SC Study Guide en FINAL

STUDY GUIDE
Security Council
Is remilitarisation inevitable in twenty-first century
Europe?
Ongoing tensions in the South China Sea
President
Oliver Hegglin
oliver.hegglin@gimun.org
Vice President Vice President
Jessica Nuske Hussein Abul-Enein
jessica.nuske@gimun.org hussein.abulenein@gimun.org
GIMUN 2017 Security Council
2
WORDS OF WELCOME
Dear delegates of the GIMUN 2017 Annual Conference Security Council,
As your President and chair I am very pleased to welcome you to 18th GIMUN Annual Conference. Along
with my co-chairs we will be sure to provide you with an immersive and memorable experience.
I am a second year student at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva
and served as the President of the Human Rights Council at last year’s Annual Conference. The Security
Council now provides me with an opportunity to share my diplomatic and military knowledge and
experience with you.
The two topics we have chosen, Europe’s militarization in the 21st century and Tensions in the South China
Sea, are shaping the geopolitics of those two regions. While “stable but tense” has become the norm, there
will be developments that prove to have consequences. Both topics will be discussed in the conference and
while we may not solve the world’s problems we will walk away with a better understanding of why the
world works the way it does.
This Study Guide will serve as an introduction into the topics and provide you with further references for
study. Please do not hesitate to contact Jessica, Hussein or myself with further questions or concerns. I am
very excited to meet you all in person and am looking forward to our week together.
Kind regards,
Oliver
3
Dear honourable delegates of the Security Council at GIMUN 2017,
My name is Jessica, I am 24 years old and I study Political Science at the University of Bremen in Germany.
In my studies, I focus on sustainable development and deliberative democracy. In addition to my studies I
participate in international conferences on a regular basis, especially Model United Nations. So far, I have
attended 17 MUNs but this will be my first participation at GIMUN! Another “first” is that I will be chairing
the Security Council for the first time. Yet as delegate I spend most of my time debating as one of the five
permanent members (mostly as Russia) in the SC. I really got addicted to this Council, its format and the
debates!
This year’s topics focus on two different conflict issues, both shaped by underlying historical conflicts, on
the edge of escalation and relating to geopolitical issues and the questions of regional supremacy. They do
not occur on the everyday news on a regular basis but the magnitude of both problems calls for a focused
approach and considered, concerted actions that had not, until now, been adequately formulated and
compiled in any of UNSC’s earlier resolutions.
That is why I am extremely delighted to be Vice-President to this year’s UNSC and I am very much looking
forwards to these topics being discussed by talented MUNers! I expect passionate debates and discussions
as well as innovative and constructive ideas to tackle the problems in a sustainable and comprehensive way
and a decent resolution at the end of the day.
All the best and see you soon,
Jessica
Dear Security Council Members,
We are glad that you are interested in security politics and that you are committed to playing a role in
debating two very pressing issues here in Geneva. The SC today, allows me to share my passion towards
and experience in security studies with every single one of you.
By attending the Security Council, you will learn and practice how to debate very complex matters and, in
the end, find a consensus from different viewpoints. It will sharpen your negotiation skills and encourage
one’s own ability to listen, understand each other and work together in the spirit of progress.
While being a Security Council Veteran, it is my first time chairing this committee. I expect a positive,
coherent and constructive debate from the delegates this year, especially taking into consideration the
complexity and volatility of both the topics that Oliver, Jessica and myself picked for you.
GIMUN is not just a conference. It is rather a grand experience that the co-chairs and I will aim to make it
unforgettable, hence I encourage everyone to foster their innovative capacities and think big.
Both topics will be discussed so get ready and we will see you soon.
4
Best Regards,
Hussein
CONTENTS
1. The Security Council 6

1.1 About the Security Council 6
1.1.1 Composition and voting 6
1.2 Mandate and functions 6
1.3 Recent history 8
2. Is remilitarisation inevitable in twenty-first century Europe? 9
2.1 Historical background (and past resolutions) 9
2.1.1 Definition of remilitarization 11
2.2 Europe’s remilitarisation and the Sustainable Development Goals 12
2.3 Aggression 13
2.3.1 Definition of aggression 13
2.3.2 Legality of aggression 13
2.3.3 Troop movements, military exercises, new equipment, and aggression 14
2.3.4 Disaster stemming from aggression 15
2.4 Confidence building, strategic partnerships and a multi-stakeholder approach 15
2.4.1 Understanding the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach 15
2.4.2 Current regime (NATO-Russia Council) 15
2.4.3 Ways forward towards demilitarisation through capacity building, strategic
partnerships and confidence 16
2.6 Bloc positions 17
2.6.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 17
2.6.2 European Union 17
3. Ongoing tensions in the South China Sea 18
3.1 Historical background (and past resolutions) 18
3.1.1. The dispute over the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands 18
3.1.2. Paracel and Spratly Islands 19
3.2 Tensions in the South China Sea and women and the Sustainable Development Goals 20
3.3 Legal issues 21
3.4 Most recent developments 22
3.4.1. The Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands 22
3.4.2. Paracel and Spratly Islands 23
3.4.3. China against the Philippines before the permanent court of Arbitration 25
3.5 Institutions involved 26
3.5.1. Association of Southeast Asian Nations 26
3.5.2. European Union 27
3.5.3. Asia Europe Meeting 28
4. Suggested reading 28
5. Bibliography 30
6. Countries present 33
5
1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1.1 ABOUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The United Nations Security Council is tasked with maintaining international peace and security. It
does so by declaring what constitutes a threat to this global stability and has the capacity to call
upon United Nations member states to take steps to resolve potential conflicts, either emerging or
instigated through acts of aggression, ranging from the enforcement of sanctions to the
authorization of force.1 The Council itself can impose sanctions, both diplomatic and economic,
deploy peacekeeping forces, and, if need be, military forces as well. It is the only body within the
United Nations system capable of imposing legally binding resolutions which all member states
must follow.
1.1.1 COMPOSITION AND VOTING
The Council is comprised of 15 members, five of which are permanent and the other ten are
elected by the General Assembly (GA) on a bi-annual basis with five per year. The non-permanent
seats are also distributed based on geopolitical regions. Each state has one vote on the council
with the permanent five also holding a veto. The five permanent members, commonly referred to
as the P5, are the People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.2 In order
for a procedural matter to pass nine votes in favor are required while for all other matters nine
votes, including those of the P5, are required.3
The non-permanent member states serving through the year 2017 are Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, and Uruguay.4 As such, these will be the states
that will be assigned to participating delegates.
1.2 MANDATE AND FUNCTIONS

