Ruperto vs. Torres No.

L-8785 February 25, 1957 (unreported case)

100 Phil 1098

Cornelito S. Ruperto, as Assistant Fiscal to the City of Manila. Petitioner and appellee, vs. Hon. Luis P. Torres, as Chairman,
Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Pompeyo Diaz and Hon. Pilar Hidalgo Lim, as members of the Integrity Board,
respectively and Conrado Teodoro Sr., respondents and appellants.

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila holding that the supplementary report and
recommendation of the Integrity Board recommending the removal of the petitioner herein, is null and void, and
so is Administrative Order No. 171 of the President, removing petitioner herein from office. Ordering that
petitioner be reinstated to his former position as assistant city fiscal of Manila and that all salaries due him from
the date of his dismissal until his reinstatement be paid to him.

Judgment reversed, case dismissed with costs against petiotner-appellee. Labrador, J. ponente.

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his
capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his
capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987

FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the
Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation under
a Contract to Sell. On 28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his rights over the said lot to private
respondent Virgilio Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor. However, for
failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under
Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages
pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly
installment payments falling due thereafter. On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a
notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had
already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No.
15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to
verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo
Realty reiterated its request, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25
October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes,
respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot
buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell. A formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of
the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during
the period while the improvements were being completed — i.e., between September 1972 and
October 1976. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed
to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell,
and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Yuson brought his
dispute with Antipolo Realty before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss, which NHA denied.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract
to Sell. A motion for reconsideration of Antipolo Realty was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not in hearing the complaint of Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the parties NHA assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions
which it was not authorized to perform.

HELD: No. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform
adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or
quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the
need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of
questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets
of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. The Court held that under the law creating
NHA it is empowered to regulate the real estate trade and business involving … specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman… The Court held that under the "sense-making and
expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience,
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered."

People of the Philppines vs Efren Mendoza

On July 14, 1993 about 7:30 pm in the Municipality of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, Mendoza hacked Anchito
Nano with a bolo which led to the instant death of the accused. The trial court found the accused acted with
evident premeditation hence convicted him of the crime murder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Prior to trial he voluntarily surrendered but it was not appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrendered was offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery.

HELD: Treachery is a qualifying circumstance in the present case therefore it cannot offset the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Therefore, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused
should be sentenced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
United States vs Aniceto Barrias

In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the
business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or
cascos (small ships/boats). The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to
implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should
not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.

Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually
powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular,
only steam powered ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the information
against Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding
P500.00 at the discretion of the court – this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:

For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine
of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.

Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the
penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that
time the peso-dollar exchange was more or less equal).

ISSUE: Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.

HELD: No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty different from that specified by
Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to
legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anybody or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the
responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its
substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the
people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The
Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in
accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this case, the Supreme Court determined
that the proper fine is $25.00.
 Jalandoni v. Drilon
327 SCRA 107
FACTS: Private respondents published a full-page advertisement in five major daily newspapers. These
ads contained allegations naming petitioner who was then a PCGG Commissioner of having committed
illegal and unauthorized acts. Petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of libel.

HELD: In libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory statement must
relate to official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unless the public official concerned
proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or
not. Here, petitioner failed to prove actual malice on the part of the private respondents. The
statements embodied in the advertisement are covered by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech. This carries the right to criticize the action and conduct of a public official.