G.R. No.

L-58289 July 24, 1982

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER and/or
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; respondents.

Petition filed by the Honorable Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang
Pambansa, praying that this Court declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax amnesty and filing
of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes” unconstitutional.

This PD was issued under Amendment no. 6 of the constitution that was proclaimed in full force and
effect as of October 27, 1976 which states that the president, in grave emergency or threat, or
whenever the BP or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter,
he can issue the necessary decrees, orders, LOI, in order to meet the exigency, and which will form
part of the land.

This was promulgated despite the constitution saying “ The legislative power will be vested in a BP
and the president may only grant amnesty with concurrence of the BP

Legaspi claimed that Amendment No. 6 is not one of the powers granted the President by the
Constitution as amended in the plebiscite of April 7, 1981 in sec. 16 art 7 of the 1973 consti and that
such re-confirmation of existing powers did not mean to include the President’s legislative powers
under Amendment No. 6

Issue:
Whether the 1973 Constitution as amended by Plebiscite-Referendum of 1976, retained the same
amendments, more particularly Amendment No. 6, after it was again amended in the Plebiscite held on
April 7, 1981?

Held:

No, it is maintained that "Amendment No. 6 is rendered inoperable, deleted and/or repealed by the
amendments of April 7, 1981".

He says the term incumbent president mentioned here could only refer to president Marcos.

After the April 7 amendments there exists no longer "a President (Prime Minister)" but "A President"
and "A Prime Minister." They are now two different offices which cannot be held by a single person
— not a transitory one but a regular one provided for and governed by the main provisions of the
newly amended Constitution. Subsequent events accept the reality that we are no longer governed
by the transitory provisions of the Constitution. (Pp. 27-28, Record.)

He also says that leg power is granted to a president (prime minister) and not either! This is in conflict now since the
2 positions are now separated
Is Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution as approved in 1976 reproduced or unaffected by the
April 7, 1981 amendment? Or, is it considered repealed by Omission?

Legaspi also questions question no. 1 in the ballot for the plebiscite which does not submit that the pres will enjoy
leg powers

The Constitutional provisions of the Presidency do not restate the provisions of Amendment No. 6
which grants the President (Prime Minister) limited powers to legislate. This is tantamount to a
withdrawal or deletion of such grant.

The 1976 amendments are amendments to the transitory provisions of the Constitution and that the
office of the President or the Prime Minister is concerned they have ceased to be governed by the
transitory provisions but under the newly amended Constitution.

After mature study and deliberation and considering the peculiar circumstances that dictated the
formulation of Amendment No. 6, the Court's conclusion is, that Assemblyman-Petitioners posture
lacks, to say the least, sufficient merit.

Legaspi’s petition lacks merit!! Dismissed and no costs.

Constitutional provisions are to be interpreted not only on the basis of current events, but also on the basis of the
historical background of their enactment

Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of the Charter. The ancient and
familiar rule of constitutional construction that has consistently maintained its intrinsic and
transcendental worth is that the meaning and understanding conveyed by the language, albeit plain,
of any of its provisions do not only portray the influence of current events and developments but
likewise the inescapable imperative considerations rooted in the historical background and
environment at the time of its adoption and thereby caused their being written as part and parcel
thereof.

True enough Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Philippine Constitution as amended in 1981 explicitly ordains
that "(T)he legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa". Section 2, however, readily
reveals that the Batasang Pambansa contemplated in that Section 1 is the regular assembly
(formerly referred to as National Assembly, now as Batasang Pambansa — evidently to indigenize
the nomenclature, which, incidentally should have been done also with the Pangulo and Pangunang
Ministro), to be elected in May 1984, per Sec. 5(1) of the same Article. We must keep in mind that at
least for the present and until 1984, what can be properly discussed here are only the legislative
powers of the interim Batasang Pambansa as such. as a matter of fact, the BP now is still the same
interim assembly contemplated by amendment no. 2 to the 1973 consti transitory provisions

Examining closely, the only change in amendment no. 2 consisted of the non-inclusion of the “incumbent president”
as a member of the assembly in order to separate the presidency from the regular legislative body to establish a
modified form of parliamentary suited for our political condition  evident that the reference to amendment no.
2 was not intended to convert/upgrade present existing assembly into the regular BP  still interim!

Since it is still interim, this follows that its legislative authority cannot be more exclusive now after 1981
amendments than when it was originally created in 1976 there can be no question that at the same time with the
creation of the interim Batasan, Amendment No. 6 came into force and effect. And Amendment No. 6 mandates in
unequivocal and unambiguous terms the grant of concurrent legislative authority to an official (the President
[Prime Minister]) who is not in the Batasan itself.

Ration d’tre of amendment no. 6

Contrary to the imputations of petitioner, this amendment is not rooted in the authoritarian, much less dictatorial
tendencies or inclinations of anyone.

Such hue of a one-man authoritarianism it somehow connotes is there only because it is so dictated by paramount
considerations that are needed in order to safeguard the very existence and integrity of the nation and all that it
stands for.

Perhaps the truism -- almost a dogma -- well recognized by constitutionalists and political scientists of all persuasions
as a convenient pragmatic rule for survival of nations, namely, that in an emergency, the best form of government
is a dictatorship, might have been in the mind of those who formulate it, but it is quite obvious, as will be explained
anon, that other fundamental factors must have been taken into account in order precisely to minimize the rigors
and generally feared oppressiveness of a dictatorship in an unrestricted martial regime

Note that the power amendment no. 6 vests upon the president (prime minister) can only be exercised when in (1)
his judgement there exists a grave emergency and threat thereof, and (2) whenever the interm BP or the regular NA
fails to act adequately on any matter  obviously It is a power that the consti confers to him in times of crises and
emergencies note that both 1935 and 1987 constis intended to operate this ratio during perilous situations like
war, insurrection, rebellion, invasion

Within the 4 corners of the consti there were 4 constitutionally designed ways of coping with abnormal situations in
the country: emergency powers delegated by the assembly, calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the
writ of HC, and martial lawso why need amendment no. 6?