Chapter III of the United Nations Charter establishes the Security Council.5 Chapter V lays out its
functions and powers. The Security Council, as per Article 24 of Chapter V, has the mandate of the
“maintenance of international peace and security.”6 Crucially however, states join the United
Nations with the understanding that this responsibility, and powers entailed with this, are given to
1
Security Council, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sc/
2
Ibid, members, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/
3
Article 27, Chapter 5 “The Security Coucil.”, UN Charter, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/
4
Ibid.
5
United Nations Charter, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/
6
Article 24, Charter
6
the body by the remaining member states while also agreeing to let the Council act on their
behalf.
Specific powers are laid out in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) outlines the first line in dealing with emerging threats
to international security. Article 33 gives the Security Council the responsibility to call on states to
resolve disputes peacefully but may, under Article 34, “investigate any dispute, or any situation
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.” 7 Article 36 permits the Council
to recommend procedures or methods in line with the parties’ considerations. 8
Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression) begins by stating in Article 39 that it is the Security Council who shall “determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42,
to maintain or restore international peace and security.”9 Article 41 follows by saying the Council
may choose which non-military measures to use while Article 42 permits the use of military force
if the measures listed under Article 41 prove to have been ineffective.
Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) calls on member states to use existing regional
arrangements to solve disputes and to only resort to the powers of the Security Council once
these options have been exhausted.10 However actions taken by regional arrangements must still
have prior authorization by the Security Council to act.
Chapter XII (International Trusteeship System) exists to enhance the prospects of international
peace and security by placing territories under the administration of the United Nations by means
of individual agreements.11
In summary, the Functions and Powers of the Security Council, as per the United Nations charter,
are:12
● to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and
purposes of the United Nations;
● to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
● to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
● to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
7
Ibid, Article 34.
8
Ibid, Chapter 6.
9
Ibid, Article 39.
10
Ibid, Chapter VIII.
11
Ibid, Chapter XII.
12
“Functions and Powers,” United Nations: Security Council, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml
7
● to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend
what action should be taken;
● to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use
of force to prevent or stop aggression;
● to take military action against an aggressor;
● to recommend the admission of new Members;
● to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in "strategic areas";
● to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and,
together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.
1.3 RECENT HISTORY

In 2016 the Security Council has been heavily preoccupied with the ongoing situation in Syria.
Most recently, Resolution 2314 noted allegations of the use of chemical weapons and strongly
condemned their use, since it is a severe violation of international law.13
A second natural disaster that hit Haiti in 2016 reasserted the commitment of the Security Council,
through resolution 2313, towards the island-nation and took steps towards increasing the capacity
of MINUSTAH, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.14
With resolution 2312, the Security Council granted authority towards United Nations member
states to intercept and inspect vessels bound for Syria which are suspected to be used for the
smuggling of people or weapons.15
Resolution 2311 formally recommended the appointment of Mr. Antonio Guterres to the Position
of United Nations Secretary General.16
By adopting Resolution 2310, on the twentieth anniversary of the enactment of the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Security Council called for an early entry into force of
the document, saying it would help enhance international peace and security.17
13
Security Council Resolution 2314 (2016),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2314(2016)
14
15
16
17
8
2. IS REMILITARISATION INEVITABLE IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

EUROPE?
2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (AND PAST RESOLUTIONS)
Ever since the end of the cold war and the collapse of the former Soviet Union (USSR), the Russian
Federation and the west, represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have
been in a continuous state of confrontation. With both sides trying to establish dominance and
superiority, contemporary history of the two counterparts has been characterized by a multitude
of booms and slumps.
The Washington Treaty established the NATO in in 1949. While the official organization started
with 12 members, today NATO has 28 member states located in North America, Europe and
Eurasia.
Within the cycle of establishing dominance NATO’s look east expansionist policy has irritated
Moscow; it remains the predominant grievance Russia has against the west. On the other hand,
Russian military buildup and activities towards former soviet states has left NATO commanders
questioning the Russian Federation’s commitment to peace and has threatened to engulf the
world with further conflict on a global scale.
In 2014 the Russian Federation, through military action, annexed Crimea, continuing its disregard
for international norms and practices. As a consequence, the federation saw massive sanctions
from the European Union (EU), the United States of America, Canada and other allies.18 A non-
binding General Assembly Resolution condemning the actions in Eastern Ukraine was also
adopted.19
18
Hunter, Edward. "Sanctions after Crimea: Have They Worked?" NATO Review Magazine. NATO, n.d. 30 Oct. 2016.
19
Published. "UN Resolution A/RES/68/262 Territorial Integrity of Ukraine." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on
Foreign Relations, 27 Mar. 2014. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
9
Graphic: NATO-Russia forces (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3876672/)
In the most recent developments, member states of the Washington Treaty are increasing their
military presence near their borders with Russia. Accordingly, the Russian Federation has
escalated its military operations as it considers these actions and NATO missile defense systems as
a substantial threat to Russian territorial integrity. While the former is increasing military spending
specifically in Baltic states, the latter is moving nuclear capable Iskander missiles to the Kaliningrad
Oblast and introducing a quantum leap in battle tank production with the commissioning of the T-
14 Armata.20
Both EU/NATO and Russia claim to be responding to each other’s aggression and external threats.
We can only conclude that Europe is re-arming itself and cannot help but wonder if the inevitable
remilitarization of the continent in the 21st century is leading up to a new cold war or even a
catastrophic full scale nuclear confrontation.21
20
Majumdar, Dave, John Allen Gay, J. Michael Cole, and Amitai Etzioni. "The Game Changing Feature in Russia's T-14
Armata That Might Make NATO Tanks Obsolete." The National Interest. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
21
Gaouette, Nicole, and Elise Labott. "US and Russia Now in Unpredictable Confrontation." CNN. Cable News
Network, 18 Oct. 2016. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
10
Graphic: Foreign troop deployments in Europe (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3876672/)
Basing itself on the fact that one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations is to maintain
international peace and security, the Security Council should take all measures, to the best of its
ability, in order to ensure the removal of all threats to current world peace and promote the
utmost importance of territorial integrity.
2.1.1 DEFINITION OF REMILITARIZATION
Remilitarization is historically associated with that of the Rhineland in the late 1920s and more
recently with Japan in the late 2010s. In both cases this concept implies a renewed growth of
military strength and a state of readiness for potential conflict. In Rhineland this growth took place
after the First World War, in anticipation of the Second World War.22 In Japan this concept is more
contested, yet in recent years Japan has spent an impressive amount of money on growing its
military capabilities.23
22
Schuker, Stephen A. “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936.” Available at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/286380?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
23
Hagstrom, Linus. “Remilitarization,” Really? Assessing Change in Japanese Foreign Security Policy. Available at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14799850903178980
11
Arguably, the end of the Cold War marks the point at which Europe began to de-militarize. Yet in
recent years, in cases similar to the two examples of Russia and Japan, countries across the
continent are increasing their budgets, sizes of armed forces, and operational readiness. The only
question is what the intended purpose of remilitarization is and whether or not we can apply
lessons learned from history.
2.2 EUROPE’S REMILITARISATION AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The Sustainable Development Goals, otherwise known as the Global Goals, are a universal call to
action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity. 24
The SDGs were ratified in January 2016 and build on the Millennium Development Goals, while
including new expanded areas.
First of all, Goal 9 stipulates the need to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and
sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. Goal 9 includes a set of sub points that
encourage governments to build long lasting infrastructure nationally and transnationally.
While nations might be already within the process of doing so, the re-militarization of Europe and
the risk associated with it might lead to negative repercussions, including the destruction of
infrastructure.
Secondly, Goal 10 calls for reducing inequality within and among countries. With increased
military spending and shift of budget towards weaponry, the funds available for governments to
invest on educational campaigns and job creation will, by extension, decrease. This will make it
more difficult to achieve goal 10 by 2030 and reduce inequality within and among countries; war
only makes the world unjust.
Moreover, Goal 11 recommends making cities and human settlements safe. However, with the
current proliferation of nuclear weaponry across Europe, a disaster that would destroy cities
cannot be ruled out as impossible.
On the other hand, Goal 17 relates to the revitalization of global partnerships and multi-
stakeholder approaches. This is goal that can be applied within the current confrontation. If the
stakeholders concerned agreed to revitalize partnerships and seek new ones, escalation will be
avoided and simultaneously the SDGs attainment shall be possible.
24
‘Sustainable Development Goals.’ UNDP. 2016 http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-
development-goals.html
12
2.3 AGGRESSION
2.3.1 DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION
Resolution 3314 adopted at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly provided a clear-cut
definition of the term aggression and highlights certain activities that prevail as acts of aggression.
Although the resolution was adopted without a vote, it contained a preamble clause calling the
attention of the Security Council to the definition set in the operative clauses of the resolution.
The definition found in Article 1 is as follows:
“[A]ggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,

territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition…” 25
2.3.2 LEGALITY OF AGGRESSION
The Legality of Aggression is set out in the Charter of the United Nations. As such, Article 1(1)
states that the purpose of the UN is to take effective collective measures of prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression.26 Article 2(4)
stipulates that members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state.27
In principle, aggression is not permitted under the legal regime of the UN charter. The Security
Council under Articles 39 to 42 of the Charter is mandated to determine, if an act constitutes an
act of aggression or not. By extension the Council is authorized to take all necessary measures to
halt the aggression or use of force as a means of preserving world peace and stability.
The only exception where the use of force or aggression is permitted is set under Article 51 of the
Charter in allowing members the inherent right to self-defense.28
25
Assembly, United Nations General. "A/RES/29/3314 - Definition of Aggression - UN Documents: Gathering a Body of
Global Agreements."A/RES/29/3314 - Definition of Aggression - UN Documents: Gathering a Body of Global
Agreements. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Oct. 2016. http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3314.htm
26
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html
27
Ibid.
28
ibid.
13
2.3.3 TROOP MOVEMENTS, MILITARY EXERCISES, NEW EQUIPMENT, AND AGGRESSION
The RAND Corporation has recently published a report

claiming that the Russian Federation can overrun Baltic
States in 36 hours if it wanted to.2930 Currently, the
Russian Federation is displaying signs of willingness to
take over or undermine its former Eastern European
Satellite states (Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Lithuania) in a
manner consistent with that established in the
annexation of Crimea. Troops have been mobilized,
moving across the Federation’s borders with the states in
question and the Russian air force continues to be
belligerent in neutral airspace. Nuclear-capable missiles
have also been deployed in Kaliningrad.
As a result, the west has responded with the biggest

show of force since the Cold War. Plans to send more
troops to NATO’s 40’000-strong rapid reaction force is
underway, British forces are being stationed and a 5000-
strong spearhead force that is able to deploy in as little
as 48 hours has been put on alert.31
Additionally, in the latest NATO summit at Warsaw, Poland and other member states of NATO
issued a statement re-emphasizing its collective security act and its commitment to maintaining
and protecting the territorial integrity of its members.
All this leaves us wondering whether or not these acts should be considered acts of aggression, or
whether there is a possibility of this confrontation escalating into a full scale hybrid war.32
29
Withnall, Adam. "Russia Could Overrun Baltic States in 36 Hours If It Wanted To, Nato Warned." The Independent.
Independent Digital News and Media, n.d. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nato-russia-baltic-states-overrun-in-hours-rand-corporation-
report-a7384381.html?cmpid=facebook-post>.
30
Mcleary, Paul. “SitRep: Pentagon Walks Back Raqqa Talk; Estonia Braces for Russian Attack; New Chinese Stealth
Fighter.” 1 November, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/01/situation-report-pentagon-walks-back-raqqa-talk-
estonia-braces-for-russian-attack-new-chinese-stealth-fighter-iraqi-troops-in-mosul-and-lots-more/
31
Larisa Brown and John Stevens.0000"Nato Squares up to Putin: As Russia Beefs up Its Military Might on Europe's
Border, West Responds with Biggest Show of Force since the Cold War." Mail Online. Associated Newspapers, 27 Oct.
2016. Web. 31 Oct. 2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3876672/Nato-squares-Putin-Russia-beefs-
military-Europe-s-border-West-responds-biggest-force-Cold-War.html>
32
A Hybrid War is considered to be one that is non-conventional in the traditional sense. Rather, a war with multiple
new dimensions including the fourth realm of warfare namely, Cyber Warfare.
14
2.3.4 DISASTER STEMMING FROM AGGRESSION
The current escalations in the presence of military forces by both the Russian Federation and their
counterpart NATO/EU/American forces can spillover at any time, bringing the world to chaos once
more.
Considering that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force and
that the current situation might have a possible significant threat to world peace and all its
catastrophic consequences, the Security Council is obliged - by all means possible and according to
the articles and principles of the charter - to prevent this.
2.4 CONFIDENCE BUILDING, STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER

APPROACH
2.4.1 UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACH
A multi-stakeholder approach is one that is based on the identification of all the risk takers within
a certain circumstance, bringing them together for discussions and providing a platform for these
stakeholders to carefully negotiate and analyse of their activity, with the intention of mitigating
the consequences of any actions.
Within the current topic of discussion, the stakeholders are considered to be: The Russian
Federation, NATO states, past USSR satellite states, the European Union and the international
community represented in intergovernmental organizations; namely, the United Nations, The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the NATO-Russia Council.
A multi stakeholder approach allows for the collective pooling of ideas, hence facilitating the most
effective and innovative solution to any issue.
2.4.2 CURRENT REGIME (NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL)
The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established at the NATO-Russia Summit in Rome on 28 May
2002 by the Declaration on “NATO-Russia Relations: a New Quality”.33 The Rome Declaration
builds on the goals and principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security, which remains the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations. The NRC
replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), a forum for consultation and cooperation created by
the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.34
33
Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 22 November 2002,
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p021122e.htm
34
‘Nato-Russia Council’ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 15 Apr 2016.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm
15
The purpose of the NRC has been to serve as the principal structure and venue for improving the
relationship between NATO and Russia. It is a clear cut example of a multi-stakeholder approach,
as within the NRC, Nato members and Russia meet as equals to cooperate and build a consensus.35
While NATO has suspended all practical cooperation with the Russian Federation following the
‘illegal’ violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity, the alliance agreed to keep channels of
communication open in the NRC.
2.4.3 WAYS FORWARD TOWARDS DEMILITARIZATION THROUGH CAPACITY BUILDING, STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND
CONFIDENCE
For a better future and in order to eliminate the threats associated with escalation, there is a need
for new, innovative solutions. Fulfilling Goal 17 of the SDGs - a multi-stakeholder initiative - is a
prime example of how the international community and the Security Council can move forward
towards the de-militarization of Europe.
A multi-stakeholder approach is one that takes into account all considerations, whether they are
diplomatic, military or financial, of the actors. If, for example, the Security Council brokers a
platform that includes all the entities implicated in the current standoff it would be an example of
the way in which a multi-stakeholder approach can be adopted.
Within a multi-stakeholder setting, capacity building measures can be utilized as a method of

establishing confidence and trust between the stakeholders previously mentioned. This would be
followed by various strategic partnerships based on an inclusive modus operandi by which states
can show their commitment towards a common goal or objective, such as demilitarization.
Previously, a myriad of international organizations engaged its membership in similar types of

partnerships which proved to be extremely fruitful.
While this is a peaceful path towards demilitarization and one that has its foundations in public
diplomacy and empowers the current available institutions, it can be rather difficult to bring
entities with a history of animosity to settle their disagreements.
The Security Council, under articles 39 to 42 of the UN Charter, remains the legitimate body for
administering peace and stability. If all else fails, member states should not hesitate to take any
necessary action to maintain the current peaceful world order.
35
The Forum is based on 28 members + instead of the original NATO+1 of the PJC.
16
2.6 BLOC POSITIONS

