Jacinto v. People, [G.R. No. 162540. July 13, 2009.

]
- The offender was tasked to collect payment from Megafoam’s customers. In one
of the instances, she was handed a BDO check payable to cash and representing
the amount of PhP10,000.00. However, when the check was deposited, it was
dishonored by the bank. The offender then coordinated with the issuer of the check
for its replacement with cash. The issuer agreed. Megafoam had previously
learned of the theft and set up an entrapment operation. Offender was then caught
receiving the marked money and they were charged with qualified theft.
- Can the theft of the check, which has no value as evidenced by its dishonor, be
classified as an impossible crime.
- The Court found in the affirmative.
- Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would
be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent;
and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed
was either inadequate or ineffectual.
- Legal impossibility means where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime.
- Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor
or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime
- Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face
value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the
extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing
unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the
check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to
replace the value of said dishonored check. Thus there was a factual
impossibility.

People v. Umawid [G.R. No. 208719. June 9, 2014.]

Perlas-Bernabe
- The offender had attacked Vicente who was with his two (2)-year old
granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor (Maureen), at the terrace of their house.
While Vicente was able to evade Umawid's blows, the latter nevertheless hit
Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous death. Upon
seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked away.
- Vicente was the charged with the offense of murder for the death of Maureen. The
court found that the killing had been attended by treachery because Maureen was
merely a minor at two years old.
- Additionally, the Court observed that the death of Maureen was a case of aberratio
ictus or a mistake in the blow since the offender’s real target was Vicente. In such
case, the offender’s single act actually produced two offenses of Attempted Murder
 and Consummated Murder which would fall under a compound crime/delito
compuesto under Art. 48 or when a single act produces two or more grave or less
grave felonies. Therefore, he should have been charged with a complex crime.

Chua v. People, [G.R. No. 172193. September 13, 2017.]

J. Bersamin
- Accused Chua is charged with the crime of robbery and carnapping along with two
others. Chua is said to be the mastermind while his two co-accused were the principals
by direct participation.
- Based on testimony, the principals by direct participation barged into the house of the
victims demanding the proceeds from the commission that they had earned from
brokering the sale of a fishpond. They also demanded cash and jewelry from the victims.
During the robbery, they also stabbed one of the victims four times but he was able to run
to the bathroom and hide. The robbers were able to take the cash, jewelry, television and
Betamax sets, vhs player. They loaded this aboard the owner type jeep of the victims and
drove away.
- the victims were able to identify the two persons who had robbed their house and stolen
their owner type jeep. On the other hand, Chua had warned the victims not to report what
happened and immediately fled. It was later learned that Chua was acquainted with the
two offenders as he had recommended them to their employer. He had knowledge that
the victims had received a broker’s commission for the sale of a fishpond. It was also
found that he had been the one who sold the stolen owner type jeep to another person.
And one of the stolen items, the Betamax was found in his possession.
- For an accused to be validly held to conspire with his co-accused in committing the
crimes, his overt acts must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely
passive conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt
acts, unless such passive conspirator is the mastermind. In that respect, it is not always
required to establish that two or more persons met and explicitly entered into the
agreement to commit the crime by laying down the details of how their unlawful scheme
or objective would be carried out. 15 Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or can be inferred from the acts of the several
accused evincing their joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
- Being the mastermind, Chua was as responsible for the consequences of the acts
committed by Lato and Reyes, the principals by direct participation. This is because
of the conspiracy among the three of them. The informations had properly charged
them as co-conspirators in robbery and carnapping. Once their conspiracy was
established, the act of each of the conspirators became the act of all. Indeed, Chua
could not escape responsibility for the acts done by his co-conspirators. The very
 nature of the planned robbery as a crime that entailed violence against persons
warranted holding Chua fully responsible for all the consequences of the criminal plot.

||| (Cruz y Bartolome v. People, G.R. No. 166441, [October 8, 2014], 745 PHIL 54-76)
J. Bersamin
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between
attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such
intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the
offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a
naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being
in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.
- The victim in this case was sleeping when she was suddenly awakened by the
offender lying on top of her. She discovered that she was now naked and the
offender had mashed her breasts and touched her vagina. She resisted and fought
back and the accused desisted from continuing his acts. [note that the acts here
took place prior to 8353, but the principle still holds insofar as attempted rape is
concerned]
- For these acts, the accused was convicted of attempted rape. The court, however,
reversed the conviction and instead found him liable for mere acts of
lasciviousness.
- The attempt must have a causal connection to the crime. An immediate and
necessary connection to the offense.
- In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not
perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted
stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce
the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can
be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female.

||| (People v. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, [April 20, 1983], 206 PHIL 314-333)
J. Makasiar
The accused woke up from his nap to find that the victims were chiseling a part of the wall
of his house and were also placing a fence which when completed would bar him from
accessing his concrete dryer and the highway. The victims action was prompted by a
claim of ownership over the property which, while there was already a decision affirming
their claim, had not yet attained finality as an injunction had been sought against it.
Furthermore, the victims had also given a definite deadline to the victim to vacate the
property but before this had lapsed they had already started putting up the fence.
 - The accused shouted at the victims and asked that they stop and first discuss the
situation. However, Fleischer cursed and ordered his men to continue. Thus, the
accused brought out his shotgun and shot Fleischer. Another of the victims tried
to run to the jeep where there was a gun resting on the steering wheel, but befor
he could get there he was also shot by the accused.
- The Court here held that the accused is still guilty but appreciated in his favor the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of property.
- The Court found that the act of fencing and chiseling of the accused’s house
amounted to an act of aggression which was unlawful since the deceased had no
right to destroy or cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility
to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with
him.
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property
which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides:
- "Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use
such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property"
- However, the accused’s resistance manifested through his shooting of the victims
was disproportionate to the attack. Hence, failing the second requisite of a
reasonable means employed to prevent or repel the aggression was found to be
absent.

[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC

GENOSA, appellant.

J. Panganiban
- A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
- the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she
remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
- The cycle of violence has three phases:
1. The tension building phase. - it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form
of hostile behavior.
2. The acute battering incident - characterized by brutality, destructiveness and,
sometimes, death.
3. The tranquil or loving phase - On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and
nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and
tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again.
On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will
never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this "good, gentle
and caring man" is the real person whom she loves.

||| (People v. Sisracon y Rupisan, G.R. No. 226494, [February 14, 2018])
J. Peralta
The accused invited the victim, a minor aged 15 years old, to a drinking spree in the house
of one of their aunts. She agreed reluctantly and told them that she would have to leave
by 11:30 pm. When the victim tried to leave, the accused barred her from leaving and
even guarded the door. The accused proceeded to threaten that they would hurt the
victim’s older brother if she insisted on leaving. Thus the victim was forced to return and
the drinking spree continued. She narrates that after a few drinks she began to feel dizzy
with her body going numb. She was transferred to a papag, and the accused then started
to rape her.
The accused were all subsequently arrested. They were tried and convicted of Rape and
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua was imposed.
- The court noted that the accused were minors aged above 15 but below 18 years
old. It found that they acted with discernment.
- Discernment is the mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences
of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in
each case.
- In such case, the Court found that the conviction was proper. However, the
property should have considered their minority as a privileged mitigating
circumstance. Therefore the proper penalty should have been RT MED as
maximum and PM in any of its period as minimum.
- Moreover, Section 38 should have been applied. It provides that when a minor is
found guilty of an offense, the sentence must be suspended even though he had
reached the age of 18 at the time of pronouncement of his guilt. The court shall
then direct the conduct of the appropriate disposition measures.
- If the child reaches 18 while on suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether:
1. He should be discharged;
2. The sentence should be executed; or
 3. Extend the suspension of the sentence for a specified period or until the child
reaches 21.
- Neverthelees, although the accused had already passed the age of 21 without their
sentence being suspended, they are still entitled to the benefit of Sec. 51 of RA
9344 which provides that the offender may be made to serve his sentence in an
agricultural camp or other training facility instead of a regular penal institution.

