Republic of the Philippines On December 11, 1995, the accused filed a motion for reinvestigation

SUPREME COURT and prayed that in the meantime issuance of the warrant of arrest be
Manila held in abeyance. It appears, however, that the warrant had already
been issued on that day, although it could not be sewed on the accused
SECOND DIVISION (Rene C. Tabia, Ruben S. Fajardo, Per Jurgensen, Birger Jurgensen, Jose
M. Nieto, Edwin Marasigan, Franklin Roger Lee Sun, Ricardo J. Romulo
and Ramon Espejo, of the Maersk Tabacalera Crewing Agency) as they
were not at the Maersk office on 900 Romualdez St., Ermita, Manila.
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1385 January 8, 1998
Upon learning of the issuance of the warrant against them, the
(formerly OCA IPI No. 96-141-RTJ) accused filed on December 13, 1995 an Urgent Motion to Recall the
Warrant of Arrest. They alleged that the warrant of arrest had been
RAMON T. ARDOSA, complainant, prematurely issued because they had a pending opposition to the
vs. issuance of a warrant of arrest and motion for reinvestigation. The
JUDGE LOLITA O. GAL-LANG and CLERK OF COURT NENITA R. accused argued that some of them were not officers and members of
GRIJALDO, Branch 44, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents. the board of the Maersk Tabacalera yet when the act being
complained of was allegedly committed.1

