although mandamus is proper only in ministerial
function, SC held that if the questioned act was done
with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or
palpable excess of authority, the writ will be issued to
control the exercise of such discretion. Likewise,
mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek
to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when
mandated by the Constitution. In this case, respondent
acted with grave abuse of discretion for failing to
resolve the case for 8 years.
FACTS:
On May 9, 2000, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB), Office of the Ombudsman, filed with
the Administrative Adjudication Bureau, same Office,
separate Complaints-Affidavits of even date, charging,
among others, herein petitioners with administrative
and criminal offenses (violation of Code of Conduct,
Anti-Graft, and Administrative Code), in connection
with the bidding of the Land Titling Computerization
Project of the LRA.
11
Petitioners then waited for respondent’s resolution
on the parties’ respective formal offers of
evidence, but there was none. This prompted
petitioners to file a Motion to Set Date for the
Simultaneous Filing of Memorandum by Each Party.
Respondent, however, did not act on petitioners’
motion. On December 12, 2002, Edilberto R.
Feliciano, one of those charged with petitioners, filed a
Motion for Early Resolution expressing alarm over the
“inaction of the Office of the Ombudsman,” and praying
that the cases be resolved immediately considering
that all the evidence have been formally offered and
the parties’ arguments have been submitted. Despite
all these and petitioners’ repeated personal follow-
ups, still, respondent failed to resolve the cases.
On March 24, 2006, or six (6) years from the filing of
the complaints- affidavits and more than four (4)
years after the parties formally offered their
evidence on January 29, 2002, petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss all the cases against them as
respondent’s “inordinate delay” constitutes a violation
of their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
their cases. Significantly, complainant FFIB, despite
notice, did not interpose any objection to
petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Yet, the cases have
remained unresolved.
Owing to respondent’s “stubborn inaction,” petitioners
filed the present petition for mandamus, invoking their
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their
cases. Petitioners pray that the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondent, be ordered to dismiss the
administrative and criminal cases against them.
Respondent maintains that it did not violate petitioners’
right to a speedy disposition of their cases; that
petitioners cannot resort to the remedy of mandamus
because dismissing the administrative and criminal
cases against them involves respondent’s exercise of
discretion; and that respondent did not act with grave
abuse of discretion for failing to resolve the cases.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for mandamus is an
appropriate remedy.
HELD: YES
Mandamus is the Appropriate Remedy
Ordinarily, a petition for a writ of mandamus is proper
to compel the public official concerned to perform a
ministerial act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station. However,
it is inaccurate to say that the writ will never issue to
control the public official’s discretion. Our
jurisprudence is replete with exceptions to that rule.
Thus, this Court held that if the questioned act was
done with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice
or palpable excess of authority, the writ will be issued
to control the exercise of such discretion. Likewise,

mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek
to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when
mandated by the Constitution. Thus, a party to a case
may demand expeditious action from all officials who
are tasked with the administration of justice.
Under the undisputed facts before us, we hold that
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by failing to
resolve the administrative and criminal cases against
petitioners even to this day, or a period of almost eight
(8) years from the filing of their complaints- affidavits.
Other Issue:
Whether respondent violated petitioners’ constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of their cases.—YES
When the Constitution enjoins respondent to “act
promptly” on any complaint against any public officer
or employee, it has the concomitant duty to speedily
resolve the same. But respondent did not act
promptly or resolve speedily petitioners’ cases. The
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
requires that the hearing officer is given a definite
period of “not later than thirty (30) days” to resolve
the case after the formal investigation shall have
been concluded.[21] Definitely, respondent did not
observe this 30-day rule.
Here, respondent did not resolve the administrative
and criminal cases against petitioners although the
investigation of the said cases had long been
terminated when the latter formally offered their
evidence way back on January 29, 2002. In fact,
due to respondent’s inaction, petitioners, on March 24,
2006 or more than four (4) years from January 29,
2002. Significantly, this motion was never resisted
by complainant FFIB. Nonetheless, respondent
did not even bother to act on the motion. Likewise,
it did not inform petitioners why the cases remain
unresolved.
65.15 (Mandamus 3)
UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE
G.R. No. 176831; January 15, 2010; NACHURA, J.
Petition For Review On Certiorari Under Rule 45
ER: Lee filed a Petition for mandamus to compel his
mother, Uy, to produce the holographic will of his
father allegedly in Uy’s possession. Uy denied that she
has the custody of the will, and alleged that Lee and
his siblings have its photocopies. After Lee’s
presentation of evidence, Uy demurred, contending
that the pieces of documentary evidence failed to
prove his custody of the will and such won’t suffice to
enjoin a duty to issue the writ of mandamus. RTC
ruled in Uy’s favour. However, the CA upon
reconsideration issued the writ and ordered Uy to
produce the will.
12
SC: CA erred in issuing the writ. Recognized in this
jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be
used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally,
mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract
rights, and will not lie against an individual unless
some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-
public duty is imposed. To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress of
private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the
public. Moreover, an important principle followed in the
issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law other than the remedy of mandamus being
invoked. In the instant case, the Court, without
ascertaining whether the obligation is in the nature of a
public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of
mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee
because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, which is Rule 76.
FACTS:
Alleging that his father passed away and left a
holographic will, which is now in the custody of
petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon
Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages before
the RTC of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the
will so that probate proceedings for the allowance
thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had
already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the
patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their
respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so
without any justifiable reason.
Uy moved to dismissed and denied that she
was in custody of the original holographic will and that
she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted
that photocopies of the will were given to respondent
and to his siblings, further Uy contended that
respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to
amicably settle the controversy.
After the presentation and formal offer of
respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred,
contending that her son failed to prove that she had in
her custody the original holographic will. In addition,
the pieces of documentary evidence did not prove or
disprove that she unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.
RTC at first denied the demurrer, but later
granted it.
The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of
merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue
only in instances when no other remedy would be
available and sufficient to afford redress, in this case
Lee has Rule 76. However, upon reconsideration, it set
aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ and ordered the
production of the will.

Uy now contends in the main that the petition
for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the
testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as
basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in issuing the writ of
mandamus
HELD: YES
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law
of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or
the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal,
or board, or to some corporation or person requiring
the performance of a particular duty therein specified,
which duty results from the official station of the party
to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law.
This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be
resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
performance of duties in which the public has no
interest.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty
to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.
Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt
exists, although objection raising a mere technical
question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the
case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in
the absence of any of the following grounds:
[a] that the court, officer, board, or person against
whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station;
or
[b] that such court, officer, board, or person has
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the
principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations. Generally,
mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private
contract rights, and will not lie against an individual
unless some obligation in the nature of a public or
quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an
individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating
to the public and to the government; hence, it is called
a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress
of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to
the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the
issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law other than the remedy of mandamus being
13
invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only
in cases where the usual modes of procedure and
forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.
Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is
equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally
controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of
the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the
court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily
ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the
production of the original holographic will—is in the
nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the
remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by
respondent Lee because there lies another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a
photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production
of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of
Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting
probate proceedings for the allowance of the will
whether the same is in his possession or not (Rule 76).
65.16 (Mandamus 4)
Hilarion M. Henares, Jr., Victor C. Agustin, Alfredo
L. Henares, Daniel L. Henares, Enrique Belo
Henares, And Cristina Belo Henares Vs. Land
Transportation Franchising And Regulatory Board
And Department Of Transportation And
Communications
G.R. No. 158290; October 23, 2006; Quisumbing, J
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus
ER: Petitioners filed this case for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB, and
DOTC to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel, in
order to counter the detrimental effects of emissions
from PUVs. The SolGen states the mandamus is not
the proper remedy because it is only available in a
ministerial act. Further, RA 8749, which petitioners
invoke does not even mention the existence of CNG as
alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is
amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs,
the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG
as alternative fuel.
SC: The writ should not be issued. For the issuance of
the writ of mandamus it is essential to the issuance of
a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. Mandamus is available only to compel the
doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty.
Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG. Further, mandamus will not
generally lie from one branch of government to a
coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither
is inferior to the other

FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ
of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB, and
DOTC to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Citing statistics on the high growth and low
turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines,
including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine
powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission
of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a
compelling case for judicial action against the bane of
air pollution and related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM)
have caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of
life.
To counter the detrimental effects of
emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of
CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas
comprised mostly of methane which although
containing small amounts of propane and butane, is
colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest
fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants
The Solicitor General, for the respondents,
states the mandamus is not the correct remedy,
explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a
ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an
act done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing
in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke prohibits
the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor
vehicles. It does not even mention the existence of
CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law
is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for
PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use
CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General also
adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement
Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC
Petitioners contend that respondents failure to
recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as
alternative fuel while air pollution brought about by the
emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the
environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect
in the performance of a duty which the law enjoins.
ISSUE: W/N mandamus should be issued against
respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as
alternative fuel
HELD:NO
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1)
against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically
14
enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
the Court said:
“On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a
clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the
act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it
may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely
expressed, it must however, be clear…. The writ
neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply
a command to exercise a power already possessed
and to perform a duty already imposed.”
Petitioners invoked the provisions of the Constitution
and the Clean Air Act, although admitting that both are
general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the
use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG,
there is an executive order implementing a program on
the use of CNG by public vehicles, which is EO 290.
Under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to
set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of
developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are
concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the
LTFRB.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require
PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there
is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB
and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by
E.O. No. 290 "to grant preferential and exclusive
Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises
to operators of NGVs based on the results of the
DOTC surveys."
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one
branch of government to a coordinate branch, for
the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other. The need for future changes in both legislation
and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders
from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is
procedurally infirm.
65.17 (Mandmus 5)
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila
Railroad Company Credit Union, Inc. Vs. Manila
Railroad Company

G.R. No. L-25316; February 28, 1979; FERNANDO,
J their credit unions, then, the law would have so
Appeal
ER: The lower court dismissed the petitioner’s
mandamus petition. Petitioner contends that under the
provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by
credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the
payroll collection from the respondent's employees'
wages and salaries. The appellate court ruled that the
mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to
compel the employer to make the deduction of the
employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this
over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory
character does not convert the credit union's credit into
a first priority credit.
SC: SC agrees with the appellate court. RA 2023
provides no ambiguity that first priority is not given.
Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Kapisanan was
unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on
which he would base his action fails to supply any
basis for this petition. Only specific legal rights may be
enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If
the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well
defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be
dismissed.
FACTS:
Kapisanan seek a reversal of the decision of
the lower court dismissing their mandamus
petition relying on what it considered to be a right
granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023,
more specifically the first two paragraphs (basically
authorizes the member of the co-operative to sign an
agreement authorizing his employer to deduct from his
wages the amount of debt the member owes to the co-
operative) Kapisanan contends that under the above
provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by
credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the
payroll collection from the respondent's employees'
wages and salaries.
The decision of the appellate court provides:
“There is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023
hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation of
laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall
enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees'
wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023
is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries
or wages payable to members of the employees'
cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the
union and to pay the same to the credit union. In other
words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is
only to compel the employer to make the deduction of
the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn
this over to the employees' credit union but this
mandatory character does not convert the credit
union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative
intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act
2023 were to give first priority in the matter of
15
payments to the obligations of employees in favor of
expressly declared.”
Respondent agrees that there is nothing in
said provision from which it could be implied that it
gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that
payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent
company, in issuing the documents which establish the
order of priority of payment out of the salaries of the
employees did not violate the above-quoted Section 62
of Republic Act 2023.
ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the
mandamus petition
HELD: NO
The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023
quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity.
As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant
cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the
lower court to view it otherwise would have been to
alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary.
Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Kapisanan
was unable to show a clear legal right. The very
law on which he would base his action fails to
supply any basis for this petition. "Man-damus is
the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was
neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of
an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or
an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and
enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. The
opinion continued in this wise:"According to former
Chief Justice Moran," only specific legal rights may
be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and
certain. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are
not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition
must be dismissed.
65.18
STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE
AGENCY, INC., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ and
MANUEL V. FERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, MAYOR EDWARD
HAGEDORN and CITY COUNCIL OF PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 181792 April 21, 2014
PETITION: Petition for mandamus
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioners were the owners of two (2) parcels
of land located in Puerto Princesa City. One of the lots

(Lot 7) was taken and used by the national
government as a road right-of-way leading to the
military camp established in Puerto Princesa City.
Petitioners filed an action for Payment of Just
Compensation. RTC br 78 ruled in favor of petitioners
and ordered respondents to pay them just
compensation. A writ of execution was issued.
Respondents initially paid but was unable to pay for
the following months. Petitioners filed a complaint
before the RTC-Br. 223 against respondents for
collection of unpaid just compensation, including
interests and rentals. RTC Br 23 ruled in favor of
petitioners and a writ of execution was issued.
Petitioners wrote a letter to the Commission On Audit
(COA) requesting that it order respondents to pay
petitioners the amount adjudged in the decision of the
RTC-Br. 223 but was denied by COA stating that it had
no jurisdiction over the matter as the case was already
in the execution stage. Hence, petitioners filed petition
for mandamus.
The Supreme Court held that the petition for
mandamus was improper. An important principle
followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should
be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
mandamus being invoked. Considering that the COA
still retained its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate
money claim, petitioners should have filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court pursuant to Section 50 of
P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not
leave the petitioners without any remedy at all.
FACTS:
Star Special Watchman and Detective
Agency, Inc., Celso A. Fernandez and Manuel V.
Fernandez (petitioners) were the owners of two (2)
parcels of land located in Puerto Princesa City. The
national government established a military camp in
Puerto Princesa, known as the Western Command.
One of the lots (Lot 7) of the petitioners was used as a
road right-of-way leading to the military camp.
In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an action
for Payment of Just Compensation against Puerto
Princesa City, Mayor Edward Hagedorn and the City
Council of Puerto Princesa City (respondents).
On July 22, 1993, the RTC-Br. 78 rendered a decision
(RTC-Br. 78 Decision) in favor of petitioners ordering
the defendant Puerto Princesa City to pay them. A writ
of execution was issued which directed respondents to
satisfy the money judgment. The total money judgment
amounted to ₱16,930,892.97 as of October 1995.
Nonetheless, sometime in November 1995, petitioner
Celso A. Fernandez and respondents’ legal counsel,
Atty. Rocamora, met and agreed to reduce the money
judgment to ₱12,000,000.00, subject to the condition
that respondents would pay the amount of ₱2 million in
February 1996 and, thereafter, ₱1 million monthly until
16
fully paid. The ₱1 million monthly payment was further
reduced to ₱500,000.00.
Pursuant thereto, respondents initially appropriated the
amount of ₱2 million representing the initial payment of
petitioners’ claim. On May 10, 1996, however, Celso
Fernandez wrote a letter informing respondents that
after petitioners received the amount of ₱2 million from
them in February 1996, there were no more payments
received for the months of March, April and May 1996.
Records show that the total negotiated amount of ₱12
million was already fully paid and received by
petitioners on the basis of the certification issued by
then City Treasurer of Puerto Princesa, Rogelio L.
Hitosis. Nevertheless, on November 27, 2001,
petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC-Br. 223
(Civil Case No. Q-01-45668) against respondents for
collection of unpaid just compensation, including
interests and rentals, in accordance with the RTC-Br.
78 Decision.
The RTC-Br. 223 rendered its decision in favor of
petitioners. A writ of execution was issued. On
February 14, 2006, petitioners filed a motion to declare
respondents in indirect contempt of court for their
failure to comply with the RTC-Br. 223 decision despite
the issuance of a writ of execution against them.
Petitioners’ motion was denied by the RTC-Br. 223
ruling that government funds may not be subjected to
execution and levy, or to garnishment, unless there
was a corresponding appropriation law or ordinance.
On May 7, 2007, petitioners wrote a letter to the
Commission On Audit (COA) requesting that it order
respondents to pay petitioners the amount adjudged in
the decision of the RTC-Br. 223 but was denied by
COA stating that it had no jurisdiction over the matter
as the case was already in the execution stage.
Undaunted, petitioners filed similar complaints against
respondents before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon and to the Office of the
Undersecretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy of mandamus is proper to
compel herein respondents to comply with the
november 18, 2003 decision of the regional trial court
of quezon city, branch 223 and pay herein petitioners
of the judgment debt stated therein, plus the interests
until fully paid
RULING:
NO.
In Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals it was
held that where a municipality fails or refuses, without
justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money
judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of
the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the
enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefore.

In the case of Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega v.
City of Cebu: The writ is a proper recourse for citizens
who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when
the public right involved is mandated by the
Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs,
mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station. An important principle
followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law other than the
remedy of mandamus being invoked.
Regarding final money judgment against the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
the legal remedy is to seek relief with the COA
pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 10-
2000 dated October 25, 2000. Considering that a writ
of execution was already issued by RTC-Br. 223, the
remedy of petitioners is to follow up their claim with the
COA. Petitioners rightfully did so, but the COA erred in
not acting on the claim.
Petitioners did file their Formal Money Claim with the
COA, but the latter, through its Legal and Adjudicating
Office-Local, wrote a letter, dated July 17, 2007,
stating that it could not act upon petitioners’ request
because it would encroach upon the prerogatives of
the RTC and the case was already in the execution
stage. The COA was of the position that it had no
proper legal standing and jurisdiction anymore.
It is the opinion of this Court that COA should have
acted on the formal request of petitioners. It is clear
from Sections 26 and 49 of P.D. No. 1445 otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines that the COA has the authority and power
to settle "all debts and claims of any sort due from or
owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities." This authority and
power can still be exercised by the COA even if a
court’s decision in a case has already become final
and executory. In other words, the COA still retains its
primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after the
issuance of a writ of execution.
More importantly, Section 50 of PD 1445 states that
the party aggrieved by any decision, order or ruling of
the Commission on Audit may within thirty days from
his receipt of a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the
Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the
Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling
adversely affects the interest of any government
agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head
of that agency.
Considering that the COA still retained its primary
jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners
should have filed a petition for certiorari with this
Court pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445.
17
Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not leave the
petitioners without any remedy at all.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DENIED.
65.19
JOSEPH OMAR O. ANDAY A, Petitioner, v. RURAL
BANK OF CABADBARAN, INC., DEMOSTHENES P.
ORAIZ and RICARDO D. GONZALEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 188769, August 03, 2016
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Andaya bought from Chute 2,200 shares of
stock in the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran for P220,000.
Chute requested the bank to register the transfer and
issue new stock certificates in favor of Andaya. The
bank eventually denied the request. It reasoned that he
had a conflict of interest, as he was then president and
chief executive officer of the Green Bank of Caraga, a
competitor bank. It also maintained that Chute should
have first offered her shares to the other stockholders,
as agreed upon during the 2001 stockholders' meeting.
Consequently, Andaya instituted an action for
mandamus and damages against the Rural Bank of
Cabadbaran; its corporate secretary, Oraiz; and its
legal counsel, Gonzalez. Petitioner sought to compel
them to record the transfer in the bank's stock and
transfer book and to issue new certificates of stock in
his name. RTC denied the complaint stating that
petitioner Andaya had no legal standing to file petition
for mandamus.
The Supreme Court held that Andaya has
legal standing to file petition for mandamus because
he was able to prove that he is a bona fide transferee
of the shares. As the transferee of the shares,
petitioner stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the instant petition, a judgment that will
either order the bank to recognize the legitimacy of the
transfer and petitioner's status as stockholder or to
deny the legitimacy thereof.
FACTS:
Andaya bought from Chute 2,200 shares of
stock in the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran for P220,000.
Chute duly endorsed and delivered the certificates of
stock to Andaya and, subsequently, requested the
bank to register the transfer and issue new stock
certificates in favor of the latter. Andaya also
separately communicated with the bank's corporate
secretary, respondent Oraiz, reiterating Chute's
request for the issuance of new stock certificates in
petitioner's favor.
A few days later, the bank's corporate
secretary wrote Chute to inform her that he could not
register the transfer. He explained that under a
previous stockholders' Resolution, existing
stockholders were given priority to buy the shares of
others in the event that the latter offered those shares

for sale (i.e., a right of first refusal). He then asked
Chute if she, instead, wished to have her shares
offered to existing stockholders. He told her that if no
other stockholder would buy them, she could then
proceed to sell her shares to outsiders.
Respondent Gonzalez (bank’s legal counsel)
informed Andaya that the latter’s request had been
referred to the bank’s board of directors for evaluation.
Andaya responded by reiterating his earlier request for
the registration of the transfer and the issuance of new
certificates of stock in his favor. Citing Section 98 of
the Corporation Code, he claimed that the purported
restriction on the transfer of shares of stock agreed
upon during the 2001 stockholders' meeting could not
deprive him of his right as a transferee. He pointed out
that the restriction did not appear in the bank's articles
of incorporation, bylaws, or certificates of stock.
The bank eventually denied the request of
Andaya. It reasoned that he had a conflict of interest,
as he was then president and chief executive officer of
the Green Bank of Caraga, a competitor bank. It also
maintained that Chute should have first offered her
shares to the other stockholders, as agreed upon
during the 2001 stockholders' meeting.
Consequently, Andaya instituted an action for
mandamus and damages against the Rural Bank of
Cabadbaran; its corporate secretary, Oraiz; and its
legal counsel, Gonzalez. Petitioner sought to compel
them to record the transfer in the bank's stock and
transfer book and to issue new certificates of stock in
his name.
The RTC issued a Decision dismissing the
complaint ruling that Andaya had no standing to
compel the bank to register the transfer and issue
stock certificates in his name. It explained that he had
failed "[to show] that the transfer of subject shares of
stock [was] recorded in the stock and transfer book of
[the] bank or that [he was] authorized by [Chute] to
make the transfer.
Consequently, Andaya directly filed with this
Court a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari
assailing the RTC Decision on pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether Andaya, as a transferee of shares of
stock, may initiate an action for mandamus
compelling the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran to record
the transfer of shares in its stock and transfer book, as
well as issue new stock certificates in his name.
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
It is already settled jurisprudence that the registration
of a transfer of shares of stock is a ministerial duty on
the part of the corporation. Aggrieved parties may then
resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel
corporations that wrongfully or unjustifiably refuse to
record the transfer or to issue new certificates of stock.
This remedy is available even upon the instance of a
18
bona fide transferee who is able to establish a clear
legal right to the registration of the transfer. This legal
right inherently flows from the transferee's established
ownership of the stocks.
In transferring stock, the secretary of a corporation
acts in purely ministerial capacity, and does not try to
decide the question of ownership.The duty of the
corporation to transfer is a ministerial one and if it
refuses to make such transaction without good cause,
it may be compelled to do so by mandamus.
Consequently, transferees of shares of stock are real
parties in interest having a cause of action for
mandamus to compel the registration of the transfer
and the corresponding issuance of stock certificates.
We also rule that Andaya has been able to establish
that he is a bona fide transferee of the shares of stock
of Chute. In proving this fact, he presented to the RTC
the following documents evidencing the sale: (1) a
notarized Sale of Shares of Stocks showing Chute's
sale of 2,200 shares of stock to petitioner; (2) a
Documentary Stamp Tax Declaration/Return (3)
Capital Gains Tax Return; and (4) stock certificates
covering the subject shares duly endorsed by Chute.
The existence, genuineness, and due execution of
these documents have been admitted and remain
undisputed. There is no doubt that Andaya had the
standing to initiate an action for mandamus to compel
the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran to record the transfer of
shares in its stock and transfer book and to issue new
stock certificates in his name. As the transferee of the
shares, petitioner stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the instant petition, a judgment that will
either order the bank to recognize the legitimacy of the
transfer and petitioner's status as stockholder or to
deny the legitimacy thereof.
This Court further finds that the reliance of the RTC on
Ponce case in finding that petitioner had no cause of
action for mandamus against the defendant bank was
misplaced. In Ponce, it was held that without the
registration of the transfer, the alleged transferee could
not yet be recognized as a stockholder who is entitled
to be given a stock certificate. In contrast, at the crux
of this petition are the registration of the transfer and
the issuance of the corresponding stock certificates.
Requiring petitioner to register the transaction before
he could institute a mandamus suit in supposed
abidance by the ruling in Ponce was a palpable error. It
led to an absurd, circuitous situation in which Andaya
was prevented from causing the registration of the
transfer, ironically because the shares had not been
registered.
On whether the writ of mandamus should issue:
accordingly, a writ of mandamus to enforce a
ministerial act may issue only when petitioner is able to
establish the presence of the following: (1) right clearly
founded in law and is not doubtful; (2) a legal duty to
perform the act; (3) unlawful neglect in performing the

duty enjoined by law; (4) the ministerial nature of the
act to be performed; and (5) the absence of other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Respondents primarily challenge the mandamus suit
on the grounds that the transfer violated the bank
stockholders' right of first refusal and that petitioner
was a buyer in bad faith. Both parties refer to Section
98 of the Corporation Code to support their arguments.
It must be noted that Section 98 applies only to close
corporations. Hence, before the Court can allow the
operation of this section in the case at bar, there must
first be a factual determination that respondent Rural
Bank of Cabadbaran is indeed a close corporation.
There needs to be a presentation of evidence on the
relevant restrictions in the articles of incorporation j
and bylaws of the said bank. From the records or the
RTC Decision, there is apparently no such
determination or even allegation that would assist this
Court in ruling on these two major factual matters.
With the foregoing, the validity of the transfer cannot
yet be tested using that provision. These are the
factual matters that the parties must first thresh out
before the RTC.
After finding that petitioner has legal standing to initiate
an action for mandamus, the Court now reinstates the
action he filed and remands the case to the RTC to
resolve the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus.
The resolution of the case must include the
determination of all relevant factual matters in
connection with the issues at bar.
65.20
ELSIE S. CAUSING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D.
BIRON, SR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 199139 September 9, 2014
EMERGENCY RECIT:
On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron issued
Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 which detailed
Petitioner Causing at the Office of the Municipal
Mayor. Causing filed the complaint-affidavit in the
Office of the Regional Election Director claiming that
Office Order No. 12, being made within the election
period and without prior authority from the COMELEC,
was illegal and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No.
1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009. COMELEC En
Banc dismissed the complaint of Causing. Causing
filed a petition for certiorari. Mayor Brion argued that
the petition for certiorari should be dismissed because
petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration in
the COMELEC.
The Supreme Court held that the petition for
certiorari should be dismissed. The well-established
19
rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an
indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can
resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. None of the exceptions to this
general rule is present in the case, hence the petition
must be dismissed.
FACTS:
On January 1, 1993, Petitioner Causing
assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron
issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 which
reads “ Exigencies of service so requiring, you
(petitioner Causing) are hereby detailed at the Office of
the Municipal Mayor effective upon receipt of this
Order and shall likewise receive direct orders from the
undersigned as to particular functions our office may
require from time to time”.
In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron,
Causing filed the complaint-affidavit dated June 8,
2010 in the Office of the Regional Election Director,
Region VI, in Iloilo City, claiming that Office Order No.
12 dated May 28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering
her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being
made within the election period and without prior
authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative
of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with
Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737,
Series of 2009.
In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Biron countered that the
purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to
closely supervise the performance of her functions
after complaints regarding her negative behavior in
dealing with her co-employees and with the public
transacting business in her office had been received;
that as the local chief executive, he was empowered to
take personnel actions and other management
prerogatives for the good of public service; that
Causing was not being stripped of her functions as the
Municipal Civil Registrar; that she was not transferred
or detailed to another office in order to perform a
different function; and that she was not demoted to a
lower position that diminished her salary and other
benefits.
On September 9, 2011, the COMELEC En Banc
affirmed the findings and recommendation of PES
Doronilla, observing that Mayor Biron did not transfer
or detail Causing but only required her to physically
report to the Mayor’s office and to perform her
functions thereat; and that he did not strip her of her
functions as the Municipal Civil Registrar, and did not
deprive her of her supervisory functions over her staff.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. Mayor
Biron insists that the petition for certiorari should
be dismissed because of the petitioner’s failure to
file a motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC,
and because of her failure to attach copies of equally
important documents pertinent to the case

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari should
be dismissed because of the petitioner’s failure to file a
motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC.
RULING:
YES.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that
unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy
thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court(1997)
contains a separate rule(Rule 64) on the review of the
decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit. Rule 64 is generally identical with certiorari
under Rule 65, except as to the period of the filing of
the petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the
period is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the
latter, not later than 60 days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution assailed.
The well-established rule is that the motion for
reconsideration is an indispensable condition
before an aggrieved party can resort to the special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. The filing of the motion for reconsideration
before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to
afford to the public respondent the opportunity to
correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by
way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects
of the case.
The rule is not absolute, however, considering that
jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the
requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari
without first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question, and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the
petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there
is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order ofarrest is urgent, and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceeding was ex parteor in which the petitioner had
no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised
is one purely oflaw or public interest is involved.
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that
none of the foregoing exceptions was applicable
20
herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the motion
for reconsideration, especially because there was
nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that
precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in
election offense cases.
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
*Additional ruling: Mayor Biron’s acts did not violate
the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC
Resolution
The only personnel movements prohibited by
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and
detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as "any
personnel movement from one government agency to
another or from one department, division, geographical
unit or subdivision of a government agency to another
with or without the issuance of an appointment;" while
detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is
the movement of an employee from one agency to
another without the issuance of an appointment.
Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer
and detail must be construed as such. Obviously, the
movement involving Causing did not equate to either a
transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if
Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her
office area from its old location to the Office of the
Mayor "some little steps" away. We cannot accept the
petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the phrase "any
transfer or detail whatsoever" encompassed "any and
all kinds and manner of personnel movement,"
including the mere change in office location.
Mayor Biron’s act of transferring the office space of
Causing was rooted in his power of supervision and
control over the officials and employees serving in his
local government unit, in order to ensure the faithful
discharge of their duties and functions. His explanation
that he transferred Causing’s work station from her
original office to his office in order to closely supervise
her after his office received complaints against her
could not be justly ignored. Verily, she thereafter
continued to perform her tasks, and uninterruptedly
received her salaries as the Municipal Civil Registrar
even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.
65.21
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION,
Petitioner,
vs.

SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO and DOLORES LAZO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 195594 September 29, 2014
PETITION: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Respondents spouses Lazo voluntarily sold to
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) a portion of
Monte Vista for the construction of an open irrigation
canal. They engaged the services of Engr. Donno G.
Custodio, who later came up with a Geohazard
Assessment Report (GAR) to minimize the possible
adverse effects of the NIA irrigation canal. Resolution
No. 34 adopted the recommendations contained in the
GAR. Respondents filed a complaint for just
compensation with damages against NIA and
subsequently filed petition for prelim injunction. RTC
granted respondent’s application for prelim injunction.
RTC issued supplemental order fixing the injunction
bond in the amount of THREE MILLION PESOS
(Php3,000,000.00). Petitioner directly filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA without moving for
reconsideration of the two orders.
The Supreme Court held that the petition for
certiorari was proper. The case falls on one of the
exceptions to the general rule that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie. In particular, the assailed
Orders of the trial court are patent nullity for having
been issued in excess of its jurisdiction. Also, the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the
same as those already raised and passed upon in the
lower court; hence, filing a motion for reconsideration
would be useless and serve no practical purpose.
There is likewise an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government.
FACTS:
Respondents spouses Rogelio Lazo and
Dolores Lazo are the owners and developers of Monte
Vista Homes (Monte Vista), a residential subdivision
located in Barangay Paing, Municipality of Bantay,
Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 2006, they voluntarily sold to
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) a portion of
Monte Vista for the construction of an open irrigation
canal that is part of the Banaoang Pump Irrigation
Project (BPIP). Subsequently, respondents engaged
the services of Engr. Donno G. Custodio, who later
came up with a Geohazard Assessment Report
(GAR), finding that ground shaking and channel bank
erosion are the possible hazards that could affect the
NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte Vista. He
recommended specific constructions to minimize the
said effects.
On December 22, 2006, the Sangguniang
Bayanof Bantay, Ilocos Sur approved Resolution No.
34, which adopted the recommendations contained in
21
the GAR. Respondent Rogelio Lazo brought to NIA’s
attention Resolution No. He specifically asked for the
implementation of the GAR recommendations and the
payment of just compensation for the entire buffer
zone involving an aggregate area of 14,381 sq. m.,
more or less.
When respondents’ demands were not acted
upon, they decided to file a complaint for just
compensation with damages against NIA on January
31, 2008.11 Prior to the filing of an Answer,
respondents filed an Amended Complaint with
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction.
On September 17, 2008, the trial court granted
respondents’ application for preliminary injunction.
Defendant is hereby enjoined from continuing further
construction works on the irrigation canal. Further,
defendant is ordered to comply with Resolution No. 34,
Series of 2006 of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Bantay Ilocos Sur, adopting the
recommendations of the GAR.
Two days later, the trial court issued a
Supplement to the Order of September 17, 2008 fixing
the injunction bond in the amount of THREE MILLION
PESOS (Php3,000,000.00).
Without moving for a reconsideration of the
two Orders, petitioner directly filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA. Eventually, the CA dismissed
the petition and affirmed the challenged Orders of the
trial court on October 22, 2010.
ISSUE:
Whether the facts of this case justified
petitioner’s immediate resort to the court of appeals
without filing a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed orders of the trial court.
RULING:
YES, the petition for certiorari is proper.
A petition for certiorari may be given due course
notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was
filed in the trial court. The general rule is that a motion
for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant
an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error
attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case. However, the rule is
not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the
following exceptions when the filing of a petition for
certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a
motion for reconsideration: (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the

subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of
due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest
is involved.
We cannot but agree with petitioner that this case falls
within instances (a), (b), (c), (d), and (i) above-
mentioned. As will be elucidated in the discussion
below, the assailed Orders of the trial court are
patent nullity for having been issued in excess of
its jurisdiction. Also, the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings are the same as those
already raised and passed upon in the lower court;
hence, filing a motion for reconsideration would be
useless and serve no practical purpose. There is
likewise an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government. In its petition and
memorandum filed before the CA, petitioner in fact
noted that the BPIP is intended to cater the year-round
irrigation needs of 6,312 hectares of agricultural land
in Bantay, Caoayan, Magsingal, San Ildefonso, San
Vicente, Sto. Domingo, Sta. Catalina, and Vigan in
Ilocos Sur. Even Resolution No. 34 recognizes this.
Public interest is actually involved as the targeted
increase in agricultural production is expected to uplift
the farmers’ standard of living. Lastly, the issue raised
– that is, under the antecedent facts, whether the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
respondents’ prayer for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction despite the mandate of R.A. No.
8975 – is one purely of law.
As for the issue on payment of docket fees, records
show that petitioner timely filed its motion for extension
of time to filea petition on March 2, 2011.37 The
petition, however, was not docketed because the
required fees were not paid based on petitioner’s belief
that it is exempt therefrom. Nonetheless, payment was
immediately made the following day, March 3, 2011.38
The tardiness of petitioner is excusable since no
significant period of time elapsed.
Finally, respondents argue that the filing of a
Manifestation and Motion dated March 25, 2011 by
petitioner with the trial court should be considered as
an act of forum shopping. They assert that the prayer
to admonish them from closing or blocking the
irrigation canal that traverses their property is
tantamount to asking the trial court to lift the injunction
order. Respondents contend that instead of pleading
for a restraining order from this Court, petitioner, in
22
effect, belatedly sought a reconsideration of the Orders
dated September 17, 2008 and September 19, 2008
before the trial court.
The Contention is without merit. It appears from the
pleadings that petitioner honestly sought clarification
from the trial court the meaning of the writ it issued. To
refresh, when the trial court granted respondents’
application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction on September 17, 2008 it enjoined petitioner
from continuing further construction works on the
irrigation canal located inside Monte Vista and ordered
it to comply with Resolution No. 34, which adopted the
GAR recommendations. As petitioner pointed out, the
injunction order does not authorize respondents to
close or block the irrigation canal, the construction of
which was, as alleged, already completed prior to the
issuance of the Order. In filing the Manifestation and
Motion, petitioner was just protecting its property
rights, claiming that it is already the owner of the
land where the irrigation canal was constructed by
virtue of the negotiated sale that transpired prior to
the institution of this case. According to petitioner,
respondents previously blocked the irrigation canal and
it was only through the initiative and efforts of the
affected farmers that the same was removed. Faced
with another threat of closure, it only exercised its legal
right to seek affirmative relief from the trial court.
66.1
ERNESTO CAMPOS and FLORENCIO OROC,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
ESTEBAN DEGAMO and FELINO PALARCA,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-18315 September 29, 1962
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioners Campos and Oroc were elected as
Councilor 1 and 2, respectively in the Municipality of
Carmen, Agusan. Respondents Degamo and Palarca
were elected as Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively.
Petitioners filed a petition for quo warranto against
respondents. RTC dismissed the petition. Petitioners
directly elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that the petition for
quo warranto cannot prosper. Assuming that it is made
under the Revised Election Code, it violates Section
173 wherein it provides that the petition for quo
warranto should be filed by any registered candidate
for the same office, within one week after the
proclamation of his election, by filing a petition for quo
warranto. Petitioners Campos and Oroc were not
registered candidates for the offices of mayor and vice-
mayor, and the quo warranto was not filed within one
week after the proclamation of the persons sought to
be ousted. Even assuming that it is an ordinary quo
warranto petition under the Rules of Court, it will still
not prosper because petitioners-appellants Campos

and Oroc, having been candidates and elected for the
office of councilors and not for the office of mayor and
vice-mayor, they are not the proper parties to institute
the present action.
FACTS:
In the election of November, 1959, petitioners
Ernesto Campos and Florencio Oroc were elected and
proclaimed councilor No. 1 and councilor No. 2,
respectively, of the municipality of Carmen, Agusan.
on December 7, 1959, respondents Esteban Degamo
and Felino Palarca were proclaimed Mayor and Vice
Mayor, respectively, of the said municipality,
notwithstanding the protest and request that the
proclamation be suspended on the ground that the
Board of Canvassers used in their canvass for election
in Precinct 6, the election return coming from the
Provincial Treasurer's Office, inspite of the fact that the
copy of election return in the hands of the municipal
treasury of Carmen was available; that there was no
valid canvass for the offices of Mayor and Vice Mayor
effected and the respondents could not legally occupy
the said positions.
Petitioner made verbal demands upon
respondents to stop forming the duties and functions
of said offices, but respondents denied and refused,
thereby making the public believe they were the lawful
officials of said municipality. Petitioners, therefore,
prayed (a) that a writ quo warranto be issued ousting
and excluding respondents Degamo and Palarca from
the office of mayor and vice-mayor of Carmen,
respectively; and that they be declared entitled to said
offices and placed forthwith possession thereof.
As affirmative defenses, respondents claimed
that (1) the petition was filed outside the reglementary
period; (2) there was no sufficient cause of action; (3)
the petitioners had no legal personality or authority to
file the present case; 4) the court had no jurisdiction
over the petition and the petitioners; (5) there was a
pending case of the same nature and of substantially
the same allegations against the respondents, before
the same court; and (6) the respondents took their
oaths of office and performed their respective duties
starting January 1, 1960.
The lower court rendered a decision stating
that the petition for quo warranto cannot prosper
because it fails to state a cause of action, the
petitioners not being entitled to the positions of mayor
and vice mayor of the municipality of Carmen, Agusan,
inasmuch as there is at present pending before the
Supreme Court a case of quo warranto over these two
positions filed by Jose Malimit and Vicente Acain
against the herein respondents Esteban Degamo and
Felino Palarca.
Petitioners appealed directly to the Supreme
Court on purely questions of law.
ISSUE:
23
Whether or not the petition for quo warranto
filed by petitioners will propser
RULING:
NO.
Under the theory that the present action for
quo warranto comes under the provisions of the
Revised Election Code, its filing violates section 173
thereof which provides that when a person who is not
eligible is elected to a provincial or Municipal Office,
his right to the Office may be contested by any
registered candidate for the same office, within one
week after the proclamation of his election, by
filing a petition for quo warranto.
Petitioners Campos and Oroc were not
registered candidates for the offices of mayor and vice-
mayor, and the quo warranto was not filed within one
week after the proclamation of the persons sought to
be ousted - the respondents herein. The proclamation
of the respondents was made on December 7, 1959,
and the present quo warranto complaint was filed on
September 27, 1960, about a year later.
On the assumption that the present action is
presented as an ordinary quo warranto case (Rule 68,
Rules of Court), same can not also prosper.
Malimit and Acain who claimed to be entitled
to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively,
are not parties herein. The complaint must likewise
allege that plaintiffs were duly elected to such
positions. Where the office in question is an elective
one, the complaint must show that the plaintiff was
duly elected thereto (Luna vs. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 401;
Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18). Petitioners-appellants
Campos and Oroc, having been candidates and
elected for the office of councilors and not for the
office of mayor and vice-mayor, they are not the
proper parties to institute the present action.
Moreover, there being a pending case for quo warranto
before this court (G.R. No. L-17850 footnote No. 1,
supra) filed by Malimit and Acain against the same
Degamo and Palarca, for the office of mayor and vice-
mayor of Carmen, respectively, the filing of the case at
bar was premature and the cause of action had not as
yet accrued.
66.2
ABRAHAM C. SISON
vs.
HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of
Civil Service; GERONIMO LIPUMANO, Mayor,
Olongapo City; ALFREDO D. OCAMPO, Officer-in-
Charge, Civil Service, Regional Office No. 3, San
Fernando, Pampanga; and EUREKA F.

MALIWANAG, Assistant City Assesor, Olongapo
City,
G. R. No. L-40295 July 31, 1978
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Respondent Maliwanag was appointed as
Assistant City Assessor of Olongapo City on
November 23, 1973. Petitioner opposed appointment
contending that he should have been appointed
because he was the next in rank. Regional Director of
CSC affirmed appointment of Maliwanag. Petitioner
filed petition denominated as certiorari and quo
warranto before the SC. The Supreme Court held that
the petition cannot prosper because the appointment
was made on November 23, 1973 while the petition
herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more
than one year after the pretended right of petitioner to
hold the office in question arose. This single
circumstance has closed the door for any judicial
remedy in his favor.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the Chief Deputy Assessor
exercising, according to his allegation, immediate
administrative control and supervision over respondent
Maliwanag, who was Senior Deputy Assessor.
Respondent Mayor Lipumano appointed Maliwanag as
Assistant City Assessor of Olongapo City on
November 23, 1973. Petitioner opposed said
appointment inasmuch as he has superior educational
and appropriate civil service eligibilities to those of said
respondent, the appointment aforementioned
extended to the latter by respondent City Mayor is
illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of
next-in-rank. Petitioner maintains that upon the
promotion of the Assistant City Assessor to the
position of City Assessor, he, petitioner, instead of
respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed
thereto.
Regional Director and commissioner of Civil
Service affirmed the appointment of Maliwanag. MR
was dismissed. Hence, petitioner filed petition
denominated as certiorari and quo warranto before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition will propser
RULING:
NO.
The Commissioner of Civil Service who is
primarily charged with the administration of the Civil
Service Law and rules and regulations, absent, as in
this case, convincing showing of palpable error or
grave abuse of discretion. After all as We see it,
petitioner rests his case mostly on the Organization
Chart and the position description or CSC Form No.
122-D of respondent Maliwanag, prepared by
petitioner himself, which do not carry the approval of
the Mayor, as Department Head, contrary to
requirement of Memorandum Circular No. 5, S. 1963
24
of the Commission of Civil Service touching on the
basis for determining the hierarchical relationships of
positions, and, therefore, are not necessarily
controlling.
As already stated, the appointment in
controversy was made on November 23, 1973 and
respondent Maliwanag assumed office on the strength
thereof, albeit she claims she has not been paid her
salary. On the other hand, the petition herein was filed
only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one year
after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the
office in question arose. This single circumstance
has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his
favor.
Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section
16 of Rule 66 invoked by private respondent refers to
actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also
for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable.
Such contention is not correct. As earlier noted in this
decision, the allegations supporting petitioner's cause
or causes of action boil down to no more than the
removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to
which she has been appointed in order to be replaced
by him, with a new appointment in his favor.
Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto
has to be based on a nullification of her appointment,
which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by
certiorari. His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo
warranto. Besides, even if it could be also viewed
as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter
remedy prescribes also after one year. And it is of
no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period
of more than one year, he was seeking relief from the
corresponding administrative authorities. The resort to
such administrative remedy does not abate the period
for the judicial action.
66.3
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO VS. MENDEZ
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
EMERGENCY RECIT:
On August 20, 1959, EO 353 by President
Garcia was issued creating the municipal district of
San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the
municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the
barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy,
Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed
a petition for quo warranto against the officials of the
Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought the
declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and
prayed that the respondent local officials of the
Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to
refrain from performing the duties and functions of their
respective offices. RTC dismissed the petition for lack
of cause of action.