SPARK v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017

J. Perlas-Bernabe
The petitioners questioned the various curfew ordinances of several cities in Metro
Manila on the grounds that these violate, among others, the right to travel of minors.
The Court did find that while children may have the same rights as adults, the exercise
of these rights are not co-extensive as those of an adult such as the right to vote, to
contract, or to employment.
- The right to travel being a fundamental right calls for a strict scrutiny of the
restrictions placed upon it even if in this case it is the right to travel that is involved.
It must therefore be shown that the state has a compelling interest and that the
means used is the least restrictive.
- In relation to the Manila and Navotas ordinances, the exceptions to the curfew are
too limited and do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression, among others.
- The Manila ordinance also imposed various sanctions on the minor who violates
the curfew ordinance based on the age and frequency of violations.
- If the offender is 15 years old and below the sanctions shall consist of a reprimand.
- If the offender is 15 years old and below 18, the first and second offense merit a
reprimand and admonition while a third offense would lead to Imprisonment of
one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court,
- These consequences must be examined in relation to RA 9344’s provisions on
status offenses particularly Section 57 and 57-A.
- SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an offense
or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an
offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
- SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted by
local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but
not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-
smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to,
disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy,
 littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of
children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations,
and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay
official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their
parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in
such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and
not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide
for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group
activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting
education seminars.
- These provisions do not bar the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct
of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or
penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition
of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations
- In this context, an admonition is not a penalty. It is merely a formal way of giving
warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is
generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof" or "counsel or warning against
fault or oversight."
- However, a reprimand is a penalty and therefore violates Sec.57-A. A "public and
formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior
officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or
admonition." 169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement
made to denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke
the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public
against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the
erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from
others.
- Thus, an admonition or community service are proper consequences for violation
of curfew but a reprimand, fine and imprisonment are not.

[G.R. No. 181409. February 11, 2010.]

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE

CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as
Administratrix, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
WILLIAM SATO, respondents.

J. Corona

- The case basically raises two questions:

1. Does the exemption from liability hold in case the offense charged is a complex
crime such as estafa through falsification of a public document?
 2. Will the death of one spouse extinguish the relationship by affinity between the
surviving spouse and the deceased spouse’s relatives?

- William Sato was married to Zenaida Carungcong. They had several children, one
of which was Wendy. Zenaida died in 1991.
- It is alleged that Manolita was deceived by her son in law William Sato to execute
a special power of attorney in favor of her granddaughter Wendy who was only 20
years old at the time authorizing the latter to sell 4 valuable pieces of land in
Tagaytay. Based on Wendy’s narration, her grandmother’s execution of the SPA
was procured by making her believe that it was in connection with her taxes. She
adds that these were sold but the amounts stated in the deeds of sale were not
those which were actually paid. Eventually, William was charged in an information
which effectively accuses him with the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public documents.

- Art. 332 does not cover the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. Art. 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain,
categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does
not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with
another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.

- The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes
against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected
by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the
component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence
of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other
words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate
simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would
wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification
of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of
estafa through falsification of public document.

- As to the second question, the Court held that the relationship by affinity survives
and the protection under 332 extends even beyond death. In dubio pro reo and the
rule of lenity as well as the fact that 332 is intended to protect family relations led
the Court to rule as such. Furthermore, the provision speaks in general language
and makes no distinctions.
||| (People v. Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, [April 4, 2003], 448 PHIL 748-804)
J. Callejo
The offenders boarded a bus bound for Pangasinan. While the bus was in Plaridel,
Bulacan they announced the robbery. They began to divest the passengers of their
belongings. One of the passengers happened to be a policeman. When they got to him
the offenders took his identification and service firearm. They told him: Pasensya ka na
Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and papatay sa iyo." The police officer pleaded for
mercy: "Pare maawa ka sa akin. May pamilya ako." However, Victor and Juan ignored
the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and right side of
his body. Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He fell to the floor of the bus. Victor
and Juan then moved towards the driver Rodolfo, seated themselves beside him and
ordered the latter to maintain the speed of the bus. Rodolfo heard one of the felons
saying: "Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok." The other
said: "Ayos na naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki ito."
- The trial court found the offenders liable for the crime of Robbery with Homicide
and imposed upon them the penalty of Death.
- The Court noted that the penalty for Robbery with Homicide is actually Reclusion
Perpetua to Death. In the presence of an aggravating circumstance, death will be
imposed. In the presence of a mitigating or absent an aggravating circumstance it
should have been Reclusion Perpetua.
- It deduced that the reason for the death penalty’s imposition was the trial court had
considered treachery to be present.
- May treachery be appreciated in robbery with homicide?
The court answered in the affirmative. The Court observed that the revised penal
code traces its roots from that of the Spanish Penal Code and although both recognized
robbery with homicide as a crime against property, treachery had been applied as a
generic aggravating circumstance. The Court adds that the treachery is neither an
element nor inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide as to bar its application.
Furthermore, it notes that when robbery is coupled with crimes committed against
persons, the crime is not only an assault (ataca) on the property of the victims but also of
the victims themselves.
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to
robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime
against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against
property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the
constituent crime of "robbery" of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

||| (Ivler y Aguilar v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, [November 17, 2010], 649
PHIL 478-510)
J. Carpio
Ivler was involved in a car collision and was charged with Reckless imprudence resulting
to slight physical injuries and another offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide and Damage to Property. He plead guilty to the Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Slight Physical Injury and was meted the penalty of public censure. He then moved for
the quashal of the second charge based on double jeopardy.
- Under Art. 365, what is penalized is the reckless imprudence of the offender and
not the results whether it be a death, damage to property or physical injuries. Thus,
in a situation where the offender had already been once penalized for his reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, he cannot be held liable for the
same reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and homicide. To allow
the same would be placing him in a second jeopardy for the same act where he
had already been punished.
- Article 48 on complex crimes cannot apply to offenses under Article 365.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a
single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. 55
- Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger
and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more
than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects
qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact
the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties
under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.

[G.R. No. 172539. November 16, 2016.]