Since the prosecutor was present and had been furnished copy of the
motion, the judge decided to hear the motion on the same day it was
MENDOZA, J.:
filed. Complainant also happened to be in court at that time to file a
motion for the issuance of a hold order and an entry of appearance as
This is a complaint against Judge Lolita O. Gal-Lang of the Regional
private prosecutor. He was persuaded by respondent clerk of court,
Trial Court at Manila, Branch 44, for grave abuse of authority, manifest
Nenita Grijaldo, to attend the hearing on the motion.
bias, gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering all unjust
judgment and grave misconduct and Atty. Nenita R. Grijaldo, branch
Complainant appeared in court but requested that the hearing be
clerk of court, for grave misconduct, gross ignorance, disrespect for
the Rules of Court, malfeasance, and misfeasance in public office. reset on another day because he had not been informed of the hearing
nor furnished copies of the motion beforehand. He cited the absence
of his counsel. But Judge Gal-lang proceeded with the hearing.2
Complainant was complainant in Criminal Case No. 95-146559 for
illegal recruitment, which was assigned to respondent Judge Gal-lang.
The prosecutor initially recommended bail for P8,000.00 for the On December 14, 1995, respondent judge granted the motion of the
accused and recalled the warrant of arrest, even as she ordered a
provisional release of the accused but later changed his
reinvestigation of the case.
recommendation to "no bail."
On December 20, 1995, complainant, as private prosecutor, moved for
a reconsideration of the court's ruling. The hearing on his motion was
held on December 22, 1995. An order purporting to have been made
on the same day was later issued, denying complainant's motion.
Complainant claims that he received a copy of the older only on
January 18, 1996 despite the fact that he had been asking the court for
a copy many times before. He accuses respondent judge of antedating
her order to make it appear it had been made shortly after the hearing.
Complainant also takes respondent judge to task for holding a hearing
on the motion of the accused for the recall of the warrant of arrest
despite the fact that it was served only on the day of the hearing.
Complainant claims that clerk of court Grijaldo, in collusion with the
counsel of the accused, inveigled him to attend the hearing.
In their comment, respondents allege that Judge Gal-lang heard the
motion to recall warrant of arrest on December 13, 1995 because of
its urgent character. She points out that anyway the public prosecutor
had been furnished copy of the motion and was present, as were the
counsel for the accused and the complainant himself. Respondents
further contend that complainant and his counsel filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order recalling the warrant of arrest without
the conformity of the public prosecutor, who had control of the
prosecution of cases, and that during the hearing of his motion
complainant made offensive gestures at the court for which his
counsel had to make an apology.
Respondent judge denies she antedated her order of December 22,
1995 denying complainant's motion for reconsideration. She claims
that she prepared the order in the afternoon of December 22, 1995
but it was released only on January 3, 1996 because December 22,
1995 was a Friday and, on the next business day, she went on vacation
leave. Copy of the order was sent to complainant and his counsel by
registered mail on January 3, 1996, presumably after respondent had
returned from her vacation. Respondents claim that when
complainant followed up the resolution of his motion by phone on
January 8, 1996, he was told that the order had been sent by mail.
Respondents deny that they were prejudiced against complainant.
They claim that anyway respondent judge has inhibited herself from
the consideration of the criminal case and there should be no further
question regarding this case. On June 19, 1997 they informed the
Court that the criminal case against the accused had been dismissed
by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49. The dismissal was
based on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice reversing and
setting aside the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila and
ordering the withdrawal of the information filed in court against the
accused.
The Office of the Court Administrator finds respondent judge guilty of
abuse of discretion in hearing the motion to recall the warrant of
arrest on the same day the motion was filed and recommends that
respondent be admonished to be more circumspect and warned that
repetition of the incident would be dealt with more severely. While
holding that the provision of Rule 15, §4 on the three-day notice is too
basic for respondent judge not to know, the OCA nonetheless finds
respondent judge's liability somewhat mitigated by the fact that
notice of the motion was at least given to complainant. Thus, Deputy
Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez states in his memorandum:
Complainant was never deprived of the fundamental rule of due
process which requires that a person be accorded notice and an
opportunity to be heard. (Rubenecia v. CSC, 244 SCRA 640) He
was properly represented by counsels in the persons of
Prosecutors Erlinda Alvaro and Nestor Gonzales. Notice was also
served to the Office of the Prosecutor and both parties were
allowed to argue during the hearing of the motions dated
December 13, 1995. This will mitigate respondent's actuation.
With respect to respondent clerk of court, the OCA finds no evidence
to support the charge against her.
First. Complainant charges that respondent judge antedated her order
denying reconsideration of her previous order recalling the warrant
of arrest by making it appear that it was made on December 22, 1995
when the fact was that in the first week of January 1996, when
complainant called up the court to inquire about the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration, he was told by respondent judge "to just
wait." As already stated, respondent judge denies the allegation. She
claims that her order was actually prepared on December 22, 1995
but it was mailed to complainant only on January 3, 1996 because she
had gone on leave the week after December 22, 1995.
If the order of December 22, 1995 was really made on that day, it is
hard to see why a copy could not have been sent to complainant
earlier. The service of orders and other court processes after all is the
ministerial function of the clerk of court. The fact that the judge had
to go on leave was not a reason for court employees to wait for her
return. It would therefore appear that the order was prepared only on
January 3, 1996 and not on December 22, 1995 as it purports to have
been made. Be that as it may, we find no delay in tile resolution of
complainant's motion. Between December 22, 1995 (date of hearing)
and January 3, 1996 (date of mailing of the order) was just 12 days.
Second. We agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that
respondent judge committed an abuse of discretion in hearing the
motion of the accused on the same day the motion was filed. Rule 15,
§4 of the former Rules of Court states:
Notice. — Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all
parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing
thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits
and other papers accompanying it. The court, however, for good
cause may hear a motion on shorter notice, specially on matters
which the court may dispose of on its own.
Thus, although a motion may be heard on short notice (i.e., less than
three days after it is filed) it must be for "good cause" shown. In this
case, respondent judge defends her decision to hear the motion of the
accused for the recall of the warrant of arrest on the same day it was
filed on the ground that anyway the public prosecutor was present.
This is not a good reason for hearing the motion on short notice. Of
course the opposing party must be served a copy of the motion. But
the question is whether he was given sufficient time to prepare for the
hearing. That the public prosecutor was present was a mere
happenstance. In fact he asked for fifteen (15) days to comment on the
motion to recall the order of arrest against the accused because
obviously he was unprepared.
Indeed the failure to observe the three-day notice rule is not excused
by the fact that parties happen to be present. The only excuse for
dispensing with it is if the matter to be heard is urgent. In this case a
hearing on the previous motion of the accused for reinvestigation and
their opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest was set the next
day, December 14, 1995. There is no reason why the matter could not
just wait for that hearing during which respondent could have also
heard the motion to recall the warrant of arrest. After all, the grounds
for the two motions were substantially the same. That the accused
might have appeared to respondent judge to be innocent of the
charges, as indeed the case against them was subsequently dismissed,
was no reason for respondent judge to resort to procedural shortcuts.
Third. Respondent judge contends that complainant's motion for
reconsideration of the order of December 13, 1995 recalling the
warrant of arrest did not have the conformity of the public prosecutor.
This is another matter, however. The question here is whether
respondent judge delayed the dispositions of complainant's motion
for reconsideration.
Moreover, complainant, through the private prosecutor, had been
allowed to intervene. While his intention was subject to the
supervision of the public prosecutor, it cannot be said that opposition
to the recall of the warrant of arrest was something the public
prosecutor did not like. The fact is that he asked for time to oppose or
at least comment on the motion to recall the warrant of arrest.

Fourth. As already stated, the OCA finds no evidence to hold

respondent clerk of court administratively liable. Indeed, the only act
she is accused of is that of convincing complainant to attend the
hearing of December 13, 1995. Complainant was not forced to attend
the hearing by respondent clerk of court. If he appeared in court on
December 13, 1995 it was because he had decided to. His decision was
voluntary.

Considering the foregoing, as recommended by the Office of the Court

Administrator, the Court finds respondent judge GUILTY of
misconduct and hereby REPRIMANDS her, with warning that
repetition of the same conduct will be dealt with more severely in the
future. The complaint against respondent clerk of court is dismissed
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 228.

2 TSN or Dec. 13, 1995; id., pp. 73-104.