The SC held that the petition cannot prosper
because EO 353 creating the municipal district of San
Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only
after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that
the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to
challenge the legality of the executive order. In the
meantime, the Municipal District, and later the
Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to
exercise the powers and authority of a duly created
local government unit. In the same manner that the
failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the
right of another to hold a position within a one-year
period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also,
if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo
warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a
political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest
demands it.
FACTS:
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P.
Garcia, issued Executive Order No. 353 creating the
municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by
segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the
same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero,
Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their
respective sitios. By virtue of Executive Order No. 174,
dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado
Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was
later officially recognized to have gained the status of
a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963.
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San
Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto against the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition
sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No.
353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of
the Municipality of San Andres be permanently
ordered to refrain from performing the duties and
functions of their respective offices. Petitioner
municipality argued that the officials of the Municipality
or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to
exercise the duties and functions of their respective
offices that rightfully belonged to the corresponding
officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.
In their answer, respondents asked for the
dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative
and special defenses, that since it was at the instance
of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San
Andres was given life with the issuance of Executive
Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be
deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the
new municipality and that considering the petition to be
one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not
the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative
being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor
General.
In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court
dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action on
what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State,
25
adding that "whatever defects (were) present in the
creation of municipal districts by the President
pursuant to presidential issuances and executive
orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160,
otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991."
In an order, dated 17 January 1992, the same court
denied petitioner municipality's motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition will propser
RULING:
NO.
The special civil action of quo warranto is a
"prerogative writ by which the Government can call
upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a
public office or exercises a public franchise." When the
inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body
politic, the action is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit
proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the
Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the
President of the Philippines ". Such officers may, under
certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the
request and upon the relation of another person" with
the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also
allows an individual to commence an action for quo
warranto in his own name but this initiative can be
done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office
or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another." While the quo warranto proceedings filed
below by petitioner municipality has so named only the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres as
respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of
the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of
San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
Executive Order No. 353 creating the
municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30)
years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San
Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the
executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal
District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres,
began and continued to exercise the powers and
authority of a duly created local government unit. In
the same manner that the failure of a public officer
to question his ouster or the right of another to
hold a position within a one-year period can
abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not
indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo
warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority
of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public
interest demands it.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete
nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional

delegation of legislative power, the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer
a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San
Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its
own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that
of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional
wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure
standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under
the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986)
apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution,
the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to
be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the
Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally
significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered
as regular municipalities."
All considered, the de jure status of the
Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon
must now be conceded.
66.4
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]
* Hi Guys, 100+ pages itong case, hindi kaya ng 2
pages digest kaya lampas two pages to sorry ☹
EMERGENCY RECIT:
The OSG, invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution in relation to the special civil action under
Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the
petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment
as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude
26
Sereno therefrom. Sereno contends that an
impeachable officer may only be ousted through
impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of the
Constitution
The SC held that quo warranto is proper. Quo
warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public
official may be availed of when the subject act or
omission was committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions,
even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo
warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to
disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the
faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of
Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from
October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently
employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two
international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases,
and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on
Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP
HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s
file of any permission to engage in limited practice of
profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of
employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records
of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy
of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from
the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The
Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed
by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of
one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs
were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate
Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was
declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants
to submit documents, among which are “all previous
SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the
government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for
those from the private sector. The JBC announcement
further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-
of-date documentary requirements will not be
interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno
expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned
from UP Law on 2006 and became a private
practitioner, she was treated as coming from the
private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or
her SALNs from the time she became an Associate

Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that
most of her government records in the academe are
more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the
clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be
taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter
was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the
JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete
requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was
appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed
by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her
SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to
hear the case for determination of probable cause, and
it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the
JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete
SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as
pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not
declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior
years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her
husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998
SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the
OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of
the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding
against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s
original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution in relation to the special civil action
under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the
petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment
as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude
Sereno therefrom.
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al.,
intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition
against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and
Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having
testified against her on the impeachment hearing
before the House of Representatives.
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available
remedy because what is being sought is to question
the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment
complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation
of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in
office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v.
Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG
maintains that the phrase “may be removed from
office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution
means that Members of the SC may be removed
through modes other than impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the
one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule
66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light
during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG
claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo
warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus
27
occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or
prescription does not operate against the government.
The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that
those who partake of its sovereign powers are
qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is
applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not
published, the OSG will have no other means by which
to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction,
citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to
investigate complaints involving graft and corruption
and ethical violations against members of the SC and
contending that this is not a political question because
such issue may be resolved through the interpretation
of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules,
and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on
the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a
person of proven integrity which is an indispensable
qualification for membership in the Judiciary under
Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According
to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC
requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity
remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN,
which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified
Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no
right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be
considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are
thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum,
wherein malice or criminal intent is completely
immaterial.
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only
be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of
Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First
lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-
Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T.
Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive
category of public officers who can be removed only by
impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was
chosen as the method of removing certain high-ranking
government officers to shield them from harassment
suits that will prevent them from performing their
functions which are vital to the continued operations of
government. Sereno further argues that the word
“may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the
penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e.,
removal from office. Sereno contends that the since
the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is
not in all fours with the present case because the
President and the Vice President may, in fact, be

removed by means other than impeachment on the
basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of
all contests relating to the qualifications of the
President and the Vice-President. There is no such
provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on
the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no
mention that quo warranto may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo
warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would
result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court
would have effectively exercised disciplinary power
and administrative supervision over an official of the
Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to
Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which
vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative
power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can
be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG,
the Congress’ “check” on the SC through
impeachment would be rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-
barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for
quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the
“cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the
disqualification.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot
presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as
a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her
appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to
overcome the presumption created by the certifications
from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all
administrative responsibilities and charges. Her
integrity is a political question which can only be
decided by the JBC and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that
the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the
inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11
SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern
of filing, not of non-filing.
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon
Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the
integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus
of determining whether or not she qualified for the post
fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is
not a constitutional requirement; what is only required
is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise
contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age,
and experience are enforceable while “characteristics”
such as competence, integrity, probity, and
independence are mere subjective considerations.
ISSUES:
Preliminary issues:
1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for
intervention
28
2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the
inhibition of Sereno against five Justices
Main Issues:
3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and
give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the
House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer,
can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding,
i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable
officer is impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto
proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of
powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the
ground of prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s
eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive
function of the JBC and whether such determination.
partakes of the character of a political question outside
the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and
statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative,
whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated
by the Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative,
whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and
promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the
submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative,
whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids
the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief
Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold
the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the
President cured such ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
HELD:
Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not
originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third
party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may
be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of
intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the
sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the
first requirement on legal interest and the second
requirement that no delay and prejudice should result.
The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their
common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine
Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and

Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation
in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the
articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate
as the impeachment court will be taken away is not
sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be
actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and
not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the
petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the
Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any
private individual or group, because disputes over title
to public office are viewed as a public question of
governmental legitimacy and not merely a private
quarrel among rival claimants.
Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in
the case.
It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a
just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as
to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek
the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does
not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent in handling the case must be
balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases
without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with
clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who
were present at the impeachment proceedings were
armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En
Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on
matters within their personal knowledge. The mere
imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis.
There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with
the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for
inhibition has been based on speculations, or on
distortions of the language, context and meaning of
the answers the Justices may have given as sworn
witnesses in the proceedings before the House.
Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are
towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining the
quo warranto petition must be struck for being
unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and
discordance between the Court and the public. The
Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except
to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and
promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to
misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met
consistent litigation success before the SG shall
likewise automatically and positively be received in the
present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the
Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The
best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a
case rests with the magistrate sought to be
disqualified.
29
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is
allowed against impeachable officials and SC has
jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and
RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo
warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original
jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there
are special and important reasons therefor, and in this
case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the
action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting
that the petition is likewise of transcendental
importance and has far-reaching implications, the
Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial
review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear
renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of
the petition based on speculation that Sereno will
eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear
abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual
controversy squarely presented before it. Quo
warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in
character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme
Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases
and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty
cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in
deference to, any other branch of the government
including the Congress, even as it acts as an
impeachment court through the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto
involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or
validity of the election or appointment of a public
official based on predetermined rules while
impeachment is a political process to vindicate the
violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment,
what is determined is the legality of the appointment.
The title to a public office may not be contested
collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as
a public wrong and carries with it public interest, and
as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor.
The SolGen is given permissible latitude within his
legal authority in actions for quo warranto,
circumscribed only by the national interest and the
government policy on the matter at hand.
Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto
proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not forum
shopping and is allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed
independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable
rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and
(4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant

who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues, either pending in
or already resolved adversely by some other court, to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision
if not in one court, then in another. The test for
determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or
more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights
or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the
controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the
determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds
the Chief Justice position to be considered as an
impeachable officer in the first place. On the other
hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for
certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while
Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo
warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily
presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office
and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue
being whether or not she committed impeachable
offenses to warrant her removal from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent
in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to
cease from holding a public office, which he/she is
ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a
conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses
shall result to the removal of the respondent from the
public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not
legally possible to impeach or remove a person from
an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and
cannot legally hold or occupy.
Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the
impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a
determination of probable cause. The impeachment
case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment,
there is no pending impeachment case against
Sereno. The process before the House is merely
inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a
person may be reasonably charged with a crime.
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive
remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly
elected impeachable official may be removed from
office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action
against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
30
public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term
“may” which denote discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a
mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In
American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the
express provision for removal by impeachment ought
not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by
other methods when there are other adequate reasons
to account for this express provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their
incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally
prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the
penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their
positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment.
The proscription does not extend to actions assailing
the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she
occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for
the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President
and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable
officers
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable
offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for
impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete
statement of the causes of removal from office. If other
causes of removal are available, then other modes of
ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the
view that appointments or election of impeachable
officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their
appointments or election of any possible defect
pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed
qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an
impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow
an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when,
for instance, he or she has been determined to be of
foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership
is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently
represented to be a member of the Bar.
Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of
its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action
for quo warranto involving a person who would
otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been
for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall
be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again,
the difference between quo warranto and
impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo
warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an
impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo
warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The

Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto
proceedings does not preclude Congress from
enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable
cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the
Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate
from exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment.
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality
and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the
conclusion that an unqualified public official should be
removed from the position immediately if indeed
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or
breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal
controversy simply because of perceived availability of
another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be
to sanction the initiation of a process specifically
intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire
membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily
abandon their legislative duties to focus on
impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of
a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be
unqualified under existing laws and case law.
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or
omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject
of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites
for the commencement thereof are present.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity, being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly
elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo
warranto proceeding, but of something else, which
may either be impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie
against the State.
The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing
contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize
an action against a public officer or employee for his
ouster from office unless the same be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or
the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position,
arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period
has been applied in cases where private individuals
asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case
where no private individual claims title to the Office of
the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself
which commenced the present petition for quo
warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the
person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.
31
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint
or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any
case specified in the preceding section can be
established by proof must commence such action.” It
may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil
or penal, have no application to quo warranto
proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is
no limitation or prescription of action in an action for
quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason
that it was an action by the Government and
prescription could not be plead as a defense to an
action by the Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be
deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo
warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a
continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies
to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just
court would allow an unqualified person to hold public
office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary.
Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for
questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon
discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to
the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether
she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on
Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible,
but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered
obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory
authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC
complies with its own rules.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides
that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The
power of supervision means “overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate
officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy
from the Court as to place its non-action or improper·
actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what
the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the
JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although
calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute
nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an
exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale,
the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s
supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain
leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled
discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal
requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not
accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place
the JBC’s actions in the same category as political
questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications
under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained

by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the
Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is
closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to
an applicant’s good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to
sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is
likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of
preserving the confidence of the litigants in the
Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to
ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.
Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a
constitutional and statutory requirement.
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A
public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by
law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been
required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply”
with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie
evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in
the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a
clear breach of the ethical standards set for public
officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so
important for purposes of transparency and
accountability that failure to comply with such
requirement may result not only in dismissal from the
public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance with
this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in
disqualification to hold public office.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is
constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a
positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities.
According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion
in one case, those who accept a public office do so
cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as
accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its
benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all
constitutional and legislative provisions relating
thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their
office. The public has the right to demand the
performance of those duties. More importantly, while
every office in the government service is a public trust,
no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the Judiciary.
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement
indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not
merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention
that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s
32
integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713
and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in
se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act
as defined by the law, and not the character or effect
thereof, that determines whether or not the provision
has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial.
Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file
her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law,
and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law,
only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have
easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of
the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the
Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information
or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The
Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied,
because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the
head of the personnel of the branch of the court that
the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and
received by the OCA as the repository agency. In
Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven
to be in the records of nor was proven to have been
sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the
repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and
the fact of filing thereof were neither established by
direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by
mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the
Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file,
there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years
1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.”
This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not
indeed file her SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its
burden of proof with the certification from UP HRDO
and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent
upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence.
Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto
proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in
that the burden rests upon the respondent.
In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being
on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN
because it is not tantamount to separation from
government service. The fact that Sereno did not
receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does
not make her a government worker “serving in an
honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN
laws on RA 6713.
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP
HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period
when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned
authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the
Ombudsman had not yet established compliance
procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials
and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like

U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue
compliance order came about only on 2006 from the
CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been
expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not
yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance
are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said
clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her
academic and administrative responsibilities, money
and property accountabilities and from administrative
charges as of the date of her resignation.
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of
candidates with complete requirements and in the
shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her
compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion
in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief
Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the
requisite proof of integrity. She should have been
disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc
cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible
because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to
submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the
body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and
subsequent appointment to the position do not estop
the Republic or this Court from looking into her
qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the
representation or conduct of the party sought to be
estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an
innocent mistake
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly
and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements . Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially
Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN
would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is
attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to
make false statements. The suspicious circumstances
include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998;
1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only
notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed
which were the years when she received the bulk of
her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on
intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO
cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of
P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her
first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore
clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying
with the physical act of filing, but also committed
dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and
probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the
supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials
whose SALNs were found to have contained
discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.
Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the
required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant
to the JBC rules.
33
The JBC required the submission of at least ten
SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought
not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. From the minutes of the
meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was
singled out from the rest of the applicants for having
failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of
service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away
with the SALN requirement, but still required
substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that
it was only Sereno who was not able to substantially
comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of
complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing
justifications why she should no longer be required to
file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006
and then resumed government service only in 2009,
thus her government service is not continuous; that her
government records are more than 15 years old and
thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of
all academic and administrative responsibilities and
charges.
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the
simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the
JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was
nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover,
Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file
several SALNs during the course of her employment in
U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the
concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of
integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme
Court.
comply with the submission of the SALNs but there
was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a
grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from
the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to
public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful
compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt
upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the
integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer
or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no
longer have considered Sereno for interview.
Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to
engage in private practice while in UP, her false
representations that she was in private practice after
resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the
government, her false claims that the clearance from
UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs
requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to
truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years
2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser
worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms.
Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused
P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel
accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of

the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO
in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme
Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of
the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute
cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the
Supreme Court with respect to the grant of
survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the
release of survivorship benefits to spouses of
deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the
processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ
Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential
document involving national security against the latter
among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has
integrity.
Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to
the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her
integrity was not established at the time of her
application
The requirement to submit SALNs is made more
emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of
Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc
meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of
the requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief
Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through.
Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs
means that the JBC and the public are divested of the
opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or
propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In
Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the
confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically
useless for the years that she failed to submit her
SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same
matches the entries indicated in the SALN.
34
Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to
qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the
President in the selection and nomination process is
evident from the composition of the JBC itself.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. While the Court
surrenders discretionary appointing power to the
President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to
the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is
qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied,
in the absence of which, the appointment is
susceptible to attack.
Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer
removable through quo warranto
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an
office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on
him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a
Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold
the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has
never attained the status of an impeachable official
and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a
quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to
oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief
Justice.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for

lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief
Justice.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public
office must be possessed at the time of appointment
and assumption of office and also during the officer’s
entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The
voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary
consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is
ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the
position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said
position follows as a matter of course. The Court has
ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of
impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial
notice of the explanations from the JBC members and
the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding,
maintains the power to issue such further judgment
determining the respective rights in and to the public
office, position or franchise of all the parties to the
action as justice requires.

67.1
THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE ARRELANO LAW COLLEGES, INC.,
defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-2929 February 28, 1950
EMERGENCY RECIT:
RA 267 provides that cities and municipalities
are authorized to contract loans from Reconstruction
Finance Corporation for the purpose of purchasing or
expropriating homesites within their territorial
jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents. The
court below ruled that this provision empowers cities to
purchase but not expropriate and so dismissed the
present action, which seeks to condemn several
parcels of land situated in Legarda St. Manila.
The Supreme Court held that there was no
showing of necessity for condemnation of the several
parcels of land to justify expropriation. The land in
question has cost the owner P140,000. The people for
whose benefit the condemnation is being undertaken
are so poor they could ill afford to meet this high price,
unless they intend to borrow the money with a view to
disposing of the property later for a profits
FACTS:
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 267 provides:
Cities and municipalities are authorized to contract
loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
the Philippine National Bank, and/or other entity or
person at the rate of interest not exceeding eight
percent per annum for the purpose of purchasing or
expropriating homesites within their respective
territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to
residents of the said cities and municipalities.
The court below ruled that this provision empowers
cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for the
purpose of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed
the present action, which seeks to condemn, for the
purpose just stated, several parcels of land having a
combined area of 7,270 square meters and situated on
Legarda Street, City of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the necessity for
condemnation is shown to justify the expropriation.
RULING:
NO.
The SC is inclined to believe that Act No. 267
empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase
lands for homesites. The word "expropriating," taken
singly or with the text, is susceptible of only meaning.
But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject to
the limitations and. The National Government may not
confer its instrumentalities authority which itself may
not exercise. A stream can not run higher than its
source.
To authorize the condemnation of any particular land
by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a
35
necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the
proposed uses and purposes. Necessity within the
rule that the particular property to be expropriated
must be necessary does not mean an absolute but
only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as
would combine the greatest benefit to the public with
the least inconvenience and expense to the
condemning party and property owner consistent with
such benefits.
The land in question has cost the owner P140,000.
The people for whose benefit the condemnation is
being undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to
meet this high price, unless they intend to borrow the
money with a view to disposing of the property later for
a profits. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so
worthy as a school and more suited to the occupants'
needs and means, if really they only want to own their
own homes, are plenty elsewhere the defendant not
only has invested a considerable amount for its
property but had the plans for construction ready and
would have completed the project a long time ago had
it not been stopped by the city authorities.
67.2
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Elena M. Cuevas for respondents.
G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987
EMERGENCY RECIT:
The four parcels of land which are the subject
of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing
Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed.
Private respondent in which these lands are registered
under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without reaching the agreement as to the
compensation. Respondent Judge then issued an
order for the appointment of the commissioners to
determine the just compensation. It was later found out
that the payment of the government to Private
Respondent would be P15 per square meter, which
was objected to by the petitioner contending that under
PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair
and according to the fair market value declared by the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated or by
the assessor whichever is lower. Such objection and
the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were

denied, and hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for
certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent
from further hearing the case.
The SC held that PD 1533 is void and
unconstitutional. The decree constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court inutile in a matter which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
The valuation in the decree may only serve as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining
just compensation but it may not substitute the court's
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded
and how to arrive at such amount. The determination
of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a
judicial function.
FACTS:
On January 15, 1979, the President of the
Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving
a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in
the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the
establishment of an export processing zone by
petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
The proclamation included four (4) parcels of land
owned and registered in the name of the private
respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to
purchase the parcels of land from the respondent. The
parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale
of the property.
The petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against
the private respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid
parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended,
which empowers the petitioner to acquire by
condemnation proceedings any property for the
establishment of export processing zones, in relation
to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of
establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a
writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take
immediate possession of the premises. At the pre-trial
conference, the respondent judge issued an order
stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue
to be resolved is the just compensation for the
properties. The respondent judge then issued an
order appointing certain persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court
the just compensation for the properties sought to
be expropriated.
On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted
their consolidated report recommending the amount of
P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable
value of just compensation for the properties. The
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds
that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of
36
just compensation through commissioners; and that
the compensation must not exceed the maximum
amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
The trial court denied the MR of petitioner. The
petitioner flied this present petition for certiorari and
mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining
the trial court from enforcing the order and from further
proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and in setting the commissioner's
report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which
is the applicable law herein, the basis of just
compensation shall be the fair and current market
value declared by the owner of the property sought to
be expropriated or such market value as determined
by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there
is no more need to appoint commissioners as
prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
and for said commissioners to consider other highly
variable factors in order to determine just
compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed
amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment
of commissioners to determine the just compensation
is concerned. Stated in another way, is the exclusive
and mandatory mode of determining just compensation
in P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional?
RULING:
NO.
The Court is constrained to declare the
provisions of the Decrees on just compensation
unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismiss the
instant petition for lack of merit.
The method of ascertaining just compensation
under the decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court inutile in a matter which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding
the court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property,
following the applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the
property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners under
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to
satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private
property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said
that a judicial proceeding was not had before the
actual taking. However, the strict application of the
decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short
of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to

choose between the valuation of the owner and that of
the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the
lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its
discretion or independence in determining what is just
or fair.
We are convinced and so rule that the trial
court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree
may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the
factors in determining just compensation but it may
not substitute the court's own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount. A return to the earlier well-established
doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the
principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission
"by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights."
The determination of "just compensation" in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded
from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed
compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which
eliminates the court's discretion to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise
would be to undermine the very purpose why this
Court exists in the first place.
67.3
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Br. 15; and NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 135042. September 23, 1999
PETITION: Petition under Rule 45
EMERGENCY RECIT:
NPC filed complaint for Eminent Domain
against Robern. Robern countered with a Motion to
Dismiss. RTC denied MTD. Robern filed MR. Before
the MR could be resolved, Robern filed a Motion for
the Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was
granted by the RTC. The CA upheld the decision of
the RTC.
The SC held that the issues raised by the
petitioner are affirmative defenses that should be
alleged in an answer, since they require presentation
of evidence aliunde. Hence, petitioner should have
filed an answer instead of an MTD. The Court also
held that the trial court's issuance of the Writ of
Possession is ministerial under Rule 67, Sec 2, once
37
the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997
Rule is deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
granted the NPC’s Motion for the issuance of the Writ,
despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the
provisional deposit.
FACTS:
Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of
land, which the National Power Corporation is seeking
to expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed
low-cost housing project. On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a
Complaint for Eminent Domain against Robern.
Instead of filing an answer, petitioner countered
with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging (a) that the action
did not have the approval of the NPC board of
directors; (b) that Nemesio S. Cañete, who signed the
verification and certification in the Complaint, was not
the president, the general manager or an officer
specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA
6395); (c) that the choice of property to be
expropriated was improper, as it had already been
intended for use in a low-cost housing project, a public
purpose within the contemplation of law; and the
choice was also arbitrary, as there were similar
properties available within the area.
Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC
filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession. In
its Order of August 13, 1997, the trial court denied the
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner filed an MR
but was dismissed by the trial court in its order on
September 11, 1997.
On September 22, 1997, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of September
11, 1997, arguing among others that Section 15-A of
RA 6395 was virtually “amended” when Cañete was
allowed to verify and sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping in regard to the Complaint for expropriation
filed by NPC. Without awaiting the outcome of the
Motion for Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to
Implement the Writ of Possession. On September 19,
1997, in spite of petitioner’s opposition, the trial court
issued a Writ of Possession.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the
trial court. The CA ruled that the verification and
certification of the Complaint by someone other than
the president or the general manager of NPC was not
a fatal jurisdictional defect. Also, the issuance of the
Writ of Possession was proper in view of NPC’s
compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine
National Bank an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the disputed property. Lastly, certiorari was
not the proper remedy, as the Order sustaining the
right to expropriate the property was not final and could
still be appealed by the aggrieved party. The
availability of appeal ruled out certiorari
ISSUES:

1. Were there valid grounds to dismiss the Complaint?
2. Was the Writ of Possession validly issued,
considering that the trial court had not conducted any
hearing on the amount to be deposited?
RULING:
1. NO.
In this case, the questioned verification stated that
Atty. Cañete was the acting regional legal counsel of
NPC at the Mindanao Regional Center in Iligan City.
He was not merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-
house counsel and officer, whose basic function was
to prepare legal pleadings and to represent NPC-
Mindanao in legal cases. As regional legal counsel for
the Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in the
best position to verify the truthfulness and the
correctness of the allegations in the Complaint for
expropriation in Davao City. As internal legal counsel,
he was also in the best position to know and to certify
if an action for expropriation had already been filed
and pending with the courts.
Next, petitioner asserts that NPC had no legal
standing to file the expropriation case, because the
Complaint did not allege that its board of directors had
authorized its filing. It added that under Section 6, RA
6395, only the board was vested with the corporate
power to sue and be sued. The contention is without
merit.
Under Rule 67, Section 1, it does not require that the
Complaint be expressly approved by the board of
directors of a corporation. In any event, such
authorization is a factual issue that can be threshed
out during the trial.
Petitioner avers that the Complaint should be
dismissed, because the subject property was already
committed to be used in a low-cost housing project.
We disagree. Petitioner's argument in this case is
premised on the old rule. Before the 1997
amendment, Section 3 of Rule 67 allowed a defendant
“in lieu of an answer, [to] present in a single motion to
dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all of his
objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to
take his property xxx.” A motion to dismiss was not
governed by Rule 15 which covered ordinary motions.
Such motion was the required responsive pleading
that took the place of an answer and put in issue the
plaintiff's right to expropriate the defendant's property.
Any relevant and material fact could be raised as a
defense in a condemnation proceeding, such as that
which tended to show that (1) the exercise of the
power to condemn was unauthorized, or (2) there was
cause for not taking defendant’s property for the
purpose alleged in the petition, or (3) the purpose for
the taking was not public in character.
This old rule found basis in the constitutional
provisions on the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, which were deemed to be for the protection of
the individual property owner against the aggressions
38
of the government. Under the old rule, the hearing of
the motion and the presentation of evidence followed.
However, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
no longer requires such extraordinary motion to
dismiss.
To be exact, the issues raised by the petitioner are
affirmative defenses that should be alleged in an
answer, since they require presentation of
evidence aliunde. Section 3 of Rule 67 provides that
“if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the
allegations in the complaint, or any objection or
defense to the taking of his property,” he should
include them in his answer. Naturally, these issues will
have to be fully ventilated in a full-blown trial and
hearing. It would be precipitate to dismiss the
Complaint on such grounds as claimed by the
petitioner. Dismissal of an action upon a motion to
dismiss constitutes a denial of due process if, from a
consideration of the pleadings, it appears that there
are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the
case on the merits.
Inasmuch as the 1997 Rules had just taken effect
when this case arose, we believe that in the interest of
substantial justice, the petitioner should be given an
opportunity to file its answer to the Complaint for
expropriation in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. YES.
Under SEC. 2. of Rule 67: Upon the filing of the
complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice
to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the real property
involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value
of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by
such bank subject to the orders of the court.
In the present case, although the Complaint for
expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for
the Issuance of the Writ of Possession was filed on
July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the Writ is covered
by the 1997 Rules. As earlier stated, procedural rules
are given immediate effect and are applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time they are
passed; new court rules apply to proceedings that take
place after the date of their effectivity. Therefore,
Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, is the prevailing and governing law in this
case.
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance
of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once
the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997
Rule is deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
granted the NPC’s Motion for the issuance of the Writ,
despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the
provisional deposit.

67.4. SPOUSES MARIAN B. LINTAG and ANGELO
T. ARRASTIA, represented herein by Attorney-in-
Fact REMEDIOS BERENGUER LINTAG v.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
(G.R. No. 158609, July 27, 2007, NACHURA, J.)
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Emergency Recit:
Petitioners are the registered owners of a property covered
by (TCT) No. T 24855. Respondent National Power
Corporation (NPC) filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain
against petitioners in order to acquire an easement of a right
of way over a portion of the said property. On November 7,
2000, Republic Act (RA) No. 8974 entitled "An Act To
Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location
For National Government Infrastructure Projects And For
Other Purposes" was approved. Petitioners filed a Motion
asking the RTC to direct the NPC to comply with RA No.
8974. Petitioners asseverated that pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA
No. 8974, they are entitled to 100% of the value of the
subject property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
which at the time was pegged at ₱700.00 per square meter.
NPC counters that RA No. 8974 is not a remedial statute
that can be given retroactive effect, and submits that Sec. 4
thereof is a substantive provision. SC held that held that RA
No. 8974 is a substantive law. Expropriation of lands
consists of two stages: The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second
phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. It
is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is
not complete until payment of just compensation.
Facts:
Marian Berenguer-Lintag and Angelo T.
Arrastia (petitioners) are the registered owners of a
property with an area of 80,001 square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T
24855
On December 4, 1996, respondent National
Power Corporation (NPC) filed a Complaint for
Eminent Domain against petitioners in order to acquire
an easement of a right of way over a portion of the
said property, consisting of 8,050 square meters. After
the deposit of the initial assessed value of the subject
property amounting to ₱2,468.09 with the Philippine
National Bank, the RTC, upon an ex-parte motion of
NPC, ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession on
the subject property. The RTC issued an Order
appointing three (3) new Commissioners to appraise
the value of the subject property.
On November 7, 2000, Republic Act (RA) No.
8974 entitled "An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of
Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National
Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other
Purposes" was approved. Petitioners filed a Motion
asking the RTC to direct the NPC to comply with RA
No. 8974. In the said motion, petitioners asseverated
39
that pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA No. 8974, they are
entitled to 100% of the value of the subject property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation made by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), which at the
time was pegged at ₱700.00 per square meter. Thus,
petitioners prayed that NPC be directed to pay
₱5,635,000.00 for the subject property.
The RTC issued an Order directing the NPC to
comply with RA No. 8974. The court held that RA No.
8974 is procedural in nature, and, thus, may be given
retroactive effect. On appeal, CA declared that RA No.
8974 cannot be applied retroactively since an initial
deposit had already been made and possession of the
subject property had already been obtained by NPC.
Moreover, the CA held that the retroactive application
of said law would impose a greater burden on the part
of the State where none had existed before. It would
inflict substantial injury to a substantive right. Finally,
the CA opined that RA No. 8974 itself made no
mention of retroactivity.
Petitioners contend that the Government's
deliberate delay of payment of just compensation is the
evil sought to be remedied by RA No. 8974; that
despite the issuance of Administrative Order (AO) No.
50 and NPC Resolution No. 98-184, NPC never had
the intention of making prompt payment of just
compensation; and that just compensation does not
only mean correct determination of the amount to be
paid but also the prompt payment thereof. On the other
hand, NPC through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) counters that RA No. 8974 is not a remedial
statute that can be given retroactive effect, and
submits that Sec. 4 thereof is a substantive provision
as it vests substantive rights; that the legislature did
not intend RA No. 8974 to have retroactive application
Issues:
1. W/N CA committed a reversible error when it
declared that RA No. 8974 cannot be applied
retroactively because it is a substantive law and
not a remedial statute
2. Assuming for the sake of argument that RA
No. 8974 is not retroactive, how should the
petitioners be promptly paid just compensation?
Ruling:
No. The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioners'
first ground must fail.
In the case of Republic v. Gingoyon, this Court
held that RA No. 8974 is a substantive law, to wit:
It likewise bears noting that the
appropriate standard of just
compensation is a substantive matter.
It is well within the province of the
legislature to fix the standard, which it
did through the enactment of Rep. Act
No. 8974.
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes,
including administrative rules and regulations, operate
prospectively unless the legislative intent to the
contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary
implication.
In the application of RA No. 8974, the Court finds no
justification to depart from this rule. First, RA No. 8974
is a substantive law. Second, there is nothing in RA
No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have

retroactive effect. Third, neither is retroactivity
necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its
provisions. Unfortunately for the petitioners, the
silence of RA No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules on
the matter cannot give rise to the inference that it can
be applied retroactively.
As to petitioners' second ground, the parties may be
guided by the following principles.
Expropriation of lands consists of two
stages: The first is concerned with the determination
of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint
x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain
action is concerned with the determination by the court
of "the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners x x x.27
It is only upon the completion of these two
stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. The process is not complete until payment
of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the
writ of possession in this case does not write finis to
the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the
transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to
pay the property owners the final just compensation
RTC must bear in mind that it is the value of
the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the
filing of the complaint, whichever came first, not the
value of the land at the time of the rendition of
judgment which should be considered. In this case,
where the institution of an expropriation action
preceded the taking of the subject property, just
compensation is based on the value of the land at the
time of the filing of the complaint. This is provided by
the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by
the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its
deposit with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the
amount equivalent to the value of the property as
provisionally ascertained by the court having
jurisdiction of the proceedings.
67.5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the TOLL REGULATORY BOARD
vs. PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING
CORPORATION and SY CHI SIONG AND CO., INC.
(G.R. No. 172243, June 26, 2007, GARCIA, J.)
Emergency Recit
Petitioner Republic, through the Toll
Regulatory Board, sought to widen the Balintawak Toll
Plaza which would necessarily affect two (2) parcels of
land registered under the names of herein
respondents Phil-Ville Development and Housing
Corporation (Phil-Ville, for brevity) and Sy Chi Siong
and Co., Inc. Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of
Order of Expropriation and Appointment of
40
Commissioners on the rationale that the respondents
had never challenged its right to expropriate their
properties subject of the suit. The trial court, even as it
found the aforementioned motion meritorious, deferred
action on the petitioner’s prayer for an order of
expropriation and instead set the same motion for
hearing. Petitioners argued that the issuance of an
order of expropriation is proper citing Section 4, Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and adding
that where a defendant in an expropriation case raises
only the issue of just compensation, the court "should
forthwith enter an order of expropriation. SC held that
payment of just compensation is not a condition sine
qua non to the issuance of an order of expropriation. In
expropriation proceedings, it is the transfer of title to
the land expropriated that must wait until the indemnity
is actually paid
Facts:
Petitioner Republic, through the Toll
Regulatory Board, sought to widen the Balintawak Toll
Plaza which would necessarily affect two (2) parcels of
land registered under the names of herein respondents
Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation (Phil-
Ville, for brevity) and Sy Chi Siong and Co., Inc.
Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City for the
acquisition of the 2 parcels of land. Petitioner
deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines the
amount of Two Million Three Hundred Eleven
Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (₱2,311,200.00),
representing the total zonal value of the properties
under expropriation. Thereafter, it filed with the court a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Issuance of Order of Expropriation
and Appointment of Commissioners on the rationale
that the respondents had never challenged its right to
expropriate their properties subject of the suit. The trial
court, even as it found the aforementioned motion
meritorious, deferred action on the petitioner’s prayer
for an order of expropriation and instead set the same
motion for hearing on March 7, 2005 "so that the
parties may nominate the commissioners who will
ascertain and report to the court the just compensation
for the aforementioned properties
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that since
the case had been set for hearing on March 7, 2005 for
the nomination of the commissioners and necessarily
for the conduct of hearing for the determination of just
compensation, "it is proper that an order of
expropriation be forthwith issued before such
determination of just compensation proceeds," citing,
as basis therefor, Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and adding that where a defendant
in an expropriation case raises only the issue of just
compensation, the court "should forthwith enter an
order of expropriation.
RTC denied the motion holding that just
compensation of the subject properties must first be
determined and paid before the Court can issue an
order of expropriation. CA affirmed
Issue:

W/N a final determination of just compensation in an
expropriation proceedings must first be made before
an order of expropriation may be issued by the court
Ruling:
No. There are two (2) stages in every action
for expropriation. Petitioner Republic is correct in
saying that an order of expropriation denotes the end
of the first stage of expropriation. Its end then paves
the way for the second stage – the determination of
just compensation, and, ultimately, payment
Because an order of expropriation merely
determines the authority to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of such exercise, its
issuance does not hinge on the payment of just
compensation. After all, there would be no point in
determining just compensation if, in the first place, the
plaintiff’s right to expropriate the property was not first
clearly established.
During the first stage, if the defendant had
denied or objected to the plaintiff's right to expropriate,
a hearing would have been held to decide upon
whether the land was private, and whether the
purpose was, in fact, public.However, once the
objections and defenses against the right of the
plaintiff to expropriate are overruled, an order of
expropriation may issue. With all the more reason
must this be so when, as in this case, there is no
contest or objection by either of the herein
respondents as to the petitioner’s right to expropriate
After the trial court determined the right of
petitioner to condemn the subject properties for the
expansion and rehabilitation of the North Luzon
Expressway, the first stage of the expropriation
proceedings should have been properly terminated
with the issuance of an order of expropriation declaring
that petitioner has the right to take the properties.
To stress, payment of just compensation is not
a condition sine qua non to the issuance of an order of
expropriation. In expropriation proceedings, it is the
transfer of title to the land expropriated that must wait
until the indemnity is actually paid. This is made all the
more clear when note is taken of the second
paragraph of Section 4, Rule 67, supra, which states
that the defendant may appeal from the order of
expropriation by filing a record on appeal, which
appeal does not prevent the court from determining
the just compensation to be paid.
Further, a perusal of Section 5, Rule 67 bolsters this
point:
Section 5. Ascertainment of
Compensation. - Upon the rendition of the
order of expropriation, the court shall appoint
not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be
taken. x x x
Clearly, it is after the rendition of the order of
expropriation that the court shall appoint
commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken.
41
67.6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS vs. FAR EAST
ENTERPRISES, INC., ARSOL MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION,* MARIA CHRISTINA C.
BERNASCONI, JORGE C. BERNASCONI, RENE C.
BERNASCONI, REGINA B. TUASON, CHRISTIAN C.
BERNASCONI, MARTIN C. BERNASCONI, JAIME C.
BERNASCONI and CHRISTINA MARIE C.
BERNASCONI
(G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009, CHICO-
NAZARIO, J.)
Emergency Recit
The Republic represented by the Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a
Complaint for Eminent Domain before the Regional Trial
Court of Nasugbu, Batangas against Far East Enterprises,
Inc. (Far East), Arsol Management Corporation (Arsol), and
the Bernasconis. The trial court ordered petitioner to comply
and manifest its compliance with the guidelines of Section 12
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 8974. The trial court issued a Resolution dated 17 June
2002 ordering the plaintiff to make the additional deposit of
₱425.00 per square meter for the properties of the movants
before the order to possess and writ of possession issue.
The appellate court found that the trial court did not act with
grave abuse of discretion. SC made it clear that Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 8974 lists the relevant standards that are to
be considered in determining just compensation for and not
classification of lands, as petitioner would like us to believe.
To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a
prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs
from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated
property. While the provisional value is based on the current
relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the
prevailing fair market value of the property
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint for Eminent
Domain before the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu,
Batangas against Far East Enterprises, Inc. (Far East),
Arsol Management Corporation (Arsol), Maria Christina
C. Bernasconi, Jorge C. Bernasconi, Rene C.
Bernasconi, Regina B. Tuason, Christian C.
Bernasconi, Martin C. Bernasconi, Jaime C.
Bernasconi and Christina Marie C. Bernasconi
(Bernasconis).
The complaint alleged that to enable the
plaintiff to construct the Ternate-Nasugbu Tali
Batangas Road, it is both necessary and urgent for
plaintiff to acquire portions of the parcels of land
owned by the defendants
The trial court ordered petitioner to comply and
manifest its compliance with the guidelines of Section
12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 8974, within ten days from receipt
thereof, before it would issue an order for petitioner to
take possession of the affected properties. Petitioner
filed its Compliance and Motion for Issuance of Order
and Writ of Possession.
Both Far East and the Bernasconis claimed
that petitioner intentionally and wantonly disregarded
and misled the trial court by stating that their properties

were classified as agricultural to justify the deposit it
made
The trial court ordered petitioner to correct its
zonal valuation with respect to Far East and the
Bernasconis and to make the corresponding deposit
therefor. It found that the amounts deposited as
regards Far East and the Bernasconis were not
sufficient because these were based on a zonal
valuation of ₱75.00 per square meter. It said that the
deposit should be based on ₱500.00 per square
meter, because the subject lands were residential
lands. As to Arsol, the trial court found the deposit of
petitioner at ₱75.00 per square meter was correct
The trial court issued a Resolution dated 17
June 2002 ordering the plaintiff to make the additional
deposit of ₱425.00 per square meter for the properties
of the movants before the order to possess and writ of
possession issue. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
72425 rendered its decision dismissing, for lack of
merit, the petition filed by petitioner DPWH. The
appellate court found that the trial court did not act with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ordering petitioner to make the
additional payment of ₱425.00 per square meter for
the subject properties of Far East and the Bernasconis
before the issuance of the order to take possession,
and the writ of possession
Issue:
In paying a property owner 100% of the value
of a property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the BIR for the purpose of an issuance of
a writ of possession, under which classification of the
expropriated property should petitioner, as the
implementing agency, be required to make such
payment?
Ruling:
We agree with petitioner that the courts have
judicial discretion to determine the classification of
lands, because such classification is one of the
relevant standards for the assessment of the value of
lands, subject of expropriation proceedings. It is one
factor that the courts consider in determining just
compensation. The determination of just compensation
is a function addressed by the courts of justice and
may not be usurped by any other branch or official of
the government. However, we would like to make it
clear that Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974 lists the
relevant standards that are to be considered in
determining just compensation for and not
classification of lands, as petitioner would like us to
believe.
In the case before us, the lands in question
had long been (almost 20 years) reclassified as
residential before the instant case was filed. All those
years, no one questioned the ordinance reclassifying
the lands. If petitioner would like to have the
reclassification of the lands involved changed to
agricultural, the just and reasonable way of doing it is
to go to the municipal council -- not the courts – that
enacted the ordinance and to ask that the lands be
reclassified again as agricultural. Technical matters
such as zoning classifications and building
42
certifications should be primarily resolved first by the
administrative agency whose expertise relates therein.
To clarify, the payment of the provisional value
as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession differs from the payment of just
compensation for the expropriated property. While the
provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal
valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing
fair market value of the property. As the appellate court
explained:
The first refers to the preliminary or provisional
determination of the value of the property. It serves a
double-purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully
expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if the
proceedings are dismissed. It is not a final
determination of just compensation and may not
necessarily be equivalent to the prevailing fair market
value of the property. Of course, it may be a factor to
be considered in the determination of just
compensation.
Just compensation, on the other hand, is the
final determination of the fair market value of the
property. It has been described as "the just and
complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the
thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation." Market values, has also been described
in a variety of ways as the "price fixed by the buyer
and seller in the open market in the usual and ordinary
course of legal trade and competition; the price and
value of the article established as shown by sale,
public or private, in the ordinary way of business; the
fair value of the property between one who desires to
purchase and one who desires to sell; the current
price; the general or ordinary price for which property
may be sold in that locality
67.7. CITY OF ILOILO represented by HON. JERRY
P. TREÑAS, City Mayor vs. HON. LOLITA
CONTRERAS-BESANA, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 32, and ELPIDIO JAVELLANA
(G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010, DEL
CASTILLO, J)
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
Emergency Recit
In an expropriation case filed by petitioner
against private respondent (Javellana), the plaintiff was able
to take possession of two parcels of land owned by Javellana
for the purpose of making the said lots the site for Lapaz
High School. On May 17, 1983, a writ of possession was
issued to plaintiff after it allegedly made a deposit of P
40,000. Private respondent found out that the amount of Php
40,000 was not deposited. Javellana filed a complaint for
Recovery of Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and
Damages. RTC then issued an order (2003 order) which
nullified the 1983 order, ordering the petitioner to
immediately deposit the 10% of the just compensation. This
was amended six months later, changing the reckoning point
from the time of the filing of the complaint to the date of the
issuance of this order. SC held that an order of
condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of
whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised
its power of eminent domain. Once the first order becomes
final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the

taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings.
Facts:
In an expropriation case filed by petitioner
against private respondent (Javellana), the plaintiff
was able to take possession of two parcels of land
owned by Javellana for the purpose of making the said
lots the site for Lapaz High School. On May 17, 1983,
a writ of possession was issued to plaintiff after it
allegedly made a deposit of the amount of the value of
the said lots (Php 40,000).
On April 2000, private respondent found out
that the amount of Php 40,000 was not deposited by
the petitioner when he tried to withdraw the said
amount (as proved by a certification issued by the
PNB). When no amicable resolution and a negotiated
sale was successful, he (Javellana) filed a complaint
for Recovery of Possession, Fixing and Recovery of
Rental and Damages. He alleged that since he was
not compensated for the expropriation of his property,
the possession by the plaintiff was illegal. This
argument was opposed by the petitioner, claiming that
Javellana can no longer file an action for the recovery
of the possession of the lots since the same was
already utilized for public use, therefore can only
demand for the payment of just compensation.
The RTC then issued an order (2003 order)
which nullified the 1983 order, ordering the petitioner
to immediately deposit the 10% of the just
compensation after determining the value of the
property at the time the complaint was filed. This was
amended six months later (2004 order), changing the
reckoning point from the time of the filing of the
complaint to the date of the issuance of this order. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner,
arguing that there was no legal basis for its issuance.
This was denied by the trial court, ruling that since no
deposit was made, the reckoning point for the
determination of the fair market value of the property
should be the date of the issuance of the order.
Petitioner assailed the aforementioned orders
claiming that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in overturning the 1983 order which was
already final and executory, and that the just
compensation for the expropriation should be based
on the fair market value of the property at the time of
the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Private respondent argued that there was no error
committed by the trial court, and that the said orders
were subject to amendment and nullification at the
court’s discretion.
Issues:
1. Does an order of expropriation become final?
2. What is the correct reckoning point for the
determination of just compensation?
Ruling:
Expropriation proceedings have two stages.
The first phase ends with an order of dismissal, or a
determination that the property is to be acquired for a
43
public purpose.32 Either order will be a final order that
may be appealed by the aggrieved party.
An order of condemnation or dismissal is final,
resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff
has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent
domain. Once the first order becomes final and no
appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate
and its public use can no longer be questioned.
Javellana did not bother to file an appeal from
the May 17, 1983 Order which granted petitioner’s
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession and which
authorized petitioner to take immediate possession of
the Subject Property. Thus, it has become final, and
the petitioner’s right to expropriate the property for a
public use is no longer subject to review. On the first
question, therefore, SC ruled that the trial court gravely
erred in nullifying the May 17, 1983 Order
In a long line of cases, SC have constantly
affirmed that:
x x x just compensation is to
be ascertained as of the time of the
taking, which usually coincides with
the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry
into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as
of the time of the filing of the complaint
We stress, however, that the City of Iloilo
should be held liable for damages for taking private
respondent’s property without payment of just
compensation. In Manila International Airport Authority
v. Rodriguez,43 the Court held that a government
agency’s prolonged occupation of private property
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages
67.8. APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO
PLANTATION, INC vs. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES
(G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010, BRION,
J.)
Emergency Recit:
Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation,
Incorporated were owners of 5 parcels of land in Davao.
These companies voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the
Department of Agriculture pursuant to RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The parties were not
able to come into agreement as to the price of the lands in
question. Thus, the petitioners brought the matter to before
the DAR Adjudication Board to determine just compensation.
Pending the determination of the just compensation, the
government deposited P26M and P45M to Apo Fruits
Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc., respectively. DAR also
registered said lands in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines and distributed the same to farmers under CARP.
Three years passed but DARAB failed to render decision on
the valuation of land and determination of just compensation.
Hence, petitioners filed a complaint for the determination of
just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Davao,
which rendered decision in favor of AFC and HPI. RTC ruled
that the purchase price of the land should be higher than
what was initially offered by DAR, considering the permanent

improvements on AFC’s and HPI’s lands. SC held that when
the LBP took the petitioners’ landholdings without the
corresponding full payment, it became liable to the
petitioners for the income the landholdings would have
earned had they not immediately been taken from the
petitioners. LBP is liable to pay legal interest of 12% counted
from December 9, 1996, the time of the taking until June 30,
2013.
Facts:
On 12 October 1995, petitioners (AFC & HPI)
voluntarily offered to sell (VOS) their respective
registered tracks of land to the government. On 16
October 1996, they were notified by the PARO of the
acquisition and valuation of P86.9M (AFC) and
P164.5M (HPI) to which petitioners rejected for being
very low. Accordingly, the respondent bank deposited
P26.4M (AFC) and P45.5M (HPI) to petitioners’ bank
account which they withdrew after. On 9 December
1996, titles over the lands were cancelled and new
ones were issued in the name of the Republic.
When DARAB failed to act for three years on
the petitions for determination and payment of just
compensation, petitioners filed the petitions with RTC
Tagum. On 25 September 2001, it fixed the amount of
just compensation and an interest at market rate
computed from the taking of the properties (9
December 1996). When the respondent moved for
reconsideration, the RTC modified its ruling on 5
December 2001 fixing the interest at 12% per annum
from the time the complaint was filed until finality of the
decision.
On 6 February 2007, the Third Division of SC
affirmed RTC decision but, upon motion for
reconsideration, it was modified on 19 December 2007
deleting the 12% interest due on the balance of just
compensation. All parties moved for reconsideration of
the modified ruling but was denied. On 16 May 2008,
Entry of Judgment followed. Notwithstanding the Entry
of Judgment, petitioners still filed a motion to admit the
Second Motion for Reconsideration and motion to refer
the second motion to Court En Banc.
The Court En Banc accepted the referral. But
on 4 December 2009, it denied the petitioners’ second
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
motion runs counter to the immutability of final
decisions and that it has no reason to recognize the
case as an exception to the immutability principle.
Thus, petitioners filed the present motion for
reconsideration to reconsider its 4 December 2009
Resolution arguing among others that the principle of
immutability of judgment does not apply. LBP, on the
other hand, contends that the principle of immutability
applies to the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
the interest on the just compensation?
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is
granted.
In the context of this case, when the LBP took
the petitioners’ landholdings without the corresponding
full payment, it became liable to the petitioners for the
44
income the landholdings would have earned had they
not immediately been taken from the petitioners. From
this point of view, the December 19, 2007 Resolution
deleting the award of 12% interest is not only patently
and legally wrong, but is also morally unconscionable
for being grossly unfair and unjust.
The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent
to the market value of the property, broadly described
to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as between
one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed
at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value to be computed from
the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and
the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to
place the owner in a position as good as (but not
better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred.
The award of interest is intended to
compensate the property owner for the income it would
have made had it been properly compensated for its
property at the time of the taking. It is imposed in the
nature of damages for delay in payment which, in
effect, makes the obligation on the part of the
government one of forbearance to ensure prompt
payment of the value of the land and limit the
opportunity loss of the owner.
In LBP v. PH-Agro Industrial Corporation
(2017), the SC ruled that “the requirement of the law is
not satisfied by the mere deposit with any accessible
bank of the provisional compensation determined by it
or by the DAR, and its subsequent release to the
landowner after compliance with the legal
requirements set forth by R.A. No. 6657.”
In the present case, LBP merely deposited the
amount of 3,814,053.53Php as initial payment of the
just compensation. The RTC's valuation in its decision
as just compensation for the subject property is
149,783,000.27Php. There is a staggering difference
between the initial payment made by the LBP and the
amount of the just compensation due to Apo. It should
be noted that the subject property has already been
taken by the government on December 9, 1996.
Thus, LBP is liable to pay legal interest of 12%
counted from December 9, 1996, the time of the taking
until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1,
2013 until fully paid, the just compensation shall earn
6% legal interest in accordance with Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series
of 2013
More than the stability of our jurisprudence,
the matter before us is of transcendental importance to
the nation because of the subject matter involved –
agrarian reform, a societal objective that the
government has unceasingly sought to achieve in the
past half century. This reform program and its
objectives would suffer a major setback if the
government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly
or unwittingly, through lack of good faith in

implementing the needed reforms. Truly, agrarian
reform is so important to the national agenda that the
Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked agricultural
lands, its ownership and abuse, to the idea of
revolution.
67.9. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q.
BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 165354,January 12, 2015,BERSAMIN J.)
Emergency Recit
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)
entered into a private property owned by respondents
Borbon in order to construct and maintain transmission
lines for its Power Transmission Project. NAPOCOR
then filed for expropriation of an easement of right of
way over a portion of the said property. However,
during the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a
motion to discontinue the expropriation proceedings,
that the property sought to be expropriated was no
longer necessary for public purpose, that because the
public purpose ceased to exist, the proceedings for
expropriation should no longer continue, and the State
was now duty-bound to return the property to its
owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of
the expropriation proceedings was in accordance of
the Rules of Court. SC held that the dismissal of the
proceedings for expropriation at the instance of
NAPOCOR is proper, but in pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 67
of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance
of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the
court deems just and equitable.
Facts:
NAPOCOR, a government owned and
controlled corporation, entered into a property located
at Batangas City to construct and maintain
transmission lines. Saturnino Boboron’s heirs, the
herein respondents, owned the property which was
registered under Transfer Certificate Title No. T-9696
of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas.
NAPOCOR filed a complaint of expropriation in
the RTC Batangas City seeking for an easement of
right of way over a portion of the property. They
contended that they had negotiated with the
respondents for the acquisition of the easement but
they had failed to reach any agreement and that it
was willing to pay an amount representing the
assessed value of the portion of the land sought to be
expropriated.
The respondents answered with a motion to
dismiss and stated that they never had a negotiation
with NAPOCOR and that the entry was done without
their consent in the process and even destroyed some
of trees, transmission posts and wood poles; that the
area being expropriated only covered the portion
directly affected by the transmission lines.
45
In 2004, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings,
informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable
agreement; that the property sought to be
expropriated was no longer necessary for public
purpose because of the intervening retirement of the
transmission lines installed on the respondents’
property; that because the public purpose for which
such property would be used thereby ceased to exist,
the proceedings for expropriation should no longer
continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return
the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should
be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal
Ruling:
Yes. The dismissal of the proceedings for
expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper,
but in pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the
proceedings must be upon such terms as the court
deems just and equitable. It is important to note the
power of eminent domain. The right of eminent
domain is the “ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate, not only the public but private property of
all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public
purpose.” However, this right cannot be exercised in
an unlimited manner for it has two mandatory
requirements in the Government’s exercise of owner of
eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular
public purpose; and (2) the just compensation be paid
to the property owner.
Public use, in common acceptation, means
“use by the public.” However, the concept has
expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity
for the benefit of the public. “Public use” has now
been held to be synonymous with “public interest,”
“public benefit,” and “public convenience.”
It is essential that the element of public use of
the property be maintained throughout the
proceedings for expropriation. The Court has observed
in Metropolitan Water District v. De los Angeles:
It is not denied that the purpose of
the plaintiff was to acquire the land in
question for public use. The fundamental basis

then of all actions brought for the
expropriation of lands, under the power of
eminent domain, is public use. That being
true, the very moment that it appears at any
stage of the proceedings that the
expropriation is not for a public use, the action
must necessarily fail and should be dismissed,
for the reason that the action cannot be
maintained at all except when the
expropriation is for some public use. That
must be true even during the pendency of the
appeal or at any other stage of the
proceedings. If, for example, during the trial in
the lower court, it should be made to appear
to the satisfaction of the court that the
expropriation is not for some public use, it
would be the duty and the obligation of the
trial court to dismiss the action. And even
during the pendency of the appeal, if it should
be made to appear to the satisfaction of the
appellate court that the expropriation is not
for public use, then it would become the duty
and the obligation of the appellate court to
dismiss it.
The retirement of the transmission lines
necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of
the element of public use. To continue with the
expropriation proceedings despite the definite
termination of the public purpose of the project would
result in the rendition of an invalid judgement in
favour of the expropriator due to the absence of the
essential element which is public use.
Accordingly, due to the fact that NAPOCOR
entered the property without consent and without
paying the compensation to the respondents, as well
as to the damages it caused considering that in the
installation of transmission lines, there were fruit trees
and plants damaged, the Court grants the motion to
discontinue the proceedings subject to the conditions
mentioned.
In the view of the discontinuance of the
proceedings and return of the property to the
respondents, there is no need to pay just
compensation to the respondents because their
property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead,
the said agency must compensate the respondents for
the disturbance of their property rights form the time
they entered the property, until the time of restoration
of the possession by paying to them actual or other
compensatory damages. Compensation now must be
understood as the actual lost as the result of the
damaged resources such as the plants and crops
destroyed by NAPOCOR. Considering that the dismissal
of the expropriation proceedings is a development
occurring during the appeal, the Court now treats the
dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as
producing the effect of converting the case into an
action for damages. For that purpose, the Court
remands the case to the court of origin for further
46
proceedings. The court of origin shall treat the case as
if originally filed as an action for damages.
67.10. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v.
HEIRS OF ANTONINA RABIE, REPRESENTED BY
ABRAHAM R. DELA CRUZ
(G.R. No. 210218, August 17, 2016, CARPIO, J)
Petition for Review On Certiorari
Emergency Recit: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
expropriation for the acquisition of Rabies’ land.
NAPOCOR disagree with the amount of just
compensation that the RTC granted. It filed an MR,
and after 7 days from receipt of its denial Rabies filed a
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. NAPOCOR
filed a Notice of Appeal, so the RTC transmit the
records to the CA. The trial court then set for hearing
respondents' Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and
then issued an order granting it. NAPOCOR was
informed by LBP of the Notice of Garnishment.
SC: The trial court still has jurisdiction to resolve a
motion for discretionary execution, but discretionary
execution does not apply to eminent domain
proceedings, and the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to specify and discuss any
good reason required for granting execution pending
appeal. NAPOCOR funds being government
properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution
pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court
likewise cannot grant discretionary execution
pending appeal.
FACTS:
NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
expropriation before the RTC against Heirs of Rabie
for the acquisition of the 822-square meter portion a
residential lot located in Lumban, Laguna to be used
as access road for the Caliraya Hydro Electric Power
Plant. Rabies filed their Verified Answer claiming that
the just compensation should be P1,250,700 based on
BIR zonal value of P1,000/sqm. NAPOCOR deposited
with the Land Bank the amount of P411,000
(P500/sqm).
Rabies filed a Motion to Withdraw deposit
which the RTC granted. NAPOCOR filed a Motion to
Issue Order of Expropriation. However, NAPOCOR
opposed the Commissioner’s Report, which
nevertheless became the basis of RTC for grant of just
compensation and the order for payment of lease from
the time of occupation in 1940.
NAPOCOR filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order. However, the trial court denied the motion
in an Order dated 30 April 2013 which was received by
NAPOCOR on 23 May 2013 and by respondents on 15
May 2013. On 22 May 2013, respondents filed a
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
NAPOCOR filed its Comment/Opposition and
its Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal. RTC gave
due course to NAPOCOR's Notice of Appeal and

directed the transmittal of the records of the case to
the Court of Appeals. The trial court set for hearing
respondents' Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
and then issued an order granting it.
NAPOCOR was informed by LBP of receipt of
Notice of Garnishment. NAPOCOR file with the CA a
petition for certiorari, but it dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: W/N NAPOCOR’s funds may be garnished
through a Motion for Execution for Pending Appeal
Ruling:
NO. The trial court still has jurisdiction to
resolve a motion for discretionary execution, but
discretionary execution does not apply to eminent
domain proceedings, and the judge committed grave
abuse of discretion when it failed to specify and
discuss any good reason required for granting
execution pending appeal.
Execution pending appeal, also called
discretionary execution under Section 2(a), Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, is allowed upon good reasons to
be stated in a special order after due hearing.
In this case, the motion for execution pending
appeal was filed by respondents seven days after their
receipt of the trial court's order denying the motions for
reconsideration filed by both parties. Clearly,
respondents filed the motion for execution pending
appeal before the lapse of the period to file an appeal,
which is fifteen days from notice of the order denying
the motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the trial
court still had jurisdiction when respondents filed their
motion for execution pending appeal.
Further, prior to transmittal of the records of
the case, the trial court does not lose jurisdiction over
the case and in fact, may issue an order for execution
pending appeal.
However, the universal rule that where the
State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimants
action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law.
Thus, NAPOCOR funds being government
properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution
pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court
likewise cannot grant discretionary execution
pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the
47
established jurisprudence that government
properties are exempt from execution. What
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
(note :State cannot be sued without its consent thus,
garnishment cannot be made on government funds,
there’s a need for a law. Thus, trial court cannot do so
by grant of discretionary execution pending appeal.)
Lastly, the trial court also committed grave
abuse of discretion when it failed to specify and
discuss any good reason required for granting
execution pending appeal.
Execution pending appeal requires the
observance of the following requisites: (a) there must
be a motion therefor by the prevailing party; (b) there
must be a good reason for issuing the writ of
execution; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a
special order.
The execution of judgment pending appeal
is an exception to the general rule and must,
therefore, be strictly construed. So, too, it is not to
be availed of and applied routinely, but only in
extraordinary circumstances.
In this case, the trial court granted the motion
for execution pending appeal based on "good reasons
as stated in the motion," without identifying and
discussing any of these alleged good reasons. . The
trial court should have expressed clearly and distinctly
the facts and law on which the order granting the
motion for execution pending appeal was based, but it
did not. Without such finding, the allegations in the
motion for execution pending appeal remain as
allegations.
67.11. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
HEIRS OF LORENZO TAÑADA AND EXPEDITA
EBARLE,
(January 11, 2017, G.R. No. 170506, LEONARDO-
DE CASTRO, J.)
(Petition for review under Rule 45)
Emergency Recit:
The heirs were owners of parcels of land that
were included in the land reform program. The Land
Bank put a value of 223,837 and 192,610 on the
subject lands. The heirs alleged that the value was too
low. The RTC then valued the land as 150,000 per
hectare. SC held that the just compensation for the
said properties must be governed by the valuation
factors under Section 17 of Republic Act No.
6657.Ppursuant to the rule-making power of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Section
49 of Republic Act No. 6657, the enumerated factors
were translated into a formula that was outlined in DAR
Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1989, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 03, series
of 1991, and as further amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 06, series of 1992

Facts:
Respondents, the Heirs of Lorenzo Tañada
and Expedita Ebarle, are the owners of several parcels
of land situated in Gabon, Abucay, Bataan, covered by
TCT Nos. T-8483 and T-12610. The record shows that
sometime in 1988, the aforesaid parcels of land were
placed under the land reform program of the
government. It was determined that 16.7692 hectares
from TCT No. T-8483 and 13 hectares from TCT No.
T-12610 would be included in the program. P
etitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
valued the properties to be taken at ₱223,837.29 for
16.7692 hectares and ₱192,610.16 for 13 hectares or
a total of ₱416,447.43. Dissatisfied with this valuation
for being unreasonably and unconscionably low,
respondents instituted the summary administrative
proceedings for the preliminary determination of just
compensation in 1992 and 1993.
Neither the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) nor petitioner presented any witness to refute
the evidence presented by respondents. Instead, they
offered documentary exhibits to show how, in
adherence to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series
of 1992, they arrived at the valuation of the just
compensation for the subject parcels.
The trial court acting as a Special Agrarian
Court (SAC) rendered the assailed July 13, 1999
Decision which favored the respondents in this case
and pegged the value of the lots in question at fifteen
pesos per square meter or P-150,000.00 per hectare
A motion for reconsideration was
subsequently filed by petitioner but this was denied by
the trial court. Dissatisfied with the adverse judgment,
petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
Respondents, in turn, opposed the petition on
the ground that petitioner's valuation based on the
formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 06, series of
1992, may not supplant the valuation of the SAC,
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court utilized the
correct method in fixing the just compensation due to
respondents' parcels of land which have been
subjected to land reform proceedings under Republic
Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988
Ruling:
No. Since there is no dispute that the subject
properties are qualified for coverage under the
agrarian reform law, the just compensation for the said
properties must be governed by the valuation factors
under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657.
When handling just compensation cases, the
trial court acting as a SAC should be guided by the
following factors: (1) the acquisition cost of the land;
(2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature,
actual use, and income; (4) the sworn valuation by the
owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment
made by government assessors; (7) the social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property;
and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured
48
from any government financing institution on the said
land, if any
Pursuant to the rule-making power of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Section
49 of Republic Act No. 6657, the enumerated factors
were translated into a formula that was outlined in DAR
Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1989, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 03, series
of 1991, and as further amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 06, series of 1992
There shall be one basic formula for the
valuation of land covered by VOS or CA regardless of
the date of offer or coverage of the claim: LV = (CNI x
0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where: LV = Land Value, CNI =Capitalized Net
Income, CS = Comparable Sales and MV = Market
Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three
factors are present, relevant, and applicable.
Al. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV
are applicable, the formula shall be: LV = (CNI x 0.9) +
(MV x 0.1)
A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and
MV are applicable, the formula shall be: LV = (CS x
0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and
only MV is applicable, the formula shall be: LV = MV x
2
The Court En Banc held in the recent case of
Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines18:
For clarity, we restate the
body of rules as follows: The factors
listed under Section 17 of RA 6657
and its resulting formulas provide a
uniform framework or structure for the
computation of just compensation
which ensures that the amounts to be
paid to affected landowners are not
arbitrary, absurd or even contradictory
to the objectives of agrarian reform.
Until and unless declared invalid in a
proper case, the DAR formulas
partake of the nature of statutes,
which under the 2009 amendment
became law itself, and thus have in
their favor the presumption of legality,
such that courts shall consider, and
not disregard, these formulas in the
determination of just compensation for
properties covered by the CARP.
When faced with situations which do
not warrant the formula's strict
application, courts may, in the
exercise of their judicial discretion,
relax the formula's application to fit the
factual situations before them, subject
only to the condition that they clearly
explain in their Decision their reasons
(as borne by the evidence on record)
for the deviation undertaken. It is thus
entirely allowable for a court to allow a
landowner's claim for an amount
higher than what would otherwise
have been offered (based on an
application of the formula) for as long

as there is evidence on record
sufficient to support the award.
It is apparent from the foregoing that both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals did not observe the
valuation factors under Section 17 of Republic Act No.
6657 as translated into a basic formula in DAR
Administrative Order No. 06, series of 1992, without a
well-reasoned justification for the deviation as
supported by the evidence on record. This is in clear
violation of the express mandate of both the law and
jurisprudence concerning the determination of just
compensation of land subjected to coverage by the
agrarian reform law. For this reason, the valuation
made by the trial court cannot be upheld and must be
struck down as illegal.
68.1. ALONA G. ROLDAN v. SPOUSES CLARENCE
I. BARRIOS AND ANNA LEE T. BARRIOS,
ROMMEL MATORRES, AND HON. JEMENA
ABELLAR ARBIS, IN HER CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, AKLAN
(G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018, PERALTA, J.)
Petition for certiorari
Emergency Recit
Alona G. Roldan filed an action for foreclosure of
real estate mortgage against respondents spouses Clarence
I. Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios and respondent Romel D.
Matorres. RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction it appearing from the complaint that the
assessed value of the property mortgaged is only
P13,380.00 and the instant cases being a real action, the
assessed value of the property determines the jurisdiction.
Petitioner in her Motion argued that foreclosure of real estate
mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and
jurisdiction lies with the Regional Trial Court. SC held that as
foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed
value of the property which determines the court's
jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed value of the
mortgaged property is only P13,380.00, the RTC correctly
found that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the first
level court. er Section 33(3) of BP 129 as amended.
Facts:
Petitioner Alona G. Roldan filed an action for
foreclosure of real estate mortgage against
respondents spouses Clarence I. Barrios and Anna
Lee T. Barrios and respondent Romel D. Matorres.
She alleged that defendants borrowed from plaintiff the
sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, payable within the
period of one (1) year. To secure the prompt and full
payment of the principal and interest, defendants
made and executed on October 13, 2008 a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of plaintiff upon a parcel
of land and improvements thereon
RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction it appearing from the complaint
that the assessed value of the property mortgaged is
only P13,380.00 and the instant cases being a real
action, the assessed value of the property determines
the jurisdiction.
Petitioner in her Motion argued that
foreclosure of real estate mortgage is an action
49
incapable of pecuniary estimation and jurisdiction lies
with the Regional Trial Court
Issue:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the foreclosure cases filed with
it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling:
No. The RTC exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction in civil actions where the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. It also
has jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to, or
possession of, real property or any interest in it where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
P20,000.00, and if it is below P20,000.00, it is the first
level court which has jurisdiction. An action "involving
title to real property" means that the plaintiffs cause of
action is based on a claim that he owns such property
or that he has the legal right to have exclusive control,
possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.
It is worthy to mention that the essence of a
contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property
has been identified or set apart from the mass of the
property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the
payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to
answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default
in payment.15Foreclosure is but a necessary
consequence of non-payment of the mortgage
indebtedness.16 In a real estate mortgage when the
principal obligation is not paid when due, the
mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and
to have the property seized and sold with the view of
applying the proceeds to the payment of the
obligation.17 Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a real
action so far as it is against property, and seeks the
judicial recognition of a property debt, and an order for
the sale of the res.
As foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is
the assessed value of the property which determines
the court's jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed
value of the mortgaged property is only P13,380.00,
the RTC correctly found that the action falls within the
jurisdiction of the first level court. er Section 33(3) of
BP 129 as amended.
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation are those for specific performance, support,
or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment;
also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage,
annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover
the price paid and for rescission, which is a counterpart
of specific performance.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are
also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the
MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of
the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in
Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If
the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the
case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have
jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).
68.2. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION
vs. ALTO SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC
(G.R. No. L-14303, March 24, 1960, BARRERA, J.)

Emergency Recit:
Eustaquio Palma executed a first
mortgage in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC), and subsequently, with the consent of the RFC, a
second mortgage over the same property, in favor of Alto
Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. (Alto). Upon default, RFC
foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially. Six months later,
mortgagor Palma, transferred and conveyed all his rights,
title and interest in the mortgaged property to the spouses
Anacleto Trinidad and Rosa S. de Trinidad, the assignees
assuming the obligation of paying the repurchase price of
the auctioned property. RFC executed an affidavit
consolidating ownership on the purchased property. RFC
sought to cancel the annotation alleging that with the
consolidation and transfer to it as the first mortgagee of the
mortgagee's rights on the property, the junior
encumbrancer's lien on the same property had ceased. SC
held that Section 112 authorizes only alterations which do
not impair rights recorded in the decree, or alterations which,
if they do prejudice such rights, are consented to by all
parties concerned or alterations to correct obvious mistakes.
An interest in the mortgaged property acquired subsequent
to the (first) mortgage may be divested or barred only by
making the holder thereof a party to the proceedings to
foreclose.
Facts:
Eustaquio Palma is an owner of a parcel of
land in Camarines Sur. He used such land in
executing a first mortgage to secure a loan of P20,
000.00, in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC), and subsequently, with the
consent of the RFC, a second mortgage over the
same property, in favor of Alto Surety & Insurance
Company, Inc. (Alto). Both mortgages were duly
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds and
annotated.
Upon failure of the mortgagor to settle the
P20, 000.00 loan on its maturity, RFC foreclosed the
mortgage extrajudicially under Act 3135 as authorized
in the deed of mortgage and the property was sold in
public auction under the direction of the Provincial
Sheriff in favor of mortgagee RFC as the highest
bidder.
Six months later, mortgagor Palma,
transferred and conveyed all his rights, title and
interest in the mortgaged property to the spouses
Anacleto Trinidad and Rosa S. de Trinidad, the
assignees assuming the obligation of paying the
repurchase price of the auctioned property. Within the
year of redemption, the assignee-spouses and the
RFC executed a "Deed of Resale" whereby the
mortgaged property was resold and reconveyed in
favor of the "redemptioners, their heirs, assignees and
successors in interest". However, instead of paying the
whole redemption price, only P5,500 was paid on hand
and the sum of P21,505.11, balance of the total
indebtedness including 6% interest was agreed to be
paid in ten annual amortizations.
Alto, as junior encumbrancer, wrote the RFC
inquiring as to the actual status of the property subject
to redemption. RFC advised Alto that the auctioned
property had already been sold to the Trinidad
spouses "under a deed of redemption on the
installment plan".
50
This notwithstanding, the RFC executed an
affidavit consolidating ownership on the purchased
property, stating therein that the period of redemption
had expired without the debtor or any lien-holder
thereon exercising said right of redemption or
repurchase. This affidavit, together with the deed of
sale evidencing its (RFC's) purchase of the property at
public auction which RFC was able to secure the
cancellation of
Palma’s TCT, and the issuance of a new title in its
name (T.C.T. No. 1155). The second mortgage in favor
of Alto, however, was carried and annotated at the
back of the new title.
RFC sought to cancel the annotation alleging
that with the consolidation and transfer to it as the first
mortgagee of the mortgagee's rights on the property,
the junior encumbrancer's lien on the same property
had ceased.
Alto opposed the petition contending that with
the execution of the Deed of Resale between RFC and
the spouses Anacleto Trinidad and Rosa S. de
Trinidad, assignees of the mortgagor, the mortgaged
property had been completely released from the first
mortgage and the second mortgage had been
automatically transformed into a first lien on the
property. RTC denied the petition for cancellation. RFC
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case reached to
SC via certiorari and pure questions of law are raised.
ISSUE:
W/N the annotation of the second mortgage in favor of
the oppositor on the back of TTCT No. 1155 was made
in accordance with law
RULING:
YES. The court a quo acted correctly in
denying the petition to cancel the annotation of the
second mortgage at the back of the title. SC held that
the relief afforded by Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act may only be allowed if "there is a
unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse
claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial
and should be threshed out in an ordinary case.
Section 112 authorizes only alterations which
do not impair rights recorded in the decree, or
alterations which, if they do prejudice such rights, are
consented to by all parties concerned or alterations to
correct obvious mistakes. The proceedings provided in
the Land Registration Act being summary in nature,
they are inadequate for the litigation of issues properly
pertaining to ordinary civil actions, thus, questions
involving ownership of or title to a real property, or
relating to the validity or cancellation or discharge of a
mortgage should properly be ventilated in an ordinary
proceeding."
There is another reason why the petition must
be denied. Granting arguendo that the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding instituted by the RFC is proper
and justified, since the junior encumbrancer was
admittedly not notified thereof, the foreclosure of the
first mortgage cannot be considered to have

terminated or extinguished the rights of said junior
encumbrancer over the property.
An interest in the mortgaged property
acquired subsequent to the (first) mortgage may be
divested or barred only by making the holder thereof a
party to the proceedings to foreclose.
While as a general rule, the junior
encumbrancer is not a necessary party to a suit to
foreclose by a senior mortgagee, it is always proper
and prudent to join him as a defendant, both to give an
opportunity to defend and to extinguish his right of
redemption.
When a senior mortgagee forecloses and
becomes the purchaser at his own foreclosure sale,
but the holder of a subsequent mortgage or other
subordinate interest has not been joined or has been
eliminated from the proceeding, equity will keep the
senior mortgage alive against the subsequent
encumbrance and the senior mortgagee will be entitled
to an action de novo to reforeclose the mortgage as to
the omitted persons.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed
from denying the first mortgagee's petition to cancel
the annotation of the second mortgage at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1155, is hereby
affirmed, without prejudice to the proper adjudication,
in an appropriate ordinary action, of the respective
rights of the parties herein as a result of the execution
of the Deed of Resale, Exhibit J. The petitioner-
appellant shall pay the costs. It is so ordered
68.3 BERNARDO TIGLAO vs. ENGRACIO
BOTONES
(G.R. No. L-3619, October 29, 1951, PARAS, C.J.)
Emergency Recit
Upon motion of the plaintiff, the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac on July 20, 1943, ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution. Accordingly, on
October 9, 1943, the provincial sheriff sold at public
auction the mortgaged properties to the plaintiff as the
highest bidder. On May 7, 1948, the plaintiff filed with
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession. The defendant filed
an opposition alleging (1) that the judgment of March
24, 1943, is null and void, because the defendant’s
former counsel had no special authority to settle the
case in the manner stated in said judgment, and (2)
that the sheriff’s sale was not legally confirmed,
because the defendant was not given notice of the
motion for confirmation or its hearing. SC held that
notice and hearing of motion for confirmation are
essential to the validity of the order of confirmation, not
only to enable the interested parties to resist the
motion but also to inform them of the time when their
right of redemption is cutoff.
Facts
Upon motion of the plaintiff, the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac on July 20, 1943, ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution. Accordingly, on
October 9, 1943, the provincial sheriff sold at public
auction the mortgaged properties to the plaintiff as the
highest bidder. On March 7, 1944, the plaintiff filed an
51
ex parte motion with the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, for the confirmation of the sale in his favor. On
March 22, 1944, the court issued the following order:
"As prayed for in the motion for confirmation of the
Sheriff’s sale dated October 9, 1943, of lots Nos. 784
and 1146 of the cadastral survey of Concepcion
executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac in favor of
Bernardo Tiglao, pursuant to the order of execution
entered herein, the said sale is hereby APPROVED.’"
On May 7, 1948, the plaintiff filed with the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession. The defendant filed
an opposition alleging (1) that the judgment of March
24, 1943, is null and void, because the defendant’s
former counsel had no special authority to settle the
case in the manner stated in said judgment, and (2)
that the sheriff’s sale was not legally confirmed,
because the defendant was not given notice of the
motion for confirmation or its hearing. On June 30,
1948, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession. The defendant filed
on July 7, 1948, a motion for reconsideration and
under date of September 9, 1948, a motion invoking
moratorium under Republic Act No. 342 and praying
that all proceedings be suspended. In its order of
October 12, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
denied the motion for reconsideration. The defendant
appealed.
Issues:
1. W/N the trial court erred in sustaining the order
confirming the sheriff's sale and in issuing the
corresponding writ of possession in favor of the
appellee.
2. W/N the trial court erred in not suspending the
proceedings because of the Moratorium Law
(Republic Act No. 342).
Ruling:
1. Under section 3 of rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, the sale of mortgaged property" when
confirmed by an order of the court . . . shall
operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of redemption as may be
allowed by law." The effect of confirmation was
more elaborately explained in the case of
Raymundo vs. Sunico:
"As the title to mortgaged real property
does not vest in the purchaser until
after the confirmation of the sale, he
has, prior to that time, no right to the
possession of such property, and no
legal cause of complaint against the
defendants, who remain in
possession, exercising the rights of
ownership. On the other hand, the
mortgagors have no means, until the
confirmation of compelling the
purchaser to comply with the terms of
the sale. Should the mortgagors
attempt to compel a purchaser to pay
in his money, an answer on the part of

the purchaser to the effect that the
sale had not been confirmed would be
sufficient. The confirmation operates
to divest the title out of the former
owner and to vest it in the purchaser.
It is at this time when the rights or title
passes, and not before. Sales of
mortgaged real estate should be more
strictly scrutinized than ordinary sales
under execution. In the former the
title, as we have said, passes to the
purchaser upon confirmation by the
court, and the defendant or debtor has
no right to redeem within the statutory
period granted in cases ordinary
execution sales. In some of the States
of the American Union there are
statutes permitting the mortgagor to
redeem after the foreclosure sale has
been confirmed. There is no such
privilege extended to him by statute in
the Philippine Islands. The right of the
mortgagor and those claiming under
him to redeem for mortgagee is
extinguished by the foreclosure when
the same has been properly made.
But, up to the time of confirmation the
title remains in the mortgagor."
In said case this Court held that a hearing "is a
very essential part of those proceedings because the
hearing gives the interested parties an opportunity to
lay before the court their reasons why the sale should
or should not be confirmed, and it is the result of this
hearing which diverts the title if the sale is confirmed.
In the cases of La Urbana vs. Belando, 54
Phil. 930, and Anderson vs. Reyes, 54 Phil. 944, it was
held, following the decision in Grimalt vs. Velasquez
that after the sale of mortgaged property and before its
confirmation, the court may still grant the judgment
debtor an opportunity to pay the amount of the
judgment. In other words, until a sheriff's sale is validly
confirmed, the judgment debtor may exercise a right of
redemption.
Notice and hearing of motion for confirmation
are therefore essential to the validity of the order of
confirmation, not only to enable the interested parties
to resist the motion but also to inform them of the time
when their right of redemption is cutoff.
In the case at bar, the lower court undoubtedly
had acquired jurisdiction over theforeclosure
proceedings but, in confirming the sheriff's sale without
the essentialrequisite as to notice of the motion for
confirmation, it exceeded its power, with the result that
the order of confirmation is null and void.
2. No. The foreclosure judgment had long
become final. By his motion for confirmation of the
sheriff's sale and his motion for a writ of
possession, the appellee sought to recover, not a
monetary obligation, but the properties sold to him
at public auction. What was held in Barrozo vs.
Macaraeg, 46 Off. Gaz., 4932, is decisive against
appellant's position. "The debt moratorium merely
prohibited the enforcement by action of the debts
therein included; and inthis case no one is
attempting to force anybody to pay his debt. The
52
judgment debtor whose property has been sold is
not in debt for the redemption money. He could not
be required by action to redeem. Hence, he is not
entitled to invoke the suspension."
68. 4. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO,
BRANCH III, ILOILO CITY and NELITA M. VDA.
DE BACALING & MARIA TERESA INTEGRATED
DEVELOPMENT, Respondent
G.R. No. L-45322. July 5, 1989. Griño-Aquino, J.
Appeal by Certiorari
EMERGENCY RECIT: Spouses Bacaling obtained
a loan from GSIS which was secured by a real
estate mortgage over a 4 parcels of land. For
failure to pay the loan, GSIS filed a complaint for
extrajudicial foreclosure, which was granted by the
court. The lots were sold at a public auction with
GSIS as the higest bidder. MITDC tried to redeem
the property but the redemption was declared null
and void by the court. Almost 3 years after the
court had annulled MTDIC’s redemption, the latter
filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was
granted by the trial court and MTIDC was granted
a period of 1 year after the finality of the decision
to redeem the properties. On appeal, the period of
redemption was reckoned from the date of the
decision instead of the the date of finality of the
said decision. The SC held that no such right of
redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of
a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a
bank or banking institution. In such a case, the
foreclosure sale when confirmed by an order of the
court, ... shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser.' Since the GSIS is not a bank or
banking institution, its mortgage is covered by the
general rule that there is no right of redemption
after the judicial foreclosure sale has been
confirmed.
FACTS: In 1957, the spouses Ramon and Nelita
Bacaling were granted a real estate loan of
P600,000 by the GSIS for the development of the
Bacaling-Moreno subdivision. To secure the
repayment of the loan, a real estate mortgage was
executed on the four lots owned by the spouses.
The spouses failed to pay the amortizations, thus,
the GSIS filed a complaint for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage before the CFI of
Iloilo. Ramon Bacaling died during the pendency of
the case. The CFI ruled in favor of GSIS.
Mrs.Bacaling failed to pay the judgment debt within
90 days. As a result, the mortgaged lots were sold
at public auction (1961) with GSIS as the highest
bidder. The GSIS then filed a motion for
confirmation of the sale of the property and further
asked for a deficiency judgment.
In 1972, Respondent Maria Teresa Integrated
Development Corporation (MTIDC), as alleged
assignee of the mortgagor’s “right of redemption”
filed a “Motion to exercise right of redemption”,
which was granted by the trial court. A check was

delivered by MTIDC to GSIS as payment of the
redemption price, but the same was dishonored.
Thus, the CFI declared the redemption of
respondent MTIDC as null and void.
In 1975, respondent Nelita Bacaling filed a
motion to reopen the case so she could prove the
inadequacy of the price of the sale of the
mortgaged property. The trial court denied the said
motion. In the same year (1975), or 14 years after
the foreclosure sale (1961) and almost 3 years
after the court had annulled MTDIC’s redemption
(1973), the latter filed a motion for reconsideration.
The motion was granted by the trial court and
MTIDC was granted a period of 1 year after the
finality of the decision to redeem the properties.
On appeal, the period of redemption was reckoned
from the date of the decision instead of the the
date of finality of the said decision.
The GSIS appealed the decision on the
ground that the court may not extend the period of
redemption pf the property.
ISSUE: W/N after the judicial foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage and confirmation of the sale, the
trial court may grant, or fix another period for the
redemption of the foreclosed property by the
assignee of the mortgagor’s equity of redemption.
RULING: NO.
Section 3 of Rule 68 states that
SEC. 3. Sale of mortgaged property; effect. —
When the defendant, after being directed to do
so as provided in the last preceding section,
fails to pay the principal, interest, and costs at
the time directed in the order, the court shall
order the property to be sold in the manner
and under the regulations that govern sales of
real estate under execution. Such sale shall
not affect the rights of persons holding prior
encumbrances upon the property or a part
thereof, and when confirmed by an order of
the court, it shall operate to divest the
rights of all the parties to the action and to
vest their rights in the purchaser, subject
to such rights of redemption as may be
allowed by law.
In a long line of decisions of the Supreme
Court, the consistent interpretation of Rule 68 is
that there is no right of redemption from a
judicial foreclosure sale after the confirmation
of the sale, except those granted by banks or
banking institutions as provided by the
General Banking Act. In mortgage
foreclosures, the rights of the mortgagee and
persons holding under him are cut off by the
sale when duly confirmed, and with them the
equity of redemption. The reason for that holding
is that the right of redemption being purely
statutory, and there being no statute conferring
that right, it does not exist.
When the foreclosure sale is validly confirmed
by the court, title vests upon the purchaser in the
53
foreclosure sale, and the confirmation retroacts to
the date of the sale (Binalbagan Estate, Inc. vs.
Gatuslao, et al., 74 Phil. 128). Only foreclosure of
mortgages to banking institutions (including the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation) and those
made extrajudicially are subject to legal
redemption, by express provision of statute, and
the present case does not come under exceptions.
To repeat, no such right of redemption
exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a
bank or banking institution. In such a case, the
foreclosure sale when confirmed by an order of the
court, ... shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser.' There then exists only what is known
as the equity of redemption. This is simply the
right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by
paying the secured debt within the 90-day period
after the judgment becomes final, in accordance
with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but
prior to its confirmation. (Limpin vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70987, September 29,
1988.)Since the GSIS is not a bank or banking
institution, its mortgage is covered by the
general rule that there is no right of redemption
after the judicial foreclosure sale has been
confirmed. Hence, Judge Numeriano Estenzo
exceeded his jurisdiction and acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the respondent,
MTIDC, another one-year period to redeem the
Bacaling properties over the opposition of
petitioner GSIS as mortgagee- purchaser thereof
at the public sale.
68.5. EPIFANIO CRUZ and EVELINA
CRUZ, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, CALIXTRO O.
ADRIATICO, RUFINO J. SANTIAGO and
GODOFREDO VALMEO, respondents.
G.R. No. 72806. January 9, 1989 Regalado, J
EMERGENCY RECIT: Private respondent sued
petitioners for the judicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties. A compromise agreement
was reached whereby the parties agreed that upon
failure of herein petitioners to pay the sums agreed
upon, the private respondents herein would be
entitled to a writ of execution. For failure to comply
with the said agreement, private respondent
moved for a writ of execution and the mortgaged
properties were sold to private respondent as the
highest bidder. Petitioners argue that the judgment
on compromise was null and void because it
denied them of their equity redemption under
Sec.2 of Rule 68 of the ROC. The SC held that the
dispositions of Section 2 of Rule 68 clearly cannot
apply in this case since the parties therein had
specifically agreed on the amounts to be paid,
when they should be paid and the effects of non-
payment or violation of the terms of their
agreement. Therefore, by virtue of the compromise

agreement, the petitioners thereby waived their so
called equity of redemption and the case was
necessarily removed from the operation of Section
2, Rule 68 insofar as its provisions are
inconsistent with the judgment on compromise.
FACTS: Petitioners Epifanio and Evelina Cruz
mortgaged certain properties to private
respondents who eventually sued them for non-
payment and for the judicial foreclosure of
aforementioned mortgages under Rule 68 of the
Rules of Court. A compromise agreement was
reached and this became the basis of the
Judgment on Compromise issued by the RTC of
Bulacan. Paragraph 3 of the agreement provided
that upon failure of herein petitioners to pay the
sums agreed upon, the private respondents herein
would be entitled to a writ of execution.
Petitioners failed to comply with certain
provisions of the agreement. As a result, private
respondent moved for a writ of execution. The
mortgaged properties were foreclosed upon in an
auction sale and were purchased by the private
respondents as the highest bidder. The sale was
later judicially confirmed.
Petitioners argue that the aforestated
judgment on compromise was null and void ab
initio because it allegedly "denied them their equity
of redemption under Sec. 2, Rule 68 of the Rules
of Court, by not allowing the petitioners to pay 'into
court within a period of not less than 90 days from
the date of the service of said order,' and that it is
only if the petitioners default in said payment that
the property should be sold to pay the judgment
debt.
ISSUE: W/N Rule 68 is applicable
RULING: NO.
Section 2 of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or
sale. — If upon the trial in such action the court
shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be
true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff
upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including
interest and costs, and shall render judgment for
the sum so found due and order the same to be
paid into court within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date of the service of such order, and that
in default of such payment the property be sold to
realize the mortgage debt and costs.
 clarificatory provision in the agreement.
The procedure outlined therein obviously
refers to the situation where a full-blown trial, with
the introduction of evidence is entailed, such that
the trial court has to thereafter determine whether
the allegations in the complaint have been proved,
then ascertain the total amount due to the plaintiff,
and thereafter render judgment for such amount
with an order for the payment thereof in
accordance with the prescription of the
aforequoted section, sans the agreement of the
parties on those particulars.
54
However, the aforesaid procedure cannot
be of substantial application to, and can be
modified by, a valid agreement of the parties,
such as in the compromise agreement subject of
and constituting the basis for the judgment on
compromise rendered in Civil Case No. 7418-M of
the RTC of Bulacan, as hereinbefore stated. The
dispositions of Section 2 of Rule 68 clearly
cannot apply since the parties therein had
specifically agreed on the amounts to be paid,
when they should be paid and the effects of
non-payment or violation of the terms of their
agreement.
Paragraph 5 lucidly provides that, upon the
happening of the aforesaid contingency
contemplated therein, private respondent
Godofredo Valmeo shall be entitled to a writ of
execution directing the foreclosure of all the
mortgages subject matter of said litigation.
Ineluctably, therefore, the petitioners herein
thereby waived their so called equity of
redemption and the case was necessarily
removed from the operation of Section 2, Rule
68 insofar as its provisions are inconsistent
with the judgment on compromise.

True, the
procedural requirement in Section 2 grants a
substantive right to the mortgagor, consisting of
the so-called equity of redemption, which after the
ordinary adversarial course of a controverted trial
of a case may not be omitted in the relief to be
awarded in the judgment therein. 9 The same,
however, may be waived, as already
demonstrated.
Hence, as correctly observed by the respondent
court:
(1) Re the 'equity of redemption'. It is true
that under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, the
debtor-mortgagor is allowed a period of 90 days
within which to pay his debt, to prevent
foreclosure, but this right, to Our mind was
impliedly waived when the parties signed the
compromise agreement, which was later embodied
in the Judgment. The agreement in effect says that
upon breach of the same (and this fact is not
disputed), foreclosure should be resorted to. The
agreement was clear that payment had to be made
within the stipulated period. It would be absurd to
say that after said stipulated period, petitioners
would still be given an additional 90-day period for
the 'equity'. Had petitioners intended still an
exercise in 'equity', they should have insisted on a
68.6. SPS. MIGUEL S. KHO and JUANITA
KHO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BANCO FILIPINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 83498. October 22, 1991 Paras, J.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners obtained a loan
from Banco Filipino which was secured by a REM.
For failure to pay the loan, Banco Filipino
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged and

acquired the property as the highest bidder in the
auction sale. 10 days before the end of the
redemption period, petitioners filed a complaint for
the annulment of the specific performance with
preliminary injunction which was granted by the
RTC. The SC held that the issuance of injunction
was improper. During and after the period of
redemption, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
is entitled as of right to a writ of possession,
regardless of whether or not there is a pending
suit for annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure itself. Hence, an injunction to prohibit
the issuance of the writ of possession is entirely
out of place.
FACTS: Petitioners, Spouses Miguel and Juanita
Kho, constituted a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land in Cebu in favor of private
respondent Banco Filipino to guarantee a loan
granted them by the bank. Unfortunately, the Kho
spouses defaulted in the payment of some
amortizations. Thus, Banco Filipino extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. Banco Filipino
purchased the property as the highest bidder, and
the certificate of sale was then registered on June
17, 1982. The petitioners had until June 17,1983
within which to redeem the property.
In the meantime, the foreclosed property was
leased to third persons and the rentals were
remitted monthly by petitioners to respondent
bank. 10 days before the end of the redemption
period, petitioners filed a complaint for the “
Annulment of specific performance with
preliminary injunction etc.” against Banco Filipino
before the RTC of Cebu. This was granted by the
RTC. Respondent bank then filed an Urgent
Motion to Lift Injunction, which was denied by the
RTC. On appeal, the CA reversed the orders of
the RTC.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of injunction by the trial
court was proper **
RULING: NO. (Sobrang ikli nung ruling. Ito na yung buong
sinabi)
The law and jurisprudence are clear that both
during and after the period of redemption, the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale is entitled as of
right to a writ of possession, regardless of whether
or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the
mortgage or the foreclosure itself (without
prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of
said case). Hence, an injunction to prohibit the
issuance of the writ of possession is entirely out of
place (See Act 3135)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The assailed decision of respondent
Court of Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby AFFIRMED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch XIV for further proceedings on Civil
Case CEB-759.
55
68.7. BLANCA CONSUELO ROXAS,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RURAL
BANK OF DUMALAG, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 100480 May 1, 1993 Nocon, J
Petition for Review on Certiorari
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioner executed a
special power of attorney authorizing Manuel
Roxas to apply for an agricultural loan and to
execute a REM to secure said loan in favor of the
Rural Bank of Dumalag. The REM was foreclosed
for failure to pay the loan, and the property was
sold to private respondent. Petitioner then filed a
complaint for cancellation of the foreclosure of the
REM and the annulment of the auction sale. The
trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and held that
the auction sale was null and void since the notice
was not posted in atleast 3 conspicuous places in
the barrio and for the failure of the sheriff who
conducted the sale to accomplish the required
affidavit. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC.
The SC held that the auction sale is null and void
because the notice was not posted in atleast 3
conspicuous places in the barrio which is not in
compliance with Sec. 5 of RA 720. Furthermore,
the same section provides that proof of publication
shall be accomplished by an affidavit of the sheriff
or officer conducting the foreclosure sale. In this
case, the sheriff executed a certificate of posting,
which is not the affidavit required by law.
FACTS: Petitioner Blanca Roxas executed a
special power of attorney appointing her brother,
the late Manuel Roxas, as her attorney-in-fact for
the purpose of applying for an agricultural loan
with private respondent Rural Bank of Dumalag.
Manuel then executed a real estate mortgage over
a land petitioner owned, to be used as collateral
for the said loan. Private respondent foreclosed
the real estate mortgage for failure to pay the loan.
The land was sold to private respondent as the
highest bidder in the public auction. For failure to
exercise the right of redemption, private
respondent consolidated its ownership over the
land.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for
cancellation of foreclosure of mortgage and
annulment of the auction sale on the ground that
Manuel Roxas never informed her of the approval
of the loan. Furthermore, she argues that the
foreclosure did not comply with the requirement of
giving written notice to all possible redemptioners.
On the other hand, private respondent argues that
petitioner was duly notified of the foreclosure and
auction sale since notice to Manuel Roxas, her
agent, was notice to the principal, and that the
sheriff duly posted copies of the notice of
foreclosure sale in conspicuous public places
before the actual auction sale.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner. It held that the notice was not posted

in at least 3 most conspicuous places in the
barrio, and that there was no affidavit of the
sheriff who conducted the sale. Thus, the
auction sale was declared as null and void. On
appeal, the CA reversed the trial court and held
that Section 5 of RA 720 does not require personal
notification to the mortgagor in case of foreclosure
and that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of the said sale.
ISSUE: W/N the auction sale is null and void
RULING: YES.
It is settled doctrine that failure to publish notice of
auction sale as required by the statute constitutes
a jurisdiction defects with invalidates the sale.
Even slight deviations therefrom are not allowed.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 720, as amended by R.A.
No. 5939, provides that notices of foreclosure
should be posted in at least three (3) of the most
conspicuous public places in the municipality
and barrio where the land mortgaged is
situated.
In the case at bar, the Certificate of Posting which
was executed by the sheriff states that he posted
three (3) copies of the notice of public auction sale
in three (3) conspicuous public places in the
municipality of Panay, where the subject land was
situated and in like manner in Roxas City, where
the public auction sale took place. It is beyond
dispute that there was a failure to publish the
notices of auction sale as required by law. Section
5 provides further that proof of publication shall be
accomplished by an affidavit of the sheriff or
officer conducting the foreclosure sale. In this
case, the sheriff executed a certificate of
posting, which is not the affidavit required by
law. The rationale behind this is simple: an
affidavit is a sworn statement in writing. Strict
compliance with the aforementioned provisions is
mandated. We, therefore, cannot sustain the view
of respondent court that there was substantial
compliance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 720, as
amended, with respect to the affidavit of posting
by the sheriff and the non-posting of the required
notice in the barrio where the land mortgaged is
situated. Instead, We declare the foreclosure and
public auction sale of the subject land void.
68.8 TERESITA MONZON, Petitioner, vs.
SPS. JAMES & MARIA ROSA NIEVES RELOVA
and SPS. BIENVENIDO & EUFRACIA PEREZ,
Respondents. vs ADDIO PROPERTIES,
INC.,Intervenor.
G.R. No. 171827 September 17, 2008 Chico-
Nazario, J.
Petition for Review on Certiorari
EMERGENCY RECIT: Spouses Relova and Perez
filed a petition for injunction against Mozon and
Atty. Luna (Clerk of Court). They alleged that
Monzon issued promissory notes to the respective
56
spouses with lots as security (Lot 2A- Sps. Perez,
Lot 2B- Sps. Relova). Monzon was indebted to
Coastal Lending which foreclosed the property due
to the non-payment of Monzon’s 3.4 million debt.
Addio was the highest bidder in the sale. There
was an excess of 1.6 M from Addio’s payment of
5M. The Spouses contend that they should be
given the residue as stated in Rule 68, Sec 4. The
residue money is with Atty. Luna (clerk of court).
The SC held that the spouses do not have cause
of action against Atty. Luna. The present case
involves Extrajudicial Foreclosure (Act 3135) and
not Rule 68’s judicial foreclosure. Unlike Rule 68,
which governs judicial foreclosure sales, neither
Act No. 3135 as amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-
0 grants to junior encumbrancers the right to
receive the balance of the purchase price. Case is
remanded back to trial court to check if motion for
injunction is to be treated as complaint for
collection of money.
FACTS: Respondents, Spouses James and Maria
Rosa Relova and the spouses Bienvenido and
Eufracia Perez, filed an initiatory pleading
captioned as a Petition for Injunction against Atty.
Ana Liza Luna, Clerk of Court of Branch 18 of the
RTC of Tagaytay City, and herein petitioner
Teresita Monzon. Respondents alleged that
Monzon executed a promissory note in favor of the
spouses Perez which was secured by a lot in
Tagaytay City, denominated as Lot No. 2A. Later
on, Monzon executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the said parcel of land in favor of the spouses
Perez. Respondents also claim that Monzon
executed another promissory note, this time in
favor of the spouses Relova which was secured by
a lot in Tagaytay, denominated as Lot No. 2B.
Similarly, Monzon later on executed a Deed of
Conditional Sale over said parcel of land in favor of
the spouses Relova.
The Coastal Lending Corporation
extrajudicially foreclosed the entire property of
Monzon, including the portions mortgaged and
subsequently sold to respondents. According to
the Petition for Injunction, Monzon was indebted to
the Coastal Lending Corporation in the total
amount of P3,398,832.35. The winning bidder in
the extrajudicial foreclosure, Addio Properties Inc.,
paid the amount of P5,001,127.00, thus leaving a
P1,602,393.65 residue. According to
respondents, this residue amount, which is in
the custody of Atty. Luna as Branch Clerk of
Court, should be turned over to them pursuant
to Section 4, Rule 68 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. Monzon, in her Answer, claimed
that the Petition for Injunction should be dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action. Monzon
likewise claimed that respondents could no longer
ask for the enforcement of the two promissory
notes because she had already performed her
obligation to them by dacion en pago as evidenced
by the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of
Absolute Sale.

The RTC, citing the absence of petitioner and
her counsel on said hearing date despite due
notice, allowed the ex parte presentation of
evidence by respondent. Consequently, the RTC
rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The
CA dismissed the appeal by petitioner stating that
petitioner cannot now complain that she was
denied due process when she was given ample
opportunity to defend and assert her interests in
the case.
ISSUE: W/N the Petition for injunction failed to
state a cause of action
HELD: YES.
Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which is
the basis of respondent’s alleged cause of action
entitling them to the residue of the amount paid in
the foreclosure sale, provides as follows:
SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.—The
amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs
of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the
mortgage, and when there shall be any balance
or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt
due, the same shall be paid to junior
encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to
be ascertained by the court, or if there be no such
encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue
after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his
duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.
However, Rule 68 governs the judicial
foreclosure of mortgages. Extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgages, which was what
transpired in the case at bar, is governed by
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. We
have three different types of sales, namely: an
ordinary execution sale, a judicial foreclosure sale,
and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. An ordinary
execution sale is governed by the pertinent
provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments.
Rule 68 of the Rules, captioned Foreclosure of
Mortgage, governs judicial foreclosure sales. On
the other hand, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No. 4118 applies in cases of extrajudicial
foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages.
Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial
foreclosure sales, neither Act No. 3135 as
amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 grants to
junior encumbrancers the right to receive the
balance of the purchase price. The only right
given to second mortgagees in said issuances is
the right to redeem the foreclosed property
pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, which provides:
Sec. 6. Redemption. In all cases in which an
extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors
in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment
creditor of said debtor, or any person having a
57
lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage
or deed of trust under which the property is
sold, may redeem the same at any time within
the term of one year from and after the date of
the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by
the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-
four to four hundred and sixty- six,[14] inclusive, of
the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are
not inconsistent with this Act.
Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to
be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages, such right can only be given to second
mortgagees who are made parties to the (judicial)
foreclosure. While a second mortgagee is a
proper and in a sense even a necessary party to a
proceeding to foreclose a first mortgage on real
property, he is not an indispensable party,
because a valid decree may be made, as between
the mortgagor and the first mortgagee, without
regard to the second mortgage; but the
consequence of a failure to make the second
mortgagee a party to the proceeding is that the lien
of the second mortgagee on the equity of
redemption is not affected by the decree of
foreclosure.
A cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. A cause
of action exists if the following elements are
present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages. In view of the
foregoing discussions, we find that respondents
do not have a cause of action against Atty. Ana
Liza Luna for the delivery of the subject
amounts on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of
the Rules of Court, for the reason that the
foregoing Rule does not apply to extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgages.
AS TO EFFECTS OF DEFAULT (Baka tanungin ni
Dean)
Despite the fact that Monzon was not declared in
default by the RTC, the RTC nevertheless applied
the effects of a default order upon petitioner under
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. Failure to
file a responsive pleading within the reglementary
period, and not failure to appear at the hearing, is
the sole ground for an order of default, except the
failure to appear at a pre-trial conference wherein
the effects of a default on the part of the defendant
are followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to
present evidence ex parte and a judgment based

thereon may be rendered against the defendant
(§5, Rule 18). Also, a default judgment may be
rendered, even if the defendant had filed his
answer, under the circumstance in §3(c), Rule 29.
The effects of default are followed only in three
instances: (1) when there is an actual default for
failure to file a responsive pleading; (2) failure to
appear in the pre-trial conference; and (3) refusal
to comply with modes of discovery under the
circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29.
We agree with petitioner that such failure to
attend, when committed during hearing dates for
the presentation of the complainant’s evidence,
would amount to the waiver of such defendant’s
right to object to the evidence presented during
such hearing, and to cross-examine the witnesses
presented therein. However, it would not amount
to a waiver of the defendant’s right to present
evidence during the trial dates scheduled for the
reception of evidence for the defense. It would be
an entirely different issue if the failure to attend of
the defendant was on a hearing date set for the
presentation of the evidence of the defense, but
such did not occur in the case at bar.
68.9 SPOUSES SALVADOR F. DE VERA and
FELIZA V. DE VERA, petitioners, vs. HON.
GUILLERMO P. AGLORO, Presiding Judge,
RTC – Branch 83 Malolos, Bulacan and BPI
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 155673 January 14, 2005
Callejo,Sr., J
Petition for Review on Certiorari
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners obtained a loan
from BPI which was secured by a real estate
mortgage over a land in Bulacan. For failure to pay
the loan, BPI filed a petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The
property was sold to BPI. Petitioners filed a
complaint for the nullification of the real estate
mortgage. Respondent also filed an Ex-parte
petition for writ of possession with the RTC of
Bulacan and impleaded the petitioners. Petitioners
then filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings to await the resolution of their
complaint for nullification of the REM or for the
consolidation of the 2 cases. The trial court denied
petitioners’ motion. The CA also denied
petitioners’ petition for certiorari. The SC held that
there was no need for the court to suspend the
proceedings merely and solely because the
petitioners filed a complaint in the RTC for the
nullification of the real estate mortgage. First, the
petition for issuance of a writ of possession is not
an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party
"sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong." . Hence, there is no necessity of
giving notice to the petitioners. Second, the right of
the purchaser to have possession of the subject
property would not be defeated notwithstanding
the pendency of a civil case seeking the
58
annulment of the mortgage or of the extrajudicial
foreclosure. Furthermore, the SC held that the
respondent judge did not err in denying the
consolidation of the cases because consolidation
should be denied when prejudice would result to
any of the parties or would cause complications,
delay, prejudice, cut off, or restrict the rights of a
party. In this case, The rights of the respondents
would be prejudiced if the petition for issuance of
the writ of possession were to be consolidated with
the complaint for nullification of the REM,
especially since it had already adduced its
evidence.
FACTS: Petitioners, Spouses Salvador and Feliza
De Vera secured a loan from BPI Family Savings
Bank which was secured by a real estate
mortgage over their property in Guiguinto,
Bulacan. When petitioners failed to pay the loan,
BPI filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage. The property was sold
to BPI as the highest bidder in the auction, and title
to the property was transferred in its name.
Petitioners filed a complaint for the nullification of
the real estate mortgage. Respondent also filed an
Ex-parte petition for writ of possession with the
RTC of Bulacan and impleaded the petitioners.
Petitioners then filed an urgent motion to suspend
the proceedings to await the resolution of their
complaint for nullification of the REM or for the
consolidation of the 2 cases.
The trial court denied the motion of petitioners
and held that it is its ministerial duty to issue the
writ of possession in favor of a purchaser at public
auction, and that such duty could not be defeated
by the pendency of a civil case, in this instance the
complaint for nullification of the REM. The CA also
denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari. It held that
since the subject parcel of land was not redeemed
within one (1) year from the registration of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, it follows that the
bank, as purchaser thereof, acquired an absolute
right to the writ of possession. It emphasized that
the land registration court has the ministerial duty
to issue the writ of possession upon mere motion,
conformably to Section 7, Act No. 3135, as
amended.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the CA erred in not suspending the
proceedings in the Ex-parte petition for
writ of possession because of the
pendency of petitioners’ complaint for the
nullification of the real estate mortgage
2. W/N the 2 cases should be consolidated
RULING:
1. NO, the CA did not err.
First. An ex parte petition for the issuance of a
possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No.
3135 is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial
process" as contemplated in Article 433 of the
Civil Code. It is a judicial proceeding for the

enforcement of one’s right of possession as
purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party
"sues another for the enforcement of a wrong
or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong." No notice is needed to
be served upon persons interested in the
subject property. Hence, there is no necessity
of giving notice to the petitioners since they
had already lost all their interests in the
property when they failed to redeem the
same.
Second. As a rule, any question regarding the
validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
cannot be a legal ground for refusing the
issuance of a writ of execution. The right of
the purchaser to have possession of the
subject property would not be defeated
notwithstanding the pendency of a civil case
seeking the annulment of the mortgage or of
the extrajudicial foreclosure. Indeed, under
Section 8 of Act No. 3135,41 even if the
mortgagor files a petition assailing the writ of
possession granted to the buyer and the sale
at public auction within 30 days from the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
buyer at public auction of the property, and
the court denies the same, the buyer may
appeal the order of denial. However, the
buyer at public auction remains in possession
of the property pending resolution of the
appeal. We have consistently ruled that it is
the ministerial duty of the court to issue writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale. The trial court has no
discretion on this matter.
2. NO, it should not be consolidated.
Consolidation is aimed to obtain justice with
the least expense and vexation to the
litigants. The object of consolidation is to
avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression or abuse, prevent delays and save
the litigants unnecessary acts and expense.
Consolidation should be denied when
prejudice would result to any of the parties or
would cause complications, delay, prejudice,
cut off, or restrict the rights of a party.
In the present case, the trial court acted in the
exercise of its sound judicial discretion in
denying the motion of the petitioners for the
consolidation of the 2 cases.
First. The proceedings in the petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession is not, strictly
speaking, a judicial process and is a non-
litigious proceeding; it is summary in nature.
In contrast, the action in the complaint for
59
nullification of the REM is an ordinary civil
action and adversarial in character. The rights
of the respondent in the petition for issuance
of the writ of possession would be prejudiced
if the said case were to be consolidated with
the complaint for nullification of the REM,
especially since it had already adduced its
evidence.
Second. The matter of whether or not
consolidation is proper has certainly become
moot and academic. The RTC had already
issued an order granting the writ of
possession in favor of the respondent herein,
and declared that the latter had already been
placed in actual possession of the property.
68.10. SPOUSES GODOFREDO V.
ARQUIZA and REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EQUITABLE PCIBANK, respondents.
G.R. No. 160479 June 8, 2005. Callejo, Sr. J.
Petition for Review on Certiorari
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners obtained a loan
from Equitable PCIBank which was secured by a
REM over a parcel of land. Petitioners failed to pay
the loan and the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed and the property was sold to Equitable
PCIBank as the highest bidder. Petitioners then
filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
REM and foreclosure sale while Equitable
PCIBank moved for the issuance of Writ of
Possession which was granted by the Court.
Petitioners argue that petition for the issuance of
the writ of possession should have been dismissed
for failure to attach a certification against forum
shopping and that they should be protected in their
possession over the subject property pending the
resolution of their complaint for the declaration of
nullity. The SC held that the ex parte petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the
respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Thus, the
certification against forum shopping is not
required. Furthermore, it held that there is no litis
pendentia in this case since the petition of the
Equitable PCIBank for a writ of possession was
not an ordinary action. Any order or decision of the
RTC in the petition for issuance of writ of
possession is not determinative of the merits of the
petitioners’ complaint for declaration of nullity of
promissory note,REM, and foreclosure sale
FACTS: Petitioners, Spouses Godofredo and
Remedios Arquiza obtained a loan from private
respondents Equitable PCIBank, which was
secured by a real estate mortgage (REM) over a
parcel of land in Quezon City. When petitioners
defaulted in the payment of their loan, Equitable
PCIBank filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the REM. A public auction was held,
and the land was sold to Equitable PCIBank as the
highest bidder. The property was not redeemed