ALBERTO GARONG y VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

BERSAMIN, J p:

The offender, a court interpreter, was approached by two litigants who wanted
assistance in the processing of an order that would allow the reconstitution of their
titled. The offender represented that he could help them and asked for a processing
 fee of PhP4,000 and the pertinent documents in the possession of the litigants. The
latter paid the amount and gave the documents. Subsequently, the offender gave
them an order purportedly signed by the judge and which also contained a stamp that
these were certified true copies of the original.
However, when the litigants presented the Order to the register of deeds it was found
that it contained some erroneous sentences and they were told to return it to the clerk
of court of the judge who had supposedly signed the order. The litigants complied.
When the offender learned of what they had done, he got angry and eventually agreed
to process the order again. On the other hand, the clerk of court had now discovered
that the order was falsified as the docket number it used pertained to a different case.
What is the liability of the offender in this case?
The court found that he was liable for falsification of a public document by a private
individual under Art. 172. It noted that the offender’s position as a court interpreter is
one where he has no authority to make, prepare, or intervene in the making of the
Order and therefore cannot be considered as a situation in which he could have taken
advantage of public office in order to falsify the order.

||| (Wacoy y Bitol v. People, G.R. Nos. 213792 & 213886 , [June 22, 2015], 761 PHIL
570-581)
J. Perlas-Bernabe

Offenders Wacoy and Quibac were seen beating up the victim. The victim was rushed
to the hospital but subsequently died due to complications. The offenders underwent
trial and were found by the trial court guilty of Death caused in a tumultuous affray.
The CA modified the decision, and held them to be liable of homicide instead therefore
increasing their penalty.
- The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there
be several persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these
several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray; (e) that
it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (f) that the person
or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be
identified
The court held that there was no tumultuous affray in the case at bar. On the
contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons, Wacoy
and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was
no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression
in that fateful incident. 25 Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones
who assaulted Aro, the latter's death cannot be said to have been caused in a
 tumultuous affray. 26 Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac's act of
mauling Aro was the proximate cause 27 of the latter's death; and as such, they must
be held criminally liable therefor, specifically for the crime of Homicide.

||| (People v. Baay y Falco, G.R. No. 220143, [June 7, 2017])

J. Tijam
Offended party is a 22 year old woman but has the mental age of a 4-5 year old due to
mental retardation. The offender was convicted of rape under paragraph 1 (d) of 266 A
covering statutory rape. This means that the offended is below 12 years of age
-- It should, however, no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate
falls under paragraph 1 (b), not Section 1 (d), of the said provision as the same,
precisely, refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason." 30 This Court, in the case
of People v. Dalan, 31 explained:
We are not unaware that there have been cases where the Court
stated that sexual intercourse with a mental retardate constitutes
statutory rape. Nonetheless, the Court in these cases, affirmed the
accused's conviction for simple rape despite a finding that the victim as
a mental retardate with a mental age of a person less than 12 years old.
Based on these discussions, we hold that the term statutory
rape should only be confined to situations where the victim of rape
is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a person
with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed
is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) as she is considered
"deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent
to that of a person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental
retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years,
while akin to statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d),
should still be designated as simple rape under paragraph
1(b). 32 (emphasis supplied)
Considering the circumstances of this case, We find that accused-appellant
should be held liable for simple rape.

||| (People v. Deniega y Espinosa, G.R. No. 212201, [June 28, 2017], 811 PHIL 712-
728)
J. Peralta
The offended party is 16 years old but had a mental capacity of a six year old. She was
raped by the accused who knew that she was suffering from mental retardation. Hence,
he was convicted of statutory rape as provided for under paragraph 1(d) of Art. 266-A.
 - The Court affirmed this finding. It pointed out that in statutory rape punishes
carnal knowledge with a woman below 12 years old. Hence, the only inquiry is
whether there had been carnal knowledge and the age of the victim is below 12
years old. In such case, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are
not relevant considerations.
It is also a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental
retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory
rape. 24 In People v. Quintos, 25this Court held that if a mentally-retarded or
intellectually-disabled person whose mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the
rape is considered committed under paragraph 1 (d) and not paragraph 1 (b), Article
266-A of the RPC. In holding as such, this Court differentiated the term "mentally-
retarded" or "intellectually disabled" from the terms "deprived of reason" and
"demented" as used under Article 266-A, paragraphs 1 (b) and 1 (d) of the RPC. The
Court ruled that:
xxx xxx xxx
The term, "deprived of reason," is associated with insanity or
madness. A person deprived of reason has mental abnormalities that
affect his or her reasoning and perception of reality and, therefore, his
or her capacity to resist, make decisions, and give consent.
The term, "demented," refers to a person who suffers from a
mental condition called dementia. Dementia refers to the deterioration
or loss of mental functions such as memory, learning, speaking, and
social condition, which impairs one's independence in everyday
activities.
We are aware that the terms, "mental retardation" or "intellectual
disability," had been classified under "deprived of reason." The terms,
"deprived of reason" and "demented," however, should be differentiated
from the term, "mentally retarded" or "intellectually disabled." An
intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived of reason or
demented. This court had even ruled that they may be credible
witnesses. However, his or her maturity is not there despite the physical
age. He or she is deficient in general mental abilities and has an
impaired conceptual, social, and practical functioning relative to his or
her age, gender, and peers. Because of such impairment, he or she
does not meet the "socio-cultural standards of personal independence
and social responsibility."
Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal
mental age is as capable of making decisions and giving consent as a
person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are
considered incapable of giving rational consent because both are not
yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives them the
capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving
sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a person's
capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance
 to an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological
age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether
a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A(1)(d), the
interpretation should be in accordance with either the
chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from
intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is
established.

(People v. Niebres y Reginaldo, G.R. No. 230975, [December 4, 2017])

J. Perlas-Bernabe
The victim is a sixteen year old female with a mental age of nine years old. She was
raped by the accused and as a consequence he was convicted of qualified rape. The
trial court had found that his offense was qualified on the theory that he knew that the
victim was suffering from mental retardation which under 266B would serve as a
qualifying circumstance.

- The Court held that the accused is indeed guilty of rape under Par. 1(d) of th 266-
A otherwise known as statutory rape. It noted that while the victim may have a
chronological age of 16, her mental age of 6 still fell below the age of 12. The
Court made reference to the ruling in Deniega that in such cases, the applicable
provision is 1(d).
- On the other hand, the court held that the rape could not be qualified. In this case,
while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of AAA's mental
retardation was specifically alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was
adduced by the prosecution. The fact that Niebres did not dispute AAA's mental
retardation during trial is insufficient to qualify the crime of rape, since it does not
necessarily create moral certainty that he knew of her disability at the time of its
commission. It is settled that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. 30 On that score, the prosecution cannot simply profit
from Niebres's omission, as it must rely on its own evidence to prove his
knowledge of AAA's mental disability beyond reasonable doubt.

[G.R. No. 187495. April 21, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
 Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the
accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and
she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. 30 However, in 1997, he
started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any
foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was
physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten
her into submission. 31
- On two occasions and consecutive days, the accused forced his wife to have
sexual intercourse with him despite her protests and that of his daughters.
- He was charged with and convicted with rape.
- The question is whether a husband may be held liable for raping his wife.
- The irrevocable consent theory as a defense.
- Court found that the law, particularly 8353 which amended the law on rape
recognizes marital rape as an offense. It points out that the law itself provides for
the manner by which the offending husband may be pardoned by the wife. The
law also makes a general reference to a man as the offender in rape and
therefore makes no distinction that would exclude a husband.
- Neither is there reason to use a different standard in determining the existence
of marital rape.
- A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A
husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property,
he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity
equal 120to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity
by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent.
Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and
accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities 121 that
have lost their relevance in a progressive society.

||| (People v. Caga y Fabre, G.R. No. 206878, [August 22, 2016])
J. Del Castillo
The victim and her boyfriend went on a drinking spree with the offender in the latter’s
residence. After consuming four bottles of red horse grande, they decided to sleep in
the offender’s house since she and her boyfriend were intoxicated. In fact the victim had
vomited a couple of times due to her intoxication. While she was sleeping, the victim felt
someone kissing her vagina. At first, she thought it was her boyfriend and she tried to
push him because she had her menstruation at the time. Instead of stopping, the person
moved on to kiss her on the lips and was subsequently able to mount her and have
sexual intercourse with her.

