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G.R. No. L-7491 August 8, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GO PIN, defendant-appellant.
Go Pin, a Chinese citizen, was charged with violating Art. 201 of the
RPC, for exhibiting films which were allegedly indecent and immoral.
The trial court noted that the films were only slightly obscene,
indecent and immoral. He was sentenced to 6 months and 1 day of
prision correctional and a fine of 300 pesos. Go Pin appealed the
decision. His counsel claimed that like paintings and pictures of
women in nude, the films are not offensive but are considered art.
ISSUE: Whether or not the films are considered obscene
HELD: Yes, the films are obscene. Unlike nude paintings and
sculptures which are considered art, the films in question are used for
commercial purposes to satisfy the curiosity, and taste and lust of the
people. Gain and profit are the main consideration in their exhibition.
The lower court ruling was affirmed.
413 U.S. 15 June 21, 1973
Miller v. California,
Mr. Miller was convicted for sending five unsolicited advertising
brochures for sexually explicit adult books and movies. Descriptive
language, pictures and drawings of men and women sexually engaged
were displayed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may regulate obscene materials
HELD: Yes, the state may regulate obscene materials but subject to
certain safeguards. Obscene materials are not part of those protected
by freedom of speech/expression.
The three pronged test of obscenity as modified from Memoirs vs
Massachusetts:
1) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards,' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient (lecherous) interest
2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law
3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value."
390 U.S. 629 April 22, 1968
Ginsberg v. New York
Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated “Sam’s Stationary and
Luncheonette” in Bellmore on Long Island in New York. They had a
lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-called “girlie”
magazines. On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-old boy entered the
store and purchased copies of “Sir” and “Mr. Annual”; the purchase
was initiated by the boy’s parents to prosecute Ginsberg. On October
26, 1965, Ginsberg sold the same minor copies of “Man to Man” and
“Escapade” at the instigation of a police officer. All of the magazines
contained nude pictures and sexual content.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation interferes with protected
freedoms and parental authority
HELD: No, the state has an independent interest in protecting the
welfare of children and safeguarding them from abuses. The
magazines are obscene. Obscenity is not part of protected expression

and may be repressed without applying the “clear and present danger”
test. The concept of obscenity will vary according to the group it is
applied. In the case at hand, Ginsberg did not prove that he made an
attempt to ascertain the age of the minor in question.
G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
LEO PITA doing business under the name and style of PINOY
PLAYBOY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and
NARCISO CABRERA, respondents.
On December 1983, members of the police conducted a raid and
seizure of obscene and pornographic materials along Manila as part of
the city’s Anti-Smut Campaign. The seized materials were burned in
public. Among those seized and burned were the “Pinoy Playboy”
magazines published by Leo Pita.
Pita filed a petition for injuction against Mayor Bagatsing claiming
that Pinoy Playboy is a decent, artistic and educational magazine and
is protected by freedom of speech and press. The Court granted a TRO
against the continuance of the Anti-Smut Campaign.
The trial court set a hearing to determine whether or not Pinoy Playboy
is obscene. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held it as
obscene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pinoy Playboy is obscene and may be
confiscated without a warrant
HELD: No, the seizure and confiscation is not valid. The authorities
must have first applied for a search warrant after convincing the judge
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that the materials are obscene and that they pose clear and present
danger. Afterwards, a case must be filed to determine if the materials
are really obscene. Here, no warrant has been obtained and no charges
have been filed. However, the case is moot and academic because the
seized materials have already been burned and cannot be returned.
G.R. No. L-6465 January 31, 1955
NORBERTO QUISUMBING, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUGENIO LOPEZ, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
Norberto Quisumbing filed a libel case against the publisher, EIC and
general manager of The Manila Chronicle. The headline read “NBI
raids the offices of 3 City Usurers”; it was published that
Quisumbing’s office was raided by the NBI for a usury complaint and
that criminal charges would be filed against him. The trial court and
the Court of Appeals both dismissed the complaints.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publication was libelous
HELD: No, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings.
While the headline may be libelous per se, it does not identify
Quisumbing. The article taken as a whole is not libelous. There is no
evidence that the article was prompted by malice. Press reporters and
editors usually have to race with their deadlines thus they should be
given leeway provided that such publication was made in good faith.

PEOPLE VS. ALARCON
69 Phil 265
FACTS:
After the decision rendered by the CFI of Pampanga a in criminal case
convicting Alarcon of the crime of robbery committed in band, a
denunciatory letter, signed by one Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to the
President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the
herein respondent, Federico Mangahas who, as columnist of the
Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted
the letter in an article published by him in the issue of that paper of
September 23, 1937.
On September 29, 1937, provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed with the
CFI of Pampanga to cite Mangahas in contempt. On the same date, the
lower court ordered Mangahas to appear and show cause. Mangahas
appeared and filed an answer alleging, among others, that “the
publication of the letter in question is in line with the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court properly cited Mangahas for
contempt inasmuch as the case is still pending appeal.
HELD:
No. What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no
pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a
decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. In the
present case, the letter complained of was published after the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for
robbery in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court
of Appeals. It was then without power to reopen or modify the decision
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it had rendered, and could not have been influenced by the questioned
publication.
GOV. GARCIA VS MANRIQUE
GR 186592, Oct 10, 2012
FACTS:
Manrique is the publisher/editor of Luzon Tribune, which allegedly
contained disparaging statements against the Supreme Court. The
petitioners alleged that the subject article undermines the people’s
faith in the Supreme Court due to blunt allusion that they employed
bribery in order to obtain relief from the Court, particularly in
obtaining a TRO in a certain case. Manrique alleged that there was
nothing malicious or defamatory in his article since he only stated the
facts or circumstances which attended the issuance of the TRO.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the court decisions are beyond criticism
and public opinion.
(2) Whether or not Manrique’s invocation of the freedom of
speech in his criticisms tenable.
HELD:
(1) No. The court ruled that every citizen has the right to comment
upon and criticize the actuations of public officer sand such right is
not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at judicial
authority. It is, however, crucial that such criticisms be decent and
proper.
(2) No. Manrique’s article no longer partakes of an adverse criticism
of an official act but an indecent attempt to malign the petitioners
which ultimately brought equal harm to the reputation of this Court.
Malicious publications cannot seek the protection of the constitutional
guaranties of free speech and press.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MAYOR JOSE
ATIENZA
FACTS:
In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an
application for a rally permit with the office of Manila Mayor Jose
“Lito” Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola
Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is
only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day
before the scheduled rally. Cadiz immediately went to the Court of
Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was only a
partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional
right to freedom of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Atienza.
Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda
but at the Mendiola Bridge. Subsequently, the Manila Police District
(MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly violating the
Public Assembly Act or specifically, for staging a rally in a place
different from what was indicated in the rally permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that
what Atienza did was within his power; that freedom of expression is
not absolute.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienza’s power to
modify the rally permit without consulting with the IBP.
HELD:
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No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which
contains a time and place different from that applied for, the mayor
must first consult with the applicant at the earliest opportunity. This is
in order to give the applicant some time to determine if such change is
favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek judicial
remedies) – Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the
clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil, the applicant must be heard on the matter. In this
case, Atienza did not consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and
whimsically changed the venue without any reason. Such is a grave
abuse of discretion and a violation of the freedom of expression.
GESITE VS. CA
FACTS:
The petitioners admitted that they participated in concerted mass
actions in Metro Manila from September to the first half of October,
1990 which temporarily disrupted classes in Metro Manila but they
claimed that they were not on strike. They claimed that they were
merely exercising their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of their grievances. Thus, they may
not be penalized administratively.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mass action launched by the public school
teachers is valid.
HELD:

No. Petitioners, in joining the mass actions, failed to hold classes to
the prejudice of their students. While petitioners have the right to
assemble peaceably to air their grievances, however, they should have
exercised such right in a lawful manner. It is undisputed fact that there
was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their
demands by withholding their services.
Concerted mass actions by government officials, teachers in this case,
like walkouts, mass leaves, and other work stoppage or absence from
work are prohibited because it is tantamount to strike which is
prohibited to government employees.
BAYAN VS. ERMITA
FACTS:
Petitioners come in three groups: First is Bayan, et al , second is Jess
del Prado and third is Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU). They alleged their
rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rallies,
marches and protests they participated were violently dispersed, some
are arrested and detained and caused injuries to several by policemen
implementing BP No. 880. All petitioners assail BP No. 880, some in
toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as
the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR). They seek to
stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy
and the CPR policy.
Their contentions are the following:
1. That BP No. 880 is a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human
rights treaties of which Philippines is a signatory;
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2. That the provisions of BP No. 880 are not mere regulations but
prohibitions as it is allegedly a curtailment of the right to peacefully
assemble and petition for redress of grievances;
3. That BP No. 880 requires permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger and that it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government;
4. That two standards stated in the law (clear and present danger and
imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent; and
5. That CPR is void for it alters and contravenes the standard of
maximum tolerance. They argue that it is preemptive, that the
government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their
act.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not BP No. 880 is constitutional.
(2) Whether or not Calibrated Preemptive Response is legal
and constitutional.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The Supreme Court reiterated that the right to freedom of
speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances are fundamental rights of the people
guaranteed by the constitution but it is a settled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of
those rights is not absolute for it may be regulated that it shall not
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. BP No. 880 is
only a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner
of the assemblies. The SC stated that the law provides a precise
and sufficient standard - the clear and present danger test stated in
Sec. 6(a).

(2) No. The SC ruled for the discontinuation of the usage of CPR
for it means and serves only for the same purpose as maximum
tolerance. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be
that mandated by the law which maximum tolerance.
RANDOLF DAVID vs ERMITA (and other consolidated cases),
489 SCRA 160,
May 6, 2003
FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and
the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president,
then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General
Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness
and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I
and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other
public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their
rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David
proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor,
was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA
articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current
imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of
national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition
Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no
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factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such
power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the
emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP
1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the
declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within
the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional
and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there
are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP.
Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that
PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions
of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis
in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration
of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and
the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and
the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military

aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress
what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle
liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool
developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The
7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’
cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call
upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion
are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’
and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought
to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact
remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP
1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in
a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that
GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out
power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
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and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes
necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion
has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president
declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated
Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to
the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause
‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The
SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted
former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate
‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency
can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but
cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private
corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise
of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such
exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress
must be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress
may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law
Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the
president by the president.
CRISANTO EVANGELISTA vs TOMAS EARNSHAW, GR No.
36453,
September 28, 1932
Evangelista, president of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP), sent a letter to Earnshaw, Mayor of the City of Manila,
requesting permission to hold a popular meeting and parade at Plaza
Moriones, Manila. Earnshaw denied the request and ordered his chief
of police to prohibit all kinds of meetings held by the CPP throughout
the city.
Evangelista contested such refusal arguing it is a deprivation of the
CPP’s constitutional right to assembly and prays that a writ of
mandamus be issued against Earnshaw to compel him to issue the
requested permits. In his defense, Earshaw stated that the CPP is an
illegal association which has for its principal object to incite the revolt
of the laboring class in order to overthrow the government.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CPP’s constitutional right to assembly was
violated.
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HELD
No. The right to peaceful assemblage is not an absolute one; as held
in People v Perez, when the intention and effect of the act is seditious,
the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of
assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to
maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the
constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.
Instead of being condemned or criticized, the respondent mayor
should be praised and commended for having taken a prompt,
courageous, and firm stand towards the said Communist Party of the
Philippines before the latter could do more damage by its
revolutionary propaganda, and by the seditious speeches and
utterances of its members.
CIPRIANO PRIMICIAS vs VALERIANO FUGOSO GR No. L-
1800,
January 27, 1948
Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties,
instituted an action for mandamus against Fugoso, Mayor of the City
of Manila, for the latter’s refusal to issue a permit to them to hold a
peaceful public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to
the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense
for refusing the permit is “that there is a reasonable ground to believe,
basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions,
especially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high,
that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith
and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and
a disruption of public order.”
Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local
government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting
as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor,

"any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb
the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or
crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly."
ISSUE
Whether or not Primicias’ party’s constitutional right to assembly was
violated.
HELD
Yes. The reason given for the refusal of the permit cannot be given
any consideration. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. To justify suppression of
free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil
will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground
to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. That the evil to be
prevented would cause serious injury to the state.
SIMEON DE LA CRUZ vs NORBERTO ELA, GR No. L-6858,
May 31, 1956
Petitioners, in their behalf and for the benefit of other Jehova’s
Witnesses in the province of Zambales, brought this action to compel
respondent to grant them a permit to hold a public meeting at the
public plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
Respondent in his answer stated that he had not refused the request of
petitioners to hold a religious meeting at the public plaza as in fact he
gave them permission to use the northwestern part of the plaza on July
27, 1952, but they declined to avail of it. He prayed that the action be
dismissed.
The Jehova’s Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to
those professed by the Catholic organization. In its publication "FACE
THE FACTS", that society branded the latter as a religious
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organization which is "a part of the monstrosity now appearing in and
claiming the right to rule the earth." He adopted as a policy not to allow
the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any religious denomination as
it is his belief that said kiosk should only be used "for legal purposes."
And when their request for reconsideration was denied, petitioners
instituted the present action for mandamus.
It is now contended by petitioners that the action taken by respondent
is unconstitutional being an abridgment of the freedom of speech,
assembly, and worship guaranteed by our Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner’s right to assembly was violated.
HELD
No. The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though
guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated
in order that it may not be "injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society.
The power exercised by respondent cannot be considered as capricious
or arbitrary considering the peculiar circumstances of the case. It
appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a
short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said
church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the
authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the
happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to
prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place
of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted by Ela for
sometime previous to the request made by petitioners. Respondent
never denied such request but merely tried to enforce his policy by
assigning them the northwestern part of the public plaza.

NAVARRO vs VILLEGAS, G.R. No. L-31687,
February 26, 1970
On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement
of a Democratic Philippines, wrote a letter to the respondent, the
Mayor of the city of Manila, applying to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda
February 26, 1970, from 4-11pm.
On the same day, the respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on
the grounds that they have temporarily adopted the policy of not
issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or
demonstration during weekdays due to the events that happened from
the past week.
On the same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an option to use
the Sunken Garden near Intamuros for its rally, and for it to be held
earlier for it to end before dark.
The petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayor’s action on the ground
that it violates the petitioner’s right to peaceable assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to peaceable assembly.
HELD
No. The right of peaceable assemble is subject to regulation under the
police power of the state.
The right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, though granted
by the Constitution, is not absolute for it may be regulated in order that
it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right of community and society, This power may be exercised
under the police power of the state, which is the power of the state,
which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
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morals, peace, education, and good order, safety and general welfare
of the people.
While the privilege of the citizen to use streets and parks for
communication may be regulated in the interest of all, said privilege
is not absolute. It must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience and in consonance with peace and good
order, but it must not guise of regulation be abridged or denied.
16. Philippine Blooming Mills Case,51 SCRA 189
Petitioners: Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization,
Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio, Padrigano Rufino, Roxas Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and
Rodulfo Munsod
Respondents: Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. and Court of
Industrial Relations
Ponente: J. Makasiar
Facts:
1) The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners
Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and
Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of

Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of
the Pasig Police.
2) Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a
mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the
workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in
the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8
A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.
3) The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the
leaders of the PBMEO after learning about the planned mass
demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in factual
exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of
expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.
4) The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would
interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the
loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility
that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the
rally.
5) A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their
appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those
from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to
participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late
to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO
were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No
Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
6) The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc., and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
Page 11 of 30
bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being
filed two days late.
Issue:
Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not
against the employer, as a violation of freedom expression in general
and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances
Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of
the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition of the
employers
Held:
1) Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by
the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit
the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against
the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful,
and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before
Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for
their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent
firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private

respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for,
its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.
2) To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence
a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is “a
potent means of inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as
well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of
the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations,
in effect imposes on the workers the “duty … to observe regular
working hours.” The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to
stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and
deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should
not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners
from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor
practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3
of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage
in concert activities for … mutual aid or protection”; while Section
Page 12 of 30
4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three.
The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of
Industrial Relations. The Supreme Court also directed the re-
instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from
the date of their separation from the service until re-instated, minus
one day’s pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from
other sources during their separation from the service.
17. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-
Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the
front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart.
The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing.
The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that
indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He
also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies
within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out
that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy
from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution
we “adhere to generally accepted principles of international law”.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the
Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the
permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of
foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna
Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of

international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the
primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and
guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the
same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be
invoked if the application thereof would collide with a
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present
danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the
ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than
the police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to
ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet
because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the
500 feet radius (besides, there’s also the question of whether or not
the mayor can prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC, that has
not been raised an an issue in this case).
18. Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233
FACTS:
On the very afternoon of the same day, there was this manifestation
from respondent Mayor: "1. On November 22, 1983, the petitioner,
allegedly the coordinator of the, Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for
National Reconciliation, had their request for a prayer rally and
parade/march received in the Office of the Mayor. 2. That even before
the request, the respondent had repeatedly announced in his regular
program on Sunday over the radio (DWGO) and at the Monday
morning flag ceremony before hundreds of government employees
that he would grant the request of any group that would like to exercise
their freedom of speech and assembly. 3. That respondent when
interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', a
Page 13 of 30
newspaper of general circulation in Olongapo and Zambales,
mentioned the fact that he had granted the permit of the petitioner,
which interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue of the
said newspaper. A copy of the newspaper is hereto attached and made
an integral part hereof as Annex 'A'. 4. On November 23, 1983, the
City Mayor approved the request of the petitioner to hold a prayer rally
and a parade/march on December 4, 1983. A copy of the permit is
hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex 'B'. 5 " The
prayer was for the dismissal of the petition. The permit reads as
follows: "23 November 1983, Dr. Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator,
Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, Olongapo
City. Dear Dr. Ruiz: Your request for a PERMIT to hold a prayer rally
at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City and a parade/march from Gordon
Avenue at 1:00 p.m. of 4 December 1983 as stated in your letter dated
19 November 1983 received in this office on 22 November is hereby
GRANTED provided that: 1. The parade/march and rally will be
peaceful and orderly; 2. Your organization will be responsible for any
loss or damage to government property and for the cleanliness of the
Rizal Triangle; 3. The parade/march shall proceed from the corner of
Gordon Ave., and Magsaysay Drive, to Rizal Ave., thence to the Rizal
Triangle. Please coordinate with the Integrated National Police for
appropriate traffic assistance. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) Richard J.
Gordon, City Mayor."
At its next session then of November 27, the Court, in the light of the
above manifestation, resolved to grant such plea for dismissal. From
petitioner came, on December 1, 1983, a motion dated November 29
to withdraw petition. As therein stated: "Petitioner, by counsel,
respectfully moves to withdraw the above-entitled petition on the
ground that the permit being sought in the prayer-rally to be held on 4
December 1983 from 1:00 to 6:00 PM has been granted by the
respondent." Then the next day, December 2, 1983, the answer of
respondent came reiterating what was set forth in his manifestation.
The reason for the delay of such pleading, the due date the service had
been served on petitioner being December 1, 1983, was obviously the
distance between Manila and Olongapo City. It was not served until

November 30. At any rate, no prejudice was caused either party as in
the meanwhile, the Court had acted on the very day the manifestation
was submitted. That was on December 1, 1983.
ISSUE:
Freedom of assembly and to petition the government for redress of
grievancess
HELD:
There is relevance to a recital of such facts. It appears that the
guidelines set forth in the extended opinion in the aforesaid J.B.L.
Reyes decision as to the role of the judiciary in petitions for permits
to hold peaceable assembles may have to be supplemented. This is
how the J.B.L. Reyes opinion reads on this point: "The applicants for
a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of
the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.
If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be
filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he
is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded,
they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech
and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms,
are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be
too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on
the other departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of
assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal
Page 14 of 30
formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has
been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes 'as the sovereign
prerogative of judgment.' Nonetheless, the presumption must be to
incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. Clearly then, to the
extent that there may be inconsistencies between this resolution and
that of Navarro v. Villegas, that case is pro tanto modified. So it was
made clear in the original resolution of October 25, 1983. "
As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for
mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble
of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued.
A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should
be the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request
for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time
was designated for the decision on the request, such party or his
representative should be at the office of the public official concerned.
If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or
favorable, should be sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there
need not be waste of time and effort not only of the litigants but
likewise of a court from which redress is sought in case of a denial or
modification of a request for a permit.
While, therefore, this petition should be dismissed, the Court deems it
best to set forth the above to specify in more detail, the steps necessary
for the judicial protection of constitutional rights with the least delay
and inconvenience to the parties and with the greater assurance that
the factual background on which is dependent the determination of
whether or not the clear and present danger standard has been satisfied.
Lastly, a certiorari petition to this Court is likewise available to the
losing party.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, this case is dismissed.

19. Villar vs. TIP, 135 SCRA 705
FACTS:
Petitioners Villar, Recitis, Barreto, Salcon, de Leon,
Laxamana and Guilatco were all refused enrollment at the
Technological Institute of the Philippines (TIP) due to their exercise
of their constitutional right to freedom of assembly. As held in
MALABANAN vs RAMENTO, petitioners cannot be barred from
enrollment for their exercise of their freedom of assembly.
In opposition to the petition filed by petitioners, respondent
made reference to the academic records of petitioners, invoking the
constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions
of higher learning. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana all
obtained failing grades while petitioners Villar, Salcon, Guilatco and
Recitis met the requirements for retention in the said institute, entitling
them to the writs of certiorari and prohibition against TIP.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners can be barred from enrollment for their
exercise of their freedom of assembly.
2. Whether or not TIP is under no obligation to admit the students with
failing grades under the constitutional provision on academic freedom
regarded to institution of higher learning.
RULING:
Page 15 of 30
1. NO. Petitioners have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of
the constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was
visited by their expulsion from respondent College.
2. YES. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher
learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine
under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of
students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be
followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against
those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate
grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal
protection clause being disregarded. To that extent therefore, there is
justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners
because of their marked academic deficiency.
20.Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M,
on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and
Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such
permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second
floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and
vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same
day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued
their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they
rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the
same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal

assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they
were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the
holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and
Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of
illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the
permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral
defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.
Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary
action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right
to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic.
They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded
and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking
place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and
present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without
prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed
students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to
discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is
not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment
unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive
evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost
leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or
utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be
lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent,
whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction
through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are
Page 16 of 30
devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably.
In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and
place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of
work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be
violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
G.R. No. L-57439
August 27, 1981
J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO and GRACE VINZONS-MAGANA,
Petitioners, v. LT. COL. EDGAR GUEVARA, as Camp
Commandant, Camp Bagong Ibalon, Regional Command V,
Respondent.
Facts:
It is the claim of petitioners J. Antonio M. Carpio and Grace Vinzons-
Magana in this application for the writ of habeas corpus filed on July
20, 1981, that their detention at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City is
illegal, there being no valid authority for the warrants of arrest
respectively issued against them on July 2 and 3, 1981. The
Presidential Order of Arrest was allegedly signed on June 26, 1981 for
the violation of Art. 138 of the Revised Penal Code dealing with
incitement to rebellion, Presidential Decree No. 885, the amended
Anti-Subversion Law, and Presidential Decree No. 33 on the
possession and distribution of subversive materials. It was further
alleged that petitioners were only shown a copy of what appeared to
be a radiogram, no signed copy of the order having been furnished
them. It was then alleged that there was no justification for their
detention, that martial law having been terminated on January 17,
1981 and President Marcos himself having "banned the use of military
processes of arrest and issued a letter of instruction ordering that,
thenceforth, all arrests, even for alleged crimes involving national
security, must undergo normal judicial processes."
The next day, on July 21, 1981, this Court issued a writ of habeas
corpus requiring respondent to make a return not later than Tuesday,

July 28, 1981 and setting the case for hearing on July 30, 1981. In the
return of the writ, the detention of petitioners was characterized as
"lawful and valid, having been done by virtue of a presidential
commitment order, issued pursuant to the reservation of power under
Presidential Proclamation 2045, exercised by the President on the
strength of the evidence before him." 2 Nonetheless, at the hearing on
July 30, 1981, to quote from the language of the resolution of this
Court of that date: "The Solicitor General manifested that President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued an order yesterday directing the
temporary release of detainees-petitioners J. Antonio M. Carpio and
Grace Vinzons-Magana on recognizance of Assemblyman Marcial
Pimentel. On his part, Senator Diokno (a) manifested that yesterday
morning, after he met the petitioners at the airport, they all reported to
the military authorities and in such conference, Deputy Minister
Carmelo Barbero turned over the custody of petitioners-detainees to
Senator Diokno for which he signed a receipt to produce them in
today’s hearing, and (b) requested that the hearing of this case be
postponed until further orders of the Court, with the petitioners-
detainees in the meantime to stay in his custody."
Held:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO PEACEABLE
ASSEMBLY; NO ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ON THE
EXERCISE THEREOF WITH THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW.
— With the lifting of martial law, the people have a right to expect
that reliance on the constitutional right to peaceable assembly would
not be visited with adverse consequences. It should be safeguarded
and respected not only by courts but by other public officials,
especially those entrusted with the task of maintaining peace and
order. The danger to public security that could conceivably arise by
people gathering en masse is certainly much less. It is quite true that
turbulence may mark such an event. One who is responsible certainly
can be held accountable if the assembly is utilized for illegal purposes.
The guilty parties can be duly proceeded against. In the absence of
such a showing, it is of the essence in a constitutional government that
no encroachment on the rights of an individual is permissible.
Page 17 of 30
2. PARTICIPATION IN A PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY CANNOT
BE PROSCRIBED. — What was said by Chief Justice Hughes with
force and eloquence in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1936)
possesses relevance: ". . . The holding of meetings for peaceable
political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct
of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be
preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but
as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether
their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which
the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed
crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy
against the public peace and order they may be prosecuted for their
conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter
when the State instead of prosecuting them for such offenses seizes
upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public
discussion as the basis for a criminal charge."
3. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DISMISSAL
THEREOF WHERE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY DETENTION.
— Where, as in the case at bar, the petitioners have been released from
military custody the petition is dismissed for being moot and
academic.
ARREZA VS, GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY
FOUNDATON
Facts:
Carmelo A. Arreza, Lonesto G. Oidem, Jacob F. Meimban, and
Edgardo S. Fernando were either leaders or participants in what the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation referred to as a
rally/demonstration held on 28 September 1982, in front of the Life
Science Building of the University, and are officers and members of
the Supreme Student Council of said university. The demonstration’s
purpose was to register the opposition of the students to the abolition

of the school's Institute of Animal Science, as those taking courses
therein would not be able to graduate. Other rallies were held on
September 8, 27 and 29, 1982, for the purpose of sympathizing with
the suspension of 5 student leaders who conducted an illegal assembly
on 27 August 1982, causing additional disturbance on the campus, not
only by the disorderly conduct observed but also by the resulting
boycott of classes. Such exercise of the right to peaceable assembly
was visited by the University with a refusal to let Arreza, enroll after
an investigation of their alleged violation of school rules and
regulations. Arreza, filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a
preliminary mandatory injunction to allow them to enroll
Issue:
Whether the students may be denied re-enrollment due to the improper
conduct attributed to them in the exercise of their free speech and
peaceable assembly.
Held:
If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience
goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic,
were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly
the timid diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic.
They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded
and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a
sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their
fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the
occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of
youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but
with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the
daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible.
This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for
conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
Herein, the infractions of University rules or regulations by the
students justify the filing of appropriate charges. What cannot be
justified is the infliction of the highly-disproportionate penalty of
Page 18 of 30
denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to
graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and
peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them.
BROTHER ELI SORIANO VS. MTRCB LAGUARDIA
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., Soriano, as host of the
program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following
remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung
putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay
Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang
babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra
ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical
affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other
private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against
petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent
Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners
remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan. Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a
notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use
of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating
Daan.
After a preliminary conference in which Soriano appeared, the
MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the
showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with
Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the
MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the
MTRCB Rules of Procedure. The same order also set the case for
preliminary investigation.

HELD:
The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at
least with respect to the average child,” and thus his utterances cannot
be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US
Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be
“context based” and found the utterances to be obscene after
considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time
of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that
made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court
emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a
child literally rather than in the context that they were used.”
The SC also said “that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather
a “form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent
punishment.” In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order
of suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB
may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free
speech clause.” visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the
suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue
with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued
to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent contents
of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program.” (Soriano v. Laguardia;
GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)
Dissenting Opinion:
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in a separate dissenting opinion, said
that a single government action could be both a penalty and a prior
restraint. The Chief Magistrate pointed out that the three month
suspension takes such form because it also acts as a restraint to
petitioner’s future speech and thus deserves a higher scrutiny than the
“context based” approach that the majority applied. In voting to grant
Soriano’s petition, the Chief Justice said that “in the absence of proof
and reason, he [Soriano] should not be penalized with a three-month
suspension that works as a prior restraint on his speech.”
Page 19 of 30
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and
CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,
Petitioners, -versus- HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G.
MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA
and THE CITY OF CAUAYAN, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009
FACTS:
Newsounds Broadcasting Network and Consolidated Broadcasting
System are authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan
City, and had been doing so for some years undisturbed by local
authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official capacities
impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not broadcast
at all. These actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate
to the physical closure of those stations. Petitioners were required to
submit requirements for the reclassification of the land wherein the
said stations are operating. Such requirements then as required were
never listed in the list of requirements in the renewal/application of
any permit issued by Cauayan City. And notably, petitioners had never
been required to submit such papers before.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to free expression of the petitioners was
violated by respondents by the closure of the station.
HELD:
Yes. The right to free expression of the petitioner was violated by the
respondents.
That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression of respondents who happen to be
members of the press is clear enough.
The circumstances of this case dictate that respondents’ closure of
petitioners’ radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. It must be
pointed out that in the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive

in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that
appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy
political dynasty. Bombo Radyo is a rival station of DWDY who is
also owned by the family DY. Also, in an article found in the
Philippine Daily inquirer dated February 2004, respondent Dy was
quoted as saying that he will "disenfranchise the radio station." Such
statement manifests and confirms that respondents’ denial of
petitioners’ renewal applications on the ground that the Property is
commercial is merely a pretext and that their real agenda is to remove
petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice.
Therefore the right to free expression of the petitioners’ constitutional
right to press freedom was blatantly violated by the respondents.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. V. SANCHEZ
GR No. 75209 – September 30, 1987
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR
SOLIDARITY V. NLRC
GR No. 78791 – September 30, 1987
FACTS:
The Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia had been conducting
pickets which intensified during the period of July 8-10, 1987 outside
Padre Faura gate of the SC building. Since June 17, 1981
On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said
unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring the union
leaders and their counsels and other individuals to appear before the
Court on July 14 and then and there to show why they should not be
held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union
of Filipro Employees, was further required to show why he should not
be administratively dealt with. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf
of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court with an
assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s
leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the
leaders of the PAMANTIK, an unregistered loosed alliance of about
75 unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either the UFE or
Page 20 of 30
KILU.
ISSUE: WON the respondents should be held in contempt and Atty.
Espinas be administratively dealt with.
HELD:
Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e.,
through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping
with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrator of justice
entitled to “proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice.“ It is a traditional
conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the
decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from
every20extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.” (In re
Stolen).
The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the
dignity of the Court, but equally a violation of the constitutional right
of the adverse party and the citizenry at large to have their causes tried
fairly. The right of free speech and of assembly of the individuals
herein are not violated because any attempt to pressure or influence
courts of justice through the exercise of either rights amounts to an
abuse thereof and is no longer within the ambit of constitutional
protection. However, being non-lawyers, the duty and responsibility
of advising them rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their
counsel of record, Atty. Espinas. It is the duty of all members of the
legal profession as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients
on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice.
The contempt charges were dismissed. 20

MTRCB vs ABS-CBN, GR 155282
Facts:
Respondent ABS-CBN aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the
TV program “The Inside Story” produced and hosted by
respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as
prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. PWU was
named as the school of some of the students involved and the
façade of the PWU building served as the background of the
episode. This caused upsoar in the PWU community and they filed
a letter-complaint to the MTRCB saying their reputation was
besmirched. MTRCB alleged that respondents: 1) Did not submit
“the inside story” to petitioner for review and 2) Exhibited the
same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and
some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations. ABS-CBN replied
saying: 1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial, its airing is protected
by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of
the press and 2) Petitioners has no power, authority and
jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon
respondents. MTRCB investigating committee ordered the
respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program
and also affirmed the ruling. Respondents filed a special civil
action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered a decision in
favor of respondents, annulling and setting aside the decision and
resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that
certain sections of PD 1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV
program “Inside Story”, they being a public affairs programs
which can be equated to a newspaper.
Issue:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the
“Inside Story” prior its exhibition or broadcast by TV.
Page 21 of 30
Held:
Yes. Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties
of the board which includes the power to screen, review and
examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV programs,
including publicity materials. The court ruled that PD 1986 gives
MTRCB the power to screen, review and examine ALL TV
PROGRAMS LESSON where the law does not make any
exceptions, courts may not exempt something therefrom, unless
there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
Thus, when the law says “all TV programs”, the word all covers
all tv programs whether religious, public affairs and news
documents. It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV
Program, MTRCB has the power to review it. The only
exemptions from the MTRCB’s power to review are those
mentioned in Sec 7 of PD 1986 which are: 1) TV programs
imprinted or exhibited by Philippine govt and/or departments and
agencies and 2) Newsreels. In a desperate attempt to be exempted,
respondents content that Inside Story falls under the category of
newsreels. MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as “straight
news reporting, as distinguished from analyses, commentaries,
and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered
newsreels. Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a
public affairs program and within petitioner’s power of review.
Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA 71
Facts:

Antonio Gonzales, president of Malaya Films, claimed that his film
Kapit sa Patalim, was rated “For Adults Only” by a subcommittee of
the movie review board together with the required cuts and scene
deletions. He justified that these requirements were without basis and
were restrains on artistic expression. He adduced that the film is an
integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board
now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film.
Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations
advanced by the Board as basis for its classification.
He appealed to the movie review board but the same affirmed the
decion of the sub committee. When Gonzales appealed to the Supreme
court, the board claimed that the deletions were removed and the
requirement to submit the master negative was taken out but the film
was still rated for adults only. He said it is illogical thaat obscenity is
the basis for any alleged invasion of the right to the freedom of artistic
and literary expression embraced in the free speech and free press
guarantees of the Constitution. The petition was amended to contest
the rating only.
Issue :
WON the rating made is with grave abuse of discretion
Held :
Yes. There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and
its perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive. But, sadly, there
were not enough votes to maintain that there was grave abuse of
discretion. Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material
is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest. The portrayal of sex, in art, literature and scientific works, is
not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional
Page 22 of 30
protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious
motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of
absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital
problems of human interest and public concern. In the Philippine
context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural values as a
standard. Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are
concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall
be under the patronage of the State. Given this constitutional mandate,
It will be less than true to its function if any government office or
agency would invade the autonomy that an artist enjoys. It is for the
artist to determine what for him is a true representation. What is seen
or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing
that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene.
On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in
Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid
any taint of unconstitutionality. When a law is susceptible of two
constructions' one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the
courts will always adopt the former. There can be no valid objection
to the controlling standard. The supporting evidence was in the fact
that some scenes were not for young people. They might
misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to make it GP if
the petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they
refused. The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity
applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that
where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for
observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the
patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where
there is a set. It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual
fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the
State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring
for the welfare of the young.

New York Times vs. U.S., 403 U.S. 713
Facts:
In 1971, during rising tensions over the undeclared Vietnam War, the
New York Times attained copies of a 7,000 page top-secret articles
based on the 1968 study, “History of U.S. Decision Making Process
on Viet Nam Policy." The New York Times analyzed the articles for
several months, and on June 13, 1971, it began to print series of
articles about the document. President Richard Nixon, claiming that
the articles could harm national security and the ongoing war in
Vietnam, obtained injunctions against each publication, seeking to
prevent each from publishing any further information about the
document in question. The next day, the United States obtained a
restraining order prohibiting further publication until June 19. Shortly
after, the District Court denied the government’s request for a
preliminary injunction, but a Circuit Court judge prolonged the
restraining order to give the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia adequate time to consider the government’s case. On June
22, the Circuit Court remanded the case to the trial court for
determination of whether any of the future publications “posed such
grave and immediate danger to the security of the country as to warrant
prior restraint and a continued stay of publication." The New York
Times appealed the Circuit Court’s decision to the Supreme Court in
which the Supreme Court issued a ruling just four days after hearing
arguments.
Issue:
Is the First Amendment violated when the United States, during
wartime, prohibits a newspaper from publishing sensitive articles
which may cause security concerns for the United States?
Ruling:
Page 23 of 30
Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the U.S.
government carries a heavy burden to justify the need to infringe upon
the rights protected under the First Amendment, a burden it failed to
meet in this case. Therefore, the New York Times and the Washington
Post were protected by the First Amendment and were allowed to
publish the contents of the classified study.
Most notably, Justice Black in his concurrence argued that the First
Amendment protection of the freedom of the press is an essential
function of U.S. democracy. Black stated that the purpose of the
freedom of the press is to serve the people and to preserve the right to
censure the government. The First Amendment abolished the
government’s ability to censor the press in order to ensure that the
people have access to information that is free from government bias
and to allow people to hold open public debates. The rights protected
in First Amendment triumph over the government’s interest in security
or civil obedience.
In his concurrence, Justice Douglas noted that secrecy in government
is undemocratic, as is the government’s attempt to kept relevant
information out of the public debate surrounding the Vietnam War.
Justice Brennan differed in his concurrence, stating while the First
Amendment acts as an absolute bar in the present case, this may not
be the case for a temporary prevention of publishing information in
the interest of national security, or if one of the exceptions established
in Near v. Minnesota applies.Justice Stewart asserted in his
concurrence that if the disclosure would cause a direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to the U.S. or to U.S. citizens, then the outcome
may be different in the future. Justice White stated in his concurrence
that the fact that information is sensitive to national security does not
prevent the press from exercising its First Amendment rights.
Finally, Chief Justice Burger in his dissent argued that the First
Amendment is not absolute in all cases: there are exceptions to the
First Amendment, and these exceptions should be debated in the court

system. The exceptions include if the publication is obscene, would
jeopardize national security in wartime, or threatens to incite violence
and/or the overthrow the government. Here, the Court found that none
of these exceptions applied.
Near vs. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
Facts:
A Minnesota law that “gagged” a periodical from publishing
derogatory statements about local public officials was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. The
freedom of press is essential to the nature of a free state but that
freedom may be restricted by the government in certain situations. In
this case, The Saturday Press (the Press) published attacks on local
officials. The Press claimed that the chief of police had “illicit
relations with gangsters.” Minnesota officials obtained an injunction
in order to abate the publishing of the Press newspaper under a state
law that allowed this course of action. The state law authorized
abatement, as a public nuisance, of a “malicious, scandalous and
defamatory newspaper, or other periodical. A state court order abated
the Press and enjoined the Defendants, publishers of the Press
(Defendants), from publishing or circulating such “defamatory and
scandalous” periodicals. A Minnesota statute declares that one who
engages "in the business of regularly and customarily producing,
publishing," etc., "a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper,
magazine or other periodical," is guilty of a nuisance, and authorizes
suits, in the name of the State, in which such periodicals may be abated
and their publishers enjoined from future violations
Issue:
Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision
Held:
Page 24 of 30
No. Judgment of the state court reversed. The fact that the liberty of
press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not effect
the requirement that the press has immunity from previous restraints
when it deals with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for
such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with
the constitutional privilege. Therefore, a statute authorizing such
proceedings is not consistent with the conception of the liberty of the
press as historically conceived and guaranteed and is thus,
unconstitutional. The statute in question cannot be justified by reason
of the fact that the publisher is permitted to show, before injunction
issues, that the matter published is true and is published with good
motives and for justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld, could lead to
a complete system of censorship. Thus, the statute is a substantial
infringement on the liberty of the press and in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Times Film vs. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43
Facts:
The Municipal Code of Chicago, 155-4, requires submission of all
motion pictures for examination or censorship prior to their public
exhibition and forbids their exhibition unless they meet certain
standards. Times Film Corp. (plaintiff) applied for a permit to exhibit
its film “Don Juan,” a certain motion picture and tendered the required
license fee; but the permit was denied, solely because Times Film
refused to submit the film for examination. Petitioner sued in a Federal
District Court for injunctive relief ordering issuance of the permit
without submission of the film and restraining the city officials from
interfering with its exhibition. It did not submit the film to the court or
offer any evidence as to its content. Times Film also claims that the
ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint. The District

Court dismissed the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that neither a
substantial federal question nor a justiciable controversy was
presented.
Issue:
Whether the ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Held:
No. It was held that motion pictures are included "within the free
speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." Admittedly, the challenged section of the ordinance
imposes a previous restraint, and the broad justiciable issue to whether
the constitutional protection includes complete and absolute freedom
to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture. It is
concluded that 155-4 of Chicago's ordinance requiring the submission
of films prior to their public exhibition is not void on its face.
Petitioner's attack upon the ordinance does not require that any
consideration be given to the validity of the standards set out therein.
They are not challenged and are not before us. Prior motion picture
censorship cases which reached this Court involved questions of
standards. The films had all been submitted to the authorities and
permits for their exhibition were refused because of their content.
Obviously, whether a particular statute is "clearly drawn," or "vague,"
or "indefinite," or whether a clear standard is in fact met by a film are
different questions involving other constitutional challenges to be
tested by considerations not here involved.
Petitioner claims that the nature of the film is irrelevant, and that even
if this film contains the basest type of pornography, or incitement to
riot, or forceful overthrow of orderly government, it may nonetheless
be shown without prior submission for examination. The challenge
here is to the censor's basic authority; it does not go to any statutory
Page 25 of 30
standards employed by the censor or procedural requirements as to the
submission of the film.
They have consistently reserved for future decision possible situations
in which the claimed First Amendment privilege might have to give
way to the necessities of the public welfare. It has never been held that
liberty of speech is absolute. Nor has it been suggested that all
previous restraints on speech are invalid. In discussing the classic legal
statements concerning the immunity of the press from censorship,
observed that the principle forbidding previous restraint "is stated too
broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. It was held
that there were "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or `fighting'
words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace."
Freedman vs. Maryland
Facts: Freedman was convicted because he showed a movie without
first submitting it to the Maryland State Board of Censors and securing
a prior approval.
Freedman showed the film “Revenge at Daybreak” in his theater in
Baltimore without following the procedures laid out by the state.
The State of Maryland concedes that the movie does not violate
any statutory standard for movies and would actually receive a license
if it had been submitted to them.

Issue: W/N the submission of a film to the Maryland State Board of
Censors is avalid exception to the constitutional prohibition of prior
restraint.
Held:
No. It is not a valid exception. The Board of Censors rules did not
follow the safeguards required by the law in order for their action to
be exempted in the prohibition of prior restraint.
The prior submission of a film to a censor can only be valid if it
follows these two guidelines:
First -“The burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression
must rest on the censor.”
Second - The State can advance the submission of all films in
order toregulate and bar those which are considered as unprotected
films. However, they are not allowed to provide a finality to its
censorship – i.e. banning it. Courts are the only entities that could
provide a valid final restraint because only a judicial determination
can ensure the sensitivity to such an issue.
The Maryland Board violates the prohibition on prior restraint on three
grounds:
First, if the board disapproves the film, the exhibitor has the burden of
initiating a judicial proceeding in order to persuade the court of the
non-obscene status of the film or that it is protected expression.
Second, when the Board has acted on the film and has ruled against it
being shown, the exhibitor could not show it lest he be charged of a
Page 26 of 30
violation of the law. The exhibitor could also be charged if
he show edit, in lie u with unsuccessfully getting a license, absent any
judicial decision in the film’s obscenity.
Third, the Board does not ensure any judicial determination that could
validly make a final determination regarding the film’s status.
Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule
Read
Cabansag vs. Fernandez
FACTS:
Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint seeking the ejectment
of Germiniana Fernandez from a parcel of land. He later wrote a letter
to the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC)
regarding the delay in the disposition of his case before the
CFI Pangasinan. The judge ordered Cabansag and his lawyers to show
cause why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending such
letter which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President
(Magsaysay) and the people. After due hearing, the court rendered a
decision finding Cabansag and his lawyers guilty of contempt and
sentencing them to pay a fine.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Cabansag’s letter created a sufficient danger to a fair
administration of justice.

RULING:
NO. The letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help
because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course
of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been
proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the
Supreme Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so
the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration
of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has “a dangerous tendency”
to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the
writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the
government for redress of a legitimate grievance.
Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping
the respondent from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov.
Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have been
superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he
however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only
conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the
Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in
the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been
approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked
to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he
"was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it
will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the
undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading
Page 27 of 30
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two
Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the
SC’s order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice
system in this country, especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free”
was publicized in leading newspapers.
Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing
why he should not be punished for contempt of court for making such
public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get
some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of
the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little
later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing
upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for
this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground
that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the
Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The
Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction,
invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it
is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than
the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt
charges."
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of
speech/expression.
Held:
There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new
doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3

(d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety
of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice."
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-
interest test," the Court held that the statements made by respondent
Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free
speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to
confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the
avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system
of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts,
which has some implications to the society.
Zaldivar vs Gonzales
FACTS:
Hon. Raul Gonzales was found guilty of contempt of court and gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the bar. He
contends that the court was wrong in applying the visible tendency
rule rather than the clear and present danger rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges.
ISSUE: W/N there is clear and present danger
HELD:
Page 28 of 30
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's
counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and
dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy
of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a
defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of
impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has
been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of
freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not,
however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by
courts.
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-
interest test," we believe that the statements here made by respondent
Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free
speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of
October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil"
which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not,
in the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt
violence or similar disruptions of public order.
A YER PRODUCTION VS. JUDGE CAPULONG, JUANPONCE
ENRILE, ET AL.,
FACTS:
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in
1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international
release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted.

Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage
as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright
and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an
American historian has developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or
other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. McElroy
acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the
movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected
motion picture.
On 23 February 1988, Enrile filed a Complaint with application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional
Trial Court, seeking to enjoin Ayer Production from producing the
movie "The Four Day Revolution". Enrile alleged that petitioners'
production of the mini-series without Enrile’s consent and over his
objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy.
Hence, the trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order
and set for hearing the application for preliminary injunction.
On 9 March 1988, Hal McElroy filed a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending that
the mini-series film would not involve the private life of Juan
Ponce Enrile or that of his family and that a preliminary injunction
would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Ayer
Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause
of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed.
Page 29 of 30
In an Order dated 16 March 1988, RTC issued a writ of Preliminary
Injunction against the petitioners. On 22 March 1988, petitioner Ayer
Productions came to the Supreme Court by a Petition for certiorari
with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order,
and a day later, or on 23 March 1988, Hal McElroy also filed separate
Petition for certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining Order or
Preliminary Injunction.
By a Resolution, the petitions were consolidated and Enrile was
required to file a consolidated Answer. Further, in the same
Resolution, the Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order partially
enjoining the implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of 16
March 1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and
allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those
portions of the projected mini-series which do not make any reference
to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based
on or respondent.
Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution,"
they are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression
protected under our Constitution. Private respondent, upon the other
hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production and
filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful
intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.
ISSUE:
Whether freedom of speech and expression was violated?
HELD:
Yes, this freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned
and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
 Page 30 of 30

In our community as in many other countries, media facilities are In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy
owned either by the government or the private sector but the private asserted by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked
sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by by petitioner. taking into account the interplay of those interests, we
being devoted in whole or in plait to revenue producing activities. hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and
Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement
available in our country and hence to exclude commercially owned entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to
and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected of be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are
speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private
such constitutional liberties in our country. concern."
The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present
was demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R. Cortes that danger test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court
our law, constitutional and statutory, does include a right of privacy. It believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The
is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope and content production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture
of this right in differing types of particular situations. The right of "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case,
privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of
is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has privacy."
long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure
and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitute of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of
privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and dissemination of
matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the
right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from
the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an
individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.
The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is such
a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom
of speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass
media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing of interest
test". The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation
or type of situation"