People hate martial law!!  marcos is aware of this but he was also aware that something was needed for
national security  amendment no. 6 was born!

the central idea that emerged was that martial law may be earlier lifted, but to safeguard our country and people
against any abrupt dangerous situation which would warrant the exercise of some authoritarian powers,
amendment no. 6 must be constitutionally allowed

designed to make it practically unnecessary to proclaim martial law, except in instances of actual surface warfare
or rebellious activities or very sophisticated subversive actions that cannot be adequately met without martial
law itself.

the purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that the Philippines be henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest
extreme situations should ever demand it.

Critics say amendment no. 6 and martial law the same (a dog with another collar) WRONG

o Amendment no. 6 is a more restrained way of conferring law-making authority to the executive
during emergency  limited, restricted, subject to conditions, and temporary
o Obviously the simplest remedy  least violence to constitutional processes
o Should matters really go out of hand  martial law

Legaspi maintains that said amendments vested extraordinary legislative powers on the President (Prime Minister)
and on nobody else, and since there is no one who is President (Prime Minister) under our present governmental
set-up pursuant to 1981 amendments, no one in the existing government can exercise said powers  if we go solely
by rules of literature: puwede pa

o the Constitution is not merely a literal document to be always read according to the plain and ordinary
signification of its words
o Elements and factors radiating from political and economic developments of the situation prevailing at
the time of the inclusion of any particular provision thereof or amendment thereto  only in light of
these that the real implications of such elements and factors that the real essence and significance of
the words of the consti provision can be comprehended
o the literal reference to “the President (Prime Minister)” in Amendment No. 6 was the intention to
make such reference descriptive of the person on whom is vested the totality of the executive power
under the system of government established thereby.
o Also, the amendment does not speak of the “incumbent President” only, but of the President, meaning
to include all future presidents  power isn’t for marcos alone!

 the fact that Amendment No. 6 was not in any way or sense mentioned in the amendments submitted to the
people for ratification in 1981 and there being nothing in the latter intrinsically inconsistent with the former, it
is safe to conclude that it would be deceiving the people themselves and depriving them of something they had
decided in 1976 to be part of the fundamental law of the land to now eliminate the power conferred by them
upon the Executive of sharing legislative authority with the Batasan on appropriate occasions of emergency and
urgency.

All the above premises taken into account. Our considered conclusion and judgment is that
Amendment No. 6 of October 1976 of the Constitution of 1973 has not been in anyway altered or
modified, much less repealed by the constitutional amendments of 1981.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile
121 SCRA 472
FACTS:
The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14 detainees. Sabino
Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then having a conference in the dining room at Dr.
Parong’s residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under surveillance as they were then
identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in subversive activities. They
were arrested and later transferred to a facility only the PCs know, hence, the present petition of
Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid

HELD:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and
that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period. PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested,
assuming a law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest incident to the suspension
of the privilege of the writ. In addition, however, it should be noted that the PCO has been replaced by
Preventive Detention Action (PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA
constitutes an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned
crimes, for a period of one year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to review by the
President or the by the Review Committee created for the purpose.
G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974

PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,

vs.
RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH XV, respondents.
Concepcion, Victorino, Sanchez and Associates for petitioners.
Jose G. Ricardo for respondent Ricardo Cipriano.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the review and nullification of two orders of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated August 4, 1970 sustaining private respondent Ricardo
Cipriano's motion to dismiss "on the authority of Republic Act 6126", and the second, dated October 16,
1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the first order. The question before Us involves the
retroactive application of the provisions of Republic Act 6126, otherwise known as the Rental Law.

The plaintiffs were the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendants since 1952. In
January, 1969, the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis, and the plaintiffs increased the rent
to P30.00 a month. The defendant has remained in possession of the property up to the present. Since
January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the present monthly rate. A formal notice to vacate,
dated March 22, 1969, was sent by registered mail to, and received by, defendant.

On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order giving private
respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on July 13, 1970,
respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision of Republic Act
6126, entitled "An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling Is
Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof; which states that there should be no increase
of rent during a one year period starting from March 30, 1970, where the rent does not exceed
P300.00.However, the increase of rent happened a year before the enactment of the statute.

Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss but respondent Judge issued an order on August 4, 1970,
which reads:

On the Authority of Republic Act 6126, this Court hereby sustains the Motion for
Dismissal filed by the defendant through counsel, dated July 13, 1970.

A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied by respondent Judge. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bar.

Rulings:

For convenience We reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question:

Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another's dwelling is located

shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental
agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when
said rental does not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

 Approved June 17, 1970.

It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered by the
aforecited law. We rule, otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of
the lot involved was effected in January, 1969,1 while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or
after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected.

Private respondent, however, puts forward the argument that there was no perfected contract covering
the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly payments of P30.00 effective January
1969, as he did not give his consent thereto.

Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive
effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute
affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of
the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and
that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. 2 The law
being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation",3 it had a limited period of operation
as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No lessor of a dwelling unit or land ...
shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon
between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act.

Hence the provision against the increase in monthly rental was effective only from March 1970 up to March
1971. Outside and beyond that period the law did not by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The
said law did not, by express terms, purport to give retroactive effect.

We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear
and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says. It must be given its literal interpretation. The
principle of verba legis or the plain meaning rule was applied.

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby nullified and set aside.
The court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M (12285) on the merits
in accordance with Republic Act 6031 if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing procedure prescribed
by the Rules of Court.

Costs against respondent.

G.R. No. L-44113 March 31, 1977
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MERICIA B. PALMA and ROMULO INTIA Y MORADA, respondents.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Guillermo C. Nakar, Jr. and Solicitor Celia Lipana-Reyes
for petitioner.
Hon Judge Mericia B. Palma for and in her own behalf.

The Court resolves the sole issue of conflict of jurisdiction between the City Court of Naga (presided by
respondent judge) and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts for Camarines Sur and Cities of Naga
and Iriga over criminal cases where the accused is 16 but under 21 years of age and rules that the
issuance of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603) which includes such accused within the definition
of youthful offenders (over 9 years but under 21 years at the time of the commission of the offense)
did not transfer jurisdiction over such cases from the regular courts (the City Court in this case) to the
Juvenile Courts.

Facts:

Respondent-accused Romulo Intia y Morada, 17 years of age, was charged by the Naga City fiscal's
office with vagrancy (Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code) in respondent judge's court.

In an Order, respondent judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court "has no jurisdiction to
continue to take further cognizance of this case" without prejudice to the refiling thereof in the Juvenile
Court.

The prosecution shares the view of the Camarines Sur Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court presided
by Judge Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa that jurisdiction over 16-year olds up to under 21 years remains with
the regular courts and has not been by implication transferred to the Juvenile Court. Hence, the petition at
bar.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from regular courts to the
Juvenile Court?

Held:
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations court expressly confers upon it as a special and limited jurisdiction
over criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years old at the time of the filing the case.

The subsequent issuance of P. D. 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code which took effect on
June 11, 1975 and defines in Article 189 a youthful offender as "one who is over nine years but under
twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense" did not by such definition transfer
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 years and below 21 years of age from the
regular courts 2 to the Juvenile Court, as opined by respondent judge.

The Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603) concerning the welfare of the child and youth throughout
the country is a general law while R.A. 6591 which defined and confer jurisdiction on the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for Camarines Sur is a special law 3 classifying expressly that it can try in
criminal cases involving offenders below the age of majority only those accused who are under 16 years
of age at the time of the filing of the case.

A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must be express and specific.
Furthermore, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Camarines Sur is a court of special and
limited jurisdiction and the enlargement or conferment of additional jurisdiction on said court to include
accused persons who are 16 years and under 21 years of age must positively appear in express terms.

It is quite patent that the mere definition in a single article of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (P. D.
603, Article 189) of youthful offenders (over 9 and under 21 years of age) did not withdraw from the
regular courts their jurisdiction to try accused persons who are 16 but below 21 years of age and transfer
the same to the Juvenile Courts whose criminal jurisdiction is expressly limited to those where the
accused is under 16 years of age.

If it were the intent and purpose of P.D. 603 to remove from the City Court the jurisdiction over youthful
accused who are 16 but below 21 years of age and transfer the same to the Juvenile Court, it would have
expressly so provided for repeal of the corresponding provision as when it repealed the Civil Code
provisions on Adoption in Article 26 thereof. 4

The cited codal articles, it may be stressed, adequately provide as in Article 192 that the courts in general
shall suspend sentence instead of pronouncing a judgment of conviction and commit the youthful offender
"to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the
government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have reached
twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the
reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible individual
under whose care he has been committed."

ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal orders of respondent judge dated March 6, 1976 and April 1, 1976 are set
aside. The case filed with respondent judge's court is ordered reinstated for prompt trial and
determination on the merits. In the public interest 6 this decision resolving the jurisdictional conflict shall
be immediately executory upon promulgation.
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada

Case No. 219

G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977)

Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3

FACTS:

Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on
the ground that her court has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the
refiling thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was
transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines
youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.

ISSUE:

W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.

HELD:

The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over criminal
cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case . The subsequent issuance
of PD 603 knownas the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as one who is over 9 years of
age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense didnot by such definition transfer jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile
Court.

LATIN MAXIM:

35
G.R. No. L-1276 April 30, 1948
ROSARIO VALERA, assisted by her husband, Juan Valera, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO TUASON, Jr., Justice of the Peace of Lagayan, Abra, MANUEL TULLAS ET AL., respondents-
appellees.
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL, intervenor-appellee.
Marcelino N. Sayo for petitioner-appellant.
Etelboldo Valera for respondents-appellees Tullas et al.
The justice of the peace in his own behalf.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra dismissing a petition for certiorari.

Facts:

A complaint for forcible entry was filed in the justice of the peace of court of Lagayan over which Judge
Federico Paredes presided. Finding himself disqualified by reason of relationship to one of the parties, to
try the case, Judge Paredes transferred it to the justice of the peace of La Paz, the nearest municipality to
Lagayan. The latter justice of the peace, over the objection of the attorney for the defendants, proceeded
with the trial, after which he gave judgment for the plaintiff and returned of the case with his decision to
the justice of the peace of Lagayan.

In the meantime, a new justice of the peace had been appointed for Lagayan — Mariano B. Tuason, one
of the respondents in the petition for certiorari. After the case was received in the court of the justice of
the peace of Lagayan, the defendants moved for a new trial impeaching the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace of La Paz. The new justice of the peace of Lagayan found the challenge well founded, declared
the judgment null and void, and ordered the case reset for hearing before him.

The Lagayan justice's ground for unvalidating the decision of the justice of the peace of La Paz is that
"the designation of another justice of the peace to hear, try and decide a given case, when the justice
having jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the same disqualifies himself, is not in law given to the
disqualifying justice but 'to the judge of the district' who 'shall designate the nearest justice of the peace.'
(Section 211, Rev. Adm. Code)."

The annulment by the newly-appointed justice of the peace of Lagayan of the proceedings before the
justice of the peace of La Paz and the latter's decision was sustained on appeal by Honorable Patricio
Ceniza, Judge of the Court of First Instance, but on a different ground. Judge Ceniza does not agree that
section 211 of the Revised Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190.) He is of the opinion that it is the new
Rules of Court which have abrogated the last-named section.

In every case, whether civil or criminal, of disqualification of a justice of the peace upon any ground
mentioned in section eight of this Act, the regular justice shall notify the auxilliary, who shall thereupon
appear and try the cause, unless he shall be likewise disqualified or otherwise disabled, in which event
the cause shall be transferred to the nearest justice of the peace of the province who is not disqualified.

Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Auxilliary justice — Qualifications and duties. — The auxilliary justice of the peace shall have the
same qualifications and be subject to the same restrictions as the regular justice, and shall
perform the duties of said office during any vacancy therein or in case of the absence of the
regular justice from the municipality, or of his disability or disqualification, or in case of his death
or resignation until the appointment and qualification of his successor, or in any cause whose
immediate trial the regular justice shall certify to be specially urgent and which he is unable to try
by reason of actual engagement in another trial.
 In case there is no auxilliary justice of the peace to perform the duties of the regular justice in the
cases above-mentioned, the judge of the district shall designate the nearest justice of the peace
of the province to act as justice of the peace in such municipality, town, or place, in which case
the justice of the peace so designated and seventy-five per centum of the salary of the justice of
the peace whom he may substitute.