When the victim opened her eyes, she realized that the person who had done these
acts was the offender and not her boyfriend. She then became hysterical and hit and
slapped the offender accusing him of violating her. She also kicked her boyfriend who
was asleep and yelled at him “Bakit mo ako pinabayaan”.

- This Court finds that Caga did have sexual intercourse with "AAA" when she was
asleep and still under the influence of alcohol. The case thus falls under the
second paragraph of rape: "when the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious." It is altogether immaterial that the prosecution's
evidence failed to establish the presence of physical force, threat, or intimidation
because, as the evidence at bar shows, Caga raped an unconscious and
extremely intoxicated woman — a fact that was duly alleged in the Information
and duly established by the prosecution's evidence during the trial. In the case
at bench, physical force, threat or intimidation is not necessary, for the simple
reason that an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman cannot freely and
voluntarily give her consent to engaging in sexual intercourse.

(People v. Borja, G.R. No. 199710, [August 2, 2017])

J. Leonen
- The victim and her companion were walking along Agham Road when a gray van
suddenly stopped beside them. The offender, PO3 Borja grabbed the victims arm
and dragged her inside the van. The victim and her companion shouted for help
but none came. However, the victim’s companion was able to escape and
reported what happened to the victim’s mother. The offenders then asked for the
contact number of the victim’s relatives and thus she gave her brother’s number.
- During their first call the offenders asked for Php200,000 in exchange for the
victim’s release. But her relatives bargained saying they did not have that kind of
money, hence the ransom was reduced to PhP100,000.00. The family
coordinated with the NAKTAF and prepared the ransom. The victim’s brother and
the accused met at the Wildlife Park where the latter was apprehended when he
received the plastic bag containing the ransom. However, the apprehending
officers were unable to rescue the victim. According to her, the other kidnappers
were angered by the arrest of the accused. They then brought her to the office
of PDEA where she was charged with the illegal sale of shabu.
- The offender, PO3 Borja was then charged with kidnapping for ransom. In his
defense, he claims that the victim was arrested and convicted for selling shabu
in a buy bust operation.
- The court found his defense to be without merit and upheld his conviction for
kidnapping for ransom. It found that the victim’s arrest and conviction for a
violation of RA 9165 is irrelevant to the question of whether the offender is liable
for kidnapping.
 Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private
individual, 52 the fact that the accused is a public official does not automatically
preclude the filing of an information for kidnapping against him.
A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of extorting ransom
cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity. In People v. Santiano, 53 this Court
explained that public officials may be prosecuted under Article 267 of theRevised
Penal Code if they act in their private capacity:
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is "an organic member of
the NARCOM" and appellant Sandigan [is] "a regular member of the
PNP" would not exempt them from the criminal liability for kidnapping. It
is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did
so neither in furtherance of official function nor in the pursuit of authority
vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in purely
private capacity, that they have acted in concert with their co-appellants
Santiano and Chanco. 54 (Citation omitted)
The burden is on the accused to prove that he or she acted in furtherance of
his or her official functions. In People v. Trestiza, 55 this Court noted:
Before the present case was tried by the trial court, there was a
significant amount of time spent in determining whether kidnapping for
ransom was the proper crime charged against the accused, especially
since Trestiza and Manrique were both police officers. Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code specifically stated that the crime should be
committed by a private individual. The trial court settled the matter by
citing our ruling in People v. Santiano[.]
xxx xxx xxx
In the same order, the trial court asked for further evidence which
support the defense's claim of holding a legitimate police operation.
However, the trial court found as unreliable the Pre-
Operation/Coordination Sheet presented by the defense. The sheet was
not authenticated, and the signatories were not presented to attest to its
existence and authenticity. 56 (Citations omitted)
Accused-appellant's membership in the Philippine National Police does not
automatically preclude the filing of an information for kidnapping or serious illegal
detention against him. He may be prosecuted under Article 267 of theRevised Penal
Code if it is shown that he committed acts unrelated to the functions of his office.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is "the actual deprivation of the victim's
liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it." 57 The deprivation of a
person's liberty can be committed in different ways. 58 It is not always necessary that
the victim be imprisoned. 59 The second element of the crime of kidnapping 60 is met
as long as there is a showing that the victim's liberty of movement is restricted. 61
G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO
GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The victim had been dropped off at the gym by his brother. Subsequently, the brother
received a message that the victim had been kidnapped. The record shows that the
victim had been seen bleeding and being dragged from the gym by the offenders. They
then pushed the victim inside a dark green Toyota car. The next day, the brother of the
victim received a call from the offenders where the latter demanded the payment of
ransom in the amount of PhP15million. They haggled and settled at PhP110,000.00 the
kidnappers thereafter agreed to release the victim upon payment of the ransom. Hence,
they gave the victim’s brother the directions on where he would drop off the ransom.
However, the exchange never took place. Later it would be found that while they were
negotiating for the ransom and release of the victim, the latter had died due to a gunshot
wound to the head.
- The accused were subsequently caught and tried for the kidnapping and killing
of the victim. However, when the trial court rendered its verdict, the offenders
were merely convicted of kidnapping for ransom without any reference being
made on the death of their victim

Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether
the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and
murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art.
267, as amended by RA No. 7659.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)

- Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction must be
modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of
death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the
imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could,
as the CA and trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

||| (Benabaye v. People, G.R. No. 203466, [February 25, 2015], 755 PHIL 144-157)
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Benabaye is a bank employee who is authorized to collect and accept loan payments
of the bank clients and to issue provisional receipts for these payments. At the end of
the day, she prepare a cash transfer slip detailing the amounts she had collected.
Thereafter, she would remit the payments to her supervisor, Tupag. When the bank
conducted an audit, it found that the some loan payments made by its clients were not
remitted despite the existence of provisional receipts evidencing that these had been
paid by the clients. This led the bank to investigate Benabaye and Tupag. Both were
directed to explain the missing money but the bank found their explanation to be
unsatisfactory. It then made a final demand that they pay the missing money.
They were both charged with estafa Art. 315par 1(b). Can benabaye be held liable for
estafa?
The court held in the negative. The elements of estafa under 1(b) are:
a) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or
conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt
of the money or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended party that the offender
return the money or property received
The Court observed that Benabaye merely had material possession of the monies she
received as payment to the loans owed to the bank. Therefore, the first element of
juridical possession is absent in the case at bar and she cannot be held liable for estafa.

It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of

an employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the
employee. 42 The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his
employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the
juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator,
the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. 43 Hence, conversion
of personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession
of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to
whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred,
misappropriation of the same property constitutes Estafa. 44

||| (Lee v. People, G.R. No. 157781, [April 11, 2005], 495 PHIL 239-254)
J. Callejo

The accused is the sales manager of Atoz Trading. He was able to procure as a client
Ocean Feeds. Since he was the one who had been able to get Ocean as a client, all
transactions between it and Atoz was done through him. Upon audit, Atoz Trading found
that several payments made by Ocean were not remitted to the company. He was
thereafter charged with estafa under 1(B) of Art. 315. In his defense, he claims that Atoz
had failed to make a formal demand for the payment of the missing money and
therefore, the absence of such element means he cannot be held criminally liable.