during the redemption period, thus, Equitable
PCIBank consolidated its ownership over the
subject property. The petitioners then filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
promissory note, real estate mortgage and the
foreclosure sale. Meanwhile, Equitable PCIBank
filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession. Instead of acting on the petition
and receiving evidence ex parte, the RTC set the
case for hearing. Subsequently, it issued a Writ of
Possession. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Petitioner argues that the ex-parte petition for
the issuance of the writ of possession should have
been dismissed for failure to attach a certification
against forum shopping. In addition, it contends
that they are legally entitled to be protected in their
possession over the subject property pending the
resolution of their complaint for the declaration of
nullity of the promissory note, real estate
mortgage, and foreclosure sale. For its part, the
private respondent contends that the requirement
for the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping
is not applicable, considering that the ex parte
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is
not an initiatory pleading. It submits that litis
pendentia does not exist because there is no
identity of the issues and the reliefs prayed for
between the present case and petitioners’
complaint. Hence, forum shopping cannot likewise
exist.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the petition for issuance of writ of
possession is an initiatory pleading and
therefore requires a certification against
forum shopping
2. W/N the case falls under litis pendencia
RULING:
1. NO. The certification against forum
shopping is required only in a complaint or
other initiatory pleading. The ex parte petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession filed
by the respondent is not an initiatory pleading.
Although the private respondent denominated its
pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless, a motion.
What distinguishes a motion from a petition or
other pleading is not its form or the title given by
the party executing it, but rather its purpose. The
office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation,
but to bring a material but incidental matter arising
in the progress of the case in which the motion is
filed. A motion is not an independent right or
remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of a cause. It relates to some question
that is collateral to the main object of the action
and is connected with and dependent upon the
principal remedy. An application for a writ of
possession is a mere incident in the
registration proceeding. Hence, although it
was denominated as a "petition," it was in
substance merely a motion.
60
It bears stressing that Section 7 of Act No. 3135,
as amended by Act No. 4118, specifically provides
that the buyer at public auction may file a verified
petition in the form of an ex parte motion.
2. NO. The requisites of litis pendentia are the
following: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other. And one
element of res judicata is that the judgment or
order must be on the merits of the case.
The petition of the Equitable PCIBank for a writ
of possession was not an ordinary action. Any
order or decision of the RTC in the petition for
issuance of writ of possession is not
determinative of the merits of the petitioners’
complaint for declaration of nullity of
promissory note,REM, and foreclosure sale.
Well established is the rule that after the
consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure
of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession
becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely
a ministerial function. The issuance of the writ of
possession being a ministerial function, and
summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a
judgment on the merits, but simply an incident in
the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for
annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale
cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata
68.11 HELEN E. CABLING, assisted by
her husband ARIEL CABLING, Petitioner, vs.
JOSELIN TAN LUMAPAS, as represented by
NORY ABELLANES, Respondent
G.R. No. 196950 June 18, 2014. Brion, J
Petition for Review on Certiorari
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioner acquired the
subject property in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale. She then filed an application for the issuance
of a writ of possession which was granted by the
RTC. Respondent then filed a Motion for Leave of
Court for Intervention as party defendant with
urgent motion to hold the implementation of the
writ on the ground that the subject property was
sold to her by the judgment debtor pursuant to a
Deed of Conditional sale. The RTC recalled the
previously issued writ of possession. The CA
affirmed the RTC. Petitioner argues that
respondent’s possession is not in the concept of
an owner because in a conditional sale, ownership
is retained by the seller until the fulfillment of a
positive suspensive condition. The SC held that
the rule is that in the extrajudicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgages under Act No. 3135 (as
amended), the issuance of a writ of possession is
ministerial upon the court after the foreclosure sale
and during the redemption period when the court
may issue the order for a writ of possession upon

the mere filing of an ex parte motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond. As an
exception, Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court provides that the possession of the property
shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner unless a third party is actually
holding the property in a capacity adverse to the
judgment obligor. In the present case, the
respondent cannot be said to possess the subject
property by adverse title or right as her possession
is merely premised on the alleged conditional sale
of the property to her by the judgment
debtor/mortgagor. The execution of a contract of
conditional sale does not immediately transfer title
to the property to be sold from seller to buyer.
FACTS: Petitioner Helen Cabling was the highest
bidder in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale over a
property located in Olongapo City. Title to the
property was duly transferred to petitioner.
Petitioner filed an Application for the Issuance of a
Writ of Possession which was granted and issued
by the RTC. Respondent Joselin Lumapas then
filed a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention
as party defendant with urgent motion to hold the
implementation of the writ pf possession. She
alleged that the subject property was sold to her
by Aida Ibabao, the property’s registered owner
and judgment debtor in the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, pursuant to a Deed of
Conditional sale.
The RTC recalled and rendered ineffective the
writ of possession issued to petitioner.
Considering that the respondent was not a party to
the extrajudicial foreclosure, the RTC held that she
cannot be ousted of her possession by a mere ex-
parte motion for the issuance of a possessory writ,
and that the petitioner must now resort to the
appropriate judicial process in order to recover the
foreclosed property. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.
Petitioner argues that respondent’s
possession is not adverse to that of the judgment
debtor/mortgagor. Neither is possession in the
concept of an owner because in a conditional sale,
ownership is retained by the seller until the
fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition, that
is, the full payment of the purchase price.
ISSUE: W/N the exception under Section 33 of
Rule 39 (unless a third party is actually holding the
property in a capacity adverse to the judgment
obligor) is applicable in the present case
RULING: NO.
The well-settled rule is that in the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgages under Act No.
3135 (as amended), the issuance of a writ of
possession is ministerial upon the court after the
foreclosure sale and during the redemption period
when the court may issue the order for a writ of
possession upon the mere filing of an ex parte
motion and the approval of the corresponding
bond. The writ of possession also issues as a
61
matter of course, without need of a bond or of a
separate and independent action, after the lapse of
the period of redemption, and after the
consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a
new TCT in the purchaser’s name.
There is, however, an exception to the rule.
Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
which is made applicable to extrajudicial
foreclosures of real estate mortgages, the
possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party
is actually holding the property in a capacity
adverse to the judgment obligor. Thus, the court’s
obligation to issue an ex parte writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial when
there is a third party in possession of the property
claiming a right adverse to that of the judgment
debtor/mortgagor. We emphasize that the
exception provided under Section 33, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court contemplates a situation
in which a third party holds the property by
adverse title or right, such as that of a co-
owner, tenant or usufructuary, who possesses
the property in his own right, and is not merely
the successor or transferee of the right of
possession of another co-owner or the owner
of the property.
In the present case, the respondent cannot be
said to possess the subject property by
adverse title or right as her possession is
merely premised on the alleged conditional
sale of the property to her by the judgment
debtor/mortgagor. The execution of a contract
of conditional sale does not immediately
transfer title to the property to be sold from
seller to buyer. In such contract, ownership or title
to the property is retained by the seller until the
fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition which
is normally the payment of the purchase price in
the manner agreed upon. In the present case, the
Deed of Conditional Sale between the respondent
(buyer) and the subject property’s registered
owner (seller) expressly reserved to the latter
ownership over the property until full payment of
the purchase price, despite the delivery of the
subject property to the respondent. It likewise
appears from the records that no deed of
absolute sale over the subject property has
been executed in the respondent's favor. Thus,
the respondent's possession from the time the
subject property was "delivered" to her by the
seller cannot be claimed as possession in the
concept of an owner, as the ownership and title
to the subject property still then remained with
the seller until the title to the property was
transferred to the petitioner in March 2009. In
order for the respondent not to be ousted by the ex
parte issuance of a writ of possession, her
possession of the property must be adverse in that
she must prove a right independent of and even
superior to that of the judgment debtor/mortgagor.

68.12. JUANITO M. GOPIAO, Petitioner, vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 188931 July 28, 2014. Peralta, J.
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
EMERGENCY RECIT: Respondent purchased
parcels of land in Pampanga and filed a petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was
granted by the RTC. A notice to vacate was
served on Green Asia Construction (represented
by spouses legaspi) which prompted petitioner
Gopiao to file an affidavit of third party claim and
to stop the implementation of the writ of
possession. Petitioner alleged that he is the owner
of the subject properties by virtue of a deed of sale
executed by the spouses legaspi in his favor. The
RTC denied the motion for intervention. Petitioner
argues that while the issuance of a writ of
possession after a foreclosure sale is ministerial, it
ceases to be a ministerial duty of the court if there
is a third party holding the property adversely to
the judgment debtor. The SC held that it is a well
established rule that the issuance of a writ of
possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a
ministerial function of the court, which cannot be
enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil
case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure
and consequent auction sale. The foregoing rule,
however, admits of a few exceptions, one of which
is when a third party in possession of the property
claims a right adverse to that of the debtor-
mortgagor. In the present case, the exception is
not applicable because petitioner’s possession of
the subject properties is questionable. Petitioner
failed to substantiate his possession with sufficient
evidence. The Deed of Absolute Sale relied upon
by petitioner was not notarized, unregistered, and
essential details such as the tax account numbers
of the interested parties and the names of the
witnesses are missing.
FACTS: Respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust
purchased parcels of land in Pampanga.
Respondent then filed a Petition for the Issuance
of Writ of Possession of Real Properties, which
was granted by the RTC. A Notice to Vacate was
served on Green Asia Construction, represented
by Spouses Renato and Delia Legaspi. Upon
learning of the notice to vacate, petitioner Juanito
Gopiao filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a
very urgent motion for intervention and to recall or
stop the implementation of the writ of possession,
alleging that he is in actual possession and is the
owner of the properties by virtue of a deed of sale
executed by the spouses legaspi in their favor
dated 1995.
The trial court denied the motion for
intervention on the ground that it was filed late
since the sale was executed 23 years ago. The
CA also dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari
on the ground that petitioner failed to prove the
due execution and authenticity of the document.
The CA also ruled that Metropolitan Bank is a
mortgagee in good faith.
62
Petitioner posits that the RTC/CA gravely
abused its discretion when it failed to recognize his
right as a third party adverse possessor. He
explains that while the issuance of a writ of
possession after a foreclosure sale is ministerial, it
ceases to be a ministerial duty of the court if there
is a third party holding the property adversely to
the judgment debtor. He claims that since he has
been in possession of the subject properties by
virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by the Spouses
Legaspi in his favor, the RTC exceeded its powers
in denying its intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the CA gravely abused its discretion
RULING: NO.
A writ of possession is a writ of execution
employed to enforce a judgment to recover the
possession of land. It commands the sheriff to
enter the land and give its possession to the party
entitled under the judgment. Under Sections 6 and
7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, a writ of
possession may be issued in favor of a purchaser
in a foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage
either (1) within the one-year redemption period,
upon the filing of a bond; or (2) after the lapse of
the redemption period, without need of a bond. It is
a well-established rule that the issuance of a writ
of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is
a ministerial function of the court, which cannot be
enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil
case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure
and consequent auction sale.
The foregoing rule, however, admits of a
few exceptions, one of which is when a third
party in possession of the property claims a
right adverse to that of the debtor-mortgagor,
as this Court has time and again upheld in
numerous cases, consistent with Section 33 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As such, petitioner
claims that since the following rulings squarely
apply to the instant case, the writ of possession
should not be enforced against him.
Petitioner cited the cases Heirs of the Late
Domingo Nicolas vs Metropolitan Bank, Dayot vs
Shell Chemical Company, and PNB vs CA. While
the facts of the foregoing rulings are similar to that
of the instant case, there remains one crucial
difference: the certainty of possession. In all three
cases cited by the petitioner, the fact that the
subject property was actually in the possession of
the adverse third party is undisputed. In contrast,
petitioner’s possession of the subject properties in
this case is questionable. Petitioner failed to
substantiate his possession with sufficient
evidence. On its face, the Deed of Absolute Sale
relied upon by petitioner is neither complete nor in
due form. It was not notarized, unregistered, and
essential details such as the tax account numbers
of the interested parties and the names of the
witnesses are missing. Petitioner even failed to
prove the due execution and authenticity of the
document. To cast more doubt on petitioner’s

claim of possession, the RTC and CA are in
agreement as to the fact that respondent Bank
found no occupants in the subject properties when
it inspected the same before approving the loan
applied for by the Spouses Legaspi. Verily, the
exception cannot be made to apply in the instant
case as petitioner failed to establish his actual
possession of the same.
68.13 FE H. OKABE, Petitioner, vs.
ERNESTO A. SATURNINO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 196040 August 26, 2014. Peralta,J
Petition For Review On Certiorari under Rule 45
EMERGENCY RECIT: Respondent obtained a
loan from PNB. For failure to pay the loan, PNB
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the
property was sold to PNB. Without taking
possession of the property, PNB sold the land to
Petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for issuance of
writ of possession which was granted by the RTC.
The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and held that
although petitioner obtained the same rights of a
purchaser-owner and which rights she derived
from mortgagee turned owner PNB, this does not
mean that the right to file an ex-parte motion for a
writ of possession under Act 3135 had also been
transferred to the petitioner.
The SC held that the ex-parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession was not the
proper remedy of the petitioner in obtaining
possession of the subject property. It ruled that it
is PNB, if it was the purchaser in the foreclosure
sale, or the purchaser during the foreclosure sale,
who can file the ex-parte petition for the issuance
of writ of possession during the redemption period,
but it will only issue upon compliance with the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135. If the
purchaser is a third party who acquired the
property after the redemption period, a hearing
must be conducted to determine whether
possession over the subject property is still with
the mortgagor or is already in the possession of a
third party holding the same adversely to the
defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is in
the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of
possession could thus be issued. Otherwise, the
remedy of a writ of possession is no longer
available to such purchaser, but he can wrest
possession over the property through an ordinary
action of ejectment.
FACTS: Respondent Ernesto Saturnino and his
wife obtained a loan with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) which was secured by a parcel of land
in Makati. For failure to pay the loan, PNB
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Since the
property was not redeemed during the redemption
period, consolidation of ownership was inscribed
in the title. Without taking possession of the
property, PNB sold the land to petitioner Fe
Okabe.
Petitioner filed an ex-parte petition for issuance of
writ of possession over the property. Respondent
63
filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied on the
ground that the right of the petitioner to be placed
in absolute possession of the subject property was
a consequence of her right of ownership and that
petitioner cannot be deprived of said possession
being now the registered owner of the property.
Petitioner’s petition for issuance of writ of
possession was granted by the RTC.
The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and held that
that although it may be true that by virtue of the
contract of sale, petitioner obtained the same
rights of a purchaser-owner and which rights she
derived from erstwhile mortgagee turned owner
PNB, this does not mean that the right to file an
ex-parte motion for a writ of possession under Act
3135 had also been transferred to the petitioner.
Such a special right is granted only to purchasers
in a sale made under the provisions of Act 3135.
ISSUE: W/N in the case at bar, an ex-parte
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
was the proper remedy of the petitioner in
obtaining possession of the subject property.
HELD: NO.
Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the purchaser or
the mortgagee who is also the purchaser in the
foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession
during the redemption period, upon an ex-parte
motion and after furnishing a bond.
Furthermore, in the case of Spouses Marquez vs
Spouses Alindog, it was held that
the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute
owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed
during the period of one year after the registration of the
sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said
property and can demand it at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance
to him of a new transfer certificate oftitle. The buyer can in
fact demand possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to post a bond in
accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
No such bond is required after the redemption period if the
property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then
becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed
owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial
duty of the court.
Here, petitioner does not fall under the
circumstances of the aforequoted case and the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, since she bought the property long after
the expiration of the redemption period. Thus, it is
PNB, if it was the purchaser in the foreclosure
sale, or the purchaser during the foreclosure
sale, who can file the ex-parte petition for the
issuance of writ of possession during the
redemption period, but it will only issue upon
compliance with the provisions of Section 7 of
Act No. 3135.
It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court be applied to cases involving
extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were
bought by a purchaser and later sold to third-party-

purchasers after the lapse of the redemption
period. The remedy of a writ of possession, a
remedy that is available to the mortgagee-
purchaser to acquire possession of the foreclosed
property from the mortgagor, is made available to
a subsequent purchaser, butonly after hearing and
after determining that the subject property is still in
the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the
purchaser is the mortgagee or a third party during
the redemption period, a writ of possession may
issue ex-parte or without hearing. In other words,
if the purchaser is a third party who acquired
the property after the redemption period, a
hearing must be conducted to determine
whether possession over the subject property
is still with the mortgagor or is already in the
possession of a third party holding the same
adversely to the defaulting debtor or
mortgagor. If the property is in the possession of
the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be
issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of
possession is no longer available to such
purchaser, but he can wrest possession over the
property through an ordinary action of ejectment.
68.14. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS (formerly Prudential Bank) Petitioner,
vs. SPOUSES DAVID M. CASTRO and
CONSUELO B. CASTRO, Respondents
G.R. No. 195272 January 14, 2015
Perez, J.
Petition for Review on Certiorari
EMERGENCY RECIT: Respondent spouses
obtained 2 loans from Prudential Bank. The 1st
loan was secured by a REM over a property in QC
while the 2nd loan was secured by a REM over
parcels of land in Laguna (owned by Guellerma
Malabanan). Respondents failed to pay the loan,
thus, Prudential Bank filed 2 separate petitions for
foreclosure of the mortgage. In the Notice of
Sheriff’s Sale, the name "Guellerma Malabanan
rep. by her AIF David M. Castro" appeared as
mortgagor while the amount of mortgaged
indebtedness is ₱96,870.20. The real property
described therein however is the QC property. The
QC property was sold to Prudential Bank as the
highest bidder. Respondents argue that the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the property was null
and void since the property foreclosed is not one
of the properties covered by the REM executed by
Guellerma Malabanan. The trial court upheld the
validity of the sale, but the decision was reversed
by the CA. The SC held that the errors in the
Notice of Sheriff’s Sale do not invalidate the notice
and render the sale and the certificate of such sale
void. Notices are given for the purpose of securing
bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property.
If these objects are attained, immaterial errors and
mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the
notice; but if mistakes or omissions occur in the
notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or
mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the
property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price,
64
such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the
validity of the notice, and also to the sale made
pursuant thereto. In this case, the errors pointed
out by respondents appear to be harmless. There
was no intention to mislead. The amount
mentioned in the notice did not indicate a collusion
between the sheriff who conducted the sale and
the respondent bank. Notably, the mentioned
amount of ₱96,870.20 refers to the mortgage
indebtedness not the value of the property. As
regards the designation of Guellerma Malabanan
as the mortgagor, the erroneous designation of an
entity as the mortgagor does not invalidate the
notice of sale.
FACTS: Respondent spouses David and
Consuelo Castro contracted 2 loans from
Prudential bank. The first loan (P100,000) was
secured by a real estate mortgage (REM) over a
property located in Quezon City, while the second
loan (P55,000) was secured by a REM over
parcels of land in Laguna. The loan remained
unpaid and ballooned to P290,205 and P96,870
respectively. Hence, Prudential Bank, through
counsel, filed 2 separate petitions for foreclosure
of the mortgage. In their first petition, Prudential
Bank admitted that through inadvertence, the
photocopies of the first two pages of the REM
covering the properties in Laguna were mixed and
attached to the photocopies of the last two pages
of the REM covering the Quezon City property.
Thus, in the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, the name
"Guellerma Malabanan rep. by her AIF David M.
Castro" appeared as mortgagor while the amount
of mortgaged indebtedness is ₱96,870.20. The
real property described therein however is the
Quezon City property. The Quezon City property
was sold to Prudential Bank as the highest bidder.
In their complaint, Spouses Castro alleged that
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the property was
null and void since the property foreclosed is not
one of the properties covered by the REM
executed by Guellerma Malabanan which was the
basis of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale which was
posted and published. On the other hand,
Prudential Bank argues that the spouses were fully
aware that the Quezon City property was to be
foreclosed and that the spouses should have
noticed the clerical and harmless inadvertence in
the preparation of the petition and alerted the
sheriff since they were notified of the sale.
The trial court ruled in favor of Prudential Bank and
held that there was no substantial defect on the
published and posted notice of Sheriff’s Sale since
the notice did not render the spouses uninformed
of the nature of the property to be sold. On appeal,
the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and
held that the erroneous designation of Guellerma
Malabanan as mortgagor, instead of David, did not
affect the validity of the notice. With respect to the
amount of the mortgaged indebtedness however, it
noted that the discrepancy vis-a-visthe actual
amount owed by Spouses Castro is so huge that it
can hardly be considered immaterial. It opined that

declaring a small amount of indebtedness in the
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure and in the
notice of sheriff’s sale would effectively depreciate
the value of the property.
65
clarification from the sheriff's office. Instead, he let
the public auction run its course and belatedly
objected to the sale.

ISSUE: W/N the errors in the Notice of Sheriff’s

Sale invalidate the notice and render the sale and
the certificate of such sale void.

RULING: NO.
Foreclosure proceedings have in their favor, the
presumption of regularity, and the party who seeks
to challenge the proceedings has the burden of
evidence to rebut the same. In this case,
respondent failed to prove that Prudential Bank
has not complied with the notice requirement of
the law.

The object of a notice of sale is to inform the

public of the nature and condition of the property
to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the
sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing
bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property.
If these objects are attained, immaterial errors and
mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the
notice; but if mistakes or omissions occur in the
notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or
mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the
property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair
price,such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to
the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made
pursuant thereto. The mistakes and omissions
referred to in the above-cited ruling which would
invalidate notice pertain to those which: 1) are
calculated to deter or mislead bidders, 2) to
depreciate the value of the property, or 3) to
prevent it from bringing a fair price.

The errors pointed out by respondents appear to

be harmless. There was no intention to mislead,
as the errors in fact did not mislead the bidders as
shown by the fact that the winning registered bid
of ₱396,000.00 is over and above the real amount
of indebtedness of ₱209,205.05. As correctly
observed by the trial court, the amount mentioned
in the notice did not indicate a collusion between
the sheriff who conducted the sale and the
respondent bank. Notably, the mentioned amount
of ₱96,870.20 refers to the mortgage
indebtedness not the value of the property.

As regards the designation of Guellerma

Malabanan as the mortgagor, the erroneous
designation of an entity as the mortgagor does not
invalidate the notice of sale. The notice rule was
complied with when the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale
was published in Philippine Recorder, a national
newspaper of general circulation once a week for
three consecutive weeks or on 29 July, 5 and 12
August 1996. There is much significance in the
fact that David admitted on the witness stand that
he knew that there was an application for
foreclosure on their Quezon City property but the
REM used as basis or the foreclosure covered the
Laguna properties. Upon learning this information,
he should have registered his objection or sought