One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that endeavor should be made to
harmonize the provisions of a law or two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that one law may
operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act. (U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208.) Merely because a
later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient
to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old
one. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 634.)

The above-quoted provisions can stand together. By a fair and reasonable construction, section 73 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said to apply to disqualifications under section 8 of that
Act, and section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code to disqualifications or disabilities not embraced
in the Code of Civil Procedure.

From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law is not regarded as having
been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia
specialibus non derogant. And if this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to
include the matter in the special statute. (Manila Railroad Company vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.) At any
rate, in the event the harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is
impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirely, indicates a
contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. granting then that the two laws can not be reconciled, in
so far as they are inconsistent with each other, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being a specific
law, should prevail over, or considered as an exemption to, section 211 of the Administrative Code, which
is a provision of general character. a general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and
does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which
relates to particular persons or things of a class. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 2645.)

But the history of the two laws gives positive indication that they were designed to complement each
other. This history reveals that the two enactments have different origins, one independent of the other,
and have been intended to operate side by side. This intent is apparent from the fact that, in their
respective process of evolution, they, at one time, in Act No. 1627, met and were lodged in the adjoining
sections — 7 and 8 — each maintaining a separate and independent identity; and while, later, section 7
of Act No. 1627 was amended by section 3 of Act No. 1741, section 8 was given a different direction by
being amended by another law, section 1 of Act 1888. We further note that the final section of the
Administrative Code expressly repealed section 7 of Act 1627 and the entire Act 1741 but made no
reference whatever tom section 1 of Act 1888. The purpose to keep both laws in force and subsisting can
find no clearer proof than this unless it be an express declaration of intention.

For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs Judge Ceniza's opinion that the Rules of court have
replaced and absorbed section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure is clearly erroneous. It may be said that
there is less reason to hold that this section has been impliedly repealed by the Rules of Court than that it
has been abrogated by section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code; for authority of a judge to try a
case is a matter of substantive law, not embraced by the purposes and scope of the Rules of Court,
which concern "pleading, practice admission and procedure in all courts of the Philippines, and the
admission to the practice of law therein." (Introductory section of the Rules of Court.)

Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed with costs against the appellee.
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay for petitioner.
Barrios and Fule for respondent.

The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is
entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which
includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the
present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Facts:

On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790,
now in dispute.

RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur," was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are
within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voter registration in the said territories
of Dianaton. This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a
resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967
elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's
resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes,
be nullified because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in
the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE:
Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province - Cotabato - to
be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?

HELD:

1.Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 2

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon
legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and
the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the
bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3 Compliance is imperative, given
the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the
entire text of the bill.
The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 — projects
the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the
slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this
new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or
contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-
pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from
twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it
also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns
of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept
the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the
pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in
the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion
thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other
province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios
actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.

In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court,
thus:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while
another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is
fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they
could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible,
and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part
of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains
must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to
legislate, . . . .12

Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no
substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated
differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real party in interest.

Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that
the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's
substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang,
Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.

The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to
ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the
Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio
before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town
different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different
communities which are fanned into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and
as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even
know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may
feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by
constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of
the community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on
the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent
Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.

No costs allowed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24806 February 13, 1926

JULIO AGCAOILI, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ALBERTO SUGUITAN, Defendant-Appellee.

The appellant in his own behalf.

The appellee in his own behalf.

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte. Its purpose was
to obtain the extraordinary legal writ of quo warranto. The petition was denied by the trial court and the
plaintiff appealed.

Facts:
chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte by Francis
Harrison on March 25, 1916, with authority to have and hold the said office with all the powers, privileges,
and emoluments thereinto of right appertaining into him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law.

On the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature, composed of the Senate and House of
Representatives, adopted Act No. 3107, which was " an Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the
Administrative Code relative to the judiciary in order to reorganize the latter; increasing the number of
judges for certain judicial districts; increasing the salaries of judges of Courts of First Instance; vesting the
Secretary of Justice with authority to detail a district judge temporarily to a district or province other than
his own; regulating the salaries of justices of the peace; abolishing the municipal court and justice of the
peace court of the City of Manila and creating in lieu thereof a municipal court with three branches;
regulating the salaries of clerks of court and other subordinate employees of Courts of First Instance, and
for other purposes.

On the 9th day of April, 1923, Luis Torres, the Undersecretary of Justice sent a letter to Julio Agcaoili,
through the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Third Judicial District, of the Province of Ilocos Sur;
saying that he should cease to be a justice because he is now over 65 years old. Justice Agcaoili filled a
protest through a letter addressed to the undersecretary to which he asserted that he will not cease from
the office because he was appointed as justice of peace before the enactment of Act 3107, and he has
the right to hold office during good behaviour. Agcaoili filed protest at Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He
waited for a reply but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for writ of quo warranto in the CFI of the
Province of Ilocos Norte.

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to the petitioner with regard to his petition for quo
warranto

Held:
No, Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of office and franchise. Section 216 provides
“Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless
the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall
an action be brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause
of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose.” The Supreme Court held that this provision is
applicable only to private officials. Hence, it has no applicability to the petitioner, who is a justice of the
peace. The second point the court made is with regard to the rules of Statutory Construction, given that
the said provision is applicable to public officials, the sentence after the word “committed;” should not be
treated as a separate thought from the preceding phrase. In the end, the court ruled that the petitioner
remain in office.

The judgment appealed from should be revoked, and a judgment should be entered ordering the
restoration of the appellant to the office from which he was illegally rejected. We should follow the effect
of the doctrine announced solemnly by this court in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543). So
ordered.

StatCon maxim: A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a
separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what
follows that semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used
for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the
expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the
purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose,
namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon
makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma.
JULIO AGCAOILI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ALBERTO SUGUITAN, defendant-appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:

The facts involved in the decision of those questions are as follows:

(a) That the said Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte, with
authority "to have and to hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him,
subject to the conditions prescribed by law.

“ to which the appointee was "subject" at the time of his appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 (vol. 8 Public Laws, 153).
Said section is amendment to section 67 of Act No. 136, and provides for the "appointment and term of the justices of the peace."
It provides that one justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice shall be appointed by the Governor-General, etc., for each municipality
organized according to the Municipal Code. Said section further provides that "All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall
hold office during good behavior . . . ."

Said Act in section 203 provides for "the appointment and distribution of justices of the peace" with the proviso in said section ". .
. That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five
years." Attention is here called to the fact again that there is nothing in the title of the Act, which, indicates that said Act contains
provisions for "appointment of justices of the peace" nor as to the period during which they may serve after appointment. Attention is
also invited to the fact that the same section (203) contains provisions for the jurisdiction of justices of the peace while section 207
contains provisions defining the"qualifications for justices of the peace." Section 210 of said Act provides for the "filling of vacancies
in the office of justices of the peace." There is nothing in the title of the Act which in any way indicates that the Act contains said
provisions. Attention is here called to the provision of the Act of Congress of the 29th day of August, 1916, and to section 3 thereof,
which provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that the subject shall be
expressed in the title of the bill." The effect of a violation of said provision of said Act of Congress will be discussed later.

FACTS

The Undersecretary of Justice sent the following letter to the said Julio Agcaoili, stated “In view of the provision of section 203 of the
Administrative Code as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3107, which, in part, provides that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, and in view of the fact that the record shows that you
are over sixty-five years of age already, I have the honor to hereby advise you that, upon receipt hereof, you cease to be a justice of
the peace by operation of said amendment of the Administrative Code.”

In Agcaoili’s response he believes that the aforecited part of the provision of section 1 of Act No. 3107 does not include those justices
of the peace who had already been appointed justices of the peace, like the undersigned, before the passage and enactment of said
Act No. 3107 and the amended Administrative Code nor can this be the intention of the legislator, for if it were so, it should have so
stated in order that the justices of the peace already appointed, who were discharging the functions of the office and who had attained
the age of 65 years when said Act was passed and enacted, should cease from their office.

And that he was appointed on March 25, 1916, and therefore under Act No. 2041, enacted February 3, 1911. Section 1 of this Act,
which amended section 67 of Act No. 136, was not amended by any subsequent Act and provides: All justices if the peace and
auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office who have not the qualifications required by this Act
shall continue in office until their successors are appointed.

Julio Agcaoili presented protest and patiently waited in vain for a resolution by the Secretary of Justice and not having received any
reply, he filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE
WON sec 203 of the administrative code by section 1 of act no. 3107 providing that the justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
shall be appointed to serve until they have reaches 65 years of age should be give PROSPECTIVE effect only?

HELD
YES. It should be given prospective effect only following the doctrine in the case of Segovia vs Noel that said act no 3107 is not
applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed before the said act went into force.

Considering that the great weight of authority is to the effect that the provision like the one above quoted from the Jones Law is
mandatory; and considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act
contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of
sixty-five years," we are forced to the conclusions that, that provision is illegal, void and contrary to the mandatory provision of the
Jones Law, and that said law (3107) cannot be applied to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior
to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his
office as justice of the peace, he was forced to do so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as
justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay.

G.R. No. L-9659 May 29, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VALERIANO VALENSOY Y MASA, defendant-appellant.
Rosauro L. Alvarez for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista for
appellee.

Facts:

Valeriano Valensoy y Masa was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with a violation of section
26, Act No. 1780 (concealment of a bolo, about 9" blade with a leather sheath, a deadly weapon) in
criminal case No. 32068.

He moved to quash the information on the ground that as the title of Act No. 1780, to wit: "An Act to
regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the
possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act," does not embrace weapon
other than firearms, the inclusion of section 26 in the said Act outlawing the concealment about one's
person of a bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon, violates the constitutional provision
that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill."1

The trial court denied the motion on the ground that at the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 the
prohibition had reference to private or local bills only and "that when a law containing a subject-matter not
expressed in the title is valid under existing constitutional provisions when enacted it remains valid
thereafter regardless of any change or amendment in such constitutional provisions when enacted it
remains valid thereafter regardless of any change or amendment or the change existed at the time of the
enactment of the bill into law."

Issue:
WON Act No. 1780

Held:

Act No. 1780 was enacted on 12 October 1907. At the time, the prohibition against the enactment of bills
into law embracing more than one subject not expressed in the title of the bills, referred to private or local
bills only. Act No. 1780 remained operative even after the Constitution took effect because it is not
consistent with the constitution.

The constitutional prohibition in Sec 21 (1), Art 6 , refers to bills that may thereafter be enacted into law.
It has no reference to laws in force and existing at the time the Constitution took effect.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa
Case No. 230
G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957)
Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55
FACTS:
Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by
concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act,
which was an Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms , and to
prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act, did not include weapons
other than firearms, and that Section 26 violated the constitutional provision that no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule
2. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution.

HELD:
No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on October 12, 1907, the one subject-one title rule referred to
private and local bills only, and to bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and
existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject
expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution,
pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution.

LATIN MAXIM:
30a, 36a, 46a, 50

G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of
Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of
Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents.

This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction

Facts:

On September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of
foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed
of the other respondents herein1 for the implementation of said proposed importation.

On September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales — a rice planter, and president of the
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of
rice and corn — filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of
foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction",
because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 — explicitly
prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency;" that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the
pendency this case and to prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual.

Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be
forthwith issued restraining respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of
the Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment
be rendered making said injunction permanent.

Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and petitioner's
pray for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties appeared and argued
orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on,
that the resolution said incident may require some pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a
decision on the merits of the case, the same was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties,
however, waived the right to argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.

Issue:

whether or not respondents herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed
importation.

Held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has
no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said
authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of
the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.

Librares v Executive Secretary

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Sec. 21, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts:

Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, filed a petition questioning said act because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly
repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation of foreign rice by the
Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

Hechanova countered that the importation is authorized by the President for military stock pile
purposes (the president is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency
without waiting for special authority). He also contends that there is no prohibition on importation
made by the “Government itself”. He also further that the Government has already entered into 2
contracts with Vietnam and Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under
international law; and, that such agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof by
the representatives of both parties. Hechanova also maintains that the status of petitioner as a rice
planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein
prayed for and that Gonzales has not exhausted all administrative remedies available to him before
coming to court".