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: a) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return the same; b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender; or denial on his part of such receipt; c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another. 12
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" as used in the aforequoted law connote
an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own or of devoting it
to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To "misappropriate" a thing of value
for one's own use or benefit, not only the conversion to one's personal advantage but also
every attempt to dispose of the property of another without a right. 13 Misappropriation or
conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence.
Demand is not an element of the felony or a condition precedent to the filing of a
criminal complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accused may be convicted of the felony under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of the
Information. 14 In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is
evidence of misappropriation or conversion. 15 However, failure to account
upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. 16
Demand need not be formal. It may be verbal. In Barrameda v. Court of
Appeals, 17 the Court ruled that even a query as to the whereabouts of the money is
tantamount to ademand:

||| (Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, [February 18, 2004], 467 PHIL 723-
765)
J. Ynares-Santiago

Tenebro had entered into a marriage with his first wife. During the subsistence of such
marriage, he entered into a second marriage. Tenebro subsequently informed his
second wife of his prior marriage and told her that he was going to return to his first wife.
Aggrieved a criminal complaint for bigamy was filed against Tenebro.
In his defense, he claims that his second marriage had been nullified due to
psychological incapacity. Hence, since its void ab initio for such reason, there can be
no bigamy.
Does the nullity of the second marriage due to psychological incapacity negate liability
for bigamy.

No. The Court said that the law on bigamy punishes entering into a marriage although
the offender is still married. Thus, as soon as the second marriage was entered into,
the crime of bigamy is already consummated. Moreover, the court held that the nullity
of the marriage under Art. 36 is not due to the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites of marriage.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage
is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before
the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. 28 There
is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal
laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.

(Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 184800, [May 5, 2010], 634 PHIL 348-364)

A complaint for libel was filed by the private respondent in behalf of the Yuchengcos.
The subject of the complaint was the website and posts made by the aggrieved
planholders of Pacific Plans who were unable to collect from their pre-need educational
plans after the company was placed under rehabilitation.

The allegation was that the defamatory content on the website was accessed in Makati
City and thus this is where the criminal action was being filed. Thus, the issue is whether
Makati City is the proper venue especially considering that venue in libel is specified to
be the place where the libel is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties reside at the time of publication.
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the
present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the
offending article "was first published and accessed by the private complainant in
Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite
allegation of printing and first publication.
 The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest
jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for
the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of
Appeals 36 explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of
venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act
No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code: HTcDEa
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the
criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province wherein
the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place
where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally
did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the
preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action
for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was
published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed
(People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is
transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended
party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of
the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and
the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin
Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San
Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was
enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal
action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation
cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town
libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No.
4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v.
Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was
the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or
far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an
accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute
where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and
is motivated by spite or the need for revenge. DAcSIC
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are
used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information
 must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first
published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or
business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This
pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to
defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way
of determining thesitus of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez's premise
of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners' website in Makati
with "printing and first publication" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to
Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much
imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the website's author
or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed
the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested
jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article
was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being
accessed.
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360,
as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Court's pronouncements in Chavez 37 are
instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to
abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the
complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at
the complainant's place of residence. We would also have to abandon the
subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such
as Soriano, Agustin, andMacasaet. There is no convincing reason to
resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel
actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as
they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in
their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no
need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the
libelous matter was printed and first published. aDHCAE
||| (Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 184800, [May 5, 2010], 634 PHIL 348-364)

People v. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, March 12, 2018

J. Gesmundo.
The accused is a police officer who was subjected to the mandatory drug testing provided
for under Sec. 36 of RA 9165. His drug test came back positive for shabu or
methamphetamine. This prompted the filing of a criminal complaint against him under
Sec. 15 of RA 9165 which penalizes the use of dangerous drugs.
Section 15 provides: Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person apprehended or arrested,
who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory
test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a
government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of
this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable
where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any
dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions
stated therein shall apply. (emphasis supplied)||| (People v. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373,
[March 12, 2018])
The accused claims that this provision can only apply to a situation in which the offender
is apprehended or arrested and is found positive for the use of dangerous drugs. It does
not contemplate criminal liability for a person who is subjected to a mandatory drug testing
under Sec. 36 of 9165. It further explains that the “person apprehended or arrested” does
not extend to those detained for any crime. Rather the same should further be limited to
those arrested for a violation of 9165 such as those guilty of possession, sale, trade,
manufacture, importation of dangerous drugs etc.

People v. Laba, G.R. No. 199938, 28 January 2013

J. Perlas-Bernabe
The offender was in the Manila Airport for the purpose of boarding a flight to Davao. He
was subjected to a pat-down search and the officer’s suspicion was aroused by his
oversized shoes. When these were searched it was found to contain 3 sachets of shabu.
The accused was therefore charged with a violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 for the
transportation of shabu/dangerous drugs.
The Court upheld his conviction under such charge.
"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry
or convey from one place to another." 35 The essential element of the charge is the
movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. 36
In this case, appellant was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to
board his flight bound for Davao City with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in his possession, concealed in separate
plastic bags inside his oversized Spicer rubber shoes. While it may be argued that
appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs in his
possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the airport at that particular instance
was for the purpose oftransporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to
another.
 Moreover, it may be reasonably inferred from the deliberations of the Congress
that if a person is found to have more than five (5) grams of shabu in his possession, then
his purpose in carrying them is to dispose, traffic, or sell it, as follows:
||| (People v. Laba y Samanoding, G.R. No. 199938, [January 28, 2013], 702 PHIL 301-
310)

Santos v. People, G.R. No. 232950, 13 August 2018

J. Perlas-Bernabe
As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the
foregoing procedure. However, failure to do so will not ipso facto render the seizure
and custody over the items as void and invalid provided: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. 30For the saving clause to apply, it is
important that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been
preserved. 31 Further, the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a
fact, as the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist. 32 Notably, these rules have been effectively set into law with the passage
of RA 10640.
As the records disclose, there were unjustified deviations committed by the
police officers in the handling of the confiscated items after petitioner's arrest in breach
of the chain of custody procedure as discussed above. First, while it is true that a
physical inventory 33 of the seized items was prepared by the investigating officer,
SPO3 Fernando Moran (SPO3 Moran), no photographs thereof were taken. Second,
although it appears that the physical inventory had been prepared in the presence of
petitioner who merely refused to sign, 34 it was not shown that a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), as well as an elected public official
had been present during the inventory. If any of them had been present, they should
have signed the physical inventory itself and been given a copy thereof.
The mere marking of the seized drugs, unsupported by a physical inventory
and taking of photographs, and in the absence of the necessary personalities under
the law, as in this case, fails to approximate compliance with the mandatory procedure
under Section 21 of RA 9165. 35 In People v. Mendoza, 36 the Court stressed that
"[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ],
or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the
evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-
busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again
reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken
chain of custody." 37
 To make matters worse, no practicable reasons were given by the arresting
officers, such as a threat to their safety and security or the time and distance which
the other witnesses might need to consider, 38 for such non-compliance. It is well-
settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. Therefore, it must be
shown that earnest efforts were exerted by the police officers involved to comply with
the mandated procedure so as to convince the Court that the failure to comply was
reasonable under the given circumstances. 39 Evidently, such is not the case here,
thereby leading to no other conclusion than that there was an unjustified breach of
procedure rendering the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti in this
case highly suspect. Consequently, petitioner's acquittal is in order.
||| (Santos y Italig v. People, G.R. No. 232950, [August 13, 2018])