2.6.1 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, NATO
NATO was created to counter the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. However, with the fall of the
Soviet Union the alliance turned its eyes towards the de-facto successor Russia. For the first time
since the Cold War, animosity between some nations has become increasingly evident. This is
especially the case in Eastern European countries wary of aggression by Russia, in light of events in
Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
NATO member states are required to spend 2 two percent of their GDP on defence, of which only
five countries achieved this objective in 2016.36 However, there is a clear link between increased
troop deployment to NATO’s eastern border and a steady increase in the spending over the past
few years. While NATO claims this to be in response to the perceived Russian aggression, Russia
claims NATO is following a policy of encirclement and a mentality reminiscent of the Cold War era,
which has been denied by NATO.37 NATO’s position is that neither its policies or actions are a
threat to Russia.
2.6.2 EUROPEAN UNION
While there is a lot of overlap in the membership of NATO and the EU, not all NATO states are in
the EU and vice-versa. However where NATO acts more on security issues, the EU takes a more
political approach, not least with sanctions since events in Crimea that have affected the Russian
economy.38 Broader events in Ukraine and Georgia have also seen an increase in the number of
states in Eastern Europe wanting to join the EU.39
Despite these measures, which have hampered cooperation to some extent, the EU and Russia
continue to engage on a number of economic, environmental, educational, and other policies. 40
The idea of a “European Army” however has re-emerged. Rather than being in an alliance such as
NATO, it would serve as a force under the EU flag. This is in response to Russia, as well as other
modern security threats, and to the exit of Great Britain from the European Union.41 Some believe
36
“Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009-2016).” 4. July 2016.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_132934.htm
37
“NATO-Russia relations: the facts.” 7. November 2016.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm?#cl201
38
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/russia-and-security-of-europe-pub-63990
39
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/15/ukraine-will-not-join-eu-dutch-are-promised-in-effort-to-save-
tr eaty
40
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/720/russian-federation-and-european-union-eu_en
41
http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/734711/EU-army-agreed-strasbourg-defence-Britain-pays-bill-blame-
Brexit- article-50-NATO-SHAPE
17
that the EU is too reliant on NATO, yet the creation of an EU army may even cause the split-up of
NATO.
3. ONGOING TENSIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (AND PAST RESOLUTIONS)
The South China Sea (SCS) is one of the main conflict areas in East Asian geopolitics. Six nations -
China (and Taiwan), Japan, Viet Nam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei - are currently involved
in numerous territorial disputes, mostly with China as one main claimant42.
The South China Sea conflict can be divided into two separate issues; firstly, the territorial dispute
over the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands, Senkaku (Japanese name) or Diaoyu (Chinese name) which is a
cluster of islands and reefs in the East China Sea. The other dispute is over the Spratly Islands and
the Paracel Islands. The islands are coral reefs and small islands scattered in the South China Sea,
with different parts of the islands being claimed by several countries, namely the Philippines, Viet
Nam, and China. The area around the Spratly and Paracel Islands is of strategic importance, since it
is believed to contain oil and gas reserves. Additionally, the area is one of the busiest areas for
commercial shipping and the habitat for a significant amount of fish43 .
3.1.1. THE DISPUTE OVER THE SENKAKU-DIAOYU ISLANDS
The Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands remained

uninhabited and officially unclaimed until
1895 when Japan incorporated them into
the Okinawa Island Province and established
a Japanese factory on the largest island.
After China lost the First Sino-Japanese War
in 1895, both parties signed the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, under which China was to
cede the Island of Taiwan and all islands
belonging to it to Japan. After the Second
World War, these islands and several others
were occupied by the Allied Powers, but
remained formally under Japanese
sovereignty until 1951. In 1949 Taiwan
officially became the Republic of China
(ROC) and in 1951 the United States began to exercise control over several other islands, including
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In 1971, through the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, numerous islands
were recognized as part of the Okinawa territory and the sovereignty was returned to Japan.
42
Kuok, Lynn (2014): Overcoming the Impasse in the South China Sea – Jointly Defining EEZ Claims. In: Center For East
Asia Studies, 2014 (4).
43
Ibid.
18
Today both China and Taiwan claim sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and China
disputes the 1971 transfer, arguing that the islands were not part of that treaty and therefore
belonged to China44. This dispute results from the fact that, later in 1971, the U.S. Senate
explained that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were not part of that contract. Yet, over time, the U.S.
reconsidered that statement and is now arguing that the islands did fall under the treaty. Over
time, the conflict has always been marked by tension and diplomatic confrontations, sometimes
even with military involvement. In 2012, Japan bought parts of the Senkaku-Diaoyu from a private
Japanese owner, which triggered protests and rebellions on both sides45.
3.1.2. PARACEL AND SPRATLY ISLANDS
In 1939, Japan established military bases on both the Paracel and Spratly Islands; during the
Second World War, France (on behalf of its then-colony Viet Nam) and Japan coexisted on both
islands. At the Peace Conference in San Francisco in 1951, Japan formally abandoned its claim to
all islands in the SCS. The Spratly Islands, due to their suspected low economic value, were left
under the supervision of the Commonwealth. In 1956, the Philippines, dissatisfied with the
control of the islands by other nations, occupied a number of them and established a new micro
nation called Freedomland in the Spratly Islands. During the mid-1950s, British and US oil
companies started to express their own interest in the area due to potential oil fields.
In 1969 the International Court of Justice adjudicated the North Sea Continental Shelf case by
enunciating the natural prolongation principle which resulted in the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea being convened in 1973 (UNCLOS III, 1973-82). Motivated by the
prospect of oil, the Philippines officially claimed the Spratly islands in 1971, whilst the unified
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam took over the South Vietnamese claims over the Paracel islands in
1975. Over time, the Spratly islands were claimed by Viet Nam from the west, the Philippines from
the east and Malaysia from the south.
The first military confrontations occurred when China occupied the Vietnamese part of the Paracel
Islands in 1974, which it has been holding ever since. In response to this loss, Viet Nam moved
their troops onto the Spratly islands. After the Vietnamese war, Viet Nam became dependent on
the Soviet Union which led to the SCS playing an important role in the Soviet-American naval-
rivalry. With Gorbachev withdrawing from costly Soviet deployments and Viet Nam lacking a
powerful ally, the PRC used Viet Nam’s isolation and occupied the Spratly Islands in 1988,
triggering a battle between Chinese and Vietnamese ships, during which three Vietnamese ships
were sunk and 70 troops killed.
44 th
Ikeda, Tadashi (2013): Getting the Senkaku History Right. In: The Diplomat on the 26 November 2013:
http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/getting-senkaku-history-right/1/.
45
Müser, Oliver/ Pohl, Anna Yumi/ Godehardt, Nadine (2012): Inselstreit zwischen Japan und China gefährdet die
regionale Stabilität in Ostasien. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2012 (12).
19
In 1989, Viet Nam withdrew its troops
from Cambodia and subsequently a more
harmonious relationship amongst the SCS
nations. During the 1990s, frequent
formal and informal talks were initiated to
reach a resolution46. At the start of the
21th century, the USA increased its
involvement in the dispute, which is
evident through the collision of U.S. navy
intelligence aircraft and Chinese fighter
jets midair killing one Chinese pilot and
resulting in the detainment of the U.S.
crew in 2001. In 2009, several
confrontations occurred between Chinese
fisheries vessels and a US navy vessel. In
addition, a People’s Liberation Army
(PLA)’s navy submarine almost collided
with an US destroyer causing damage on
the ship’s sonar equipment. Viet Nam, Malaysia and Brunei made the claim that the continental
shelf attached to their land should be extended in order to widen their economic rights further
into the SCS. In August 2013 Malaysia proclaimed it might cooperate with China in order to
support Chinese claims.47
3.2 TENSIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND WOMEN AND THE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Goal 9 stipulates the need to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable
industrialization and promote innovation. Goal 9 includes a set of additional points encouraging
governments to build long lasting infrastructure nationally and transnationally.
The ongoing tensions in the South China Sea may lead to destruction of infrastructure and threats
to sustainable industrialization. These tensions have their origins in the creation of artificial islands
and also contribute to legal contention between nations. It is doubtful that this is the kind of
resilient infrastructure intended by the creators of goal 9.
Goal 10 calls for reducing inequality within and among countries. With increased military spending
the finances available for governments to invest on educational campaigns and job creation will
decrease, hence making it more difficult to achieve goal 10 by 2030 and reduce inequality within
and among countries; war only increases injustice in the world.
46
Kivimäki, Timo (2002): War or Peace in the South China Sea? Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 6-21
47
The Financial Times (2016): Timeline: South China Sea dispute. https://www.ft.com/content/aa32a224-480e-11e6-
8d68-72e9211e86ab
20
Goal 11 recommends ensuring the safety of cities and human settlements. However, with the
current tensions around the region of the South China Sea, it is possible that inhabited zones
would be damaged if war were to break out. Tension between nations reduces the possibility of
achieving goal 11.
Goal 17 relates to the revitalization of global partnerships and multi-stakeholder approaches,

which is pertinent given the current level of conflict. If the stakeholders agreed to revitalize
partnerships and seek new ones, an escalation in tension could be avoided.
3.3 LEGAL ISSUES

In order to effectively discuss the following matters, it is important to fully understand sovereign
maritime territories and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) began to implement EEZs and received support from nations in the
vicinity of the SCS. Despite objections from the USA, the Convention was signed in 1982, entered
in to force in November 1994 and has been ratified by all states with claims in the SCS48.
In accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the sovereign maritime territory
extends 12 nautical miles (nm) from the nation’s coast, and grants full jurisdiction to the nation in
question. Put briefly, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends 200 nm from the coast but only
allows exploitation of marine resources, such as fishing or energy production, and is classed as
international waters49.
Graphic: Exclusive Economic Zones (securefisheries.org)
48
Kivimäki, Timo (2002): War or Peace in the South China Sea? Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 14.
49
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982): Part V.
21
Islands, defined as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high tide’’50, are entitled to have an EEZ, yet rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life on their own do not have an EEZ51. Within a nation’s EEZ, the respected state can
establish artificial islands and installations. Since the artificial islands built by China are located in
disputed waters, the question whether these artificial islands are illegal should also be examined,
as it may be argued by some that the islands were not built within China’s EEZ.
Graphic: What makes an island? (Financial Times 2016)
3.4 MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

3.4.1. THE SENKAKU-DIAOYU ISLANDS
On the 23th November 2013, China took the controversial step of establishing an Air Defence
Identification Zone (ADIZ), encompassing the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands. An ADIZ requires aircrafts
entering the zone to contact the national authority of the sovereign territory they intend to cross
to submit flight plans. This airspace, demarcated outside the territorial airspace, allows a country
to identify and monitor aircraft. It sets aside time for early warnings and helps to defend the
country's airspace. The Chinese ADIZ extends over the East China Sea and has a significant overlap
with the Japanese ADIZ declared in 1969, with both zones covering the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands52.
50
Ibid. Article 120
51
Ibid. Article 121
52
Lee, Jeamin (2014): China’s Declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone in East China Sea: Implications for
Public International Law. In: American Society of International Law, 18 (17).
22
Graphic: East Asia’s Overlapping Air Defence Identification Zones (stratfor.com 2013)
The Chinese government explains the establishment of an ADIZ as a measure to guard against
‘potential air threats’. The Chinese government argued that it had only followed common
international practices by establishing the zone, with aims of protecting its state’s sovereignty as
well as its territory and airspace. It would be a necessary measure in China's exercising of self-
defence rights. It had no particular target and would not affect the freedom of flight in airspace 53.
The declaration raised international criticism. Western nations accused China of seeking to
increase regional tension. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called on China to revoke any
measures that could infringe upon the freedom of flight in international airspace. The former US
Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel declared that the policy is a ‘destabilising attempt’ to alter the
status quo in the region, and would aggravate underlying tensions. The Chinese response
remarked that Japan shall acknowledge the sovereignty of China and demanded that the U.S.
should respect China’s national security issues54.
3.4.2. PARACEL AND SPRATLY ISLANDS
With the decision of the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOCC) to deploy
the oil platform Haiang Shiyou 981 (HYSY981) close to the Paracel Islands on the 2 nd May 2014, the
conflict escalated even further. Viet Nam demanded the oil platform to be removed since it was
deployed in the disputed waters. This dispute triggered the third clash, involving demonstrations
and riots against Chinese citizens, as well as an altercation between members of Chinese and
53
Lee, Jeamin (2014): China’s Declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone in East China Sea: Implications for
Public International Law. In: American Society of International Law, 18 (17).
54 th
BBC (2013): Shinzo Abe: China new air defence zone move ‘dangerous’. In: BBC online on the 25 November 2013:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25050493.
23
55
Vietnamese ships - one of Viet Nam’s vessels sank due to a collision . Additionally, since then the
US has began to play an important role by starting to further support its allies Viet Nam, the
Philippines and Japan with an increased military presence on their military bases around the SCS
region and by strongly condemning China’s actions56.
Graphic: Overlapping EEZ claimed by China and several different nations, the disputed islands and the position of the oil platform HYSY981 (BBC
2015)
The incident regarding the oil rig was discussed at length within the international community and
in June 2014, two months earlier than planned, China removed the oil platform HYSY981 57.
Nevertheless, due to the violent clashes and the rising tensions between China and Viet Nam, both
countries held a bilateral meeting on the 27th November 2014 in order to restore their fragile ties.
Both sides agreed to avoid any actions that could worsen the conflict, as well as establishing an
emergency hotline to discuss crucial and urgent matters58. In September 2014, the US and the
55
Crisis Group Asia Report (2015): Stirring up the South China Sea (III): A Fleeting Opportunity for Calm.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/267-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-iii-a-fleeting-
opportunity-for-calm.pdf.
56
Kuok, Lynn (2014): Overcoming the Impasse in the South China Sea – Jointly Defining EEZ Claims. In: Center For East
Asia Studies, 2014 (4).
57
Crisis Group Asia Report (2015): Stirring up the South China Sea (III): A Fleeting Opportunity for Calm.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/267-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-iii-a-fleeting-
opportunity-for-calm.pdf.
58 th
The Wall Street Journal (2014): Vietnam, China Agree to Better Manage Sea Disputes. Beijing – 27 October 2014.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/vietnam-china-agree-to-restore-bilateral-relations-1414399895.
24
59
Philippines conducted joint military exercises within disputed waters . Yet, in spring 2015,
satellites exposed China’s approach to build landmasses around the reefs it controls in the Spratly
Islands. The building up of seven of the reefs with an area of more than 2000 acres was followed
by criticism from the international community. During a news conference on the 9 th April 2015 in
Beijing, the spokeswoman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry proclaimed that China "has indisputable
sovereignty over the Nansha [Spratly] Islands and their adjacent waters" 60. It was further claimed
that the purpose of China’s manoeuvre was for marine scientific research, weather observation,
environmental protection and improving the living standards of the people working at those
scientific stations. The additional landmass was mainly built for peaceful purposes; nevertheless
they would also have to meet ‘necessary’ military defense requirements61.
3.4.3. CHINA AGAINST THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION
In January 2013, the Philippines initiated proceedings against China under Annex VII of the
UNCLOS to The Permanent Court of Arbitration at the International Court of Justice. The
Philippines demanded China’s claim over rocks, land-features and banks, classified as islands, to be
denounced as invalid and that the Philippines could proceed operating within its EEZ without
being harassed by China, thereby reinforcing the UNCLOS rulings. Shortly afterwards, China
rejected the claim by the Philippines, calling for bilateral talks and further declaring that the
Arbitral Tribunal lacks jurisdiction in this case and would not accept a verdict. Nevertheless, the
court published a press release elaborating the rules of procedure and the initial timetable. In
March 2014, the Philippines issued a Memorial to the Tribunal containing its legal analysis and
evidence. In June, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provided a press release scheduling the
deadline of China’s Counter-Memorial on December 2014. In December 2014, The United States
Department of State published a Limits of Seas Report on the issue, elaborating on the legality of
three different possible rationales of China’s Nine-Dash-Line by examining historic water claims.
The report argued that the presence of numerous claimants in the SCS weaken Chinese claims for
sovereignty within the territory of the Nine-Dash-Line. Also in December, China issued a report
arguing that the court is not eligible to decide on this matter, since the Tribunal cannot determine
issues of a country`s sovereignty and their maritime rights within their territory. Furthermore, by
signing the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration of Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea, the
Philippines agreed to solve the issue via bilateral talks. In December, Viet Nam again stressed their
claim on the Paracel and Spratly Islands and further requested the Court to also take Vietnamese
interests into account.
In March 2015, the Philippines issued a supplemental submission upon a request of the court. In
April 2015, the Court scheduled the preliminary hearing for July 2015 and declared that it would
59
The Financial Times (2016): Timeline: South China Sea dispute. https://www.ft.com/content/aa32a224-480e-11e6-
8d68-72e9211e86ab
60 th
The New York Times (2015): China’s Statement on the Construction in the South China Sea. In: Sinosphere - 10
April 2015. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/chinas-statement-on-its-construction-in-the-south-
china-sea/
61
Ibid
25
use, due to the absence of a Chinese Memorial, Chinese communications and papers regarding the
issue as plea. In June 2015, China missed the latest deadline to submit a final response. The first
oral hearing was held in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in June 2015. In October
2015, the Court’s ruling decided that it has jurisdiction over at least seven of the 15 claims raised
by the Philippines62.
On July, 12 2016, The Permanent Court of Arbitration declared, amongst numerous decisions,
“that, as between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign
rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by
the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect
to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime
entitlements under the Convention; and further declares that the Convention superseded any
historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits imposed therein” 63.
3.5 INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED

3.5.1. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
In the context of numerous formal and informal talks, ASEAN agreed on a Joint Declaration on the
South China Sea in July 1992, supporting the Philippines in a dispute with China. As result of the
Asian crisis of 1997-98 the council’s unity had decreased and although China intensified their
cooperation with ASEAN by the end of the 1990s, they refused to discuss the SCS with ASEAN. Yet
during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1999, ASEAN agreed to draft a Code of Conduct with
China submitting their own proposal. Yet due to the disagreements between Malaysia and ASEAN
the issue was unable to be resolved64.
The Code of Conduct was eventually finalised in 2002, when China and ASEAN member states
agreed upon a non-binding treaty on the SCS dispute - the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea . It established guiding principles of interaction and communication
between the parties involved. It also states that this dispute shall be settled via bilateral talks.
Over the years, the SCS dispute has always been an issue for ASEAN, and the Council has been
making the headlines with struggles over a common agreement over the SCS dispute.
The dispute over the construction of the oil rig in 2014 led Viet Nam and the Philippines to
approach ASEAN in order to demand an official condemnation of China’s behaviour. The
Association did not act upon this request. The different dependencies and bilateral relations led to
the council being divided into two parts. One group consists of nations, who are close allies to the
U.S., like Viet Nam and the Philippines. Those nations strongly condemn the actions taken by
China. The judgements of other group of nations, most notably Cambodia and Laos, are
62
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative: Arbitration on the South China Sea: Rulings from The Hague:
https://amti.csis.org/ArbitrationTL/
63
Permanent Court of Arbitration: Case No. 2013-19: 473.
64
Kivimäki, Timo (2002): War or Peace in the South China Sea? Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 18-19.
26
dependent on their economic relations with China. Therefore, they try to avoid any harsh
statements disapproving China’s behaviour65. Cambodia, as chair of the council, rejected the
appeal by Viet Nam and the Philippines and so, on the 14th May 2014, the Council merely
expressed its concerns regarding the dispute, without naming China explicitly, as well as urging all
parties to adhere to International Law, in particular the UNCLOS convention, and to avoid any
actions which could threaten international peace and security66.
In response to the court ruling, the ASEAN Council aimed for a joint statement at the ASEAN
foreign ministers’ meeting in Laos in July 2016. Cambodia however blocked any mention of the
court ruling in that statement and rejected the proposal put forward by the Philippines and
Vietnam. The group was not able to find a compromise67.
3.5.2. EUROPEAN UNION
The EU is closely intertwined with many countries in the Asian-Pacific region due to major trade,
financial and political relations, namely with China and some of the member states of the ASEAN
Council. The trade routes are mainly in the South China Sea and therefore the EU depends on
regional stability. Additionally, this conflict leads to a highly competitive environment and the EU
has to manoeuvre itself between two of its main partners, the U.S. – regarding security issues -
and China – regarding economic issues68. In July 2012, Catherine Ashton, a high representative of
the EU visited the Chinese leaders and the ASEAN Regional Forum which led to a joint statement
with the U.S. addressing the South China Sea Conflict. Both actors encouraged the ASEAN Council
and China to formulate a Code of Conduct on the SCS and to resolve territorial disputes through
peaceful and diplomatic means. Both pledged to commit themselves to cooperate with their Asian
partners to increase maritime security based on International Law and UNCLOS 69. However, no
precise actions followed that statement. The lack of a clear and autonomous statement by the EU
is evident, and this can be explained by the lack of cohesion among the member states. Many
member states prefer a neutral stance towards the issue whereas Britain, France and Germany are
more in favour of upholding international law. An EU diplomat remarked that “it is not easy to
speak with one voice. We have no issue with a peaceful settlement, but the way we phrase the
statement is very sensitive."70
65
Casarini, Nicola (2012): EU foreign policy in the Asia Pacific: Striking the right balance between the US, China and
ASEAN: European Union Institute for Security Studies Analysis. Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
66
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (2014): ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on the Current
th
Developments in the South China Sea on the 10 May 2014. http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-
communiques/item/asean-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-current-developments-in-the-south-china-sea.
67
Reuters 2016: ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-asean-idUSKCN1050F6
68 th
Hellendorff, Bruno (2014): South China Sea disputes: what is in for Europe? At: europeangeostrategy.org – 15 June
2014: http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/06/south-china-sea-disputes-europe/.
69
Casarini, Nicola (2012): EU foreign policy in the Asia Pacific: Striking the right balance between the US, China and
ASEAN: European Union Institute for Security Studies Analysis. Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
70
Reuters (2016a): EU’s statement on South China Sea reflects divisions. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
southchinasea-ruling-eu-idUSKCN0ZV1TS
27
3.5.3. ASIA EUROPE MEETING
The latest Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) was held in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia in July 2016. As a
Mongolian diplomat pointed out that the negotiations over the closing statement were intense,
“the Europeans wanted lots on the South China Sea but the Asians didn't”71. Eventually, the
closing statement reaffirmed that member states shall promote maritime security, safety and
cooperation, freedom of navigation and flight and demanded member states to refrain from using
force. Furthermore, it stated that disputes should be resolved via international law, the United
Nations charter and U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS 72.
4. SUGGESTED READING
Also be sure to regularly check #scgimunac2017 on Twitter for recent relevant articles:
https://twitter.com/search?src=typd&q=%23scgimunac2017
Topic A:
Assembly, United Nations General. "A/RES/29/3314 - Definition of Aggression - UN Documents:

Gathering a Body of Global Agreements."A/RES/29/3314 - Definition of Aggression - UN
Documents: Gathering a Body of Global Agreements. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Oct. 2016. http://www.un-
documents.net/a29r3314.htm
Brown, Larisa and John Stevens.0000"Nato Squares up to Putin: As Russia Beefs up Its Military
Might on Europe's Border, West Responds with Biggest Show of Force since the Cold War." Mail
Online. Associated Newspapers, 27 Oct. 2016. Web. 31 Oct. 2016.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3876672/Nato-squares-Putin-Russia-beefs-military-
Europe-s-border-West-responds-biggest-force-Cold-War.html

71
Reuters (2016b): Discord over South China Sea clouds Asia-Europe summit. Available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-idUSKCN0ZW0ET
72
Ibid
28
Mcleary, Paul. “SitRep: Pentagon Walks Back Raqqa Talk; Estonia Braces for Russian Attack; New
Chinese Stealth Fighter.” 1 November, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/01/situation-
report-pentagon-walks-back-raqqa-talk-estonia-braces-for-russian-attack-new-chinese-stealth-
fighter-iraqi-troops-in-mosul-and-lots-more/
“NATO-Russia Council.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 15 Apr 2016.


“The founding treaty.” (The Washington Treaty).

Withnall, Adam. "Russia Could Overrun Baltic States in 36 Hours If It Wanted To, Nato Warned."
The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, n.d. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nato-russia-baltic-states-overrun-in-hours-
rand-corporation-report-a7384381.html?cmpid=facebook-post
Topic B:
Cooper, Aviana (2016): South China Sea Takeover: Destroying Fisheries and Creating Economic
Dead lands for Surrounding Coastal States. University of Baltimore Journal of International Law, 4
(1) 165-172. Available at:
http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=ubjil
European Council on Foreign Relations (2016): China and the South China Sea arbitration: what
next? Available at:
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_china_and_the_south_china_sea_arbitration_what_next
_7082
Gao, Zhihuo/ Jia, Bing Bing (2013): The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and
Implications. American Society of International Law, 107 (1), 98-124.
Glaser, Bonnie S. (2015): Conflict in the South China Sea. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at:
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/conflict-south-china-sea/p36377
Morton, Katherine (2016): China’s ambition in the South China Sea: is a legitimate maritime order
possible? International Affairs, 92 (4). Available at:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12658/pdf
29
Paul, Mihael (2016): A “great wall of sand” in the South China Sea? Political, legal and military
aspects of the island dispute. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. Available at:
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/47417/ssoar-2016-paul-
A_great_wall_of_sand.pdf?sequence=1
Wu, Shicun/ Valencia, Mark/ Hong, Nong (2016): UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
South China Sea. National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS). New York: Routledge.
ISBN: 978-1-4724-5295-5
Zhang, Feng (2016): South China Sea Arbitration Award: Breath-taking (But Counterproductive).
The National Interest. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/south-china-sea-
arbitration-award-breathtaking-17004
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Introduction:
Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-

charter-full-text/
Security Council. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/sc/

Topic A:
Assembly, United Nations General. "A/RES/29/3314 - Definition of Aggression - UN Documents:

Gathering a Body of Global Agreements."A/RES/29/3314 - Definition of Aggression - UN
Documents: Gathering a Body of Global Agreements. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Oct. 2016. http://www.un-
documents.net/a29r3314.htm
Brown, Larisa and John Stevens.0000"Nato Squares up to Putin: As Russia Beefs up Its Military
Might on Europe's Border, West Responds with Biggest Show of Force since the Cold War." Mail
Online. Associated Newspapers, 27 Oct. 2016. Web. 31 Oct. 2016.
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3876672/Nato-squares-Putin-Russia-beefs-military-
Europe-s-border-West-responds-biggest-force-Cold-War.html>

30
Gaouette, Nicole, and Elise Labott. "US and Russia Now in Unpredictable Confrontation." CNN.
Cable News Network, 18 Oct. 2016. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
Hagstrom, Linus. “Remilitarization,” Really? Assessing Change in Japanese Foreign Security Policy.
Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14799850903178980
Hunter, Edward. "Sanctions after Crimea: Have They Worked?" NATO Review Magazine. NATO,
n.d. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
Majumdar, Dave, John Allen Gay, J. Michael Cole, and Amitai Etzioni. "The Game Changing Feature
in Russia's T-14 Armata That Might Make NATO Tanks Obsolete." The National Interest. N.p., n.d.
Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
Mcleary, Paul. “SitRep: Pentagon Walks Back Raqqa Talk; Estonia Braces for Russian Attack; New
Chinese Stealth Fighter.” 1 November, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/01/situation-
report-pentagon-walks-back-raqqa-talk-estonia-braces-for-russian-attack-new-chinese-stealth-
fighter-iraqi-troops-in-mosul-and-lots-more/
‘Nato-Russia Council’ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 15 Apr 2016.


Published. "UN Resolution A/RES/68/262 Territorial Integrity of Ukraine." Council on Foreign

Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 27 Mar. 2014. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
Schuker, Stephen A. “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936.” available at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/286380?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 22 November 2002,

http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p021122e.htm
Sustainable development Goals. UNDP. 2016.

http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html
Withnall, Adam. "Russia Could Overrun Baltic States in 36 Hours If It Wanted To, Nato Warned."
The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, n.d. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nato-russia-baltic-states-overrun-in-hours-
rand-corporation-report-a7384381.html?cmpid=facebook-post>.
Topic B:
31
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative: Arbitration on the South China Sea: Rulings from The
Hague. Available at: https://amti.csis.org/ArbitrationTL/
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (2014): ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on
the Current Developments in the South China Sea on the 10 th May 2014. Available at:
http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/asean-foreign-ministers-
statement-on-the-current-developments-in-the-south-china-sea.
BBC (2013): Shinzo Abe: China new air defence zone move ‘dangerous’. In: BBC online on the 25th
November 2013. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25050493.
Casarini, Nicola (2012): EU foreign policy in the Asia Pacific: Striking the right balance between the
US, China and ASEAN: European Union Institute for Security Studies Analysis. Brussels: European
Union Institute for Security Studies.
Crisis Group Asia Report (2015): Stirring up the South China Sea (III): A Fleeting Opportunity for
Calm. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/267-stirring-
up-the-south-china-sea-iii-a-fleeting-opportunity-for-calm.pdf.
Hellendorff, Bruno (2014): South China Sea disputes: what is in for Europe? At:
europeangeostrategy.org – 15th June 2014. Available at:
http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/06/south-china-sea-disputes-europe/.
Ikeda, Tadashi (2013): Getting the Senkaku History Right. In: The Diplomat on the 26th November
2013. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/getting-senkaku-history-right/1/.
Kivimäki, Timo (2002): War or Peace in the South China Sea? Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of
Asian Studies, 6-21.
Kuok, Lynn (2014): Overcoming the Impasse in the South China Sea – Jointly Defining EEZ Claims.
In: Center for East Asia Studies, 2014 (4).
Lee, Jeamin (2014): China’s Declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone in East China Sea:
Implications for Public International Law. In: American Society of International Law, 18 (17).
Müser, Oliver/ Pohl, Anna Yumi/ Godehardt, Nadine (2012): Inselstreit zwischen Japan und China
gefährdet die regionale Stabilität in Ostasien. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area
Studies (GIGA), 2012 (12).
Permanent Court of Arbitration: Case No. 2013-19: 473.

Reuters (2016): ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement. Available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-asean-idUSKCN1050F6
32
Reuters (2016a): EU’s statement on South China Sea reflects divisions. Available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-eu-idUSKCN0ZV1TS
Reuters (2016b): Discord over South China Sea clouds Asia-Europe summit. Available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-idUSKCN0ZW0ET
The Diplomat (2016): After China Meeting, ASEAN must unite on South China Sea. Available at:
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/after-china-meeting-asean-must-unite-on-south-china-sea/
The Financial Times (2016): Timeline: South China Sea Dispute. Available at:
https://www.ft.com/content/aa32a224-480e-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab
The New York Times (2015): China’s Statement on the Construction in the South China Sea. In:
Sinosphere - 10th April 2015. Available at:
http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/chinas-statement-on-its-construction-in-the-
south-china-sea/
The Wall Street Journal (2014): Vietnam, China Agree to Better Manage Sea Disputes. Beijing –
27th October 2014. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/vietnam-china-agree-to-restore-
bilateral-relations-1414399895.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).
6. COUNTRIES PRESENT
FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS:
1. China
2. France
3. Russian Federation
4. United Kingdom
5. United States
TEN NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS:
6. Bolivia
7. Egypt
8. Ethiopia
9. Italy
10. Japan
11. Kazakhstan
12. Senegal
13. Sweden
14. Ukraine
15. Uruguay
33

SC Study Guide en FINAL

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

SC Study Guide en FINAL

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

STUDY GUIDE

Dear delegates of the GIMUN 2017 Annual Conference Security Council,

Dear honourable delegates of the Security Council at GIMUN 2017,

All the best and see you soon,

Dear Security Council Members,

1. The Security Council 6

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1.1.1 COMPOSITION AND VOTING

1.2 MANDATE AND FUNCTIONS

1.3 RECENT HISTORY

By adopting Resolution 2310, on the twentieth anniversary of the enactment of the

2. IS REMILITARISATION INEVITABLE IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Graphic: NATO-Russia forces (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3876672/)

Graphic: Foreign troop deployments in Europe (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3876672/)

2.1.1 DEFINITION OF REMILITARIZATION

2.2 EUROPE’S REMILITARISATION AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

“[A]ggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,

2.3.2 LEGALITY OF AGGRESSION

2.3.3 TROOP MOVEMENTS, MILITARY EXERCISES, NEW EQUIPMENT, AND AGGRESSION

The RAND Corporation has recently published a report

As a result, the west has responded with the biggest

2.3.4 DISASTER STEMMING FROM AGGRESSION

2.4 CONFIDENCE BUILDING, STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER

2.4.1 UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACH

2.4.2 CURRENT REGIME (NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL)

Within a multi-stakeholder setting, capacity building measures can be utilized as a method of

Previously, a myriad of international organizations engaged its membership in similar types of

2.6 BLOC POSITIONS

2.6.2 EUROPEAN UNION

3. ONGOING TENSIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

3.1.1. THE DISPUTE OVER THE SENKAKU-DIAOYU ISLANDS

The Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands remained

3.1.2. PARACEL AND SPRATLY ISLANDS

Goal 17 relates to the revitalization of global partnerships and multi-stakeholder approaches,

3.3 LEGAL ISSUES

Graphic: Exclusive Economic Zones (securefisheries.org)

Graphic: What makes an island? (Financial Times 2016)

3.4 MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

3.4.2. PARACEL AND SPRATLY ISLANDS

3.5 INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED

3.5.2. EUROPEAN UNION

3.5.3. ASIA EUROPE MEETING

Assembly, United Nations General. "A/RES/29/3314 - Definition of Aggression - UN Documents:

“Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009-2016).” 4. July 2016.

“NATO-Russia Council.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 15 Apr 2016.

“NATO-Russia relations: the facts.” 7. November 2016.

“The founding treaty.” (The Washington Treaty).

Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-

Security Council. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/sc/

Security Council Resolution 2314 (2016),

Assembly, United Nations General. "A/RES/29/3314 - Definition of Aggression - UN Documents:

“Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009-2016).” 4. July 2016.

‘Nato-Russia Council’ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 15 Apr 2016.

“NATO-Russia relations: the facts.” 7. November 2016.

Published. "UN Resolution A/RES/68/262 Territorial Integrity of Ukraine." Council on Foreign

Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 22 November 2002,

Sustainable development Goals. UNDP. 2016.

Permanent Court of Arbitration: Case No. 2013-19: 473.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen