Publication and Effectivity of Laws (e.o.

200, June 18,1987)

Tanada vs. Tuvera
Facts:

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in

demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on
April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the
decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette
all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official
gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first
that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be
dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the
new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in
the official gazette.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

Held:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application
shall be published as condition for their affectivity, which shall
begin 15 days after publication unless a different affectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.
Nationality Rule
Bellis vs.Bellis
Facts:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his
death. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing his Texas
properties, the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, the
recognized illegitimate children were not given any share. Texas has no
conflict rule (Rule of Private International Law) governing successional
rights. Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs.

Issue:
Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to
successional rights.

Held:
The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimise.
Under Texas law, there are no legitimise. Even if the other will was
executed in the Philippines, his national law, still, will govern the properties
for succession even if it is stated in his testate that it shall be governed by
the Philippine law.
Conflict Rule

Azar vs. Christensen- Garcia

Facts:

Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where

he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine
years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time
of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had
always considered himself as a citizen of California.

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural

daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in
favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court
had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims
that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is
returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that
the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate
children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as
much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the
deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter.
Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should
dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue:

Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen

Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.

1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California,
and

2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in California.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States
that “if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it
is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”

Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the
Philippines is ought to be followed.

Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower
court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law
provides.
Mandatory effect of laws
Columbia Pictures v. CA (1996) – Regalado, J.
Concept: Foreign Corporations

FACTS:
Columbia Pictures, et al. had lodged a formal complaint with the NBI, vis-à-vis their
anti-film piracy drive. Eventually, the NBI obtained a search warrant against Sunshine
Video seeking to seize pirated video tapes, among others. The NBI carried out the
seizure, and filed a return with the trial court. However, the trial court eventually
granted a motion to lift the order of search warrant – the contention was that the master
tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied were
never presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants. The CA
dismissed the appeal brought before it. Hence, Columbia Pictures, et al. brought the
case before the SC. Sunshine Video contended that Columbia Pictures, et al.
(being foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines) should have
a license in order to maintain an action in Philippine courts – and without
such license, it had no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant.
Sunshine video submitted that the fact that Columbia Pictures, et al. were copyright
owners or owners of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted
motion pictures, AND the fact that Att. Domingo had been appointed as their atty.-in-
fact constituted “doing business in the Philippines”, under the Rules of the Board of
Investments.

ISSUE:
Do Colombia Pictures, et al. have legal personality to sue in the Philippines?

HELD:
YES. Under the Sec. 133 of the Corp. Code, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to
transact business in the Philippines, as this phrase is understood under the Corporation
Code, unless it shall have the license required by law, and until it complies with the law
in transacting business here, it shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in local
courts. However, such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the
Philippines. Any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain
an action in our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and
the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court.

No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes "doing"
or "engaging in" or "transacting" business. The true tests, however, seem to be whether
the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise
for which it was organized (as distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional
transactions and isolated acts) or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned
it over to another. Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by
statutory standards, petitioners are not barred from maintaining the
present action. There is no showing that, under our statutory or case law, petitioners
are doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would
require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from our courts.

As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the
State simply because it enters into contracts with residents of the State, where such
contracts are consummated outside the State. It has moreover been held that the act of a
foreign corporation in engaging an attorney to represent it in a Federal court sitting in a
particular State is not doing business within the scope of the minimum contact test. The
mere institution and prosecution or defense of a suit, particularly if the transaction
which is the basis of the suit took place out of the State, do not amount to the doing of
business in the State.
Repeal of laws

Frivaldo vs. Comelec

Facts:

- Frivaldo, J. was elected as a Governor of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,

1988.

- On October 27, 1988 the League of Cities of Sorsogon President Salvador Estuye filed a
petition to COMELEC requesting to disqualify Frivaldo from his office on the grounds
that he was a naturalized citizen of the United States of America.

- Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen in Januray 20, 1983.

- Frivaldo admitted but said that he was only forced to do so since the time of Marcos
regime he was considered as an enemy and he went to USA seeking refuge and his
naturalization is not impressed with voluntariness as he went back after the Marcos
Regime to the country to help the restoration of democracy.

- He implies that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by participating in the

election.

- The case was approved by COMELEC and motion to dismiss filed by Frivaldo was
denied to which Frivaldo filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition to the court.

Issue:

- Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on January 18, 1988?

Ruling:

- Petition denied, Juan G. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and disqualified
from serving as the Governor of the Province of Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the
elected Vice-Governor.

- Local Government Code section 42 indicates that a candidate for local elective office
must be a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where is
running.

- Omnibus Election Code section 117 states that a qualified voter, among other
qualifications, must be a citizen of the Philippines.

- The Court rules that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election as the evidence shown from the certification of US District Court of North
California stating that he is a citizen of the Philippines.

- Frivaldo’s argument that he reacquire his Philippine citizenship through the

participation in the election which in his view repatriated him to which the Court refutes
that there are proper methods to which one can reacquire citizen ship either through
Direct Act of Congress, Naturalization or Repatriation to which Frivaldo did not access
to.

- Only citizens of the Philippines which have one allegiance can run in local elective
office.
Ignorance Of the Law

Elegado vs. Court of tax appeals

FACTS:

1. March 14, 1976 - Warren Taylor Graham: American national formerly resident in
the Philippines, died in Oregon, U.S.A left certain shares of stock in the Philippines son,
Ward Graham, filed an estate tax return on September 16, 1976, with the Philippine
Revenue Representative in San Francisco, U.S.A. February 9, 1978 - on the basis of the
return, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the decedent's
estate an estate tax of P96,509.35. This assessment was protested by the law firm of
Bump, Young and Walker on behalf of the estate. The protest was denied by the
Commissioner on July 7, 1978. No further action was taken by the estate in pursuit of
that protest. (meanwhile) January 18, 1977 -the decedent's will had been admitted to
probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon Ward Graham.

The executor, Elgado, petitioned for allowance of the will in the Philippines. This was
allowed and he was dubbed ancillary administrator. He filed a 2nd estate tax return w/
BIR, June 4, 1980. Commissioner imposed an assessment of P72,948.87 protested by
the Agrava, Lucero and Gineta Law Office. While protest was pending, the
Commissioner filed in the probate proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic
estate tax of P96,509.35. He said that there was no payment yet but the assessment was
final and executory. The petitioner regarded this motion as an implied denial of the
protest filed on August 13, 1980, against the second assessment of P72,948.87. He then
filed a petition for review w/ CTA. The Commissioner did not immediately answer (for
195 days) and in the end instead cancelled the protested assessment in a letter to the
decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982. This cancellation was notified to the CTA in a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and academic. CTA
– granted the motion and dismissed the petition. Now- petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

(1) whether the shares of stocks left by the decedent should be treated as his exclusive,
and not conjugal, property;

(2) whether the said stocks should be assessed as of the time of the owner's death or six
months thereafter; and

(3) whether the appeal filed with the respondent court should be considered moot and
academic.

HELD: (1)Unresolved (ratio 13);(2) unresolved (ratio 13) ;(3)YES (ratio 1-12)

RATIO:

1. In the letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue wrote as follows:

Estate of WARREN T. GRAHAM c/o Mr. ILDEFENSO O. ELEGADO Ancillary

Administrator Philex Building cor. Brixton & Fairlane Sts. Pasig, Metro Manila

Sir:
This is with regard to the estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR GRAHAM, who died a
resident of Oregon, U.S.A. on March 14, 1976. It appears that two (2) letters of demand
were issued by this Bureau. One is for the amount of P96,509.35 based on the first
return filed, and the other in the amount of P72,948.87, based on the second return
filed.

It appears that the first assessment of P96,509.35 was issued on February 9, 1978 on the
basis of the estate tax return filed on September 16, 1976. The said assessment was,
however, protested in a letter dated March 7, 1978 but was denied on July 7, 1978. Since
no appeal was made within the regulatory period, the same has become final.

In view thereof, it is requested that you settle the aforesaid assessment for P96,509.35
within fifteen (15) days upon receipt hereof to the Receivable Accounts Division, this
Bureau, BIR National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City. The assessment for
P72,949.57 dated July 3, 1980, referred to above is hereby cancelled.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) RUBEN B. ANCHETA Acting Commissioner

2. It is obvious from the express cancellation of the second assessment for

P72,948.87 that the petitioner had been deprived of a cause of action as it was precisely
from this assessment that he was appealing.

3. CTA said that the petition questioning the assessment of July 3, 1980, was
"premature" since the protest to the assessment had not yet been resolved. As a matter
of fact it had: the said assessment had been cancelled by virtue of the above-quoted
letter. The respondent court was on surer ground, however, when it followed with the
finding that the said cancellation had rendered the petition moot and academic. There
was really no more assessment to review.

4. Petitioner argues - that the issuance of the second assessment on July 3, 1980,
had the effect of canceling the first assessment of February 9, 1978, and that the
subsequent cancellation of the second assessment did not have the effect of
automatically reviving the first. Moreover, the first assessment is not binding on him
because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of our
tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals. SC: The petitioner is clutching at straws.

5. It is noted that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the second assessment of
P72,948.87, the Commissioner made it clear that "the aforesaid amount is considered
provisional only based on the estate tax return filed subject to investigation by this
Office for final determination of the correct estate tax due from the estate. Any amount
that may be found due after said investigation will be assessed and collected later."

6. It is illogical to suggest that a provisional assessment can supersede an earlier

assessment which had clearly become final and executory.

7. The second contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when he
argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the
return on which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the
petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance therewith because of their
ignorance?
8. If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they
are not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be
any less bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow
discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.

9. But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact that the first
assessment is already final and executory and can no longer be questioned at this late
hour.

a. The assessment was made on February 9, 1978. It was protested on March 7,

1978. The protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no further action was taken thereon by
the decedent's estate, there is no question that the assessment has become final and
executory.

10. In fact, the law firm that had lodged the protest appears to have accepted its
denial. as shown in the letter from the commissioner. Significantly, it has not been
denied by the petitioner.

11. In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot now raise the
question of its validity before this Court any more than he could have done so before the
CTA.

12. What the estate of the decedent should have done earlier, following the denial of
its protest on July 7, 1978, was to appeal to the CTA within the reglementary period of
30 days after it received notice of said denial. It was in such appeal that the petitioner
could then have raised the first two issues he now raises without basis in the present
petition.

13. The question of whether or not the shares of stock left by the decedent should be
considered conjugal property or belonging to him alone is immaterial in these
proceedings. So too is the time at which the assessment of these shares of stock should
have been made by the BIR. These questions were not resolved by the CTA because it
had no jurisdiction to act on the petitioner's appeal from an assessment that had already
been cancelled. The assessment being no longer controversial or reviewable, there was
no justification for the respondent court to rule on the petition except to dismiss it.

14. If indeed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed an error in the

computation of the estate tax, as the petitioner insists, that error can no longer be
rectified because the original assessment has long become final and executory. If that
assessment was not challenged on time and in accordance with the prescribed
procedure, that error — for error it was — was committed not by the respondents but by
the decedent's estate itself which the petitioner represents. So how can he now
complain.


Judicial Decisions

D.M Consunji vs. Court of appeals

G.R. No. 137873, April 20 2001
Justice Kapunan

FACTS: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was
then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the
removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the
chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer,
D.M. Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the
State Insurance Fund. The employer argued that in Floresca, the claimants may invoke either
the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the
consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of
compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the
other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.

Petitioner, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent
cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

ISSUE: Whether the private respondent is already barred from claiming damages
under the Civil Code pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may
be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance,
does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private
respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her
ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the
elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from
the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the
accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27,
1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the
claim before the ECC was filed.
Applicability of Customs

In re: Sycip, Salazar,Feliciano Hernandez and Castillo, et. Al

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May
5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February
14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local
custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s
name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila
Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual
members of the firm.

Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the
partners who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations
between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could
give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop
the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able
lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation
established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the
use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of
practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as
a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.
Human Relations
SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner
vs
Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNIDA, respondents
Doctrine:
Damages can be claimed whenever there is abuse of right or exercise of a suspended or
extinguished right.
Facts:
On May 30, 1986, the petitioner commenced the demolition of the respondent’s house
under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
However, records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was issued by the
Supreme Court (SC) on June 2 , 1986 enjoining the demolition. It was also found out
that the copy of the said TRO was also served to the petitioner on June 4, 1986. But the
petitioner did not heed to the TRO and continued the demolition until mid of 1987.
In this case, the petitioner was contending that the damages claimed by the respondent
are not valid because he is just exercising his right.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct.
Held:
No, the petitioner’s contention is not correct.
Damnum absque injuria is theprinciple that damage resulting from legitimate exercise
of a person’s right is a loss without injury for which the law gives no remedy.
However, in the case at bar, the principle of damnum absque injuria cannot be applied
because he abuses his right and exercise his suspended and extinguished right to
demolish the respondent’s house.
Hence, petitioner is liable for the damages incurred in his abusive exercise of a
suspended right.
Human Relation
University of the east vs. Jader

FACTS:

Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants’ College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the
first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade . He
enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he
filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor
Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the
required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor
Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5).

The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of
Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988, and in the invitation for that occasion the
name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. At the foot of the list of the
names of the candidates there is an annotation stating that the same is a tentative list.

The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies and he was thereafter handed by Dean
Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. He tendered a
blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who
wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. He thereafter prepared
himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job
from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in
Far Eastern University . Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his
review class and was not able to take the bar examination.

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from
the latter’s negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages,
unrealized income, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

RTC’s Decision:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with
legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.

CA’s Decision:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court’s Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum
adjudged by the lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay
plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for
moral damages. Costs against defendant-appellee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not UE has liability to Romeo Jader, considering that the proximate and
immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of his own
negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam.

RULING:

Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,

particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams,
cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to provide specifically in statutory law. Schools and professors cannot just take students
for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.

Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of
an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied
all requirements for the course.

“It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee University
had been informed during the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave
plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-
appellant of his failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did they remove
his name from the tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee
university, despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again
included plaintiff-appellant’s name in the “tentative” list of candidates for graduation
which was prepared after the deliberation and which became the basis for the
commencement rites program. Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant’s
name was allowed to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation in the hope
that the latter would still be able to remedy the situation in the remaining few days
before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff-appellant
Jader could have done something to complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee
university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in
Practice Court I.

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the
latter’s actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have
been awardedmoral damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ findings that
respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not
graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it
behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all
necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student,
respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these
considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold
embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and
not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure
to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all
the requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar
examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and
submission of requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per
annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and the costs of the suit. The award
of moral damages is DELETED.
Duty to Act with Justice, Observe Honesty And Good Faith
Nikko Hotel Manila v. Reyes
G.R. No. 154259, 28 February 2005
FACTS:
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of
Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According
to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the
hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to
vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He lined up at the buffet
table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby
Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard
by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman
accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr.Filart ignored him adding to
his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner
claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister,
Ms. ZenaidaFruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr.
Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart
since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked
Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be
intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the
plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close Ms. Lim was when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly
kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay
the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody
to know what happened.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms.
Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise
ruled that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it
found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him
to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests. CA held petitioner
liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “AmangBisaya”, an entertainment artist.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
RULING:
No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim
who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in
requesting him to leave the party.
Art. 19. of the Civil Code states that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith”. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this
article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are
the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements
are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Art. 21. of the Civil Code also states that: “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage”.Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores
and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with
intent to injure.
As applied to herein case Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
animosity against him. The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was
likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. Ms. Lim having been in the
hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be
emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire
belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct. Considering the
closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party
was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by
him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to
him.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its
liability springs from that of its employees.
LILIAN CAPITLE, SOFRONIO CORREJADO, ARTEMIO CORREJADO,
VICENTE CORREJADO, CECILIA CORREJADO, GLORIA VDA. DE
BEDUNA, ROGELIA CORREJADO, MANUEL CORREJADO, RODOLFO
CORREJADO, TERESITA C. AMARANTE, JUANITA CORREJADO AND
JULIETA C. PEREGRINO, petitioners, vs. JULIETA VDA. DE GABAN,
JULIA CORREJADO AND HERMINIGILDO CORREJADO, respondents.

DOCTRINE: Article 19 of the Civil Code in Chapter 2 on Human Relations is a

statement of principle that supplements but does not supplant a specific provision of
law.

FACTS:
Fabian Correjado (Fabian) inherited from his father Santos Correjado two parcels of
land subject of the case at bar.
Fabian died intestate in 1919. He was survived by four children, namely: Julian,
Zacarias, Francisco and Manuel, all surnamed Correjado.
After Fabian’s death in 1919, his son Julian occupied and cultivated the two subject
parcels of land (the property) until his death in 1950. He was survived by three
children, namely, herein respondents Julieta vda. de Gaban (Julieta), Julia Correjado
(Julia) and Hermegildo Correjado.
Julian’s brother Francisco died in 1960. He was survived by herein petitioners Manuel
Correjado, Teresita C. Amarante, Juanita Correjado, Rodolfo Correjado, and Jileta
Peregrino.
Julian’s brother Zacarias died in 1984. He was survived by the other petitioners herein,
Aurora P. vda. de Correjado, Lilia Capitle, Artemio Correjado, Cecilia Correjado, Rogelia
Correjado (Rogelia), Sofronio Correjado, Vicente Correjado and Gloria vda. de Beduna.
petitioners filed a complaint for partition of the property and damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Carlota City against respondents, alleging that Fabian
contracted two marriages, the first with Brigida Salenda who was the mother of Julian,
and the subsequent one with Maria Catahay (Maria) who was the mother of Zacarias,
Manuel and Francisco; that the property remained undivided even after the death of
Julian in 1950, his children-herein respondents having arrogated unto themselves the
use and enjoyment of the property, to the exclusion of petitioners; and that respondents
refused to deliver petitioners’ share in the property despite demands therefor and for
partition.
Respondents answered that in the proceedings in the intestate estate of their great
grandfather Santos Correjado, petitioners were not adjudicated any share in the
property, for Maria, the mother of petitioners’ respective fathers Francisco and Zacarias,
was just a mistress of Fabian, hence, Francisco and Zacarias (as well as Manuel) were
illegitimate who were not entitled to inherit under the old Civil Code (Spanish Civil Code
of 1889).
RTC dismissed the complaint upon the grounds of prescription and laches.
CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate court
found that respondents failed to discharge the onus of proving that Francisco and
Zacarias were illegitimate. But it too found that petitioners also failed to prove that
Zacarias and Francisco were legitimate. And the action of the petitioners has
prescribed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision upon the
ground that “THIS CASE HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS, PARTICULARLY ART.
19 OF THE [NEW] CIVIL CODE” which reads:
ART. 19. Every person, must be in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Petitioners contend that “[t]here is such a thing as morality that comes into play,” as
after all, the appellate court found the parties to be first cousins and, therefore,
following Art. 19 of the Civil Code, petitioners should get their share in the property.
ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT RELIANCE ON ART. 19 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS MISPLACED.

HELD:
The petition fails.
Article 19 of the Civil Code in Chapter 2 on Human Relations is a statement of principle
that supplements but does not supplant a specific provision of law.
With respect to rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity on
August 30, 1950 of the Civil Code like Fabian who died in 1919:
Art. 2263, New Civil Code
ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will,
before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other
previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. x x x
ART. 807, Spanish Civil Code of 1889
ART 807. The following are forced heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
The widower or widow, natural children legally acknowledged, and the father or the
mother of the latter, in the manner and to the extent established by Articles 834, 835,
836, 837, 840, 841, 842, and 846.
ART. 939, Spanish Civil Code of 1889,
ART. 939. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, the natural
children legally acknowledged and those legitimated by royal concession shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased.
With respect to prescription:
Art. 1134, New Civil Code
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137, New Civil Code
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners’ respective fathers Francisco and Zacarias were
legitimate and, therefore, were co-owners of the property: From the moment co-owner
Julian occupied in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute and exclusive owner of the
property and denied his brothers any share therein up to the time of his death in 1950,
the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership in which case
imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked. The adverse
possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest- herein respondents as exclusive
owner of the property having entailed a period of about 67 years at the time of the filing
of the case at bar in 1986, ownership by prescription had vested in them
Action To Breach to Promise to marry
US vs. Limcangco
The following facts have been proven: (1) That the accused Ponciano Limcangco, had a
considerable time courted Urbana del Rosario, a young woman under 20 years of age;
(2) that he had carnal intercourse with her; (3) that he had promised to marry her; (4)
that about the month of September, 1906, she had been pregnant for some five
months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The entire defense consisted in that the promise of marriage was subsequent, and not
prior to the carnal knowledge, and that therefore there was no deceit employed in the
seduction of the girl.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
One of the conclusions of the judgment appealed from is that -
According to the letters offered in evidence, both from those written by the accused to
Urbana del Rosario, and from such as the latter wrote to the accused, there can be no
doubt whatever that the promise of marriage was made before any carnal
communication between them had taken place.
Another conclusion is that -
From the time when the accused became aware that Urbana del Rosario was pregnant
he abandoned her and refused to fulfill his promise to marry
her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The lower court sentenced Ponciano Limcangco to four months of arresto mayor and to
pay the costs, reserving "the plaintiff's right to recover for damages suffered by reason of
the nonfulfillment of the promise of marriage, and for subsistence.
Both parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, appealed from the above
judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This court, upon appeal, does not find any proof of the alleged error in the judgment
based upon the fact that the court considered that, in the commission of the crime,
deceit had been employed; rather, on the contrary, the opinion of the trial court appears
to have been correctly founded upon the statements made in the letters of the accused
and of the injured party as well as from the testimony of the accused
himself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The defendant testified that his intimacy with Urbana del Rosario began in February,
1905, and that in July or August he had carnal communication with her. Although the
latter be the true date, and not that of January, 1906, as stated by the young girl, Del
Rosario, it appears to be proven, not that the promise of marriage was made after the
seduction, as the accused claims, but previous thereto according to the result of the
following question put to Urbana del Rosario by her attorney:
Q. Is it not true that the first promise of marriage that he made you was towards the end
of February or the beginning of March 1905? - A. No, sir; it was made since January and
February.
And as to the deceit, the accused has made it evident by his declaration:
Q. Did you not tell her that you loved her before you had any carnal communication with
her? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Did you expect her to believe that you loved her, and that you courted her with the
idea of marrying her? - A. Yes, sir.
The decision in cassation of October 2, 1888, is as follows:
A promise of marriage, in order to constitute that deceit which leads to the
consummation of the crime of seduction, requires no solemnity whatever nor any other
formality except that of making it in such manner that it may reasonably be believed by
the injured party, considering the antecedents of the case, the persistence and repetition
of the offer, and other similar circumstances which give to the offer the appearance of
sincerity.
The decision in cassation of April 26, 1886, is as follows:
In view of the personal circumstances of both the accused and injured party, their
uninterrupted love affair prior to the carnal communication, the progress of the
affection they professed for each other, as inferred from the insinuating phrases and
suggestions revealed in the letters written by the former to the latter for the purpose of
obtaining her favor, as well as the fact that the intercourse was preceded by her belief in
his assurance of a more or less proximate marriage, it can not be doubted that all of the
said facts taken together constitute the deceit which led to the seduction.
Although the appeal of the plaintiff can not be the subject of consideration by this court,
yet as the accused has appealed, it is the duty of this court to see that the final judgment
is in accordance with the law. For this purpose the provisions of article 449 of the Penal
Code should be applied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, although only three months
of arresto mayor with the accessories thereof are imposed on the defendant; and we
further sentence Ponciano Limcangco to indemnify Urbana del Rosario in the sum of
P500, to recognize the offspring, and to pay the costs of both instances. So ordered
Actions for Breach to Promise to Marry
Bunag Jr. vs. Court of Appeal
FACTS:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought
plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that
evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his
grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived
together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September
10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor,
Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in
the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel
where she was raped.
ISSUE:
Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in
awarding damages.
RULING:
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable,
except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the
necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to
those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of
said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral
damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly
abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will,
and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to
thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days,
irremissibly constituteacts contrary to morals and good customs. These are
grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and
abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial
court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite
the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay
City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law
that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words,
criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or
omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause
thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist
Unjust Enrichment
H.L Carlos Construction vs. Marina Properties Corp,.
H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. v Marina Properties Corporation, et al. GR
No. 147614, January 29, 2004
FACTS:
Marina Properties Corporation (MPC) entered into a contract with H.L. Carlos
Construction, Inc. (HLC) to construct a condominium complex for a total consideration
of PhP35.58 million within a period of 365 days from receipt of notice to proceed. The
original completion date of the project was May 16, 1989, but was extended to October
31, 1989 with a grace period until November 30, 1989. On December 15, 1989, HLC
instituted a case for sum of money, among others, for cost of labor escalation, change
orders and material price escalation. The Construction Contract contains the provision
that no cost escalation shall be allowed except on the labor component of the work. HLC
argues that it is entitled to price escalation for both labor and material because MPC was
delayed for paying its obligations. MPC, on the other hand, avers that HLC was delayed
in finishing its project; hence, it is not entitled to price increase.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not MPC is liable for price escalation.
HELD:
MPC is liable for price escalation, but only for the labor component. The Construction
Contract contains the provision that no cost escalation shall be allowed except on the
labor component of the work. Since the contract allows escalation only of the labor
component, the implication is that material cost escalations are barred. There appears
to be no provision, either in the original or in the amended contract that would justify
billing of increased cost of material. HLC attempts to pass off material cost escalation as
a form of damages suffered by it as a natural consequence of the delay in the payments
of billings. However, the contentious billing itself contains no claim for material cost
escalation.
Unjust Enrichment
U.P vs.Philab Industries, Inc.,
University of the Philippines vs Philab Industries, Inc.
G.R. No. 152411
September 29, 2004

Facts:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

In 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an integrated

system of research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the project,
laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of
Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños.
Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed
to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof.

Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to
contact a corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina,
the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory
Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory furniture and deliver the same to
BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the account of the FEMF.

On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase
order and downpayment for the office and laboratory furniture for the project, thus: 1)
Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project, and
2) Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project, and
paying the downpayment of 50% or P286,687.50

Ten days after, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to
proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF
Executive Assistant Lirio. Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and
laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after having been duly inspected by their
representatives and FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.

On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted P600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for the
laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt
No. 253 to FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial payment of
P800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter issued Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The
remittances were in the form of checks drawn by FEMF and delivered to PHILAB,
through Padolina.

On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños and
FEMF, represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support and donate sums
of money to UP for the construction of buildings, installation of laboratory and other
capitalization for the project, not to exceed P29,000,000.00.

The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA with Philab on November 25, 1982.
Later, President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution. On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her
help to secure the payment of the amount due from the FEMF. In the meantime, the
PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant contract and the MOA for its
perusal.
PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. In the complaint,
PHILAB prayed that it be paid the following: (1) P702,939.40 plus an additional amount
(as shall be determined during the hearing) to cover the actual cost of money which at
the time of transaction the value of the peso was eleven to a dollar (P11.00:$1) and
twenty seven (27%) percent interest on the total amount from August 1982 until fully
paid; (2) P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and (3) Cost of suit.

In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action
against it because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the
BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for
the purchase price of the laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to
pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the legal principle of unjust
enrichment when it held that UP and not FEMF, is liable to Philab?

Held:

There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the
petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said agreement. Contracts take effect
only between the parties and their assigns. A contract cannot be binding upon and
cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such
contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. Likewise admitted by the parties, is the
fact that there was no written contract executed by the petitioner, the respondent and
FEMF relating to the fabrication and delivery of office and laboratory furniture to the
BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner and the
respondent entered into a contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-
in-fact contract of sale was entered into between the Philab and FEMF.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make
remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise
to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one
must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not
itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine
of restitution.

The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not
obtain in this case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action based
on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. The
petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it
is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.

The petition is granted. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, is reinstated
with no costs
Rights to Personel Dignity and Privacy

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS.

NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000

Facts:

Sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at Pasig City, in
an apartment leased to them by the owner Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also
resided in the same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was
then engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with
office equipment, appliances and other fixtures. Florence Concepcion joined this
venture. Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of
the deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and
accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence.

Rodrigo threatened Florence over the telephone that should something happen to his
sick mother; in case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill Florence. As a result
of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent
that he could no longer face his neighbors. Consequently, he was forced to write Rodrigo
demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored
the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him
for damages. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Nestor Nicolas, hence this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting damages to Nestor Nicolas and his spouse.

Ruling:

According to petitioner, private respondents’ evidence is inconsistent as to time, place

and persons who heard the alleged defamatory statement. The Court finds this to be a
gratuitous observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the respondents are
unanimous that the defamatory incident happened in the afternoon at the front door of
the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence of some friends and neighbors, and
later on, with the accusation being repeated in the presence of Florence, at the terrace of
her house. All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award
of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.

The Court reject petitioner’s posture that no legal provision supports such award, the
incident complained of neither falling under Art. 22, 19, nor Art. 26 of the Civil
Code. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person’s dignity, such as
profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. As stated in the Civil
Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of
petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and insulting language. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is therefore affirmed.
Liability of Public officers
Obra, et al,. vs Court of Appeal et al.,

OBRA v. CA

FACTS

Petitioner Benjamin Obra was Regional Director of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-
Sciences (BMGS) in Baguio. On jun 26, 1985, Jeannette Grybos wrote him a letter on
behalf of the Gillies heirs complaining that private respondents (Sps. James and June
Brett) had been conducting illegal mining activities in Bgy. Palasa-an, Mankayan,
Benguet, belonging to Gillies family. On the same day, Obra wrote Brig. Gen Tomas
Dumpit1 requesting assistance in apprehending a truck2 allegedly used by Sps. Brett in
illegal mining. The next day, Obra wrote Sps Brett and Grybos informing them that
BMGS was going to conduct an ocular inspeciton and field investigation and requesting
them to be present “so that all… matters… shall be gathered and collated in order for
this Office to take appropriate action.” Elements of RUC under Maj. Densen seized the
truck3 as it was entering “Mamakar” mining area. It was impounded by the military and
prevented from leaving the area except on mercy missions4. Private respondents filed
a complaint for injunction and damages with the RTC as the truck was seized without
due provess in violation of their constitutional rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioners (Obra and Dumpit) were authorized to seize the vehicle in
the absence of any finding of probably cause (PC).

HELD

NO.Although peittioners have authority to order seizure and confiscation via PD. 1281,
Art IV, S3 of the 1973 Constitution merely validated the grant by law to nonjudicial
officers of the power to issue warrants but did not in any way exempt them from the
duty of determining the eixstence of probable cause. Petitioner Obra’s letters to private
respondents and Grybos clearly stated that an investigation was to be held on July 2-5,
1985 to determine the veracity of the allegations of Grybo’s complaint. His only basis
was an alleged certificationfrom the BMGS that no mining permit had been issued to the
Sps. However, such certification was not presented in evidence. The seizure cannot be
justified under the moving vehicle doctrine as there is no existence of probable cause.
The doctrine does not give poblice officers umliminted discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of PC. Therefore, the CA is correct in affirming
the RTC’s decision that petitioners are liable for damages(P100,000) and attorney’s fees
(P10,000) in violation of the Sps. Rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
Independent Civil Action
Samson vs. Daway, et al.,
Facts:
two informations for unfair competition... under
Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code... ere filed... against petitioner Manolo P.
Samson... challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged. He
contended that since under Section 170... of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty... of
imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years... he offense is cognizable
by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court... trial court denied
petitioner... r's... motions
A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the assailed orders.
Issues:
Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual
property rights?
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is dismissed.
Under
R.A. No. 8293
Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil) under
Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts
with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The
Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of
registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or
representation, is... lodged with the
Regional Trial Court... e find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was
expressly repealed by R.A. No. 8293
Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over that
granted by a general law to Municipal
Trial Courts.
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws[... conferring
jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial
Court. They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general... law.
Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properly
lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is imprisonment of less
than 6 years
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of
intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC...
designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property
Courts.
the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide
Intellectual Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts
Independent Civil Action
Hambon vs. Court of Appeal

Facts:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein filed a complaint for damages against
respondent for the injuries and expenses he sustained sustained after the truck driven
by the respondent bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.

However, the criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence) filed
previously against the respondent was dismissed by the court for petitioner’s lack of
interest and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of
respondent.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991,
ruling that the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that
petitioner is entitled to damages.

Respondent alleges that the dismissal of criminal case includes that of the civil action.

The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995, reversed and set
aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages
on the grounds that the Hambon failed to file the civil case. Hence, it is impliedly
instituted with the Criminal case. The dismissal of the criminal case also includes the
dismissal of the civil case.

According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to
institute a separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the
criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the
suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was provisional as it
amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.

Issue:
Whether or not a civil case for damages based on an independent civil action falling
under articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the new civil code be duly dismissed for failure
to make reservation to file a separate civil action in a criminal case filed arising from
the same act or omission of the accused pursuant to Rule 111, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, the failure to make reservation being due to the fact that the criminal case
was dismissed before the prosecution started to present evidence for failure of the
private complainant to appear despite notice.

Held:
Civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.
The Court expounded that it clearly requires that a reservation must be made to
institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they
will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. In other words, the right
of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether
arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.
Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement that before a separate
civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat
substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of
procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the
Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also
civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no
one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be
brought separately.

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute
the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil
Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation
should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil
action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein was
likewise dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Prejudicial Questions
Peopleof the Phil. Vs. Delizo