People v. Goco, G.R. No. 219584, 17 October 2016

J. Perlas-Bernabe
In order to fulfill the chain of custody requirement, the prosecution must identify
the persons who handled the seized items from seizure up until their presentation in
court as evidence. To do so, the prosecution must present testimonies about
every link in the chain, in such a way that every person who touched the illegal
drugs would describe how and from whom they were received, where they were
and what happened to them while in his or her possession, the condition in
which he or she received them, and their condition upon delivery. The witnesses
must describe the precautions taken to ensure that there was no change in the
condition of the illegal drugs and no opportunity for someone not in the chain
to have possessed the said items. Also, crucial in proving the chain of custody
is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they
are seized from the accused. 32
In this instance, the prosecution failed to show who handled the seized items
after PO2 Emano took hold of them, how their custody was transferred to another,
who marked the seized sachets of drugs, and when and how they were marked.
Verily, marking the drugs or other related items immediately upon seizure from
the accused is crucial in proving the chain of custody as it is the starting point in the
custodial link. The marking upon seizure serves a twin purpose, first is to give the
succeeding handlers of the specimen a reference, and second to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the
moment of seizure until their disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. 40 The police officers'
failure to mark the seized items may lead to the acquittal of the accused based on
reasonable doubt. 41
Taken together, the lapses committed by the police officers in accounting for
the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR, more so their
questionable handling of the seized drugs cast serious doubt on the integrity and
 evidentiary value of the seized items. As the said drugs presented before the court as
evidence constitute the corpus delicti of the offenses charged, it must be proven with
moral certainty that these are the same items seized from Goco during the buy-bust
operation and the ensuing search. As the prosecution failed to do so, Goco must be
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. 42
||| (People v. Goco y Ombrog, G.R. No. 219584, [October 17, 2016])

People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 236304, 5 November 2018

J. Perlas-Bernabe
he Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance
with the chain of custody procedure may not always be possible. 32 As such, the
failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that
the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. 33 The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in Section 21
(a), 34 Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, which
was later adopted into the text of RA 10640. 35 It should, however, be emphasized
that for the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, 36 and that the justifiable ground for non-compliance
must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are
or that they even exist. 37
Anent the witness requirement in the chain of custody procedure, non-
compliance may be permitted if the prosecution is able to prove that the apprehending
officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such
witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these
efforts must be examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the
Court to be convinced that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given
circumstances. 38 Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious
attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for
non-compliance. 39 These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare
for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements
beforehand, knowing fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the chain
of custody rule. 40
Records show that after the buy-bust transaction, the plastic sachet
containing shabu seized from Gutierrez was immediately marked, photographed,
and inventoried in the latter's presence, the backup officers of the PNP, the
Provincial Prosecutor, and the barangay officials. 44 Thereafter, PO1 Tadeo
brought Gutierrez, together with the seized items, to the Binmaley Police Station,
where the incident was recorded in the blotter, and thereafter to the Pangasinan
 Provincial Crime Laboratory for examination, where the seized plastic sachet was
turned over and personally received by PCI Todeño. 45
PO1 Tadeo's testimony on this point was corroborated by PCI Todeño who
testified that at around 4:20 in the afternoon of May 30, 2015, he delivered the seized
sachet marked with "ATT2 5 30 15" for qualitative examination, which yielded positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, as contained in her initial and
final chemistry report. 46PCI Todeño also gave a clear account of the procedure she
had undertaken after the examination to secure the integrity and evidentiary value of
the specimen, and testified that she personally turned it over to the evidence custodian
for safekeeping, who likewise affixed his signature upon receipt. 47
Notably, while the Court observes that the media representative, i.e., Soriano
from ABS-CBN, failed to witness the inventory and photography of the seized items,
her presence during the said activities was not actually necessary since the witness
requirement under RA 10640 had already been complied with. As earlier stated,
under RA 10640, the presence of "[a]n elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service [OR] the media," and of course, the accused himself,
during the conduct of the inventory and photography is required. This is in contrast to
the witness requirement prior to the effectivity of RA 10640, wherein the presence of
a representative from the media AND the DOJ, and any elected public official, as well
as the accused, was required. In this case, the presence of the Provincial
Prosecutor and the barangay officials during the inventory and photography
conducted on May 30, 2015 already sufficiently complied with the procedure laid down
in the amendatory law. caITAC
At any rate, it deserves pointing out that the absence of the media
representative was both recognized and sufficiently explained by PO1 Tadeo who
testified that he previously informed ABS-CBN's Soriano of the planned buy-bust
operation and invited her to witness the same. It was, however, unfortunate that
Soriano could not make it in time to witness the inventory considering that she was in
an area far from the buy-bust site. 48 Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Soriano still
came, albeit late, and just proceeded to the Binmaley, Police Station as the conduct
of the inventory was already over. 49 Thus, based on these circumstances, the Court
finds that the police officers' efforts to comply with the required procedure, whether
during or prior to the amendments of RA 10640 as discussed-above, were genuine
which, hence, justifies the media representative's absence.
||| (People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 236304, [November 5, 2018])

Fuentes v. People. G.R. No. 186421, 17 April 2017

J. Perlas-Bernabe,
Accused is the mayor of a municipality in Leyte. He was the subject of a complaint for
violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3E for his repeated refusal to issue a business permit to the
private complainant who is engaged in ship handling and general maritime services.
The complainant had already secured all the requirements for the issuance of such
permit as well as the necessary police clearances. However, Fuentes would not issue
her the permit because he claims that the complainant was involved in smuggling
The Court found Fuentes guilty. It noted that he had shown manifest partiality against
the complainant. It noted that Fuentes had actually accused five similar businesses
engaged in port handling as engaged in smuggling but had only refused to issue such
permit to the complainant.
In the instant case, Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest
partiality, but also with bad faith. As can be gleaned from the records, Fuentes himself
testified that according to the rumors he heard, all five (5) ship chandlers operating in
the Port of Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug trading. Yet, it was
only Valenzuela's chandling operations through Triple A that was refused issuance of
a Business Permit, as evidenced by Business Permits issued to two (2) other
chandling services operators in the said port, namely: S.E. De Guzman Ship Chandler
and General Maritime Services; and Golden Sea Kers Marine Services. Moreover, if
Fuentes truly believed that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal smuggling and
drug trading, then he would not have issued Business Permits to the latter's other
businesses as well. However, and as aptly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan,
Fuentes issued a Business Permit to Valenzuela's other business, Gemini Security,
which provides security services to vessels in the Port of Isabel. Under these
questionable circumstances, the Court is led to believe that Fuentes's refusal to issue
a Business Permit to Valenzuela's Triple A was indeed committed with manifest
partiality against the latter, and in favor of the other ship chandling operators in the
Port of Isabel.
As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor's
prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to
Sections 16 23 and 444 (b) (3) (iv) 24 of the Local Government Code as an incident
of his power to issue the same, it must nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power
to suspend or revoke is premised on the violation of the conditions specified therein;
and (b) the power to refuse issuance is premised on non-compliance with the pre-
requisites for said issuance. In the exercise of these powers, the mayor must observe
due process in that it must afford the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to
be heard. 25
Here, it is clear that Valenzuela had complied with all the prerequisites for the
issuance of a Business Permit for Triple A, as her application already contained the
prior approval of the other concerned officials of the LGU. In fact, Valenzuela even
submitted numerous certifications issued by various law enforcement agencies
clearing her of any kind of participation from the alleged illegal smuggling and drug
trading activities in the Port of Isabel. Despite these, Fuentes still refused to issue a
Business Permit for Valenzuela's Triple A without affording her an opportunity to
controvert the rumors against her. Worse, he even issued the unnumbered
Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from conducting its ship chandling
operations without a Business Permit. Quite plainly, if Fuentes truly believed the
rumors that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal activities in the Port of Isabel,
then he should have already acted upon it in the years 1999, 2000, and 2001, or when
he allegedly first heard about them. However, Fuentes's belated action only in 2002
 — which was done despite the clearances issued by various law enforcement
agencies exonerating Valenzuela from such activities — speaks of evident bad faith
which cannot be countenanced.
||| (Fuentes v. People, G.R. No. 186421, [April 17, 2017])

Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 163494, 3 August 2016

J. Reyes
The accused issued 23 checks to serve as payment for textiles she had bought. The
checks however, were dishonored due to the account from which these were drawn
being already closed. Thus, a Notice of Dishonor was claimed to have been sent to the
accused.
As between the parties to this case, the dispute only pertains to the presence
or absence of the second element. In order to support her plea for an acquittal, the
petitioner particularly insists that she failed to receive any notice of dishonor on the
subject checks, which rendered absent the element of knowledge of insufficient
funds. cTDaEH
Although a notice of dishonor is not an indispensable requirement in a
prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as it is not an element of the offense, evidence
that a notice of dishonor has been sent to and received by the accused is actually
sought as a means to prove the second element. Jurisprudence is replete with cases
that underscore the value of a notice of dishonor in B.P. Blg. 22 cases, and how the
absence of sufficient proof of receipt thereof can be fatal in the prosecution's case.
In Yu Oh v. CA, 46 the Court explained that since the second element involves
a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima
faciepresumption of such knowledge, as follows:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient
funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Based on this section, the presumption that the issuer had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only
after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and
that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of
the check or to make arrangement for its payment. The presumption
or prima facieevidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such
 notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or
drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by
the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial
5-day period. 47 (Citations omitted)
Further, the Court held:
Indeed, this requirement [on proof of receipt of notice of
dishonor] cannot be taken lightly because Section 2 provides for
an opportunity for the drawer to effect full payment of the amount
appearing on the check, within five banking days from notice of
dishonor. The absence of said notice therefore deprives an
accused of an opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution. In
other words, procedural due process demands that a notice of
dishonor be actually served on petitioner. In the case at bar,
appellant has a right to demand and the basic postulate of fairness
requires — that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received
by her to afford her the opportunity to aver prosecution underB.P. Blg.
22. 48 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
To support its finding that the petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds
with the drawee bank, the RTC merely relied on the fact that replacement checks had
been issued, in lieu of those that were originally issued to pay for the petitioner's
obligation with Tan. 49 The Court finds the conclusion misplaced, considering that the
last batch of replacement checks, which eventually became the subject of these
cases, were precisely intended to address and preclude any dishonor. Thus, the
replacement checks dated March 30, 1987 were purposely drawn against a different
checking account with FBTC, different from the old checks that were drawn against
another drawee bank.
The prosecution also attempted to prove the petitioner's receipt of a notice of
dishonor by referring to a demand letter 50 dated August 8, 1987, along with a registry
receipt 51showing that the letter was sent by registered mail, and the registry return
card 52 showing its receipt by a certain Rolando Villanueva on August 25, 1987. Given
the circumstances and the manner by which the documents were presented during
the trial, the presumption that could lead to evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds
failed to arise. The Court emphasized in Alferez v. People, et al. 53 the manner by
which receipt of a notice of dishonor should be established, to wit:
In Suarez v. People, . . . [w]e explained that:
The presumption arises when it is proved that the
issuer had received this notice, and that within five banking
days from its receipt, he failed to pay the amount of the
check or to make arrangements for its payment. The full
payment of the amount appearing in the check within five
banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete
defense. Accordingly, procedural due process requires
that a notice of dishonor be sent to and received by the
 petitioner to afford the opportunity to aver prosecution
underB.P. Blg. 22.
. . . . [I]t is not enough for the prosecution to
prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the
petitioner. It is also incumbent upon the prosecution
to show "that the drawer of the check received the
said notice because the fact of service provided for in the
law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by
the drawee of the check.["]
A review of the records shows that the prosecution
did not prove that the petitioner received the notice of
dishonor. Registry return cards must be authenticated
to serve as proof of receipt of letters sent through
registered mail.
In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the
demand letter, together with the registry receipt and the return card,
allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there wasno attempt to
authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return
card. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by
themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve
as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. To
be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an
unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received such notice. It is
not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was
sent to the drawee of the check. The prosecution must also prove actual
receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law
is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the
check. The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its
existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove
notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there
should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, for notice by mail, it must
appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized
agent of the addressee. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible
that petitioner or his authorized agent did receive the demand
letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused
an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. As there is insufficient
proof that petitioner received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that
he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise. 54 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours) cSaATC
 Similarly, in the instant case, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the
actual receipt by the petitioner of the demand letter sent by Tan. No witness testified
to authenticate the registry return card and the signature appearing thereon. The
return card provides that the letter was received by one Rolando Villanueva, without
even further proof that the said person was the petitioner's duly authorized agent for
the purpose of receiving the correspondence.
||| (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 163494, [August 3, 2016], 792 PHIL 214-237)

People v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, 9 July 2018

J. Perlas-Bernabe

The prosecution claimed that AAA, BBB, and CCC are the minor children of spouses
XXX and YYY. AAA claimed that sometime in April 2010, when she was just 13 years
old, her mother XXX brought her to a hotel in Makati to meet with a certain John Hubbard
who proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. AAA further alleged that from 2008
to 2011, XXX ordered her to engage in cybersex for three (3) to four (4) times a week
in pornographic websites where AAA was shown in her underwear and made to do
sexual activities in front of the computer. For their part, BBB and CCC corroborated
AAA's statements, both averring that from 2010-2011, XXX ordered them to dance
naked in front of the computer with internet connectivity while facilitating the webcam
sessions and chatting with a certain "Sam," their usual client. BBB and CCC alleged
that during those sessions, their father YYY would be outside the room or fixing the
computer. The children all claimed that they were made to do sexual activities to earn
money for their household expenses which were collected by YYY in remittance
centers.||| (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 235652, [July 9, 2018])

Fianza v. People, G.R. No. 218592, 2 August 2017

J. Perlas-Bernabe

The accused had the victim, an 11 year old child, masturbate his penis on two separate
occasions.

In the present case, the existence of all the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC, as well as the first and third elements of sexual abuse
under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, remains undisputed. Records disclose that
on two (2) occasions in July 2010 and on November 30, 2010, Fianza induced AAA,
an 11-year-old minor, to hold his penis and masturbate him. The only point of dispute
is with regard to the existence of the second element of sexual abuse, i.e., whether
or not the lascivious conduct was performed on a child subjected to other sexual
abuse.
A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Case law further
clarifies that lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists
when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which
subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. 33 Corollary thereto,
Section 2 (g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves
the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:
[T]he employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in,
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution,
or incest with children x x x
The term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way
that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective." On the other
hand,"coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to
the wishes of one who wields it." 34
With the foregoing parameters considered, the Court finds that Fianza's acts
were attended by coercion or influence within the contemplation of Section 5 (b),
Article III of RA 7610. HEITAD
It is undisputed that AAA was only 11 years old at the time of the incidents,
hence, considered a child under the law. Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610 defines
children in this wise:
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition[.]
Case law states that a child, such as AAA in this case, is presumed to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act. In Malto v. People, 35 the
Court explained:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This
is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize
the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve
its protection.
The harm which results from a child's bad decision in a sexual
encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business
deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences
of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should
not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to
surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law
 which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation
and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be
justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game
and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse.
||| (Fianza v. People, G.R. No. 218592, [August 2, 2017])

Ricalde v. People, G.R. No. 211002, 21 January 2015

J. Leonen
The offended party is a 10 year old boy who claimed that the offender had inserted his
penis into his anus and that he felt pain in the latter and his stomach.
- The Court found the offender liable for sexual assault under 266-A (2) but the
penalty is under RA 7610 5(b) of RT Med.
XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus." 93 The slightest
penetration into one's sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime
of rape.People v. Bonaagua 94 discussed this distinction: EICSTa
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape
whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest
contact with the outer lip or the labia majoraof the vagina already
consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of
cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be
considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual
assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the
present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be
pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part
and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of
the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be
identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in
conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for
convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual
assault. 95 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Bonaagua considers a woman's private organ since most if not all
existing jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation
can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the
victim's anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim's dignity. The degree of
penetration is not important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity."
- ||| (Ricalde v. People, G.R. No. 211002, [January 21, 2015], 751 PHIL 793-821)
Lutap v. People, G.R. No. 204061, 5 February 2018
J. Tijam’
Victim is a six year old girl and was wearing shorts when the offender hus,
absent any showing that there was actual insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's
vagina, petitioner cannot be held liable for consummated rape by sexual
assault. ATICcS
People v. Mendoza, 39 explains that for a charge of rape by sexual assault with
the use of one's fingers as the assaulting object, as in the instant case, to prosper,
there should be evidence of at least the slightest penetration of the sexual organ and
not merely a brush or a graze of its surface, being that rape by sexual assault requires
that the assault be specifically done through the insertion of the assault object into the
genital or anal orifices of the victim. 40
Applying by analogy the treatment of "touching" and "entering" in penile rape
as explained in People v. Campuhan, 41 Mendoza states:
The touching of a female's sexual organ, standing alone, is not
equivalent to rape, not even an attempted one. With regard to penile
rape, People v. Campuhan explains:
x x x Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not
simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing
of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the
external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as
in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof
that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface
thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated
rape. x x x
x x x Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must
be entered for rape to be consummated and not merely for
the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus,
a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching
the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape,
if not acts of lasciviousness. (Italics in the original.)
What was established beyond reasonable doubt in this case was that petitioner
touched, using his middle finger, AAA's sexual organ which was then fully covered by
a panty and a short pants. However, such is insufficient to hold petitioner liable for
attempted rape by sexual assault. As above intimated, the mere touching of a female's
sexual organ, by itself, does not amount to rape nor does it suffice to convict for rape
at its attempted stage. 42
 The Court's explanation of attempted penile rape in Cruz v. People 43 is
instructive:
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the
offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal
knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the
commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts
without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should
produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed
by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the
intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the
female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere
of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly
connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without
such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short,
the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts,
should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination without
being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as
succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge in determining
whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the
commencement of the act of sexual intercourse,i.e., penetration of the
penis into the vagina, before the interruption." (Italics and citations
omitted.)
Applying by analogy the above pronouncements to attempted rape by sexual
assault, petitioner's direct overt act of touching AAA's vagina by constantly moving his
middle finger cannot convincingly be interpreted as demonstrating an intent to actually
insert his finger inside AAA's sexual organ which, to reiterate, was still then
protectively covered, much less an intent to have carnal knowledge with the victim. An
inference of attempted rape by sexual intercourse or attempted rape by sexual assault
cannot therefore be successfully reached based on petitioner's act of touching AAA's
genitalia and upon ceasing from doing so when AAA swayed off his hand.
Instead, petitioner's lewd act of fondling AAA's sexual organ consummates the
felony of acts of lasciviousness. The slightest penetration into one's sexual organ
distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v.
Bonaagua 44 discussed this distinction:
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape
whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest
contact with the outer lip or the labia majoraof the vagina already
consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of
cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be
considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual
assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the
present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must
be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her
private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina.
 This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various
interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the
vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle
that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with
the crime of rape through sexual assault. 45(Emphasis supplied)
Since there was neither an insertion nor an attempt to insert petitioner's finger
into AAA's genitalia, petitioner can only be held guilty of the lesser crime of acts of
lasciviousness following the variance doctrine enunciated under Section 4 46 in
relation to Section 5 47 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Acts of
lasciviousness, the offense proved, is included in rape, the offense charged. 48
Pursuant to Article 336 of the RPC, acts of lasciviousness is consummated
when the following essential elements are present: (a) the offender commits any act
of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of
lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii)
when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii)
when the offended party is under 12 years of age. 49 As thus used, lewd is defined
as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has
relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner. 50 All of these
elements are present in the instant case.
It is likewise undisputed that at the time of the commission of the lascivious act,
AAA was six (6) years old which calls for the application of Section 5 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7610defining sexual abuse of children and prescribing the penalty therefor, as
follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. —
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse. TIADCc
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph
3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be:
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; x x x
 Apropos, Section 2 (h) of the rules implementing R.A. 7610 defines lascivious
conduct as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks,
or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person. (Emphasis supplied)
In Quimvel v. People, 51 the Court En Banc pronounced that Section 5 (b)
covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. Further, Quimvel instructs that the term "coercion and influence"
as appearing under the law is broad enough to cover "force and intimidation."
In this case, the Information specifically stated that: (a) AAA was a 6-year old
minor at the time of the commission of the offense; (b) that petitioner inserted his finger
into AAA's genitalia; and (c) petitioner employed force, threats and intimidation. At the
trial it was established that petitioner committed a lewd act by fondling AAA's vagina
who, at the time of the incident, was alleged and proved to be only 6 years old. Here,
it was also established that AAA, being of tender age, knew and trusted petitioner who
frequents their house being the best friend of her father, thus, satisfying the element
of "influence" exerted by an adult which led AAA to indulge in lascivious conduct.
Petitioner's defense of denial, apart from being inherently weak, 52 is demolished by
AAA's and BBB's testimonies which the RTC and the CA unanimously regarded as
straightforward and credible.
Conclusively, the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC and of lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610 were established in the present
case. Following People v. Caoili, 53 petitioner should be convicted of the offense
designated as acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to
Section 5 of R.A. 7610 since the minor victim in this case is below 12 years old and
the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), and in the absence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the minimum term shall be taken from the
penalty next lower toreclusion temporal medium, which is reclusion
temporal minimum, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months. The maximum term shall be taken from the medium
period of the imposable penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal in its medium period, which
ranges from fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days to sixteen (16)
years, five (5) months and nine (9) days. 54
||| (Lutap v. People, G.R. No. 204061, [February 5, 2018])