Issues:

1. Does Gonzales have sufficient interest to file the case?

2. Whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in this case

3. What is the nature of the government contracts with Vietnam and Burma? Are they valid?

4. May an international agreement be invalidated by our courts?

Held:

1. Yes. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn, RA 3452 declares that "the policy of
the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic foods directly from those tenants,
farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their products
at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment. ... ."
Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion, is entitled
to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the
purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and
as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has
sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he
believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.

2. No. The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one", or where the controverted act is "patently illegal"
or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a
department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar fails under each one of the foregoing
exceptions to the general rule.

3. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements.
But, even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same
are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may,
under the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited
by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the
legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through
an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 138, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by
and/or for the armed forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The
importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

4. Yes. The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in
Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules
of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in — (1) All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when
it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress

Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento

Case No. 133
G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957)
Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42
FACTS:
Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection
of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty, property and due process of law 2) It is a
violation of the constitutional requirement that a bill s title must reflect the subject matter of
the same because regulate does not really mean nationalize and prohibit 3) the Act violates
International treaties and Laws.

ISSUE:
W/N RA 1180 is constitutional?

HELD:
RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the
constitutional requirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title.
This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because thetitle must be able to apprise legislators and
the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. Constitution
precludes the encroaching of one department to the responsibilities of the other departments.
The legislature is primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and
expediency of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this.

LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 24a, d
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila, respondents.

Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No.
1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others,
are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that:
It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty
would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of
the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium
of a treaty.

Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw
no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the
law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.”
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila, respondents.

FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent
persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.

a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which
are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business,
unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case
of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected
by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:

it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of
the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen,
which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.

RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is
this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he
temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State
cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien
may become the potential enemy of the State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes
his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a
monopolistic control on the nation’s economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.

SUMULONG vs. COMELEC

SUMULONG vs. COMELEC
73 P.R. 288, 1942

Facts:
Under the authority of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, Comelec adopted a resolution providing
for the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed by the political parties and persons named therein.
Petitioner, Juan Sumulong, President of the political party Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, claims the exclusive right
to propose the appointment of such inspectors. He contends that the resolution of the Comelec, by giving
the so-called rebel candidate or free-zone faction of the Nationalista Party the right to propose one election
inspector for each of the precincts in each of the 53 legislative districts, contravenes Section 5 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 657. He argues that under that section the Nationalista Party has the right to
propose one, and only one inspector for each precinct, and that the resolution has the effect of giving that
party two inspectors in each and every precinct within those legislative districts. Petitioner maintains that
the discretion given by Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the Comelec in the Choice of election
inspectors is not absolute, but limited by the provision of the Act that the majority party shall have the right
to propose only one inspector.

Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec, in giving the so-called rebel candidates and free-zone factions of the
Nationalista Party the right to propose election inspectors, has acted within the limits of the discretion
granted to it by law.

Held:
The present case is not an appropriate case for review by the Supreme Court. The Comelec is a
constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. It should
be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the
great objective for which it was created – free, orderly, and honest elections. The Supreme Court may not
agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal / constitute grave abuse of discretion,
this court should not interfere. The Comelec because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a
peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions. Due regard to the independent
character of the Commission, as ordained in the Constitution requires that the power of the Supreme Court
to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate
cases.
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications,
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

Facts:
This is a petition raised by the members of the lower courts who assails the constitutionality of Section 35
of Republic Act No. 7354 implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-
28. P

It is alleged that the said law is discriminatory per se to withdraw the franking privilege of the Judiciary but
not on other offices of the government, such as: the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of
the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in
the filing of complaints against public offices and officers.

Respondents counter that there is no discrimination since the law is based on the valid classification in
accordance of the equal protection clause. In addition, not only the Judiciary department will be affected
with it but also other offices like Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical
Commission; etc. P

Issue:
WON Sec. 35of RA 7354 is violates the equal protection clause?

Held:
The Court held Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 unconstitutional, thus violates the equal protection clause.

The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal
protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking
privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of
the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme
Court should be similarly treated as that Committee.

In the SC’s view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived
need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the
Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government
and the people. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who
do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,
especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it
at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35
did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The
petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment
to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference
committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the
Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final
reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was
created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have
been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the
benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free
carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of
their own public functions.

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it
was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law
as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal
protection of laws.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and
the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege
shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
G.R. No. L-22945 March 3, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOVITA V.

BUENVIAJE, Defendant-Appellant (47 Phil. 536)

Facts:

Defendant Jovita V. Buenviaje was accused of violating the Medical Act, where the information filed
against her alleged that she had been practicing medicine without having obtained from the Board of
Medical Examiners the necessary certificate of registration, in the City of Manila. She was admitted that
she treated, and manipulated the head and body of Regino Noble, for the purposes of curing him of
ailments, diseases, pains and physical defects which he pretended to suffer from, and for advertising and
offering her services as a physician (doctor of chiropractic), evidenced by letterheads and signs exposed
on her office door, and in newspapers circulated in Manila, and adding the prefix ‘Dra.’ To her name,
causing the public to believe that she was a legitimate doctor.

Defendant admitted said facts. She further admitted to collecting ₽1 from Noble for her services, and that
she graduated a doctor of chiropractic from the American University School of Chiropractic on 13-Aug-
1919, in Chicago.

Upon this admission and some other evidence to the same effect, the trial court found the defendant
guilty as charged in the information and, in accordance with section 2678 of the Administrative Code,
sentenced her to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs. From this judgment the defendant appeals to this court and presents four assignments of error.ch

Counsel for defendant appealed that the demurrer to information should have been sustained when the
information charged more than one offense (illegal practice of medicine, and illegal representation). The
Medical Law is contained in sections 758 to 783 of the Administrative Code and it is argued that
inasmuch as some of the illegal acts with which the defendant is charged are prohibited by section 770 of
the Code and others by section 783, the defendant is in reality accused of two separate and distinct
offenses, namely, illegal practice of medicine and illegally representing oneself as a doctor.

Under the second assignment of error the appellant argues in substance that chiropractic has nothing to
do with medicine and that the practice of that profession can therefore not be regarded as practice of
medicine. There is no merit whatever in this contention. Assuming without conceding that chiropractic
does not fall within the term "practice of medicine" in its ordinary acceptation, we have the statutory
definition contained in section 770 of the Administrative Code and which clearly includes the
manipulations employed in chiropractic. The statutory definition necessarily prevails over the ordinary
one.

The third assignment of error is closely related to the foregoing. The appellant contends that the
prohibition in section 783 against the unauthorized use of the title "doctor" must be understood to refer to
"Doctor of Medicine" and has no application to doctors of chiropractic. Under different circumstances that
might possibly be so, but where, as here, chiropractic is by statute made a form of the practice of
medicine, it necessarily follows that a person holding himself out as a doctor of chiropractic in legal effect
represents himself as a doctor of medicine.

section 770 of the Administrative Code, on the ground that the subject of the Act is not sufficiently
expressed in its title and that it embraces more than one subject. There is no merit in this contention.

An Act to amend sections seven hundred and fifty-nine, seven hundred and sixty, seven hundred and
sixty-one, seven hundred and sixty-two, seven hundred and sixty-five, seven hundred and sixty-seven,
seven hundred and seventy, seven hundred and seventy-four, seven hundred and seventy-five, seven
hundred and seventy-six, seven hundred and seventy-eight, seven hundred and eighty, seven hundred
and eighty-two, seven hundred and eighty-three, and twenty-six hundred and seventy-eight of Act
Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, increasing the number
of the members of the Board of Medical Examiners, conferring upon the same certain additional powers
and responsibilities and for other purposes.

Issue/s of the case:

- Whether or not chiropractic is a form of medicine regulated under the law.
- Whether or not the information was duplicitous.

Regulation/s involved:
1. Act 2711 (1917 Administrative Code)
- Section 770. Inhibition against practicing medicine by uncertificated persons – No person shall
practice medicine in the Philippine Islands without having previously obtained the proper
certificate of registration issued by the Board of Medical Examiners as herein constituted, or the
lawful Board which was its predecessor, except as hereinafter stated in this section and in the
next following section of this Act.

A person shall be considered to practice medicine within the meaning of this section, who shall,
for compensation or reward or even without the same, diagnose, treat, operate, prescribe
remedies for any human disease, injury, deformity, physical or mental condition or any ailment,
real or supposed, regardless of the nature of the remedy or treatment used or recommended, or
who shall, by means of signs, cards, advertisements, or in any other way either offer or undertake
by any means or method to diagnose, treat, manipulate, adjust, operate, or prescribe for any
human disease, pain injury, deformity, physical or mental condition.
2. Act 2711 (1917 Administrative Code)
- Section 2678. Violation of Medical Law – A person violating any provision of the Medical Law
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than ₽300, or by imprisonment for not
more than 90 days, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Application of regulations involved:

1. Chiropractic is considered as practice of medicine, according to the statutory definition of the term
“practice of medicine” as found in Section 770 of the 1917 Administrative Code (Act 2711).
Hence, defendant was required to have the pertinent license to practice, and having been found
in want of one, is guilty of illegal practice.
2. Said provision did not distinguish between illegal practice and illegal representation. Both are
violations of the Medical Law, and are merely different ways of violating the same law.

Conclusion:
- Supreme Court ruled that there was no duplicitous information when the Medical Law itself did
not distinguish any specific violation, but mere violation of said statute is punishable. Hence, for
holding herself out as a practitioner of chiropractic when she was not qualified, for falsely
advertising and holding herself out to the public as a ‘Dra.’ and a practitioner of chiropractic,
Jovita Buenviaje was found guilty of violating the Medical Law. It was further concluded by the
High Court that in order to use the prefix ‘Dr.’ or ‘Dra.’, one must be a doctor of medicine, and
such distinction has no application to practitioners of chiropractic.
-
All of the sections enumerated in the title quoted relate to the same general subject, namely, defining and
regulating the practice of medicine, and section 770 is expressly mentioned as one of the sections
amended.

This is sufficient. Under constitutional provisions similar to ours the general rule is that a title which
declares the amendatory statute to be an act to amend a designated section or the like of a specified
Code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory Act need not be further stated. (Ross vs.
Aguirre, 191 U.S., 60; Udell vs. Citizens Street R. Co., 152 Ind., 507; McGuire vs. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
131 Iowa, 340; Lankford vs. County Commissioners of Somerset County, 73 Md., 105; Tabor vs. State,
34 Tex. Crim., 631; Com. vs. Brown, 91 Va., 762.) For a full and authoritative discussion of this subject,
see Note to Lewis vs. Dunne, 55 L.R.A., 833. See also Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Municipality of Binalonan and Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia (32 Phil., 634) and Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad (p. 385, ante).

We find no error in the judgment appealed from and the same is therefore affirmed, with the costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the
law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of
the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the
Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down
for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme
Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within
the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol
VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II,
ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S
SUELLO, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with
squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772.

at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into,
occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty.
Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture
Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of
the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a
portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the
pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is
preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to
the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated
December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused
entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected
"with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of
a grazing land.

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is
devoid of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.

HELD:
NO. Appeal was devoid of merit. The Trial court’s dismissal was affirmed.

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of
involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this
case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities,
particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction
which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. L-239 June 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLONIO CARLOS, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People's Court and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, to pay a fine of P7,000, and costs.

The lower court found that one day in July or August, 1944, about two or three o'clock in the
morning, a truck pulled up to the curb in front of a house on Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
where one Martin Mateo lived. From the truck the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted together with
members of the Japanese military police and pointed Martin Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's
house to his Japanese companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's
dwelling first and Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao
Mateo and Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put them in the truck. Along with other persons
who had been rounded up in the other places and who had been kept in the truck while it was
parked, they were taken to Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and
from which they were released six days later. The reason for the arrest and maltreatment of Martin
and Ladislao Mateo was that they had refused to divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino
Mateo, who was a guerrilla and who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was
arrested and tortured because he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at least
suspected.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: MERE QUESTION OF THE LAW.

- why PCA is unconstitutional: 4 errors
1. The lower Court cannot convicted of treason because there is a settled principle in international law when
a territory is under the governance of an enemy, all political laws of the previous government are
suspended. Thus our laws at that time have no binding effect because crime of treason is a political
complexion. Likewise Philippine laws are inconsistent and suspended, without force and effect. Allegiance
(legal obligation) distinguishable from loyalty. Thus, decision should be reversed because the law that
created it is unconstitutional.
-law created PCA is non-binding Japanese law is in force therefore making it unconstitutional
-PCA contains provisions entirely foreign to the subject matter
-Second provision: retaining the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (it should try and decide cases
against threats to national security)
-Section 14: Disqualification of SC Justices and procedure of their substitution
1. PCA deprives persons similarly situated of equal protection of the laws
2. Political offenders accused by PC are denied of preliminary investigation while others are entitled
to.
3. PO accused by PC have a limited right to appeal while the accused charged by courts of first
instance have an absolute right to appeal.
4. Appeals involving person who held public office under Phil. Exec. Comm and Phil. Rep or any
branch are to be heard and decided by a substantially different SC thus lacking uniformity in rulings
over the same subject matter.
5. provision change the existing rules of Court on the subject of bail
6. Art 125 of RPC: Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authority (shall be
allowed upon request to communicate confer any time with his attorney or counsel)

ISSUE:
Crime of treason should be reversed because PCA is unconstitutional.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE:
1. PC is a special court with restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency and national
security, operate on limited period only imposed by economic necessity and other factors of public policy.
Main concern is the trial and disposition of the cases over 6000 held by US military to be turned over to
Commonwealth government.
2. In view of the great numbers of offenders with limited time, amount of labor will take time if all of which
are allowed to have P.I considering there’s an urgency in disposing the cases. P.I is n9t a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution.
3. PC is a collegiate court while CFI is of single judge. Appeal is not constitutional but a statutory right.
Admitted fact already saves court the provision of being objected from being unconstitutional.
4. No merit on contention since it is beyond the subject of constitutional guarantee.
-The disqualification of some or majority of SC to the PC and their substitution by people from CA, not a
new court in the eyes of the law.
-A court possesses a separate personality from the men who compose them
-lack of uniformity: constitution does not ensure uniformity of judicial decisions neither does it assure
immunity from judicial error.
5. granting bail to political offenders detained by US army and released to the commonwealth but not to
other political offenders
6. suspended to those political detainees
CRIME: treason Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the
Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them
aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death
and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.
RECLUSION TEMPORAL:
Max- 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day to 20 years
Medium: 14 yrs, 8 mos and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months
Minimum: 12 yrs, 1 day to 14 yrs and 8 months

DECISION:

It is destructive of the independence of the judiciary and thereby violates the constitutional provision that
the Philippines is a republican state because:

(1) By creating a special court with jurisdiction over cases which were already within the
jurisdiction of the existing Courts of First Instance without any real necessity and urgent
justification, considering that the persons involved in said cases were more or less known and
identified at the time of the creation of said special court, the law establishes a precedent under
which the legislature may at any time remove from the jurisdiction of existing courts cases
involving definite or specific individuals or groups of individuals to serve any purpose which said
legislature or the legislators composing the same may wish to accomplish, either to the benefit or
damage of said individuals or groups of individuals;

(2) By limiting the choice of the judges to compose the People's Court to those who did not hold
any position in the Philippine Executive Commission and/or the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, the law makes a classification that has absolutely no rational basis inasmuch as the
reason for discriminating against those who served in said governments, which is, that they might
be prejudiced or influenced in favor of the accused exists in equal measure for those who did not
serve, in the sense that they may likewise be prejudiced or influenced against the accused; and

(3) In leaving practically in the hands of the Solicitor General the absolute right to choose, in
which court he shall prosecute the cases contemplated by the law, and in providing that the
judges of the People's Court shall be chosen from a limited group of the judges of the Court of
First Instance, etc., the law does not leave a wide room for the play of external factors in the
administration of justice to those concerned but also destroys the confidence of the people in the
judiciary.
These objections go to the wisdom of the law and to matters of policy. This being so, it is enough that the
Congress deemed it necessary to incorporate these provisions in Commonwealth Act No. 682. It is not
the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common
sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.

This proposition is covered by and answered in our comment on paragraph (d) of the brief.

SC AFFIRMED DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT

People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos

FACTS:

The People s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of
the People s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely
foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices
of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed
the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

W/N the People s Court Act was unconstitutional.

HELD:

No. The People s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for
the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied and
germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People s Court Act. The Congress is not
expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional rule is
satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.
G.R. No. 128448 February 1, 2001

SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MlRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL and PHILIPPINE EXCHANGE CO.,
INC., respondent

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 22, 1996, in
CA-G.R. CY No. 38607, as well as of its resolution of January 23, 1997, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. The challenged decision reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
City, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 14725.

Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols'
sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed
Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB.
The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds
to the payment of their obligations to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX)
to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree
directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government.

Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an
accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to
make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due
and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en
pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties.
PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D.
No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar
pertained to the National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against
PNB.

Issue:

Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the
Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held:

It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny
the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress
that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving
declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action"
and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule,
there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential
decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process
clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now
ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be
before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the
Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing
to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and
lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the respondent court in CA-
G.R. CY 38607 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984

ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO,
Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April
1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to
transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial commander
and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines
Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents, Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa,
and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which
prohibited the transport of carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda
distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and
damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later transferred to
Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.

HELD:

No, executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already
noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14,
1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section
11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which
prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture
provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be
informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order
can be bound thereby.

The practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when
approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly
promulgated".

In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the
head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-
A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are
reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with
the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right
to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT
BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA,
HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.

Facts:

This is a petition raised by Senator Blas Ople to invalidate the Administrative Order No. 308 or the
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos.

The petitioner contends that the implementation of the said A.O. will violate the rights of the citizens of
privacy as guaranteed by the Constitution. Ople vs. Torres [Rights of Privacy]

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy.

HELD:

Yes.

The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself,
it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.

The right of privacy is guaranteed in several provisions of the Constitution:

"Sections 3 (1), 1, 2, 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights

The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:

(1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with
basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and

(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons
seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the
issuance of A.O. No. 308. Ople vs. Torres [Rights of Privacy]

But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less
verify the correctness of the data encoded.

They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

The petition is granted and declared the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" null and void for being unconstitutional.
G.R. No. L-51353 June 27, 1988

SHELL PHILIPPINES, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant.