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G.R NO. 127820, JULY 20, 1998
Pursuant to a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution in 1933, the Municipality of Paranaque filed a
complaint for expropriation against VM Realty over 2 parcels of land with a combined area of 10,000
sq. m., allegedly “for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by
providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.”
RTC of Makati authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit
with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value based on its tax
VM Realty filed a counterclaim alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
because it was filed pursuant to a Resolution and not to an Ordinance as required by R.A 7160 (
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE). Thereafter, RTC nullified the previous Order and dismissed the
The Municipality of Paranaque appealed to Court of Appeal. CA affirmed in toto the RTC
WON a RESOLUTION duly approved by the Municipal Council has the same force and
effect of an ORDINANCE and thus, a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of the
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE in the exercise of the power of eminent domain
NO. An LGU may exercise the power of eminent domain only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latter’s control and restraints imposed “through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations.”
In this case, SECTION 19 of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, which delegates to
LGU’S the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides, as
follows, the requisites which must concur before an LGU may do so:
1.) An ORDINANCE is enacted by the Local Legislative council authorizing the LOCAL
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain
over a particular private property.
2.) The POWER of EMINENT DOMAIN is exercised for PUBLIC USE, PURPOSE, and
3.) There is payment of just compensation, as required by Section 9, Article 3 of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4.) A valid and definite offer have been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the first requisite that there must be an ordinance was not complied with by the
ordinance is a law, which possesses a general and permanent character; a resolution on the other hand
is temporary in nature or merely a declaration of sentiments or opinions of a law-making body on a
specific matter.
G.R. NO. L-63915, DECEMBER 29, 1986
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 20, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was otherwise as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to
publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
WON publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.
WON a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication.
WON a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation
1.) Art. 2 of Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette… The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed
on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared
that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no
force and effect.
2.) The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
in any other date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the
law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only
to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the law.
3.) Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is
not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. Laws must come
out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumoured rules cannot be recognized
as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is
like a scabbarded sober that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in accordance with Art.2 of the Civil Code. SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 114508, NOVEMBER 19, 1999
In 1970, Escobar filed an application with the Bureau of Patents for the registration of the
trademark “Barbizon” for use in horsiers and ladies undergarments (IPC NO. 686). Private respondent
reported Barbizon Corporation, a corporation organized and doing business under the laws of New
York, USA, opposed the application. It was alleged that its trademark is confusingly similar with that
of Escobar and that the registration of the said trademark will cause damage to its business reputation
and goodwill. In 1974, the Director of Patents gave due course to the application. Escobar later
assigned all his rights and interest over the trademark to petitioner. In 1979, Escobar failed to with the
Bureau the affidavit of use of the trademark required under the PHILIPPINE TRADEMARK LAW.
Due to this failure, the Bureau cancelled Escobar’s certificate of registration. In 1981, Escobar and
petitioner separately filed this application for registration of the same trademark. (IPC 2049). Private
respondent opposed again. This time it alleged
(1) That the said trademark was registered with the US PATENT OFFICE;
(2) That is entitled to protection as well-known mark under Art. 6 bis of the Paris
Convention, EO 913 and the two Memoranda of the Minister of Trade and Industry and
(3) That its use on the same class of goods amounts to a violation of the Trademark Law and
Art. 189 of the RPC. Petitioner raised the defense of RES JUDICATA.
WON res judicata applies in this case. (One of the requisites of res judicata is identical causes
of action)
HELD: NO. The issue of ownership of the trademark was not raised in IPC 6868. IPC 2049 raised
the issue of ownership, the first registration and use of the trademark in the US and other countries,
and the international recognition of the trademark established by extensive use and advertisement of
respondents products for over 40 years here and abroad. These are different from the issues of
confessing similarity and damage in IPC 686. The issue of prior use may have been raised in IPC 686
but this claim was limited to prior use in the Philippines only. Prior use in IPC 2049 stems from the
respondents claims originator of the word and symbol “Barbizon”, as the first and registered user of
the mark attached to its products which have been sold and advertised would arise for a considerable
number of years prior to petitioner’s first application. Indeed, there are substantial allegations that
raised new issues and necessarily gave respondents a new cause of action.
Moreover, the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate registration for failure to file the affidavit
of use arose after IPC 686. This gave respondent another cause to oppose the second application.
It is also to be noted that the oppositions in the first and second cases are based on different
laws. Causes of action which are distinct and independent from each other, although out of the same
contract, transaction, or state of facts, may be sued on separately, recovery on one being no bar to
subsequent actions on others. The mere fact that the same relief is sought in the subsequent action will
not render the judgment in the prior action operating as res judicata, such as where the actions are
G.R. NO. 114714, APRIL 21, 1995
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of
licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire
and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge us
to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the POEA and POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 05 which increases the compensation and benefits of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract to Seaferers specifically death benefits will now equivalent to $50,000 and an
additional $7,000 for each child under 21 but not exceeding four children.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate
rates affecting death and workmen’s compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going
vessels; and only Congress can.
WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power.
HELD: YES. Under ART. XIII, SECTION 3 of the 1987 CONSTITUTION, the state shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on impermissible
delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by the public respondents, brushed
aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious not to say, specific solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.
While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into
effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by
the law.
That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the
previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of “fair
and equitable employment practices” prescribed in E.O. NO. 797 can no longer be disputed.
G.R. NO. 139465, JANUARY 18, 2000
Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a request
for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of Conspiracy to
Commit Offense, Attempt to Evade Tax, Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television, False Statement, and
Election Contribution in Name of Another.
During the evaluation process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the
petitioner, Secretary of Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the U.S.
government, that he be given ample time to comment regarding the extradition request against him
after he shall have received copies of the requested papers, and to suspend the proceeding in the
The petitioner, Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the RP- US
Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the
U.S. in any proceedings arising from an extradition request.
The private respondent filed with the RTC against the petitioner Hon. Ralph Lantion
(presiding judge RTC Manila Branch 25) a mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition to enjoin the
petitioner, the Secretary of DFA, and NBI from performing any acts directed to the extradition of the
respondent, for it will be a deprivation of his rights to due process of notice and hearing.
WON the respondent Mark Jimenez is entitled to the basic rights of due process over the
government’s duties under a treaty
YES. According to the principle of “PACTA SUNT SERVANDA”, parties to a treaty should
keep their agreements to good faith. However, Section 2 of Art. 2 of the Constitution (incorporation
clause) provides that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land”.
Incorporation clause is applied when there is a conflict between the international law and
local/municipal law. However, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal court.
The fact that the international law has been made part of the law of the land does not imply
the primacy of international law are given an equal standing with, but not superior to, the national
legislative enactment. The principle of “Lex Posterior Derogat Priori” clarifies that a treaty may
repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. And the Republic of the Philippines considers its
Constitution as the highest law of the land. Therefore, both statutes and treaty may be invalidated if
they are conflict with the Constitution.
G.R. NO. 138810, SEPTEMBER 29, 2004
Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a
permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in the City on July 28, 1986. Section 8 of the
Resolution provides that petitioner is authorised to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified
therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime on November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to
P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its
permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution
No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging
that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by
CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines
WON a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators within its territorial jurisdiction
NO. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. NO. 436, the
NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGU’s under the general
welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing
public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers). The physical realities of
constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and
the parcelling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.
But, while we recognize the LGU’s power under the general welfare clause, we cannot
sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well-recognized
limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are:
1.) It violates the mandate of existing laws
2.) It violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
LGU must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive
regulatory power of the NTC.

*NO. The resolution is an enactment of an LGU acting only as an agent of the national
legislature. There is no law authorizing LGU’s to grant franchises to operate CATV. Whatever
authority the LGU’s had before, the same had been withdrawn when Pres. Marcos issued P.D. No.
1512 terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously
granted by local governments. Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons,
associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate
of Authority of by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render
cable television service within a service area. It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or
legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises.
Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation
of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of
its powers, or ultra vires.
G.R. NO. 151908, AUGUST 12, 2003
Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against
the National Telecommunications Commission, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such
jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the
Philippines, that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional
prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in
the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and
expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid
card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing
Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and
its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.
As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the RTC to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances.
What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the RTC.
G.R. NO. 147096, JANUARY 15, 2002 X------------------------------------------------------
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represented by NATIONAL G.R. NO. 147210, JANUARY 15, 2002

On December 29, 1992, the International Communication Corporation (now BAYANTEL)
filed an application with the NTC for a CPCN to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular
Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA). However,
Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (EXTELCOM) filed in NTC an OPPOSITION praying for the
dismissal of BAYANTEL’s application. On May 3, 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor
of BAYANTEL, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure.
EXTELCOM filed with the CA a petition seeking the annulment of the Order of the RTC, which was
eventually granted by the CA. Aggrieved, BAYANTEL brought the case to the SC.
EXTELCOM contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed
with the office of the NAR on February 3, 1993. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to
the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general
circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules. Thus, the present petition.
Which among the NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in the approval of
BAYANTEL’s application?
The 1978 NTC RULES
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC
stating that NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules
have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to BAYANTEL.
There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules
with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. Still, publication in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes,
rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which
implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act ( COMMONWEALTH ACT 146, as amended), fall
squarely within the scope of these laws. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to
be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
JR., Respondent.

G.R. NO. 168056, SEPTEMBER 1, 2005

FACTS: Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of Sections
4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a
10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions
contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the
following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by

Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or
exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under
the exemption delegations since this refers to custom duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also
said that the President has powers to cause, influence, or create the conditions provided by
law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards
are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They
claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be
brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that,
ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.

ISSUES: 1. WON R.A No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Art. 6, Sec. 24, and Art. 6,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution

2. WON there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Art. 6,

Sec.28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution

3. WON there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Art. 3,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution

1. Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill
which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of
Representatives, but Senate has the power not only to propose amendments, but
also to propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by
the Constitution to originate in the House. The Constitution simply means is that
the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of
the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts,
the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are
expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both
views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
2. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or
not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
3. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class
of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place and like circumstances.”


1. R.A No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The Revenue Bill exclusively
originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House Bill when it included
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage,
and excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Art. 6, Sec. 24 of the Constitution does not
contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be
introduced by the Senate to House Revenue Bill
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to
the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not
abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must
be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make
reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been
established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the
rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity.
As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing
of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.