Constitutional Law 1 PDF

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
VOLUME I
Based on the outline of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
April 1996 Revised Edition
_______________
Compiled by Jose Salvador Y. Mirasol
Updated by UP Law Batch 1995

Updated and Enlarged by Rodell A. Molina
UP Law Batch 1996
This revised edition is intended to further improve a previous edition of this work.
Important points taken from Justice Isagani Cruz's book in Political Law have been summarized in
this work.
Special thanks to Lianne Tan for lending me her diskette in Political Law Review as updated
by UP Law Batch 1995, Ma. Rosario Bernardo for digesting some of the cases in volume I, Shirley
Alinea for lending me her notes in Political Law, Non Lerrer, Buddy Carale and TJ Matta for
patiently printing this work.
This work is dedicated to UP Law Batch 1996, to which I belong, most specially to Section
A. May this work help us in passing Political Law this coming bar exams in September 1996.
Let us all pray for a one hundred per cent passing rate.
"To Him be the glory and honor forever."
RAM
_______________
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
I. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS IN PUBLIC LAW
A. Political Law defined
That branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the government organs of
the state and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. (Sinco, Philippine Political
Law 1, 11th ed., 1962)
Scope of Political Law. The entire field of political law may be subdivided into (a) the law of public
administration, (b) constitutional law, (c) administrative law, and (d) the law of public corporations. These
four subdivisions may be briefly described for the time being, as follows: The first deals with the organization
and management of the different branches of the government; the second, with the guaranties of the constitution
to individual rights and the limitations on governmental action; the third, with the exercise of executive power in
the making of rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights; and the last, with governmental
agencies for local government or for other special purposes. (Sinco 1)
Macariola v Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 (1982)
Spanish Code of Commerce Provision Disqualifying Judges from Engaging in Commerce is Part of Spanish
Political Law Abrogated by Change of Sovereignty
F: The complainant alleged that respondent judge of the CFI violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Art. 14 of the Code of
Commerce (w/c prohibited judges, among others, from engaging in commerce, either in person or in proxy or in the
financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies w/in the limits of the districts) when he associated himself w/
the Traders Mftg. & Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and pres., said corp. having been organized to engage in
business.
HELD: Although this provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce w/c is part of the commercial
laws of the Phils, it partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges. Political law has been defined
as that branch of public law w/c deals w/ the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State
and defines the relations of the state w/ the inhabitants of its territory. Specifically, Art. 14 of the Code of
Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law bec. it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees w/ respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.
xxx Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to US, and later on from US to the Republic of the
Phils., Art. 14 of the said Code must be deemed to have been abrogated bec. where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not w/ those of the new sovereign,
are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly reenacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There
appears to be no enabling or affirmative act. Consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to respondent Judge. VV.
B. Constitutional Law Defined
A constitution is both a legal document and a political plan. It, therefore, embodies legal rules as well as
political principles. And so when we speak of constitutional law in the strict sense of the tern, we refer to the
legal rules of the constitution. xxx
xxx
In the sense in w/c the concept is understood in American and Philippine Jurisprudence, constitutional
law is a term used to designate the law embodied in the constitution and the legal principles growing out of the
interpretation and application made by courts of the provisions of the constitution in specific cases. xxx
Constitutional law forms a distinct branch of jurisprudence dealing w/ the legal principles affecting the
nature, adoption, amendment, and operation of the constitution. (Sinco 67.)
Types of Constitutional Law. In general, there are three (3) different types of constitutional law, namely,
(1) the English type, characterized by the absence of a written constitution (Sinco 67)
An unwritten constitution, and the power of judicial review by the courts. Thus, the courts cannot
invalidate the acts of the parliament as being unconstitutional because of "parliamentary supremacy." (Mirasol
notes.)
(2) the European continental type, where there is a written constitution w/c gives the courts no power to
declare ineffective statutes contrary to it (Sinco 67.)
A written constitution but no power of judicial review by the courts. The socalled Constitutional
Courts of France do not exercise real judicial review but only render advisory opinions on constitutional
questions upon the request of the government, not of parties in actual litigation. (Mirasol notes.)

(3) the American type where the legal provisions of the written constitution are given effect through the
power of the courts to declare ineffective or void ordinary statutes repugnant to it. (Sinco 67.)
A written constitution and the exercise of judicial review by the courts, which is the power of the courts
to determine the constitutional validity of the acts of legislature and other branches of government. (Mirasol
notes.)
C. Constitution Defined
It is "a law for the government, safeguarding individual rights, set down in writing." (Hamilton.)
Such a view found acceptance in the work of Tanada and Fernando:
"It may be more specifically defined as a written instrument organizing the government, distributing its
powers and safeguarding the rights of the People."
From Malcolm and Laurel:
"It is the written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited
and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful
exercise for the benefit of the body politic."
According to Schwartz, "a constitution is seen as an organic instrument, under which governmental
powers are both conferred and circumscribed. Such stress upon both grant and limitation of authority is
fundamental in American theory. 'The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of
governmental activity.'" (Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2021, 2nd ed., 1977.)
Types of Constitutions
Classification of Constitutions:
Constitutions are classified as follows: (1) written and unwritten, and (2) rigid and flexible.
Written and Unwritten (Classification as to when it is adopted.)
(a) A written constitution is one the provisions of w/c have been reduced to writing and embodied in
one or more instruments at a particular time. The US Constitution is a classical example of a written
constitution.
Written constitutions have been also called conventional or enacted, bec. they are given definite form by
a steadily constituted body, the constitutional convention, at a particular time.
Written constitutions are either democratic or monarchical. Democratic constitutions essentially spring
from the authority of the people. Monarchical constitutions are those granted by a monarch as an act of grace to
his subjects. This class of constitutions are also called octroyed constitutions. They belong to the past age.
(b) An unwritten constitution is one w/c has not been committed to writing at any specific time but is
the accumulated product of gradual political and legal development. The English Constitution is the modern
example of this class.
Unwritten constitutions have been known also as cumulative or evolved, bec. they are not formulated at
any definite time but are rather the outcome of a political evolutionary process.
Flexible and Rigid Constitutions. (Classification according to amendment process.)
The classification of constitutions into written and unwritten has been considered unscientific and
inaccurate bec. no written constitution, after having been applied for a considerable period, can remain
substantially unchanged in its original condition other than by formal amendments. xxx.
To classify constitutions into rigid and flexible is to use a basis that has to do more w/ their nature rather
than their mere form.
Rigid. A constitution is classified as rigid when it may not be amended except through a special
process distinct from and more involved than the method of changing ordinary laws. It is supposed that by such
a special procedure, the constitution is rendered difficult to change and thereby acquires a greater degree of
stability.
Flexible. A constitution is classified as flexible when it may be changed in the same manner and
through the same body that enacts ordinary legislation. The British Constitution is flexible.
A constitution's stability depends upon other factors than the mere rigidity or flexibility of the amending
process, such as (1) the general temperament of the people and their leaders and (2) the degree of a nation's
political maturity and social homogenity. (Sinco 6870.)
The Philippine Constitution is both written and rigid (See Art. XVII on the Amendment process).
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION
Historical Background of the 1987 Constitution
The history of the 1987 Constitution began on 11 April 1899, the date when the Treaty of Paris between
the United and Spain of 10 December 1898 became effective upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of
both countries. But the sources of the 1987 Constitution are (i) McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission; (ii) Spooner Amendment; (iii) Philippine Bill of 1902; (iv) Jones Law of 1916, otherwise known as
the Philippine Autonomy Act; (v) 1935 Constitution; (vi) 1973 Constitution and (vi) Freedom Constitution of
1986 and its implementing orders.
Treaty of Paris
Under the Treaty of Paris, the Philippines was ceded by Spain to the United States. Spain relinquished
its sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, and with this, all laws of a political nature were automatically
abrogated.
The Treaty provided that the civil and political status of all inhabitants of the islands was to be
determined by the US Congress.
The Philippines in turn, was not given the status of an "incorporated territory" (as to make it a candidate
for statehood) and so ex proprio vigore, the US Constitution did not apply to the Philippines unless the US
Congress expressly enacted its provisions.
McKinley's Instructions
President McKinley, legislating as CommanderinChief, issued on 7 April 1900 his "Letter of
Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission " under Taft.
It set up a "divided civil and military government" with the existing Military governor as the Executive,
and a Philippine Commission, created on 1 September 1900, as the Legislative, both representing the US
President as CommanderinChief.
It also extended to the Philippines all the rights in the Bill of Rights of the US Federal Constitution,
except the right to bear arms (because the country was in rebellion) and the right to a trial by jury (because the
Americans distrusted the Filipinos capacity to be a just judge of his peers). The right to jury trial of an
American charged with a crime in the Philippines was denied by the courts in US v Dorr, 2 Phil 332 (1903) by
virtue of the Letter of Instruction.
This was the first Organic Act (a law which establishes the structure and limitations of the government)
of the Philippines. What it lacked, as a constitution, were the ratification by the people, and the right of
amendment (which was reserved solely to the US President).
The judiciary was subsequently established on 11 June 1901, with a Supreme Court, Courts of First
Instance, and Justice of Peace Courts.
Spooner Amendment
On 4 July 1901, the Spooner Amendment, which was actually a rider to the "Army and Navy
Appropriations Act," changed the then "divided, military and civil government" into a fully civil government,
under the US Congress. All acts of the Philippine Commission would now begin: "Be it enacted by the
authority of the US government," and no longer by authority of the US President.
Philippine Bill of 1902
The US Congress now in control of the Philippines, ratified all the organic acts of the President, in order
to prevent disruption of government, and on 1 July 1900, passed the Philippine Bill of 1902, which was to be
organic act of the Philippines from 1902 to 1906. The organic act introduced significant provisions to
constitutional history.
The Philippine Commission was the upper house. It was under the GovernorGeneral who retained all
the executive power, including the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus upon recommendation of the
Philippine Commission.
It established an elective lower house called the Philippine Assembly, composed entirely of Filipinos. It
called for the first election in the Philippines to fill up, the membership in the lower house, as soon as the
Philippine insurrection stopped and there was a condition of general peace, except in the Moro and Non
Christian provinces.
A census was taken and completed on 28 March 1903 and with a certification of peace and of Filipino
acceptance of the US government made by the Philippine Commission on 29 March 1907, the election for the
Philippine Assembly was conducted on 10 July 1907, with Osmena as speaker.
The Bill also defined for the first time who the citizens of the Philippines were. They were all the

inhabitants of the Philippine islands who were subjects of Spain as of 11 April 1899, who continued to reside
therein, and all the children born subsequent thereto. This definition is still good law today.
Jones Law
On 29 August 1916, the US Congress passed the Jones Law, otherwise known as the Philippine
Autonomy Act.
It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers; this was the prototype of our
present setup. The executive power was in the hands of an American GovernorGeneral, who was independent
of the Legislature, and who was given the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and impose martial law
without the recommendation of the Legislature. The Legislature was composed of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, all composed of Filipinos. The judiciary continued to be made up of the Supreme Court, the
CFIs and Justice of Peace Courts.
Under this setup, while the Filipinos has all the legislative power, the Americans had all the executive
power and thus, also the control of the government. Thus, in the Board of Control (National Coal Corporation)
cases, the US Supreme Court ruled, despite the dissent of Holmes and Brandeis, that the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House could not vote the stocks of the NCC and elect its directors because this was a
political function. Only the GovernorGeneral could vote the government shares, said the court.
The definition of who were citizens of the Philippines first enunciated in the Philippine Bill of 1902,
was carried over by the Jones Law.
TydingsMcDuffie Law
Although this was not an organic act, it is important in the constitutional history of the Philippines
because it was to be the enabling statute, providing the mechanism whereby the constitution of an independent
Philippines could be adopted. The law, upon its acceptance by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines, provided for (i) the calling of a Constitutional Convention to draft a Constitution for the Philippines,
(ii) the adoption of a Constitution that established a republican government, with a Bill of Rights, and a
separation of church and state, (iii) the submission of the draft to the US President for certification that the
Constitution was in conformity with the conditions set by the TydingsMcDuffie Law, and (iv) its ratification by
the people in a plebiscite. Complete independence was to take place ten (10) years after its effectivity.
1935 Constitution
Accordingly, on 30 July 1934, an election was held to choose the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. Claro M. Recto was elected President of the Convention. On 8 February 1935, the Concon
approved the draft. On 23 March 1935, the draft was certified by the President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt as
conforming to the TydingsMcDuffie Law. On 14 May 1935, it was ratified by the people in a plebiscite, with
the provisions on the qualifications of the President, VicePresident and members of Congress taking effect upon
ratification. In September 1935, the first election under the 1935 Constitution was conducted with Manuel Luis
Quezon as President and Sergio Osmena as Vice President.
On 15 November 1935, upon the inauguration of the Commonwealth, the 1935 Constitution took effect.
This Constitution was to serve as the charter of the Commonwealth, and upon withdrawal of US sovereignty, of
the Republic.
The Constitution provides for a tripartite government, with the executive lodged in the President who
had a sixyear term, the legislative in a unicameral National Assembly, and the judiciary in a Supreme Court,
CFIs and Justice of Peace Courts as before.
In 1940, it was amended to provide for (a) a bicameral Congress with a Senate and a House of
Representatives; (b) a term of four years for the President, but with reelection and (c) the establishment of an
independent constitutional body known as the Commission on Elections.
War ensued, and the Philippines was so devastated that the declaration of its independence, due 15
November 1945 had to be postponed. At any rate, on 23 April 1946, the election of the first officials of the
Philippine Republic was held, and on 4 July 1946, the Republic was inaugurated and the Philippines became
"politically" independent of the US.
Theoretically, to an extent that sovereignty is never granted to a people but is earned by them as they
assert their political will, then it is a misnomer to say that 4 July 1946 was the day US granted independence to
the Philippines. More appropriately, it was the day when the US withdrew its sovereignty over the Philippines,
thus giving the Filipino people an occasion to assert their own independence.
But not "economically". On 30 April 1946, one week after the election, the US Congress passed the
Bell Trade Act which would grant Philippine prime exports entry to the US free of customs duties from 1946 to
1954, and a gradual increase in duties from 1954 to 1974 (LaurelLangley agreement), provided that the
Philippines would grant US citizens and corporations the same privileges, and in addition, the right to explore
natural resources of the Philippines in parity with the Filipinos, and to operate public utilities. This must be
accepted by Congress, embodied in an Executive Agreement, and reflected as an amendment in the Constitution.
The Senate approval of this bill gave rise to the case of Vera v Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (1946). The Senate
then had 11 Nacionalistas and 13 Liberals. Three Nacionalista Senatorselect (Vera, Diokno and Romero),
known to be against the Bell Trade Act, were prevented by the rest of the Senate, in what is known as "exclusion
proceedings," on grounds that their elections were marred with fraud. The political motivation was clear but the
SC was conned into lifting the injunction it issued for the withholding of the suspension, because of the
unfulfilled promise that the Senate would not carry out the suspension. With the balance of power offset, the
Bell Trade Act was passed. Subsequently, the SC had to dismiss the petition on the ground that the principle of
separation of powers, it could not order a coequal branch to reinstate a member.
The Senate authorized President Roxas to enter into an Executive Agreement, which he did on 3 July
1946, the eve of the declaration of Philippine Independence.
Then came the amendment of the Constitution in order to include the Parity Rights Agreement, which
gave rise to the case of Mabanag v Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1 (1947). Under the Amendatory Provisions of the 1935
Constitution, Congress, acting as constituent body, needed 3/4 vote to propose an amendment to the Constitu
tion. But with the three Senators still suspended, only the 21 remaining were used as the basis for computing the
3/4 requirement. When this was raised in court, it begged off from ruling on the ground that it was a political
question. It also used the Enrolled Bill Theory.
So with the amendment proposed, it was subsequently ratified on 5 March 1947.
The third time the Constitution was amended (1940, 1947) was in 1967. A Resolution of both houses
provided for (a) the amendment of the Constitution by a Convention, (b) the increase of seats in the House of
Representatives to make the Concon sufficiently representative, and (c) allowing members of the House as dele
gates without forfeiting their seats. The first was approved, the second and third were rejected. This became the
subject matter of Gonzales v COMELEC.
Election of delegates to the Concon took place on 10 November 1970. Then the ConCon met on 1 June
1971. Before it finished its work, it came up with a resolution calling for an amendment to the 1935 Constitution
reducing the voting age from 21 to 18, so that a wider base could vote in the ratification of the Constitution then
being drafted. A plebiscite was set by the COMELEC for 8 November 1971 but this was enjoined by the SC in
the case of Tolentino v COMELEC, the court ruling that a piecemeal amendment was not allowed by the 1935
Constitution since it provided that the amendments were to be ratified at "an election" which meant only one
election. The Court upheld its jurisdiction over the ConCon by arguing that since the Concon derived its power
from the Constitution, it was thus limited by the Constitution.
But it was subsequently overtaken by Martial Law. On 30 November 1972, the Convention submitted its
"draft" to the President, who called on a plebiscite to ratify the Constitution. This was questioned in the case of
Planas v COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105 (1973) on the ground that there can be no freedom of expression under
Martial Law. But the case was rendered moot and academic when the President cancelled the plebiscite and
instead held a citizens' assembly on 10 to 15 January, 1973. On 17 January 1973, the President came up with a
proclamation that the Constitution had come to full force and effect after its overwhelming ratification by the
people in a viva voce vote.
1973 Constitution
The validity of the ratification process was questioned in the case of Javellana v Executive Secretary, 50
SCRA 30 (1973) but the failure of the SC to come up with the necessary votes to declare the act as
unconstitutional forced it into the conclusion that "there are no further obstacles to considering the constitution
in force and effect."
The 1973 Constitution was amended four times.
The first, in 1976, gave the President, legislative powers even if the Interim Batasang Pambansa was
already operating.
The second, in 1980 was not significant. It merely raised the retirement of justices of the SC from 65 to
70 as to keep Fernando for five more years.
The third, in 1980 changed the form of government from Parliamentary to Presidential.
The fourth, in 1984, responded to the succession problem by providing for a VicePresident.
The start of the end of the Marcos years, of course, could be treated as early as 21 August 1983. But its
immediate precursor was the Snap Election which the President was forced to call and set on 7 February 1986 to
respond to the clamor for popular mandate.
The validity of the "Snap Election Law" called by the Batasang Pambansa was raised in the case of
Philippine Bar Associa tion
v COMELEC , 140 SCRA 455 (1985). The issue was raised because of the
conditional letter of resignation sent by Mr. Marcos to the Batasan, making his resignation effective only upon
(i) the holding of a Presidential election, (ii) the proclamation of a winner, (iii) the assumption into office by the
winning candidate. It was contended that a conditional resignation was not allowed under the 1973
Constitution, for it did not create a vacancy, and without a vacancy, there was no reason to call for an election.
But the SC failed to issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin the COMELEC from preparing for the election, thus
making "the initially legal question into a political one." In the meantime, the political parties have started
campaigning and the people were so involved in the election that to stop it on legal grounds would frustrate their
very will. And so, failing to come up with the majority to hold the Snap Election Law unconstitutional, the SC
could not issue the injunction prayed for. The election went ahead.
The rest is history. The results of the election were proclaimed by the Batasan, naming Marcos and

Tolentino as the winners. But the February 2 to 25, 1986, EDSA revolution took place. On 25 February, Marcos
was proclaimed in Malacanang by Makasiar, while Aquino was proclaimed in Club Filipino by Teehankee.
Later that evening, Marcos fled to Hawaii.
A. The February 1986 Revolution and the Proclamation of Provisional Constitution.
Freedom Constitution
What was the basis of the Aquino government? Did it assume power pursuant to the 1973 Constitution,
or was it a revolutionary government?
Proclamation No. 1, 25 February 1986 (Provisional government). But Proclamation No. 3 which
announced the Provisional Constitution, seemed to suggest that it was a revolutionary government, since in one
of its whereases it announced that the "new government was installed, through a direct exercise of the power of
the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces," referring to the EDSA revolution.
The better view is the latter view. The Aquino government was not an offshoot of the 1973 Constitution
for under that Constitution, a procedure was given for the election of the President proclamation by the
Batasan and the candidate Batasan proclaimed was Marcos.
Lawyers League v Aquino (GR Nos. 73748, 73972 & 73990, May 22, 1986). This view was affirmed
in Lawyers League v Aquino where the legitimacy of the Aquino government is questioned on the ground that it
was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The SC ruled that petitioners had no personality to sue
and their petition states no cause of action. "For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective
control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All
the eleven members of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under her government."
The Aquino government was a result of a "direct state action." It was not as if a small group revolted
and succeeded in wresting power in the end. Rather, the entire state revolted and overthrew the government, so
that right from the beginning, the installation was already lawful and the government was at all times de jure.
In this regard, it must be noted that there is no such thing as a constitutional right of revolution. A
revolution, from the point of view of a State, is always lawful since a State can never go wrong; it can change its
government in whatever way the sovereign sees fit. But this right of revolution, inherent in sovereignty, cannot
be recognized in a Constitution, for this would be selfdestructive. The nature of a Constitution is to setup a
government and provide for an orderly way to change this government. A revolution contradicts this nature.
Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution). At any rate, the Provisional
Constitution or Freedom Constitution was adopted on 25 March 1986 through Proclamation No. 3. It abrogated
the legislative provisions of the 1973 Constitution, modified the provisions regarding the executive department,
and totally reorganized the government. (Its use of the 1973 Constitution, however, is not be to construed that it
was a continuation thereof.) Then it provided for the calling of a Constitutional Commission, composed of 30 to
50 members appointed by the President within 60 days. (In our history, all major constitutions Malolos,
1935, 1971 were drafted by elected delegates.)
The President appointed 48 Commissioners, who worked on the Constitution from 1 June to 15 October
1986. The draft was submitted to the people in a referendum on 2 February 1987. On 11 February 1987, the
President, through Proclamation No. 58, announced its overwhelming ratification by the people and that,
therefore, it had come into force and effect.
In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (145 SCRA 160)(1960). In the case of In Re: Saturnino Bermudez , the SC
held, quoting the previous case of Lawyers League v Aquino, that:
[T]he legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country
so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members
of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.
B. Adoption and Effectivity of the present Constitution
Provisional Constitution, Art. V.
ARTICLE V
ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION
Section 1. Within sixty days from the date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be appointed by the
President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed of not less than thirty nor more than
fifty natural born citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their independence, nationalism and
patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors of society.
Section 2. The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may be consistent with the
need both to hasten the return of normal constitutional government and to drat a document truly reflective of the
ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people.
Section 3. The Commission shall conduct public hearings to insure that the people will have adequate

participation in the formulation of the New Constitution.
Section 4. The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be public and recorded.
Section 5. The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the President who shall fix the
date for the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in such plebiscite which shall be held within a period of 60 days following its submission to the President.
1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII, sec. 27.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede the all previous
Constitutions.
The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was approved by the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the twelfth day of October 1986, and accordingly signed on the
fifteenth day of October 1986 at the Plenary Hall, National Government Center, Quezon City, by the
Commissioners whose signatures are hereunder affixed.
Proclamation No. 58 (Proclaiming the Ratification of the 1987 Constitution), February 11, 1987
De Leon v Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 (1987.)
The 1987 Constitution took effect on 2 February 1987.
F: The case arose due to Art. III, Sec. 2 of Proclamation No. 3, which provided that: "All elective and appointive
officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made
within a period of one year from 25 February 1986."
De Leon was a barrio captain in Taytay, Rizal. On 9 February 1987, he was replaced by the MLG (DLG). So the
question arose as to when the 1987 Constitution took effect. If it took effect on 2 February, the replacement was no longer
valid, since Proclamation No. 3 would have been superseded. But if it took effect on 11 February (the date of
proclamation), the replacement would have been valid.
The SC, consulting the proceedings of the Concom, ruled that the intent of the framers of the
Constitution was to make it effective on the date of its ratification. Art. XVIII, Sec. 27 clearly provided that
"this Constitution shall take effect imme
diately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite." The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb. 2, 1987, superseding the Provisional
Constitution. Consequently, after that date, respondent OIC Governor could not designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners. Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure.
The dissenting opinion pointed out that by contemporaneous construction, the 1973 Constitution had a
similar provision as the present one in issue (Art. XVII, Sec. 16, This Constitution shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite), and yet it took effect on the day of the
proclamation. The 1981 and 1984 amendments contained similar provisions (valid when approved), and yet the
practice has always been to make the date of proclamation, the date of effectivity.
Furthermore, if the effectivity was 2 February, then the appointments made by the President to CA posts
after that date would be invalid for they were not submitted to the Judicial
and Bar Council. On this point, however, Teehankee noted that the President issued the appointments in the end
of January.
A concurring opinion noted the debate between Davide (date of proclamation) and Bernas (date of

ratification), and Davide's comment that he was giving up due to tyranny of numbers.
VV: The SC was correct for that was the clear intent of the framers. The ones to be blamed are the
framers themselves. Effectivity should really be the date of proclamation.
One, how can one can be expected to comply with the provisions of the Constitution when, prior to its
proclamation, there is no way to determine if it has been ratified or not? Should the Director of Prison continue
the scheduled electrocution of a death row convict on 3 February in view of the abolition of capital punishment
in the 1987 Constitution; if he does, he would technically be violating the constitution under the above holding.
If he does not, he would be in dereliction of duty, in case the constitution is not ratified.
Two, no analogy can be made between the election to office of a public officer who is deemed elected
on the day of election), and the effectivity of the constitution, because a public officer, though deemed elected,
does not assume office on the day of his election, not even on the day of his proclamation.
III. THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
A. Theory of Judicial Review
Angara v Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936). In 1935, the National Assembly
adopted a resolution that "all members elect, with no election protest filed on or before 3 December 1935 are
deemed elected." The Electoral Commission, a constitutional body, on the other hand set the 9 December 1935
as the deadline for the filing of election protest.
Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was
entertained by the Electoral Commission. Angara contended that the deadline set by the National Assembly was
controlling. Who prevailed?
The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral
Commission, in view of the constitutional provision granting the Electoral Commission jurisdiction over election
protests.
In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated
constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy, nor annuls the acts of the legislature. It simply carries
out the obligations imposed upon it by the constitution to determine conflicting claims and to establish for the
parties the rights which the constitution grants to them.
Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review
In People v Vera, 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that judicial review can only be
exercised in an actual case and controversy.
This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a
constitutional question raised at the earliest possible time, and (4) a constitutional question that is the very lis
mota of the case, i.e. an unavoidable question.
Seven (7) rules of avoidance of constitutional questions (J. Brandeis) :
In the following cases, the court must refrain from passing on the issue of constitutionality or from
exercising judicial review:
1. Friendly, nonadversary proceedings. (no vital conflict)
2. Anticipation of a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. (premature
case)
3. Formulation of a rule broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.
4. Existence of other grounds upon which the case may be disposed of (not the very lis mota)
5. A complaint made by one who fails to show injury as to its operation. (no standing)
6. Instance of one who has availed himself of its benefit.
7. Possibility of a construction of the statute which can avoid the resolution of the constitutional
question.
Policy of strict necessity (Rescue Army case)
The court must, as much possible, refrain from exercising judicial review unless all the requirements for
its exercise are fulfilled because of :
1. The danger of exercising the function, in view of possible consequences for others stemming also
from constitutional roots.
2. Comparative finality of those consequences.
3. Consideration due to the judgment of the other repositories of constitutional power concerning the
scope of their authorities.
4. Necessity for each to keep within its own power.
5. Inherent limitations of the judicial process its largely negative character, and its limited resources for
enforcement.
6. Withal in paramount importance of constitutional adjudication.
Thus, the following must be avoided: (i) political questions, (ii) advisory opinions, (iii) moot and
academic issues, and (iv) no standing.
Political Question
An issue is a political question when it does not deal with the interpretation of a law and its application
to a case, but with the very wisdom of the law itself. When a judge attempts to resolve a political question, he is
not exercising a judicial function, but is rather supplanting his conscience to that of the political branch of the
government.
Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) has attempted to formulate some guidelines for determining whether a
question is political or not.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unequestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multafarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
Advisory Opinion
A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case and controversy that demands
constitutional construction for its resolution. This may take the form of declaratory relief. It is not wise for the
court to engage in an advisory opinion because:
a) This only leads to dialectics, to abstract legal arguments and sterile conclusions (Laurel quoting
Frankfurter)
b) The judicial function is impoverished since it thrives on facts that draw out the meaning of the law.
Mootness
A case becomes moot when there are facts, injuries and heated arguments but for some reason the legal
problem has become stale. When a case is moot and academic, it ceases to be a case and controversy. Any
decision reached by the court would not be conclusive on the parties.
Exceptions to mootness:
1) If the question is capable of repetition and evasive of review.
2) If there exits a mere possibility of collateral legal consequences if the court does not act.
3) Voluntary cessation from the wrongful act by the defendant, if he is free to return to his old ways.
Ripeness
A constitutional question may come to the court either too early or prematurely, so that it is still abstract
(advisory opinion), or too late, so that the court's decision would no longer affect the parties (mootness). The
court must resolve constitutional issues only when they come to it at the right time (ripeness).
No Standing
A party has a standing in a case if his interest is such that he stands to be benefited if the case is resolved
in his favor, and he stand to be really injured if it is decided against him.
Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type of legislative act being
questioned, or his status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement.
The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure such concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions (Baker v Carr, supra.)
A person has standing to challenge the governmental act only if he has a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result ot its enforcement. (People v. Vera,
infra.)
Philippine Practice
In re Saturnina Bermudez (145 SCRA 160, 1986)
The action was for declaratory relief to interpret Section 5 of Art. XVIII, which provides that: The six
year term of the incumbent President and VicePresident elected in the 7 February 1986 election, is for purposes
of synchronization of election, hereby extended to noon of 30 June 1991. The question was who the "incumbent
President" referred to in said provision was whether Aquino (the one in office) or Marcos (the one
proclaimed by the Batasan). The confusion arose because in Proclamation No. 3, Pres. Aquino referred to the
"direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by the units of the new AFP" as the cause for the
installation of the new government. If President Aquino was not elected but came into office as a result of the
EDSA Revolution, the she would not be the "incumbent" who was elected in the February 7 election, referred to
in the provision.
The SC ruled that (a) the petitioner had no standing, (b) the SC had no jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief, c) the suit was against the President who cannot be sued, d) the petitioner had no cause of
action because, reiterating the decision in Lawyer's League for a Better Philippines v Aquino, the legitimacy of
the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but is a political question.
And yet, the SC ruled that the "incumbent" referred to was President Aquino who was in effective
control of the country and had been recognized by the rest of the world.
(The Court, disregarding the limits of judicial review, felt compelled to render a decision on the
legitimacy of the Aquino government so as to avoid any doubt as to its very own legitimacy. It must be noted,
though that his case is the entitlement of an actual case and controversy.)
Dumlao v COMELEC (95 SCRA 392)
Section 4 of BP 52 provided that any retired elective local official who had received retirement pay to
which he was entitled under the law and who have been 65 years old at the commencement of the term of office
to which he sought to be elected, was not qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he had
retired.
Dumlao filed for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of the law, claiming that this was directed at him
as former governor of Nueva Vizcaya.
The SC held that (a) he had no standing, since he had not been injured by the operation of the law, no
petition for his disqualification having been filed and (b) the action was a request for advisory opinion. And yet,
the SC upheld the validity "because of paramount public interest", declaring that the legislative purpose of
infusing younger blood in local government was valid. Adapted.
Igot v COMELEC (95 SCRA 392)
Sec. 4 of BP 52 also provided in part that any person convicted of subversion, insurrection or rebellion,
or similar offenses was disqualified from running for any local position, and the filing of charges for such crimes
before a civil or military court after preliminary investigation was prima facie evidence of such fact. Igot sought
to question the validity of this provision.
The SC held that he had no standing because (a) he had never been convicted nor charged of any these
crimes, (b) he had not been disqualified from being a candidate, (c) he had no personal nor substantial interest at
stake, and (d) he could not sue as taxpayer since the statute did not directly involve the disbursement of public
funds.
And yet, although abstaining from ruling on the first part of the provision, the SC held that the second
part regarding the presumption of guilt was unconstitutional for violating the presumption of innocence.
Political Questions
In PBA v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455, we see a reversal of judicial review. The case was clearly a
justiciable controversy. Is the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election,
proclamation and assumption into office by the elected President, a valid resignation as to authorize the Batasan
to pass a Snap Election Law? The Court could have validly issued an injunction to stop the COMELEC from
proceeding with the preparations for the election. But it did not, citing its delay in deciding the case and the
sentiments of the people that developed in the meantime as reason for its inaction. According to the court, what
at first was a legal question became a political question because it was overtaken by events.
VV: A Court which does not issue an injunction to enjoin an official act when it could have issued one
is actually deciding the case in favor of the validity of the act. Failure to issue an injunction is as much an
exercise of judicial review.
In Romulo v Yniguez, infra, we see another trend of judicial review. What seems like a legal question
when viewed in isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it to shelf a complaint for
impeachment against the President is constitutional.) is really a political question when viewed in a broader
context (i.e., that the case was filed against the Speaker of a coequal branch to compel him by mandamus to
recall the complaint from the archive, and that the ultimate result of the case was to question the decision of the
Batasan to shelve the case, a matter, that is solely committed to that department.)
Yet, despite the really political nature of the question, the SC passed on the validity of the rules to erase
doubts that may still be entertained.
C. Functions of Judicial Review
1. Checking invalidating a law or an executive act that is found to be contrary to the Constitution.
2. Legitimating (legitimizing) upholding the validity of the law which results from a mere dismissal of a case
challenging the validity of that law.
When the Court exercises this function, it uses the double negative by declaring that the law is "not
unconstitutional". This is no mere semantics. The Court cannot declare the law constitutional for it enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality, so that a declaration to that effect by the court would not make it more
constitutional. On the other hand, anyone who challenges the validity of a law has the burden of proof to show
its invalidity. Declaring that the law is not unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the challenger has not
met the burden required.
Legitimating and Checking Aspects of Judicial Review. Dismissal of Challenge to a Law's Validity Legitimizes
it.
In Occena v COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1 (1981), which sought an injunction to prohibit the COMELEC
from proceeding with the plebiscite for the proposed 1981 amendments, and in Mitra v COMELEC, 104 SCRA
59 (1981), which sought a mandamus to compel the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify the 1973
Constitution, both prayers based on the premise that the 1973 Constitution had not been ratified, the SC held that
the failure of the Court in the Javellana v Executive Secretary case to muster the votes required to declare the
1973 Constitution as being invalidly ratified, which resulted in the dismissal of the suit questioning the validity
of the ratification of the Constitution, in effect legitimated the ratification. In Occena, the Court ruled that:
"The Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In the latter case, there is an affirmation
that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of
this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in the Javellana resolution.
Since then, the Court has invariably applied the present Constitution."
3. Symbolic to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and concepts on matters of great
public importance.
Symbolic Function of Supreme Court to Give Guidelines to Bench and Bar in Cases which are Moot and
Academic.
In Salonga v CruzPano, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), the case against petitioner for subversion which was
filed by the fiscal on the basis of flimsy testimony given by Victor Lovely was already dismissed without
prejudice by the fiscal (upon anticipation of adverse ruling). And yet, the SC noting that as the fiscal said the
dismissal of the charges was without prejudice to the filing of new ones for the same acts because the petitioner
has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply, the case is not entirely moot, decided to perform its
duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts and doctrines or rules" for the
guidance of the bar and bench. It thus, went on to lecture about its antiquated understanding of the inciting test,
and how it could not be proved by a mere photograph.
In Javier v COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 (1986), the case was already mooted not only by the death of
Evelio Javier, but also by the abolition of Batasan, the Antique seat which he and Pacificador were contesting
for. And yet the SC, claiming to be "not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government," decided the case anyway "for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. The citizen comes
to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The 2 are not always the same. There are times when we
cannot grant the latter bec. the issue has been settled and the decision is no longer possible according to the law.
But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be
resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but
also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future."
In Demeteria v Alba, 148 SCRA 208, the SC struck down Sec. 44 of PD 1177, authorizing the President
to transfer funds from one department to another, on the ground that it overextended the privilege granted under
Art. VIII, sec. 16(5) of the 1973 Constitution, even if such provision was already abrogated by the Freedom
Constitution. Then, citing the Javier case on the need "not only for the vindication of an outraged right, though
gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future," it lectured on how this law would open the
floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffusion of
accountability for budgetary performance, and entrenchment of the pork barrel system, and on how this would
create temptations for misappropriation and embezzlement.
All courts can exercise judicial review
Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in :
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of lower

courts on cases with constitutional issues. If so, inferior courts have original jurisdiction over constitutional
cases although they decide the case only at first instance, their decision being always reviewable by the SC.
Thus, for instance an RTC can rule on the constitutionality of the AntiSubversion Law.
In J.M. Tuason & Co. v CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961), RA 2616, which provided for the expropriation of the
Tatalon Estate, was claimed to be unconstitutional. This issue said the SC, could be resolved by the CFI in the
ejectment case filed before it by the evictees of the estate, since the 1935 Constitution contemplated that inferior
courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality issues, that it spoke of appellate review of
"final judgment of inferior courts" in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. The 2/3 vote of
the SC required by Sec. 10 of Art. VII restricted the decisions of that Court only in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
In Ynot v IAC, 148 SCRA 659, the SC reversed the RTC's holding that it had no authority to rule on the
validity of EO 626A, banning the transporting of carabaos from one province to another. The Court pointed
out, that since it has jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in
constitutional cases, then the lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.
The SC then struck down the law for being arbitrary and for unduly delegating legislative power.
C. Effect of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Civil Code, Art. 7.
Article 7. xxx
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void
and the latter shall govern.
xxx
The effect of a declaration that a law is unconstitutional is to make the law either void or voidable.
It is void if on its face, it does not enjoy any presumption of validity. As such, it produces no effect
whatsoever, creates no right or office, it imposes no duty. Whatever penalty was paid during the period of its
operation must be remitted.
An example is BP 52 in Igot v COMELEC case, supra, providing that anyone who has been charged of
rebellion, etc. is prima facie presumed to be disqualified from running for a local post. On its face, it blatantly
goes against the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Another example is a law imposing prior restraint which is, according to Sullivan v Bantam Books, and
US v New York Times, presumptively unconstitutional.
But a law declared unconstitutional is only voidable if, on its face, it enjoys the presumption of validity.
In this case, it becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And even so, the
invalidation produces no retroactive effect, since it would be unjust to hold that the law did not produce any
effect at all prior to its nullification. From the time the law was promulgated to the time it was declared invalid,
people would have entered into various transactions and relations, expecting and in fact compelled to presume
that the law is valid. Thus, to now hold that the law never produced any effect would penalize those who in faith
believed the laws passed by their representatives to be in accordance with their solemn duty under the
Constitution.
As the court put it in Chicot County District v Baxter State Bank, the past cannot always be erased, so
that statements of principle of absolute retroactivity is not acceptable in all cases. Said the court,
"[T]he actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination, is an operative fact, and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official. xxx "
The case of Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971) is in point.
In 1939, Agbayani borrowed P450 from PNB secured by a realty mortgage. In 1944, the loan matured
but PNB could not collect because it was at this time of the war. In 1945, Pres. Osmena issued the Debt Morato
rium Law (EO #32), suspending the payment of loans for four years due to the ravages of war. In 1948, RA 342
extended the Debt Moratorium Law for another eight years (up to 1956). In 1953, however, the SC declared RA
342 as unconstitutional in the case of Rutter v Esteban. In 1959, PNB filed a suit for payment of the loan. Has
the action prescribed?
If we take the orthodox view, the action has prescribed, since the declaration of RA 342 as uncon
stitutional retroacted to 1945 when EO 32 was first issued. Between 1944 when the loan matured and 1959, when
PNB collected the loan, 15 years had elapsed.
[The orthodox view was announced by Mr. J. Field, in the case of Norton vs. Shelby County where the
court held that:
"xxx. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed.]
But if we take the unorthodox view, as the SC did, the action could still prosper. The period from 1945
when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when it was declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the
purpose of prescription since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. In effect, only 7 years
had elapsed (194445, 195359).
Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt
Moratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid law made him lose
his right to collect.
Art. 7 of the Civil Code which provides that, "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." seems to be the orthodox view on the matter.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
________________
PART ONE
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
I. State defined.
CIR v Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23 (1971). A State is a politically organized sovereign community,

independent of outside control, bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, and acting
through government functioning under a regime of law.
A state is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory and
possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants
render habitual obedience. (Prof. Samilo Barlongay quoting Garner, Introduction to Political Law, 41.)
The elements of a state are : territory, people, sovereignty, government.
People refers simply to the inhabitants of the State.
Territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the State.
Government is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed
and realized.
Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State is governed.
II. Components of the Philippine State
A. Territory The Archipelago Concept
Art. I. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,
consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands
of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
In short, the Philippine territory consists of: (1) the Philippine archipelago, and (2) all territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
Of all the constitutions in the world, probably only the Philippines has a definition of its territory. At
first glance, this is useless since one's territory under International Law is defined not by one's selfserving
claims as to what it covers, but by international treaties and customs. Historically, however, this definition had a
valid purpose.
The 1935 Constitution needed to define Philippine territory in order to prevent its dismemberment by
the US. Since, pursuant to the TydingsMcDuffie Act, the draft of the Constitution was to be submitted to the US
President for approval, defining the national territory was a way of making the US acknowledge its extent and
(to) respect its integrity.
The 1973 Constitution needed a definition of national territory in order to lay claim to
Sabah. The claim was originally made by President Macapagal. Sabah was one of the territories belonging to
the Philippines by historic right and legal title. President Marcos, in 1977 on the occasion of an ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting in Singapore announced that the Philippines was willing to drop its claims over Sabah;
nothing was done, however to amend the Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution changed the phraseology into: "all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction." In so changing, the rationale was to remove any irritant to our relations with the
Malaysia brought about by the 1973 formulation but without renouncing the claim at the same time. Anyway, if
the Philippines has the right over Sabah under International Law, it possesses that right with or without a
Constitution, the Constitution being merely a municipal law which does not bind other states.
The 1987 Constitution, therefore, contains a definition of national territory so as not to give an
impression that the Philippines is abandoning its claim over Sabah. Removing such a definition would amount
to dropping the claim altogether, a fact not for the Commissioners to decide.
1. The Philippine Archipelago
a. Treaty limits
1. Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898.
Article 3 defines the metes and bounds of the archipelago by longitude and latitude, degrees and
seconds. Technical descriptions are made of the scope of the archipelago as this may be found on the surface of
the earth.
2. Treaty of Washington of 7 November 1900 between the United States and Spain.
Ceding Cagayan, Sibuto and Sulu.
3. Treaty of 2 January 1930 between the United States and Great Britain.
Ceding the Turtle and Mangsee Islands.
b. Method of determining the baselines
1. RA 3046 (17 June 1961)
Determine appropriate points of the outermost Islands of the archipelago, then connect them by means
of a straight line until all islands are surrounded or enclosed by the imaginary straight lines.
"The baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight
lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago." (fifth whereas clause.)
2. RA 5446 (8 September 1968). Sec. 2 of the Act provides that the definition of the
territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic
of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
Uses of the baseline:
a. Determine what is internal water (all waters inside the baseline, whether or not more than 12 miles
from the shore).
b. Determine the 200 mile EEZ.
c. Archipelagic Doctrine
The basic concept of an archipelago is that body of water studded with islands, or the islands surrounded
with water, is viewed as a unity of islands and waters together forming one unit. This is in contrast to a
continent which is a single mass of land.
The main purpose of the archipelagic doctrine is to protect the territorial interests of an archipelago. If
we follow the old rule of international law, it is possible that between islands, e.g. Bohol and Siquijor, due to the
more than 24 mile distance between the 2 islands, there may be high seas. Thus, foreign vessels may just enter
anytime at will, posing danger to the security of the State. According to the doctrine, even these bodies of water
within the baseline, regardless of breadth, form part of the archipelago and are thus considered as internal
waters.
The archipelagic doctine has a twofold purpose: (1) economic reasons; (2) national security.
(Barlongay.)
The archipelagic doctrine is the principle that it is an integrated unit; everything within it comprises the
archipelago. (ibid.)
The Constitutional provisions embodying this doctrine are :
1. "archipelago, with all the island and waters embraced therein"
An archipelago is a body of water, studded with islands.
2. "the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of the breadth
and dimensions, form part of internal water"
The following provisions are really superfluous:
1. "terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains"
(because land, water and air space already form part of an archipelago)
2. "territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves, other submarine areas"
"Territorial sea" means water outside the baseline extending up to 12 miles.
"Internal water" refers to water within the baseline.
"Insular shelf" means the land which is submerged under water which may extend beyond 12 miles as
long as it is not more than 300 ft. deep. It is also known as intercontinental shelf. (Barlongay.)
2. Other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction
PD 1596 (11 June 1978)
Claims the Kalayaan Group of Islands as part of Philippine territory on the basis of historic rights and
legal title.
The claim was made "by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control
established in accordance with international law. xxx"
3. The territorial sea, the sea bed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other submarine areas
4. Exclusive Economic Zone
PD 1599 (11 June 1978). There is established an exclusive economic zone extending "to a distance of
two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. Provided,
That, where the outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an adjacent
or neighboring state, the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the state concerned or in
accordance with pertinent generally recognized principles or international law on delimitation." (Sec. 1 thereof.)
Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to navigations and
overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea relating
to navigation and communications. (Sec. 4 thereof.)
Purposes:
1. Sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources, living or nonliving,
renewable or nonrenewable of the seabed, subsoil, and superadjacent waters.
Economic exploitation and exploration of the resources of the zone such as the production of energy
from the water, currents and winds.
2. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with repect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands,
offshore terminals, installations and structures; the preservation of the marine environment, including the
prevention and control of pollution and scientific research.
3. Such other rights as are recognized by international law.
Other states are prohibited from using the zone to:
1. Explore or exploit any resources;
2. Carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations;
3. Conduct any research;
4. Construct or operate any artificial island, offshore terminal, installation, or other structure;
5. Perform any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction
herein provided.
Other states are allowed to use the zone for:
1. Navigation and overflight;
2. Laying of submarine cable and pipelines;
3. Other lawful uses related to navigation and communication.
In case of overlapping of EEZs, the common boundaries are to be detemined by (i) agreement and (ii)
international rules on delimitations.
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (30 April 1982.)

The exclusive economic zone which shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, is recognized in the UNCLOS, of which the Philippines is a
signatory. Its concept is that although it is not part of the territory, exclusive economic benefit is reserved for
the country.
B. People
1. Three meanings of the word "People"
The word "people" is used in at least three senses in the Constitution:
a. "People" as Inhabitants
Art. XIII, Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.

Art. II, Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Art. III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
xxx
Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963), infra. The right of the an individual to be

secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular
right of the people and, of course, indisputably applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country.
b. People as Citizens
Preamble. We, the sovereign Filipino people imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a
just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
Art. II, Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.
Art. II, Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all "citizens" may
be required to render personal military or civil service.
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recog
nized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertinent to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizens subject to limitations provided by law.
c. People as Electors
Art. VII, Sec. 4. The President and VicePresident shall be elected by direct vote of the people

xxx.
Art. XVI, Sec. 2. The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national anthem,
or a national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of
the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national referendum.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between Republic of the
Philippines and United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when Congress requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting party.
2. Citizenship
a. Who are citizens
Art. IV, Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1) Those who are citizen of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
These citizens are classifiable into (i) naturalborn citizens (covering #'s 1, 2, and 3) and (ii) naturalized
citizens (covering #4).
b. Election of Philippine citizenship
Com. Act No. 625 (June 7, 1941.) AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE DECLARED BY A PERSON WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), section 1, Article IV
[1935 Constitution: Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship] shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement herein
authorized before any officer of the Government of the United States (now officials of Philippine Embassy or
Consulate) authorized to administer oaths, and he shall forward such statement together with his oath of allegiance,
to the Civil Registry of Manila.
Note : The right of election permitted under the 1987 Constitution is available only to those born to Filipino
mothers under the 1935 Constitution who, had that charter not been changed, would have been able to elect
Philippine citizenship upon attaining majority age. That right is retained for them under Article IV, Section 1
(3). Obviously, election is not necessary in the case of the child to a Filipino mother under the present
constitution as she would be considered a Filipino citizen at birth.

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

F: Petitioners Balingit and Co and private respondent Ong were among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the 2nd legislative district of Northern Samar in the May 1987 election. Ong was proclaimed the winner.
Petitioners filed election protest with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal against Ong on the ground
that Ong is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the 2nd district of Samar. HRET ruled in favor
of Ong.
ISSUE: W/N Ong is a natural born citizen as to entitle him to run as congressman.
RULING: YES, Ong is a natural born citizen.
Under the 1987 Constitution:
"Sec. 1. The ff. are citizens of the Phil.:
xxx
3) Those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
Sec. 2. Natural born citizens are those who are citizens of the Phil. from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Phil. citizenship in accordance with par.
3, Sec. 1 hereof shall be deemed natural born citizens."
The Court interprets Sec. 1 par. 3 as applying not only to those who elect Phil. citizenship after 2
February 1987 but also those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date, as
in the case of Ong. This ruling finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The
provision was framed to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother
was automatically granted the status of a natural born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father would still have to elect Phil. citizenship. If one so elected, under earlier laws, he was not conferred the
status of a natural born citizen.
There is no question that Ong's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage with Jose
Ong Chuan, a Chinese who filed an application for naturalization and was granted one. Crucial to this case is
whether or not Ong elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen in order to come within the purview of the above
quoted constitutional provision.
To expect Ong to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary for the court is of the opinion that Ong was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987, the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a
citizen since 1957. An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien or his
status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Ong's Filipino
nationality when he turned 21.
There are cases which define "election" as both a formal and an informal process. In the case of In Re
Mallare, the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Phil. citizenship. In this case, Ong did not merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Phil.

Ong was born in the rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions.
The resp. has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still
a small boy. Ong has worked in a sensitive position in a government agency. His profession (CPA) requires
citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a
Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino. There is nothing to indicate any tinge of alienness. The
mass of voters of N. Samar are fully aware of Ong's parentage. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have
him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him a Filipino.
The HRET had an interesting view as to how Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when Ong was
only nine years old, his father became a naturalized Filipino. Sec. 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely
applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in the country. Concededly, it was the law itself that
had already elected Phil. citizenship for Ong by declaring him as such.
The petitioners contend that Ong's father was not validly naturalized because of his premature taking of
the oath of citizenship. The petitioners question the citizenship of Ong's father through a collateral approach.
This cannot be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct
action for its nullity. MRM.
xxx The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to
elect citizenship. FOR THOSE ALREADY FILIPINOS when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of private re
spondent Ong would not only have been superfluous but would also have resulted in absurdity considering that it
was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for him.
Dissenting:
Ong is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen, he having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the
Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth. Under the 1935 Constitution which was in force at the
time of Ong's birth, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens.
Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens.
c. Naturalborn citizens
Art. IV, Section 2. Naturalborn citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed naturalborn
citizens.
The provision granting naturalborn status even to those who were born of Filipino mothers before 17
January 1973 but elected Philippine citizenship after that date is meant to correct the anomalous situation where
one born under similar circumstances but made the election before 17 January 1973 is granted the status of
naturalborn citizen by the 1973 Constitution. Simply because there was no definition of a naturalborn citizen
under the 1935 Constitution, that one who made the election after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution was
not conferred such status. The definition of a naturalborn citizen under the 1973 Constitution, therefore made a
child of Filipino mother and alien father's right depends on the fleeting accident of time, and resulted in two
kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same members.
At the same time, however, those who elected prior to 17 January 1973 could not be placed in the same
footing as those who made the election after that date, because the former already had a "vested right" to their
citizenship which could not be diminished by the 1973 Constitution.
The remedy is to place the latter in the same footing as the former. Thus, under the 1987 Constitution,
this accidental anomaly no longer exists.
To illustrate: If X was born and elected before 17 January 1973, his status under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions is that of a naturalborn citizen, because although he had to perform an act to perfect his citi
zenship, he could not otherwise be classified since there was no definition of naturalborn citizens in the 1935
Constitution.
If X was born before and elected after 17 January 1973, whether before or after 2 February 1987, he was
not a naturalborn citizen under the 1973 Constitution. If not for the proviso in the 1987 Constitution, he would
not have been deemed naturalborn citizen either.
In turn the definition of "naturalborn citizen" as one who is such from (not at) birth (continuously up to
the time his citizenship is questioned), was raised about the citizenship of Quezon, et. al., under the 1935
Constitution.
Having the status of a naturalborn citizen is important for the purpose of certain political and economic
rights open only to such citizens.
a) Political: Qualification to run for the following posts:
Who must be natural born citizens:

(1) President Art. VII, Sec. 2
(2) VicePresident Art. VII, Sec. 3
(3) Members of Congress Art. VI, Secs. 3 and 6
(4) Justices of the SC and lower collegiate courts Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1)
(5) Ombudsman and his deputies Art. XI, Sec. 8
(6) Constitutional Commissions Art. IX, B, Sec. 1 (1)
Art. IX, C, Sec. 1(1)
Art. IX, D, Sec. 1(1)
(7) Members of the Central Monetary Authority Art, XII, Sec. 20
(8) Members of the CHR Art. XIII, Sec. 17(2)
(Commission on Human Rights)
Former naturalborn citizens as transferees of private lands.
b) Economic
Art. XII, Sec. 8 xxx [A]naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may still be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
The following are naturalborn citizens:
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution (as of 2

February 1987).
a) Those who are citizens under the Treaty of Paris
Under Art. 9 of the Treaty of Paris, the civil and political status of the inhabitants of the Philippines was
to be determined by the US Congress.
Pursuant to this provision in the treaty, the US Congress passed the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902,
Section 4 of which defined who the citizens of the Philippines were:
"The inhabitants of the Philippines residing therein who were subjects of Spain on 11 April 1899, and
continuing to reside therein, as well as their children born subsequent thereto."
The cutoff date of 11 April 1899 was the date of "exchange of instruments of ratification" between the
US Senate and Spain, or the date of ratification of the Treaty of Paris.
The peninsulares were given a period of 18 months to indicate if they choose Filipino or Spanish citizen
ship, by filing their election with the CFI.
This same provision was reembodied in the Jones Law of 29 August 1916.
b) Those declared citizens by judicial declaration applying the jus soli principle, before the 1957
case of Tio Tiam v Republic.
In Roa v Commissioner of Customs (1912), during the regime of the Philippine Bill of 1902, Roa, who
was born in the Philippines in 1889 by a Chinese father and Filipino mother, was declared by the court to be a
citizen by jus soli.
In Paz Chua v Secretary of Labor (1939), during the regime of the 1935 Constitution, Paz Chua who was
born in Tarlac in 1914 of Chinese father and Filipino mother, was not declared a citizen. The SC held, without
alluding to the Roa case, that the jus soli was never adopted in the Philippines.
In Torres v Tan Chim (1940), Tan, who was in the Philippines in 1893 of Chinese father and Filipino
mother, was declared a citizen. According to J. Laurel, the principle of jus soli still applied. The 1934 Concon
was aware of the Roa ruling and did not intend to overrule it.
In Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor and Lam Swee Sang v Secretary of Labor (1947), a case decided
during the regime of the Republic upon a motion for reconsideration of a prewar decision, Tan, who was born
in 1915, and Lam, who was born in 1900, both in the Philippines, of Chinese father and Filipino mother, were
not declared citizens. According to J. Padilla, the 1935 Constitution never adopted the jus soli principle; the
mere fact of birth in the Philippines does not confer citizenship on a person.
In Talaroc v Uy (1950), considering his service during the war and his having been elected mayor in
Misamis, was declared by the SC a citizen "simply due to birth", without mention of jus soli or jus sanguinis.
Finally, in Tio Tam v Republic (1957), the SC tried to resolve the flipflop rulings by stating that we

follow only jus sanguinis but that those who were judicially declared citizens on the basis of jus soli prior to this
case would be considered citizens. This is the final word on the matter.
It would be worthy to note that the flipflop in decision can be explained by the date of birth of the
applicant in each case. Those born before 11 April 1899 were the ones to whom jus soli was applied, for they
very well were citizens under the Treaty of Paris.
c) Those who were naturalized in accordance with law. (Act. No. 2927 of the Philippine
Commission).
d) Those who were citizens under the 1935 Constitution.
1) Those who were citizens at the time of adoption of the Constitution (15 November 1935, the date of
the inauguration of the Commonwealth government).
2) Those born in the Philippines of foreign parent, who before the adoption of the Constitution had been
elected to public office in the Philippines.
This is the socalled "Caram rule in honor of Caram, a Syrian, elected to the 1934 Constitutional
Convention. The rule was adopted to avoid the absurdity of the situation.
The rule only applies to elective positions, not appointive ones.
In Chiongbian v de Leon, the SC held that if one is considered a citizen under the Caram rule, his
children would also be considered citizens, but under the third category (those whose fathers are citizens)
3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon, reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship.
It was only beginning 17 January 1973 when children of Filipino mothers became citizens without need
of election. Children born before this date of Filipino mother and alien fathers had an "inchoate citizenship"
until they elected upon reaching 21 years.
5) Those naturalized in accordance with law.

e) Those who are citizens under the 1973 Constitution.
1) Those who are citizens as of 17 January 1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
That is, those born on or after 17 January 1973 of Filipino father or Filipino mother.
3) Those who elected Philippine citizenship pursuant to the 1935 Constitution
That is, those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers but reached the age of majority and
elected Philippine citizenship on or after 17 January 1973.
Note that if one was born, reached the age of majority and elected Philippine citizenship before 17
January 1973, then he would be a citizen under e1 (those who are citizens at the adoption of the 1973
Constitution).
On the other hand, if one was born, reached 21 years, but did not or failed to elect before 17 January
1973, then he lost his citizenship then.
2.) Those born of Filipino fathers or Filipino mothers (after 17 January 1973).
3.) Those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
This case arose under the 1935 Constitution, children of Filipino mothers did not automatically become
citizens. They had an "inchoate citizenship" during their minority, and became fullpledged citizens only upon
election at the age of majority.
Beginning with the 1973 Constitution, however, children of Filipino mothers automatically became
citizens. This provision then covers those children born, before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
By January 17, 1994, this provision would have no application anymore, since the last of those born
before 17 January 1973 would have reached the age of majority by then.
Case A: A Filipino woman married B, an American in 1961. The marriage made A an American citizen
(which under CA 63, stripped her of her Philippine citizenship, the marriage having been celebrated before 17
January 1973). A and B lived in the US since then and in 1962, begot C, who was automatically an American
citizen by jus soli and jus sanguinis.
In 1983, when C turns 21, can he elect Philippine citizenship? Yes, according to obiters in Cu v
Republic and Villahermosa v CID, in order to elect Philippine citizenship, at least for election purposes, it is
enough that (1) the person's mother was a Filipino at the time of her marriage to the alien father, even if she
subsequently lose her citizenship by virtue of the marriage and (2) the person be a child of that marriage, for him
to elect Philippine citizenship.
If C wants to run for Congress, is he considered a natural born Filipino? Under the 1973 Constitution,
no. But under the 1987 Constitution, yes.
Note that if he were born after 17 January 1973, the child would not even be a Filipino.
d. Naturalized Citizens, Revised Naturalization Law (Com. Act No. 473, effective
June 17, 1939.)
4.) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (namely CA 473, Revised Naturalization Law) (Art.
IV, Sec.1 (4))
Who are qualified to be naturalized
Qualifications (Sec. 2, CA 473)
A. Age
1) He must not be less than 21 years old at the date of hearing.
Barlongay: When the law uses the phase "age of majority," use 18 years old, but not when it uses the
phrase "not less than 21 years old.
B. Residence
2) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years.
C. Character
3.) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in an irreproachable conduct during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in
which he is living.
D. Property
4.) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than P5,000 or must have some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation.
(Test: Can he support himself and his family?)
E. Education
5.) Must be able to speak and write (not read and write) Filipino or English, and a principal dialect (as
pro tanto modified by the 1987 Constitution, since the law itself spoke of English or Spanish, and a principal
dialect). Thus, a deaf and mute is disqualified, Orest
off v Republic
.
Art. XIV, Sec. 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the
Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English. The regional languages are the
auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein. xxx
6.) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government
and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in
the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
When is the tenyear residence requirement reduced to five (5) years?
Com. Act No. 473, sec. 3.
Sec. 3. Special qualifications. The Ten years of continuous residence required under the second condition of
the last preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner having any of the following
qualifications:
(1) Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the
provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions. (which was allowed before by the 1935 Constitution, no
distinction whether appointive or elective posts.)
(2) Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines. .
(3) Being married to a Filipino woman
If it were an alien woman who married a Filipino man, she would only need an administrative
proceeding for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration, upon proof of marriage and according to
the holding in Moy Yam Lim, proof of nondisqualification. These are the only requirements because ipso facto,
she became a Filipino herself by marriage.

(4) Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not
established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the
branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two years.
(5) Having been born in the Philippines.
Who are disqualified to be naturalized?
CA 473, Sec. 4
The applicant must not only possess the qualifications, he must not have any of the disqualifications set
by law.
Section 4. Who are disqualified. The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination
for the success and predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Moral turpitude involves dishonesty, depravity. A propensity to break the law, even just traffic laws,
constitute moral depravity. While murder being a crime of passion does not involve moral turpitude, theft and
estafa do.)
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Declaration of Intention
Sec. 5. Declaration of intention. One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine

citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, a declaration
under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth
the name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of
arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in
the Philippines at the time of making the declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent
residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued.
The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and
civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each
declarant must furnish two photographs for himself.

Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. Persons born in the
Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines
for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a
declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be
added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the
public schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The
same shall be understood applicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.
If one who is not exempted, fails to file, or files an invalid declaration of intention, he can be
denaturalized anytime through denaturalization proceedings.
Procedure
Com. Act. No. 473, Secs. 712
Section 7. Petition for citizenship. Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the
competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name
and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether
single or married and the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the
children; the approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if
he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by
this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that
he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The
petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two
credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident
of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become citizen of the
Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the
names and postoffice addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the
case. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.
Section. 8. Competent court. The Court of First Instance of the province in which the petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear the petition.
Section 9. Notification and appearance. Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of
the clerk of the court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the
Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides,
and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of the hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his
office or in the building where said office is located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence
of the petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner
proposes to introduce in support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not
be held within ninety days from the date of the last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as soon as possible,
forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data to the Office of
the President, the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, the Provincial Commander of the Philippine National Police of the
province and the municipal judge of the municipality wherein the petitioner resides.
Section. 10. Hearing of the petition. No petition shall be heard within the thirty (30) days preceding any
election. The hearing shall be public, and the SolicitorGeneral, either himself or through his delegate or the
provincial fiscal concerned, shall appear on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines at all the proceedings and at
the hearing. If, after the hearing, the court believes, in view of the evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the
qualifications required by, and none of the disqualifications specified in this Act and has complied with all requisites
herein established, it shall order the proper naturalization certificate to be issued and the registration of the said
naturalization certificate in the proper civil registry as required in section ten of Act Numbered Theree thousand
seven hundred fiftythree.
Section 11. Appeal. The final sentence may, at the instance of either of the parties, be appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Section 12. Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization. If, after the lapse of thirty days from and after
the date on which the parties were notified of the decision of the Court, no appeal has been filed, or if, upon appeal,
the decision of the court has been confirmed by the Supreme Court, and the said decision has become final, the
clerk of the court which heard the petition shall issue to the petitioner a naturalization certificate which shall,
among other things, state the following: The file number of the petition, the number of the naturalization
certificate, the signature of the person naturalized affixed in the presence of the clerk of the court, the personal
circumstances of the person naturalized, the dates on which his declaration of intention and petition were filed, the
date of the decision granting the petition, and the name of the judge who rendered the decision. A photograph of
the petitioner with the dry seal affixed thereto of the court which granted the petition, must be affixed to the
certificate.
Before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall, in open court, take the following oath:
"I_________________________________, solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty and particularly to the
___________________________ of which at this time I am a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God."
a. Declaration of intention filed with the OSG one year before actual application.
b. Filing of petition for naturalization with the RTC of the province in which the applicant is a resident for at
least one year.
c. Hearing, except within 30 days before an election. The State is represented by the Solicitor General or by the
fiscal in his behalf. Two witnesses to testify on the character of the applicant are presented.
d. Decision. Appeal of the decision of the RTC may be made to SC, pursuant to RA 530, amending Sec. 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948. (Under BP 129, appeal is to the CA).
e. Decision becomes final but not executory, thirty (30) days after notice of the decision is received by the
parties. The notice of the decision must be received by the OSG; copy furnished to the fiscal is not sufficient to
start the running of the 30day period.
A favorable decision becomes executory only after 2 years from the finality of the decision. It shall become
executory only after the period of 2 years during which the petitioner shall continue to be under probation, as it
were, so the government can be doubly sure he is entitled to be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines.
(Republic Act 530, Section 1)
f. Summary hearing after two years, which is really a continuation of the previous proceedings, to prove that:
i) He did not leave RP during the 2year period of probation;
ii) He devoted himself to lawful calling;
iii) He was not convicted of any offense of violation of government rules.
iv) He did not commit an act prejudicial to national interest or inimical to a government announced
policy.
g. Oath before the RTC.
h. Issuance of a Certificate of Naturalization issued by the Court. (Only a certification is given because the
decision two years before has granted him his citizenship.)
i. Cancellation of ACR before the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.
"Derivative Naturalization" (Sec. 15)
" xxx Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
Note : In its latest pronouncement on this question, the SC held that the clause "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" should be interpreted to mean only that the alien woman must not be laboring under any of the
disqualifications prescribed by law. Moreover, she can establish her claim to Philippine citizenship in
administrative proceedings before the immigration authorities only and will not have to file a judicial action for
this purpose. She is no longer required to prove that she possesses the qualifications for naturalization.
When decision executory
Republic Act No. 530, sec. 1
Sec. 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard
by the courts until after six months from the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision
granting the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after the court, on
proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that
during the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a
lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated
rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.
Effect on wife and minor children
Section 15. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof.
A foreign born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent,
shall automatically become a Philippine citizen and a foreignborn minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the
time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to
reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen
even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parents, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the Philippine Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of
allegiance.
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife
If the wife is (i) legally married to the naturalized husband, and (ii) she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications in Sec. 4, she is entitled to be declared a citizen as well. What is required is only an
administrative proceeding before the CID for the cancellation of her ACR on the ground that her husband has
been recently naturalized.
According to Moya Lim Yao (41 SCRA 292) ruling, she need not prove the qualifications, but only that
she is not disqualified. The proceedings may even be with the Department of Natural Resources in relation to a
grant of concession requiring citizenship, where the wife proves that her husband has become a Filipino.
Effect of Naturalization on the Children
I. If the child is of age, no effect.
II. If the child is a minor:
A. If born in RP automatically becomes a citizen upon the naturalization of the father.
B. If born abroad
1. If before the naturalization of the father.
a. If residing in RP at the time of naturalization automatically becomes a citizen.
b. If not residing in RP at the time of naturalization considered citizen only during his
minority, unless he takes permanent residence in RP before reaching majority age. In other words, he continues
to be a Filipino after reaching 18 years old only if he decides to reside here permanently before reaching that age.
2. If after the naturalization of the father Considered citizen on the condition that upon reaching the
age of majority, he takes an oath of allegiance in the Philippine consulate of the place where he may be. If he
fails to register his intent to continue as Filipino within one (1) year upon reaching 21 years, he ceases to be a
Filipino citizen.
Denaturalization
Com. Act No. 473, Sec. 18
Section 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificate issued. Upon motion made in the proper proceedings
by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the
naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Registry:
(a) If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;
(b) If the person naturalized shall, within the five years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there:
Provided, that the fact of the person naturalized remaining for more than one year in his native country or the
country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie
evidence of his intention of taking up permanent residence in the same;
(c) If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;
(d) If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or
private high schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum through the fault of their parents either by
neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree
cancelling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Office of the President
and the SolicitorGeneral;
Not when they dropped out because of scholastic performance
(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the
Constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship, as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of
a right, franchise or privilege.
Procedure:
Filed by the Solicitor General before the same RTC that granted his naturalization, regardless of where
he may be residing at that time.
BARLONGAY CASE:
Republic vs. Li Yao (214 SCRA 748)
F: Fifteen (15) years after Li Yao was conferred with Filipino citizenship by naturalization, the Republic sought the
cancellation thereof on the grounds of: 1) not being of good moral character by having amorous relations with women; 2)
not having conducted himself in an irreproachable manner in dealing with the duly constituted authorities by using names
other than that authorized, by resorting to tax evasion and violating the AntiDummy Law. The trial court relying solely on
the ground of evasion of the payment of lawful taxes by underdeclaration of income as reflected in his income tax return
for 194651, cancelled his naturalization. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: W/n the cancellation of Li Yao's naturalization was valid.
RULING: Yes. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the
cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions which arise subsequent to the granting
of the certificate of naturalization. Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding,
the decision rendered therein not constituting res judicata as to any matter that would support a judgement
cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the ground of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof.
The concealment of applicant's income to evade payment of lawful taxes shows that his moral character
is not irreproachable, thus disqualifying him for naturalization.
A tax amnesty only relieves him from any civil, criminal or administrative liability insofar as his tax
case is concerned. It does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good moral character and irreproachable
conduct which are grounds for denaturalization. MRM.
3. Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship
Article IV, Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
(referring to CA 63.)
Article IV, Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless
by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law (CA 63) to have renounced it.
Commmonwealth Act 63
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways
and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship or expatriation;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
reaching the age of majority; Provided, however, That a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in
any manner while the Philippines is at war with any country;
(4) By rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided,
That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and
the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of
his Philippine citizenship if either of the ff. circumstances is present:
(a) The Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign
country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces in the Philippine territory with the
consent of the Philippines; Provided that the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering
said service or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto,
states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: And provided
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed
forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) shall
not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Philippines during the period of his
service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the
service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his
civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of
war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted ;
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's
country, she acquires his nationality. [This is now qualified by Art. IV, Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry
aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced it.]
The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the acquisition of citizenship by a natural born Filipino
citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic IberoAmerican countries or from the United Kingdom
shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship if the law of that country grants the same privilege to
its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which
citizenship is acquired.
a. Loss of Citizenship
Grounds:
(1) Naturalization in a foreign country [CA 63, Sec. 1(1)]
Frivaldo v COMELEC (174 SCRA 245) (1989)
F: Frivaldo was elected as governor of Sorsogon. The League of Municipalities filed a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo's election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the US in
1983. He admitted such but raised as a defense that he did so to protect himself from Marcos and that his naturalization as
an American citizen was not impressed with voluntariness but was obtained only for reasons of convenience. The League
argued that since Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of
the election, he was not qualified to run for governor. Frivaldo countered that his oath in his certificate of candidacy that he
was a natural born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987
elections had divested him of his US citizenship under the laws of the US.
HELD: Frivaldo claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that
by actively participating in the elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under US laws. Such
laws do not concern us. Such forfeiture is between him and the US as his adopted country. It should be obvious
that even if he did lose his naturalized Amer ican citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect
of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might
have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Mere filing of certificate of candidacy is not a sufficient act of repatriation. Repatriation requires an
express and equivocal act. Frivaldo's claim that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 bec. the
Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body
rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is farfetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would open the
floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their
abandoned citizenship w/o formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the Phils. It
does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate
of candidacy he had, w/o more, already effectively recovered Phil. citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisionssurely, Phil. citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the
Special Committee had not yet been convened, what it meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this
was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. Adapted.
Labo vs COMELEC (176 SCRA 1)
F: Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Phils. He was granted Australian citizenship . He took an
oath of allegiance renouncing all other allegiance, etc. Though the marriage was declared void for being bigamous, Labo
was, according to the records still an Australian citizen. In the 1988 local elections, Labo ran for mayor of Baguio. His
Filipino citizenship was questioned on the ground that he had acquired Australian citizenship through his marriage to an
Australian citizen and his taking an oath of allegiance to Australia where he renounced all other allegiance to other
countries. Labo claimed that (1) his marriage did not automatically divest him of his Filipino citizenship and that (2) his
naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Labo's first contention is irrelevant. He became an Australian citizen by virtue of naturalization and not
by marriage.
The second argument is specious w/c cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, w/c
enumerates the modes by w/c Phil. citizenship may be lost, and among them are (1) naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Consti. or laws of a foreign country, all of w/c are applicable to petitioner. Under Article IV, Section 5, "dual
allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
xxx Even if it be assumed that, as petitioner asserts, his naturalization was annulled after it was found
that his marriage was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Phil. citizenship. His
divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted
country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Phil. citizenship and willingly
and knowingly embraced the citizenship of another country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently
rejected by Australia does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a Phil. citizen
Phil. citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. It does
not appear that petitioner has reacquired Phil. citizenship by any of these methods. Adapted.
Labo v. COMELEC (211 SCRA 297, July 1992)
F: Labo ran for mayor of Baguio in the May 11, 1992 elections. His opponent, Ortega, questioned his citizenship
before the Comelec, relying on Labo v. Comelec (179 SCRA 1, 1989) which declared Labo not a citizen of the Philippines.
HELD: 1. Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he was elected
by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
As held in Fivaldo vs. COMELEC,
"xxx The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. xxx "
xxx Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for
reacquisition of Phil. citizenship filed before the Office of the SolGen. pursuant to PD 725 and LOI 270. To
date, however, the Special Committee on Naturalization had not yet acted upon said application. In the absence
of any official action or approval by proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not, and cannot,
amount to an automatic reacquistion of the applicant's Phil. citizenship.
2. The disqualification of Labo does not necessarily entitle Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number
of votes to proclamation as mayor. The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority vote does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
3. The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact & in law of a candidate's disqualification
so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible can
didate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected. Adapted.
(2) Express renunciation or Expatriation [CA 63, Sec 1(2)]
This overrules Haw v Government, where the SC held that renunciation could be implied.
Expatriation is a constitutional right (Go Gullian v Government). No one can be compelled to remain a
Filipino if he does not want to.
Yu v DefensorSantiago (169 SCRA 364)
F: Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for five years and renewed for the same period upon
presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen in 1978, he
applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon
his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty"
and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents he signed.
HELD: The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine
citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioner vs Go Gallano, express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication. Yu, with full knowledge and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese
citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese
citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
Dissenting: The mere use of a foreign passport is not ipso facto express renunciation of Filipino citizenship.
Whatever may be the reasons for doing so, it must be ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is conducted
instead of an administrative determination of a most summary nature (as in this case). Adapted.
Aznar v Osmena, COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (May 1990)
F: Emelito Osmena ran for Governor of Cebu in the Jan. 18, 1988 elections. Aznar as Cebu Chairman of LDPLaban
filed with COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmena on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen,
being a US citizen, as evidenced by Osmena's application for alien, his alien certificate of registration, permit to reenter
the Phils, immigration certificate of clearance etc. Osmena on the other hand maintained that he is a Fil citizen, alleging
that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio Osmena, that he is a holder of a valid Phil passport, that he has been
continuously residing in the Phils since birth & has not gone out of the country for more than 6 months and that he has
been a registered voter in the Phils since 1965. The Comelec decided for Osmena.
HELD: 1. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the pet failed to present direct proof that private resp had
lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under CA #63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; (3) by subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private
respondent Osmena did not lose his Phil citizenship by any of the 3 mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode
of losing Phil citizenship.
2. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private resp is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that priv resp had lost his Phil citizenship. Pet Aznar
failed to positively establish this fact. Osmena remains a Filipino & the loss of his Phil citizenship cannot be
presumed.
3. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmena was both a Filipino & an American, the mere fact that he
has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmena,
the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not STILL a Filipino, possessed as he is, of
both nationalities or citizenship. There is no express renunciation here of Phil citizenship. There is even no
implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Phil citizenship
must be EXPRESS, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Phil citizenship WHEN THERE IS NO
RENUNCIATION, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
4. The statement in the 1987 constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest & shall be dealt with by law" has no retroactive effect. Adapted.
(3) Taking an oath of allegiance to another country upon reaching the age of majority.
(4) Accepting a commission and serving in the armed forces of another country, unless there is an
offensive or defensive pact with the country, or its maintains armed forces in RP with RP's consent.
(5) Denaturalization.
(6) Being found by final judgment to be a deserter of the AFP.
(7) Marriage by a Filipino woman to an alien, if by the laws of her husband's country, she becomes a
citizen thereof.
This is deemed repealed by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, which mandate that Filipino citizens who
marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their "act" or "omission", they are deemed under the law to
have renounced it. At present, the law (CA 63, Sec. 1 par. 7) only provides for express renunciation (i.e., act),
and so there is no law at the moment on "renunciation by omission." But Congress may provide for such later.
But Sec. 2 of the 1973 Consti. (carried over as Sec. 4 of the 1987 Consti.) only has a prospective

application. Thus, CA 63 continues for marriages celebrated before 17 January 1973. If a Filipino married a
Greek in 1972 and became a Greek citizen herself thereby, then she lost her Filipino citizenship. As to her
children, however, it is enough that she was a Filipina at the time of marriage to qualify them to elect Philippine
citizenship when they reached the age of majority (Villahermosa ruling). But if the children were born after
1973, then under the 1987 Constitution, those children are now even naturalborn.
But if, in 1961, a Filipino woman married an alien whose country did not make her an automatic citizen,
and so in order to acquire his citizenship, she applied for naturalization, and after her naturalization she begot C,
C could no longer elect Philippine citizenship. The ruling in Cu and Villahermosa applies only to mothers who
lost their citizenship by operation of law and not by their own voluntary acts.
If C was born after the application but before the approval of the naturalization of his mother, he could
still elect Philippine citizenship.
But for similar marriages celebrated after 17 January 1973, the mere fact of marriage alone does not strip
the Filipino woman of her Philippine citizenship. Thus, if a Filipina marries an alien in 1974, even if she gains
her husband's citizenship, lives abroad, does not pay her taxes, never returns to RP, she is still a Filipina under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, so long as she does not categorically renounce her citizenship. It follows that
her children are naturalborn citizens, being the children of Filipino mothers, and this time without the need of
election.
Expatriation is a constitutional right (Go Gullian v Government). No one can be compelled to remain a Filipino
if he does not want to.
Exception:
Com. Act. No. 63, Sec. 1(3).

xxx [A] Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the
Philippines is at war with any country.
People vs. Manayao, 74 Phil. 721 (1947)
F: Manayao was one of the Makapilis who took part in the killing of the residents in barrio Banaban, municipality of
Angat, Bulacan. After the liberation, he, among others, was charged w/ treason and w/ multiple murder in the People's
court. In his defense, he argues, among others, he has lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the
Phil. law on treason.
HELD: Appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles governing the
duties of a citizen toward his country under the Consti. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government
and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service.
During a period of stress, under a Consti enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free to cast off
his loyalty and obligations toward his Fatherland.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very fact of
committing the treasonous acts charged against him, divested himself of his Phil. citizenship and thereby placed
himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would
protect him from punishment. VV.
Art. XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all
times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
BARLONGAY CASE:
Caasi vs. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 229)
F: These 2 cases were consolidated bec. they have the same objective: the disqualification under Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the private resp., Merito Miguel, for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to
w/c he was elected in the local elections of 1/18/88, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of the US, not of Bolinao.
HELD: Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an abandonment of
his domicile and residence in the Phils. For he did not go to the US merely to visit his children or his doctor
there; he entered the US w/ the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on his application, he was issued by the US Govt the
requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
xxx To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Phils., the law (Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code) requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective
office in the Phils., did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
US. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act of acts independent of and done prior to
filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for
any elective office."
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least 1 year at the time of
the filing of his cert. of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must
possess. Miguel did no possess that qualification bec. he was a permanent resident of the US and he resided in
Bolinao for a period of only 3 mos. after his return to the Phils. in Nov. 1987. RAM.
b. Reacquisition of Citizenship
Secs. 2 5, Commonwealth Act 63
Sec. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. Citizenship may be reacquired:
(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualifications prescribed in
section two of Act Numbered Twentynine hundred twentyseven (now Sec. 4 of CA 473.)
(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act
after the termination of the marital status; and
(3) By direct act of the National Assembly (now Congress.)
Sec. 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. The procedure prescribed for
naturalization under Act Numbered Twentynine hundred twentyseven (now CA 473) shall apply to the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by naturalization provided for in the next preceding section: Provided, That
the qualifications and special qualifications prescribed in sections 3 and 4 of said Act shall not be required: And
Provided, further,
(1) That the applicant be at least twentyone years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least
six months before he applies for naturalization;
(2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period
of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in
which he is living; and
(3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith
and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject.
Sec. 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for the proper enforcement of this Act.
Naturalization blanks and other blanks required for carrying out the provisions of this Act shall be prepared and
furnished by the Solicitor General, subject to approval of the Secretary of Justice.
xxx
(1) Naturalization (CA 63 and CA 473)
But this is now an abbreviated process, with no need to wait for three years (one year for declaration of intent,
and two years for the judgment to become executory). An applicant must only possess the following:
a. 21 years of age;
b. Resident for 6 months;
c. Good moral character;
d. No disqualification.
(2) Repatriation
(i) Woman who by her marriage lost her citizenship.
(This is no longer true under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, if the loss was due only to marriage.)
In People v Avengoza, 119 SCRA 119 (1982), it was held that a woman who lost her citizenship by
reason of her marriage to a Chinese husband and her gaining his citizenship, must first judicially, prove that she
was Filipino citizen prior to the marriage, before she can be repatriated by virtue of the death of her husband.
In Jao v Republic, 121 SCRA 358 (1983), it was held that although her citizenship prior to her marriage
to a Chinese husband needed judicial confirmation, the process of repatriation itself (i.e., of reacquiring that
citizenship) involves a purely administrative proceeding.
Thus: Filipino citizenship prior to its loss by virtue of marriage to an alien and gaining his citizenship
needs judicial declaration. But re acquisition of such citizenship by repatriation is a purely administrative
procedure.
People v. Avengoza, 119 SCRA 119 (1982)
F: Go Cham, a Chinese, his wife Anselma Avengoza, and the latter's mother, Gavina A., were accused of violation of
CA 108. It was charged that Go Gam and Anselma A. used Gavina A. as dummy in order to acquire lands in Camarines
Sur w/c the couple were not qualified to acquire under the 1935 Consti. Pending trial, Gavina A. and Go Cham died. On
her motion the trial court allowed Anselma A. to withdraw her previous plea of not guilty and to file a motion to quash w/c
the court later granted. The trial court ruled that Anselma had reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her
husband, Go Cham, and upon complying w/ CA 63, sec. 4 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic and filing the
oath w/ the Civil Registrar. The prosecution appealed.
HELD: Def. Avengoza's sole evidence on record to support her repatriation is her oath of allegiance to the
Republic. Def. Avengoza became an alien by reason of her lawful marriage to a Chinese citizen; however this
does not necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen previous to such marriage. Thus, she should first prove
her citizenship previous to her marriage and as there is no conclusive proof of this matter on record, this
question must be judicially determined before she can be legally repatriated. VV.
Jao v. Republic, 121 SCRA 358 (1983)
F: Petitioner filed in the CFIDavao a petition for repatriation. She claimed that while her father was a Chinese and
her mother a Filipinio, her parents were not legally married, and that although she lost her Phil. citizenship when she
married a Chinese national, her husband died on 9/6/62. After trial, the court declared the petitioner judicially repatriated.
The govt appealed.
HELD: The proceedings taken in the trial court are a complete nullity. There is no law requiring or authorizing
that repatriation should be effected by a judicial proceeding. All that is required for a female citizen of the Phils.
who lost her citizenship to an alien to reacquire her Phil. citizenship upon the termination of her marital status
"is for her to take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Phils. and to register the said oath in the
proper civil registry." Moreover, the petitioner's claim of Phil. citizenship prior to her marriage for being
allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother may not be established in an action
where the other or her heirs are not parties. It is consistent rule that Phil. citizenship may not be declared in a
nonadversary suit where the persons whose rights are affected by such declaration are not parties, such as an
action for declaratory relief or a petition for judicial repatriation as an alien. VV.

(ii) Those declared by authorities to be deserters of the Armed Forces. (Only this is applicable to the
present.)
(3) Legislative Act
Which is both a mode of acquiring and reacquiring citizenship.
BARLONGAY CASE:
Republic vs. Dela Rosa, 232 SCRA 785
F: Three (3) petitions involving the same issues and parties were consolidated. Said cases questioned the readmission
of Juan Frivaldo as a Filipino citizen under CA 63 or the Revised Naturalization Law as amended by CA 473. Frivaldo
became a US citizen allegedly due to the pressure from the Marcos regime. He came back here, ran for Governor of
Sorsogon and won.
RULING: DISQUALIFIED. Frivaldo must vacate his office and surrender the same to the ViceGovernor.
A former citizen who opts to reacquire Phil. citizenship through naturalization under CA 63 is duty
bound to follow the procedure prescribed by said law, and it is not for him to decide and select the requirements
which he believes are inconvenient. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a
Filipino citizen and one who was never a citizen.
(Barlongay: This statement is inaccurate because there are indeed differences.)
Failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the law rendered null and void
the proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken. The TC never acquired
jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. Under the law, both the petition for naturalization
and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the OG or in a
newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, the publication and the posting must be in its full text for the Court
to acquire jurisdiction.
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations under Secs. 2 and 6 of the law: (1) that petitioner
is of good moral character; (2) he resided continuously in the Phil. for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to
speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) he will reside continuously in the Phil. from
date of filing of petition until his admission to Phil citizenship; (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or
if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from promulgation, counted
from the date of receipt by the Sol. Gen. of his copy of the decision. Sec. 1 of RA 530 provides that no decision
granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after 2 years from its promulgation in
order to be able to observe if the applicant has: (1) not left the country; (2) dedicated himself continuously to
lawful calling; (3) not been convicted of any offense or for violation of government promulgated rules; (4) not
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.
The proceedings in the TC were marred by irregularities. The hearing was set ahead of the scheduled
date upon request of Frivaldo so he could catch up with the last day for filing his certificate of candidacy,
without publication; the petition was heard within 6 months from last publication; Frivaldo was allowed to take
his oath of allegiance even before the finality of judgment and without waiting for the 2 year waiting period.
MRM.
4. Dual Allegiance
Art. IV, Sec. 5 Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law.
Art. XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all
times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
Dual allegiance is not contradictory to the double nationality of a Filipina who married an alien. It is
not the business of Philippine law to determine if its citizen is also a citizen of another country by virtue of
marriage.
What Sec. 5 contemplates is the case of aliens who are naturalized as Filipinos but remain loyal to their
country of origin (specifically former Chinese nationals who even ran in the legislative Yuan of China), as well a
public officers who, while serving the government, seek citizenship in another country.
Note : Under Sec 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective local position.
5. Mixed Marriages
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 ed. (hereinafter Cruz):
1. It was provided under the old rule that a Filipino woman who married an alien forfeited her Phil.
citizenship if under the laws of her husband's State she was required to follow his citizenship. This rule has been
reversed by Art. IV, Sec. 4 of the Consti. w/c provides that:
"Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed, under the law, to have renounced it."
2. But what of the reverse of the situation? Suppose it is the alien woman who marries a Filipino?
Sec. 15 of CA 473 provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Phils., and who might herself be naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Phils."
In its latest pronouncement on this question, the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" was
interpreted to mean only that the alien woman must not be laboring under any of the disqualifications prescribed
by law for naturalization in her own right as a Filipino citizen. Moreover, she can establish her claim to Phil.
citizenship in administrative proceedings before the immigration authorities only and will not have to file a
judicial action for this purpose.
Recapitulating, J. Barredo declared in Moya Lim Yao v. Comm. of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292:
xxx We now hold xxx that under Sec. 15 of CA 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Phils. under Sec. 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Phil. citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Sec. 4.

UPDATED 11/24/95
RAM
C. Sovereignty
Sovereignty
"Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which the State is governed.
There are two kinds of sovereignty, to wit, legal and political. Legal sovereignty is the authority w/c has the
power to issue final commands whereas political sovereignty is the power behind the legal sovereign, or the sum
total of the influences that operate upon it.
Sovereignty may also be internal or external. Internal sovereignty refers to the power of the State to
control its domestic affairs. External sovereignty, w/c is the power of the State to direct its relations w/ other
States, is also known as independence. xxx" (Cruz.)
"The supreme power of the State to govern persons and things within its territory.
'Theory of AutoLimitation' is the property of the Stateforce due to which a State has exclusive legal
competence of selflimitation and selfrestriction (Jellinek).
In Reagan v CIR, it was held that the provision in the military bases agreement giving the US criminal
jurisdiction over crimes committed even by Filipinos inside the bases is not a derogation of Philippine
sovereignty. The Philippines has the power to limit the exercise of its sovereignty. When it allows a foreign
State to use part of its territory and waives jurisdiction over crimes committed therein, it does not give up part of
its sovereignty but only limits the exercise of its sovereignty." (Mirasol notes.)
1. Dominium and Imperium
"Imperium refers to the State's authority to govern. It covers such activities as passing laws governing a
territory, maintaining peace and order over it, and defending it against foreign invasion. When the State act in
this capacity jure imperii, it generally enjoys sovereign immunity.
Dominium refers to the capacity of the State to own property. It covers such rights as title to land,
exploitation and use of it, and disposition or sale of the same. The Regalian doctrine whereby all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, and anyone claiming title has the burden to show ownership, comes within
this concept. In this capacity jure gestium, the State descends to the status of ordinary persons and thus becomes
liable as such." (Mirasol notes.)
A state as a juridical person may act in the capacity of sovereign as well as owner. xxx "As there are
overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the wellknown distinction in public law bet.
the governmental authority possessed by the state w/c is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty,
and its capacity to own or acquire prop., it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes
under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate w/ reference to
lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use
of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Consti. Dean Pound did
speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era bet. two such concepts, but did note the existence of
res publicae as a corallary to dominium. xxx [T]here was a recognition by J. Homes in Carino v. Insular Gov't,
that 'Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal theory that all lands were held from the Crown***.'
That was a concept of jus regalia, w/c was adopted by the 1973 Consti., ownership however being vested in the
state as such rather than the head thereof. (Fernando 56.)
2. Territorial, Personal, and Extraterritoral Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the manifestation of sovereignty. (Mirasol notes.)
The jurisdiction of the state is understood as both its authority and the sphere of the exercise of that
authority. (Sinco 26.)
a. Territorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State to have all persons and things within its territorial
limits to be completely subject to its control and protection. (Mirasol notes.)
When exercised in reference to persons or things found w/in the territory of the state, it is known as
territorial jurisdiction. All persons w/in that area, regardless of nationality, are subject to the territorial
jurisdiction of the state.
The territorial jurisdiction of a state is sovereignty operating or applied w/in its territory. Its scope and
effect are expressed in this classic statement of Chief Justice Marshall on the subject:
"The jurisdiction of the nation w/in its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an
investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power w/c would impose such restriction. All
exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation w/in its own territories, must be traced
up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may
be either express or implied." (Sinco 2627.)
b. Personal jurisdiction is the authority of the state over its nationals, their persons, property, and acts,
whether within or outside its territory. The Civil Code provision that prohibitory and mandatory laws follow
citizens wherever they go is an example. (Mirasol notes.)
When jurisdiction is exercised on the basis of the status of the persons affected, independent of their
presence or absence in the territory of the state, it is known as personal jurisdiction. (Sinco 26.)
The personal jurisdiction of the state is exercised over all its citizens w/in or w/o its territory. It affects
their person, prop., and even some of their acts performed abroad. The authority of the state to w/c they owe
permanent allegiance follows them at all times wherever they might reside and as long as their membership of
the state subsists. (Sinco 28.)
c. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State over persons, things or acts, outside its
territorial limits by reason of their effects to its territory. Art. 2 of the RPC is a classic example of this.
(Mirasol notes.)
By agreement w/ other states, a state may establish its legal institutions outside its territorial limits.
Thus if a state does not have sufficient confidence in the administration of justice and the system of law
obtaining in a particular country, it may enter into a treaty for the establishment of its own courts in the latter
country where its citizens or nationals may be tried.
xxx
Regardless of treaty or agreement, however, a state has full authority to adopt rules intended to apply to
persons, whether citizens or aliens, and things found in the territory of other states or on the high seas under
certain conditions. Of course, the actual enforcement of rules intended to have extraterritorial effect may be
accomplished only when the persons concerned are found w/in the territorial jurisdiction of the state. To enforce
them in the territorial limits of another state would be to violate the sovereignty of the latter, unless this state
gives its consent thereto. Thus, we have Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Art. 2. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the
provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its
atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those
who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship.
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippines.
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number.
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of
their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code."
xxx. (Sinco 2829.)
3. Sovereign Immunity
(a) Basis
i. Constitutional
Art. XVI, Sec. 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
ii. Jurisprudence
Positivist theory: There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the laws on which the
right depends. (Holmes in Kawananakoa v Polyblank)
Sociological theory: If the State is amenable to suits, all its time would be spent defending itself from
suits and this would prevent it from performing its other functions. (Republic v Villasor, 54 SCRA 83) (Mirasol
notes.)
The doctrine is also available to foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the
local State. The added basis in this case is the principle of the sovereign equality of States, under w/c one State
cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. To do so
would "unduly vex the peace of nations." (Cruz.)
Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83 (1973.)
F: On 7/3/61, a decision was rendered in SP in favor of resps. P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, et. al. and against petitioner herein,
confirming the arbitration award in the amount of 1.7 M, subject of SP. On 6/24/69, resp. Judge issued an Order declaring
the aforestated decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, QC as well as Manila to execute the
said decision. A corresponding alias writ of execution was then issued. On the strength of said writ, the sheriff served
notices of garnishment w/ several banks, specially on the 'monies due the AFP in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover
the amount mentioned in the writ;' the Phil. Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. Hence, this original
action for certiorari and prohibition w/ the SC.
HELD: It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that
the state as well as its govt is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it
must be so. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not bec. of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on w/c
the right depends. (J. Holmes, Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 US 349.) Sociological jurisprudence supplies an
answer not dissimilar. [A] continued adherence to the doctrine of nonsuability is not to be deplored for as
against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from
such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to
be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. This is based on considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. RAM.
(b) When a suit is against the State and when it is not.
A suit is against the State, regardless of who is named as the defendant, if it produces adverse
consequences to the public treasury in terms of disbursement of public funds and loss of government property.
When a suit is against the State, it cannot prosper unless the State has given its consent.
In the following cases, however, the suit is not really against the State.
1. When the purpose of the suit is to compel an officer charged with the duty of making payments
pursuant to an appropriation made by law in favor of the plaintiff to make such payment. For in this case, the
suit is not really against the State, the State having acknowledged its liability to the plaintiff through the
enactment of an appropriation law. Rather, the suit is intended to compel performance of a ministerial duty.
(Begoso v PVA, 32 SCRA 466 and Del Mar v PVA, 51 SCRA 340 both involving the War Widow Benefits Law
due the veterans.)
2. When from the allegations in the complaint, it is clear that the respondent is a public officer sued in a
private capacity.
3. When the action is not in personam with the government as the named defendant, but an action in
rem that does not name the government in particular.
In Republic v Feliciano (148 SCRA 424), a suit against the government for the recovery of possession
and ownership of land based on a possessory information was disallowed by the SC on the ground that a suit for
the recovery of property is an action "in personam" which seeks to bring the State to court just like any private
person who is claimed to usurp a piece of property.
What the plaintiff should have done, the Court continued, was to apply for a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Sec. 48(b) of CA 141, which is an "action in rem", i.e., one directed against the whole
world, and not the government in particular.
Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424
F: Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint in the CFI of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the land authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land in Tinambac, Camarines
Sur. He alleged that the lot in question should be excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation program of the
government under Proc. No. 90, since it's his private property being covered by a possessory information title in the name
of his predecessorin interest. (Proc. No. 90 reserves for settlement purposes, under the administration of the NARRA, now
the Land Authority, a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur.) Feliciano
prayed that he be declared the rightful owner of the property in question.
A motion to dismiss, principally on the ground that the RP cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action
cannot prosper, was filed by 86 settlers (as intervenors) of the land in question.
The CFI granted the motion to dismiss, which was then reversed by the IAC on appeal. Hence this petition by the
RP.
ISSUES: 1. WON the doctrine of nonsuability of the state can be invoked in this case. (YES)

The doctrine of nonsuability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded
the RP as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State
to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of
property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under
settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such
showing of consent in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.
This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before
the court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked
by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings."
2. WON the consent of the RP may be read from Proc. No. 90 itself. (NO)

The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proc. no. 90 cannot be
construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being in derogation of
sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is
not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State
Immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Adapted.
Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Adm., 32 SCRA 466 (1970)
F: Gaudencio Begosa, plaintiffappellee, was an "enlisted men of the Phil. Commonwealth Army, inducted in the service
of the USAFFE" having taken "active participation in the battle of Bataan" as well as the "liberation drive against the
enemy" thereafter became "permanently incapacitated from work due to injuries he sustained in line of duty xxx."
Pltff. filed his claim for disability pension as far back as 3/4/55; but it was erroneously disapproved on 6/21/55,
bec. his dishonorable discharge from the Army was not a good or proper ground for the said disapproval, and that on
reconsideration asked for by him on 11/1/57, w/c he continued to follow up, the Board of Administrators, Phil. Veterans
Admin., finally approved his claim on 9/2/64, at the rate of P30/mo. Judge Soriano noted that: "had it not been for the said
error, it appears that there was no good ground to deny the said claim, so the latter was valid and meritorious even as of the
date of its filing on 3/4/55, hence to make the same effective only as of the date of its approval on 9/2/64 according to
def's stand would be greatly unfair and prejudicial to pltff.
The appeal assigns as one error what it considers to be the failing of the LC in not holding that the complaint in
this case is in effect a suit against the State w/c has not given its consent thereto.
HELD: It does not admit of doubt that if the suit were in fact against the State, the LC should have dismissed
the complaint. Nor is it to be doubted that while ostensibly an action may be against a public official, the def.
may in reality be the govt. As a result, it is equally wellsettled that where a litigation may have adverse
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursement of funds or loss of prop., the public official
proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of nonsuability may appropriately
be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted bec. of
his failure to comply w/ the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of pltff. or
petitioner. Such is the present case.
xxx However, where the judgement in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of
the prop. in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liab. of the Govt, then the suit should be
regarded as one against the govt itself, and consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts
except w/ the consent of said Govt. RAM.
Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Adm (PVA), 51 SCRA 340 (1973)
F: Del Mar averred that he served during WW II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command (a duly
recognized guerrilla org.) w/ the rank of major; that he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on
10/20/46 on a cert. of permanent total physical disability; that upon proper claim presented and after hearing and
adjudication, the Phil. Veterans Bd granted him a monthly life pension of P50 effective 1/28/47; that in 3/50, the said Bd.
discontinued payment of monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of similar pension from the US Govt, thru the
US Veterans Admin. by reason of military service rendered in the US in the Far East during the war, precluded him from
receiving any further monthly life pension from the Phil. Govt; that he wrote the said Bd. twice, demanding the continued
payment of his monthly pension but his demands went unheeded. And petition for mandamus was filed w/ CFICebu w/c
rendered judgment upholding Del Mar's claim.
The PVA argues that the court a quo was w/o jurisdiction to try the civil case bec. it involves a money claim
against PVA a mere agency of the Govt performing governmental functions w/ no juridical personality of its own and, in
reality, partakes of an action against the Phil. Govt w/c is immune from suit w/o its consent.
HELD: As a general proposition, the rule on the immunity of the Govt from suit w/o its consent holds true in all
actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss
of prop. Needless to say, in such actions, w/c, in effect, constitute suits against the Govt, the court has no option
but to dismiss them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant
institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply w/ his statutory duty to release the amount claimed
from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. As clearly discernible
from the circumstances, the case at bar falls under the exception. RAM.
Shauf v CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990)
Doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in
his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
F: By reason of her nonselection to a position at Clark Air Base, Shauf filed an equal opportunity complaint against
officers of Clark Air Base, for alleged discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex. She then filed
a complaint for damages with the RTC. Respondents filed a MTD on the ground that as officers of the US Armed Forces
performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them, they are immune from suit.
Shauf contends that the officers are being sued in their private capacity for discriminatory acts performed beyond
their authority, hence the instant action is not a suit against the US Govt. which would require its consent. According to
respondents, the complaint is barred by the immunity of the US since the acts sued upon are governmental activities of the
US.
HELD: 1. The general rule is that a state may not be sued without its consent. While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials
of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
2. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of govt. officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his
rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
3. The cloak of immunity is removed from the moment the public official is sued in his individual
capacity such as where he acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official may
be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in
bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. In this case, the officers are liable for damages.
Adapted.

Republic v Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124 (1993)
Herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable
for damages.
F: The heirs of the 12 rallyists who perished during the Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages. Such action
was filed against the government. This was by virtue of a recommendation made by the Citizen's Mendiola Commission
(created for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place during the
Mendiola incident.) that the heirs and wounded victims of the incident be compensated by the Govt. Notwithstanding such
recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by the victims. The Caylo Group (the group of marchers
in the said incident) filed a formal letter of demand from the govt. Still unheeded for almost a year, the group filed an
action against the govt, together w/ the military officers and personnel involved in the incident before the trial court. Resp.
Judge dismissed the complaint as against the RP on the ground that there was no waiver by the Sate.
HELD: 1. The principle of immunity from suit is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It
also rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the
sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in
the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government.
2. This is not a suit against the State with its consent. Firstly, the recommendation made by the Mendiola
Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs and the victims of the incident by the government does not
in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The Commission was merely a factfinding
body and its recommendation was not final and executory. Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that President
Aquino may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit.
Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, such consent was not given in this case.
3. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:
(1) when the Republic is sued by name;
(2) when the suit is against an unincorporated govt. agency;
(3) when the suit is on its face against a govt. officer but the case is such that the ultimate liability will
belong not to the officer but to the govt.
In this case, while the Republic is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the govt.
Although the military officers were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their
functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other
official of the Republic.
The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by
the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any
obligation w/c belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made
defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.
They are therefore liable for damages. Adapted.
(c) Consent to be sued
How consent is given
The consent to be sued, in order to be effective, must come from the State, acting through a duly enacted
statute. Waiver of state immunity can only be made by an act of legislative body.
In Republic v Purissima, 78 SCRA 470 (1977), the SC held that a contract entered into by the Rice and
Corn Administration stipulating that in the event of breach, action may be filed by the parties, cannot be the
basis of a money claim against the RCA, a government entity under the Office of the President, since the RCA
had no authority to bind the government to be sued. Only a statute could.
Republic v. Purissima, 78 SCRA 470 (1977)
Suability of the State. The Need for a Statute Giving Consent
F: The Rice & Corn Administration (RCA) entered into a contract w/ the Yellow Ball Freight Lines in w/c they
agreed that in the event of breach, action may be filed w/ the courts of Mla. In 1972, Yellow filed a money claim against
RCA. The case was assigned to resp. Judge., who denied a motion to dismiss filed by RCA relying on the stipulation in the
contract of the parties.
HELD: The RCA is part of the govt, being in fact an office under the Office of the Pres. and therefore cannot be
sued w/o the consent of the State. The consent to be effective.... must come from the State, acting thru a duly
enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for def. RCA agreed to had no binding force in the govt. That was
clearly beyond the scope of his authority.
In Republic v Feliciano, 148 SCRa 424, the SC held that the Proclamation of the President of the Phil
ippines (recognizing private rights to the land) cannot be the source of consent, since the Proclamation is not a
legislative act. VV.
Republic v Feliciano, supra.
Express consent:
(1) Money claims arising from contracts, express or implied.
Act No. 3083. An Act Defining the Conditions under which the Government of the Philippines
may be Sued.
Sec. 1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippines hereby consents and submits
to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve
as a basis of civil action between private parties.
Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has presented
his claim to the Commission on Audit and that the latter did not decide the same within two months from the date of
its presentation.
Sec. 3. Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted in the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila or of the province where the claimant resides, at the option of the latter,
upon which court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions.
Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original and
appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.
Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippines is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original
jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of setoff or counterclaim in a similar action
between private parties.
Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippines pursuant to the authority
granted in this Act shall be served upon the SolicitorGeneral whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense,
either himself or through delegates.
Sec. 7. No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the Government of the
Philippines under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in which
judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the President of the Philippines, within five days after the
same becomes final.
Sec. 8. The President of the Philippines, at the commencement of each regular session of the Legislature,
shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received by him, and if said body determine that
payment should be made, it shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay, including
the same in the appropriations for the ensuing year.
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 16, 1923.
Com. Act 327. An Act Fixing the Time within which the Auditor General shall Render His Decisions and
Prescribing the Manner of Appeal Therefrom.
Sec. 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers,
the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their
presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested,
the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by
him. With respect to the accounts of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act on the same within one
hundred days after their submission, Sundays and holidays excepted.
In case of accounts or claims already submitted to but still pending decision by the Auditor General on or
before the approval of this Act, the periods provided in this section shall commence from the date of such approval.
Sec. 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or
claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing:
(a) xxx
(b) To the President of the Philippines, or
(c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines, if the appellant is a private person or entity.
If there are more than one appellant, all appeals shall be taken to the same authority resorted to by the first
appellant.
From a decision adversely affecting the interests of the Government, the appeal may be taken by the proper
head of the department or in case of local governments by the head of the office or branch of the Government
immediately concerned.
The appeal shall specifically set forth the particular action of the Auditor General to which exception is
taken with the reasons and authorities relied on for reversing such decision.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1938.
Sec. 2 of CA 327 has been amended by Sec. 50 of PD 1445 and by Sec. 35, Chapter 5, Subtitle B, Title
I, Book V, Administrative Code of the Philippines, as follows:
Sec. 50. Appeal from decisions of the Commission. The party aggrieved by any decision, order, or ruling of
the Commission may within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court
in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling adversely affects the
interests of any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. (PD 1445.)
Sec. 35. Appeal from Decision of the Commission. Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy
thereof in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order or ruling adversely affects
the interest of any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. (Subtitle B, Title
I, Book V, Administrative Code of the Philippines.)
Before the 1987 Constitution, the law in force was Act 3038 and CA 327 which, according to Sayson v
Singson (a suit to compel payment of electrical supplies delivered to CAA), allowed suit only for money claims
arising from contract, and providing a special procedure.
Under this procedure, the claim must be filed with the Auditor General (now, COA). If the Auditor did
not act within 60 days, then the claimant could file his claim with the RTC. But if the Auditor rendered a
decision, then the appeal could be made to the SC, unless the claimant was a public official in which case appeal
was to the President.
Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution now gives a different procedure. All money claims are to be filed with
COA, which has 60 days within which to act. If it fails to so act, the claimant must wait anyway. Once a
decision has been made, he has, within 30 days to appeal by certiorari to the SC.
Sayson v. Singson, 54 SCRA 282 (1973)
F: In 1/67, the Office of the District Engr. requisitioned various spare parts for the repair of a D8 Bulldozer. A
public bidding for the said items was conducted wherein the awards committee accepted the winning bid of P43,530 given
by Singkier Motor Service owned by resp. Singson. Said award was approved by the Sec. of Public Works and Comm. who
then directed the immediate delivery of the parts. In due course, the voucher w/c covered the transaction reached the hands
of petitioner Highway Auditor Sayson who then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. After finding the
price reasonable (as was evidenced by the indorsements of the Div. Engr. and the Comm. of Public Highways, the approval
of the Sec. of PW & C, and the verification of the representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination), petitioner
approved and effected payment of the voucher and withheld the 20% equivalent of P8,706 in order to submit the documents
covering the transaction to the Supervising Auditor for review. After making a canvass, the General Auditing Office
determined the transaction to be overpriced by at least P40,000. Malversation charges were failed against the district engr.
and civil engr. involved. A mandamus suit was filed by the resp. w/c sought to compel petitioner government auditors to
approve the payment of the voucher covering the balance. The LC decided in favor of resp. Singson. Hence this appeal by
certiorari.
HELD: It is apparent that resp. Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the Govt, for the payment of
the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming
momentarily the validity of such claim, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim
against the State ***, but an ordinary action for specific performance***. Actually, the suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, w/c cannot
prosper or be entertained by the Court except w/ the consent of the State***. In other words, the resp. should
have filed his claim w/ the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of CA 327*** w/c prescribe the
conditions under w/c money claim against the government may be filed.
xxx It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State,
however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted.
Also, in the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the
party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor Gen. Even had there been such , the court to w/c the
matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the LC could not legally act on the matter. Adapted.
(2) Quasidelicts committed by special agents
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176
shall be applicable.
xxx (Civil Code.)
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (ibid.)
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code allows a suit against the government for quasidelicts committed by the
government when acting through special agents (those performing nonregular functions)
But if the tortious act was committed by a regular employee, the injured party could only bring a suit for
damages against the employee in his personal capacity.
It should be noted in this connection, that in Merritt vs Govt. of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil 311, the
SC said that it is therefore evident that the State is only liable for acts of its agents, officers and EEs when they
act as special agents within the meaning of Art. 1903 (now Art. 2180) and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of
the General Hospital was not such agent. In this case, the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), the agency
involved, did not yet have separate legal personality from the Philippine Govt. It should further be noted that the
plaintiff was allowed to sue by virtue of a special law but was unable to hold the defendant govt. liable since the
injuries were caused by a regular driver of the govt. and not a special agent.
Merritt v Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil 311
F: Merritt, while riding his motorcycle was hit by an ambulance owned by the Philippine General Hospital. It was
driven by a driver employed by the hospital. In order for Merritt to sue the Philippine government, Act No. 2457 was
enacted by the Philippine Legislature authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands
and authorizing the AttorneyGeneral of said Islands to appear in said suit. A suit was then filed before the CFI of Manila
which fixed the responsibility for the collision solely on the ambulance driver and determined the amount of damages to be
awarded to Merritt. Both parties appealed from the decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages and defendant
in rendering the amount against the government.
ISSUE: Did the defendant in enacting Act No. 2457 simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede
its liability to the plaintiff?
HELD: By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submit itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
Act No. 2457 authorizes E. Merritt to bring suit for the purpose of fixing the responsibility for the
collision and determining the amount of damages, if any, to which E. Merritt is entitled on account of said
collision. The government did not assume any liability under the Act.
The Government of the Philippine Islands is only liable, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of A1903, OCC (par. 6, Art. 2180, NCC). A
special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties
of his office if he is a special official. The special agent acts in representation of the state and executes the trust
confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions w/c are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and w/c are regulated by law and the regulations. The responsibility of the State is limited
to that w/c it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged w/ some definite purpose w/c gives rise to the claim, and not were the claim is based on acts
or omissions imputable to a public official charged w/ some administrative or technical office who can be held
to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. The chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. Adapted.
US v. Ceballos, 182 SCRA 644
F: Resp. was employed as barracks boy in Camp O'Donnel, and was arrested following a buybust operation
conducted by petitioners, who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special
Investigators. Petitioners filed charges against resp. for violation of RA 6425 and testified against him at the trial. Resp
was dismissed from employment as a result of the filing of the charge. Resp. filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners for his removal. Defendants (petitioners herein) filed the affirmative defense that they had only done their duty
in the enforcement of Phil. laws inside the American bases pursuant to the RPUS MBA. Later, their counsel filed a
motion to withdraw answer and moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that defendants were acting in their
official capacity and that the complaint against t hem was in effect a suit against the US w/o its consent.
HELD: Petitioners cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal w/c has not given its
consent to be sued. Petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the
buybust operation.
Pvt resp. invoke Art. 2180, NCC w/c holds the govt liable if it acts through a special agent. The
argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated as "special agents," the
US govt should be liable for their torts.
Suability v. Liability. There seems to be a failure to distinguish bet. suability and liability. Suability
depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be
held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the pltff the chance
to prove, it can, that the def. is liable.
The said art. establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The govt may be held liable under this art. only
if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated,
as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state
w/ its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Phil. govt and not to foreign govts impleaded in our courts.
We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the Office of
the Sheriff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a submission by the US govt to its jurisdiction. Express
waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the govt but must be effected through a dulyenacted
statute. Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent.
NOTES on the consolidated cases US v. Guinto, et al.:
1. The doctrine of state immunity is sometimes derisively called the "royal prerogative of dishonesty"
because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non
suability. This implies however that the State may be sued with its consent.
2. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
embodied in a general law or a special law. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature
through the medium of a duly enacted statute. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation. When the govt. enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. However, dis
tinctions must be made between sovereign and proprietary acts. The state may only be liable for proprietary acts.
As for the filing of a complaint by the govt., suability will result only where the govt. is claiming afffirmative
relief from the defendant.
3. There is no question that the US will be deemed to have impliedly waived its nonsuability if it has
entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.
4. In this case, by entering into an employment contract [a proprietary function] with the respondents,
the US impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity. The state could therefore be sued since such
contracts are commercial in nature. Adapted.
(3) Incorporation of governmentowned or controlled corps.
When the government creates a corporation, it invariably provides this corporation a separate entity and
with the capacity to sue and be sued. If the government entity is given the capacity to be sued, the suit
encompasses any kind of action, including one from tort.
In SSS v CA, 120 SCRA 707 (1983), the property of one Socorro Cruz was foreclosed due to the
negligence of the regular employees of SSS in mistaking her account, which was updated, with that of another
Socorro Cruz, which was in arrears. The SC, in granting nominal damages to the claimant, seemed to be saying
that SSS could have invoked the defense of Art. 2180, which it did not. The separate opinion of Makasiar
enunciated this. [Note: Consent to be sued includes actions based on quasidelict even though committed by
regular agents and not by special agents.]
So the rule, it seems, is that a government entity can be sued for tort, but if it is, it can invoke the defense
that it acted through its regular employees, not special agents.
PNB vs CIR, 81 SCRA 314 (1978)
Since the PHHC had the capacity to be sued, any judgment against it could be enforced by a writ of execution,
and its funds could even be garnished.
F: The United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) in a case filed before the Court of Industrial Relations prevailed over PHHC. The final and executory judgment
was sought to be enforced via a writ of garnishment against PHHC's funds deposited with PNB. PNB sought to quash the
writ alleging that the funds were "public in character." The motion was denied, hence this petition for certiorari alleging
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion.
HELD: PHHC was a governmentowned entity. It has personality distinct and separate from the government. It
has all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, accordingly it may sue and be sued and may be
subjected to court processes just like any other corporation. By engaging in business through the instrumentality
of a corp., the govt divests itself of its sovereign character, so as to render the corp. subject to the rules governing
private corporations. Garnishment is a proper remedy for a prevailing party to proceed against the funds of a
corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government. It is wellsettled that when the government
enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated just like any other
corporation. (The case was based primarily on NASSCO v CIR, 118 Phil 782.) VV.
Rayo vs CFI of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 456
F: Petitioners are among the many victims of the flooding caused by the simultaneous opening of the three
floodgates of Angat Dam during the height of typhoon "Kading". The complaints they filed before the CFI of Bulacan
were dismissed for the reason that the NPC in the operation of the Angat Dam is `performing a purely governmental
function,' thus it `can not be sued without the express consent of the State.' Respondent CFI denied MRecon, hence, this
petition.
HELD: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be
sued in any court under its charter [RA 6395, Sec. 3(d)]. As a government owned and controlled corporation, it
has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government (NASSCO v CIR). Moreover, the
charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause of action
and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by petitioners. Adapted.
SSS V. CA, 120 SCRA 707 (1983)
F: The Spouses David and Socorro Cruz obtained a loan from SSS on the security of a lot located in Sto. Rosario,
Pateros, Rizal. Claiming that the couple had defaulted in the payment of the monthly amortizations, the SSS applied for
the foreclosure of the mortgage. As a result the sheriff scheduled the sale of the prop. mortgaged and notice of the sale was
published. It turned out that while the couple failed to pay some of the amortizations on time, at the time of the application
for foreclosure, their account was up to date. The SSS mistook the couple's account for that of another one bearing the
same name Socorro Cruz, although w/ different middle name. The spouses sued SSS for damages.
HELD: (1) Having accepted the late payments of the monthly installments, the SSS could not suddenly and w/o
prior notice to the couple apply for the extrajudicial foreclosure of their mortgage. There was negligence on the
part of the SSS when it mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention
was called to the error but it refused to acknowledge its mistake. SSS should, thus, be held liable for nominal
damages.
(2) Under its charter [RA 1161, sec. 4(k)] the SSS can sue and be sued. So, even assuming that the SSS
enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions by virtue of the explicit provision of
the enabling law, it can be sued. The government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the
SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability.
Makasiar, dissenting:
xxx. The provision that it can be sued and be sued merely allows a private citizen a remedy for the
enforcement of his rights but always subject to the defense of the govt. Since under Art. 2180, NCC the State is
liable for tort only when it acts through special agents but not when it acts through officials to whom the task
done properly pertains and who alone are liable for their torts, the SSS cannot be held liable for damages in this
case. VV.
Implied consent:
(1) When the government enters into business contracts
When the government is in the performance of governmental function (jure imperii), even if it enters
into a contract with private persons, it cannot be sued without its consent.
Thus in United States v Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985). a contract for the repair of wharves and piers at the
naval base in Subic was held to be in line with the governmental function of the US Government and so the
immunity existed.
But when the government enters into commercial contracts and descends to the status of ordinary
persons (jure gestioni), it can be sued like any other person.
In Malong v PNR, 138 SCRA 63 (1985), it was held that when the state organized the Philippine
National Railway, it divested itself of its sovereign capacity, and so became liable for damages that arose from
the death of one who fell from an overloaded train.
United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985)
State Immunity from Suits Extends to contracts Relating to Sovereign Functions.
F: In 5/72, the US advertised for bid projects involving the repair of wharves and certain works on the shorelines at
its naval base in Subic, Zambales. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. (EG & Co.) submitted proposals in connection w/ w/c it
received 2 telegrams from the US govt asking it to confirm its price proposals and the name of its bonding co. However, in
6/82, EG & Co. was informed that its proposals had been rejected and the projects had been awarded to 3rd parties. EG &
Co. brought suit in the CFI to compel the US govt to allow it to perform the work on the projects. It also asked for a writ of
prel. inj. to restrain the US govt from entering into contract w/ 3rd parties for work on the projects. The US govt moved to
dismiss the complaint, but its motion was denied. Hence the petition for review.
HELD: It has been necessary to distinguish bet. sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis.) The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii. However, the resp. Judge held that by entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shorelines the
State did not act in its governmental capacity.
A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. The rule does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base w/c is devoted to the defense of both the
US and the Phils., indisputably a function of the govt of the highest order; they are not utilized for, nor dedicated
to, commercial or business purpose. VV.
Malong v PNR, 138 SCRA 63 (1985)
PNR not Immune from Suit
F: The petitioners sued the Philippine National Railway (PNR) for damages for the death of their son who fell from
an overloaded PNR train on 10/30/77. However, the trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that, under its charter as
amended by PD 741, the PNR had been made a government instrumentality, and that as such it is immune from suit.
HELD: The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune
from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for w/c the entity is organized."
When the govt enters into a commercial transaction it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other corp. In this case, the state divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR, w/c is
no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Co. VV.
(2) When it would be inequitable for the state to invoke its immunity, or when it takes private property
for public use or purpose.
In Amigable v Cuenca, (43 SCRA 360), Alfonso v Pasay and Ministerio v CFI, 40 SCRA 464, the SC
allowed suit for the recovery of possession of titled lands previously (decades) taken over by the government for
expansion of roads without just compensation and the proper expropriation proceedings. In so holding, it said
that it would be unjust for the government to invoke immunity after it has itself violated the rights of the parties
claimant by taking over the possession of the lands.
In Santiago v Republic, 87 SCRA 294 (1978), the SC allowed the revocation of a deed of donation made
to the Bureau of Plant Industry for its failure to comply with the condition that it should install a lightning and
water system on the property and build an office building with parking lot before a certain date. It would be
unfair, said the court, for the government to invoke its immunity after gratuitously receiving property and not
fulfilling its conditions.
The case of Commissioner of Public Highways vs Burgos, 96 SCRA 831, simply implemented the ruling
in Amigable vs Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360. In the earlier case, the question raised was the right of the plaintiff to sue
the govt. for recovery of the value of her property which had been converted into public streets without payment
to her of just compensation. Although it was shown that she had not previously filed her claim with the Auditor
General as normally required, the SC decided in her favor. The SC held that the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. In this instant case,
the SC fixed just compensation based on the market value of the land at the time of the taking.
Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 284 (1978)
Consent to be Sued Presumed where Allowance of Immunity Would be Inequitable
F: Petitioner filed an action in the CFI of Zamboanga City for the revocation of a deed of donation w/c he and his
wife had made to the Bureau of Plant Industry. He claimed that the donee failed to comply w/ the condition of the donation
that the donee should install a lighting and water system on the prop. and build an office building w/ parking lot thereon
not later than 12/7/74. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground of sovereign immunity.
HELD: Ordinarily, a suit of this nature cannot prosper. It would, however, be manifestly unfair for the govt, as
donee, w/c is alleged to have violated the condition under w/c it received gratuitously certain prop., to invoke its
immunity. Since it would be against equity and justice to allow such a defense in this case, consent to be sued
could be presumed. VV.

Commissioner of Public Highways v Burgos, 96 SCRA 831 (1980)
F: Priv. respondent Victoria Amigable was the owner of a parcel of land in Cebu City; sometime in 1924 the
Government took this land for roadrightofway purpose. In 1959, she filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession plus damages. This complaint was dismissed on the grounds of estoppel and the statute of
limitations and also on the ground of nonsuability of the Government. The SC on appeal reversed the CFI and remanded
the case for the purpose of determining the compensation to be paid Amigable, directing that to determine just
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. Respondent judge,
however did not heed the directive but instead took into account supervening inflation of the currency and adjusted the
value in accordance with the prevailing pesodollar exchange rate. His basis was Article 1250 of the Civil Code. The Sol
Gen appealed the decision.
HELD: Art. 1250 applies only to cases where a contract or agreement is involved. It does not apply where the
obligation to pay arises from law, independent of contract. The taking of private property by the Government in
the exercise of its power of eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation. The value of the
property at the time the govt took possession of the land in question, not the increased value resulting from the
passage of time, w/c invariably brings unearned increment to real estate, represents the value to be paid as just
compensation for the prop. taken. Adapted.
(3) If the Govt. files a complaint, defendant may file a counterclaim against it
In Froilan vs Oriental Pan Shipping, GR L6060 (Sept. 30, 1950), the SC held that when the State itself
files a complaint, the defendant is entitled to file a counterclaim against it. This is based on equitable grounds.
The SC ruled that the govt. impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for the
purpose of asserting a claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff, to wit, recovery of a vessel.
Froilan vs Oriental Pan Shipping, 12 SCRA 276, GR L6060 (Sept. 30, 1950)
F: Froilan purchased from Shipping Commission a vessel for P200,000 paying P50 T downpayment. A CM was executed
to secure the payment of the balance. For various reasons including nonpayment of installments, the Commission took
possession of the vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Commission chartered and delivered said vessel
to Pan Oriental. Froilan appealed from the action of the Commission and he was restored to all the rights under the
original contract. However, Pan Oriental retained the possession of the vessel. Froilan filed a complaint to recover
possession of the vessel. A writ of replevin was issued. The Govt intervened alleging that Froilan failed to pay the balance
to the Commission; that the intervenor was entitled to the possession of said vessel under the terms of the original contract
or in order for it to effect the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Pan Oriental answered the complaint in intervention
praying that if RP succeeded in obtaining the possession of the vessel, to comply w/ its obligation of delivering it to Pan
Oriental pursuant to their contract of bareboat charter w/ option to purchase. Complaint in intervention was dismissed
upon Froilan's payment of his account to the RP. RP filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim w/c Pan Oriental had filed
against it in view of the court's order dismissing the complaint in intervention. Counterclaim of Pan O. against RP was
dismissed. Hence, this appeal. RP raised, among others, as ground for the dismissal of Pan O's counterclaim, the State's
immunity from suit.
HELD: By filing its complaint in intervention, the govt in effect waived its right of nonsuability. Stated

otherwise, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the State surrendered its privileged
position and came down to the level of the def. The latter automatically acquires, w/in certain limits, the right to
set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the State. Adapted.
(d) Scope of consent
(1) Under Act No.3083
Sec. 1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippines hereby consents and submits
to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve
as a basis of civil action between private parties.
xxx
When a money judgment is given against the government, the ordinary rule for execution would not
apply, for the consent of the government to be sued is only up to the point of judgment. If it does not pay, it
cannot be compelled to pay by attachment or otherwise (how does one attach the Quezon bridge?)
The procedure is for one to furnish the Office of the President with the decision so it could include the
amount in the budget for the next year as the basis for appropriation (since there can be no disbursement of
public funds except in pursuance of law).
If the judge nonetheless issues a writ of execution against government funds or property, no ordinary
civil action can be filed against the judge, unless there is a showing of malice. But, a reinstatement of the funds
to government accounts and refund by the private party can be ordered. (Commissioner of Public Highways v
San Diego, 31 SCRA 616 (1970), reiterating the case of Alsua v Johnson.)
Commissioner of Public Highways v San Diego, 31 SCRA 616 (1970)
F: On 11/20/40, the Govt filed a complaint for eminent domain (ED) in the CFI for the expropriation of land
belonging to N.T. Hashim needed to construct EDSA. On 11/25/40, the Govt took possession of the prop. upon deposit w/
the city treasurer of the sum fixed by the court as the provisional value of all the lots needed to construct the road. In 1958,
the estate of Hashim, through its Judicial Administrator, Tomas Hashim, filed a money claim w/ the QC Engr's Office, w/c
was alleged to be the FMV of the prop. in question. Nothing having come out of the claim, the estate filed a complaint for
the recovery of the FMV against the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH.) The parties entered into a compromise agreement
w/c was approved by the CFI. The estate filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, w/c the court granted. A
notice of garnishment, together w/ a writ of execution was served on PNB, notifying it that levy was thereby made upon the
funds of petitioner Bureau and the Auditor General on deposit. Resp. Coruna, in his capacity as Chief, Documentation
Staff of PNB's Legal Dept., authorized the issuance of a cashier's check of the bank in the amount of the judgment/
compromise agreement. Petitioners contend that PNB acted precipitately in having delivered the amount w/o affording
petitioner Bureau a reasonable time to contest the validity of the garnishment. It demands that the bank credit the
petitioner's account w/ the amount garnished.
HELD: Although the govt, as pltff. in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to the jurisdiction of the Court
and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the judgement that is thus rendered requiring its payment of the
award determined as just compensation for the condemned prop. as a condition precedent to the transfer to the
title thereto in its favor, cannot be realized upon execution. xxx [It] is incumbent upon the legislature to
appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the
award determined in the judgment, since the Govt cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment.
xxx The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's claim "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the
stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts end when the judgment is rendered, since govt funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law. RAM.
(2) Under a charter
When consent to be sued is provided by the charter, the consent does not stop with the rendition, but
goes up to the satisfaction of the judgment.
In PNB v CIR, 81 SCRA 314 (1978), the SC held that since the PHHC had the capacity to be sued, any
judgment against it could be enforced by a writ of execution, and its funds could even be garnished.
PNB v CIR, 81 SCRA 314 (1978), supra.
(not in V. V. Mendoza's revised outline).
(e) Measure of recovery
When property has been unlawfully taken by the government so that it is now compelled to make
payment, the measure of recovery is the fair market value of the property at the time of taking (Ministerio v CFI,
40 SCRA 464).
The value of the peso in relation to the dollar at the time of taking cannot be considered. For Art 1250
of the Civil Code concerning supervening inflation has no application in eminent domain cases, being
applicable only to contractual obligations [Commissioner of Public Highways v Burgos, 96 SCRA 831 (1980)].
Ultimately, the face value of the peso then is the amount to be paid now.
D. Government
1. Government is that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state or which are imposed
upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them.
Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. (US v Dorr, 2 Phil 332, 339).
U.S. vs. Dorr (2 Phil 332)
F: The defendants were convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and

circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands. The complaint is based upon Sec. 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission which punishes any person who shall
"utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the U.S. Government or the Insular
Goverment of the Phil. Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend
to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the unlawful authorities x x x".
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom". The article mentioned about
the "foolish work that the Civil Commission is doing all over the Islands" referring to the appointment by the latter of
natives which were referred to as "insurgents" and "rogues" to important Government positions.
ISSUE: Whether the publication constitutes an offense under Sec. 8 of ACT. No. 292
HELD: NO. The term "government" as employed in ACT No. 292 of the U.S. Philippine Commission is used
in the abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from the concrete organism of the
Government. The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the U.S., and it is quite
apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual
members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which the authority of the U.S. is enforced in
these islands. The form of Goverment by a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the
character of the men who are instructed with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to
bring into disrepute. Adapted.
Note on the case:
Administration means the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of the govt are for the
time being (entrusted.)
(not in VV's outline)
a. Functions
Cruz:
The govt performs two kinds of functions, to wit, the constituent and the ministrant.
Constituent functions constitute the very bonds of society and are therefore compulsory. xxx Ministrant
functions are those undertaken to advance the general interests of society, such as public works, public charity,
and regulation of trade and industry. These functions are merely optional. xxx
To our SC, however, the distinction bet. constituent and ministrant functions is not relevant in our
jurisdiction. In PVTA v. CIR, 65 SCRA 416, it reiterated the ruling in ACCFA v. Federation of Labor Unions,
30 SCRA 649, that such distinction has been blurred bec. of the repudiation of the laissez faire policy in the
Consti. xxx
b. Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Cruz:
One of the important tasks of the govt is to act for the State as parens patriae, or guardian of the rights
of the people. xxx
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes
exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties.
c. De Jure and De Facto Governments
Cruz:
A de jure govt has rightful title but no power or control, either bec. this has been withdrawn from it or
bec. it has not yet actually entered into the exercise thereof. A de facto govt, on the other hand, is a govt of fact,
that is, it actually exercises power or control but w/o legal title.
The three kinds of de facto govt are as follows:
(1) The govt that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the
rightful legal govt and maintans itself against the will of the latter.
(2) That established as an independent govt by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection
against the parent state.
(3) That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of
the enemey in the course of war, and w/c is denominated as a govt of paramount force, like the Second Republic
of the Phils. established by the Japanese belligerent.
The characteristics of this kind of de facto govt are:
(a) Its existence is maintained by active military power w/in the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful govt.
(b) During its existence, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts
of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful govt.
2. "Government of the Philippines" defined
Government of the Republic of the Philippines is defined as "the corporate governmental entity through
which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines,
whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other
form of local government." [Adinistrative Code of 1987, Sec. 2(1).]
Case: NACOCO is a government entity organized to promote the coconut industry. In a litigation

concerning NACOCO, the government counsel appeared for it and obtained a transcript of stenographic notes.
Under the Rules of Court, the government is exempted from payment of the transcript. Is NACOCO part of the
government?
The SC held that it is not because NACOCO was organized to perform ministrant functions.
But according to Confederation of Government Employees v Agrarian Reform, the distinction between
the two functions of the government constituent and ministrant no longer holds under the 1935 Constitution,
which imposed a greater role on the government.
III. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
(not in V.V. Mendoza's revised outline)
Preamble
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society and establish a government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the
common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the bless
ings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
While the 1935 Constitution started with "The Filipino people ..." , the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
begin the preamble with "We, the sovereign Filipino people ..." The change from third person point of view to a
first person point of view emphasizes that the Filipinos themselves are the ones establishing the Constitution.
The third person presupposes someone talking about the Filipino people, and yet that someone is himself a
Filipino.
While the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions referred to the Divine Providence, the 1987 Constitution refers
Almighty God, which is more personal.
A preamble has two functions: (1) identify the authors of the Constitution, and (2) state the general
principles upon which the Constitution is founded. (Sets the tone for the succeeding provisions.)
A. Principles
It is a standard to be observed because it is required by justice or fairness or other dimensions of

morality
1. Sovereignty of its People and Republicanism
Art. II, Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.
Art. V. SUFFRAGE.
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as
well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the
assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as
the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Art. VI, Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by provision
on initiative and referendum.
Under this principle, the Philippines is a democratic state that is, a government for, of, and by the

people. But it is not a pure democracy. Thus, while it is true that the people are the possessors of sovereign
power, it is equally the case that they cannot exercise the powers of government directly, but only through the
medium of their duly elected representatives.
Their participation in government consists of :
1) Suffrage electing the officials to whom they delegate the right of government.
2) Plebiscite
a) ratifying the Constitution
b) approving any amendment thereto
c) with respect to local matters, approving any changes in boundaries, mergers, divisions, and
even abolition of local offices
d) creating metropolitan authorities, and
e) creating autonomous regions
3) Initiative and referendum enacting or proposing laws, local or national, in a referendum.
4) Recall (Under the Local Government Code.) [as added by Prof. Barlongay.]
Barlongay:
Features of Republicanism:
1. It is a govt of laws and not of men;
2. There is periodic holding of elections;
3. There is observance of principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances;
4. There is observance of the role that the legislature cannot pass or enact irrepealable laws.
2. Adherence to International Law
Preamble
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society and establish a government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the
common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the bless
ings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
Art. II, Sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopt the

generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
"Adopts the generally accepted principles of international law" means the Philippines uses the
incorporation theory. Without need of statute, these principles of international law become part of the
Philippine body of laws from the municipal point of view.
"Adherence to the principles of international law" was adopted from the Kellogg Brian Pact.
Art. II, Sec. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other
states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest,
and the right to self determination.
Art. II, Sec. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy
of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
"Consistent with national interest" admits of two interpretations. One view holds that the Constitution
itself has decided to have no nuclear interest as the policy of the State. The other view holds that, as shown by
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the phrase should be read as "subject to national interest"
which means that the issue of whether to allow the stockpiling of nuclear weapons depends on Congressional
policy .
It is the intent and sense of the Constitutional Commission that the phrase "consistent with national
interest" xxx also means "subject to the national interest." (Joaquin Bernas, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES A Commentary, vol. II, 1988 ed.)
Art. XVIII, Sec. 4. All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified
shall not be renewed or extended without the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
when the Congress requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting parties.
The reason why the agreement must be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state is so it is
approved by its own Senate, and not just by its President (executive agreement), thus, committing its legislature
to honor the agreement and preventing it from refusing appropriations therefore.
3. Supremacy of Civilian Authority
Art. II, Sec. 3. Civilian authority is at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of
the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the
State and the integrity of that national territory.
Art. VII, Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commanderin Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within fortyeight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twentyfour hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorise the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Art. XVI, Sec. 4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force
which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force
necessary for the security of the State.
Art. XVI, Sec. 5. (1) All members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall take an oath or
affirmation to uphold and defend the Constitution.
(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and
respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty.
(3) Professionalism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and adequate remuneration and
benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall
be insulated from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity.
(4) No members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the active service shall, at any time, be
appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government
owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
(5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service.
(6) The officers and men of the regular force of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be
recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.
(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall not exceed
three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the
President may extend such tour of duty.
Sec. 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and
civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of
local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
The supremacy of civilian rule over the military is ensured by, (i) the installation of the President, the
highest civilian authority, as the commanderinchief of the military, (ii) the requirement that members of the
AFP swear to uphold and defend the Constitution, which is the fundamental law of the civil government, (iii) the
professionalization of the service and the strengthening of the patriotism and nationalism, and respect for human
rights, of the military, (iv) insulation of the AFP from partisan politics, (v) prohibition against the appointment
to a civil position, (vi) compulsory retirement of officers (no over staying of officers), so as to avoid
propagation of power), (vii) a 3year limitation on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff, which although
extendible in case of emergency by the President, depends on Congressional declaration of emergency, (viii) re
quirement of professional recruitment, so as to avoid any regional clique from forming within the AFP, as well as
(ix) the establishment of a police force that is not only civilian character but also under the local executives.
4. Government as Protector of the People and People as Defenders of the State
Art. II Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may
be required under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
Art. II, Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare, are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessing
of democracy.
Note the emphasis on the government as servant of the people, rather than viceversa.
Note also that the people may by law are required to render "personal" (not proxy) military or civil
service.
5. Separation of Church and State
Art. II, Sec. 6. The separation of the Church and State shall be inviolable.
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 2(5) xxx Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered (as a political
party, organization, or coalition by the COMELEC).
Art. VI, Sec. 5(2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total

number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to the partylist representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Exceptions:
Art. VI, Sec. 28(3). Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, nonprofit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
Sec. 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, or any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3). At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall
be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the
regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to
which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.
Sec. 4(2). Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission
boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least 60% of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino
equity participation in all educational institutions.
The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the
Philippines.
No educational institutions shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall
comprise more than 1/3 of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply
to schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise
provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents.
The classic case in separation of church and state is Pamil v Teleron, which invalidated the selection to a
local post of Fr. Gonzaga, (note however, that ecclesiastics are not prohibited from running for Congress).
It is difficult to draw the line between separation of Church and State. In Elizalde v Victoriano, for

instance, a law exempting members of Iglesia ni Kristo from the requirement that all employees must join a
union as condition for continued employment, pursuant to a closedshop agreement in the CBA, on the ground
that it is prohibited by their religion, was held valid. For although the law amounted to an establishment of
religion, it was likewise promoting the free exercise thereof.
The nonestablishment clause is not violated, however, if the benefit derived by a religion from the
expenditure of public funds is merely incidental to public purpose. Thus, in Aglipay v Ruiz, the SC held that
the stamps printed by the government to commemorate the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress in Manila
did not violate the separation of church and state, because its main purpose was to promote Manila as seat of the
congress and thus to attract tourists to its (the stamp showed the map of the Philippines, not a chalice). Not
having been inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a denomination nor to benefit the Roman Catholic Church,
whatever religious character the stamp had was only incidental and uncontemplated.
While the Constitution mandates separation of Church and State through (1) NonEstablishment, Free
Exercise and No Religious Test clauses in the Bill of Rights, (ii) the disallowance of the religious sector from
being registered as a political party and from being appointed as sectoral representatives of Congress, yet it
allows exceptions to the rule.
(1) The exemption of religious institutions from taxation is a recognition that the Church is not all
separate from State, for if they were really so, the Church should be taxed by State like any other entity.
(2) Public funds, while generally prohibited from being spent for religious purposes as an aspect of the
Non Establishment clause, may be applied to priest rendering religious service to the AFP, a penal institution,
or a government orphanage or leprosarium. The reason is the exigency of the service. If members of the AFP
had to go out of the barracks to attend to their spiritual needs, national security might be endangered; if inmates
were allowed to go out of jail to hear mass, they might never return; and if lepers were allowed out of the
leprosarium, they might contaminate others.
The general prohibition, however, does not apply to a priest who, for instance, teaches Mathematics at
UP, for payment in this case is not for religious activities but for teaching of a secular subject.
(3) The permission to have optimal religious instruction during regular class hours upon written request
of the parent or guardian, to be taught by a teacher approved by the authorities of the religion of which the child
is a member, provided it is without cost to the government is a new provision in the Constitution. Under the old
Administrative Code, the instruction could not be within regular class hours. Under A359 of the Civil Code,
religious instruction would even be made part of the curriculum (with grades and failing marks), so long as the
parents ask for it.
(4) With the exception of sectarian schools, all schools must be owned by citizens or 60% Filipino
corporations. The control and administration of all schools, including sectarian schools, must be in the hands of
Filipinos. Furthermore, they cannot be established exclusively for aliens, and the alien population in the school
should not exceed 1/3.
B. Policies
A policy is a standard which sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in economic,
political or social feature of the community
1. Independent foreign policy and a nuclear free Philippines
Art. II, Sec. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other
states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest,
and the right to self determination.
Art. II, Sec. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy
of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 4. All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified
shall not be renewed or extended without the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
when the Congress requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting parties.
2. A Just and Dynamic Social Order
Preamble
... in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our
ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, preserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy...
Art. II, Sec. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of
life for all.
Art. XII, Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the
nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
for all, especially the underprivileged.
a. Promotion of social justice
Barlongay: The 1987 Constitution, compared to the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution, contains the most expanded
concept of Social Justice.
The classic definition of Social Justice is found in Calalang vs. Williams, 70 P 726, where Justice Laurel
declared as follows:
"Social Justice is 'neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,' but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the timehonored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex."
Art. II, Sec. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that

protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
and its increments.
Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and selfreliance.
Art. II, Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Art. VII, Sec. 13, par. 2. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil
degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Member of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including governmentowned or controlled corporations.
Art. IX, B, Sec. 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries.
The President cannot hold any other post except those allowed by the Constitution, viz., (1) Chairman of
NEDA, and (2) Department Secretary (VV).
The VicePresident can hold a cabinet seat without need of confirmation.
Members of the cabinet (Secretaries and Undersecretaries): Some are of the view that the clause
"unless otherwise provided by law" implies that when there is a law allowing so, he may be appointed to any
other government post, even if not affiliated to his cabinet position. EO 284 limits the number of government
posts of cabinet members to not more than 2. However, EO 284 has been declared unconstitutional by the SC in
the case of Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary (194 S 317). The prohibition however does not include
positions held without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the concerned official's office. [For further discussion, see Executive Dept.: Prohibitions.]
b. Respect for human dignity and human rights
Art. II, Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.
(not in VV's revised outline)
Art. XVI, Sec. 5(2). The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of
the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty.
Art. XIII, Sec. 17
(1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural
born citizens of the Philippines, and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office
and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members shall be provided by law.
(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Commission on Human Rights
shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers.
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly
released.
Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate on its own or on complaint by any party all forms of human rights violations
involving civil or political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all person within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for
the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and provide for,
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
document or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
Sec. 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission taking into account its recommendation.
c. Fundamental equality of women and men
Art. II, Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality of men and women before the law.
(the following 2 provisions are not in VV's revised outline)
Art. IV, Sec. 1(2) in relation with Sec. 4. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed under the law, to have renounced it.
Art. XIII, Sec. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working
conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will
enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
Art. XIII, Sec. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all
the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
(See also CA No. 1, the National Defense Act)
One significant move to equalize men and women is in the area of citizenship. Under the 1935
Constitution, a child born of a Filipino mother became a Filipino only upon election when he reached the age of
majority. The 1973 Constitution removed this stigma and made such born after 17 January 1973 a Filipino with
out the need of election. The 1987 Constitution improved the situation even more by granting to those children
born before 17 January 1973 who elected citizenship, whether born before or after 17 January 1973, the status of
naturalborn citizens.
At the same time, Filipino women who by virtue of marriage to an alien husband, became citizens of
their husband's country no longer lost her Philippine citizenship by that fact alone, beginning 17 January 1973.
In the area of labor it has been consistently held, beginning in the US with Sandy v Oregon ( the court
requiring the company to provide stools for women workers in the factories), that statutes (Book 3, Title III,
Chapter I of the Labor Code) granting women better treatment by virtue of their maternal function were valid.
d. Promotion of health
Art. II, Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Art. XIII, Sec. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all
the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Sec. 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health manpower development and research, responsive to the country's health
needs and problems.
Sec. 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled persons for their rehabilitation, self
development and selfreliance, and their integration to the mainstream of society.
e. Priority of education, science, technology, arts, culture and sports (ESTACS)
Art. II, Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to education, science,e technology, arts, culture and
sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social programs, and promote total human
liberation and development.
Art. XIV, Sec. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education
at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
Students have the constitutional right not only to education but to a quality education, up to the
secondary level, for free. But this is subject to the right of the school to impose reasonable academic standards,
and to make education available only on the basis of merit.
In Villar v Technological Institute of the Philippines, 135 SCRA 706 (1985), a case involving the denial
of enrollment of student activists who took part in demonstrations and mass actions, and who, at the same time
incurred scholastic deficiencies. The Court held that participation in mass actions per se is not a valid ground
for dismissal, but that failure in academic subjects pursuant to school regulations was a valid ground. For while
the right to education is a social, economic and cultural right, it is available only "on the basis of merit."
In Tagonan v Cruz Pano, 137 SCRA 245 (1985), a case of a nursing student who was denied
readmission after she failed a subject during her previous provisional admission (and her inability to take this
subject in another school after she tried to bribe the Dean of that school), the SC again upheld the right of
schools of higher learning to choose the students which it thinks could best achieve their goal of excellence and
truth, while affirming the right of students to quality education.
BARLONGAY CASE:
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 (1989)
F: The private resp. is a graduate of UE w/ a degree of BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT 3 times
and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the
rule allowing only 3 chances for a student to take the NMAT. He then went to the RTCValenzuela to compel his admission
to the test.
xxx By agreement of the parties, pvt. resp. was allowed to take the NMAT on 4/16/89 subject to the outcome of
his petition. xxx
After the hearing, the resp. judge rendered a decision declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the
petition on the ground that the petitioner had been deprived of her right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.
HELD: We cannot sustain the resp. judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a
measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education.
xxx
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised
in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission
test and, indeed w/ more reliability, by the 3flunk rule.
Exercise of Police Power. The power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed
are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is w/in the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed
the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents. xxx
The method employed by the regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The 3flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession
from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the
right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.
The challenged regulation does not violate the equal protection clause. A law does not have to operate
w/ equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to the equal protection clause.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists bet. medical students and other students
who are not subjected to the NMAT and the 3flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives
of the people, unlike other careers w/c, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others
who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality
among equals. RAM.

f. Urban land reform and housing
Art. XIII, Sec. 9. The State shall by law, and for the common good, undertake in cooperation with
the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban
centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens.
In the implementation of such program, the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.
Sec. 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except
in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation
with them and the communities where they are to be relocated.
The limitations to the power of the State in this regard:
1. Respect for the rights of property owners.
2. In the case of resettlement, said program must be with the permission of the persons to be resettled, and the
community to which they would be resettled.
g. Reform in agriculture and other natural resources
Art. II, Sec. 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.
Art. XIII, Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they
till or, in case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as Congress may presecribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits,
the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary landsharing.
Sec. 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as
cooperatives, and other independent farmers' organizations to participate in the planning, organization,
and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculuture thourgh approrpriate
technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agragian reform or stewarship, whenever applicable
in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the p
ublic domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of
small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which
shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, expecially of local communities,
to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall
provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and
conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen
against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of
marine and fishing resources.
Sec. 8. The State shall provde incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian
reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public sector
enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in
enterprises of their choice.
The basic philosophy behind agrarian reform is "land to the tiller" if one is a regular farm worker and
"profit sharing" in other cases. But "just compensation" and a "reasonable retention limit" are guaranteed the
land owner.
Common limitations to land reform (urban or agrarian):
It must not impair the rights of small agricultural land owners, small homestead settlers, and small
property owners;
The idea of reform is to benefit the poor and other peasants and the landless. It would therefore, be self
defeating for the Constitution to make no reservation in favor of small property owners and homestead settlers.
The basic philosophy behind other natural resources is the principle of "stewardship" anyone who is
given the chance to cultivate public land must use in trust for the succeeding generations, and so must exercise
prudence in its use.
h. Protection of labor
Art. II. Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitle to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decisionmaking process affecting the rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and
the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of
labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.
The basic philosophy behind labor is shared responsibility and the preferential use of voluntary and
peaceful for the settlement of disputes.
The right of government workers to form unions
Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Art. IX, B, Sec. 2(5). The right of selforganization shall not be denied to government employees.
Sec. 2(1). The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters.
The right of government workers to form unions is undisputed under Art III(8) of the Constitution. (This
provision is even misplaced since the Bill of Rights only covers civil and political rights.) The problem is
whether they have the right to strike.
Those who hold the negative view say that the right to self organization is mentioned in Art III(8)
separately from the right to strike in Art XIII(3). If it is included, there would be no need to explicate the two
anymore.
But those who hold the affirmative view say that although the Constitution does not explicitly grant it,
Congress can always grant the right to government workers. The Constitution does not prohibit it in Art III(8) in
the phrase "for purposes not contrary to law". Besides the right to selforganization is rendered nugatory
without the coercive tool of strike (which is true because the strike at issue is only the economic strike, not the
ULP strike).
It must be noted that the SC ruled in Alliance of Government Workers v Minister of Labor, 124 SCRA
1, under the 1973 Constitution, that government workers cannot negotiate for terms and condition of
employment, for these are a matter of law. Their remedy is to report to their own heads and to convince
Congress to enact the desired law.
Said the Court: Civil servants are entitled to form societies for purposes not contrary to law. But to

form an association is one thing, and to use such association for the coercive measure of going on strike and
bargaining with the government so as to pressure it into complying with their demands, is another.
In NHA v Juco (134 SCRA 172), the SC held that those in the government service cannot bargain
collectively as private workers because they are governed by the Civil Service Law. It also held that all govt
owned or controlled corporations regardless of their manner of creation, were covered by the Civil Service.
In interpreting the ruling in the above cases, we have to distinguish between two kinds of government
corporations in accordance with Art. IX, B, Sec. 2(1): a) those which were organized with special charters, in
case the employees are governed by the Civil Service Law and arguably by the SC ruling in Alliance, and b)
those which were organized pursuant to the general law (Corporation Code), in which case their employees can
without doubt bargain collectively and go on strike.
The grant of the right to form unions is a social economic right included for the first time in the
Constitution. Previously, only political and civil rights were guaranteed government employees.
Question : Does the right to selforganization given to govt. employees include the right to strike?
SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
F: SSS filed w/ the RTCQC a complaint for damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj. against petitioners SSSEA, alleging
that the officers and members of the latter staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS building
preventing nonstriking employees from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting business w/ SSS. The Public
Sector LaborManagement Council ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA
went on strike bec. SSS failed to act on the union's demands.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion was denied. The restraining
order w/c was previously issued was converted into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. Petitioners appealed the
case to the CA. The latter held that since the employees of SSS are govt employees, they are not allowed to strike.
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages,
like workers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to accede to their demands. As now provided
under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to Self
Organization which took effect after the initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of employment in the
Govt, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and controlled corporations
with original charters, are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing
changes thereof.
The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124
SCRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet. workers in the private sector and govt
employees w/ regard to the right to strike?
Since the terms and conditions of govt. employment are fixed by law, govt. workers cannot use
the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers.
The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through
compulsion of law. Relations bet. private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the
terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of
collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of govt w/c fix the terms and conditions of employment. And
this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through CBA's
EO 180, w/c provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of govt employees, while

clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and
conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law.
Govt employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the
betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are w/in the ambit of legislation or negotiate w/ the
appropriate govt agencies for the improvement of those w/ are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved
grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector LaborManagement Council for appropriate action.
RAM.
BARLONGAY CASE:
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323
F: On September 17, 1990, Monday, at least 800 public school teachers proceeded to the national office of the DECS
and aired their grievances. The mass action continued into the week despite the DECS Secretary's RETURN TO WORK
order. The Secretary filed administrative charges against the protesting teachers. The Secretary rendered the questioned
decisions in the administrative proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under suspension. Two
separate petitions were filed to assail the validity of the return to work order and his decisions in the administrative
proceeding.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MASS ACTIONS ARE CONSIDERED AS STRIKES?
HELD: Yes. The mass actions constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from work,
which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS CAN STRIKE?
HELD: No. Employees of the public service do not have the right to strike although they have the right to self
organization and negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of working conditions.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS?
HELD: This court is a court of last resort. It resolves questions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or
that the facts have been already determined by the lower tribunals. It is not a trier of facts. It can not resolve the
issue which requires the establishment of some facts. The remedy is for the petitioners to participate in the
administrative proceedings. If they lost, they may appeal to the Civil Service Commission. If pending said
administrative proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary, recourse is with the
RTC where there would be opportunity to prove relevant facts. Adapted.
i. Independent People's Organizations
Art. II, Sec. 23. The State shall encourage non governmental, communitybased, or sectoral
organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
Art. XIII, Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable
the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective
interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to
promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership and structure.
Sec. 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation
at all levels of social, political, and economic decisionmaking shall not be abridged. The State, shall by
law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.
This is in recognition of people's power, aside from the provision on initiative and referendum.
3. Family as a Basic Autonomous Social Institution
Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
This provision seems to be the basis of an argument that abortion is prohibited by the Constitution. It
might also be the basis of a stand against family planning. The root of the problem, of course, is the
determination of when life begins.
The right of parents to rear their children is the only natural right recognized by the Constitution. This is
a declaration that the State does not espouse fascism which holds that the State owns the life of everyone.
Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
Some cite this provision as the basis of a stand against divorce. And yet not really. The phrase "

inviolable social institution," was lifted from Art. 52 of the Civil code, and under that Code, divorce was part of
the proposed draft submitted to Congress by the Code Commission and was almost approved if not for reasons
other than compatibility with Art. 52.
Sec. 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family according to their religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them.
Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so
through just programs of social security.
Art. II, Sec. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of youth in nationbuilding and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social wellbeing. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civil affairs.
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature,
consequence and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage
settlements may be to a certain extent fix the property relations during the marriage. (Civil Code.)
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Family Code.)
4. SelfReliant and Independent Economic Order
Art. II, Sec. 19. The State shall develop a selfreliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Sec. 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private

enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
Art. XII, Sec. 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall
contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives and
similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so
demands.
These provisions reveal that the economic policy of the Philippines is one closer to socialism than

capitalism. The State adopts a policy of balancing the private sector's pursuit for profit and the concern of the
State to promote distributive justice.
The use of "distributive justice" is based on the Aristotelian notion of giving each one what is due him
on the basis of personal worth and value, and not merely what he has contracted for.
Garcia vs BOI (191 SCRA 288)
FACTS: The BOI approved the transfer of the site of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and shift of
feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture
between the PNOC and the BPC which is a Taiwanese group. According to the BOI, it is the investor which has the final
say as to the site and the feedstock to be used.
HELD: Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of
national interest. The nonalienation of natural resources, the State's full control over the devt. and utilization of
scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and
priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood.
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. The petrochemical industry is

essential to the national interst. The BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion when it approved the transfer of
the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorized the change of feedstock from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or LPG. No cogent advantage to the govt. has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of
the independent policy of the govt. expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the
way it deems best for the national interest.
5. Communication and Information in NationBuilding
Art. II, Sec. 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation
building.
Art. XVI, Sec. 10. The State shall the provide the policy environment for the full development of
Filipino capability and the emergence of communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations
of the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country, in accordance with
a policy that respect the freedom of speech and of the press.
Sec. 11(1). The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the

Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly owned and managed by such citizens.
The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media when the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed.
(2) The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law for the
protection of consumers and the promotion of general welfare.
Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per cent of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall be
limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of
such entities must be citizens of the Philippines.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 23. Advertising entities affected by paragraph 2, Section 11 of Article XVI of this
Constitution shall have five years from its ratification to comply on a graduated and proportionate basis
with the minimum Filipino ownership requirement therein.
Both ownership and management of mass media must be in the hands of Filipinos, 100%.
While monopolies in mass media may be regulated or prohibited, combinations in restraint of and unfair
competition in information matters are absolutely prohibited.
Commercial advertising is now defined as being vested with public interest, and can thus be owned and
managed only by 70% Filipino corporations.
6. Autonomy of Local Governments
Art. II, Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Art. X. Local Government.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
elections, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and
all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect
to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and
to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local governments.
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them.
Sec. 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law,
including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected.
Sec. 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be
prescribed by law.
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a
plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their
basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The
jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination.
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the
province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition,
shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Sec. 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts,
services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with law.
Sec. 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies
composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and
representatives from nongovernmental organizations with the regions for purposes of administrative
decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social
growth and development of the units in the region.
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics which
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to
the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance
and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the
time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organizations;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of
the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the region shall be the responsibility of the
local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with
applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National
Government.
7. Recognition of the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities
Art. II, Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of national unity and development.

Art. VI, Sec. 5(2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of the Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to the party list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Art. XII, Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands
to ensure their economic, social, and cultural wellbeing.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
Art. XIII, Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including
lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Art. XIV, Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these
rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.
Art. XVI, Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies
affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such
communities.
8. Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure
Art. II, Sec. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Honesty of Public Officials
Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often
thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner
provided by law.
Art. VI, Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon
assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the
House concerned of potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of proposed legislation of
which they are authors.
Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the
public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall
publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.
Art. IX, D, Sec. 4. The Commission (on Audit) shall submit to the President and the Congress,
within the time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the
Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled
corporations, and nongovernmental entities subject to its audit and recommend measures necessary to
improve their effectiveness and efficiency.
Art. XI, Sec. 4. The present antigraft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as the Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon,
Visayas and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall
be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.
Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except
those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.
Sec. 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines, and at
the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and
members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
provided for in Section 2 of Article IXA of this Constitution.
Sec. 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every
vacancy thereafter. Such appointment shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within
three months after they occur.
Sec. 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be
decreased during their term of office.
Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding
their cessation from office.
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the govt., or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including govt. owned or controlled corporations and
shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Art. XI, Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, duties:
(1) Investigate on its own or on complaint any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any governmentowned
or controlled corporation with original charter; to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law,
or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into
by his office involving disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to
the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of
its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.
Sec. 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly release.
Sec. 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.
Sec. 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose
may be granted, directly or indirectly by any govt. owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the
President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling
interest, during their tenure.
Foreign Loans
Art. VII, Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic
with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days form the end of every quarter of the calendar year,
submit to Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or
guaranteed by the government or governmentowned and controlled corporations which would have the
effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of
the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be
made available to the public.
Executive Agreements on Natural Resources
Art. XII, Sec. 2.
xxx
The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based
on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the
State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution. (pars. 4 and 5 thereof.)
Art. VI, Sec. 12. All members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall upon
House concerned of potential conflict of interest that may arise form the filing of proposed legislation of
which they are authors.
Health of the President
Art. VII, Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the
state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and
the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such
illness.
Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
F: Petitioners were media practitioners. They requested information from respondent General Manager of the GSIS
regarding clean loans granted by the GSIS certain members of the defunct BP on the guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos
shortly before the Feb. 7, 1986 election. Their request was refused on the ground of confidentiality. They brought this suit
for mandamus.
HELD: (1) The cornerstone of the republican system of govt is the delegation of power by the people. In this
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate w/in the limits of the authority conferred by the people.
Denied access to information on the inner workings of govt, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be
merely empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations
prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. The right to information is not
merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedom of speech and of the
press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand in hand w/ the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decisionmaking as well as in checking abuse in govt.
(2) The right to information is not absolute. It is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further
"subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." (Legaspi v. CSC, 150 SCRA 530.) Similarly, the
State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law." The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the govt and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public
character. xxx. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources w/ utmost
prudence and in strict compliance w/ the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. In sum, the public nature of the
loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought
clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
(3) The right to privacy cannot be invoked by a juridical entity like GSIS bec. a corp. has no right or
privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the
party and a corp. would have no such ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans
were alleged to have been granted.
(4) That GSIS, in granting loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion
of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.
(5) But, although citizens are afforded the right to information, and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern. VV.
UPDATED 12/1/95
RAM
PART TWO
STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Cruz: Purpose. The doctrine of separation of powers is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in

one person or group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of
our republican institutions. More specifically, according to J. Laurel, the doctrine is intended to secure action,
to forestall overaction, to prevent depotism and to obtain efficiency. xxx
Blending of Powers. There are instances under the Consti. when powers are not confined exclusively w/in one
dept but are in fact assigned to or shared by several departments. As a result of this blending of powers, there is
some difficulty now in classifying some of them as definitely legislative, executive or judicial. As J. Homes put
it vividly when he remarked that "the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from
one extreme to another." The powers of govt may not at all times be contained w/ mathematical precision in
watertight compartments bec. of their ambiguous nature, e.g., the power of appointment, w/c can rightfully be
exercised by each dept over its own administrative personnel. xxx
A. Congress
1. Composition, Qualifications, and Term of Office
a. Senate
Art. VI, Secs. 24
Art. VI.
Sec. 2. The Senate shall be composed of twentyfour Senators who shall be elected at large by the
qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Sec. 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirtyfive years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term of which he was elected.

COMPOSITION
24 Senators elected at large by qualified voters
QUALIFICATIONS
Citizenship: Naturalborn citizen
Age on the day of election: 35
Education: Able to read and write
Registered voter: In the Philippines
Residence: 2 years (immediately preceding the
election)
TERM OF OFFICE
Six (6) years
To commence unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on June 30 next following the election. (Art.
VI, Sec. 4)
But under Sec. 2 of the Transitory provisions, the senators elected on the 2nd Monday of May, 1987
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 2)
Of the senators elected in the election of 1992, the first 12 obtaining the highest number of votes shall
serve for 6 years and the remaining 12 for 3 years. Thereafter, 12 senators will be elected every 3 years, to serve
a term of 6 years. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 2)
No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms, and for this purpose, no voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall be considered for the purpose of interrupting the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Art. VI, Sec. 4)
A) Regular case: If X runs in 1992, gets the #12 slot, and is reelected in 1998, he can no longer run in
the senatorial election of 2004, even if in the year 2000 he resigns from office. In general, the limit for regular
senators (those elected after the transition, or after 1992) is 12 consecutive years.
But if X runs in 1992, gets the #13 slot, does not rerun in 1995, but reruns in 1998, he can still rerun in
2004.
B) Transition: If Maceda reruns in 1992 and ends up in #15, when his term expires at noon of 30 June
1995, he can no longer run for reelection as senator, even if he will have served for only 8 years, since the
Constitution talks of 2 consecutive terms.
If X runs in 1992, ends up #13, then reruns in 1995, he can no longer run for senator in the year 2001,
even if he will have served for only 9 years.
If Maceda does not rerun in 1992, then runs again in 1995, he can still rerun in 2001.
b. House of Representatives
Art. VI, Secs. 58
Art. VI.
Sec. 5 (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number or
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this Section.
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a naturalborn
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twentyfive years of age, able to read
and write, and, except the partylist representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less then one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Sec. 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of
the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
Art. IXC, Secs. 68
Art IXC.
Sec. 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the
people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the partylist system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the partylist system, shall
not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, board of canvassers, or
other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of
nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph (2), Section
5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
Republic Act 7941
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTYLIST
SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in congress assembled.
Sec. 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "PartyList System Act."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a partylist system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interest in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the

election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). component parties or organizations of
coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the partylist
system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section
5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of group of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes.
Sec. 4. Manifestation to Participate in the PartyList System. Any party, organization, or coalition already

registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the
Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the partylist
system.
Sec. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the partylist system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition
verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the partylist system as a national, regional or sectoral
party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require:
Provided, That the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it
was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before the election.
Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio, or upon verified

complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or though any of its officers or member or indirectly though third parties for partisan election purposes.
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the
votes cast under the partylist system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Sec. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election,
prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have
manifested their desire to participate under the partylist system and distribute copies thereof to all precints for posting in
the polling places on election day. The names of the partylist nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.
Sec. 8. Nomination of PartyList Representatives. Each registered party, organization, or coalition shall submit
to the COMELEC not later than fortyfive (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
partylist representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be
named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an
elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws
in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed in the
list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the partylist system shall
not be considered resigned.
Sec. 9. Qualifications of PartyList Nominees. No person shall be nominated as partylist representative unless
he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must be at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years
of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall
be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Sec. 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for
member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district; and the second, a vote for the party, organization, or
coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral
organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided finally, That the first election under the
partylist system shall be held in May 1998.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on
the matter of the partylist system.
Sec. 11. Number of PartyList Representatives. The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty percentum
(20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the partylist.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
partylist system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party ,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Sec. 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for PartyList Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes
for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate partylist representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization,
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the partylist system.
Sec. 13. How PartyList Representatives Are Chosen. Partylist representatives shall be proclaimed by the

COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC
according to their ranking in said list.
Sec. 14. Term of Office. Partylist representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No partylist
representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Sec. 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected partylist representative who changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as partylist representative under
his new party or organization.
Sec. 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for partylist representatives, the vacancy shall be
automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the
same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party,
organization, or coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Sec. 17. Rights of PartyList Representatives. Partylist representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and
emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.
Sec. 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the

regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its
information campaign on the partylist system.
Sec. 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or

provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Sec. 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Sec. 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Approved, March 3, 1995.
COMPOSITION
Not more than 250 Members (*unless otherwise fixed by law) elected from:
a) Legislative districts (80% of the seats shall be allotted to district representatives.)
The districts are to be determined according to the following rules: [200 districts or 80%]
1. The districts are to be apportioned among the provinces, cities, and Metro Manila. [Sec. 5(1)]
2. The apportionment must be based on the number of inhabitants, using a uniform and progressive ratio.
Within 3 years following the return of every census, Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts, based on the standards herein provided (to make it representative and more responsive to the people).
[Sec. 5 (4)]
3. Each legislative district must comprise as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory (to
avoid gerrymandering, or putting together of areas where a candidate is strong, even if these are not contiguous).
[Sec. 5 (3)]
4. Each city with a population of at least 250,000 must have at least one representative. [Sec. 5(3)]
5. Each province, regardless of population must have at least one representative. [Sec. 5(3)]
b) Partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. [Sec. 5(2)]
The partylist representatives shall constitute 20% of the lower house.
For 3 consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution (1987, 1992, 1995), 1/2 of the seats
allocated to the partylist representatives shall be filled by selection or election, as provided by law, form the (i)
labor, (ii) peasant, (iii) urban poor, (iv) indigenous cultural communities, (v) women, (vi) youth, and (vii) such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Until a law is passed, the President may set up posts by appointment from a list of nominees by the
respective sectors, the seats reserved for sectoral representatives (Art. XVIII, Sec. 7).
QUALIFICATIONS
Citizenship: Naturalborn citizen
Age on the day of election: 25
Education: Able to read and write
Registered voter: In the district, if district
representative
Residence: 1 year in the district
(immediately preceding the election)
TERM OF OFFICE
3 years
To commence (unless otherwise provided by law) at noon of June 30 next following the election. (Art.
VI, Sec. 7)
But under Sec. 2 of the Transitory Provisions, the members of the House elected on the second Monday
of May, 1987 shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
No Member of the House shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. No voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected for the purpose of circumventing this 3term limitation.(Art. VI, Sec. 7)
Thus, Perez can still rerun in 1992, and 1995, but no longer in 1998. If he is reelected in 1992 and
1995, and he resigns in 1997, he can still no longer run in 1998. But if he does not run in 1992 or in 1995, he can
run for another 3 straight terms, because the continuity would be broken. Thus, one can be a lifetime
Congressman so long as he does not run on the third term.
Dimaporo vs. Mitra 202 SCRA 779 (Oct. 15, 1991)
F: Petitioner Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the 2nd Legislative District of Lanao del Sur
during the 1987 congressional elections.
In Jan., 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Upon being informed of such development by the COMELEC,
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Reps. excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the
House of Reps. pursuant to Sec. 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881)
Having lost in the elections, petitioner then tried but failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress. Hence, this
petition. He maintains that he did not lose his seat as congressman because Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of
Congress.
ISSUE: Whether Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is operative under the present Constitution
HELD: YES. Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads: "Any elective official whether national or local running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice
President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy."
Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this
statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office and thereby cutting
short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former
position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with
utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of
Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office.
"The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the
period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the
power of said officer. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office."
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a cert. of candidacy for
another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his
successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
The fact that the ground cited in Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution
itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of the members of Congress does not preclude its application
to present members of Congress. Sec. 2, Art. IX of the Constitution provides that "xxx All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment." Such constitutional
expression clearly recognizes that the 4 grounds found in Art. VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a
Congressman may be shortened are NOT exclusive.
Moreover, as the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces
automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary that the
other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution is different from
the forfeiture decreed in Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of
office under Sec. 7, par. 2 of Art. VI of the Constitution. RAM.
Gutierrez, Jr., J.: Dissenting opinion
Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of
constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining constitutional
officers other than those provided in the Constitution.
c. Synchronized terms of office
Art. XVIII, Secs. 12
Art. XVIII, Sec. 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Sec. 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of
votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
2. Election
a. Regular election
Art VI, Sec. 8
Art. VI, Sec. 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

Regular (Art. VI, Sec. 8)
2nd Monday of may, every 3 years, starting 1992 (unless otherwise provided by law). The term of office
begins on the following June 30.
For the transitory period, the first election was held on the 2nd Monday of May, 1987 (Art. XVIII, Sec.
1.)
b. Special election
Art. VI, Sec. 9
Art. VI, Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House or Representatives, a special
election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Republic Act No. 6645, Dec. 28, 1987
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6645

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILLING A VACANCY
IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Sec. 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on
Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying
to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If
Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the
President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for
such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term.
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than
fortyfive (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating
among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general
election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due

distribution and publication, to the Provincial or City Treasurer of each province or city concerned, who in turn
shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in
each of their election precints, and a copy in each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal
buildings.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two newspapers of
general circulation.
Approved, December 28, 1987.

Art. IXC, Sec. 11
Art. IXC, Sec. 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for
holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in
the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon
certification by the Chairman of the Commission.
In case of vacancy in the Senate or the House, a special election may be called to fill up such vacancy
"in the manner prescribed by law."
The law that governs and lays down the details concerning the special congressional elections is Rep.
Act No. 6645 (December 28, 1987). Under the law, no special election will be called if the vacancy occurs (i)
less than 18 months before the next regular election in the case of the Senate, or (ii) less than 1 year before the
next regular election in the case of the House; in these cases, we will just have to wait for the next regular
election, for practical reasons.
When the vacancy occurs during the period when special elections are allowed to be conducted (18 or 12
months or more before the next regular election), the particular House of Congress must pass either a resolution
by the House concerned, if Congress is in session, or a certification by the Senate President or the Speaker of the
House, if Congress is not in session, (a) declaring the existence of the vacancy and (b) calling for a special
election to be held within 45 to 90 days from the date of calling of the special election (that is, from the date of
the resolution or certification).
But the Senator or Member of the House thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the
term.(Art. VI, Sec. 9)
Funds certified by the COMELEC as necessary to defray the expenses for holding regular and special
elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations
and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the COMELEC. (Art.
IXC, Sec. 11)
In Lozada vs COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337, a petition to compel the COMELEC to call special elections
to fill twelve vacancies in the interim Batasang Pambansa was dismissed on the ground inter alia that the
petitioners were not proper parties as they had only what the Supreme Court called a "generalized interest"
shared with the rest of the people.
Lozada vs COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337 (1983)
F: This is a pet. for mandamus filed by Lozada and Igot as representative suit for and in behalf of those who wish to
participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation, to compel the resp. COMELEC to call a special election to fill up
existing vacancies numbering 12 in the Interim BP. The pet. is based on Sec. 5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973 Consti. w/c reads:
"In case a vacancy arises in the BP 18 months or more before a regular election, the COMELEC shall call a
special election to be held w/in 60 days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term."
Petitioner Lozada claims that he is a TP and a bona fide elector of Cebu City and a transient voter of QC, MM,
who desires to run for the position in the BP; while petitioner Igot alleges that, as TP, he has standing to petition by
mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 1973 Consti.
HELD: I. a. As taxypayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged

that tax money is being illegally spent. xxx
b. As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to
maintain and prosecute the present petition. Petitioners' standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest
of the kind alleged here, w/c is held in common by all members of the public bec. of the necessarily abstract
nature of the injury supposedly shared by all citizens.
II. a. The SC's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision,
orders or rulings. xxx There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC w/c is sought to be
reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction xxx.
b. Mandamus does not lie. There is total absence that COMELEC has unlawfully neglected the
performance of a ministerial duty or has refused on being demanded, to discharge such a duty. xxx [T]he
holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of
money. Only the BP can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may
neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel BP to exercise its power of
appropriation.
III. Perhaps the strongest reason why the said provision is not intended to apply to the Interim

National Assembly is the fact that as passed by the Con Con, the Interim NA was to be composed by the
delegates to the Con Con, as well as the then incumbent Pres. and VP, and the members of the Senate and House
of Rep. of Congress under the 1935 Consti. W/ such number of representatives representing each congressional
district, or a province, not to mention the Senators, there was felt absolutely no need for filling up vacancies
occurring in the Interim NA, considering the uncertainty of the duration of its existence. RAM.

Barlongay:
Q: Can appropriation of money through a law be compelled by mandamus?
A: No.
Q: Is the rule absolute?
A: No. There are exceptions (see Pasay case). LGUs may be compelled by mandamus to appropriate money for
obligations already incurred or (when there is already) a right to w/c a private party is entitled.
3. Salaries, Privileges and Disqualifications
a. Salaries
Art. VI, Sec. 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the xxx President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives xxx (shall receive an annual salary of) two hundred forty
thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, xxx two hundred four
thousand pesos each; xxx
The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law.
Unless the Congress provides otherwise, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House shall receive
an annual salary of P 240,000; while the Senators and the members of the House shall receive P 204,000 each.
(Art. XVIII, Sec. 17.)
While it is Congress, through a salary law, that determines the salary to be received by its members, the
Constitution mandates that no increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the members of the two houses approving such increase.
Philconsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)
F: PHILCONSA has filed in this Court a suit against the Auditor General of the Phils., and the Auditor of the
Congress, seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the
increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 (approved 6/10/64) to the Speaker and members of the HRep before 12/30/69.
Sec. 1, par. 1 of RA 4134 provided, inter alia, that the annual salary of the Senate Pres. and of the Speaker of the
HRep shall be P40,000 each; that of the Senators and members of the HRep, P32,000 each (thereby increasing their present
compensation of P16T and P7,200 pa for the Presiding officers and members respectively.)
The 19651966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the HRep set by RA
4134.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Art VI, Sec. 14 of the 1935 Consti, w/c provided
that: "xxx No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. xxx"
The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA
4134, will expire only on 12/30/69; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of the said
Act expired on 12/30/65.
HELD: The Court agrees w/ petitioners that the increased compensation provided is not operative until
12/30/69, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
Purpose of the provision. The reason for the this rule, the Court said, is to place a "legal bar to the
legislators yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher
compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective,
there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt."
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period, the constitutional provision refers
to "all members of the Senate and of the House or Rep." in the same sentence, as a single unit, w/o distinction or
separation bet. them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
"expiration of the full term" xxx using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of
office, xxx thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible
components of one single Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined w/ the
following phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the House," underscores that in the application of said
provision, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that
enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
Term of all the members of the Congress, instead of all the members of the Senate and of the House."
This is a distinction w/o a difference, since the Senate and the House together constitute the Congress.
The use of the phrase "of the Senate and of the House" when it could have employed the shorter
expression "of the Senate and the House" is grammatically correct. To speak of "members of the Senate and the
House" would imply that the members of the Senate also held membership in the House. RAM.
Illustration: If a salary law is passed in 1983 increasing the salary of members of Congress, the same
law can only take effect for the term that begins at noon of 30 June 1992; but if a salary is passed in 1988
decreasing the salary of members of Congress, the law can take effect right away, since the Constitution
prohibits only the increase. If another salary law is passed in 1993 to increase the salary, the same can take
effect not in the term beginning at noon of 30 June 1995; the top twelve senators elected on the 2nd Monday of
May, 1992 would still be holding office then. It can only take effect in 1998. Effectively, therefore, such law can
take effect only after the expiration of the longest term of a Senator, which is six years, even if the term of the
Representative who voted for the law is only 3 years.
Ligot v Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)
F: Petitioner served as a member of the HRep of Congress for 3 consecutive 4yr terms covering a 12yr span from
12/30/57 to 12/30/69. During his 2nd term in office, RA 4134 was enacted into law.
Petitioner was reelected to a 3rd term (12/30/65 to 12/30/69) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of
P32,000 during such third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa v. Mathay. Petitioner lost his bid
for a consecutive 4th term in the 1969 elections and his term having expired on 12/31/69, filed a claim for retirement under
CA 186, Sec. 12 (c), as amended.
The HRep thus issued a treasury warrant in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary
of P32,000 p.a. Resp. Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant pending resolution by the Auditor Gen. of a similar claim
filed by Cong Singson. When the Auditor Gen.'s adverse decision on Singson's claim came out, resp Auditor requested
petitioner to return the warrant for recomputation. Petitioner's request for recon having been denied by the Auditor Gen. he
filed the present petition for review.
HELD: 1. [T]he "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on 12/30/69, such as

petitioner, must necessarily be P7,200 p.a., the compensation they received "as provided by law" and the Consti
during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on 12/30/69 computed on
the basis of an increased salary of P32,000 p.a. would be to pay them prohibited emoluments w/c in effect
increase the salary beyond that w/c they were permitted by the Consti. to receive during their incumbency. This
would be a subtle way of going around the constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their compensation
during their term of office and of doing indirectly what could not be done directly.
3. Petitioners' contention that since the increased salary of P32T p.a. was already operative when his
retirement took effect on 12/30/69, his retirement gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be
sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated are concerned for the simple reason that
a retirement or benefit is a form of compensation w/in the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their
compensation and "other emoluments" to their salary as provided by law. RAM.

b. Freedom from arrest
Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six (6) years imprisonment (prision correcional), be privileged from arrest while Congress is in
session. xxx
Elements of the privilege:
i. Congress must be in session, whether regular (sec. 15) or special (supra). It does not matter where the
member of Congress may be found (attending the session, socializing in a private party, or sleeping at home); so
long as Congress is in session, freedom from arrest holds;
ii. The crime for which the member is to be arrested is punishable by 6 years of imprisonment or less.
"Punishable" refers to the maximum possible penalty which a penal statute attaches to the offense. It follows too
that if the crime is punishable by 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor or more, the member can be arrested, even
if he is session in the halls of Congress.
History of the privilege
The Revised Penal Code (Act NO. 3815), enacted in 1932, indirectly granted parliamentary immunity,
when in Art. 145, it punished with a penalty of prision correcional "any public officer or employee who shall,
while the Assembly is in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor."
When the 1935 Constitution took effect, it was thought that a direct grant of parliamentary immunity
was given, since in Art. VI, Sec. 15, it was provided that: "The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the session of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same."
Martinez v Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972)
F: Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecution, the information filed against petitioner Martinez for falsification
of a public document (punishable by prision mayor) and 2 informations against petitioner Bautista, Sr. for violation of the
Revised Election Code (penalty imposable for each offense charged is not higher than prision mayor). Petitioners, as
delegates of the Con Con (1973 Consti.) would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the constitution (granting
immunity from arrest to senators and representatives during their attendance at the sessions of Congress) if considered in
connection w/ Art 145, RPC penalizing a public officer who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any
member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under (such) code by a penalty higher than
prision mayor." For under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a
senator or a representative.
What is sought by petitioners is that the respective warrants of arrest issued against them be quashed on the claim
that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, xxx they are immune from arrest.
HELD: Certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants issued against petitioners. Their reliance on the
constitutional provision w/c for them should be supplemented by what was provided for in the RPC is futile.
There is no justification for granting their respective pleas.
Under Art. IV, Sec. 15 of the 1935 Consti., the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for
treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or
adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. A felony is an act or omission punishable by law. Breach of
the peace covers any offense whether defined by the RPC or any special statute. xxx [F]rom the explicit
language of the Consti., xxx petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. Nor does Art. 145, RPC come to
their rescue. Such a provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Consti. became operative on
10/15/35.
xxx In the language of the Consti. then that portion of Art. 145, RPC penalizing a public official or
employee who shall while the Congress is in regular or special session arrest or search any member thereof
except in case he has committed a crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor is
declared inoperative.
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is,
to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
ConCon, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no
other force except the dictates of their conscience. xxx The utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded
them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, w/o
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune
during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely no dissent from
the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, w/o the need for any
transgression of the criminal law. RAM.
The exceptions under the 1935 Constitution (treason, felony and breach of the peace) were so
comprehensive as to exclude from the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses and to limit the immunity
from arrest or civil process only during the session of that body. Ultimately, Art. 145 of the RPC, to the extent
that it penalized public officers from arresting members of Congress for crimes punishable with prision mayor
or less, was rendered "inoperative" upon the passage of the 1935 Constitution. Art. 145, then was deemed
stricken out of the statute books upon this declaration by the Court; it was declared "inoperative." Without this
felony, there was no way to speak of immunity from arrest.
The 1971 Concon, aware of this ruling (Martinez and Bautista were delegates), provided for real
immunity in the 1973 Constitution, by including Art, VIII, Sec. 9: "A Member of the National Assembly shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attend
ance at its sessions, and in going to and returning from the same; but the National Assembly shall surrender the
Member involved to the custody of the law within 24 hours after its adjournment for a recess of its next session,
otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so."
The 1987 Constitution seems to have widened the privilege by simply stating that such a member "shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged form arrest while the Congress
is in session." Unlike the 1973 rule, now, arrest can only be made when Congress is not in session. If the
arresting officer cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the member during such period, he will have to
wait until the end of his term.
It would also seem that upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, Art. 145, RPC which was declared
inoperative by the SC, was deemed revived, but with modification (from prision mayor to prision correcional).
c. Speech and Debate Clause
Art VI, Sec. 11. xxx No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
This privilege protects the member concerned from any libel suit that may be filed against him for a
speech made "in" the halls of Congress or in any of its committees. Speech is not confined to traditional speech
but even to the casting of votes, the making of reports, a debate or discussion, even communicative actions, and
any other form of expression.
The speech, however, must be made "in" Congress in the discharge of legislative duty. Thus,
Jimenez v Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 (1966)
F: This is an ordinary civil action for the recovery by plaintiffs Jimenez, et al., of several sums of money,
by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. An
open letter of the President, published in several newspapers of general circulation saying that certain members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had been preparing for a coup and working for the candidacy of the
Secretary of Defense for the Presidency.
Upon being summoned, the Cabangbang moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter
in question is not libelous, and that, even if it were, said letter is a privileged communication.
ISSUES: Whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is
libelous or not.
(1) The determination of the first issue depends on w/n the publication falls w/in the purview of the
phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this provision.
Scope of Parliamentary Freedom of Speech and Debate. "Said expression refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or
votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of
the acts in question."
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint

herein, it was an open letter to the Pres. dated 11/14/58, when Congress presumably was not in session, and def.
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of gen. circ. in the Phils., on or about said date. It is
obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress of as officer or any Committee thereof.
(2) Letter was not libelous. The letter was not libelous bec. it mentions that herein appellants as

possibly "unwitting tools of a plan of which they have absolutely no knowledge." In other words, the very
document upon w/c pltffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the
alleged operation plans, and that they may be unwitting tools of the planners. The statement is not derogatory to
pltffs. to the point of entitling them to recover damages. RAM.

The provision protects the Member of Congress only from being held liable outside of Congress ("in any
other place"); it does not protect him from liability "inside" Congress, i.e., from possible disciplinary measures
that his peers may impose upon him. For as mentioned above, his speech may constitute disorderly behavior as
in Osmena v Pendatun (109 Phil 863), and this may be penalized with censure, suspension for 60 days, or
expulsion, the latter two upon concurrence of 2/3 of the membership.
It is important to note that this privilege is not absolute. The rule provides that the legislator may not be
questioned "in any other place," which means that he may be called to account for his remarks by his own
colleagues in Congress itself, and when warranted, punished for disorderly behavior. Thus, in the case of
Osmena v Pendatun, the President himself who had been vilified by the petitioner could not file any civil or
criminal action against him because of this immunity. Nonetheless, the majority of the members of the House of
Representatives in which the questioned speech was delivered were not precluded from demonstrating their
loyalty to the chief executive by declaring Osmena guilty of disorderly behavior and suspending him in the
exercise of their disciplinary power [now Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)].
Osmena v Pendatun (109 Phil 863)
F: In 1960, Cong. Osmena delivered a privilege speech in Congress entitled "A Message to Garcia," maliciously
denouncing and charging the administration of Pres. Garcia. As a result of this, the HRep through House Resolution No.
59 created a special committee to investigate the veracity of the charges and for him to show cause why he should not be
punished by the House if he failed to substantiate his charges. On his side, Osmena contended in his petition that:
(1) the Consti. gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be
questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behavior for w/c he could be punished; (3) supposing he could be
questioned and disciplined therefor, the House had lost the power to do so bec. it had taken up other business before
approving House Resolution No. 59; (4) that the House has no power, under the Consti., to suspend one of its members.
Resolution No. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behavior. He was suspended for 15 months.
HELD: 1. Sec. 15, Art. VI of the 1935 Consti. provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the

Senators or Members of the HRep "shall not be questioned in any other place." Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress. But they may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House w/c petitioner himself has invoked recognize the House's power to
hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
The provision guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression w/o fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall.
But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct
are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
For unparliamentary conduct, members xxx of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to
prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
2. On the third point of petitioner that the House may no longer take action against him, bec. after his
speech and before approving the Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business.
xxx [C]ourts have declared that "the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body appointing them." And it has been said that "Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and w/ their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body."

3. On the question w/n delivery of speeches attacking the Pres. constitutes disorderly conduct for w/c
Osmena may be disciplined, we believe that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not
only bec. the Consti. has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also bec. the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of w/c the House knows best but w/c can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to,
and adjudication by the Courts. RAM.
Illustration: If Congressman X makes an oral abuse against Congressman Y in the halls of Congress, he
cannot be arrested nor prosecuted for slander because of the speech clause. But he can be punished by his peers
for disorderly behavior.
But if Cong. X, in the course of heated debate, assaults Cong. Y and inflicts physical injuries, he can be
criminally prosecuted (for direct assault with grave or less grave physical injuries) because although a verbal
assault is immune, a physical is not immune. But although he can be prosecuted, he cannot be arrested while
Congress is in session, because while he is not immune from prosecution, he is immune from arrest, assuming
the penalty does not exceed prision correctional. The court must thus wait for the recess of Congress before it
can order his arrest.
d. Disqualifications
(1) Incompatible Offices and Forbidden Offices
Art. VI, Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. xxx
An incompatible office is a post which a member cannot accept unless he waives or forfeits his seat in
Congress. A sensu contrario, if he waives or forfeits his seat, he may accept the other post, since the
incompatibility arises only because of his simultaneous membership in both.
BARLONGAY CASE:
Adaza v. Pacana, Jr., 135 SCRA 431 (1985)
F: Petitioner Homobono Adaza was elected governor of Misamis Oriental in the 1/30/80 elections. Elected vicegov.
for said province in the same elections was resp. Fernando Pacana, Jr. Both qualified and assumed their respective offices.
Both Adaza and Pacana filed their certificates of candidacy for the 5/14/84 BP elections. In the said elections,
petitioner won while respondents lost.
On 7/23/84, resp. took his oath of office as gov. of Mis. Or. and started to perform the duties of governor.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude resp. therefrom.
He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of 6 yrs., that he remains to be the governor of the province until his
term expires on 3/23/86 as provided by law, and that w/in the context of the parliamentary system, a local elective official
can hold the position to w/c he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
HELD: 1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the BP from holding any other office of
employment in the govt during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Sec. 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Consti.
provides that:
"Sec. 10. A member of the National Assembly shall not hold any other office or employment in the government
xxx except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. xxx
xxx It is of no avail to petitioner that the system of govt in other states allows a local elective official to
act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in whom legal
sovereignty lies is explicit. xxx [T]he incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than the
constitution itself.
2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that resp. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no
right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to the BP. He maintains that resp. should be
considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vicegovernorship when he filed his cert. of candidacy.
The point pressed runs afoul of BP 697, Sec. 13 (2) of w/c provides that governors, mayors, members of the
various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a cert. of candidacy, be considered on forced leave
of absence from office." Resp falls w/in the coverage of this provision considering that he was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. RAM.
Art. VI, Sec. 13. xxx Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Forbidden Office (VI, Sec. 13)
A forbidden office is one to which a member cannot be appointed even if he is willing to give up his seat
in Congress. The effect of his resignation from the Congress is the loss of his seat therein but his
disqualification for the forbidden office nevertheless remains. The prohibition lies in the "fiduciary" nature of
the relationship involved.
Such a member cannot resign in anticipation of the passage of the law creating such office or increasing
its emolument as a way of circumventing the prohibition. However, the prohibition is not forever (as in the
Jones Law); it is for the term for which he was elected.
(2) Other prohibitions
Art. VI, Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasijudicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any governmentowned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
(i) Personally appearing as counsel before any court of justice, the Electoral Tribunal, quasijudicial
bodies, and other administrative bodies.
What the Constitution prohibits in the case of members of Congress who are also members of the bar is
their personal appearance before any of these bodies. This is not a prohibition against, the practice of law in any
court. Thus, a member may still sign and file his pleadings, give legal advice, continue as partner, and have a
partner or associate appear for him in court.
Under the 1973 Constitution, the prohibition against personal appearance covered only courts inferior to
a court of appellate jurisdiction (RTC down), courts in a civil case wherein the government is the adverse party,
and administrative bodies. Now, the prohibition is against "any" court, thus including the SC and the CA,
regardless of the action.
BARLONGAY CASE:
Puyat v. De Guzman, Jr., 113 SCRA 32 (1982)
F: On 5/14/79, an election for the 11 Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corp. (IPI) was held. There were
two groups, the Puyat Group and the Acero Group. The Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the
management of IPI.
On 5/25/79, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proc. questioning the 5/14/79 election. The said
group claimed that the votes were not properly counted.
May 2531, 1979, the Puyat Group claims that at the conferences of the parties w/ resp. SEC Commissioner,
Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim BP, orally entered his appearance as counsel for resp. Acero
to w/c the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the 1973 Consti. provided that no
Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body," and SEC was an administrative body.
xxx
On 7/17/79, the SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of ten shares. It is this
Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition w/ Prel. Inj.
xxx
On 9/4/79, the Court en banc issued a TRO enjoining resp SEC Commissioner from allowing the participation as
an intervenor, of resp. Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC case.
HELD: The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case falls w/in the ambit of the prohibition
contained in the Consti. There has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before xxx an administrative body."
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion of Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of
the pvt resps. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in
respect of the matter in litigation.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman F. in the SEC
case. He had acquired a mere P200 worth of stocks in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact," that is, on 5/30/79,
after the contested election of Directors on 5/14/79, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on 5/25/79 before
SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on 5/31/79. And what is more, before
he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for resp. Acero, but w/c was objected
to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead to "intervene" on the
ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. RAM.
(ii) Being interested financially in any (a) contract with, or (b) franchise or special privilege granted by,
the Government, its subdivision, agency or instrumentality, a governmentowned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary. The prohibition is for the duration of his term of office.
(iii) Intervening in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
(iv) Intervening in any matter where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
It may be noted that the last 3 prohibitions are themselves punishable acts under the AntiGraft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
e. Duty to Disclose
Art. XI, 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter
as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the
case of the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court,
the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with
general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
Art. VI, Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon
House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation
of which they are authors.
Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the
public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall
publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.

In general, a public officer or employee shall, upon assuming office and as often thereafter as may be,
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth. But in the case of
members of Congress and other high government officials (as enumerated), the disclosure must be made public
(Art. XI, Sec. 17). Furthermore, all members of Congress shall, upon assumption of office make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests (Art. VI, Sec. 12).
The law governing this financial disclosure by public officers and employees is RA 3019, otherwise
known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Every public officer shall submit to (a) the Office of the
Department Head, or (b) the Office of the President in case of a head of department or chief of an independent
office, the following:
1. A true, detailed, and sworn statement of assets and liability;
2. A statement of the amounts and sources of his income;
3. The amount of personal and family expenses, and
4. The amount of income taxes paid the previous year, on the following occasions:
(a) within 30 years after assuming office
(b) on or before April 15 after the close of the calendar
year, and
(c) upon the expiration of their term of office, or upon
resignation or separation from office
When a member of Congress authors a proposed legislation, he must notify the House concerned of any
"potential conflict of interest" that may arise from his filing of such bill (Art. VI, Sec. 12.)
Furthermore, the records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the
public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit, which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member (Art. VI, Sec. 20.)
The purpose of public disclosure of a member's financial status and official expenses is to make him
visible to the rest, and thus give him a deterrent from committing graft and corruption. The public has a right to
know how much it is spending for its government,
4. Internal Government of Congress
a. Election of officers
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its

Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
First order of business election by each house of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House, and such other officers that the rules of each house may provide.
A majority vote of all the respective members is required to elect these two officers.
Upon the election of the President and the Speaker, the Constitution deems the Houses "organized." (VI,
19)
b. Quorum
Id., Sec. 16(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorom to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
The quorum required to conduct business is a majority (1/2 + 1) of all the members.
But to pass a law, only the votes of the majority of those present in the session, there being a quorum,
are required. This is known as the "shifting majority".
To illustrate: 13 members of the Senate are sufficient to constitute a quorum. If only 13 members are
present, a vote by 7 in favor of a bill is sufficient to pass it. But as the number of those present increases, the
number of votes needed to pass a bill would correspondingly increase, i.e., shift.
When a quorum cannot be had, a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the
attendance of the absent (recalcitrant) members by the means of arrest or such other measures and penalties as
the House may provide in its rules.
Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
F: Jose Avelino was Senate President in 1949. On 2/21/49, Senators Tanada and Sanidad filed a resolution
(Resolution 68) against Avelino calling for an investigation. During the session, Avelino and 6 others walked out leaving 12
senators behind. The 12 senators continued the session and passed resolution no. 67 declaring the Senate Pres. seat vacate.
Sen. Cuenco was eventually elected as the acting Pres. of the Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioner asks the Court to declare him the rightful President of
the Phil. Senate and oust resp., Sen. Cuenco.
ISSUES: a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subjectmatter?
b. It if has, were resolutions Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
HELD: a. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own pres., w/c power
should not be interfered w/, nor taken over, by the judiciary. xxx
b. The second question depends upon these subquestions: (1) Was the session of the socalled rump
Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled w/ 22 Senators (2 were absent one was abroad; the
other was confined in a Manila hospital) in the morning of 2/21/49? (2) Was there a quorom in that session?
(1) Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under Sen.
Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of 10 senators may not, by leaving the
Hall, prevent the other 12 senators from passing a resolution that met w/ their unanimous resolution.
(2) If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted?
Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was for the following reasons: (i) the minutes say so, (ii) at
the beginning of such session there were at least 14 senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and (iii) in
view of the absence from the country of Senator Confessor, 12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorom, "the
House" does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the "House." There is
a difference bet. a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House," the latter requiring
less number than the first. Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23)
constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of the quorom. J. Pablo believes further that
even if the 12 did not constitute a quorom, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members xxx. RAM.
In Avelino v Cuenco, supra., the ruling then was: The quorum was computed on the number of Senators
over whom the Senate has jurisdiction at the time of session.
c. Rules of proceedings
Id., Secs. 16(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of twothirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may

conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Each House or its committees may determine the rules of its proceedings. These rules include the
procedure to be followed in "inquiries in aid of legislation."
The House may set aside the rules it adopted as it sees fit, because these rules are only of a temporary
nature.
Pacete v Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971)
The rules of the Commission on Appointments concerning its internal business could be reviewed by the Courts,
that is, it is a justiciable matter, when a certain construction of such rules would defeat the right of the individ
ual to a public office.
F: In his suit for mandamus and prohibition filed w/ this Court, petitioner F. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by
the then Pres. of the Phils. on 8/31/64 as Mun. Judge of Pigcawan, Cotabato. He then assumed office and discharged his
duties. As his appointment was made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments
(CA) at its next session in '65. On 5/20/65, he was unanimously confirmed. More than 9 mos. after such confirmation, the
then Sec. of Justice, through the Judicial Supt., advised petitioner to vacate his position as mun. judge, the ground being
that his appointment had been bypassed. Petitioner was taken by surprise and sought clarification from the prin. resp. He
was informed that a day after his confirmation, one of the members of the CA, Sen. Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman, stating
that he was filing a motion for the recon. of the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner xxx in view of derogatory
info. w/c he had received. Resp. Sec. of CA thus was led to notify the then Sec. of Justice accordingly, following what he
considered to be the prevailing practice of such body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the
confirmation of the appointment in question ***." Resp. then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as he
had not been duly confirmed.
HELD: Petitioner must prevail.
1. R 21 of the Revised Rules of the CA reads:
"Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be considered on motion by a member presented not
more than one day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a recon., the appointment shall
be reopened and submitted anew to the Commission. Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid
on the table, and this shall be a final disposition of such a motion."
"Respondent's theory would give to the mere filing of motion for recon. the effect w/c it would have if
the motion were approved, and, hence, would dispense w/ the necessity of such approval, for w/ the concurrence
of a majority of the members present is necessary." (Altarejos v. Molo, 25 SCRA 550.) xxx That would be
tantamount to imparting to a move of single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if
the minority were to prevail. A oneman rule is infinitely worse.
2. Ad interim appointments take effect at once. The title of the appointee to the office is complete. In
the language of the Consti., the appointment is effective "until disapproval by the CA or until the next
adjournment of the Congress."
The constitutional requirement is clear. There must either be a rejection by the CA or nonaction on its
part. No such thing happened in this case. Petitioner had instead in his favor a unanimous vote of confirmation.
He could thus invoke constitutional protection. For resps. to argue that the mere filing of a MFR did suffice to
set it aside, even in the absence of any further action is to lose sight of what is provided in the Consti.
3. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. Thus even legislative acts
and executive orders are not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. xxx [T]here is nothing sacrosanct about a rule
of the CA, especially so, when as in this case, a construction sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right of
an individual to a public office. RAM.
d. Discipline of members
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members
for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of twothirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
Each house may punish it members for "disorderly behavior." What constitutes "disorderly behavior" is
solely within the discretion of the house concerned.
Although a member of either house cannot be held accountable in any other place for any speech he
make in the Congress or in any committee thereof, he can be found guilty of disorderly behavior by his own
peers, so ruled the Court in Osmena v Pendatun. 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
The penalty may consist of (i) censure; or upon a 2/3 vote of all the members of the house, (ii)
suspension, not exceeding 60 days, or (iii) expulsion.
The history behind the 60day limitation on the period of suspension could be traced to the early case of
Alejandrino v Quezon, infra. In a dictum, the SC said that it was not within the power of the legislature to
suspend its member, since suspension deprived the constituents of the member suspended of the right to be
represented by a representative that they really had. In effect, suspension punished the constituents. In the case
of expulsion, the constituents could at least elect someone else to substitute the member represented.
If the only disciplinary measures were limited to expulsion and censure, however, there might not be a
penalty appropriate enough for a disorderly behavior that merited something more than censure but less than
expulsion. It was this dilemma, that the Court precisely faced in Osmena v Pendatun, which made it upheld the
suspension of 15 months despite the Alejandrino ruling.
Thus, the 1973 Constitution devised a system of allowing suspension as a penalty but limited its period
to 60 days [Art. VII, Sec. 7(3)]. This was carried over in the 1987 Constitution. [Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)]
Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 P 83 (1924)
F: The petitioner in this orig. pet. for mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Gov
Gen. to represent the 12th Senatorial District. The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Phil. Senate composed of the
resp. Senators, on 2/5/24, depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the
period of 1 yr from 1/24 having been declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant viol. of the privileges of the Senate
for having treacherously assaulted Sen. de Vera on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course
of the debate regarding the credentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution is
unconstitutional and entirely of no effect.
HELD: 1. Mandamus (M). The gen. rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the govt to a coordinate
branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. M will not lie against the legislative
body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character w/c
therefore pertains to their legislative functions and over w/c they have exclusive control.
2. On the merits of the controversy, the Organic Act authorizes the GovGen. to appoint 2 senators and
9 representatives to represent the nonChristian regions in the Legislature. These senators and representatives
"hold office until removed by the Gov.Gen." They may not be removed by the Leg. However, to the Senate and
the HRep., respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, w/ the
concurrence of 2/3, expel an elective member." xxx. The Consti. has purposely withheld from the 2 Houses of
the Leg. and the GovGen. alike the power to suspend an appointive member. The reason is obvious.
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House w/o depriving the
constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative
body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district
of representation w/o that district being afforded any means by w/c to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat
remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for 1 yr. is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.
However, the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the reason that the SC does not possess the power of
coercion to make the Phil. Senate take any particular action. RAM.
Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 P 863 (1960) supra. (Speech and Debate Clause)
Compared w/ Alejandrino v. Quezon: It is true that in Alejandrino an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives
the electoral district of representation w/o that district being afforded any means by w/c to fill that vacancy."
But the remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected
party and who was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged w/ the duty to represent
the 12th District xxx.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those powers w/ were granted to
it by the Jones Law; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign
nation, except as restricted by the Consti. xxx Now, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension w/c the Consti. did not impair.
"The Legislative power of Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in the
Consti. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the
Congress, unless the Consti. provides otherwise." (Vera v. Avelino, 77 P 192.) RAM.
Expulsion compared with exclusion under Art. VI, Sec. 17
Expulsion under Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) should be distinguished from exclusion under Art. VI, Sec. 17,
Art. VI, Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. xxx
Under the latter, Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House, determine election contests. They
shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. Each Electoral
Tribunal is independent of the other; this emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon
each House. However, each Tribunal cannot add to the qualifications or disqualifications found in the
Constitution. Thus, the Electoral Tribunal is without power to exclude any memberelect who meets all the
Constitution's requirements for membership.
e. Journal and Congressional Records
Art. VI, 16(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of onefifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
It is the first time that the Constitution requires a "record" in addition to a "journal". Up to the 1973
Constitution, only a journal was required to be kept, although in practice, the legislature has always kept a
record.
Cruz: The journal is only a resume of minutes of what transpired during a legislative session. The record is the
wordforword transcript of the proceedings taken during the session.
(1) The Enrolled Bill Theory
Once a bill has been approved by both houses (the procedure will be discussed later), the bill is
engrossed or enrolled, and this "Enrolled Copy of the Bill" bears the certification of the Presiding Officer of the
house (either Senate President or Speaker of the House) that this bill as enrolled is the version passed by each
house. The purpose of the certification is to prevent attempts at smuggling in "riders". The enrolled copy is
then sent to the President for his action.
What happens if there is a discrepancy between the enrolled copy of the bill, and any other copy of the
bill? The enrolled bill prevails, says the SC in the following cases.
Mabanag v Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947)
F: Three of the pltff. senators and 8 of the pltff. representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
COMELEC as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 4/23/46. The 3 senators were
suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The 8 representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House,
except to take part in the election of Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. xxx
As a consequence, these 3 senators and 8 reprs. did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor
was their membership reckoned in the computation of the necessary 3/4 vote w/c is required in proposing an amendment to
the Consti. (the Parity Rights Amendment.) If these members had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary 3/4 vote in either branch of Congress.
HELD: 1. Jurisdiction. Both notions of jurisdiction and conclusiveness of legislative enactment are
synonymous in that both are founded upon the regard w/c the judiciary accords a coequal, coordinate, and
independent branch of Govt. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that
respect. xxx
2. Enrolled Bill Theory. The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. xxx
Sec. 313 of the old Code of Civ. Proc., as amended, provides:
"Official documents may be proved as follows: ***(2) the proceedings of the xxx Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or
secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, that in the case of Acts of xxx the Phil. Leg., when there is an existence of a
copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such
Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
Reasons in support of enrollment:
Sec. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. xxx [T]he rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the
respect due to a coequal and independent dept of govt, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of
the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of w/c must lead to endless confusion in the admin. of the law.
The rule is also one of convenience, bec. courts could not rely on the published session laws, but would be required to look
beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments w/c might be found after the
adjournment of the legislature. (Am. Jur.)
3. Compared w/ US v. Pons. The Court looked into the journals in US v. Pons bec., in all probability,
those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was
in existence or was placed bef. the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would
not have held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. RAM.
Casco Chemical Co. v Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)
F: Pursuant to the provisions of RA 2609 (ForEx Margin Fee Law), the CB issued Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform
margin fee of 25% on forex transactions. xxx Several times in Nov. and Dec. 1959, petitioner Casco, w/c is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues xxx, bought forex for the importation of urea and formaldehyde w/c are the main
RM in the production of said glues and paid the corresponding margin fee. Petitioner had sought the refund claiming that
the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Although the CB issued the vouchers for the
refund, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers upon the ground that the exemption
granted by the MB for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord w/ the provisions of sec.
2, par. XVIII of RA 2609.
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in the provision should be construed as "urea
and formaldehyde" and that the resps herein have erred in holding otherwise. xxx "Urea formaldehyde" is a finished
product, w/c is patently distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde," as separate articles used in the manufacture
of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde." Petitioner contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" bet. the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde" and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue xxx citing
the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill bef. the House xxx.
HELD: Said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate
the intent of the HRep. Further, the enrolled bill w/c uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde," is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
adopted by the Pres. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill bef. it was certified by the officers
of Congress and approved by the Pres., the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation. RAM.
In Morales v Subido, infra., the SC, in upholding the enrolled bill, explained that its basis is the
separation of powers, so that the remedy of an aggrieved party is not a judicial decree but a legislative
amendment or curative legislation. In this case, the phrase, "who has served the police department of city or "
was omitted from the engrossed copy of the Police Act of 1966, thereby changing the qualifications required by
the law of a chief of a city police agency. It was clear from the records and journal that the omission took place
not any stage of the legislative proceedings, but only during its enrollment. It was further clear that the change
was made not by Congress, but only by an employee. And yet the SC refused to go behind the enrolled Act to
discover what really happened, because of the respect due the other departments.
The case was different in Astorga v Villegas, infra., because here, upon being informed that the enrolled
bill did not contain the amendment proposed by Senator Tolentino (regarding the powers of the ViceMayor of
Manila) when the house bill was raised to the Senate, the Senate President, withdrew his signature and notified
the President of the mistake, who then likewise withdrew his signature. There was no occasion, then, to apply
the enrolled bill theory.
(2) Probative Value of the Journal
The journal is conclusive on the courts as to its contents, so the SC ruled in US V Pons, 34 Phil. 729
(1916). Pons, in this case was prosecuted under a criminal statute. He contended, however, that the statute was
passed past the midnight after February 28, 1914, the last day of session of the legislative body, but that the
members stopped the clock at midnight, to pass the law. The SC rejected this claim, ruling that the probative
value of the journal could not be questioned, otherwise proof of legislative action would be uncertain and would
now have to depend on the imperfect memory of men.
US V Pons, 34 Phil. 729 (1916)
F: Juan Pons was accused of violating Act 2381 w/c prohibits the illegal importation of opium. In his motion for the
reversal of his conviction, counsel contented that the last day of the special sessions of the Leg. for 1914 was 2/28; that Act
2381, under w/c Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on 2/28 but on 3/1 of that yr; and that,
therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise disputed. As it is admitted that the last day of
the special session was, under the GovGen's proclamation, 2/28 and that the appellant is charged w/ having violated Act
2381, the vital question is the date of the adjournment of the Leg., and this reduces itself to 2 others, namely, (1) how that
is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence, and (2) whether the court can take judicial
notice of the journals.
HELD: A. While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question w/n the courts may
take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the US that such journals may be noticed by
courts in determining the question w/n a particular bill became a law or not. And these journals show, w/
absolute certainty, that the Leg. adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock on 2/28/14.
B. We will inquire w/n the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining
the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit.
Counsel for appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or
recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Govt or the sovereign itself. From
their very nature and object the records of the Leg are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into
the veracity of the journals of the Leg., when they are clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and
spirit of the organic laws by w/c the Phil. Govt was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent dept of the Govt, and to interfere w/ the legitimate powers and functions of the Leg. xxx If the
clock, was, in fact stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared w/ that of altering
the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon
uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of
memory xxx. RAM.
(3) Matters Required to be Entered in the Journal
The Constitution requires that the following matters be contained in the
journal:
(a) The yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill [Art. VI, Sec.
26(2)];
(b) Veto message of the President (i.e., his objection to a bill when he
vetoes it) [Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)];
(c) The yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President
(Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)];
(d) The yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of the
members present [Art. VI, Sec. 16(4)]
In addition, the journal contains the summary of the proceedings.
A record, on the other hand, contains the verbatim transcript of all proceedings of the house or its
committees. The Constitution is silent as to what the record must contain.
However, in Art. XI, Sec. 3(3), the Constitution speaks of the vote of each member of the House either
affirming a favorable or overriding its contrary resolution of the impeachment complaint to be "recorded."
(4) Journal Entry Rule v Enrolled Bill Theory
In the Astorga v Villegas case, the SC, by way of obiter, indicated that the journal might really prevail
over the enrolled bill, since a journal is required by the Constitution while the enrollment of a bill is just a
legislative practice that is not even mentioned in the Constitution. Further, enrollment does not add to the
validity of the bill, for what makes it valid are the votes of the members.
But this view is mere dictum. It contradicts the ruling in Morales v Subido that the enrolled copy
prevails over the journal. It also contradicts the ratio in Marshall Field & Co. v Clark, 143 US 649 (1891) that
the parties were not competent to show from the journal that the bill in the custody of the Secretary of State was
against the contents of the journal, because journals are just kept by clerks who could be mistaken, while the
certified bill is made by the highest officer of the chamber.
To reconcile these two views, it may be said that, as to matters required by the Constitution to be placed
in the journal, the journal is conclusive. But aside from these 4 matters, any other matter does not enjoy such
conclusiveness.
Astorga v Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974)
F: House Bill No. 9266, w/c was filed in the HRep., passed on 3rd reading w/o amendments. It was sent to the
Senate for concurrence. It was referred to the appropriate Senate Committee, w/c recommended approval w/ a minor
amendment recommended by Sen. Roxas. When the bill was discussed on the Senate floor, substantial amendments to Sec.
1 were introduced by Sen. Tolentino, w/c amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. xxx On 5/21/54, the Sec. of
the Senate sent a letter to HRep that the House bill had been passed by the Senate w/ amendments. Attached was a
certification of the amendment, w/c was the one recommended by Sen. Roxas, and not the Tolentino amendments w/c were
the ones actually approved by the Senate. The HRep signified approval as sent back to it. The printed copies were then
certified and attested to by the Secretaries of the Senate and of the HRep, the Speaker of the HRep, and the Senate Pres.
It was later made public by Sen. Tolentino that the enrolled copy of House bill no. 9266 signed into law by the
Pres. was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate and approved on the Senate floor. The Senate Pres.
admitted this mistake in a letter to the Pres. As a result, the Pres. sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses
informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill no. 9266.
Upon the foregoing facts, the Mayor of Mla. issued circulars ordering the disregard of the provisions of RA 4605.
He also issued an order recalling 5 members of the city police force who had been assigned to the ViceMayor presumably
under authority of RA 4065.
Reacting to these steps, the then VMayor Astorga, filed a pet. w/ this Court for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition w/ Prel Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel compliance w/ the provisions of RA 4065.
Respondents' position is that RA 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate,
and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the
issue.
HELD: 1. Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of
a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a coequal dept of the govt, is neutralized in this
case by the fact that the Senate Pres. declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by
the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated,
w/c it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentification. It is the approval by Congress and not the signatures
of the presiding officers that is essential.
2. Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof
by the Senate Pres., granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all,
but would not affect the validity of the statute. xxx This arguments begs the question. It would limit the court's
inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the
statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine w/n the bill had been
duly enacted? In such a case, the entry in the journal should be consulted. RAM.
Marshall Field & Co. v Clark, 143 US 649 (1891)
It is not competent for the appellant to show from the Journals that the enrolled bill contained a section that
does not appear in the enrolled Act in the custody of the State Department.
F: In accordance w/ the Tariff Act of Oct. 1, 1890, duties were assessed and collected on woollen dress goods,
woollen wearing apparel, and silk embroideries imported by Field & Co.; on silk and cotton laces imported by Sutton &
Co.; and on colored cotton cloths imported by Sternbach & Co. The importers severally protested against the assessment
upon the ground that the Act was not a law of the US. It was contended, among others, that the Tariff Act was a nullity
bec. "it is shown by congressional records of proceedings, reports of committees of conference, and other papers printed by
authority of Congress, and having reference to House Bill 9416, that a section of the bill as it finally passed, was not in the
bill authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the respective houses of Congress, and approved by the
Pres."
HELD: The signing by the House Speaker and by the Senate Pres. of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by
the two Houses that such bill is the one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the 2 houses, through
their presiding officers, to the Pres. that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the
legislative branch of the govt, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that
all bills w/c pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when the bill thus attested is signed by the Pres. and
deposited in the archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. RAM.
Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969.)
F: The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision (Sec. 10 of the Police Act of 1966), as
amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on 3rd reading, and that when the bill
emerged from the conference committee, the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has
served as chief of police w/ exemplary record." In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic
copies of the different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the various changes made. It is unmistakable that the phrase
"who has served the police dept of a city or," was still part of the provision, but according to the petitioner the House bill
division deleted the entire provision and substituted what is now Sec. 10 of the Act w/c did not carry such phrase.
It would thus appear that the omission of the phrase "who has served the police dept of a city of", was made not at
any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the
proofreading thereof; that the change was not made by Congress but only by an employee thereof xxx.
HELD: The petitioner wholly misconceives the function of the judiciary under our system of govt. [T]he

enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the Pres. of the Phils. shows that sec. 10 is exactly as it is
in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. We cannot go behind the enrolled
Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of Govt demands that we act upon
the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective
departments. Otherwise, we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine
what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, w/ consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process. The investigation w/c the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in
Congress.
[W]e are not to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To
be sure, there are certain matters w/c the Const. expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house.
xxx [W]ith respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy. RAM.
(5) Congressional Record
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (4) xxx
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
UPDATED 1/6/96
RAM
f. Sessions
(1) Regular sessions
Art. VI, Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number
of days as it may determine, until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. xxx
Sec. 16(5) Neither house during the session of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other
house, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be
sitting.
Cruz: "[P]lace" as here used refers not to the building but to the political unit where the two Houses may be
sitting.
(2) Special sessions
Art. VI, Sec. 15. xxx The President may call a special session at any time.
Special sessions are held in the following instances:
a) When the President calls for a special session at any time (Art. VI, Sec. 15)
b) To call a special election due to a vacancy in the offices of President and VicePresident (Art. VII,
Sec. 10) in w/c Congress shall convene at 10 a.m. of the third day after the vacancy, without need of a call.
c) To decide on the disability of the President because the Cabinet (majority) has "disputed" his
assertion that he is able to dispose his duties and powers. (This takes place not when the Cabinet first sends a
written declaration about the inability of the President, but after the President has disputed this initial
declaration.) (Art. VII, Sec. 11.)
Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within 48 hours, without need of call.
d) To revoke or extend the Presidential Proclamation of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus (Art. VII, Sec. 18).
Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene,
without need of a call.
In the last three cases, Congress convenes without need of a call. These are exceptions to the general
rule in the 1st case that when Congress is not in session, it can only meet in special session call by the President.
(3) Joint session
When both houses meet jointly, they generally vote separately. The reason is obvious: there are only 24
senators, while there are 250 representatives. It would be bad policy to give one vote to a Senator, who was
elected "at large", and the same weight of vote to a representative, who is either elected only by one legislative
district or a partylist.
Joint session and separate voting take place in the following instances:
(a) Voting Separately
a) When Congress, while acting as the canvasser of votes for the President and VicePresident, has to
break the tie between two or more candidates for either position having an equal and the highest number of votes
(Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 5).
b) When it decides (by 2/3 vote) on the question of the President's inability to discharge the powers and
duties of his office (Art. VII, Sec. 11, par. 4).
c) Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the VP, when it confirms the nomination of a VP by the
President from among the members of Congress; such person shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the members of both Houses, voting separately (Art. VII, Sec. 9).
d) When it declares (by 2/3 vote) the existence of a state of war [Art. VI, Sec, 23(1)].
e) When it proposes to amend the Constitution (3/4 vote of the members) [Art. XVII, Sec. 1(1)].
(b) Voting Jointly
But there is one exceptional instance when the two houses meet and vote jointly: When, there has been a
proclamation of Martial law or a suspension of the writ by the President, and Congress has to decide whether to
revoke or to extend such proclamation or suspension (majority vote of all members, voting jointly) (VII, Sec.
18).
VV: There is an illogical inconsistency here. To declare a state of war, the vote is taken separately. But
to decide on an internal disorder (which is short of war) which spurred the proclamation of Martial Law or
suspension of the writ, the vote is taken jointly. If the voting is made "joint" due to the emergency character of
the situation brought about by the invasion or rebellion, there is no reason why it should not be so to declare the
existence of war (which among others, empowers the President to extend the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff),
the danger to national security and the emergency nature being the same, if not graver.
5. Electoral Tribunals
Art. VI, Secs. 17 and 19
Art. VI, Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the partylist represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Id., Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the
election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such
powers and functions as herein conferred upon it.
a. Composition
The Senate and the House shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, to be composed of 9 members, 3 shall
be justices of the SC to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining 6 shall be members of the
respective houses chose on the basis of "proportional representation" from the political parties, and the parties
or organizations registered under the partylist system. The senior justice shall be the Chairman.
The use of proportional representation to fill up the 6 slots reserved for members of the particular house
is different from the rule under the 1935 Constitution, which reserved 3 seats for the majority party and another
3 seats for the minority party. In Tanada v Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957), the SC ruled that the slot reserved for
the minority party should not be filled up by the majority party, even if there was only one member from the
minority party (in the person of Tanada). For to fill it up would offset the balance of the tribunal, and this
would defeat its neutrality when acting as the sole judge of all election contests. This could not be done under
the present setup of the lower house because of the partylist system, which makes a fixed representation
impossible. On the other hand, by making the composition proportional, the very nature of the Electoral Tribu
nal as a neutral judge of election contests has been destroyed. In the Senate, for instance, if only one senator
comes from the minority party, there is no way that he would be represented in the tribunal. At least, 2 senators
are required of the 24 members of the Senate in order to have one representative in the tribunal. And even if
this single representative vote together with the 3 justices, there is no way for them outvote the 5 from the
majority party. The case then is one of a majority preserving its advantage. Under the system in the 1935
Constitution, so long as there is one minority senator, there is always a clause that he could outvote the majority,
and that is when the 3 justices vote with him.
In Abbas vs Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651, the petitioners who were protestants in a contest
before the respondent body, sought the disqualification of all the legislative members thereof on the ground that
they were among the protestees in the said contest, along with the other majority members of the Senate. (The
original opposition member, Senator Estrada, later joined the majority and was replaced by Senator Enrile, who
voluntarily inhibited himself.) In dismissing the petition, the SC said:
It seems clear that in providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and
members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly
share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. Said intent is more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices is 2 to 1
an unmistakable indication that the legislative and judicial components cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests.
Where a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by
any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge is shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Senators.
The overriding consideration should be that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty
which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest interest of the people.
It should be noted that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of
an election contest that would involve all 24 Senatorselect, some of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon.
b. Nature of Function
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Though its
composition is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature, it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the legislature, is intended to be complete and unimpaired. (Angara vs Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil 134)
Request of Justices Melencio Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano to be relieved as members of the HRET (Res. March
19,1991)
This resolution should be read in connection with Bondoc vs Pineda, which is discussed under
Independence of the Electoral Tribunals.
In said request, the three justices asked to be relieved from membership in the HRET. According to
them, political factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the case, were blocking the accomplishment
of their constitutionally mandated task. They therefore suggested that there should be a provision in the
Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest
themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as
they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
The SC resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. According to the court, in view
of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies should be
guided only be purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation
of the Constitution, the memberslegislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal
no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial judges. To further bolster the
independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered coextensive
with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation,
permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
Status
In Angara v Electoral Commission, supra, the SC held that the then Electoral Commission was an

independent body, although attached to Congress,
In Suares v Chief Accountant, the Commission on Audit, (then under the 1935 Constitution) as adjunct
of Congress, was ruled to be an independent body, although attached to Congress, and so the salary of its staffers
need not be the same as those of the Senate.
Organization (Art. VI, Sec. 19)
The Electoral Tribunal shall be constituted within 30 days after the 2 houses shall have been organized
with the election of the President and the Speaker.
Functions (id., Sec. 17)
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the (i) election, (ii) returns, and (iii) qualifications of their respective
members.
Under Vera v Avelino, supra, the house may conduct "exclusion proceedings," and by a vote of the

majority deny admission to a memberelect pending the resolution of complaints concerning his election.
Even if the Constitution vests in the Electoral Tribunal the power to decide the election, returns and
qualifications of memberelect, there may be no electoral contest, and so no occasion for the Electoral Tribunal
to exercise its jurisdiction. If, for instance, S is the only candidate and he suffers from a disqualification, e.g.,
citizenship, there would be no election contest since there would be no protestant, and so the jurisdiction of the
tribunal could not be invoked. In this case, the house could not be denied the power to pass on this member
elect's qualifications.
The opposite is an "expulsion proceeding" where a sitting member is ousted for disorderly behavior by a
vote of 2/3 pf all the members of the particular house.
c. Independence of the Electoral Tribunals
Although the Electoral Tribunals are predominantly legislative in membership and the provision creating
them is found in Article VI on the Legislative Department, it is not correct to say that they are mere adjuncts of
the Congress of the Philippines. In fact, in the discharge of their constitutional duties, they are independent of
the legislature, and also of the other departments for that matter.
In the case Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, the question raised was whether the House of
Representatives could, at the request of the dominant political party therein, change its representative in the
HRET, presumably to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the Tribunal. While acknowledg
ing the independence of the Tribunal as the "sole judge" of election contests involving the members of the House
of Representatives, the SC assumed jurisdiction, precisely to protect that independence. The SC held that the
independence of the HRET would become a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives of
the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
component of the HRET, to serve the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the NP's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of
the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest between Bondoc and
Pineda. To sanction such interference by the House of Representative in the work of the HRET would reduce
the Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power which the three SC justices and the lone
minority member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the
threshold of the Tribunal.
As judges, the members of the HRET must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they
belong.
Bondoc v. Pineda ( 201 SCRA 792, Sept. 1991)
F: Pineda (LDP) and Bondoc (NP) both ran as congressional reps for the 4th district of Pampanga. Pineda won but
Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Reps Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are
SC justices, and the remaining 6 are members of the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties & the parties or organizations registered under the partylist system represented therein. The HRET
decided in favor of Bondoc. Cong. Camasura, an LDP, voted in favor of Bondoc. Before Bondoc could be proclaimed, the
LDP expelled Camasura as member of the party. The 3 justices who also voted for Bondoc asked to be relieved from their
assignment in the HRET because the withdrawal of Camasura as HRET rep of LDP in effect was a way of aborting the
proclamation of Bondoc (NP). [Request of Justices Melencio Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano to be relieved as members of the
HRET (Res. March 19,1991)]
ISSUES: 1. May the House of Reps at the request of the dominant political party therein, change the
party's representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an
election contest pending therein?
2. May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?
HELD: (as to Issue #1):
1. No. The use of the word "SOLE" in both Sec. 17 of Art. VI of the 1987 Consti & Sec. 11 of Art. VI of
the 1935 Consti underscores the EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction of the HRET as judge of contests relating to the
ELECTION, RETURNS & QUALIFICATIONS of the members of the House (Robles v. HRET, GR
88647,1990). The tribunal was created to function as a NONPARTISAN court although 2/3 of its members are
politicians. It is a NONPOLITICAL body in a sea of politicians x x x. To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdic
tion, the HRET must be INDEPENDENT. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is
not shared by it with the Legislature nor with the courts.
2. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be NONPARTISAN. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality, & independence even independence from the political party
to which they belong. Hence, DISLOYALTY TO PARTY & BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE are NOT
VALID grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Cong. Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination &
appreciation of the ballots & the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the house committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Camasura is null
& void.
As to issue #2: Yes. The power & duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of the
executive & legislative branches of the Govt., does not mean that the courts are superior to the President & the
legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk the "irksome task" of inquiring into the
constitutionality & legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the
courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is "a plain exercise of
the judicial power, that power to hear and dispose of a case or controversu properly brogue before the court, to
the determination of which must be brought the test & measure of the law (Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil 192).
Adapted.
d. Powers
In the earlier case of Angara vs Electoral Commission (63 Phil 139), it was held that the respondent

body had the exclusive right to prescribe its own rules of procedure, as against those earlier adopted by the
legislature itself, in connection with the election contests under its jurisdiction. This ruling was recently
affirmed by the SC in Lazatin vs House Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391. The SC held that:
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to
matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its
rule making power necessarily flows from the general power granted to it by the Constitution. This is the import
of the case Angara vs Electoral Commission. In such case, the SC held that the creation of the Electoral
Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a general power is conferred, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
e. Judicial Review of decisions of Electoral Tribunals
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (199 SCRA 692, July, 1991)
F: Co, Balinquit & Ong ran for representative of the 2nd legislative district of Northern Samar in the May 11, 1987
elections. Ong won but pets (Co & Balanquit) protested Ong's election on the ground of noncitizenship. The HRET found
for Ong.
HELD: 1. Judgments of electoral tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only in the exercise of the Court's
socalled extraordinary jurisdiction, x x x upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or
upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.
2. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, the Court cannot exercise its corrective power. Adapted.
6. Commission on Appointments
Art. VI, Sec. 1819
Art. VI, Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the partylist system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority votes of all the Members.
Id., Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the
election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such
powers and functions as herein conferred upon it.
Composition by proportional representation has always been the rule even under the 1935 Constitution.
And rightly so. For unlike the Electoral Tribunal which performs the essentially neutral function of
adjudication, the Commission on Appointments performs the essentially political function of appointment. The
distribution of political parties in the two Houses must thus be reflected proportionately in the Commission.
Since membership in the Commission on Appointments is based on party affiliation, then a defection
from one party to another changes the proportion in the respective houses (which) is a valid ground for the
reorganization of the commission.
However, a mere temporary alliance, an agreement between and among members coming from different
parties to act in a concerted manner only on some issues, but without a change in party affiliation, does not
justify a call to reorganize the commission on the ground that there is no longer proportional representation. So
the SC ruled in Cunanan v Tan, 115 Phil 7 (1962).
In Daza vs Singson, 180 SCRA 496, the petitioner questioned his replacement in the Commission on

Appointments, insisting that his designation thereto as a representative of the Liberal Party was permanent and
could not be withdrawn. For his part, the respondent contended that he could be validly be named in the
petitioner's place in view of the political realignment in the House following the reorganization of the LDP to
which he belonged. Both invoked the earlier Cunanan vs Tan case, where the SC had held that the political
affiliations in the two Houses of Congress should be reflected in their respective representations in the
Commission of Appointments. The petitioner claimed that the formation of the LDP was merely a temporary
development whereas the respondent claimed that it had permanently altered the political composition of the
House. Ruling in favor of the respondent, the SC declared that petitioner's argument is based on the non
registration of the LDP, which he claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the
questioned reorganization. However, the COMELEC then granted the petition of the LDP for registration as a
political party. Petitioner then claims that registration is not sufficient and that the political party must pass the
test of time. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats will not be entitled to
representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet
aged. If such argument is to be followed, only the Liberal Party shall pass such test.
The House of Representatives therefore has the authority to change its representation in the Commission
of Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances
or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts
of allegiance from one political party to another.
Coseteng vs Mitra (187 SCRA 377)
F: During the 1987 Congressional elections, Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the KAIBA party. Of the
12 elected to the Commission on Appointments, Roque Ablan of the KBL, represented the Coalesced Minority. When the
LDP was organized a year later, the House Committees including the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments had to be reorganized. Coseteng requested Mitra that she be appointed a member of the CA as a
representative of KAIBA. Ablan was however retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.
Coseteng filed a petition to declare null and void the appointment of the members of the CA on the theory that
their election to the CA violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
HELD : The petition should be dismissed not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but
because the revision of the House representation in the CA is based on proportional representation of the
political parties therein.
The issue is justiciable. The legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the CA, is justiciable.
Even if it were a political question, such would still come within judicial review on the issue of whether there
was grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The composition was based on proportional representation of the political parties therein. The other
minority parties are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member
represents only .4% of the House, thus she is not entitled to one of the 12 seats. The other representatives to the
CA were duly elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Art. VI, Sec. 18. The validity of their
election to the CA eleven from the Coalesced Majority and one from the Coalesced Minority is unassailable.
Adapted.
Guingona vs Gonzales (214 SCRA 789)
F: As a result of the 1992 Senatorial elections, the LDP was entitled to 7.5 seats in the CA, the NPC to 2.5, the
LAKASNUCD to 1.5 and the LPPDPLABAN to .5. The problem arose as to what to with the 1/2 to which each of the
parties is entitled. The LDP majority converted a fractional halfmembership to a whole membership (7.5 + .5) to be able
to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party's fractional representation in the CA was reduced. This is clearly a
violation of Sec. 18, Art. VI because it is no longer based on proportional representation of the political parties.
Senator Tanada claimed that he has a right to be elected as member of the CA because of the physical
impossibility of dividing a person (need to round off .5 to one senator) and because as the sole representative of his party,
his party is entitled to representation.
HELD: The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave
any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation.
No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. Section 18 also assures representation in the
CA of any political party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators
so elected enables it to put a representative in the CA. Therefore, in the Senate, a political party must at least
have 2 duly elected senators for every seat in the CA.
The SC does not agree that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the CA. What the Constitution
requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. The Constitution does not require the
election and presence of 12 senators and 12 members of the House in order that the Commission may function.
The election of Senator Romulo and Tanada as members of the CA was clearly a violation of Art. VI,
Sec. 18. Adapted.
Function (Art. VII, Sec. 16)
The Commission shall confirm or approve nominations made by the President of certain public officers
named by the Constitution or by law:
1. heads of the executive departments
2. ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls
3. officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain
4. other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution
a. Chairman and members of 3 Constitutional Commissions
b. regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council
c. members of the Regional Consultative council
Sessions and Procedure (Secs. 18 & 19)
The Commission on Appointments shall meet to discharge its powers and functions only while the

Congress is in session. The meeting may be called by (a) the Chairman, or (b) a majority of all its members.
The Chairman of the Commission does not vote, except to break a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
rules by a majority vote of all its members.
Regular appointment
Regular appointment takes place when the President appoints an officer whose appoinment requires
confirmation by the Commission, while Congress is in session. The officer so appointed cannot assume office
at once. The President must first nominate him to the Commission. Then, the Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress from their submission (VI, 18). Failure to
act within the period is tantamount to disapproval of the nomination, since the Constitution requires positive
action by the Commission (VV). If the Congress or the Commission itself adjourns without taking any action
on the nomination, again it is deemed disapproved (or bypassed). If the Commission approves the nomination,
the Office of the President makes an "issuance of commission." Only then can the appointee assume office.
Recess appointment
On the other hand, recess appointment takes when Congress is not in session. (This is also known as
adinterim appointment, but the latter term is equivocal because it can be used in 2 senses: (i) midnight
appointment, which happens when the President makes an appointment before his term expires, whether or not
this is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and (ii) recess appointment, which happens when the
President makes appointment while Congress is in recess, whether or not his term is about to expire.) Unlike
regular appointment, the adinterim appointment made by the President is complete in itself, and thus effective
at once, even without confirmation. But this appointment has only temporary effect. When Congress convenes,
the Commission would have to act on the ad interim appointment by confirming it (in which case the
appointment becomes permanent) or disapproving it by means of a positive failure to act on the appointment (in
which case the appointment is immediately terminated).
According to the Constitution, the President shall have the power to make appointment during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments (which can only be done when Congress is in session (Art. VI,
Sec. 19) or until the next adjournment of the Congress (if the Commission fails to act earlier). (Art. VII, Sec. 16,
par. 2).
7. Legislative Power and Process of Congress
a. General plenary powers
Art. VI, Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
b. Limitations on the Legislative Power

(1) Substantive limitations
(a) Express substantive limitations
1) The Bill of Rights
Art. III. Bill of Rights.
The freedom of individuals are addressed as limitations to the power of Congress to legislate. Thus, the
provisions of the Bill of Rights begin with the phrase "No law shall be passed".
2) Appropriation Laws
Art. VI, Sec. 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an

appropriation made by law.
xxx
Art. VI, Sec. 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the

President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner
of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriations therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year
shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.
General Principle
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. [Art.
VI, Sec. 29(1)].
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments (Sec. 24). (The reason is that the House is the more popular chamber of Congress.)
General Appropriation
The President shall submit to Congress, within 30 days from the opening of its regular session, as the
basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of (a) expenditures, and (b) sources of financing, including
receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (Art. VII, Sec. 22).
The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. [Art. VI, Sec.
25(1), 2nd sentence].
The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of
the Government as specified in the budget.
No provision or enactment shall be embrace in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates. [Art. VI, Sec. 25(2)]
The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
If, by the end of the fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for
the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted,
and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. [Art. VI, Sec.
25(7)]
Special Appropriation
A special appropriations bill shall (a) specify the purpose for which it is intended, and (b) supported by
funds, actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal therein. [Art. VI, Sec. 25(4)]
(A special appropriations bill may be proposed to supply a lack or meet a new need, like a special
election. In the case of a special law to elect the President and VicePresident, however, the requirements of the
sections are specifically exempted by the Constitution in Art. VII, Sec. 10.)
Transfer of funds already appropriated
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations.
However, the President, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commission may, by law, be authorized to "augment" any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices, from "savings" in other items of their respective
appropriations. [Art. VI, Sec. 25(5)]
Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes, to
be supported by appropriate vouchers, and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. [Art. VI, Sec.
25(6)]
In Demetria v Alba, supra, it was held that Sec. 44 of the Budget Act of 1977 (BP 1177) granting the
President the blanket authority to transfer funds from one department to another, with or without savings, is
unconstitutional.
Prohibited appropriation to enforce the Separation of Church and State
No public money or property shall be appropriated (applied, paid, or employed), directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any religion (sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or any system of
religion) or of any priest (preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or religious dignitary).
Exception: When such priest, et. al., is assigned to (a) the AFP; (b) any penal institution; (c) any

government orphanage; or (d) any leprosarium. [Art. VI, Sec. 29(2)]
Appropriations laws (the spending powers of Congress (id., Sec. 25)) are tied up with Tax laws (the
power to raise revenues (id., Sec. 28)). They are two indispensable sides of a coin. They are tied up by the
principle that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law
(id., Sec. 29(1)).
3) Tax laws
Id., Sec. 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
Cruz: Uniformity in taxation means that persons or things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the same
rate. It is distinguished from equality in taxation in that the latter requires the tax imposed to be determined on
the basis of the value of the property. The present Consti. adds that the rule of taxation shall also be equitable,
w/c means that the tax burden must be imposed according to the taxpayer's capacity to pay.
Id., Sec. 28 (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,
nonprofit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.
Art. XIV, Sec. 4 (3) All revenues and assets of nonstock, nonprofit educational institutions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon
the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of
in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled
to such exemptions subject to the limitations provided by law including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled
or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
4) Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Art. VI, Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Cruz: The purpose is to prevent further additions to the present tremendous case load of the SC w/c includes the
baclog of the past 2 decades.
5) Title of royalty
Art. VI, Sec. 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
Cruz: The purpose of this prohibition is to preserve the republican and democratic nature of our society by
prohibiting the creation of privileged classes w/ special perquisites not available to the rest of the citizenry.
(b) Implied substantive limitations
(i) Nondelegation of legislative powers
As a general rule, legislative powers cannot be delegated, what can be delegated is the execution of the
laws under acceptable standards limiting discretion of the executive. The Constitution, however, provides
certain specific exemptions.
A. Delegation to the President
1) Emergency powers:
Art. VI, Sec. 23. xxx
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period, and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of
the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof..
2) Certain taxing powers [Art. VI, Sec. 28(2)] (see Delegation of Tax Powers)
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the Government.
B. Delegation to Local Governments
Tax powers:
Art. X, Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569
At issue here was the validity of Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code empowering the President
of the Philippines to create, merge, divide, abolish or otherwise alter the boundaries of municipal corporations.
Pelaez contended that it was an invalid delegation of legislative power. The govt. argued that it was not,
invoking the earlier case of Cardona vs Binangonan, 36 Phil 547, where the power of the governorgeneral to
transfer territory from one municipality to another was sustained. The SC upheld Pelaez. It ruled that the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test must be applied together or concurrently. The SC declared that
the Cardona case involved not the creation of a new municipality but merely the transfer of territory from one
municipality to another. The power to fix such boundaries of existing municipalities may partake of an adminis
trative nature but the creation of municipal corporations is strictly legislative in nature.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Govt. the power to fill details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) to fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a
statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law, and without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.
Sec. 68 of the RAC does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to
fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects of undue delegation.
Adapted.
C. Delegation to the People
Initiative and referendum powers:
Art. VI, Sec. 32. The Congress, shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws, or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof, passed by the Congress or local legislative body, after the
registration of a petition therefore, signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters with every legislative district represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
thereof.
(ii) Prohibition against passage of irrepealable laws
It is axiomatic that all laws, even the Constitution itself, may be repealed or amended. No one can bind
future generations to a law.
(2) Procedural Limits
Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1) Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet
a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Sec. 27 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, twothirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be considered, and if approved by twothirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a
law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto
of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise,
it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
c. Question Hour
Art. VI, Sec. 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and
be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days
before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may
cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
The heads of department shall provide, appear before, and be heard, by any house, on any matter
pertaining to their departments:
(i) upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President; or
(ii) upon request of either house, as the rules of that house shall provide.
(This is a carryover of the 1973 Constitution, a feature of a parliamentary system.)
Written questions shall be submitted to the presiding officer of the house at least 3 days before the
scheduled appearance. The purpose is to enable the cabinet member to prepare.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
It is submitted that a member of the Cabinet may not refuse to appear before the house. If he refuses a
summons, he can be cited for contempt. If the President forbids his appearance, still he must appear if asked by
Congress. Under 1935, it was an excuse for the President to certify that the interest of public security justifies
the refusal; under 1987, the remedy is an executive session not refusal to appear.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires, and the President so states in writing,
the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. (It must be noted then that the President cannot disallow
the appearance but can only ask for a closed door session).
d. Legislative Investigations
Art. VI, Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid or legislation in accordance with its duly published rules or procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Each house or any of its committees may conduct "inquiries in aid of legislation" according to its duly
published rules of procedures.
To enforce this right, the SC upheld the power of Congress to hold in contempt a person required to
appear before Congress or its committee and answer questions relevant to a matter of legislative interest in the
Arnault cases.
In Arnault v Nazareno. 87 Phil 29 (1950). Arnault was cited for contempt for persistently refusing, after
taking the stand, to reveal the name of the person to whom gave the P440,000. In connection with the legislative
investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong Real Estates whereby a certain Bert was able to sell the land to
the government and realized P1.5 million. The second case of Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 350 (1955) arose
when he persisted in not giving information, this time about an affidavit which purportedly gave the details sur
rounding the acquisitions of the estates by Bert and the supposed circumstances under which he gave the amount
to a Jess Santos. The Court in both cases, upheld the authority of the Senate to cite him in contempt, and thus
dismissed the habeas corpus petitions.
When so held in contempt, since the Senate is a continuing body, the contempt seems to be effective
even beyond the session during which the contempt was made, held the SC in Arnault, overruling the case of
Lopez v de los Reyes, 55 Phil 170 (1930), where the Court held that the contempt lasted only for the session and
could not be revived in the next session by a mere reapproval of the previous contempt.
However, the rights of the persons (a) appearing in, or (b) affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Notable among these rights is the right against "self incrimination". Usually, immunity is granted to
those who are compelled to appear.
Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee 203 SCRA 767
In this case, the petitioners sought to restrain the respondent from investigating their participation in the
alleged misuse of govt. funds and the illicit acquisition of properties being claimed by the PCGG for the
Republic of the Philippines. The SC granted the petition, holding that the petitioners are impleaded as
defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of
contemplated inquiry before the respondent Committee, and that no legislation was apparently being
contemplated in connection with the said investigation.
However, the decision failed to consider that the proceeding before the Sandiganbayan was criminal in
nature and that the purpose of the legislative investigation was to ascertain the disposition of funds and
properties claimed to be public in nature. Its findings on this matter could be the subject of legislation although
it may not have been expressly stated that such was the purpose of the inquiry. As observed in the earlier case of
Arnault vs Nazareno, 87 Phil 29, the SC is bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it was capable of being so construed, and it has no right to assume that the contrary was
intended.
Mendoza, The Use of Legislative Purpose as a Limitation on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 46 PHIL
L.J. 707 (1971)
A determination that the inquiry is for a "legislative purpose" is not the end, but only the beginning, of
the complexity.
xxx
The idea that Congress has a right to be fully informed in order that it may legislate wisely underlies the
exercise of the power to investigate, w/ coercive power to compel disclosure. At the same time concern for the
fact that unless limited to a "legislative purpose" the power to investigate may be used to harass individuals and
invade fundamental rights very early led the US SC to insist on a showing that investigations be "in aid of
legislation."
xxx
THE ALTERNATIVE USE OF THE DOCTRINE
Through the years, the doctrine of legislative purpose, first announced in Kilbourn vs.Thomposon, 103
US 168 (1880), has steadily declined in value as a limitation on the congressional power of investigation, until
today it is used only as a counterweight to individual rights. xxx
The use of the doctrine of legislative purpose is subject to the following observations:
First. To say that congressional inquiries may only be justified in terms of the need for legislation is to
assume two things: (a) that the powers of govt can be neatly divided into legislative, judicial and executive, and
(b) that the function of Congress is confined to strictly lawmaking. Only a doctrinaire view of the principle of
separation of powers can support the first. The 2nd assumption is based on an unreality. xxx
Second. [T]he doctrine of legislative purpose is difficult of enforcement. xxx It is said that
investigations can only be undertaken in aid of legislation. But how is the Court to prove otherwise if Congress
declares that its purpose is legislation? The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of Congress.
And legislative investigation need not result in legislation. xxx
[W]hile the Court may try to enforce the legislative purpose doctrine by requiring Congress to state the
aims and purposes of authorized investigations, there is nothing it can do if Congress refuses to comply w/ its
demand. On what ground can the Court strike down vague authorizing resolutions? On the principle of
separation of powers?
Fourth. Even given the fact that an investigation is for a legislative purpose, the task of the Court is not
at an end. xxx The legislative purpose served by the inquiry will still have to be weighed against the right of the
witness. Legislative purpose serves not as a limitation on the power of investigation but rather as a
counterweight to the interest in civil liberties.
Fifth. xxx To presume that the purpose is lawmaking where the purpose is different is to place an

undue weight on one side of the scale. Against the presumption of legislative purpose, individual rights would
indeed appear to be mere paper weights. xxx
xxx By recognizing exposure as a normal purpose of investigations, while at the same time stressing its
potential danger to individual rights, the Court can begin to act as a real balancer of interests, striking down
those inquiries which needlessly destroy constitutional rights and upholding those in w/c exposure of some
danger or misdeeds is essential to society.
xxx
[T]he use of "legislative purpose as a short hand term for what Congress might undertake tends to lend a
conclusory meaning when what is involved is a process of reaching judgment. xxx
Notes on Legislative Inquiries by RAM :
The power of Congress to conduct investigations exists for the primary purpose of enabling it to
discharge its legislative functions wisely and effectively to guide and aid Congress in the enactment of laws,
their amendments and as well as their repeal.1 In the seminal case of Arnault vs. Nazareno 2, the Supreme Court
said:
The power of inquiry with power to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess requisite information which is
not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do posses it. xxx.
Legislative investigations are carried out in order to ascertain (a) what new legislation is
needed (b) the existing law to be repealed and (c) whether a new legislation is effectively
accomplishing its purpose with a view of amending it.3 But in addition to obtaining facts that
may be useful in enacting laws, the power of inquiry may be utilized by Congress for the scrutiny
of executive action as well as the formation of public opinion. 4 Congressional investigations have
the salutary effect of keeping the public informed of what is happening in their government since
congressional investigations are given wide publicity by media.5
Congressional investigative function may be justified under certain provisions of the
Constitution which are judicial and executive in nature.6 In the exercise of the power to confirm
appointments7, information concerning the qualifications of the appointee may be investigated.
The Senate may conduct an investigation into all matters pertinent to the possible ratification of a
treaty.8 The power to inquire is also implied in the authority to impeach officials. 9 Investigatory
power is also available when Congress is considering constitutional amendments 10, or the
declaration of the existence of a state of war.11
The general power of Congress in conducting investigations may be roughly divided into
two parts, one being its inquisitorial power and the other its punitive power.12 The inquisitorial
powers of Congress, on the one hand, consists of its authority to summon witnesses, to extract
testimony from them, and compel the production of papers, documents and other information.13
The punitive power of the Legislature, on the other hand, consists of its authority to deal
directly, by way of contempt proceedings, with acts which inherently obstruct or prevent the
1Joaquin R. Roces, The Power of Congressional Investigations, UE Law Journal, vol. I, nos. 14, 19581959 at page 262
263.
287 Phil 29, 45 (1950).
3Juan F. Rivera, The Congress of the Philippines, pp. 5758.
4Tanada and Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, pp. 771771.
5op cit., loc cit.
6Juan F. Rivera, The Congress of the Philippines, p. 57.
7Art. VII, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution
8Art. VII, Sec. 21, ibid.
9Art. XI, Sec. 3, ibid.
10Art. XII, ibid
11Art. VI, Sec. 23, ibid.
12supra note no. 2 at p. 264265.
13ibid, citing Willoughby, On the Consitution of the United States, Vol. I, sec. 344.
discharge of its legislative duties.1 As early as the case of Lopez v. de los Reyes,2 the Supreme
Court has ruled that the power to punish for contempt is essential to permit the Legislature to
perform its duties without impediment. This pronouncement has been reaffirmed in the 1950
case of Arnault v. Nazareno.3 In that case, the Supreme Court has taken note of the fact that
experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and that
volunteered information are often unreliable. The courts, thus, concluded that some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
The correlative power to punish a prevaricating witness for contempt rests on the right of
the legislature to selfpreservation and is founded on "the right to prevent acts which, in and of
themselves, inherently obstruct or prevent the discharge of legislative duties, or refusal to do that
which there is an inherent legislative power to compel in order that legislative functions may be
performed."4 This punitive power, however, terminates when the legislative body ceases to exist
upon its final adjournment.5 Thus, unlike the Senate which is a continuing body, the term of
whose members expire at different times,6 the life of the House of Representatives terminates
upon its final adjournment.7
TRACING THE ROOTS
The practice of legislative inquiries dates back to the 1620s when Pilgrims landed in
America. Before that event, British Parliament had experimented with a factfinding committee
armed with the power to compel attendance of persons and the production of documents with the
power to punish contumacious witnesses. This experiment on legislative inquest eventually
developed as a necessary part of the legislative process with the establishment of the supremacy
of Parliament in 1688. By 1689, a number of parliamentary committees of investigation were in
operation.8
The US Congress first exercised this power in March of 1792. The former Congress had
approved a resolution creating a committee to investigate the causes of failure of the expedition
under Major General St. Clair against the Indians at Fort Wayne, giving this committee the power
to call for papers and records need in the investigation. When the committee was called to
submit the necessary papers relative to the campaign, President George Washington ordered his
cabinet to deliver only those papers, the examination of which would promote public interest, and
to refuse the delivery of such papers when disclosure would injure public interest. Nonetheless,
the determination of what would enhance public interest was still a Presidential prerogative. In
1796, President Washington again refused the request of the House for the delivery of copy of
1ibid, at p. 267
255 Phil 170.
3 supra note 6.
4supra note 2 at p. 267 citing Marshall v. Gordon, 243 US 521.
5Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, vol. II, p. 134.
6Art. XVII, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution.
7supra note 18.
8supra note 7 at p. 56 citing Keele, Harold M. Notes on Congressional Investigations, American Bar Association Journal,
vol. 40 no. 2, p. 154, February 1954.
instruction of the US Minister who negotiated a treaty with Great Britain invoking the doctrine of
separation of powers. Subsequently, United States Presidents from Jefferson to Truman
effectively wielded this doctrine as a shield against inquiries initiated by Congress.1
The first Philippine case on the matter of legislative investigations is the case of Arnault
v. Nazareno. In that case, Senate Resolution no. 8 created a special committee to investigate the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates purchase. The Committee called and examined various
witnesses, and among them was Jean Arnault. It sought to inquire into the necessity and
regularity of the payment of a certain Burt of one million five hundred thousand pesos (P 1, 500,
000). Burt, for the downpayment of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) had sometime in 1946
purchased from San Juan de Dios Hospital and from the Philippine Trust Company the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates. The Committee sought to determine who were responsible
for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government. Jean Arnault
refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of one hundred forty
thousand pesos (P140,000.00) as well as to any other related pertinent questions. The Committee
then ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeantatarms and imprisonment in the
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa until discharged by further order of the Senate or by the Special
Committee created by Senate Resolution no. 8. A petition for the release of the petitioner from
his confinement at Muntignlupa was denied by the Supreme Court, thereby upholding the right
of Congress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation.
Philippine courts have held that the congressional power to investigate is coextensive
with legislative power.2 This ruling follows the later decisions handed down by the US Supreme
Court. Note that earlier US jurisprudence has maintained that congressional investigative power
is to be used to implement a "clear and precise legislative purpose."3 Later, US rulings, however,
have expanded the power to "at least as great as the power to legislate."4
LIMITATIONS
Article VI, Sec. 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
In an attempt to protect the rights of witnesses, the Constitution imposes several limitations to the
investigatory power of Congress. First., the investigation must be in aid of legislation. Congress cannot
conduct an investigation merely for the purpose of investigation. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be
related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress.5 Investigation of purely private affairs of
people cannot be made, as Congress cannot legislate on them. However Congress can inquire into private
1supra note 2, at p. 265266 citing History of (US) Congressional Investigations.
2Arnault v. Nazareno, supra
3Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 US 168 (1881).
4supra note no. 2 at p. 60 citing US v. Johnson, 333 US 837.
5Watkins v. US, supra
affairs if they affect matters on which Congress can legislate. 1 Moreover, Congress cannot conduct an
investigation to find out if someone should be prosecuted criminally, or to determine if someone is guilty
or innocent of a crime, or to decide what are the rights of parties to a controversy. Congress is not a law
enforcement agency or a court.2
Unfortunately, however, the determination of what is "in aid of legislation" is not the end but only
the beginning of the complexity.3 If a claim is made by Congress that an investigation is in aid of
legislation, how will the court prove otherwise? More often than not, courts are compelled to take the
statement of "in aid of legislation" at face value and render it conclusive upon themselves.4
It is difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be circumscribed.5
It is not necessary that every question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed legislation.
Materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of inquiry and not by
its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. 6 In determining the propriety of the question
propounded to a witness, thus, the following matters are to be considered7: (1) the definition of the
inquiry found in the authorizing resolution or statute; (2) the opening remarks of the committee chair; (3)
the nature of the proceedings; (4) the question itself; and (5) the response of the committee to a
pertinency objection. In the case of Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,8 the Supreme Court has
held that the contemplated inquiry by the respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation"
because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress. In that case, the petitioners seek
to enjoin the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring them to testify and produce evidence at its
inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin Romualdez to Lopa Group in thirty six (36)
corporations.9 The Court notes the fact that since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not
the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa has violated Section 5 of Republic Act 3019, the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the matter appears more within the province of courts rather than the
legislature.10 In addition, the court notes that for respondent committee to probe and inquire into the
same justiciable controversy, which is already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into
the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that has much earlier set in.11
Secondly, the investigation must be in accordance with duly published rules of procedure of
Congress. These rules of procedure are subject to change or even suspension by Congress at any time
except if it will affect the substantive rights of the witness and other persons involved.12
And thirdly, the Constitution further mandates that the rights of witnesses appearing in or
affected by such inquiries must be respected. Like all other forms of governmental actions, the Bill of
Rights is applicable to congressional investigations. Witnesses at such investigations, hence, cannot be
1Jacinto Jimenez, The Modern Day Spanish Inquisition, Ateneo Law Journal, vol XXXIV p. 71, citing Nelson v. Symaqn,
105 A 2d 756, 764.
2Ibid.
3Vicente V. Mendoza, The Use of Legislative Purpose as a Limitaiton on Congressional Power to Investigate, 46 PLJ 707.
4supra, note 29 at p. 719.
5Arnault v. Nazareno, supra.
6ibid.
7supra note 23 citing Watkins v. US, 354 Us 178, 209214.
8203 SCRA 767.
9Miriam DefensorSantiago, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, p. 141.
10Ibid, p. 783.
11ibid, p. 784.
12supra note 19 at p. 133 citing Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960)
compelled to give evidence against themselves, they cannot be subjected to unreasonable search and
seizure, and their freedoms of speech, press, religion and political belief and association cannot be
abridged.1
The right against selfincrimination applies to any witness in any proceeding, whether civil,
criminal, or investigative, who is being compelled to give testimony that may be used against them in a
subsequent criminal case.2 The privilege against selfincrimination not only extends to answers that will,
in themselves support a conviction but likewise, embrace "those which would furnish a link in the chain
of evidence to prosecute the claimant for a (crime)."3 The privilege, nevertheless, is operative and
available only where the compelled testimony or communication possesses a potential for incrimination.
For potential incrimination to exist, there must be a showing that (1) there is a threat of criminal liability;
(2) that such threat of criminal liability concerns the witness himself; and (3) that such threat is real and
appreciable and not imaginary and unsubstantial.4 In a legislative investigation, a witness cannot claim
his right against selfincrimination in refusing to answer before any question is propounded on him. He
must wait until he is asked an incriminatory question.5
A witness can attempt to avoid answering particular questions by claiming an infringement of his
freedom of speech, or freedom of association, belief, or religion. To be meaningful, freedom of speech
and freedom of association must allow citizens to express ideas, even unpopular ones, and to join
associations, even infamous ones, without fear of ultimate sanction for doing so. To the extent that
testifying before a legislative committee forces one to publicly reveal beliefs and associations when
disclosure can lead to being blacklisted, socially ostracized, or losing one's job, compelling such
testimony infringes upon one's constitutional rights. A legislative investigation may create what is called
a "chilling effect" on the exercise of these rights.6
A witness can remain silent and ultimately avoid possible sanction for a contempt citation if he or
she (1) makes a proper claim to the constitutional protection against selfincrimination, (2) validly alleges
an infringement of freedom of religion, speech, or of the press and association and (3) validly claims
questions asked are not pertinent.7 However, it is apparent that but for a limited and proper claim, none of
these options is free of a substantial risk that the witness may be wrong and have to suffer for the
miscalculations. Indeed, the legislative power of inquiry and the auxiliary power to compel testimony are
limited in theory only, but invariably unrestricted in practice.8
The 1987, as well as in the 1973 Constitution directly conferred the power of investigation upon
congressional committees.9 This is a significant development since under the 1935 Constitution, the
investigatory powers of the committees were conferred by the legislature. There is a need for defining
1supra note 2 at p. 66.
2Manual on Guaranty against Selfincrimination, Perfecto V. Fernandez, UP Law Complex Institute of Human Rights Law
Center, p. 11 citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 US 547, 12 S Ct 195, 35 L Ed 1110.
3Ibid, p. 63 citing Hoffman v. US, 341 US 479, 71 S Ct 816, 95 L Ed 1118.
4Ibid, p. 139 citing Hoffman v. US, supra..
5Jacinto Jimenez, supra note 27 at p. 90 citing In re Petition of Graham, 104 So 2d 16, 18.
6Power to Investigate, the Supreme Court and the Allocation of Consitutional Power, Introductory Essays and Selected
Cases, Otis H. Stephens and Gregory J. Rathjen, p. 146 citing Barenblatt v. US, 360 US 109, 79 S Ct 1081, 27 US Law
Week 4366 (1959).
8Ibid.
9Bernas, supra note 18 at p. 132.
with "sufficient particularity" the jurisdiction and purpose of investigating committees (1) as a way of
insuring the responsible exercise of delegated power and (2) as a basis for determining the relevance of
the questions asked.1 The scope of the powers of the committee must, therefore, be delimited in order to
enable the witness to know whether the subject of investigation is proper, and, ultimately whether the
questions asked are pertinent to the subject of inquiry.2 In delineating this powers, the following
propositions3 have been made: (1) the authority of an investigating committee to act must be determined
from the rule or resolution creating it; (2) a valid legislative purpose as distinct from a purpose merely of
exposure, must be shown; and (3) the witness must be informed as to the pertinency of the particular
question in relation to the legislative purpose.
AVAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Art. VIII Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
The courts can review whether or not the questions propounded to a witness is relevant to
the subject matter of legislative investigation. Whether the alleged immateriality of the
information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention.4
When a claim to the constitutional right against selfincrimination, freedom of speech,
press, religion and association is asserted to bar governmental interrogation, the resolution of the
issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at
stake in the particular circumstances shown.5
It cannot be simply assumed, however, that every congressional investigation is justified
by a public need that overbalances any private rights affected. To do so is to abdicate the
responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that Congress does not
unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech,
press, religion or assembly.6 The legislative purpose served by the inquiry will still have to be
weighed against the right of the witness. Legislative purpose serves best, not as a limitation on
the power of investigation but rather, as a counterweight to the interest in civil liberties.7 To
presume that the purpose is lawmaking when , in fact, it is not is to place an undue weight on one
1supra note 29 at p. 711 citing Watkins v. US, 354 US 178.
2Ibid.
3supra note 2 at p. 66 citing Barenblatt v. US, 79 Sct 1081, 27 US Law Week 4366 (1959).
4supra note 6.
5supra note 44.
6Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committe, 203 SCRA 767, 785.
side of the scale.8 RAM.
Question Hour (Art. VI, Sec. 22) and Legislative Investigation (id., Sec. 21)
a. As to persons who may appear:
22: Only a department head
21: Any person
b. As to who conducts the investigation
22: Entire body
21: Committees
c. As to subjectmatter
22: Matters related to the department only
21: Any matter for the purpose of legislation.
e. Act as Board of Canvassers for presidential and Vice Presidential elections
Art. VII, Sec. 4, pars. 4, et seq
.
Art. VII, Sec. 4. xxx
The returns of every election for President and Vice President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each provinces or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the
Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of election (w/c is the 2nd Tuesday of June), open all the certificates in the presence of
the Senate and House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tally the
certificates of canvass) the votes.
The persons having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number of votes (tie), one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the
vote of a majority of all the members of Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
RA 7166 : An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms
8Ibid, p. 720.
Sec. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and VicePresident:
Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. Congress shall determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass for President and VicePresident as accomplished and
transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate of canvass was executed,
signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or caused to be
transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for
President and VicePresident and their corresponding votes in words and in figures; and (3) there exists no
discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in
words and figures in the same certificate.
When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province, city or district,
appears to be incomplete, the Senate President shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by
personal delivery, the election returns from polling places that were not included in the certificate of canvass and
supporting statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days from
receipt of notice.
When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by precinct bears erasures
or alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect the result
of the election, upon request of the Presidential or VicePresidential candidate concerned or his party, Congress
shall, for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for President and VicePresident, count the
votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
f. Call a special election in case of vacancy in the offices of President and Vice
President
Art. VII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the
vacancy in the offices of the President and VicePresident occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President
and a VicePresident to be held not earlier than fortyfive days nor later than sixty days from the time of
such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be
exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening
of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be
called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
When a vacancy occurs in the offices of the President and VicePresident, more than 18 months before
the date of the next regular presidential election, the Congress shall convene at 10 AM of the 3rd day after the
vacancy, in accordance with its rules, without need of call. The convening of Congress cannot be suspended.
Within 7 days after it convenes, it shall enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and
Vice President, to be held between 45 to 60 days from the day of such call. The holding of the special election
cannot be postponed.
Not later than 30 days after the election, Congress shall again act as Board of Canvassers (see infra),
since Art. VII, Sec. 4 par. a talks of every election for President and VicePresident.
Thus, the timetable is:
Day 0 vacancy occurs
Day 3 Congress convenes without need of call
Day 10 Congress passes the special election law, if it has not passed before this date
Day 55 to 70 election is held
Day 85 to 100 as the case may be canvassing by Congress, if it has not done so earlier.
Under the Constitution then a vacancy is filled by the 100th day from the vacancy at the latest.
The law so passed is exempted from the following:
a) Certification under VI, 26, par. 2. Thus, the three readings can be done all on the same day.
b) Approval by the President (for obvious reasons). The bill automatically becomes a law, then, upon its
approval on 3rd and final reading.
c) Certification by the National Treasurer of the availability of funds, or revenue raising measure under
Art. VI, Sec. 25(4). Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations.
g. Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of
habeas corpus
or declaration of martial

law
Art. VII, Sec. 18. The President shall be the CommanderinChief of all armed forces of the

functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
When the President suspends the privilege of the writ or proclaims martial law (see discussion, infra),
then Congress shall convene within 24 hours form the proclamation or suspension in accordance with its rules,
without need of a call, if it is not in session. The President shall then submit a report in person or in writing to
Congress, within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension.
By a joint majority vote of all the members of both houses in a joint meeting, the Congress has 2
possible courses of action:
1) To revoke (or disapprove) the proclamation or suspension, which revocation cannot be set aside
(vetoed) by the President, or
2) To extend the proclamation after 60 days, for a period to be determined by Congress, if the causes
persist.
It must be noted that the Congress does not approve the proclamation or suspension, but either
disapproves it or extends it, because the proclamation or suspension is valid in itself for 60 days already, and so
does not require the approval of Congress for its effectivity. What it needs is the extension that may be granted
by Congress beyond the 60day period when it expires, which extension need not be for another 60 days only.
h. Approve Presidential Amnesties
Art. VII, Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
The President has the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress.
i. Confirm certain appointments
(1) Art. VII, Sec. 9 (By Congress)
Art. VII, Sec. 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the VicePresident during the term
for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a VicePresident from among the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of
all the Members of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.
(2) Id., Sec. 16 (By the Commission on Appointments)
Art. VII, Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom, he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
The following officers appointed by the President require confirmation by the CA:
a. Heads of departments (VII, 16)
b. Ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls (VII, 16)
c. Officers of the AFP from the rank of colonel and naval captain (VII, 16)
d. Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions (IX, B, C, & D, 1[2])
e. Members of the Judicial and Bar Council (VIII, 8[2])
In Sarmiento vs Mison, 156 SCRA 549, the Commissioner of Customs was held not to be subject to

confirmation, being of the rank of the bureau director, who was purposely deleted from the listing of those
whose appointments had to be approved by the Commission on Appointments. It was the clear and express
intent of the framers of the Constitution to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the CA,
except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in Art. VII, Sec. 16. The power to appoint is already vested
in the President, without need of confirmation by the CA.
Sarmiento vs Mison, 156 SCRA 549
F: Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers, members of the Bar and law professors,
to enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions on the ground that his appointment, w/o
confirmation by the CA, is unconstitutional.
HELD: Art. VII, Sec. 16, as orginally proposed by the Committe on Executive Power of the 1986 Con Com
read:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the
heads of executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
However, on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes were approved in the text of the provision. The first was
to delete the phrase "and bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and
substitute the phrase "and all" w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." The first amendment was
intended to exempt the appointment of bureau directors from the requirement of confirmation on the ground that
this position is low and to require confirmation would subject bureau directors to political influence. On the
other hand, the 2nd amendment was intended to subject to confirmation only those mentioned in the frist
sentence, namely:
The heads of the exec. depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the
Consti, i.e.,
(1) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)]
(2) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Art. IXB, Sec. 1 (2)];
(3) Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC [Art. IXC, Sec. 1 (2)];
(4) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IXD, Sec. 1 (2)];
(5) Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.)
The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to confirmation. These are: (1) all
other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (2) those whom the Pres.
may be authorized by law to appoint; and (3) officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law
vest in the Pres. alone.
xxx. VV.
j. Concur in Treaties
Art. VII, Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least twothirds of all the members of the Senate.
This is true, although it is the President who is the chief spokesman in foreign relations. Executive
agreements do not need concurrence.
k. Declaration of war and delegation of emergency powers
Art. VI, Sec. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of twothirds of both Houses in joint sessions
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both houses in joint session assembled but voting separately shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. [Art. VI, Sec. 23(1)]
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject such restrictions as the law may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress, unless sooner
withdrawn by its resolution. [Art. VI, Sec. 23(2).]
Although the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the AFP should not exceed 3 years, the President may
extend such tour of duty in times of war or other national emergency declared by Congress. [Art. XVI, Sec.
5(7).]
l. Be judge of the President's physical fitness
Art. VII, Sec. 11, par. 4. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two
thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the VicePresident shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office.
There are 3 ways in which the President may be declared unable to discharge his functions under this
article:
(1) Upon his own written declaration
(2) Upon the first written declaration by majority of his Cabinet
(3) Upon determination by Congress by 2/3 vote of all its members voting separately, acting on the 2nd
written declaration by the Cabinet
When the President himself transmits to the Senate President and Speaker of the House his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, there is no problem. The Vice
President shall discharge such powers and duties as Acting President, until the President transmit to the Senate
President and Speaker a written declaration that he is no longer unable to discharge his powers and duties.
The problem arises when a majority of all members of Cabinet transmit to the Senate President and
Speaker their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge his office. Upon such transmittal, the
VicePresident shall "immediately" assume the office as Acting President.
The President can contest this by transmitting to the Senate President and Speaker his written
declaration that no inability exists. Upon such transmittal, he shall reassume his office.
But if the majority of all the members of the Cabinet really believe otherwise, they can contest this
"declaration of non inability" by again sending a second written declaration to the Senate President and
Speaker, within 5 days from the time the President transmitted his written declaration of noninability.
It is this second cabinet written "declaration of inability" that brings in the Congress as judge of the
President's ability to discharge his office.
(The VicePresident in this second instance does not act as President: the President having spoken as
against his Cabinet, his declaration entitles him to stay until Congress says otherwise. But if the Cabinet submits
the declaration more than 5 days after the President reassumes office, this may be viewed as a new declaration,
and so the VicePresident can immediately act as President.)
Congress must convene (a) within 10 days after receipt of the 2nd written declaration by the Cabinet, if
it is in session, or (b) within 12 days after it is required to assemble by its respective presiding officer, if it is not
in session.
In a joint session, the Congress shall decide the President's ability. Twothirds vote by each house,
voting separately, is required to declare the President's inability. In other words, if 2/3 of each house vote that
the President must step down, the VicePresident shall act as President. But if less than 2/3 of each House vote
that the President is unable, the President shall continue in office.
m. Power of Impeachment
(1) Who are subject to impeachment Art. XI, Sec. 2
Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal or public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
a. President
b. VicePresident
c. Justices of the Supreme Court
d. Members of the Constitutional Commissions
e. Ombudsman
(2) Grounds for impeachment
Art. XI, Sec. 2, supra.
a) Culpable violation of the Constitution
b) Treason (RPC)
c) Bribery (RA 3019)
d) Graft and corruption (RA 3019)
e) Other high crimes
f) Betrayal of public trust
Limitation: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year. [Art. XI, Sec. 3(5)]
Forum: The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. [Art.
XI, Sec. 3(1)]
(3) Procedure for impeachment
Art. XI, Sec. 3(1)(6)
Art. XI, Sec. 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all

cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least onethird of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least onethird of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting
for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.
A) Initiation stage
1) If initiated by less than 1/3 [Secs. 3(2)(4)]
(a) A verified complaint for impeachment is filed with the House of Representative by : (i) a member of
the House of Representatives, or (ii) any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member of the House.
(b) The complaint must be included in the Order of Business within 10 session days upon receipt
thereof. (the purpose is to prohibit any delay)
(c) Not later than 3 session days after, including the complaint in the Order of Business, it must be
referred (by the Speaker) to the proper committee (usually, the Committee on Justice and Order).
(d) The Committee has 60 session days from receipt of the referral to conduct hearings (to see if there is
probable cause), to vote by an absolute majority, and to submit report and its resolution to the House.
(e) The resolution shall be calendared for consideration and general discussion by the House within 10
(f) After the discussion, a vote is taken, with the vote of each member recorded. A vote of at least 1/3 of
all the members of the House is needed to "affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or to override its contrary resolution."
If the Committee made a favorable recommendation (i.e., it recommended that the complaint be sent
over to the Senate), 1/3 of all the members are needed to approve such recommendation.
If the Committee made a contrary recommendation (i.e., it recommended the dismissal of the
complaint), 1/3 of all the members are needed to disapprove or override this report.
In other words, so long as 1/3 of the lower house votes to proceed with the trial, then the case would be
sent to the Senate, regardless of the committee recommendation, and regardless of the number who vote (which,
could even be as high as 66% of the entire House), that it should not be sent to the Senate for trial.
The reason is that the initiation stage does not determine the guilt or innocence of the officer being
impeached. It merely determines whether there is a prima facie case against the officer that merits a full blown
trial in the Senate.
It is similar to a preliminary investigation. Its analogy in US Constitutional Law is the vote of 4 justices
of the US Supreme Court on whether to give due course to a petition for certiorari. Once the 4 justices believe
that the petition is on its face meritorious, the Court must give due course to it, even if 5 believe that it should
not hear the case. Anyway, the grant of due course does not mean a favorable judgment in the end.
The case of Romulo v Yniguez, supra, served as the precursor of the present provision on impeachment.
Under the 1973 Constitution, the only provision on the initiation stage of impeachment was: "upon the filing of a
verified complaint, the National Assembly may initiate impeachment by a vote of at least 1/3 of all its members."
The silence of the Constitution on the procedure to be followed enabled the Batasan to adopt a rule that would
allow a mere committee of the Batasan to kill the complaint for impeachment by merely shelving it into the
archives. And the dilemma in Romulo v Yniguez was the political nature of the decision to shelve the case. For
although the legality of the rules of procedure on impeachment is a justiciable or legal question, and thus subject
to judicial review, to question this in court, and satisfy the requirements of judicial review (like an injury), one
must resort to mandamus to retrieve the case from the archives. But how can one mandamus the Speaker? Thus,
even if Romulo was raising a legal question, the court had to consider the question as a political one because it
could not order the Speaker, a coequal, to retrieve the case they shelved, a decision made by the legislature in a
matter within its competence.
The factual situation could no longer arise under the present Constitution since the Committee must
report the case to the floor, regardless of its recommendation. It cannot now "kill" the bill on its own volition.
And since there is a clear rule of procedure, any other procedure similar to that adopted by the Batasan would
now be reviewable by the Courts against a constitutional standard, in the same way laws passed by Congress can
be measured against the constitutional norm.
2) If initiated by 1/3 [Art. XI, Sec. 3(4)]
If the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
This means that the entire process is cut short. There is no need for a Committee report and discussion
anymore, since the end result is that 1/3 of the members of the House have decided to send the case for trial.
B) Trial Stage
a) The Articles of Impeachment of the Committee is forwarded to the Senate, which has the sole power
to try and decide all cases of impeachment, for trial.
b) When sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment case, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation.
c) As a general rule, the President of the Senate presides over an impeachment trial. But when it is the
President of the Philippines who is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the presiding
officer, but he shall not vote.
d) To carry out a conviction, the vote of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate (16 Senators) is required.
If less than 2/3 vote that the officer is guilty, the effect is acquittal.
e) The judgment of the Senate (like the judgment of the House on whether to initiate) is a political
question that cannot be reviewed by the court (Romulo v Yniguez). (Unlike a law that can be reviewed by the
courts because of the existence of constitutional standards, this judgment cannot be reviewed, for the
Constitution itself has granted the discretion to this coequal branch to appreciate the case as presented.)
(4) Consequences of Impeachment
Art. XI, Sec. 3 (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
In case of acquittal
The President continues in office, because pending the impeachment trial, he remains in office.
Acquittal does not only mean the dismissal of the impeachment case, but also a bar from any criminal
action on the same offense that may be filed later on. (VV)
In case of conviction [Art. XI, Sec. 3(7)]
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than (i) removal from office and (ii)
disqualification to hold any office under RP.
But a person convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law (RPC, AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, and other penal laws).
(The courts cannot review the judgment on the impeachment case, and ultimately the removal from
office and the disqualification, because these are political questions. But it can review the judgment in the
criminal case.)
(5) Must impeachment precede filing of criminal case?
In Lecaroz vs Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324, the SC said that the broad power of the Constitution vests
the respondent court with jurisdiction over public officers and employees, including those in GOOCs. There are
exceptions, however, like the constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removable by impeach
ment. In their case, the Constitution proscribes removal from office by any other method; otherwise, to allow a
public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office
with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the
fundamental law. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law.
The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust
or profit under the Republic of the Philippines. The party thus convicted may be proceeded against, tried and
thereafter punished in accordance with law. The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment
proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and
that if the same does not result in conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal
action in accordance with law may not prosper.
Constitutional officers are not entitled to immunity from liability for possible criminal acts. But there is
a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and
enforced. They must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment (Art. XI, Secs. 2
and 3). Should they be impeached, they may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively for any
wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against them in appropriate proceedings. Therefore a fiscal or
prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against constitutional
officers. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
n. Power with regard to the utilization of natural resources
Art. XII, Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or
it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or productionsharing agreements with Filipino citizens or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreement may be for a period not exceeding twentyfive years, renewable for not more than twentyfive
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow smallscale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes,
bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based
on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the
State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.
The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law... The President shall notify the
Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within 30 days from its execution.
(Art. XII, Sec. 2, pars. 4 & 5).
o. Amendment of the Constitution

Art. XVII, Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of threefourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered votes therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorised within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of twothirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convetion, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days
nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

Constituent Power (Art. XVII, Secs. 1 and 2)
The constituent power, or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is different from the law
making power of Congress, said the SC in Gonzales v Comelec, infra.
Amendment or revision of the Constitution may be proposed in 3 ways:
1. By Congress acting as a constituent body (XVII, 1)
A vote of 3/4 of all its members is required.
2. By a constitutional convention (XVII, 1)
a) Congress calls a Con Con by a vote of 2/3 of all its members, or
b) Congress submits to the electorate the question of calling such convention, by an absolute
majority vote.
3. By the people (Art. XVII, Sec. 2)
Through initiative upon petition by 12% of all registered voters, of whichever legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. But this cannot be resorted to (i) within 5 years from
February 2, 1987, nor (ii) more often than once every five years.
Any amendment or revision shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to
be held between 6o to 90 days from, the approval of the amendment or revision in the case of Congress or the
Con Con, or the certification by COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition in the case of the people.
Compared with the 1935 Constitution :
1935 Constitution, Art. XV
Art. XV, Sec. 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of threefourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments
to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.
8. Legislative Process
a. Requirements as to bills
(1) As to titles of bills
Art. VI, Sec. 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof.
Title of bills
The purpose is to prevent "logrolling" or the smuggling in of "riders", that is, items that are unrelated to
the bill itself and would not have been passed had they not been sneaked into the bill.
Cruz: The purposes of this rule are:
(1) To prevent hodgepodge or logrolling legislation. This is defined as "any act containing several
subjects dealing with unrelated matters representing diverse interests, the main object of such combination being
to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of the subjects in support of the whole act."
(2) To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature.
(3) To fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the
subjects of legislation that are being considered in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon,
by petition or otherwise, if they should so desire.
xxx
But the title need not be a complete catalogue of a bill. xxx
In any case, a title must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or w/c is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression
or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."
The title could be specific ( A bill to create the municipality of Bagoda) or as broad (Civil Code).
Which should control, the title or the text of the statute?
In Cruz v Paras, infra. the SC referred to the title of the bill to fix the meaning of the text or the

substantive portion of the bill. The title provided for the "regulation" of nightclubs and other places for
entertainment, while the text, as amended, gave local governments the authority to "prohibit" these places alto
gether. The Court ruled that Bocaue, could not, under this law, prohibit these places but only regulate them, first
because the title was controlling over the text (VV: the Court stood the principle on its head), and second,
because the nightclubs were not nuisances per se that could be summarily evicted. To construe the amendatory
act as granting municipal corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it
in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof."
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to stop the Mun. of
Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls in that mun. or the
renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not
prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, granted municipalities the power to
regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that On
5/21/54, the law was ameded by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but
likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the
power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as
granting mun. corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way
that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recentylyenacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to
regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of
entertainment. Certiorari granted. VV.
(2) Requirements as to certain laws
(a) Appropriation laws
Art. VII, Sec. 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the opening
of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and
sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
Art. VI, Secs. 2425
Art. VI, Sec. 24. All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Cruz: The abovementioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House or Representatives bec. it is more
numerous in membership and therefore also more representative of the people. Moreover, its members are
presumed to be more familiar w/ the needs of the country in regard to the enactment of the legislation involved.
xxx
An appropriation bill is one the primary and specific purpose of w/c is to authorize the release of funds
from the public treasury.
A revenue bill is one that levies taxes and raises funds for the govt, while a tariff bill specifies the rates
or duties to be imposed on imported articles.
A bill increasing the public debt is illustrated by one floating bonds for public subscription redeemable
after a certain period.
A bill of local application is one involving purely local or municipal matters, like a charter of a city.
Private bills are illustrated by a bill granting honorary citizenship to a distinguished foreigner.
Art. VI, Sec. 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the

President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner
of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriations therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year
shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.
Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)
Budget Law, Authorizing the Transfer of Items Appropriated for One Government Office to Another is
Unconstitutional.
F: Petitioners, as concerned citizens, and members of the BP, filed a petition for prohibition, contesting the validity of PD
1177, Sec. 44, authorizing the President of the Phils. "to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department... to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau
or office...."

HELD: Par. 1 of Sec. 44 of PD 1177 unduly extends the privilege granted under Art. VIII, Sec. 16 (5) of the
1973 Constitution. It empowers the Pres. to indiscriminately transfer funds from one dept. bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Dept. to any program, project or activity of any dept. bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, w/o regard as to w/n the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from w/c the same are to be taken, or w/n the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to w/c said transfer is to be made. It does not completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the
tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. VV.

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled
or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
Guingona v. Garague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991)
F: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.
HELD: While it is true that under Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to assign the
highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung
as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
state policies or objectives. In this case, the budget for education has tripled and the compensation for teachers
has doubled. This is a clear compliance with the constitutional mandate giving highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its
good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt. It is not only a
matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of our country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. If in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the SC finds that such appropriation is constitutional.
It was also argued that the Presidential Decrees authorizing automatic appropriation is violative of Sec.
29(1) : No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. They
assert that there must be definiteness, certainty, and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt
service. The SC was not persuaded by such arguments. The transitory provisions provide that all existing laws
not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. In this case,
the automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management policies.
It was argued that the PDs did not meet the requirement that all appropriations authorizing increase of
debt must be passed by Congress and approved by the President (VI, 24 and 27). This refers only to
appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. In this case, the PDs have been considered as passed.
As to whether there was undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that in this case, the
questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated
therein. In this case, the legislative intention is clear and that is the amount needed should be automatically set
aside in order to enable the country to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other charges when they shall
become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. Although
the amounts are not stated specifically, such amounts are limited to the principal, interest, taxes and other
charges.
(b) Tax laws
Art. VI, Sec. 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall

evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,
nonprofit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.
Art. XIV, Sec. 4 (3) All revenues and assets of nonstock, nonprofit educational institutions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon
the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of
in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled
to such exemptions subject to the limitations provided by law including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.
(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions
used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
Norms of Taxation
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation. [Art. VI. Sec. 28(1)]
Delegation of Tax Powers
As a general rule, the power to tax, being an essential aspect of sovereignty, is inherently legislative and
therefore is nondelegable, unless the Constitution itself allows the delegation. There are 2 sets of specific
exceptions:
1. The Congress, may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, (i) tariff rates, (ii) import and export quotas, (iii) tonnage and
wharfage dues, and (iv) other duties and imposts, within the framework of the national development program of
the Government. [id., Sec. 28(2)]
2. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues, and to levy
taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments. (Art. X, Sec. 5)
The taxing power may also be exercised by the President as an incident of the emergency powers that
Congress may grant to him, under Art. VI, Sec. 23(2).
Burden of Taxation
Taxation being the source of revenue of government and its very lifeblood, "no law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress." [id., Sec.
28(4)]
According to jurisprudence, any question regarding the constitutionality of a tax measure must be
resolved in favor of its validity. But any doubt regarding the taxability of any person under a valid tax law must
be resolved in favor of that person and against the taxing power. However, any doubt as to the applicability of a
tax exemption granted to a person must be resolved against the exemption.
Proceeds of taxes
All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid
out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned,
the balance if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. [id., Sec. 29(3))
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. (Art. X, Sec. 6).
Taxation of religious and charitable institutions
Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, nonprofit
cemeteries, and "all lands, buildings and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes, shall be exempt from taxation." (Art. VI, Sec. 28(3)]
In Abra vs Hernando, 107 SCRA 104 (1981), the SC held that one who claims exemption from taxes on
the ground that the property sought to be taxed by the government is "actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious purposes" (must prove it.) This cannot simply be presumed on the basis of a declaration to that effect.
In YMCA v Collector, 33 Phil 217 (1916), the buildings and grounds of the YMCA devoted to religious,
charitable and educational ends, and not founded and conducted for profit, were held to be taxexempt. (As now,
the exemption is not limited to religious institutions.)
In Bishop of Nueva Segovia v Provincial Board, 67 Phil 352 (1927), the SC exempted from taxation (1)
a piece of land that used to be a cemetery but was no longer used for burial where the faithful would congregate
before and after mass, and (2) a tract garden near the convent where vegetables were planted for the use of the
priest. It is submitted that under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, this case would be overruled, and the
dissenting opinion of Justice Malcolm followed. For the former cemetery and the vegetable tract are not
"actually and directly" used for religious purposes.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the provision read "exclusively for religious, charitable or educational
purposes"; in 1973 actually, directly, and exclusively for religious or charitable purposes"; and, in 1987, "actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes."
At any rate, the exemption applies only to taxes. Thus, a "special assessment" (the amount assessed
resulting from the appreciation of value of realty due to public works constructed nearby) under the Real
Property Tax Code (or the recently enacted Local Government Code), not being a tax, does not fall under the
exemption. As in Apostolic Prefect v City Treasurer, 71 Phil 347 (1941), property owned by a religious
institution and used for religious and educational purposes is liable for special assessments.
Taxation of Educational Institutions
All lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for ... educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation. [Art. VI, Sec. 28(3)]
All revenues and assets of nonstock, nonprofit educational institutions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties... Proprietary educational
institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the
limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment. [Art. XIV, Sec.
4(3)].
Subject to the conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations or contributions actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax. [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(4)].
Under these provisions, it is clear that (1) sectarian schools [Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) and Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3)]
construed together as well as (2) nonstock, nonprofit secular schools [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3)] are exempt from the
following taxes : a} all real property tax ("assets" and Hodges v Municipal Board of Iloilo City, 19 SCRA 28
(1967), b} income tax [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3)] for #2 and a fortiori for #1 for income actually, directly, and
exclusively used for educational purposes and even c} estate and gift tax [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(4)].
Proprietary schools on the other hand, are granted only limited exemption.
b. Procedure for the passage of bills
Art. VI, Sec. 26. (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Three Readings:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings... [Art. VI, Sec.
26(2).]
On "first reading," the title of the bill, without the provisions, is read before the body. The presiding
officer then refers the bill to the proper committee e.g., "To the Committee on Local Governments". (Congress
generally works through its committees, not as one body.)
After consideration of the bill or resolution, the Committee returns the same to the body together with
its amendments, objections or recommendations. Where the report is favorable, the bill is placed on the proper
calendar. If the report is unfavorable, the matter shall be laid on the table, unless the body on the whole decides
otherwise.
On "second reading", the bill or resolution is read in full before the floor, with such amendments as the
committee may have proposed. Then, it is subjected to debate, discussion and amendments. When this is
through, a motion to close the general debate is made, then a vote is taken by the membership on whether to pass
the bill or not on the basis of the amendments or discussions.
The bill as amended and approved is the "printed in final form" and its copies are, as a general rule,
distributed to the members at least 3 days before its passage. [Sec. 26(2)] [The purpose of the 3day requirement
is to enable the members to check if the bill reflects the text and amendments approved on second reading, and
to see if riders have been introduced.]
As an exception, however, the Constitution allows the 3day and printed copy requirement to be
dispensed with when the President certifies to the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill to meet a
public calamity or emergency. [Sec. 26(2).] In this case, therefore, the three readings may be made in less than 3
days without the bill being printed.
On the "third and final reading", the bill is called by its name or title, then a vote is taken right away,
with the "yeas" and "nays" entered in the Journal. No more amendment is allowed.
[Sec. 26(2).]
As a general rule, the three readings must be conducted on separate days, [Sec. 26(2).] The exception is
found in Art. VII, Sec. 10: When Congress convenes to call a special election to elect the President and Vice
President, "the bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under par. 2, Sec. 26, Art. VI", mean
ing, the three readings can be done on the same day.
Conference Committee
A bill can be passed jointly (when it is a joint session, supra), or separately. In the latter case, it can be
passed simultaneously (when a bill is taken up by both houses separately but at the same time, or sequentially
(when a bill originates form one house and goes to the other house). There is no problem if the bill is passed
jointly. But if it is passed separately, the bill approved by one house goes to the other house, which can amend
such bill. Once the other house approves the bill, this is called the other house's version of the bill.
A Conference Committee is then organized, composed of equal number of members from the Senate
and the House, to make recommendations to the respective chambers on how to reconcile the two versions of the
bill. The respective members are usually granted blanket authority to negotiate and reconcile the bills. At the
end of the process, the committee comes up with a "Conference Committee Report", which is then submitted to
the respective chambers for approval.
Engrossment or Enrollment of the Bill
Once the bill is approved by both houses, the bill is engrossed or enrolled (see supra). The Enrolled
copy of the Bill bears the certification by the presiding officers (Senate President and Speaker of the House) that
this enrolled copy is the version passed by each house. (The effects of this enrolled bill are discussed above.)
Approval by the President
Art. VI, Sec. 27 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented
to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objection to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal
and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, twothirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by twothirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names
of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his
veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof,
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
The bill as approved by Congress and certified by its presiding officers is then presented to the
President.
Generally, there are 3 ways for the bill to become a law:
1) When it is approved by the President;
2) When the vote of the President is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of both houses;
3) Upon failure of the President to veto the bill and to return it with his objections, to the House where it
originated, within 30 days after the date of receipt. [Sec. 27(1).]
But there are 2 cases when a bill becomes a law without the signature of the President:
1) When the veto of the President is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of both houses; and
2) When the bill is one calling a special election for President and VicePresident under Art. VII, Sec.
10. Here the bill becomes law upon 3rd and final reading. The Acting President is not required to sign, for he
may have an interest in the question.
c. The President's veto power
Qualified versus Absolute Veto
Veto Power of the President
Message Veto versus Pocket Veto. There is only one way for the President to veto a bill: By
disapproving it, and returning it to the house where the bill originated, together with his "veto message"
(explaining his objections to the bill, which message shall be entered in the Journal within 30 days after receipt
[Sec. 27(1)]
No "pocket veto" in the Philippines. In this regard, there is no "pocket veto" in the Philippines.
What is a pocket veto?
Compare with Art. I, Sec. 7 of US Constitution:
Art. I, Sec. 7. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted)
after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it,
unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return in which case it shall not be a law. (The
United States Constitution.)
A pocket veto, as in the US requires two concurring elements, (1) failure to act on the bill and
(2) the reason he does not return the bill to Congress is that Congress is not in session. Thus, if the US
Congress is in session, failure by the President to act will not result in the veto of the bill.
In the Philippines, there is no such provision. Inaction by the President for 30 days never produced a
veto. If Congress is not in session, the President must still act in order to veto the bill. Only he needs to
communicate the veto to Congress without need of returning the vetoed bill with his veto message.
Compare with 1935 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 20
Sec. 20 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, twothirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
considered, and if approved by twothirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members
voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as
herein provided within twenty days(Sunday excepted), after it shall have been presented to him, the same
shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevents its
return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after
adjournment.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of any appropriation
bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. When a provision of an
appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without
at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. The item or items objected to
shall not take effect except in the manner heretofore provided as to bills returned to the Congress without
the approval of the President. If the veto refers to a bill or any item of an appropriation bill which
appropriates a sum in excess of ten per centum of the total amount voted in the appropriation bill for the
general expenses of the Govt. for the preceding year, or if it should refer to a bill authorizing an increase
of the public debt, the same shall not become a law unless approved by threefourths of all the Members of
each House. (The 1935 Constitution.)
Veto Message : When the President vetoes a measure, he should return the measure to the House of
origin, indicating his objections thereto in what is commonly known as a "veto message" so that the same can be
studied by the members for possible overriding of his veto.
Is partial veto allowed under the Constitution? The general rule is that the President must approve
entirely or disapprove in toto. The exception applies to appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, any particular
item or items of which may be disapproved without affecting the item or items to which he does not object.
Cruz: In Bolinao Electronics Corp. v Valencia, 11 SCRA 486, a public works bill contained an item
appropriating a certain sum for assistance to television stations, subject to the condition that the amount would
not be available in placees where there were commercial television stations in operation. Pres. Macapagal
approved the appropriation but vetoed the condition. When his act was subsequently challenged in the SC, it
was held that the veto was ineffectual and that the approval of the item carried w/ it the approval of the condition
attached to it. xxx
In this case, the SC further held that the veto power is "destructive" in nature, not creative, and so the
President is limited to approving or disapproving the bill, in toto. He cannot choose only the parts that he likes
and vetoes the rest. Thus, in this case, the President was prohibited from vetoing only the part prohibiting the
Philippine Broadcasting System from operating outside a certain radius, while approving the rest of the
appropriation for this government radio station.
Thus, when the President approves one part and vetoes another, the veto is ineffective: it is as though
there is no veto.
But in the case of appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, the President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items, without vetoing the other item or items to which he does not object.
The reason is, these items are really independent of each other, and so every item is deemed a bill in
itself. But as to each item, he cannot approve part and disapprove the other part.
In Gonzales vs Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, the President of the Philippines vetoed a provision in the 1989
General Appropriations Bill and later a similar provision in the 1990 General Appropriations Bill [providing for
a prohibition against the restoration or increase of recommended appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by
Congress]. In her veto message, Pres. Aquino said that such provision violates Art. VI Sec. 25(5) and that it
nullifies her power and that of the Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice and Heads of Constitutional
Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations, even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to
accelerate the implementation of essential public services. In rejecting the challenge to the veto, the SC
declared that the restrictive interpretation urged by the petitioners that the President may not veto a provision
without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision
shall be limited in its operate to the appropriation to which it relates [Art. VI, Sec. 25(5).] In other words, a
provision in an appropriation bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates,
and does not relate to the entire bill.
In this case, the challenged provisions do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They
apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Also, such
provisions are more of an expression of Congressional policy rather than a budgetary appropriation. They
should be treated as items for the purpose of the President's veto power.
Bengzon vs Drilon 208 SCRA 133 (1992)
F: The issue here is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the 1992 General

Appropriations Act relating to the payment of adjusted pensions to retired justices of the SC and the CA. According to
Pres. Aquino, the payment of such adjusted pensions (adjusted with respect to the peso purchasing power) would erode the
govt's collective effort to enforce the policy of standardization of compensation and that govt. should not grant distinct
privileges to select groups of officials over those of the vast majority of civil service servants. The retired justices asserted
that such subject veto is not an item veto.
HELD: The veto power of the President is not absolute. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at
all. However when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run
the machinery of govt. and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. This is the
reason for the item veto power.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove
any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of the same item.
The terms "item" and "provision" are different. An item refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct
and severable parts of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. An item
obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, and not some general provision of
law.
In this case, the President did not veto an item. She vetoed the methods or systems placed by Congress
to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials will be paid when they fall due. In this
case, the vetoed portions are not items but are provisions. The augmentation of specific appropriations found
inadequate to pay retirement payments, by transferring savings from other items of appropriations is a provision
and not an item. It gives the SC Chief Justice the power to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no
specific appropriation of money involved.
Neither may the veto power be exercised as a means of repealing existing laws. This is arrogating unto
the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. Adapted.
Overriding the Veto
Upon consideration of the objections raised by the President in his veto message, the House from which
the bill originated shall reconsider the bill. If after such reconsideration, 2/3 of all the members of such house
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent together with the objections of the President, to the other house by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered. If approved by 2/3 of all the members of that house, it shall become a
law. In all such cases, the votes of each house shall be determined by "yeas" or "nays", and the names of the
members voting for or against shall be entered in the Journal. [VI, 27(1)]
d. Legislative vetoes
The Congress cannot deem a draft submitted by an executive agency passed as law by it mere inaction
within a certain period. It must go through the 3 readings and the submission of the bill to the President, as
required by the Constitution. In Miller v Mardo, 2 SCRA 298 (1961), the SC struck down as unconstitutional
Sec. 6 of RA 997, which provided that the reorganization plan drafted by the Department of Labor and submitted
to President for approval shall be deemed as approved by Congress after its adjournment, unless in the
meantime, Congress by resolution disapproved the plan. It struck down as well the Reorganization Plan drafted
pursuant to this law.
In so holding, the Court ruled that the approval of a bill cannot be made by Congress by mere silence,
adjournment or concurrent resolution. The Constitution requires the two houses to hold separate session for
deliberation, and to submit the determination of one to the separate determination of the other, unless a joint
session is provided for. This method of passing a law amounts to an abdication by Congress of its legislative
prerogatives to the Executive.
e. Effectivity of Laws
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. The Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
When a bill becomes a law through any of the 3 means mentioned above, the law does not become
effective at once. According to the ruling upon reconsideration in Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), in
addition to the date fixed either by the effectivity clause of the statute, or, in its absence, by Art. 2 of the Civil
(15 days after its publication), there must first be a publication of the law either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation [EO 200]. Otherwise, there is a violation of due process.
This requirement for publication applies to any kind of law, even laws which are not of general
application, private laws (e.g. law granting citizenship to X), laws of local application, and rules and regulations
of substantive character.
In People v Que Po Lay, 94 Phil 640 (1956), a CB circular governing the remittance of dollars with

corresponding forfeiture in case of violation, was held to require publication, since it had the nature of a penal
rule.
Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 S 27 (1985)
F: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.
HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its publication but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect.
Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws w/
the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is
easily reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. RAM.
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 S 446 (1986). Motion for reconsideration. xxx [T]he clause "unless it is otherwise

provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, w/c cannot in any event
be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, w/o its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
15day period shall be shortened or extended.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed w/ altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws
that are supposed to govern it.
Conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law. The conclusive presumption that every person knows
the law presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all.
The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
RULE: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, w/c shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Coverage. Covered by this rule are PDs and EOs promulgated by the Pres. in the exercise of legislative
powers. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e., regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the socalled
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of the PD, the title of such decree, its whereabouts, the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the OG cannot satisfy the publication requirement.
This is not even substantial compliance. RAM.
Executive Order No. 200, June 18, 1987
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided. (as amended by EO 200.)
9. Initiative and Referendum,
Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls,
independent of the legislative assembly. It is the right of a group of citizens to introduce a matter for legislation
either to the legislature or directly to the voters.
Referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been
passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of the electors become a
law. It is a method of submitting an impt. legislative measure to a direct vote of the whole people, the
submission of a law passed by the legislature for their approval or rejection.
Rep. Act No. 6735, Aug. 4, 1989
UPDATED 1/22/96
/RAM
B. Executive Department
1. The President
a. Qualifications, election, term and oath
Art. VII, Secs. 2, 4 and 5
Art. VII, Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Qualifications of President
1) Naturalborn citizen of the Philippines
2) Registered voter
3) Able to read and write
4) 40 years of age on the day of election
5) Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election
Art. VII, Sec. 4. The President and the VicePresident shall be elected by direct vote of the people
for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for
any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four
years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No VicePresident shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and VicePresident shall be
held on the second Monday of May.
more shall have an equal and highest number of votes (tie), one of them shall forth with be chosen by the
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President, or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
Election and Term of President
Regular Election and Term
The President and VicePresident (who shall be elected with and in the same manner as the President)
shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of 6 years, which shall begin on the noon of June 30 next
following the day of election. The regular election for President and VicePresident shall be held on the 2nd
Monday of May. (Art. VII, Sec. 4 pars. 1 & 3).
The six year term for the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986

election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first
regular elections for the President and VicePresident under this Constitution shall be held on the 2nd Monday of
May, 1992. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 5.)
In In re Saturnino Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160, the SC held that the "incumbent President and Vice

President" referred to above are Pres. Corazon Aquino and VicePresident Salvador Laurel (even if they were not
the ones declared by the Batasang Pambansa as the winners of the February 7, 1986 Snap Election).
Special Election and Term
If a vacancy occurs in the offices of President and Vice President more than 18 months before the date
of the next regular presidential election, a special election to elect the President and VicePresident shall be
called by Congress, pursuant to VII, 10. (See discussion under Other Powers of Congress, supra and Succession,
infra.)
A conditional resignation by the incumbent President is not a real resignation that creates a vacancy for
the purpose of calling a special election. But in the Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v COMELEC, 140 SCRA
455, the failure of the SC to issue an injunction on time is already a decision in itself in favor of the validity of
the law calling for Snap Elections despite the absence of vacancy; only, it is a decision that is not supported by a
ratio decidendi. Indeed, a midterm election in a presidential system of government in response to popular
clamor for it, is a legal anomaly.
PBA V. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455 (1985). Validity of "Snap" Election for President and VicePresident.
Suits questioning the validity of BP 883, calling a special election for Pres. and VicePres. on Feb. 7,
1986. The law was enacted following the letter of Pres. Marcos to the BP that he was "irrevocably vacating the
position of Pres. effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as
Pres. by taking his oath of office ten days after his proclamation." The principal ground for the challenge to the
validity of the statute was that the conditional resignation of the Pres. did not create a vacancy required by Art.
VII, Sec. 9 (now Art. VII, Sec. 8) w/c authorized the calling of a special election.
After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to DISMISS. On the other hand, 5 Justices voted to DECLARE the
statute unconstitutional. In accordance w/ Javellana v. Executive Sec., 50 SCRA 141 (1973), J. Teehankee was of
the view that as there were less than ten votes for declaring BP 883 unconstitutional, the petitions should be
dismissed.
No opinion was delivered. VV.
The Constitution is silent as to whether the persons elected in the special election shall serve only for
the unexpired portion of the term, and whether the new President can run for re election if he has not served
more than 4 years, which depends on the construction of the phrase "has succeeded as the President," discussed
in the next section. VV: Only unexpired portion.
Reelection
The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. Furthermore, no person who has "succeeded" as
President and has served as such for more than 4 years, shall be qualified for any election to the same office (the
Presidency) at any time. (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 1)
The person who succeeds as President and not just in an acting capacity, could either be (i) the Vice
President, or (ii) one who was elected President in a special election. In both cases, if he has served for more
than 4 years, he is ineligible for reelection as President.
If he served for 4 years or less, he can run for re election, it is submitted, since (a) the term "succeeded"
encompasses election and (b) the general rule prohibiting the President to run for reelection refers to the
President elected during the regular election. Furthermore, it is submitted that this person may resign on the 4th
year so as to be qualified to run for President, since there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits this.
In view of the wording of Art. XVII, Sec. 5, however, President Aquino can run for the 1992 election as
President without violating the rule against reelection since the February 7, 1987 election was not conducted
under the present Constitution, the 1992 Presidential election being the "first regular elections" to be held under
this Constitution. Furthermore, although she may have served for more than 4 years as President by then, she
will have done so not as successor to the Presidency. If VicePresident Laurel is the one who serves as President
for more than 4 years, then he cannot run for the Presidency in 1992.
The VicePresident on the other hand, shall not serve for more than 2 successive terms. And for this
purpose, a voluntary (but not involuntary) renunciation of office for any length of time, shall not be considered
an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full terms for which he was elected. (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par.
2). This is applicable, however, beginning 1992, because of the Transitory Provisions. (This prohibition is
similar to that applicable to Senators.)
Canvassing of Election Returns
As already noted in the Other Powers of the Legislature, supra, it is the Congress that acts as Board of
Canvassers of every election for President and VicePresident. The provision reads:
"The returns of every election for President and VicePresident duly certified by the
Board of Canvassers of each province or city, shall be submitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than 30 days after the date of the election, open all the certificates in the presence
of the Senate and the House of Representatives in a joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof, in the manner provided by law,
canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case
2 or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen
by the vote of a majority of all the members of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates." (Art.
VII, Sec. 4, pars. 4 6).
Electoral Tribunal for the Election of the President and Vice President

returns, and qualifications of the President or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for that purpose.
(Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7.)
Note that while election controversies in the Congress are under the exclusive jurisdiction of their
respective Electoral Tribunals, those in the Executive are under the Supreme Court itself.
Oath of Office
Art. VII, Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice
President or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my
duties as President (or VicePresident or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and
defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate to myself
to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will
be omitted.)
b. Privilege and salary
Art. VII, Sec. 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and
VicePresident shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which
such increase was approved. They shall not received during their tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source.
The salaries of the President and VicePresident shall be determined by law. Unless the Congress
provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of P 300,000 and the VicePresident, the salary
of P 240,000.
c. Prohibitions
Art. VII, Sec. 13. The President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Prohibition against the President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
(a) They shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution
In Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, the petitioner challenged Ex. Order No.
284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive
officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations
imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of Art.
VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IXB, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if
allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions.
In declaring the EO unconstitutional, the SC held that by ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more
than 2 positions in the govt. and GOOCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment
in direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless other
wise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
If maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to
attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment.
Civil Liberties Union (CLU) v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
F: the petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and
asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit,
subject of the limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was
violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IXB, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive
official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions.
HELD: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOOCs, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of
Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If
maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to
his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment.
xxx
The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family under Sec. 13, Art. VII as compared
to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7, par. 2 are proof of the
intent of the 1987 Consti. to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by
the Consti. itself. xxx
However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII, Sec. 13
must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein w/o addition
compensation in an exofficio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
official's office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" w/in the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials.
Adapted.
(b) They shall not practice any other profession.
(c) They shall not participate in any business.
(d) They shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted.
Compare Prohibitions against other officials
Art. VI, Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office
or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Art. IX, A, Sec. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any
other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office,
nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Art. IX, B, Sec. 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Art. VIII, Sec. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions.
Exceptions to rule prohibiting executive officials from holding additional positions:
a. President
(1) The President can assume a Cabinet post, (because the departments are mere extensions of his
personality, according to the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, so no objection can be validly raised based
on Art. VII, Sec. 13.)
(2) The President is the Chairman of NEDA. (Art. XII, Sec. 9)
b. VicePresident
The VicePresident may be appointed as member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation.
c. Cabinet
(1) The Secretary of Justice shall be an exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. (Art. VIII,
Sec. 8[1])
2) Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, appointive officials shall
not hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art. IX, B, 7, par. 2)
Art. VII, Sec. 13 talks of "unless otherwise provided by the Constitution." In the case of Cabinet

members, this refers to Art. IX, B, 7, par. 2. Thus, the Constitution allows a Cabinet member to hold another
office provided either (1) such is necessitated by the primary functions of his position (e.g. Secretary of Trade
and Industry as Chairman of NDC, Secretary of Agrarian Reform as Chairman of the Land Bank), or (ii) is
allowed by law. The validity of EO 284 allowing members of the Cabinet and their UnderSecretaries to hold 2
additional offices was decided in the case of CLU vs Exec. Secretary.
d. Succession
(1) At the beginning of term
Art. VII, Sec. 7. The Presidentelect and the VicePresident elect shall assume office at the
beginning of their terms.
xxx
This provision refers to the President and VicePresident elected in the regular election, and so the term
referred to begins on June 30 next following the election on the 2nd Monday of 1992, and every 6 years
thereafter.
Vacancy in the Presidency
There are two sets of rules on succession, depending on whether the vacancy took place before the
beginning of the term on June 30, or during the pendency of the terms that commences on June 30. (The cutoff
point is unsettled. One view is that the cutoff is noon of June 30, as expressed in Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 1. The
other view is that the cutoff is midnight of June 29 when June 30 begins.)
A. Temporary or permanent vacancy in the Presidency before the term
1. If the Presidentelect cannot assume his post at the beginning of his term because i) he has not

qualified as yet ( e.g. he had an operation and so he could not take his oath of office on June 30), ii) or a
President has not been "chosen" and qualified as yet (e.g. there is a tie and Congress has not yet broken the tie),
then the VicePresident shall act as President until the Presidentelect shall have qualified, or shall have been
"chosen: and qualified, as the case may be. (Art. VII, Sec. 7, pars. 2 & 3).
If the Presidentelect fails to qualify, the VicePresidentelect shall act as President until a
President shall have been chosen and qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the VicePresidentelect shall act as President until a
President shall have been chosen and qualified.
xxx
2. If the Presidentelect i) dies, or ii) becomes permanently disabled "at the beginning of the term of the
President" (i.e., before the term), then the VicePresident elect shall become the President. (Id., par. 4)
xxx
xxx
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the Presidentelect shall have died or shall have
become permanently disabled, the VicePresidentelect shall become President.
3. If both President and VicePresident (i) have not been "chosen" or (ii) have not qualified, or (iii) die,
or (iv) become permanently disabled, then the President of the Senate, or in case of his inability, the Speaker of
the House, shall act as President until a President or a VicePresident shall have been "chosen" and qualified.
(par. 5)
Where no President and VicePresident shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where
both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice
President shall have been chosen and qualified. (par. 5 thereof.)

In case both the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House are unable to act as President, then
Congress shall by law, provide for the "manner of selecting" the one who will act as President until a President
of VicePresident shall have (been either "chosen" or "elected" pursuant to the special election referred to in VII,
10, and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be
selected until a President or a VicePresident shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability,
or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph. (par. 6 thereof.)
(2) During term
Art. VII, Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the
President, the VicePresident shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and VicePresident, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then
act as President until the President or VicePresident shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent
disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the VicePresident
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
B. Permanent Vacancy in the Presidency during the term
1. In case of the President's (i) death (ii) permanent disability, (iii) removal from office (the only way is
by impeachment), or (iv) resignation, the VicePresident shall become President for the unexpired portion of the
term. (par. 1)
2. In case of both the President's and VicePresident's death, permanent disability, removal from office
(by impeachment), or resignation, then the Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House,
shall act as President until the President or VicePresident shall have been "elected" (pursuant to the special
election in Art. VII, Sec. 10) and qualified. (par. 1.)
When the Acting President (i.e., the Senate President, or Speaker of the House) dies, becomes
permanently disabled, or resigns (but is not removed, because there is no need to impeach him, his stay being
temporary), then the Congress shall by law, provide "who" shall be Acting President until the President or Vice
President shall have been "elected" (pursuant to the special election in Art. VII, Sec. 10) and qualified. This
Acting President shall be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications.(par. 2)
Comparisons and distinctions between the two vacancies:
a) The incumbent President never holdsover the Presidency in any case.
b) The vacancy must occur in the offices of both the President and VicePresident in order for the Senate
President, or the Speaker, or, in their inability, the one provided to succeed according to the Law of Succession
passed by the Congress, to succeed as Acting President until the qualification of the President.
c) The Law on Succession must be passed by the Congress in both cases in the event that the President,
VicePresident, Senate President and the Speaker are all unable to act as President. But in the case of a vacancy
occurring before the term, the law provides only for the "manner of selecting" the Acting President, while in the
case of a vacancy occurring during the term, it provides for "the person" who shall act as President. In both
cases, the stint of the Acting President is temporary.
d) When the vacancy comes before the term, the Constitution talks of the successor acting as President
until a President has been "chosen" and "qualified"; when it comes during, it talks of "elected" and qualified.
The reason is that before the term, the vacancy in the Presidency need not be filled up by election, since it may
be filled up by a vote of Congress in case of a tie (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 5); but during the term, the only way to
fill up the vacancy is by special election.
e) A special election in both cases is held, pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 10, only when both offices of
President and VicePresident are vacant. However, if the vacancy occurs before the term, the grounds are
limited to 2 (death and permanent disability or both), while if the vacancy occurs during the term, the grounds
are 4 (death, permanent disability, removal, and resignation).
f) The vacancy that occurs before the term of office may be temporary or permanent; the vacancy that
occurs during the term of office can only be a permanent one. Thus, a different set of rules applies, to be
discussed next following, in case of the temporary inability of the President during the term of office.
(3) In case of temporary disability
Art. VII, Secs. 1112
Art. VII, Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the VicePresident as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VicePresident shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five
days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within fortyeight
hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or if not in session,
within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a twothirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VicePresident
shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his
office.
C. Temporary Vacancy in the Presidency during the term (Art. VI, Sec. 11, supra)
A vacancy in the Presidency arising from his disability can occur in any of the following ways:
1. A written declaration by the President
2. Written declaration by the Cabinet
3. Finding by Congress by 2/3 vote that the President is disabled.
In all these cases, the VicePresident temporarily acts as the President.
Voluntary declaration of inability by President
a. When the President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
b. The VicePresident shall so act until the President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker a
written declaration that he is no longer unable to discharge his office.
Contested inability of the President
a. When majority of all the members of the Cabinet transmit to the Senate President and Speaker their
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge his office, then the VicePresident shall immediately
assume the Presidency in an acting capacity.
b. The President can contest this by sending his own written declaration to the Senate President and
Speaker, that no inability exists. Upon such transmittal, the President shall automatically assume his office.
c. Should the majority of the Cabinet insist on their original stand by transmitting a second written
declaration of the President's inability within 5 days from resumption of office of the President, then Congress
shall step in.
d. Upon receipt of this second declaration by the Cabinet, Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
within 48 hours, without need of call, in accordance with its rules. (If it is already in session, it must meet right
away, as glimpsed from the fact that they only have 10 days to decide, whereas if it is not in session, it must
convene in 2 days and decide before the 12th day.)
e. Congress shall determine the President's inability within 10 days after receipt of the second written
declaration by the Cabinet if it is in session, or within 12 days after it is required to assemble by its respective
presiding officer if it is not in session.
f. If the President, by a 2/3 vote of both houses voting separately, determined to be "unable" to discharge
his office, then the VicePresident shall act as President. If less than 2/3 find him unable, then the President
shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
Serious Illness of the President
Art. VII, Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the
state of his health. The members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President
during such illness.
e. Removal
Art. XI, Secs. 23

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
[A more detailed discussion on this topic can be found above under Other Powers of Congress:
Impeachment.]
Initiation Stage at the House of Representatives
a. Filing of verified complaint for impeachment of the President or VicePresident, on the ground of
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust.
b. Inclusion of the complaint in the Order of Business within 10 session days.
c. Referral of complaint to the Committee on Justice within 3 session days from its inclusion.
d. Hearing, voting, and submission of report by the Committee within 60 days from referral.
e. Placing on calendar of the Committee resolution within 10 days from submission.
f. Discussion on the floor of the report, then a vote by the membership of the House of Representatives.
g. If 1/3 vote to affirm a favorable resolution or override a contrary resolution, the case is forwarded to
the Senate for trial.
Trial Stage at the Senate
a. The Senators take an oath or affirmation. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides over the
trial, but does not vote.
b. After trial, the Senators vote to convict or acquit. A vote of 16 (2/3 of all the members) is required to
convict the President or VicePresident.
Posttrial
a. If the President is acquitted by the Senate, he shall continue in office. No impeachment proceeding
can again be initiated against him within a period of one year.
b. If the President is impeached, he shall be removed from office at once, and shall be disqualified to
hold any office in the Republic. His criminal liability under Art. XI, Sec. 3(7) may be subject to him immunity
from suit.
f. Powers and Functions of the President
(1) Executive Power
Art. VII, Secs. 1 and 17
Art. VII, Sec. 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Id., Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The executive function is essentially the duty to implement the laws within the standards imposed by the
legislature. Under the Constitution, this power is exercised by the President. Thus, when the Cabinet and other
branches of the Executive Department implement the law, they are acting under the control of the President.
Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 668, 178 SCRA 760
F: This is a petition for mandamus asking the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos
and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The issue is whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines.
The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President (Art. VII, Sec. 1). However, it
does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers
by the President, i.e. the power of control over all executive depts., bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander in chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations, pardons,
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power
to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to congress and the power to address
Congress. (VII, Sec. 1423)
The inevitable question is whether by enumerating certain powers of the President, did the framers of
the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other?
According to the SC, that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific
powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive
power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
In this case, the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. She has
the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. She has to balance
the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty
of the President, as steward of the people.
Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration :
It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual
powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her
duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in
the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. Adapted.
(2) Control of executive departments
Art. VII, Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
"Control" is the power to substitute one's own judgment in that of a subordinate.
Under the qualified political agency doctrine, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of
the President. The secretaries are the alter ego of the President, men of his bosom confidence whom he
designated to assist him in his otherwise physically impossible multifarious functions, the extension of the
President in the particular field in which they act. Their acts are presumptively acts of the "President, until
countermanded or reprobated by him". The President can substitute his will over those of the secretaries, and
they cannot complain. Furthermore, they hold their office subject to the discretion of the President, who can
replace them anytime once he loses his confidence in them.
Thus, in Planas v Gil, since the Civil Service Commissioner, then not an independent body, was the alter
ego of the President, and the President could investigate local officials, the Commissioner could likewise
investigate them.
In Villena v Secretary of the Interior, the investigation of the Mayor of Makati by the Secretary of the
Interior was deemed an investigation conducted by the President himself.
The doctrine on the power of control remained unchanged in the jurisprudence under the 1973
Constitution. Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor (108 SCRA 757) had occasion to
reemphasize its continuing validity. Here, the power given to the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a
labor dispute affecting the national interest or to certify it for compulsory arbitration was challenged as an undue
delegation of a power which properly belonged to the President. All that was needed to settle the case was to
hark back to the Villena doctrine that the heads of ministries are alter egos of the President. Under the
presidential system, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Each head of a department is,
and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to
exercise authority. The President has the constitutional power of control and direction over such dept. heads and
cabinet secretaries.
(3) General supervision of local governments and autonomous regions
Art. X, Sec. 4. The President shall exercise general supervision over local governments. xxx
Art. X, Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
"General supervision" means the mere overseeing of a subordinate to make sure that they do their duties
under the law. But this does not include the power to overrule their acts, if these acts are within their discretion.
The grant of mere supervisory power over local governments and autonomous regions is in line with the
policy of the State to promote the autonomy of local governments and autonomous regions. There can be no real
local autonomy while the National Government controls the local governments.
Ganzon vs CA 200 SCRA 271
The petitioners question the power of the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government,
to suspend and/or remove local officials.
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitution, the charter
did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. The omission of "as may be provided by
law" (Sec. 4, Art. X) signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress and
to break Congress' "control" over local govt. affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend for the sake of
local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
Petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. This is a mistaken impression because legally "supervision" is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority. "Control" has been defined as the power of an officer to alter, modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. "Supervision" on the other hand means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Adapted.
(4) Power of appointment
Cruz: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested w/ the power, of an individual who
is to exercise the functions of a given office.
The power of appointment is, according to the SC in Concepcion v Paredes, the most eminently
executive power, because it is through his appointees that the President can execute laws.
The power of appointment by the President under the 1987 Constitution has been significantly curbed. It
can be classified as follows:
With the consent of the Commission on Appointments
Members of the Regional Consultative Council in Art. X, Sec. 18 are according to Sarmiento v Mison,
156 SCRA 547, supra. also subject to confirmation by the CA, because their appointment is vested in the
President by the Constitution. But J. Mendoza disagrees. For unlike the Chairman and members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the regular members of the JBC, the Constitution in Art. X, Sec. 18 does not
say that the appointment is subject to confirmation. Also, the pattern in the Constitution shows that where the
nominees are already screened either by JBC (for justices and judges) or the multisectoral bodies (Regional
Consultative Council), then there is no need for CA confirmation to prevent an overkill. It is enough that the
President made the appointment on the basis of nominations. Otherwise, it would be too rigid, considering that
the duty of the RCC is only to advise Congress on the autonomous act to be enacted.
Do bureau directors need confirmation? In Sarmiento v Mison (Dec. 1987), the SC held that no
they did not need to be confirmed. The deliberations of the Con Con showed that a draft similar to
VII, 10 of the 1935 Constitution, which included bureau heads in the list of appointees requiring
confirmation, was introduced, but upon motion, bureau directors were omitted expressly from the
draft because they were considered of low rank, and so were thought to be better shielded from
partisan politics.
But the SC added that of the 4 categories of public officers requiring confirmation, the 4th must be
given a restrictive construction because confirmation derogates the appointing power of the President. Indeed, it
said, only a small class of officers needed confirmation.
In saying so, however, it did not try to explain certain anomalies that may arise from such restrictive
interpretation: (a) If a colonel needed confirmation, why not the Undersecretary of National Defense who has a
higher rank as line officer? (b) If an ambassador needed confirmation, why not the Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs who has a higher rank? (c) Why not the CB governor who is so powerful as to plunge the country into
bankruptcy?
Bautista vs Salonga 172 SCRA 160
F: Petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 12/17/88. She took her oath of office
on 12/22 and thereafter entered into the discharge of her functions and duties. However, on 1/9/89, she was asked by the
Commission on Appointments to submit certain information and documents needed in the confirmation of her
appointment. She refused to do so on the ground that her appointment was not subject to confirmation. On 1/14/89, the
Pres. submitted petitioner's ad interim appointment to the CA, but, considering petitioner's refusal to submit to the
jurisdiction of the CA, the CA disapproved her appointment on 1/25. Petitioner, anticipating the action of the CA, filed a
petition for certiorari w/ the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) is to be made with or without CA confirmation.
HELD: (1) Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be
reviewed by the CA, namely, "the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, other officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution." All other appointments by the Pres. are to be made w/o the
participation of the CA." Since the position of Chairman of the CHR, an independent office created by the
Constitution, is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments to
which are to be made with the confirmation of the CA, it follows that the appointment by the President of the
Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CA. They are among the officers
of the govt "whom he (the Pres.) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Sec. 2 (c) of EO 163, May 5, 1987,
authorizes the Pres. to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR.
xxx. VV.
QuintosDeles vs. Commission on Appointments 177 SCRA 259
F: Petitioner and 3 others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section
16, par. 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. However, petitioner and the 3 other sectoral representatives
appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of
some congressmenmembers of the Commission on Appointments (CA), who insisted that sectoral representatives must
first be confirmed by the CA before they can take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires confirmation by the CA in the appointment of sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives.
HELD: YES. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides that: "The president shall nominate and, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution x x x".
In SARMIENTO VS. MISON (1987), the SC construed Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution to mean
that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Art. VII require
confirmation by the CA.
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in par. 2, Sec. 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Sec. 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that
sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution", referred to in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose
appointments are subject to confirmation by the CA.(SARMIENTO VS. MISON)
Implicit in the invocation of par. 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner is,
the recognition by the President as appointing authority that petitioner's appointment requires confirmation by
the CA. Under Par. 2, Sec. 16, Art VII, appointments made by the President pursuant thereto "shall be effective
only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of the Congress." If indeed appointments of
sectoral representatives need no confirmation, the President need not make any reference to the constitutional
provisions abovequoted in appointing the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the President had expressly submitted
petitioner's appointment for confirmation by the CA. Considering that Congress had adjourned without resp.
CA having acted on petitioner's appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot and academic
pursuant to Sec. 23 of the Rules of resp. CA and "unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the
Commission." Adapted.
Calderon v. Carale (208 SCRA 254)
F: In March 1989, RA 6715 (HerreraVeloso Law), amending the Labor Code, was approved. It provides in Sec. 13
thereof as follows:
"xxx
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall be appointed by the President,
subject to confirmation by the CA. xxx"
Pursuant to said law, President Aquino appointed the Chairman (B. CARALE) and Commissioners of the NLRC.
The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performances of the duties of the office.
The present petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments
extended by the President to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC, without submitting the same to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715.
Petitioners insists on a mandatory compliance w/ RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity. RA
6715 is not, according to the petitioner, an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec. 16 of
Art. VII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General contends, on the other hand, that RA 6715 transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII by expanding the
confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.
ISSUES: (1) W/N Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. (NO)
HELD: The controversy in the case is focused on Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution w/c provides:
"Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may,
by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." xxx

There are four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII,
more specifically under "those whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Undeniably, the
Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16
whose appointments requires confirmation by the CA.
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the CA of the appointments of respondents
Chairman and Members of the NLRC, it is unconstitutional because:
1. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the CA; and
2. it amends by legislation, the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, by imposing the confirmation of the CA
on appointments w/c are otherwise entrusted only with the President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a

judicial function.
Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. Adapted.
Notes: From the rulings in Sarmiento III v. Mison, 156 S 549), Bautista v. Salonga, 172 S 160, and Deles v.

Constitutional Commission, 177 S 259, these doctrines are deducible:
1. Confirmation by the CA is required only for presidential appointees as mentioned in the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Art. VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself
in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of
Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Com. on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Sarmiento v.
Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an
unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law.
(2) W/N legislation can expand a constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has interpreted it.
In Endencia and Jugo v. David, 93 Phil. 699, the Court held:
"We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the
power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the
Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative Department. If the Legislature may declare what a
law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertained its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and
instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case
based on judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative Department. That
would neither be wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our
constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers."
The function of the Court in passing upon an act of Congress is to " lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former"
and to announce its considered judgment upon the question."
It cannot be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately intended by the
framers to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the CA exercised the power
of confirmation over almost all presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of
confirmation. Adapted.
Ramos v. Alvarez (97 PHIL. 844) [Compare with Calderon case]
F: Before serving his full term as elected member of the Provincial Board of Negros Occ., Jesus Aritao (LP) resigned
his office when he filed his certificate of candidacy for congressman.
To fill such vacancy, then President Quirino, acting on the authority of Sec. 21 (b) of the Revised Election code
(REC) appointed Agustin Ramos (LP), who assumed office thereafter. In due time, Ramos' interim appointment was
submitted to the Commission on Appointments (CA) for confirmation. But before it could be confirmed, the new President
of the Phil., Hon. R. Magsaysay, nominated Rafael Alvarez for the same office. The nomination was unanimously
confirmed by the CA after it has rejected Ramos' appointment.
Alvarez assumed office as member of the Prov'l Board of Negros Occ. despite vigorous opposition from Ramos,
who thereafter filed the present petition to have himself declared legally entitled to the office and to have Alvarez ousted
therefrom.
Petitioner contends, among others, that he is still legally entitled to the office because his appointment was not
subject to the consent or disapproval of the CA. Respondent on his part contends otherwise.
ISSUE: W/N an appointment made by the President under Sec. 21(b) of the REC is subject to the consent of the
CA. (YES)
Sec. 21(b) of the REC, under w/c the petitioner was appointed, provides:
Whenever in any elective local office a vacancy occurs as a result of the death,
resignation, removal or cessation of the incumbent, the President shall appoint thereto a suitable
person belonging to the political party of the officer whom he is to replace, upon the
recommendation of said party, save in the case of mayor, which shall be filled by the vice
mayor."
Under Par. 3, of Sec. 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, there are four groups
of officers that the President shall appoint, namely:
First, the heads of executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of
the Navy and air forces from the rank of captain or commander;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the
Constitution;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, inferior officers whose appointments the Congress has by law vested in the President alone.
The Constitution is explicit that for officers of the first, second and third groups, the appointment made
by the President shall be with the consent of the CA. It is only in the case of the fourth group, that is, of inferior
officers whose appointment is by law vested "in the President alone" that such consent is not required.
On the other hand, examining the provision of Sec. 21(b) of the REC, we find that while it says that the
President shall make the appointment, it does not say that the appointment is not to be subject to the consent of
the CA that is, that it is to be made by the President alone. Such being the case, the President's appointment must
be deemed subject to the general requirement that the same is to be with the consent of the CA. It would fall then
under the third group of officers mentioned in par. 3 of Sec. 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution. Thus, in the
United States, under a constitutional provision similar to ours, the general rule is that "when a statute does not
specify how an officer is to be appointed, it must be by the President and with the consent of the Senate."
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's appointment as member of the Provincial Board was subject to the
consent of the CA, so that his right to the office ceased when his appointment was rejected by the Commission.
Adapted.
(Take note of the case of Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254)
(a) Heads of the executive departments
Art. VII, Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom, he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or
boards.
(b) Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls (Id.)
(c) Officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of colonel or
naval captain (because these are officers of a sizeable command enough to stage a coup)
(Id.)
(d) Other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in the
Constitution:
(i) Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions
Art. IX, B, Sec. 1. (2) The Chairman and the

Commissioners (of the Civil Service Commission) shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointment for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner
for five years, and another Commissioner for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Id., C, Sec. 1. (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners (of the Commission on Elections) shall
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years,
two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Id., D, Sec. 1 (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners (of the Commission on Audit) shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a
Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
(ii) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (composed of the IBP
representative, professor of law, retired SC justice, and representative of the private sector. Note the exofficio
members: Chief Justice, Secretary of Justice, and representative of Congress) Art.
VII, Sec. 8. (2) The regular members of the (Judicial and Bar) Council shall appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members
first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for
three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(iii) Sectoral representatives
Art. XVIII, Sec. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of
nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2) of
Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
(iv) Regional Consultative Commission
Art. X, Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define
the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic
acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Upon recommendation of the Judicial and Bar Council
(a) Members of the Supreme Court and all other courts
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.
(b) Ombudsman and his 5 deputies (for Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, general and
military)
Art. XI, Sec. 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for
every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled
within three months after they occur.
Appointment of VicePresident as Member of the Cabinet
The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation
Appointments solely by the President
Art. VII, Sec. 16. The President shall xxx also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom, he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

1. Those vested by the Constitution on the President alone (e.g. appointment of VicePresident to the
Cabinet) [Art. VII, Sec. 3(2)]
2. Those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
3. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
4. Those other officers lower in rank whose appointment is vested by law in the President (alone).
The phraseology is muddled.
The meaning of #4 was touched upon in Sarmiento v Mison. In arguing that even bureau chiefs needed
confirmation even if they are of inferior rank, the argument was the phrase, "The Congress may, by law, vest in
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone" meant that until a law is passed giving
such appointing power to the President alone, then such appointment has to be confirmed. Only after such law is
passed does the necessity for confirmation no longer hold. The SC dismissed this view however, saying that the
inclusion of the word "alone" was an oversight. Thus, the Constitution should read "The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President."
(5) Limitations on appointing power of the President
`Art. VII, Sec. 13. xxx
Id., Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
a. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil degree of the President shall
not, during his "tenure". be appointed as (i) members of the Constitutional Commissions, (ii) member of the
Office of Ombudsman, (iii) Secretaries, (iv) Undersecretaries, (v) Chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
b. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections (2nd Monday of March), and up to the
end of his "term" (June 30), a President (or Acting President) shall not make appointments.
Exception: Temporary appointments, to executive positions, when continued vacancies therein will (1)
prejudice public service (e.g. Postmaster) or (ii) endanger public safety (e.g. Chief of Staff).
This provision seems to have overruled previous pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the validity of
"midnight appointments".
(Ad interim appointments could either be "midnight", if made by the President before he steps down from office
or recess, if made by the President when Congress is not in session.)
In Aytona v Castillo, 4 SCRA 1 (1962), the SC ruled that while "midnight appointments" are not illegal,
they should be made in the capacity of a "caretaker" doubly careful and prudent in making the selection, so as
not to defeat the policies of the incoming administration. Said the court:
After the proclamation of an incoming President, the outgoing President is no more than a "caretaker"
administrator duty bound to prepare for the orderly transition to the new President, and he should not do acts that
would obstruct the policies of his successor.
The filling up of vacancies in important posts, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of delib
erate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees qualifications, may be
undoubtedly permitted.
But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night, and the planned induction of almost all of them a few
hours before the inauguration of the new President may be regarded as abuse of presidential prerogatives.
Where the President makes adinterim (i.e., midnight) appointments, he is bound to be
"prudent" to insure approval of his selection, either by previous consultation with the CA or by
explaining his reason thereafter. Where the CA that will consider the appointees is different from
that existing at the time of appointment, and where the names are to be submitted by his successor
who may not wholly approve of his selections, the President should be "doubly careful in
extending such appointment.
In Jorge v Mayer, 10 SCRA 331 (1964), the Court emphasized the rule in Aytona that a prudently made
midnight appointment so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointees' qualifications is not prohibited by law. The circumstances of
Jorge's appointment as Director of Lands in this case, based on his 38 years of faithful service and confirmed by
the CA before its adjournment, were found to be judicious.
In Quisumbing v Tajanglangit, 10 SCRA 446 (1964), the SC emphasized that the Aytona ruling does not
declare all midnight appointments as invalid, and that the ad interim appointment of the petitioner chief of police
here, whose qualification and regularity were not disputed, except for the fact that it was made during the last
few days of the old administration, is thus not invalid.
Interim or recess appointments
Art VI, Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be
constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized
with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only
while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge
such powers and functions as herein conferred upon it.
Regular and recess (adinterim) appointments
The procedure for confirmation has been discussed above under Constitutional Congressional
Committees. To sketch:
Appointments requiring confirmation are of two kinds, (i) regular, if the CA, that is, Congress, is in
session, or (ii) during the recess of Congress (because the Commission shall meet only while Congress is in
session [Art. VI, Sec. 19]).
Regular appointments require confirmation before the appointee can take his post. The President
nominates, Congress receives the nomination and forwards this to the CA for confirmation, then the Office of
the President issues a Commission, at which point the appointee can assume his office.
Recess appointments, on the other hand, need no confirmation to be effective, albeit temporarily. The
appointment is effective until it is disapproved by the Commission on Appointments, or until the next
adjournment of Congress (unless meantime, it is confirmed by the Commission) (Art. VII, Sec. 16, par. 2)
Temporary Designations:
Administrative Code of 1987, Book III Sec. 17
The President may designate an officer already in the govt. service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of any office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when:
(a) The officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness,
absence or any other cause; or
(b) There exists a vacancy;
In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.
(6) Limitations on the appointing power of the Acting President
Art. VII, Secs. 1416
Art. VII, Sec. 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective unless
revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
Art. VII, Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
UPDATED 1/23/96
/RAM
(7) Executive clemencies
Art. VII, Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
It shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
The President may grant (i)reprieves, (ii) commutations, and (iii) pardons, and (iv) remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment, except :
(a) In cases of impeachment, and
(b) As otherwise provided in this Constitution, viz.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence for violation of election
laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation by
the Commission (on Elections.)
Definitions
Reprieve is a temporary relief from or postponement of execution of criminal penalty or sentence or a
stay of execution. It does not more than stay the execution of a sentence extended to a prisoner to afford him an
opportunity to procure some amelioration of the sentence imposed. (Black.) It is the withholding of a sentence
for an interval of time, a postponement of execution, a temporary suspension of execution. (People vs. Vera,
infra.)
Commutation is a reduction of sentence. (Black.) It is a remission of a part of the punishment; a

substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed. (People vs. Vera, infra.)
Pardon is a permanent cancellation of sentence. (Black) It is an act of grace proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed. It is a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of the
offense. (People v Vera, infra.)
Cruz: Kinds of Pardon. Pardon may be classified into absolute or conditional and plenary or partial. An

absolute pardon is one extended w/o any strings attached, so to speak, whereas a conditional pardon is one under
w/c the convict is required to comply w/ certain requirements. A plenary pardon extinguishes all the penalties
imposed upon the offender, including accessory disabilities, whereas partial pardon does not.
Where the pardon is conditional, the offender has the right to reject the same since he may feel that the
condition imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted. But in the case of an absolute
pardon, the pardonee has no option at all and must accept it whether he likes it or not. In this sense, an absolute
pardon is similar to commutation, w/c is also not subject to acceptance by the offender.
Amnesty is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by government generally to a class of
persons who have been guilty usually of political offenses (treason, sedition, rebellion), and who are subject to
trial but have not yet been convicted, and often conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty within a
prescribed time. (Black; Brown v Walker, 161 US 602).
Probation is a disposition under which a defendant after conviction and sentence is released subject to
conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer. [Sec. 3 (a), PD 968.]
Parole is the suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a Parole Board after serving the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence penalty, without granting a pardon, prescribing the terms upon
which the sentence shall be suspended.
(a) Pardon distinguished from probation
People vs. Vera, 65 P 56 (1937)
Probation and Pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct and
different from each other, both in origin and nature. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in
pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment
w/c the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is
placed on probation. The probationer, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody subject to the
control of the probation officer and of the court, he may be rearrested upon the nonfulfillment of the conditions
of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon
him.
Notes:
In both cases, there must be a final judgment of conviction, and the convict must be exempted from
service of sentence. But pardon is granted by the Chief Executive for any crime, while probation is granted by
the court after investigation by a probation officer only for cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed 6
years and 1 day (prision mayor), where the crime is not against the security of the State, where there was no
previous conviction for an offense punished by arresto mayor, and where there was no previous availment of
probation.
In absolute pardon, the sentence and its effects, including the accessory penalties, are abolished upon the
grant of pardon. In probation, the restoration of the probationer to his civil rights takes places only after his final
discharge after the period of his probation. (Secs. 14 & 16)
(b) Pardon distinguished from Parole
Pardon may be granted by the Chief Executive under the Constitution and formerly the Administrative
Code, at any time after final judgment of conviction, even before service; while parole is granted by the Board of
Pardons and Parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law only after the convict has served the minimum term
of his sentence.
In pardon, the convict becomes a free man; in parole, he is not really free because although he his
released from the custody of the law, he must submit to periodic examination by the Board of Parole.
In Tesoro v Director of Prisons, 68 Phil 154 (1939), the SC dismissed the contention that because parole
is not mentioned in the Constitution, then the power to grant parole is also deemed repealed. The Court said that
parole is part of the pardoning power of the President. Justice Fernando points out, however, that this is not
accurate. If ever the President has the power to grant parole, it is because the law grants him that power, and not
because parole is part of pardon.
Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, 68 Phil 154

F: On Oct. 10, 1934, petitioner Tesoro was convicted in the CFI Manila of the crime of falsification of a public
document and was sentenced. His penalty was to expire on Oct. 28, 1937.
On Nov. 14, 1935, the Gov. Gen. granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to certain
conditions. One of the conditions was that he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner.
Dec. 3, 1937, the petr was charged with the crime of adultery. However, the case was dismissed for nonappearance
of the complainant, Jose Nagar.
Feb. 1938, Nagar lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts
supporting the crim. action, charged petitioner with violation of the conditions of his parole.
Later, by virtue of an order from the President, the petr was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Dir. of
Prisons.
Petr. contends that sec. 64 (i) of the Rev. Adm. Code, insofar as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to
grant and revoke paroles, has been impliedly repealed by Par. 6, sec. 11, Art. VII of the Constitution, as the latter omitted to
specify such power in connection with the powers granted therein to the President of the Philippines.
Sec. 64(1) gives the Gov. Gen the ff. powers and duties:
"To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or
unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted
person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re
incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment shall fail to comply with the condition, or
conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence."
The aforementioned Constitutional provision provides:
"The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such
conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly."
ISSUE NO. 1: W/N there has been a repeal.
HELD: NONE. The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with
such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke
paroles. If the omission of the power of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as a denial thereof to the
President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the
Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive.

ISSUE NO. 2: W/N the Board has legal authority to investigate the conduct of the petitioner.
HELD: YES. By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report to the executive secretary of the Board once
a month during the first year of his parole, and thereafter, once every 3 months. By his consent to this condition,
petitioner has placed himself under the supervision of the Board. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner
implies a corresponding power on the part of the Board to inquire into his conduct and a fortiori to make
recommendations to the President by whose authority it was acting. The power to revoke paroles necessarily
carries with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of
revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power, the President is not precluded
by law or by the Constitution from making use of any agency of the govt, or even of any individual, to secure the
necessary assistance.
ISSUE NO. 3: W/N judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime is necessary before he
can be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
HELD: NO. As one of the conditions of his parole, petitioner agreed that he will not commit any other crime and
will conduct himself in an orderly manner. Thus, the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other
crime, that was necessary in order that petitioner may be deemed to have violated his parole. And under Sec. 64
(i), the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who, in his
judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition/s of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.
ISSUE NO. 4: W/N the courts can review the findings of the Pres. regarding the violation of the conditional
parole.
HELD: NO. Where the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings.
ISSUE NO. 5: W/N upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also
expires.

HELD: NO. When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in w/c he was at the
time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prison. xxx The rule is wellsettled that,
in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had not
suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large
by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence. (Pp. v. Tapel) This rule applies by analogy to
conditional parole. Adapted.
Torres v. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272
F: Before 1979, Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa (2 counts) and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay
an indemnity. The maximum sentence would expire on Nov. 2, 2000.

On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted the petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner
would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phil. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against
in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was released.
On Sept. 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner upon recommendation of the
Board of Pardons. The record before the Board showed that petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, convicted
of sedition w/c is the subject of an appeal, and a letter report from the NBI showing a long list of charges brought against
the petitioner. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence.
Petitioner claims he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the
20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition. He also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before
he was arrested and recommitted to prison and thus deprived of due process.
ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
HELD: NO. The Court cited 3 cases: Espuelas v. Prov'l Warden of Bohol; Tesoro v. Dir. of Prisons and Sales v.
Dir. of Prisons.
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are

purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences
of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec. 64 (i) of the Rev.
Adm. Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon
under Art. 159 of the RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Sec. 64 (i), RAC, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for w/c he was
conditionally pardoned, sec. 64 (i), RAC, is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In short, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Dept. has 2 options: (i) to proceed against him under
Sec. 64 (i), RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him under Art. 159, RPC which imposes the penalty of prision
correccional minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against
the petitioner under the RAC. That choice is an exercise of the executive prerogative and not subject to judicial
scrutiny. Adapted.
(c) Pardon distinguished from Amnesty
1. Pardon is usually granted for common crimes; amnesty, for political crimes.
2. Pardon is granted to individuals; amnesty, to a group, class, or community generally.
3. Pardon can only be granted after conviction; amnesty may be granted even before trial.
4. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment; amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, that is, it overlooks and obliterates the offense with which the convict is charged
that the person released stands precisely as though he had committed no offense. (Barrioquinto v Fernandez,
infra.)
5. Pardon is a private act of the President w/c must be pleaded and proved by the person bec. the courts
do not take judicial notice of it; amnesty is a public act of w/c the courts take judicial notice. (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1991 ed.)
6. Pardon does not require the concurrence of the Congress; amnesty requires such concurrence. (id.)
Barrioquinto et al v. Fernandez 82 Phil 642
F: Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of Procl. No. 8 which grants amnesty in
favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of resistance to the enemy or
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period Dec. 8, 1941 to the date when each
particular area of the Phil. where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation.
The petitioners submitted their cases to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission (GAC).
The GAC returned their cases to the CFIZamboanga w/o deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits
of the Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither of the petitioners have admitted to committing the
offense, they cannot invoke the benefits of the amnesty.

HELD: Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and

proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while Amnesty is by Proclamation of
the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take
judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence" (Art 36 RPC). While Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
ISSUE: W/N in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Procl. of Sept. 7, 1946, it is necessary as
a condition precedent that he should admit having committed the criminal act with w/c he is charged and allege
the amnesty as a defense.
HELD: NO. It is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or of the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes w/n the terms of said Amnesty Procl.

It is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of the amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be
declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, w/n he admits
or confesses having committed the offense w/ w/c he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or
requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the
accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and
to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who has rendered invaluable services to the nation," or not, in accordance
with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
ISSUE: W/N the benefits of amnesty may be waived.
HELD: The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by the
prosecution or the defense, cannot be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the
Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if
he had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, cannot be
punished as a criminal.
Dissenting Opinion:
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not committed a
crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also selfevident that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes
certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of those conditions. A
petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the
allegations against him before he is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action.
o
The 4th distinction (pardon is forward looking while amnesty is backward looking) is not accurate on
the basis of decided cases.
It can be seen from several cases, therefore that the effect of pardon retroacts to the day of the crime. It
is not simply forwardlooking.
Pardon is still useful, then, even if the convict has already served his full sentence, because there may be
accessory penalties that are perpetual in extent. Adapted.
Notes:
The fifth distinction bet. pardon and amnesty is that pardon is a private act of the President, and so must
be impleaded in court; amnesty is a public act by the President and Congress, and so the court is enjoined to take
judicial notice of it. (supra)
The 5th distinction (pardon is a private act while amnesty is a public act) is not true in Philippine law.
The case holds that pardon must be raised as a defense, otherwise the court cannot take judicial notice of such
pardon. But under Art. 89 of the RPC, absolute pardon extinguishes criminal liability. And under the
Constitution, pardon can only be granted after final conviction. If so, once, a convict has been granted pardon,
this implies that he has already been convicted, and that precisely he has been exempted from the penalty arising
from conviction. Why would he still have to invoke it? This seems to contemplate a situation where he is being
charged again of the same crime, and that he needs to invoke the pardon as a defense, which is impossible
because of double jeopardy.
The error in the Barrioquinto ruling is that it borrowed this distinction from American law, which allows
the President the power to grant pardon even before conviction (thus, Ford was able to pardon Nixon even
without a trial.)
Such was our law under the Jones Law of 1916. But under the 1935 Constitution, this rule was changed:
pardon could only be granted after conviction, In 1973, it was made stricter: pardon could be granted only after
"final" conviction. Then, in 1981, the phrase "after final conviction" was dropped, thus going back to the rule
under the Jones Law and the President could grant pardon anytime. In 1987, the phrase reads: "after conviction
by final judgment."
Aside from extinguishing criminal liability, pardon also works to remit fines and forfeitures paid in favor
of the Government.
But it does not automatically restore the public office forfeited, nor relieve the pardonee of civil liability
and other claims pertaining to the private offended party.
(d) Effects of Pardon
In Cristobal v Labrador, 71 Phil 34 (1940), the voter whose right to vote was challenged in an exclusion
proceeding because he had been convicted of estafa which carried the accessory penalty of disqualification from
the right of suffrage, and in Pellobello v Palatino, 72 Phil 441 (1941), the mayorelect who was not allowed to
take his oath because of a previous conviction, for falsification of a private document which likewise carried the
accessory penalty of disqualification, were both allowed to exercise their political right in view of the subsequent
pardon granted them. [There would be no problem if they were pardoned beforehand, for then they would be
restored to their political right(s) right away.]
Cristobal v Labrador, 71 Phil 34 (1940)
F: On 3/15/30, Teofilo Santos was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to 6 months of arresto mayor. Upon appeal,
his conviction was affirmed. He was confined in jail from 3/14/9/32 to 8/18/32. Notwithstanding his conviction, Santos
continued to be a registered elector in Malabon, Rizal and was municipal pres. from 1934 to 1937. Subsequently, The
Election Code was approved. Sec. 94, par. (b) of said law disqualifies the resp. from voting for having been declared by
final judgment guilty of any crime against prop." Bec. of this provision, Santos petitioned the Chief Executive for absolute
pardon. The Pres. granted his petition restoring him to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the
right to hold public office or employment, he will be appointed for appointments only to positions w/c are clerical or
manual in nature and involving no money or prop. responsibility. On 11/40, Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of
Santos' name in from the list of voters in Malabon on the ground that the latter is disqualified under par. (b), Sec. 94 of CA
357. LC denied Cristobal's petition holding that Santos' pardon had the effect of excluding him from the disqualification
created by par. (b) of Sec. 94. Hence, this petition for ceritorari.
HELD: There are 2 limitations upon the exercise of the constitutional prerogative of the Pres. to grant pardon:
(1) that the power be exercised after conviction; (2) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.
xxx An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but it also removes all disabilities resulting from
conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction w/o w/c there would be no basis for the
disqualification from voting.
xxx
In the present case, while the pardon extended is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions w/c are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or prop. resp., " it is
absolute insofar as it "restores the resp. to full civil and political rights." Adapted.
Pelobello v. Palatino 72 Phil 441
F: Pelobello alleges that Palatino is disqualified from voting and being voted upon. It appears that Palatino was con
victed by final judgment in 1912 of atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment. He was later
elected mayor of Torrijos, Marinduque in 1940. It is admitted that Palatino was granted by the Gov. Gen. a conditional
pardon in 1915. It is also proven that on Dec. 25, 1940, the President granted him absolute pardon and restored him to the
enjoyment of full civil and political rights.
ISSUE: W/N the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction
under the then Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law
for assuming office.
HELD: YES. The SC adopts the broad view in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislation; an absolute pardon not
only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when
granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences
of conviction. Thus the better view is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive
who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of law to the extent of
relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal
conviction.
Under the circumstances of the case, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was
to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended after the
election but before the date fixed by the Election Code for assuming office. Adapted.
In Lacuna v Abes, 24 SCRA 780, the petitioner was convicted of counterfeiting, and so was disqualified
from the right of suffrage. As a result, he was not allowed to file his candidacy, even if he was already granted
pardon, because one of the requirements for the office was that the candidate be a qualified voter. The SC, after
pointing out that the law did not require that he be a registered voter but only a qualified voter at the day of
election, pointed out that, granting arguendo, pardon retroacted to the day of the crime. Thus, on the day of the
election, "it is as though he was a registered voter even if on that day, he was not yet pardoned."
Lacuna v. Abes 24 SCRA 780
F: Mayorelect Abes had been convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants and sentenced to prision
mayor and a fine. After he had partially served his sentence, he was released on April 7, 1959 by virtue of a conditional
pardon granted by the President, remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison term and fine. Without the pardon, his
maximum sentence would have been served on Oct. 13, 1961.
With the approach of the 1967 elections, Abes applied for registration as a voter but said application was denied.
Despite this, Abes filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor and later won. On Nov. 16, 1967, he was
proclaimed the fully elected mayor. Lacuna placed second.
Lacuna filed his petition for quo warranto with prelim. injunction in CFINueva Ecija. On the same day that the
hearing was held on the application for prelim. injunction, the President granted Abes an absolute and unconditional pardon
and restored to him full civil and political rights.
CFI dismissed the petition, declaring Abes' eligibility to the position of mayor.
Lacuna contends that the restoration of Abes' civil and pol. rights did not retroact to remove the disqualification
existing anterior to the grant of the pardon.
ISSUE: W/N a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office, had
the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by both the criminal and electoral codes.
HELD: YES. The view consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effects should not be
unnecessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power, which was not contemplated in
the Constitution (Cristobal v. Labrador; Pelobello v. Palatino; Mijares v. Custorio).
As laid down in the Pelobello case, "xxx subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the

pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots
out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and that when granted after the
term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
Thus the better view is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry
into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of law to the extent of relieving completely
the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. Adapted.
In Monsanto vs Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, where a woman who was convicted of estafa through
falsification of public documents was granted an absolute pardon, and thereafter claimed she was entitled as a
consequence to reinstatement as assistant city treasurer, the SC held that a pardon cannot mask the acts consti
tuting the crime. These are "historical facts" which, despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness
implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor."
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to
all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation
for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind, lest we lose track of the true
character and purpose of the privilege. Thus, pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public
office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction, although such pardon undoubtedly
restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
Monsanto vs Factoran, 170 SCRA 190
A Pardoned Convict is not Entitled to Reinstatement to a Public Office.
F: Petitioner Salvacion Monsanto was Asst. Treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced to 4 yrs., 2 mos. and 1 day of prision correcional, as minimum, to 10 yrs.
and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum; to pay fine (P3,500) and to indemnify the govt (P4,892.50) in a decision of the
SB. While her case was pending appeal in the SC, she was granted absolute pardon and "restored to full civil and political
rights" by then Pres. Marcos. The Ministry of Finance agreed to reinstate her w/o necessity of a new appointment provided
this was done not earlier than the date of her pardon. However, on 4/15/86, the new administration held that she was not
entitled to automatic reinstatement on the basis of the pardon granted her. As her MFR was denied, petitioner brought this
action to the SC. Petitioner's theory is that the gen. rule on pardon does not apply to her bec. she was extended clemency
while her case was still pending in the SC. She contended that w/o final judgment on conviction, the accessory penalty of
forfeiture of office did not attach.
HELD: (1) Petitioner was granted pardon under the 1973 Consti., as amended, w/c, by deleting the requirement
that pardon could be granted only after final conviction, impliedly authorized it to be granted even before
conviction. The 1987 Consti. reverted to the former rule, requiring final conviction as a condition for the grant
by the Pres. of pardon. However, it is immaterial when the pardon was granted, for the result would be the same.
By accepting the pardon, the petitioner is deemed to have abondoned her appeal, w/ the result that the judgment
of conviction of the SB (w/c entailed her temporary absolute disqualification from holding public office)
became final.
(2) The modern trend of authorities reject the unduly broad language of Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333
(1867) to the effect that in the eyes of the law, the offender who is pardoned is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a
criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not
be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the view that pardon blots out the guilt of an
individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been
the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a
pardoned convict in character and conduct w/ one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law
abiding citizen. Accordingly, pardon does not ipso facto restore him to public office may have been forfeited by
reason of the conviction, although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
Petitioner may apply for reappointment but, in considering her qualifications, the facts constituting her
conviction should be taken into account to determine whether she can again be entrusted w/ public funds.
(3) Nor can petitioner be exempted from the payment of the civil indemnity. It subsists notwithstanding
service of sentence, if for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
VV.
Notes on the case: "Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (w/c
is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept
in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege. xxx"
(e) Sanctions for violations of conditional pardon
Torres vs Gonzales 152 SCRA 272
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Dept. has 2 options: (i) to proceed against him under Sec.
64(i), RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him under Art. 159, RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correc
cional minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive,
shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under the RAC. That choice is an exercise of the executive prerogative and not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
(f) Does pardoning power apply to administrative cases?
Llamas vs Executive Secretary, 202 SCRA 844 (1991)
"Conviction" may be used in either a criminal case or in an administrative case.
F: Pet. Llamas was ViceGov. of Tarlac who assumed the position of gov. when Gov. Ocampo was found
guilty by DILG of a viol. of RA 3019 and meted a penalty of 90 days suspension. Administrative conviction was
based on complaint filed by petitioners and others charging Ocampo w/ executing loan agreement w/ Lingkod
Tarlac Foundation for the amount of P20M, w/c is a nonstock and nonprofit org. headed by the gov. as
chairman and his brotherinlaw as executive director, trustee and secretary. Loan was claimed to be
disadvantageous to the govt. MFR by Ocampo was denied by DILG. On 3/19/91, Ocampo issued "admin.
order" wherein he signified intention to continue in office at his residence in the belief that pendency of appeal
to the Exec. Sec. precluded finality as executory of the DILG order. W/o ruling on the MFR, the Exec. Sec.
issued a resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo. Llamas filed petition claiming that executive
clemency could only be granted by the Pres. in crim. cases, not in admin. cases.
HELD: According to petitioner, "after conviction by final judgment" applies solely to crim. cases." But, he

himself describes the governor as one "convicted in an admin. case" and thus actually concedes that "conviction"
may be used either in a crim. or admin. case. The Const. does not distinguish bet. w/c cases executive clemency
may be exercised by the Pres., w/ the sole exclusion of impeachment cases.
If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses. However, the power of the President to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases refers only to administrative cases in the Executive branch and not in the Judicial or
Legislative branches of the govt.
Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different Executive departments are mere adjuncts
of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by
her. In this case, the President in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive
departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate. It is clearly within the power of the
President not only to grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate
against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in
this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted. Adapted.
Sec. 53, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987
Sec. 53. Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities. In meritorious cases and upon
recommendation of the (Civil Service) Commission, the President may commute or remove administrative
penalties or disabilities imposed upon officers or employees in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms
and conditions as he may impose in the interest of the service
(g) Who may avail of amnesty?
Tolentino vs Catoy 82 Phil 300 (1948)
F: Petitioner was a Hukbalahap who was found guilty of illegal assembly in furtherance of the Hukbalahap designs.
After the judgment was promulgated, the President issued Proc. No. 76 granting amnesty to leaders and members of the
Hukbalahap. Petitioner who was already serving his sentence, sent a petition to the President for his release under the
provisions of the proclamation. No action was taken on his petition. He then went to court and filed an application for a
writ of habeas corpus.
HELD : Though some members of the Court question the applicability of Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 to
Hukbalahaps already undergoing sentence upon the date of its promulgation, the majority of the Court believe
that by its context and pervading spirit the proclamation extends to all members of the Hukbalahap. It makes no
exception when it announces that the amnesty is proclaimed in favor of the leaders and members of the
associations known as the Hukbalahap and Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid (PKM). No compelling
reason is apparent for excluding Hukbalahaps of any class or condition from its object which is "to forgive and
forego the prosecution of the crimes of rebellion, sedition, etc." If total punishment is foregone in favor of
Hukbalahaps who succeeded in evading arrest, it stands to reason that those who fell into the clutches of the law
have a better claim to clemency for the remaining portion of a punishment fixed for the same offense.
The avowed practical objective of the amnesty is to secure pledge of loyalty and obedience to the
constituted authorities and encourage resumption of lawful pursuits and occupation. This objective cannot be
expected to meet with full success without the goodwill and cooperation of the Hukbalahaps who have become
more embittered by their capture, prosecution and incarceration.
Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are synonymous. Pardon includes
amnesty. Pardon and amnesty are both construed most strictly against the state. Adapted.
Macagaan vs People 152 SCRA 430
Petitioners were charged and convicted of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents by the Sandiganbayan. They claimed that they had been granted amnesty by President Marcos. The
Sandiganbayan claimed that the benefits of amnesty were never available to petitioners under PD 1182. The SC
agreed with the Sandiganbayan that in fact the petitioners were expressly disqualified from amnesty. The acts for
which they were convicted were ordinary crimes without any political complexion and consisting only of
diversion of public funds to private profit. The amnesty proclamation covered only acts in the furtherance of
resistance to duly constituted authorities of the Republic.
BARLONGAY CASE:
Vera vs. People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963)
Amnesty cannot be invoked, where the accused actually denies the commission of the offense charged.
F: In the CFIQuezon, petitioners Vera, among others, were charged w/ the complex crime of kidnapping w/ murder
of Amadeo Lozanes. Upon petitioners' motion, invoking the benefits of Amnesty Procl. of the Pres, s. of 1946, the case
was referred to the Eight Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, w/c actually tried it. During the hearing, none of the petitioners
admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact, Vera, the only def. who took the witness stand, instead of admitting
the killing of the deceased Lozanes, categorically denied it. Hence, the Commission, in its decision held that it could not
take cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Procl., could be invoked only by defs. in a
criminal case who, admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance
movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the
Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial. A MFR was filed by petitioners but was
denied. From this order of the Commission, petitioners appealed to the CA w/c certified the appeal to us, in view of the
legal issue involved.
ISSUE: W/n persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed the crime of w/c they
are accused.
Petitioners contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Procl. No. 8, it is not necessary for
them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing in support of their submission, among others, the
case of Barrioquinto, et. al vs. Fernandez, et, al. (82 P642.) to the effect that "in order to entitle a person to the
benefits of Amnesty Procl., it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent, admit having committed
the criminal act or offense w/ w/c he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes w/in the terms of
said Amnesty Procl.
HELD: But said cases have been superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of Peo. vs. Llanita,
et. al. (86 P 219), etc. wherein we held that
"It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act or seek forgiveness for an act, according to
him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused
maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty
procl. imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence
of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance,
which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on
account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the
amnesty proclamation." (italics supplied.)
At any rate, the facts established bef. the Commission do not bring the case w/in the terms of the
Amnesty Procl. xxx As found by the Commission, the killing of the deceased (Lozanes) was not in furtherance
of the resistance movement, but due to the rivalry bet. the Hunter's Guerrilla, to w/c he belonged, and the Vera's
Guerrilla of petitioners. RAM.
(8) Powers as commanderinchief
Art. VII, Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commanderin Chief of all armed forces of the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when the evidence of guild is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Art. VIII, Sec. 1. xxx
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
As CommanderinChief of all armed forces of the Philippines, the President has the following powers:
a. He may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
b. He may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or
c. He may proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines or any part thereof.
Subject to: Art. VIII, Sec. 1 par. 2. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Govt.
Call out the AFP to prevent lawless violence
This is merely a police measure meant to quell disorder. As such, the Constitution does not regulate its
exercise radically
Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
A "writ of habeas corpus" is an order from the court commanding a detaining officer to inform the court
(i) if he has the person in custody, and (ii) what his basis in detaining that person.
The "privilege of the writ" is that portion of the writ requiring the detaining officer to show cause why
he should not be tested. Note that it is the privilege that is suspended, not the writ itself.
Requisites:
1. There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
2. The public safety requires the suspension.
Effects of the suspension of the privilege
1. The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons "judicially charged" for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 5). Such persons suspected of the
above crimes can be arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest.
"Judicially charged" as used in the Constitution is imprecise. For if one were already judicially charged,
his detention would be legal and so he could no longer petition for habeas corpus. Habeas corpus precisely
contemplates a situation in which a person is being detained without being charged in court. Thus, the provision
should read "one who is suspected of complicity in" the two crimes above.
As a general rule, no person could be arrested without a warrant of arrest (validly issued upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, (cf. Art. III, Sec. 2), unless (i) the arrest was
made in connection with a crime committed in the presence of the detaining officer, or (ii) the
privilege of the writ was suspended. If the public officer arrests him without a warrant, the
officer becomes liable for "arbitrary detention" under Art. 124 of the RPC, and a petition for
habeas corpus can be filed to seek his release.
The suspension of the privilege does not make the arrest without warrant legal. But the military is, in
effect, enabled to make the arrest, anyway since, with the suspension of the privilege, there is no remedy
available against such unlawful arrest (arbitrary detention). The arrest without warrant is justified by the
emergency situation and the difficulty in applying for a warrant considering the time and the number of persons
to be arrested.
But the crime for which he is arrested must be one related to rebellion or the invasion. As to other
crimes, the suspension of the privilege does not apply.
2. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within 3 days, or otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 6).
In other words, the public officer can detain a person without warrant of arrest, but he can only do so for
72 hours. Before the lapse of 72 hours, an information must have been filed in the proper court charging him of
the offense for which he was arrested. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the detainee wants a
preliminary investigation to be first conducted by the fiscal, he must sign a waiver of the effects of Art. 125.
(delay in the delivery of detained persons)
The effect of the suspension of the privilege, therefore, is only to extend the periods during which he can
be detained without a warrant. Under Art. 125, as amended by EO 272, the public officer can only detain him
for 12, 18 or 36 hours depending on the gravity of the offense of which he is charged; within this time, he must
be judicially charged, otherwise, he must be released. When the privilege is suspended, the period is extended to
72 hours.
What happens if he is not judicially charged nor released after 72 hours? The public officer becomes
liable under Art. 125 for "delay in the delivery of detained persons." As to the detainee, it is submitted that he or
someone else in his behalf can file a petition for habeas corpus. For even if the suspension has a lifetime of 60
days in general, as to that person, the suspension only has an effectivity of 72 hours, so that after this time, the
suspension is lifted as to him.
3. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. (Art. III, Sec. 13)
Art. III, Sec. 13. xxx The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of HC is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This new provision abrogates the ruling in Morales v Ponce Enrile which held the contrary.
Proclaim Martial Law
Requisites:
1. There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
2. Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all over the Philippines or any part thereof.
Effects of the proclamation of martial law
The President can:
1. Legislate
2. Order the arrest of people who obstruct the war effort.
But the following cannot be done (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 4)
1. Suspend the operation of the Constitution.
2. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the legislative assemblies.
The principle is that martial law is proclaimed only because the courts and other civil institutions like
Congress have been shut down. It should not happen that martial law is declared in order to shut down the civil
institutions.
3. Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies over civilians, where civil courts are unable to
function.
This is the "open court" doctrine which holds that civilians cannot be tried by military courts if the civil
courts are open and functioning. But if the civil courts are not functioning, then civilians can be tried by the
military courts. Martial laws usually contemplates a case where the courts are already closed and the civil
institutions have already crumbled, that is a "theater of war." If the courts are still open, the President can just
suspend the privilege and achieve the same effect.
4. Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
This overrules the holding in Aquino v PonceEnrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974), that when the President

proclaims martial law, he also impliedly suspends the privilege of the writ.
Under the present rule, the President can still suspend the privilege even as he proclaim martial law, but
he must so suspend expressly.
The Role of Congress
a. When the President proclaims martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ, such proclamation or
suspension shall be effective for a period of 60 days, unless sooner revoked by the Congress.
b. Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress shall convene at once. If it is not in session, it shall
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call within 24 hours following the proclamation or
suspension.
c. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the suspension, the President shall submit a report, in
person or in writing, to the Congress (meeting in joint session of the action he has taken).
d. The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolute majority. It has two options:
(i) To revoke such proclamation or suspension.
When it so revokes, the President cannot set aside (or veto) the revocation as he normally would do in
the case of bills. If Congress does not do anything, the measure will expire anyway in 60 days. So the revoca
tion must be made before the lapse of 60 days from the date the measure was taken.
(ii) To extend it beyond the 60day period of its validity.
Congress can only so extend the proclamation or suspension upon the initiative of the President.
The period need not be 60 days; it could be more, as Congress would determine, based on the
persistence of the emergency. If Congress fails to act before the measure expires, it can no longer
extend it until the President again redeclares the measure, for how do one extend something that
has already lapsed?
Note that Congress cannot "validate" the proclamation or suspension, because it is already valid.
It is thus restricted to the 2 measures above.
If Congress extends the measure, but before the period of extension lapses, the requirements for the
proclamation or suspension no longer exist, Congress can lift the extension, since the power to confer implies the
power to take back. If Congress does not review or lift the order, this can be reviewed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to the next section.
The Role of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filled by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of (a) the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, or (b) the
extension thereof. It must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18 par.
3)
This is because judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2)
The jurisdiction of the SC may be invoked in a proper case. A petition for habeas corpus is one such
case. When a person is arrested without a warrant for complicity in the rebellion or invasion, he or someone else
in his behalf has the standing to question the validity of the proclamation or suspension. But before the SC can
decide on the legality of his detention, it must first pass upon the validity of the proclamation or suspension.
The test to be used by the Supreme Court in so reviewing the act of the President in proclaiming or
suspending, or the act of Congress in extending, is the test of arbitrariness which seeks to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the measure. The question is not whether the President or Congress acted
correctly, but whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact.
Deciding on whether the act was arbitrary amounts to a determination of whether or not there was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is now made part of judicial power by Art.
VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2. This curbs radically the application of the political question doctrine.
This test was taken from the case of Lansang v Garcia, 42 SCRA 446 (1971). The issue there raised was
whether in suspending the privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for doing so. The SC, in considering
the fact that the President based his decision on (a) the Senate report on the condition in Central Luzon and (b) a
closed door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the President did not act
arbitrarily. One may disagree with his appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is without basis.
[In this case of Lansang vs. Garcia, the SC held unanimously that it has the authority to inquire into the
existence of the factual basis in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. This holding of the SC
is now found in Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3.]
With this test and the new provisions in the 1987 Constitution, the case of GarciaPadilla v Ponce Enrile,
121 SCRA 472 (1983), is, at last, overruled, and may it be so always. In that case, the SC held that the
President's proclamation of martial law is beyond judicial review, and that the citizen can only trust that the
President acts in good faith. The cases of Barcelon v Baker and Montenegro v Castaneda, which ruled that the
validity of the suspension of the privilege was a political question, are likewise buried in the grave of judicial
history.
There are 4 ways, then, for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted:
1) Lifting by the President himself
2) Revocation by Congress
3) Nullification by the Supreme Court
4) Operation of law after 60 days
Military Trial of Civilians Void Even Under Martial Law, If Civil Courts Are Open. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 5.).
In Aquino vs Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546, the SC upheld the power of the President to
create military tribunals authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil
courts were open and functioning, thus rejecting the "open court" theory. The SC there held: "Martial law
creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses
against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals. Public danger warrants
the substitution of executive process for judicial process. The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction,
must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. xxx
In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, the Aquino vs. Military
Commission No. 2 decision was reversed. According to the SC, civilians who are placed on trial for civil
offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process. Since we are not enemyoccupied territory
nor are we under a military govt. and even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are
properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly functioning. The
assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander in Chief or on
any theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functioning, military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly
cognizable by civil courts. To hold otherwise is a violation of the right to due process.
"The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected
by tenure and undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially
different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these differences, the suggestion of
the possibility of influence on the actions of the courtmartial by the officer who convenes it, selects its
members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is
a pervasive one in military laws, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.
(9) Emergency powers
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress, may, by law, authorize the
This grant of emergency power to the President is different from the CommanderinChief clause. When
the President acts under the CommanderinChief clause, he acts under a constitutional grant of military power,
which may include the lawmaking power. But when the President acts under the emergency power, he acts
under a Congressional delegation of lawmaking power.
The scope of the grant is such "powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy."
Under the 1935 Constitution, this was construed the power to issue rules and regulations to carry out the
declared policy. The 1987 Constitution, it is submitted, does not change the scope. "Power necessary and
proper" should mean legislative power, because Congress is only allowed to delegate legislative power, being its
only inherent power. Its other powers are only granted to it by the Constitution, and so it cannot delegate what
has only been delegated to it.
This power is (1) for a limited period, and (2) subject to such restrictions as Congress may provide. The
power ceases (a) upon being withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, or, if Congress fails to adopt such
resolution, (b) upon the next (voluntary) adjournment of Congress. For the fact that Congress is able to meet in
session uninterruptedly and adjourn of its own will proves that the emergency no longer exists is to justify the
delegation.
This rule or the termination of the grant of emergency powers is based on decided cases, which in turn
became Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the 1973 Constitution.
In Araneta v Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368 (1949), the Congress granted the President emergency powers to
fix rentals of houses. After the war, Congress held a special session. The SC held that the emergency power
lasted only until Congress held its regular session. The fact that Congress could now meet meant that there was
no emergency anymore that would justify the delegation.
In the cases of Rodriguez v Treasurero, involving the law made by Pres. Quirino appropriating the sum
of money for the operation of the government; Barredo v COMELEC, involving another law made by Pres.
Quirino appropriating an amount to defray the expenses for an election, and Guevarra v Collector of Customs,
involving a regulation of export, the SC held that the emergency power that enabled the President to legislate
ceased the moment Congress could meet in regular session.
At the very least, said the SC in Rodriguez v Gella, 92 Phil 603 (1953), it should cease upon the

approval of a resolution by Congress terminating such grant. In this case, the Congress enacted a bill precisely
terminating the grant of emergency power, but this was vetoed by the President. The SC ruled that the vetoed
bill should be deemed a resolution that terminates the grant.
Araneta v Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368 (1949)
F: The petitions challenge the validity of EOs of the Pres. avowedly issued in virtue of CA 671. They rest their case
chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (CA 671) has ceased to have any force and effect.
HELD: CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on 5/25/46, and the EOs were issued
w/o authority of law.
CA 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought
for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Consti.
Art. VI of the 1935 Consti. provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited
period." The words "limited period" are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency,
in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an
emergency."
It is to be presumed that CA 671 was approved w/ this limitation in view. The opposite theory would
make the law repugnant to the Consti., and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the
act would not be in harmony w/ the Consti. either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the
delegation, the period for the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that w/c was
intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," for Congress might not enact the repeal,
and even if it would, the repeal might not meet w/ the approval of the Pres., and the Congress might not be able
to override the veto. Further, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by
simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a 2/3 vote. xxx. RAM.
Rodriguez v Gella, 92 Phil 603 (1953)
F: On 12/16/41, CA 671 was approved declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Phils. and
authorizing the Pres. to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." In 1949, the SC decided that said
emergency powers ceased as early as 1945. Here, the issue again is w/n CA 671 is still effective. It appears that in 1952,
the Pres. issued EOs 545 and 546 (for appropriation of funds for public works and for relief in the provinces and cities
visited by typhoons, floods, etc.)
The Congress passed House Bill 727 declaring that "was has long ended" and that the "need for the grant of such
unusual powers to the Pres. has disappeared," and for that reason , Congress repealed all the Emergency Powers Acts of the
Pres. However, this was vetoed by the Pres.
Petitioners seek to invalidate said EOs.
HELD: Although House Bill 727, has been vetoed by the Pres. and did not thereby become a regular statute, it
may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the termination of the
emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to
the anomalous, if not absurd situation that, "while Congress while delegate its powers by a simple majority, it
might not be able to recall them except by 2/3 vote. xxx Adapted.
Barlongay: Notice the apparent inconsistency bet. the Constitution and the cases. The Consti. [Art. VI, Sec. 23
(2)] states that the emergency powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of Congress whereas the cases tell us that the emergency powers shall cease upon
resumption of session. To reconcile the two, I believe that it would not be enough for Congress to just resume
session in order that the emergency powers shall cease. It has to pass a resolution withdrawing such emergency
powers, otherwise such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress.
(10) Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
Art. VII, Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of
the calendar year, submit to Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be
contracted or guaranteed by the Government, or governmentowned or controlled corporations, which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters provided by law.
Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of
the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be
made available to the public.
Republic Act 4860
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS
AND CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE
APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE, IN BEHALF
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY
CORPORATIONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES OF RE
LENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFORE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Sec. 1. The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines to
contract such loans, credits and indebtedness with foreign governments, agencies or instrumentalities of such
foreign governments, foreign financial institutions, or other international organizations, with whom, or belonging to
countries with which, the Philippines has diplomatic relations, as may be necessary and upon such terms and
conditions as may be agreed upon, to enable the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to finance, either
directly or through any government office, agency or instrumentality or any governmentowned or controlled
corporation, industrial, agricultural or other economic development purposes or projects authorized by law:
Provided, That at least seventyfive per cent shall be spent for purposes of projects which are revenueproducing
and selfliquidating, such as electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage, telecommunication, housing,
construction and improvement of highways and bridges, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, water works
and artesian wells, air navigation facilities, development of fishing industry, and other: Provided, That such foreign
loans shall be used to meet the foreign exchange requirements or liabilities incurred in connection with said
development projects to cover the cost of equipment, related technical services and supplies, where the same are not
obtainable within the Philippines at competitive prices as well as part of the peso costs, other than working capital
and operational expenses not exceeding twenty per cent of the loan: Provided, further, That in the case of roads,
bridges, irrigation, portworks, river controls, airports and power, the amount shall not exceed seventy per cent of
the loan.
The authority of the President of the Philippines as herein provided shall include the power to issue, for the
purposes hereinbefore stated, bonds for sale in the international markets the income from which shall be fully tax
exempt in the Philippines.
Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, excluding interests, which the President of the
Philippines is authorized to incur under this Act shall not exceed one billion United States dollars or its equivalent in
other foreign currencies at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the loans, credits and indebtedness are incurred:
Provided, however, That the total loans, credits and indebtedness incurred under this Act shall not exceed two
hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of the approval of this Act, and two hundred fifty million every fiscal year
thereafter, all in United States dollars or its equivalent in other currencies.
All loans, credits and indebtedness under the preceding section shall be incurred only for particular
projects in accordance with the approved economic program of the Government and after the plans for such
projects shall have been prepared by the offices or agencies concerned, recommended by the National Economic
Council and the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and approved by the President of the
Philippines.
Sec. 3. The President of the Philippines is, likewise, hereby authorized, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, to guarantee, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, foreign loans extended directly
to, or bonds for sale in international markets issued by, corporations owned or controlled by the Government of the
Philippines for industrial, agricultural or other economic development purposes or projects authorized by law, such
as those mentioned in Section one of this Act, including the rehabilitation and modernization of the Philippine
National Railways, the cash capital requirements of the Land Bank , electrification, irrigation, river control and
drainage, telecommunication, housing, construction and/or improvement of highways, housing, construction and/ or
improvement of highways, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, waterworks and artesian wells, air
navigation, development of the fishing industry, iron and nickel exploitation and development, and others:
Provided, That at least seventy five per cent shall be spent for purposes or projects which are revenueproducing
and selfliquidating. The loans/ or bonded indebtedness of governmentowned or controlled corporations which
may be guaranteed by the President under this Act shall include those incurred by governmentowned or controlled
financial institutions for the purpose of relending to the private sector and the total amount thereof shall not be
more than five hundred million United States dollars or its equivalent in other foreign currencies at the exchange
rate prevailing at the time the guarantee is made: Provided, That the governmentowned or controlled financial
institutions shall relend the proceeds of such loans and/ or bonded indebtedness to Filipinos or to Filipinoowned or
controlled corporations and partnerships, at least sixtysix and twothirds per centum of the outstanding and paid
up capital of which is held by Filipinos at the time the loan is incurred, such proportion to be maintained until such
time as the loan is fully paid: Provided, however, That during anytime that any amount of the loan remains
outstanding, failure to meet with the capital ownership requirement shall make the entire loan immediately due and
demandable, together with all penalties and interests, plus an additional special penalty of two per centum on the
total amount due.
Sec. 4. The implementation of this Act shall be subject to, and governed by, the provisions of Executive
Order 236, dated February 13, 1957, prescribing procedures for the planning of development finances, the issuance
of government securities, and the disbursement of proceeds and creating the Fiscal Policy Council and the Technical
Committee on Development Finance, as amended by Executive Order No. 236, dated May 26, 1966, not inconsistent
with this Act, which are hereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of this Act.
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the opening of every regular session, to
report to the Congress the amount of loans, credits and indebtedness contracted, as well as the guarantees extended,
and the purposes and projects for which the loans, credits and indebtedness were incurred, and the guarantees
extended, as well as such loans which may be reloaned to Filipinoowned or controlled corporations and similar
purposes.
Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to cover the payment of the principal and interest on such loans, credits or indebtedness as
and when they shall become due.
Sec. 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, September 8, 1966.
Does Congress have to be consulted by the President when he contracts or guarantees foreign loans that
increase the foreign debt of the country?
The affirmative view cites Art. VI, Sec. 24 which holds that all bills authorizing increase of the public
debt must originate exclusively from the House of Representatives, although the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.
The negative, and stronger view, is that the President does not need prior approval by Congress because
the Constitution places the power to check the President's power on the Monetary Board and not on Congress.
Congress may, of course, provide guidelines for contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, and have these rules
enforced through the Monetary Board. But that Congress has prior approval is a totally different issue.
At any rate, the present power, which was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, was based on RA
4860 or the Foreign Loan Act. What used to be a statutory grant of power is now a constitutional grant which
Congress cannot take away, but only regulate.
(11) Powers over foreign affairs
(a) Treatymaking power
Art. VII, Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least twothirds of all the members of the Senate.
By reason of the President's unique position as head of state, he is the logical choice as the nation's
spokesman in foreign relations. The Senate, on the other hand, is granted the right to share in the treatymaking
power of the President by concurring with him with the right to amend.
Treaty distinguished from executive agreements
Executive agreements entered into by the President need no concurrence. The reason is that although
executive agreements are a kind of international agreements, when the Constitution intends to include executive
agreements, it says so specifically, as in Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par. 2, when it speaks of the power of the SC to review
final judgments of lower courts in cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, is in question.
In holding that treaties are formal documents which require ratification with approval of the Senate,
while executive agreements become binding through executive action without need of a vote by the Senate, the
SC in Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), said that the difference between a
treaty and an executive agreement is that a treaty is an international agreement involving political issues or
changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character, while an
executive agreement is an international agreement embodying adjustments of detail carrying out wellestablished
national policies and traditions, and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature.
Examples of treaties are an agreement on tax, extradition, alliance. Examples of executive agreements
are agreements relating to postal conventions, tariff rates, copyright, mostfavored nation clause.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351
F: Resp. Eastern was the consignee of several shipment of onion and garlic w/c arrived at the port of Mla. from 8/5 to
9/7/54. Some shipments came from Japan and others from HK. Inasmuch as none of the shipments had the certificate
required by CB Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and subjected to
forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of Sec. 1363 (f) of the Rev. Adm. Code, in relation to the said circulars. Said
goods were then declared forfeited in favor of the govt by the Commissioner of Customs the goods having been, in the
meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds. On review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the Commissioner of
Customs and ordered the aforementioned bonds to be cancelled and withdrawn. According to the CTA, the seizure and
forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan cannot be justified under EO 238, not only bec. the same seeks to implement
an Executive Agreement extending the effectivity of our Trade and Financial Agreements w/ Japan w/c agreement, is
of dubious validity xxx owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the making of said Executive Agreement.
HELD: The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by the Consti. in the making of "treaties", w/c
are, however, distinct and different from "executive agreements," which may be validly entered into w/o such
concurrence.
[The court went on to distinguish a treaty from an executive agreement.]
The agreement in question, being merely an executive agreement, there is no requirement of
concurrence. RAM.
USAFFE Veterans Assn. vs Treasurer 105 Phil 1030
F: The central issue in this case concerns the validity of the RomuloSnyder Agreement (1950) whereby the Phil.
Govt. undertook to return to the US Govt. in ten annual installments, a total of $35 M dollars advanced by the US to, but
unexpended by, the National Defense Forces of the Philippines. The USAFFE Veterans contended that the money delivered
by the US were straight payments for military services and that therefore there was nothing to return to the US and nothing
to consider as a loan. They also contended that the RomuloSynder Agreement was void for lack of authority of the
officers who concluded the same.
HELD: The funds involved have been consistently regarded as funds advanced and to be subsequently accounted
for. Such arrangement therefore includes the obligation to return the unexpended amounts.
In this case, Pres. Quirino approved the negotiations. He had power to contract loans under RA 213
amending RA 16. As to the contention that the agreement lacks ratification by the Senate, it was held that the
yearly appropriations by Congress of funds as compliance with the agreement constituted ratification. But even
if there was no ratification, the agreement would still be valid. The agreement is not a "treaty" as the term is
used in the Constitution. The agreement was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence. It must be noted
that a treaty is not the only form that an international agreement may assume. For the grant of treaty making
power to the Executive and the Senate does not exhaust the power of the govt. over international relations.
Consequently, executive agreements may be entered into with other states and are effective even without the
concurrence of the Senate. From the point of view of international law, there is no difference between treaties
and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries
have remained within their powers. The distinction between an executive agreement and a treaty is purely a
constitutional one and has no international legal significance.
In the case of Altman vs US, it was held that an international compact negotiated between the
representatives of two sovereign nations and made in the name and or behalf of the contracting parties and
dealing with important commercial relations between the two countries, is a treaty internationally although as an
executive agreement, it is not technically a treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate.
Nature of Executive Agreements : There are 2 classes : (1) agreements made purely as executive acts
affecting external relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, which may be termed as
presidential agreements, and (2) agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Congress, or Congressional
Executive Agreements. The RomuloSnyder Agreement may fall under any of these two classes, for precisely on
Sept. 18, 1946, Congress specifically authorized the President to obtain such indebtedness w/ the Govt of the
US, its agencies or instrumentalities. Even assuming, arguendo, that there was no legislative authorization, it is
hereby maintained that the RomuloSnyder Agreement was legally and validly entered into to conform to the
second category. This 2nd category usually includes money agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary
claims of citizens. Adapted.
CIR vs Gotamco 148 SCRA 36
F: The World Health Organization (WHO) is an international organization which has a regional office in Manila. It
enjoys privileges and immunities which are defined in the Host Agreement entered into between the Philippines and the
said organization. One of the provisions is that WHO shall be exempt from all direct and indirect taxes. When it decided to
construct a building to house its own offices, it entered into a further agreement with the govt. exempting it from paying
duties on any importation of materials and fixtures required for the construction. WHO informed the bidders that it was
exempt from the payment of all fees, licenses and taxes and that their bids should not include such items. However, the
CIR demanded from its contractor, Gotamco, the payment of 3% contractor's tax. The CIR questions the entitlement of the
WHO to tax exemption, contending that the Host Agreement is null and void, not having been ratified by the Philippine
Senate.
HELD : While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate, less formal types of international agreements
may be entered into by the Chief Executive and become binding without the concurrence of the legislative body.
The Host Agreement comes within the latter category. It is a valid and binding international agreement even
without the concurrence of the Philippine Senate. Adapted.
(b) Deportation of undesirable aliens
In Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1959), the SC declared that while the Deportation
Board has no power to issue a warrant of arrest issued upon the filing of formal charges against certain alien for
the purpose of taking him in custody to answer those charges, it has the power delegated by the President, to
issue a warrant to carry out a final order based on a finding of guilt.
In Go Tek v Deportation Board, 79 SCRA 17 (1976), the SC upheld the President's power to order the
deportation of an alien under Sec. 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. He need not wait for the pending case
to end in conviction. He may, even during the pendency of the case, order the deportation if he thinks he is
undesirable to national interest. This decision to deport, said the Court, is an act of State.
Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963)
F: On 5/12/52, Sp Pros. Galang charged petitioners bef. the Deportation Board w/ having purchased dollars in the
total sum of $130,000, w/o having the necessary license from the CB, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to HK;
and petitioners w/ having attempted to bribe officers of the Phil. and US Governments in order to evade prosecution for
said unauthorized purchase of US dollars. Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said
aliens was issued by the presiding officers of the Deportation Bd. xxx
Petitioners contest the power of the Pres. to deport aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Bd.
of the ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. It is claimed that for the
power to deport aliens be exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the same.
HELD: Under CA 613, the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of
an alien, after previous determination by the Bd. of the existence of ground or grounds therefor. W/ the
enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power
to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone. While it may really be contended that Sec. 52 of CA 613 did
not expressly confer on the Pres. the authority to deport undesirable aliens, xxx but merely lays down the
procedure to be observed should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided
for bef. the Pres. can deport an alien w/c provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect
of Immigration Act of 1940 is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the
legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive.
Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in 2
ways: (1) by order of the Pres., after due investigation, pursuant to Sec. 69 of RAC, and (2) by the
Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of the Bd. of Commissioners, under Sec. 37 of CA 613.
President's power of investigation may be delegated to the Deportation Board. The President's power
of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of Sec. 69 of the RAC w/c provides for "a prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent xxx the Deportation Board has been
conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the Pres. xxx
Power to arrest aliens. Sec. 69 of the RAC does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest.
The contention xxx that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid
only when there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the Pres. obviously has
the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that
the alien be arrested.
Power to order arrest of alien may not be delegated to Deportation Board by President. Conceding
w/o deciding that the Pres. can personally order the arrest of alien, yet such power cannot be delegated by him to
the Deportation Board. The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of
discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the
liberty of such person is warranted. xxx And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be
delegated, official functions requiring the exercised of discretion and judgement may not be so delegated.
RAM.
Go Tek vs. Deportation Board, 79 SCRA 17 (1977)
F: Petitioner was arrested for possession of fake dollars and prosecuted under Art. 168 RPC. At the same time,
deportation proceedings were brought against him. He filed a petition for prohibition against the Deportation Board,
contending that he could only be deported on grounds enumerated in Sec. 37 (3) of the Immigration Law (of w/c
possession of fake dollars is not) and only after conviction. The CFIMla sustained his contention.
HELD: The President's power to deport aliens derives from Sec. 69 of the Rev. Adm. Code w/c does not specify
the grounds for deportation of aliens but only provides that it be ordered after due investigation. The intention is
to give the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so
undesirable as to affect or inure the security, welfare, or interest of the State. The Chief Executive is the sole and
exclusive judge of the existence of facts w/c warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investigation.
VV.
(12) Power over legislation
(a) Message to Congress
Art. VII, Sec. 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session.
He may also appear before it at any other time.
Every 4th Monday of July, the President delivers the State of the Nation Address, which contains his
proposals for legislation. Through this speech, he can influence the course of legislation that Congress can take
during the regular session.
(b) Prepare and submit the budget
Art. VII, Sec. 22. The President shall submit to Congress within thirty days from the opening of
every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources
of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
The budget is the plan indicating the (a) expenditures of the government, (b) sources of
financing, and (c) receipts from revenueraising measures. This budget is the upper limit of the
appropriations bill to be passed by Congress. Through the budget, therefore, the President reveals the
priorities of the government.
(c) Veto power
As a general rule, all bills must be approved by the President before they become law, except when (i)
the veto of the President is overridden by 2/3 vote, and (ii) the bill passed is the special law to elect the President
and VicePresident. This gives the President an actual hand in legislation. However, his course of action is only
to approve it or veto it as a whole. (See Legislative Power of Congress)
(d) Emergency Power
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress, may, by law, authorize the
(See Previous Notes)
(e) Fixing of tariff rates
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
the Government.
The reason for the delegation is the highly technical nature of international commerce, and the need to
constantly and with relative ease adapt the rates to prevailing commercial standards.
(13) Immunity from suit
The SC has affirmed time and again the doctrine of the President's immunity from suit. In a resolution
in Carillo v Marcos, (April 1981) and in the latest case of In re Bermudez (October 1986), the Court said that it
is "elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period
of their incumbency and tenure."
A related doctrine is the President's "immunity from liability". In the US case of Nixon v Fitzgerald, an
employee of the Air Force was laid off due to an adverse decision of a Senate Committee made upon the
insistence of Pres. Nixon, but which decision was later found to be baseless, the SC ruled that the President,
whether in office or not, is absolutely immune from liability for his official acts. The Court gave three reasons
for such immunity:
1. The singular importance of the Presidency and his high visibility.
2. The distraction that suits would bring to such an important official laden with enormous
responsibility.
3. The consequence that the President might hesitate at the moment of greatest peril to the nation if he
knows that he would be held liable later on.
In Harlow v Fitzgerald, however, the SC ruled that Cabinet members and senior aides sued for the same
act as in Nixon v Fitzgerald only enjoy "qualified immunity." This immunity is less than absolute, and yet it
would enable them to defeat unsubstantiated claims without resorting to trial. They are allowed to show in a
preliminary manner that the claim is unsubstantial.
Barlongay:
Q: Does the President's immunity from suit extend to his alter egos?
A: No.
Carillo vs. Marcos, Res. of April 4, 1981
The President as such cannot be sued, enjoying as he does immunity from suit, but the validity of his
acts can be tested by an action against the other executive officials or such independent constitutional agencies as
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. VV.
In re: Saturnino V. Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160
F: In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first par. of Sec. 5
of Art. VIII of the proposed 1986 Consti., w/c provides:
"Sec. 5. The sixyear term of the incumbent President and VicePresident elected in the February 7, 1986 election,
is for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
xxx"
Claiming that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the
question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent Pres. Aquino and VicePres. Laurel
and elected Pres. Marcos and VicePres. Tolentino being referred to under the said provision.
HELD: This petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
Prescinding from the petitioner's lack of capacity to sue, it is elementary that this Court assumes no
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against
the incumbent Pres. Aquino and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. RAM.
Soliven vs Makasiar; Beltran vs Makasiar 167 SCRA 393
F: This is the libel case involving Beltran's allegations that President Aquino was hiding under her bed. One of the
issues was whether the President may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint
affidavit. According to Beltran, the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit. He contended that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint
affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the TC's jurisdiction. This
would be an indirect way of defeating her privilege of immunity from suit, since by testifying on the witness stand, she
would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the

exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officeholder's time, also demands undivided
attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a
criminal case where the President is a complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent
the case from proceeding against the accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by another person. RAM.
Barlongay:
Q: Does the President's immunity from suit extend even beyond his term?
A: Yes. So long as the act was done during his term.
(14) Executive Privilege
In the case of US vs Nixon, President Nixon refused to release information concerning the Watergate

scandal, claiming what he called "executive privilege." The US SC held his refusal invalid, declaring that neither
the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without
more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all
circumstances. The President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference
from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public
interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arise. Absent a claim of
need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets, it is difficult to accept the argument
that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly
diminished by production of such material for inspection with all the protection that the court will be obliged to
provide.
2. Vice President
a. Qualifications, election, term and oath
Art. VII, Sec. 3. There shall be a VicePresident who shall have the same qualifications and term
of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from office in
the same manner as the President.
The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation.
Id., Sec. 4. The President and the VicePresident shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a
term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for
any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four
years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No VicePresident shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and VicePresident shall be
held on the second Monday of May.
more shall have an equal and highest number of votes (tie), one of them shall forth with be chosen by the
returns, and qualifications of the President, or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
Id., Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the VicePresident or
the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my
duties as President (or VicePresident or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and
defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate to myself
to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will
be omitted.)
b. Privilege and salary
Art. VII, Sec. 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and
VicePresident shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which
such increased was approved. They shall not received during their tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source.
c. Prohibitions
Art. VII, Sec. 13. The President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
confirmation.
d. Succession
Art. VI, Sec. 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President during the term
for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a VicePresident from among the members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of
all the members of both houses, voting separately.
Note that in case the vacancy occurs in both the offices of President and VicePresident, there is no
Acting VicePresident spoken of. The reason is that the VicePresident does not have real functions when the
President is around.
When a vacancy occurs in both offices, the VicePresident is elected in a special election. If the
vacancy occurs only in the VicePresidency, the successor is not elected anymore, but merely chosen from the
Congress.
e. Removal
Art. XI, Secs. 23

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
f. Functions
(1) Right of succession
Art. VII, Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the
President, the VicePresident shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and VicePresident, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then
act as President until the President or VicePresident shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent
disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the VicePresident
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
Art. VII, Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the VicePresident as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VicePresident shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five
days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within fortyeight
hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or if not in session,
within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a twothirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VicePresident
shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his
office.
(2) Membership in Cabinet
confirmation.
UPDATED 1/24/96
RAM
C. The Judicial Department
Barlongay: Of the three departments of government, two departments (Executive and Legislative) are
considered as active. On the other hand, the Judiciary is considered as passive. It is passive in the sense that it
has to wait for a case to be filed before it can act.
Cruz: To maintain the independence of the Judiciary, the following safeguards have been embodied in the

Consti:
(1) The SC is a constitutional body. It cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the manner of its
meetings be changed by mere legislation. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (1)]
(2) The members of the judiciary are not subject to confirmation by the CA.
(3) The members of the SC may not be removed except by impeachment. (Art. IX, Sec. 2.)
(4) The SC may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction as prescribed in Art.
X, Sec. 5 of the Consti. (Art. VIII, Sec. 2.)
(5) The appellate jurisdiction of the SC may not be increased by law w/o its advice and concurrence.
(Art. VI, Sec. 30.)
(6) The SC now has administrative supervision over all lower courts and their personnel. (Art. VIII,
Sec. 6.)
(7) The SC has exclusive power to discipline judges of lower courts. (Art. VIII, Sec. 11.)
(8) The members of the SC and all lower courts have security of tenure, w/c cannot be undermined by a
law reorganizing the judiciary. (Id.)
(9) They shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 12.)
(10) The salaries of judges may not be reduced during their continuance in office. (Art. VIII, Sec. 10.)
(11) The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. (Art. VIII, Sec. 3.)
(12) The SC alone may initiate rules of court. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5).]
(13) Only the SC may order the temporary detail of judges. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (3)]
(14) The SC can appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (6)]
1. The Supreme Court
a. Composition
Art. VIII, Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen

Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court, en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle or
principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Creation
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 1.)
The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. As such it cannot be abolished by the Congress for the
power to destroy only resides in the one who has the power to create.
The lower courts (Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), on the other hand, are established by law, and so could be abolished by
law, provided the security of tenure is not undermined.
Composition
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. [Art. VIII, Sec.
4(1)]
Under the 1935 Constitution, the Supreme Court was composed of eleven (11) justices in all; in 1973,
fifteen (15) Justices.
Mode of Sitting
It may sit en banc, or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or 7 members (or 5, 3 or 2 divisions). [Art.
VIII, Sec. 4(1)]
In 1935, the rule was that the SC may sit en banc or in 2 divisions, "unless otherwise provided by law."
Congress decided against allowing the SC to sit in 2 divisions on the theory that there is only one Supreme
Court. And so, it provided in the Judiciary Act of 1948 the rule that the SC may only sit en banc. But the reality
was that the dockets were crowded. This prompted the framers to eliminate one phrase "unless otherwise
provided by law" in 1956, and in effect leave the decision to the SC on whether to sit en banc or in 2 divisions, if
it sat on divisions.
In 1987, not only was the discretion retained, but also the divisions were increased. There may be 5, 3 or
2 divisions made up of 3, 5 or 7 members, respectively. At present, the SC sits either en banc or in 3 divisions.
One Supreme Court
When the SC sits in divisions, it does not violate the concept of a "one Supreme Court" because,
according the United States v Limsiongco, 41 Phil 94 (1920), the divisions of the SC do not diminish its
authority, because although it sits in divisions, it remains and cofunctions as one body.
This "one Supreme Court" doctrine is strengthened by the provision that "when the required number (in
a division) is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3)]
Strict Composition
In Vargas v Rilloraza, 80 Phil 297 (1948), the SC held that the temporary designation of judges of the
CFI and the Court of Appeals in the Supreme Court to constitute a quorum due to disqualification of some of the
justices, is unconstitutional. There is but one Supreme Court whose membership appointments are permanent.
Vargas v Rilloraza, 80 Phil 297 (1948)
F: Pet. Vargas filed a motion assailing the constitutionality of People's Court Act w/c provides that any justice of the SC
who held any office or position under the Phil Exec. Commission or under the govt called Phil. Republic, may not sit and
vote in any case brought to that court under sec. 13 hereof in w/c the accused is a person who held any office or position
under either both the Phil. Exec. Commission and the Phil. Republic or any branch, instrumentality or agency thereof. If
on account of such disqualification, or bec. of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in R 126, sec. 1 of the ROC,
or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability, the requisite number of justices necessary to constitute a quorom
in any case is not present, the Pres. may designate such no. of judges of the CFI, judges at large of CFI, cadastral judges,
having none of the disqualification set forth in the above law, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as justice of the SC in
order to form a quorom.
HELD: (1) Congress does not have the power to add to the existing grounds for disqualification of a justice of
the SC. To disqualify any of these constitutional component member of the court especially as in this case, a
majority of them in a treason case, is nothing short of depriving the court itself of its jurisdiction as established
by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. It would seem evident
that if Congress could disqualify members of SC in taking part in the hearing and determination of certain
"collaboration" cases, it could extend the disqualification to other cases.
(2) The designation provided (a CFIjudge to sit as a SC justice if the SC does not have the required
quorum) is repugnant to the constitutional requirement that members be appointed by the Pres. w/ the consent of
the CA. (This was under the 1935 Constitution w/c required confirmation from the Commission on
Appointments.) It will result in a situation wherein 6 members sitting will not be appointed and confirmed in
accordance w/ the Consti.
(3) However brief or temporary may be the action or participation of a judge designated, there is no
escaping the fact that he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC and if allowed to do so,
his vote would count as much as any regular justice. xxx Adapted.
b. Appointment and qualifications
Art. VIII, Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court
must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or m ore a judge of a lower court
or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
Judicial and Bar Council
Id., Sec. 8. (5) The (Judicial and Bar) Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.
Id., Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
Qualifications
(1) Naturalborn citizen [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1)]
(2) At least 40 years of age (id.)
(3) At least 15 years of experience as a judge of lower court, or practice of law in the Philippines (id.)
(4) Of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)]
c. Salary
Art. VIII, Sec. 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
court and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased.

Unless the Congress provides otherwise, the CJ shall receive an annual salary of P 240,000 and the
Associate Justices shall receive P 204,000 each. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 17.)
The salary of lower court judges is not initially fixed by the Constitution but by the law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Art. VIII, Sec. 10.)
But it may be increased by law, to take effect at once. Reasons are: [one] the Constitution does not
prohibit it; [two] the Judiciary plays no part in the passage of the law increasing their salary unlike the Congress
and the Executive, and so there can be no conflict of interest; and [three] this will promote the independence of
the Judiciary.
Is the imposition of income tax on the salary of the Justices and Judges a diminution of their salary as
prohibited by the Constitution?
Under the 1935 Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 9), it was provided that the members of the Judiciary "shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office."
In Perfecto v Meer, 85 Phil 552 (1950), the SC ruled that salaries of judges were not subject to income
tax, for such would be a diminution of their salary, in contravention of the Constitution. This happened after
Justice Perfecto refused to pay the assessment of income tax made upon him by the Collector.
Responding to this, Congress passed a law providing that the constitutional provision against the
diminution of salaries of members of the judiciary should not be interpreted to mean an exemption from income
tax. (Sec. 13, RA 590.)
But the Court struck this statute down as unconstitutional when as in the previous case, Judge Endencia
refused to pay his taxes; thereby giving the SC an opportunity to make the pronouncement in the case of
Endencia v David, 93 Phil 696 (1953). The SC ruling invalidating the statute was based on the reason that the
legislature had no power to interpret the Constitution, such power being lodged in the judicial branch, and so
when it did, it violated the separation of powers under the Constitution.
Compare the 1973 Constitution, Art. XV, Sec. 6
Aware of this ruling, the framers of the 1973 Constitution clearly provided in Art. XV, Sec. 6 that:
Art., Sec. 6. No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including

constitutional officers, shall be exempt from the payment of income tax.
thereby avoiding a SC contrary, selfdefensive ruling.
This provision in the 1973 Constitution, however, is not found in the 1987 Constitution, prompting some
judges including Nitafan, to contend that the old ruling in Perfecto and Endencia is thereby deemed revived. But
the SC this time did not uphold the old ruling.
Not exempt from income tax
In Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (July 1987), the Court ruled that under the 1987
Constitution, the salaries of members of the Judiciary are not exempt from taxes. It anchored its decision on the
deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, that is, on the legislative history of the present Art. VIII, Sec. 10.
A draft of the present Art. VIII, Sec. 10 when originally presented to the body, expressly exempted the
salary of judges from taxation. But when this draft was discussed on second reading, the sentiment was against
the exemption, the reason being that like any other citizen, judges and justices must pay their share in the burden
of maintaining the government. So this express exemption was deleted from Art. VIII, Sec. 10 and so it was
when the draft was adopted by the body.
There was a plan to insert a similar provision as that found in Art. XV, Sec. 6 of 1973, but through
oversight, the constitutional commission failed to insert one. Yet, the intent was clear to have one, and so it must
be read into the Constitution, the SC concluded.
d. Security of
Tenure
Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges
of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Id., Sec. 2. xxx
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.
Reorganization
It is highly doubtful if this provision applies to the SC. The power to reorganize involves the power to
create and destroy. Since the SC is a creation of the Constitution and not of Congress, it may not be created nor
destroyed, and ultimately reorganized by Congress.
De la Lallana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)
F: Sec. 144 of BP 129 replaced the existing court system, w/ the exception of the SC and the SB, w/ a new one and
provided that upon the completion of the reorganization by the Pres., the courts affected "shall be deemed automatically
abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." Petitioner, judge of the city court of Olangapo, and 7
members of the Bar questioned the validity of the Act in an action for prohibition, on the ground that it contravened the
security of tenure of judges. They sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of GF in the enactment of the Act and by
characterizing it as an undue delegation of legislative power bec. of Sec. 41, w/c authorizes the Pres. to fix the
compensation of those who would be appointed under it "along the guidelines set forth in LOI No. 93, pursuant to PD 985,
as amended by PD 1597."
HELD: The imputation of lack of GF disregards the fact that the Act was the product of careful study and
deliberation not only by the BP but also by a Presidential study committee (composed of the Chief Justice and
Minister of Justice as cochairmen, w/ members drawn from the SC and Ministry of Justice.) The study group
called attention to the clogged dockets of the courts and the possible worsening of the situation as a result of
population growth and rising expectations, and the adverse effect of this on the developmental programs of the
govt. It was this problem w/c the Act seeks to solve. xxx [T]he abolition of an office is w/in the competence of
a legislative body if done in GF. The test is whether the abolition is in GF. As that element is present in the
enactment of BP 129, the lack of merit of the petition becomes apparent.
(2) However, while there can be no claim to security of tenure where the office no longer exists, in their
effect there is no difference bet. removal and the abolition of office. In either case, the effect on the incumbent
is one of separation. Accordingly, in the implementation of the law it would be in keeping w/ the spirit of the
Consti. that, as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, the SC be consulted and that its view be
accorded fullest consideration. This is not rendering advisory opinion bec. there is no question of law involved.
Neither is there intrusion into the appointing process bec. only incumbents are involved.
(3) As to the charge of undue delegation, the provisions of Sec. 41 that the Pres. should fix the
compensation of those who will be appointed to the new courts "along the guidelines set forth in LOI No. 93,
pursuant to PD 985, as amended by PD 1597" constitutes a sufficient ground. VV.
e. Removal
Art. XI, Sec. 2. The xxx Members of the Supreme Court xxx may be removed from office, on
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
See procedure for impeachment under Other Powers of Congress.
Members of the SC cannot be removed except by impeachment. Thus, a SC justice cannot be charged in
a criminal case or a disbarment proceeding, because the ultimate effect of either is to remove him from office,
and thus circumvent the provision on impeachment.
f. Fiscal Autonomy
Art. VIII, Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary

may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
g. Jurisdiction
(1) The Power of Judicial Review
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. xxx
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 1.)
Scope of the Judicial Power
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to: (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2)
1. Settle actual controversies, involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable; and
This is the classical definition of judicial power that contemplates a case where the partyplaintiff has a
cause of action against the partydefendant, that is, the plaintiff has a right corresponding to the defendant's
obligation, which right was violated by the defendant, thereby resulting in injury.
2. Determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
As early as Angara v Electoral Tribunal, the SC held that when it performs his checking function of the
coequal branches, it is merely performing a duty imposed upon it by the Constitution; that it acts as the mecha
nism that implements the "supremacy of the Constitution." The extent to which it exercises this function,
however, has been limited by the political question doctrine.
(1) Power of Judicial Review
Angara v Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936).
F: In 1935, the National Assembly adopted a resolution that "all memberselect, with no election protest filed on or
before 3 December 1935 are deemed elected." The Electoral Commission, a constitutional body, on the other hand set the 9
December 1935 as the deadline for the filing of election protest.
Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was entertained by
the Electoral Commission. Angara contended that the deadline set by the National Assembly was controlling. Who
prevailed?
HELD: The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral
Commission, in view of the constitutional provision granting the electoral Commission jurisdiction over election
protests.
In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated
constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy, nor annuls the acts of the legislature. It simply carries
out the solemn and sacred obligations imposed upon it by the constitution to determine conflicting claims and to
establish for the parties the rights which the constitution grants to them. This is in truth all that is involved in
what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very
lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. xxx Adapted.
a. Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review
In People v Vera, 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that judicial review can only be
exercised in an actual case and controversy.
This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a
constitutional question raised at the earliest possible time, and (4) a constitutional question that is the very lis
mota of the case, i.e. an unavoidable question.
Political Questions
In PBA v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455, we see a reversal of judicial review. The case was clearly a

justiciable controversy. Is the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election,
proclamation and assumption into office by the elected President, a valid resignation as to authorized the
Batasan to pass a Snap Election Law? The Court could have validly issued an injunction to stop the COMELEC
from proceeding with the preparations for the election. But it did not, citing its delay in deciding the case and
the sentiments of the people that developed in the meantime as reason for its inaction. According to the court,
what at first was a legal question became a political question because it was overtaken by events. [In this case,
no 7 Justices voted to dismiss the petitions, and 5 Justices voted to declare the statute unconstitutional. In
accordance w/ Javellana vs. Exec. Sec., J. Teehankee was of the view that as there were less than ten votes for
declaring BP 883 unconstitutional, the petitions should be dismissed. )
VV: A Court which does not issue an injunction to enjoin an official act when it could have issued one
is actually deciding the case in favor of the validity of the act. Failure to issue an injunction is as much an
exercise of judicial review.
In Romulo v Yniguez, infra, we see another trend of judicial review. What seems like a legal question
when viewed in isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it to shelve a complaint for
impeachment against the President is constitutional.) is really a political question when viewed in a broader
context (i.e., that the case was filed against the Speaker of a coequal branch to compel him by mandamus to
recall the complaint from the archive, and that the ultimate result of the case was to question the decision of the
Batasan to shelve the case, a matter, that is solely committed to that department.)
Said the SC: By denying Mitra's motion to recall the resolution of impeachment, the BP in effect
confirmed the action of its committee dismissing the resolution. This places the matter beyond review by this
Court. While the petition is directed at the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Govt., it is actually
directed at the BP bec. the committee's action, dismissing the resolution of impeachment, was approved by the
BP. Indeed, an interference by the judicial dept. w/ the work of a legislative committee would be tantamount to
an intereference w/ the work of the legislature itself.
Yet, despite the really political nature of the question, the SC passed on the validity of the rules to erase
doubts that may still be entertained.
Dumlao v COMELEC (95 SCRA 392)
F: Section 4 of BP 52 provided that any retired elective local official who had received retirement pay to which he
was entitled under the law and who have been 65 years old at the commencement of the term of office to which he sought
to be elected, was not qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he had retired.
Dumlao filed for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of the law, claiming that this was directed at him as former
governor of Nueva Vizcaya.
HELD: The SC held that (a) he had no standing, since he had not been injured by the operation of the law, no
petition for his disqualification having been filed and (b) the action was a request for advisory opinion. And yet,
the SC upheld the validity "because of paramount public interest", declaring that the legislative purpose of
infusing younger blood in local government was valid. Adapted.
Barlongay:
Q: What are the two aspects of political questions?
A: (1) those questions that are left to the people in their sovereign capacity
(2) matters w/c are lodged in the other branches of govt.
Q: What is the effect of the expanded jurisdiction on the political question doctrine?
A: The doctrine still exists but has been reduced in scope.
b. All courts can exercise judicial review
The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of lower

courts on cases with constitutional issues. If so, inferior courts have original jurisdiction over constitutional
cases although they decide the case only at first instance, their decision being always reviewable by the SC.
Thus, for instance an RTC can rule on the constitutionality of the AntiSubversion Law.
In J.M. Tuason & Co. v CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961), RA 2616, which provided for the expropriation of the
Tatalon Estate, was claimed to be unconstitutional. This issue said the SC, could be resolved by the CFI in the
ejectment case filed before it by the evictees of the estate, since the 1935 Constitution contemplated that inferior
courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality issues, that it spoke of appellate review of
"final judgment of inferior courts" in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. The 2/3 vote of
the SC required by Sec. 10 of Art. VII restricted the decisions of that Court only in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
Said the court: The Consti. contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases
involving the constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of the final judgment of
inferior courts, in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. The 2/3 vote of the SC, required by
Sec. 10, Art. VIII, of the 1935 Consti., conditions only decisions of that court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
In Ynot v IAC 148 SCRA 659, the SC reversed the RTC's holding that it had no authority to rule on the
validity of EO 626A, banning the transporting of carabaos from one province to another. The Court pointed
out, that since it has jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in
constitutional cases, then the lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.
The SC then struck down the law for being arbitrary and for unduly delegating legislative power.
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in

violation of EO 626A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court
sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked
authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review.
HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases
involving the constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first
instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs.
old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those
still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. We do not see, however, how the
prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering
that they can be killed any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province
will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so
says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the
movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow
that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond w/c was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The EO defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, w/c was carried out forthright.
The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him elementary fair play. xxx VV.
(2) Judicial Review and political questions.
Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
The second aspect of the definition of judicial power modifies the political question doctrine. As
enunciated in Tanada v Cuenco, a political question is one to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, one in respect to which full discretionary capacity is given to the other branches of the government.
It does not mean, however, that the political question doctrine has been completely abrogated by the
Constitution, such that if those cases where the SC invoked the doctrine were decided now it would have to
decide the case on its merits. It is submitted that what the Constitution overrules is only the ruling in Garcia
Padilla v PonceEnrile, supra, where the SC held that the question on the validity of the proclamation of martial
law is beyond judicial review, so that when the President says that there is a need for such proclamation, his
words are binding on the Courts, and all that the citizen can do is trust in the good faith of the President.
Indeed, as already noted in the CommanderinChief power of the President above, Art. VII, Sec. 18
authorizes the SC to review, in an appropriate proceeding (like a habeas corpus petition), filed by a citizen (who,
under the Rules of Court, could be the detainee himself, or anyone else in his behalf), the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension.
Beyond this, the political question doctrine is not a dead issue. In fact, the Supreme Court continues to
invoke it as in Lawyers' League for a Better Philippines v Aquino, In re Bermudez and Marcos vs Manglapus.
Garcia vs BOI, 191 SCRA 288
In this case, the court ruled that it has a constitutional duty to step into the controversy and determine
the paramount issue. Said the court, "[t]here is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant
should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha
only should be changed to naphtha and/ or liquified petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the
BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corp. (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical admission of the BOI
that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest
notwithstanding.
The Supreme Court held that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of
the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the
contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a
repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run
its own affairs and the way it deems best for the national interest.
Dissenting : The decision of the BOI may be extremely unwise and inadvisable, but the SC may not, for that
reason annul the BOI's action or prohibit it from acting on the manner that lies within its particular sphere of
competence, for the Court is not a judge of the wisdom and soundness of the actions of the two other coequal
branches of the Government, but only of their legality and constitutionality. Adapted.
(3) Jurisdiction over criminal cases where penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
In People v Daniel, 86 SCRA 511 (1978) and as affirmed in People v Ramos, 88 SCRA 466 (1979), both
being rape cases where the trial court imposed lesser penalties because of misappreciation of the aggravating
and qualifying circumstances and on appeal the penalty was increased. The majority opinion held that "hence
forth, should the CA be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua should be imposed in any
criminal case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua, the said
Court, with comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved (should) render
judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the
circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire
record thereto to this Court for review." Chief Justice Castro, for the majority, explained: Art. X, Sec. 5 (2) (d)
[now Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (2) (d)] provides that the SC shall have appellate jurisdiction over "final judgements and
decrees of inferior courts" in criminal in w/c the "penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment." Unless the
CA renders judgment and imposes the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua, there would be no judgment for
SC to review. Indeed, Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the present Rule 124, Sec. 13 provide that,
whenever the CA should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed,
"the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon, and shall forthwith certify the case brought before
it on appeal," which that it is not prohibited from rendering judgment. In other words, the CA is not prohibited
from rendering judgment but from "entering judgment." The distinction bet. the two is well established.
The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated w/ an "entry of judgment" as the latter is
understood in R36 in relation to Sec. 8, R 121 and Sec. 16, R 124, ROC. "Entry of judgment" presupposes a
final judgment final in the sense that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court or appellate
court w/in the reglamentary period. A judgment in a crim. case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the def. has
expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. It is only then that there is a judgment w/c is to be entered or
recorded in the book of entries of judgments.
Rule 124, Sec. 13. xxx
Whenever the Court of Appeals should be of the opinion that the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
higher should be imposed in a case, the Court after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall
render judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher as the circumstances warrant,
refrain from entering judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the
Supreme Court for review.
(4) Article VII, Sec. 18, par. 3
xxx
(5) Article VII, Sec. 4, par. 7
xxx
returns, and qualifications of the President, VicePresident, and may promulgate its rule for the purpose.
Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 (1966)
F: In 1965, the 2 Houses of Congress in joint session proclaimed petitioner Fernando Lopez elected to the Office of
the VicePresident of the Philippines. His closest opponent, resp. Gerardo Roxas, then filed with the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) an election protest contesting the election of petitioner herein as VP upon the ground that it was not he, but
said resp., who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office. Petitioner Lopez then instituted this Original
Action to prevent the PET from hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that R.A. No.
1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional" and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a nullity".
ISSUE: Whether R.A. 1793 is unconstitutional
HELD: NO. Section 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely
some specified or limited judicial power, but the entirety or "all" of said power, except, only, so much as the
Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to "judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications' of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested
by the Constitution solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
R.A 1793, creating the PET, has the effect of giving a defeated candidate the legal right to contest
judicially the election of the Presidentelect or the VPelect. By providing that the PET "shall be composed of
the Chief Justice and the other 10 Members of the SC", R.A. 1793 has conferred upon such court an additional
exclusive original jurisdiction. It has not created a new and separate court. It has merely conferred upon the SC
the functions of a PET. The PET is not inferior to the SC since it is the same court, although the functions
peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the SC in the exercise of its ordinary functions.
The authority of the PET to declare who has the better right to office does not abridge constitutional tenure.
If the evidence introduced in the election protest shows that the person really elected is the protestant, not the
person declared elected by Congress, then the latter had legally no constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence,
he can claim no abridgment thereof. Moreover, in the imposition of new duties upon the SC, the Congress has
not, through R.A. 1793, encroached upon the appointing power of the Executive. It constitutes neither the
creation of an office, nor the appointment of an officer. Said law is constitutional. Adapted.
(6) Article IX, A, Sec. 7
Art. IX, A, Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of the copy
thereof.
h. Congressional Power over Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Art. VIII, Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power the define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
xxx
But while the jurisdiction of courts is a matter of legislative apportionment, the Constitution sets certain
limitations on this prerogative:
1. It cannot decrease the constitutionally set jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
(It may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.)
2. It cannot increase the constitutionally set appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Art. VI, Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
3. It can increase the original jurisdiction of the SC (pursuant to its general power).
4. It can make the jurisdiction of the SC concurrent with lower courts (pursuant to its general power).
Thus, under the Rules of Court, the original jurisdiction of the SC is concurrent with the RTC and in the
case of the special civil actions, with the CA.
5. It cannot pass a law reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
members. (Art. VI, Sec. 2, par. 2)
Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs CA
F: Mantruste (MSI) entered into an interim lease agreement w/ DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel wherein the
former would operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 mos. or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other
third parties by DBP. Subsequently, the Pres. issued Procl. 50 w/c sought to the expeditious privatization of government
assets. The Bayview Hotel properties were among the govt assets identified for privatization and were consequently
transferred from DBP to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for disposition. xxx. The properties were subsequently
awarded to the MakatiAgro Trading and La Filipina Corp. MSI filed a complaint for the issuance of a restraining order
enjoining APT from approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview property to private petitioners and from ejecting
MSI from the property or from terminating the contract of lease. The CA nullified the lower court's decision for being
violative of Sec. 31 of Procl. 50A.
HELD: Section 31 of Proclamation No. 5A prohibited courts and administrative agencies from issuing any

restraining order or injunction against the Asset Privatization Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or
disposition of assets transferred to it, nor against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such
purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him. Said Section does not infringe any provision
of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of the courts "to settle actual controversies which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the govt." The
President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, issued said Proclamation to
prevent courts from interfering in the discharge of the Executive Department of its task of carrying out the
expeditious disposition and privatization of certain govt. corporations and/or the assets thereof, absent any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being
inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained operative.
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of separation or
powers, the powers of the courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of government is limited to the
determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the exercise of their authority and in the performance of their assigned tasks. Courts may not
substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the
implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale, or disposition of assets transferred to it.
Adapted.
The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction
A) Original jurisdiction [Art. VIII, Sec. 5(1)]
(1) Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
(2) Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
(3) Sufficiency of factual basis of proclamation of martial law and suspension of privilege of writ of HC
Note that the SC does not have jurisdiction over declaratory relief cases, which must be filed with the
RTC (In Re Bermudez said so too, and yet gave due course to the petition.)
The first case (ambassadors, etc.) is made concurrent with RTCs by law (Judiciary Act of 1948). The
second case (special civil actions) is concurrent with the CA and the RTC, with respect to inferior bodies.
B) Appellate Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on (i) ordinary
appeal, or (ii) petition for review on certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgment and
orders of lower courts in the following cases:
(1) Cases questioning the constitutionality or validity of any (a) treaty, (b) international and executive
agreement, (c) law or statute, (d) presidential decree, (e) proclamation, (f) order, (g) instruction, (h) ordinance, or
(i) regulation.
(2) Cases questioning the legality of an (a) tax, (b) impost, (c) assessment, or (d) toll, or (e) any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(3) Cases in which the jurisdiction of lower courts is in issue.
(4) Criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(5) Cases in w/c only an error or question of law is involved.
(6) Orders of the Constitutional Commissions.
Appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in two ways:
1. Ordinary appeal
This is obligatory on the courts, so the appellant possesses this "as a matter of right". Under this mode,
the SC can pass on both questions of fact and law.
Ordinary appeal to the SC is allowed by law in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher, including those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the
same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion (to ensure uniformity
of decision). (Sec. 17, Judiciary Act of 1948).
The other case is the automatic review by the SC of criminal cases where the death penalty is imposed.
This is unlike the ordinary appeal taken where the penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher, for in this case, the
review is automatic. The reason why it is not automatic in the first case (reclusion perpetua) is that on appeal,
the appellate court may increase the penalty imposed by the trial court (to death) so that the convict must first
waive his right against double jeopardy, precisely by voluntarily making the appeal, before the SC can reopen the
case on appeal. But the case is different when death is imposed because the worst that could happen on
automatic appeal is that the judgment is affirmed.
Naturalization and denaturalization cases under the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Sec. 17) used to be directly
appealable to the SC. But this is deemed to have been amended by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
(BP 129) which, in Sec. 5(3), makes all cases decided by the RTC, appealable to the CA, except those made
directly appealable to the SC by (i) the Constitution, (ii) BP 129 and (iii) Sec. 17 [3(i)] and Sec. 17 [4(4)]of the
Judiciary Act of 1948. Naturalization and denaturalization cases do not fall under any of the exceptions.
2. Petition for review on certiorari
This is not discretionary on the SC. It has the authority not to give due course to the petition, if the
petition shows no merit on its face. Thus, mode provided for in Rule 45, is limited to pure questions of law. All
other cases can be appealed to the SC using this mode.
The Constitution now provides that "no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor." (Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par.
2)
The four other cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the SC (viz, constitutionality, tax,
jurisdiction and pure questions of law), are appealable to the SC by petition for review on certiorari. However,
in cases involving constitutionality, tax, or jurisdiction, when the resolution of the main issue depends on a
controverted question of fact, the case must be appealed to the CA on both, questions of fact and law, and the
decision of the CA is then raised to the SC by petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law. (Sec. 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948)
Certiorari
The certiorari referred to in 5(1) (when the SC exercises original jurisdiction) is the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, where the question raised is a "jurisdictional question," that is, (a) lack of
jurisdiction, (b) excess of jurisdiction, or (c) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The certiorari referred to in 5(2) (when the SC exercises appellate jurisdiction) is certiorari as an
ordinary mode of appeal, where the issue raised is "error of judgment" or error of law.
i. Administrative powers
(1) Supervision of lower courts
Art. VIII, Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
In Noblejas v Teehankee, the SC held that although the Commissioner of Land Registration is given the
rank of judge of the CFI, he is still an administrative official, hence outside the jurisdiction of the SC and cannot
be investigated by it as if he were a lower court judge. Otherwise, the SC would be performing a nonjudicial
work.
(2) Temporarily assign judges to other stations in the public interest
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the xxx power (to)
xxx
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(3) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice [Art.
VIII, Sec. 5 (4)]
(4) Discipline of lower court judges
Art. VIII, Sec. 11. xxx The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of

lower courts, or order their dismissal, by a vote of a majority of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(5) Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the xxx power (to)
xxx
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
j. Rule making
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rights of procedure of special courts and quasi
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Power of Congress to repeal Rules of Court
Article XVIII, Sec. 10. All courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall
continue to exercise their jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law. The provisions of the existing
Rules of Court, judiciary acts, and procedural laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative unless amended or repealed by the Supreme Court or the Congress.
CoJudicial powers
Aside from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court mentioned above the following are its other powers
related to, though not exactly constituting, its judicial function:
1. Order a change of venue or place of trial, in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Art. VIII, Sec.
5(4)]
2. Rule making Promulgate rules concerning (a) the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, (b) pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, (c) the administration to the practice of law, (d) the
Integrated Bar, and (e) legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Limitations to this power: Such rules shall (i) provide simplified and inexpensive procedure, for the
speedy disposition of cases, (ii) be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and (iii) not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the SC. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5)]
It is on the basis of this power, that the Rules of Court, the Bar, IBP, Legal Aid Office were adopted.
In 1935, as affirmed in the case of In re Cunanan, the Congress was given the power to alter, supplement
or modify the Rules of Court. Thus, if the SC set the passing grade in the bar at 75%, Congress could lower it to
70%, provided this has no retroactive effect.
This is no longer true in 1987. Rulemaking power and the corollary power of amending the rules are
now lodged exclusively on the SC.
Practice of Professions
Art. XII, Sec. 14. xxx
The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases
prescribed by law.
Martial Law
Art. VII, Sec. 18. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of Martial Law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
form its filing. (par. 3 thereof.)
k. No quasijudicial and administrative work of judges
Generally: No nonjudicial work for judges; No quasi judicial and administrative work for judges.
As a general rule, members of the judiciary shall only have judicial functions, in line with the separation
of powers principle of the Constitution. Thus:
Art. VIII, Sec. 12. The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative function.
Thus, in Meralco v Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil 600 (1932), the SC held that justices of the SC
could not be constituted into a Board of Arbitration to determine reasonable compensation for the use of a
bridge, for this is a nonjudicial work.
Meralco v Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil 600 (1932)
The issue concerns the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
HELD: The SC and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust
or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected w/ the administering of judicial functions. RAM.
In Garcia v Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 (1971), the SC said that it did not look with favor at the practice of
long standing of judges being detailed with the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, even if it were only
in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over courts. The basis of this rule is the
separation of powers. In this case, resp. Macaraig was appointed to one of the newlycreated CFI branches w/
station at Calamba Laguna. At the time of his appointment, resp. was the chief of Technical Staff of the DOJ
and concurrently member of the Board of Pardons and Parole. xxx
In Re : Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246
F: EO No. 856 created the Provincial/City Committees on Justice to insure the speedy disposition of cases of
detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail
conditions. Among the functions of said committee are to receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail
warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to
proper authority for proper action, to recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the
proper administration of criminal justice.
Judge Manzano, Executive Judge Of Ilocos Norte was appointed as member of said Committee. Before accepting
the appointment, it sought the opinion of the SC as to the propriety of such appointment.
HELD: Such committee performs administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve

the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
Under the Constitution, the members of the courts shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasijudicial or administrative functions. Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in such committee,
will violate the Constitution, the Supreme Court is constrained to deny his request that he be allowed to serve
therein. He can only render assistance to such committee to help promote the laudable purposes of said
committee, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of his judicial duties.
Adapted.
Exceptions: Constitutionally appointed nonjudicial functions of the Supreme Court
a. Act as Presidential Electoral Tribunal
While Congress acts as the National Board of Canvassers for the Presidential election, the Supreme
Court acts as the Electoral Tribunal for such election. The Constitution provides: "The Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose." (Art. Art. VII, Sec. 4, last par.)
This means that before the proclamation by the Congress of the winner, Congress is the judge of any
electoral issue, but the proclamation, when there is an electoral contest already, then the SC becomes the sole
judge.
The 1935 Constitution did not provide this power. And so RA 1793 gave the SC the power to act as
judge in presidential electoral contests. It was challenged in the case of Lopez v Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 (1966),
but the SC upheld the law, reasoning that it did not constitute the SC as a separate body but only added to its
powers the power to be the judge of election contests.
With the express provision in Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7, this is no longer a problem.
b. Chief Justice as presiding officer in impeachment trial of the President. [Art. XI, Sec. 3(6)]
c. Chief Justice as Chairman of the Judicial and Bar Council.
l. Report on the judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular
session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and
activities of the Judiciary.
m. Manner of sitting and votes required
Art. VIII, Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen

Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court, en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle or
principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
The Supreme Court may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5, or 7 members. [Art. VIII,
Sec. 4(1)]
The following cases shall be heard by the SC en banc:
1. Cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement or law. [Id., Sec.
4(2)]
2. Cases involving the (a) constitutionality, (b) application, or (c) operation of presidential decrees,

proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations. [Id., Sec. 4(2)]
3. All other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard by the SC en banc. [Id., Sec.
4(2)]
4. Cases or matters heard by a division where the required number of votes to decide or resolve (the
majority of those who took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
less than 3 members) is not met. [Id., Sec. 4(3)]
5. To modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division. [Id., Sec. 4(3)]
6. Administrative disciplinary cases involving judges of lower courts. (Id., Sec. 11.)
7. Actions instituted by citizen to test the validity of a proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ. (Art. VII, Sec. 18.)
8. The court sitting as Presidential Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7.)
Rule 56, Sec. 11
Sec. 11. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in

opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court; in appealed cases,
the judgement or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or
motion shall be denied.
Rule 125, Sec. 3
Sec. 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. When the court en banc is equally divided in
opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the judgment of conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused
acquitted.
n. Requirement as to decisions
Art. VIII, Secs. 1314
Deliberations
Art. VIII, Sec. 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision
en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued
and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took
no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same
requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
The reason for the requirement that the decision must be reached "in consulta" (i.e., after deliberations
by the group) is to emphasize that the SC is one body, albeit collegiate, so that the decision of the case is by the
court itself and not the ponente. The writer of the opinion is merely the spokesman of the body.
Consing V CA 177 SCRA 14 (1989)
ISSUE: W/N absence of certification by the Court of Appeals renders that decision invalid.
HELD: NO. The certification requirement imposed by the 1987 constitution was meant to ensure the
implementation of the constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate
courts, such as the CA, Sandiganbayan and CTA, are reached after consultation with the members of the court
sitting en banc or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision writing.
The absence would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in
consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the court since the regular
performance of official duty is presumed. The lack of certification serves as an evidence of failure to observe
the certification requirement but it would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Voting
Votes required to "render a decision or resolution"
A) En banc
Concurrence of a majority of the members who (i) actually took part in the deliberations (i.e., the

consultation) on the issues in the case, and (ii) voted thereon. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2) and Sec. 11.]
a. The lowest possible votes needed to render a decision is 5, since quorum of 15 is 8, and majority of 8
is 5. This number may increase as the number of justices present increase;
b. One who abstained is deemed to have voted for the purpose of computing the majority vote needed.
For an abstention is really a form of casting a vote with its own repercussions on the outcome of the case.
c. One who was present but kept silent during the deliberations and did not vote is still included in the
counting for the purpose of determining the majority. For it may happen that he has already made up his mind
on how to decide and influence the outcome of the case.
d. But one who expressly inhibited or is disqualified from taking part (for instance because of conflict of
interest) is not included.
e. There must be a quorum before a valid decision can be made. Without a quorum, there can be no
valid business to begin with.
f. In case, the necessary majority cannot be mustered, then there is no decision rendered. (See effect of
failure to reach a majority below.)
This provision thus, overrules the requirement of (a) 10 votes (2/3) to declare a law unconstitutional
under 1973 (a constitutional requirement), and (b) 10 votes to impose or affirm the death penalty (by internal
rules of the SC, although constitutionally 8 votes were enough). The presumption of constitutionality of laws
under the Judiciary Act of 1948, however, remains valid.
B) In divisions
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved (a) with the concurrence of a majority
of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and (b) in
no case without the concurrence of at least 3 of such members. When the required number is not obtained, the
case shall be decided en banc. No doctrine or principle of law laid by the court in a decision rendered en banc
or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3)]
a. In a division of 7 members, the majority if all are present is 4. If only 6 are present, 4. If only 5 or 4,
3. If only 3, no quorum.
b. In a division of 5 members, 3 votes are needed regardless of whether 5, 4, or 3 are present.
c. In division of 3 members, 3 votes are needed.
d. In any of these cases, when the votes cannot be mustered, the case must be raised to the court en banc.
Effect of failure to muster the necessary majority:
If the necessary majority cannot be had, the case is again reheard. If upon rehearing, no majority is still
had, the following are the effects:
a. If a case is on appeal, the judgment appealed from is deemed affirmed except:
(i) Criminal cases where the judgment is that of conviction: the conviction is reversed, and the
accused is acquitted.
(ii) Cases where the lower court declared a law, etc. unconstitutional: the judgment is reversed,
and the validity of the law is deemed sustained, pursuant to the presumption of constitutionality under Sec. 9 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948. (If the lower court declared the law as not unconstitutional, this judgment is deemed
affirmed pursuant to the general rule above.)
(Thus, if 12 are present, 5 voted the law unconstitutional, 4 voted for its validity, and 3
abstained, there is no decision and so the law remains valid.)
b. If the case is an original petition, then the case is deemed dismissed.
Writing of the decision
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based. (Art. VIII, Sec. 14.)
In the case of the SC and lower collegiate court, this rule is addressed to the one to whom the writing of
the opinion was assigned after consultation, that is, the ponente. In the case by other courts, this rule is
addressed to the judge.
Decisions on the merit.
The rule requiring statement of the relevant facts, the issues, the ruling, and the reasoned opinion in
support of the ruling, applies only to decisions on the merit by a court of record, based on the following rulings
of the SC:
a. In Valladolid v Inciong, 121 SCRA 205 (1983), it was held that the Order of the Deputy Minister of
Labor did not contain a statement of facts and conclusions of law is not covered by the constitutional
requirement because it is not a decision of a court of record, the Ministry of Labor being an administrative
agency with quasijudicial functions, with rules of procedure mandated to be nonlitigious, summary and non
technical.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987
Section 14. Decision. Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in

writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. xxx
Air Manila vs. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489 (1971)

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedure principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials. Administrative due
process includes:
(a) The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person's legal rights;
(b) Reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence
in his favor;
(c) A tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of
competent jurisdiction; and
(d) A finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected.
b. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co. v Henares, 107 Phil. 560 (1960), the SC ruled that orders of a court on
an incidental matter (in this case, the order imposing the payment of attorney's fees) need not state the legal basis
of the ruling.
Minute Resolution
Cruz: In justifying the socalled minute resolution, the SC said in Borromeo v. CA, 186 SCRA 1:
"The SC disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where
a case is patently w/o merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accord w/ the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that
the petitions were filed merely to forsetall the early execution of judgment and for noncompliance w/ the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis.
x x x x
The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions
and/ or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case."
And neither does the rule apply to administrative cases decided by the SC itself, as it held in Prudential
Bank v. Castro, 158 SCRA 646, thus:
"No constitutional provision is disregarded in the SC's Minute Resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration 'for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed
upon. In an administrative case, the constitutional mandate that 'no *** motion for reconsideration of a decision
of the court shall be *** denied without stating the legal basis therefor is inapplicable. And even if it were, said
resolution stated the legal basis for the denial, and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the constitutional requirement.
'Lack of merit,' as a ground for denial is legal basis.
Petitions for review and motions for reconsideration
course or denied, without stating the legal basis therefor. (Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2.)
This rule applies to a dismissal of a motion for reconsideration of a "decision on the merits", said the SC
in Mendoza v CFI, 51 SCRA 369 (1973). It does not apply, as in this case, to a dismissal of a motion for
reconsideration of a previous dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus. (The dismissal of the petition for habeas
corpus is not a decision on the merits, but is similar to a dismissal of a petition for review, which is a decision
not to give due course to the petition.)
The past practice used to be that when the appellate court denied a petition for review, or denied a MFR,
it simply did so in a Minute Resolution, stating that the case was dismissed for lack of basis. This aggrieved
many a lawyer, specially those who would spend days preparing pages of briefs, only to find out that all their
effort was answered by a oneliner "Dismissed for lack of basis".
This prompted the framers of the 1987 Constitution to force the Court to at least write down the legal
basis for the denial. This means that while a fully detailed decision is not required, neither is a skimpy oneliner
is allowed. The legal reason for the dismissal must be written.
Dissenters and Abstainers
In the case of a decision on the merits, if a member (a) took no part, or (b) dissented, or (c) abstained
from a decision or resolution, he must state his reason therefor. (Art. VIII, Sec. 13.)

Before, only those who dissented were required to write an opinion. Now, even those who took no part
in the deliberations but were present, and those who abstained are required to write their reasons for these are
really forms of casting their vote. Those who inhibited themselves are, of course, not required to vote, since they
did not really participate.
Procedurally, the purpose is to enable the party to find out the reason for the action taken. For courts
lower than the SC, and even the SC itself, this is important for appeal or motion for reconsideration purposes, as
the basis for the assignment of error.
Theoretically, since the SC is not an elective branch it must explain the reason being its ultimate source
of authority. Congress need not explain its action since it has been delegated the legislative power by the people.
o. Mandatory period for deciding cases
Art. VIII, Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twentyfour months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for
all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of
the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution
has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to
such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
xxx
xxx (par. 3 thereof.)
Art. XVIII, Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this
Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in
the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be
adopted for all special courts and quasijudicial bodies.
Id., Sec. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the
applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by the
courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as practicable.
Id., Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this
Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the
applicable period lapses after such ratification.
A) Cases filed after February 2, 1987
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided within twentyfour
months counted from the date of submission." [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1)]
A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief
or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(2)]
Mandatory period in the Supreme Court: 24 months [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1)]
Except: A proper case questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or suspension of the privilege which must be decided 30 days from filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 1.)
But what happens if the judge or court fails to meet the deadline anyway? The Constitution provides:
Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice
or the presiding Judge shall forthwith be issued, and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter,
and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has been rendered or
issued within said period. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (3)]
Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility (administrative disciplinary action against the judge or justices) shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination without further delay. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(4)]
In other words, failure to decide the case [for reasons other than the inability to reach the necessary
majority] has no consequence on the case. Thus, a certification is required that the period has lapsed without any
decision being made, stating the reason for such inaction. Then the court must decide without any further delay.
The consequences are on the judge: (a) he could not draw out his salary, since he would not be able to certify
that he has resolved all cases submitted to him in 90 days and (b) he is subject to administrative sanctions.
B) Cases filed before February 2, 1987 but expire after this date
The provisions of Art. VIII, Sec, 15(3) (4) shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of
this Constitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 14)
In other words, it is as if these cases were filed after February 2, 1987.
C) Cases that expired before February 2, 1987
The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the applicable period for the
decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by the courts, shall be determined by the
SC as soon as practicable. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 13.)
The Supreme Court shall, within 1 year from February 2, 1987 adopt a systematic plan to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the SC or lower courts prior to the effectivity of this
Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasijudicial bodies. (Art. XVIII, Sec.
12.)
2. Lower courts
a. Qualifications and appointment
Art. VIII, Sec. 7 (1) (2)
Art. VIII, Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court
must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court
or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) the Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

Id., Sec. 8. (5) The (Judicial and Bar) Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.
Id., Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at list three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the
Composition
The composition of lower courts shall be provided by law. The laws are the Judiciary Act of 1948 and
BP 129.
Qualifications
Lower Collegiate Court (Court of Appeals)
(1) No person shall be appointed member of any lower collegiate court unless he is a naturalborn citizen. [Art.
VIII, Sec. 7(1)] and a member of Philippine Bar.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe qualifications of judges of lower courts. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(2)]
(3) A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
[Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)]
Lower Courts
(1) The Congress shall prescribe qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge
thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine bar. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(2)]
(2) He must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)]
b. Salary
Art. VIII, Sec. 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
court and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased.
.
c. Congressional power to reorganize and security of tenure
Id., Sec. 2. xxx
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.

The power of Congress to reorganize lower courts has been upheld by the SC prior to 1987.
In Ocampo v Secretary of Justice, 51 OG 147 (1955), the SC by failing to muster the 2/3 vote
required then to declare a law unconstitutional in effect sustained the validity of the law passed by Congress
abolishing the offices of "judgesatlarge" and "cadastral judges" and the consequent removal of judges occu
pying these posts. Noting that the purpose of the law was to promote the independence of the judiciary (by
avoiding forumshopping), it held that an abolition of an office made in good faith does not violate security of
tenure. Security of tenure presupposes the continued existence of the office from which one was removed not
removal from an office that has been abolished in good faith and not merely partisan political reasons.
In De La Llana v Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982), the SC again upheld the Reorganization Act of
1980 (BP 129), on the ground that the abolition of an office, is within the competence of the legislature if done
in good faith. That there was good faith was shown by the fact that the Act was the product of careful study and
deliberation by the Batasan and the Presidential study committee, the membership of which includes SC justices,
and was the means to upgrade the administration of justice in the Philippines. The SC reiterated that there can
be no claim for security of tenure where the office no longer exists, and that the abolition of office is not
removal, although their effects may be the same.
It is doubtful whether these rulings remain valid in toto in view of the new express provision prohibiting
a reorganization law that undermines the security of tenure of the Judiciary.
One compromise view is that Congress has the power to pass a reorganization law concerning the lower
courts, but it can only take effect until the post has been vacated by the incumbent judge.
d. Removal
Cruz: "Judges of lower court," as here used, includes justices of the Sandiganbayan. This rule casts much doubt
on the legality of the presidential decree making them removable only by the legislature through the process of
impeachment.
e. Jurisdiction
Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
As ruled in J.M. Tuason & Co. v CA and in Ynot v IAC, supra, there is in effect a " constitutional
conferment of original jurisdiction on the lower courts in those five cases for which the Supreme Court is
granted appellate jurisdiction in 5(2)."
Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction "to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari as the law or Rules of Court may provide, judgments of lower courts," lower courts can pass upon
the validity of a statute in the first instance.
f. Requirements as to preparation of decisions
Art. VIII, Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Manner of sitting
The Court of Appeals sits in divisions when it hears cases; the only time it convenes as one body is to
take up matters of administration.
The trial and inferior courts, of course, do not have this problem since there is only one judge.
Deliberations
The same requirements (for consulta) shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. (Art. VIII, Sec.
13)
For obvious reasons, this requirement does not apply to the trial and inferior courts.
Voting
For collegiate courts, like the Court of Appeals, the law provides that it sits only in divisions when
deciding cases.
For trial and inferior courts, no problem arises since only one judge is involved.
Effect of failure to muster the necessary majority
Court of Appeals. The same rules apply, except that the decision can now be appealed to the SC.
Inferior Courts. Failure to decide has no consequence on the decision of the court. The Court is not
ousted of its jurisdiction, but the judge suffers administrative consequences.
g. Mandatory period for deciding
Art. VIII, Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twentyfour months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for
all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of
the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution
has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to
such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this
Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in
the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be
adopted for all special courts and quasijudicial bodies.
Id., Sec. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the
applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by the
courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as practicable.
Id., Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this
Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the
applicable period lapses after such ratification.
Mandatory Period
Lower collegiate courts: 12 months, unless reduced by the SC
Other lower courts: 3 months, unless reduced by the SC
Overruled :
The Constitution now explicitly provides in Sec. 15 (1) that the periods are mandatory, aside from using
the word "must" (not "shall" as in 1973) in Sec. 15 (1). The case of Marcelino v Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983),
which held that the periods in the 1973 Constitution were only directory, is thus now, overruled.
Cruz: It should be noted that, although decision within the maximum period is now mandatory, failure to arrive
at the same will not divest the court of jurisdiction, without prejudice to any responsibility that may attach to the
judge. The court must still resolve the case w/o further delay, unlike the old rule when the decision appealed
was deemed automatically affirmed and the petition was deemed automatically dismissed as a result of the
inaction of the court.
xxx
Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51
F: Judgement in a criminal case was rendered before the clerk of court within 85 days after the case was concluded.
But judgement was promulgated after lapse of 90 days from the day the case was submitted for decision.
ISSUE: W/N trial court lost jurisdiction over the case for failure to decide the same within 90 days from

submission thereof.
W/N constitutional provision is mandatory.
HELD: No to both. The constitutional provision refers to rendition of judgement which refers to the filing of
the signed decision with the clerk of court.
By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is evident that the period prescribed is subject
to modification by the SC under its prerogative power to promulgate rules concerning procedure in all courts.
Constitutional provisions are directory, where they refer to matters merely procedural. But failure to decide a
case within 90 days constitute a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. Adapted.
De Roma vs CA 152 SCRA 205
The CA decided the case beyond the 12 month period prescribed by the 1973 Constitution. Said
provision in the Constitution was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the
corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
3. The Judicial and Bar Council
Art. VIII, Sec. 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor
of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four
years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the
retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep
a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the
Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It
may exercise such other function and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Exofficio members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(1)]
(1) Chief Justice as exofficio Chairman
(2) Secretary of Justice
(3) Representative of Congress
Regular members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(1)]
(4) Representative of the Integrated Bar
(5) Professor of Law
(6) Retired member of the SC
(7) Representative of private sector
Secretary exofficio [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(3)]
Clerk of the SC, who shall keep a record of its proceedings
Appointment, Tenure, Salary
Exofficio members
For obvious reasons this does not apply since the position in the Council is good only while the person is
the occupant of the office.
Regular members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)]
The regular members shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
The term of the regular members is 4 years.
But the term of those initially appointed shall be staggered in the following way so as to create
continuity in the council:
IBP representative 4 years
Law professor 3 years
Retired justice 2 years
Private sector 1 year
Regular members shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the SC. The SC shall provide
in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council. [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(4)]
Functions
1. Recommend appointees to the Judiciary [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5)]
2. Recommend appointees to the Office of the Ombudsman and his 5 deputies. (Art. XI, Sec. 9)
3. Such other functions and duties as the SC may assign [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5)]
4. Automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary

may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
UPDATED 1/27/96
REVISED 4/13/96
RAM

Constitutional Law 1 PDF

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Constitutional Law 1 PDF

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

The Bill also defined for the first time who the citizens of the Philippines were. They were all the

The rest is history. The results of the election were proclaimed by the Batasan, naming Marcos and

Section 3. The Commission shall conduct public hearings to insure that the people will have adequate

Art. XVIII, Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a

A concurring opinion noted the debate between Davide (date of proclamation) and Bernas (date of

The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of lower

CIR v Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23 (1971). A State is a politically organized sovereign community,

Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963), infra. The right of the an individual to be

Art. VII, Sec. 4. The President and Vice­President shall be elected by direct vote of the people

Com. Act No. 625 (June 7, 1941.) AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT

1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution (as of 2

Finally, in Tio Tam v Republic (1957), the SC tried to resolve the flip­flop rulings by stating that we

Sec. 5. Declaration of intention.­­ One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine

But Sec. 2 of the 1973 Consti. (carried over as Sec. 4 of the 1987 Consti.) only has a prospective

HELD: By filing its complaint in intervention, the govt in effect waived its right of non­suability. Stated

F: The defendants were convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and

Case: NACOCO is a government entity organized to promote the coconut industry. In a litigation

It is a standard to be observed because it is required by justice or fairness or other dimensions of

Under this principle, the Philippines is a democratic state that is, a government for, of, and by the

Art. II, Sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopt the

Art. VI, Sec. 5(2) The party­list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total

It is difficult to draw the line between separation of Church and State. In Elizalde v Victoriano, for

Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that

Said the Court: Civil servants are entitled to form societies for purposes not contrary to law. But to

EO 180, w/c provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of govt employees, while

Some cite this provision as the basis of a stand against divorce. And yet not really. The phrase "

Sec. 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private

These provisions reveal that the economic policy of the Philippines is one closer to socialism than

A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. The petrochemical industry is

Sec. 11(1). The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the

Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

Cruz: Purpose.­­ The doctrine of separation of powers is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.­­ (a) The party list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the

Sec. 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party­List System.­­ Any party, organization, or coalition already

Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.­­ The COMELEC may, motu proprio, or upon verified

Sec. 13. How Party­List Representatives Are Chosen.­­ Party­list representatives shall be proclaimed by the

Sec. 19. Appropriations.­­ The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the

Sec. 20. Separability Clause.­­ If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due

HELD: I. a. As taxypayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged

III. Perhaps the strongest reason why the said provision is not intended to apply to the Interim

HELD: 1. [T]he "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on 12/30/69, such as

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint

(2) Letter was not libelous.­­ The letter was not libelous bec. it mentions that herein appellants as

HELD: 1. Sec. 15, Art. VI of the 1935 Consti. provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the

Art. VI, Sec. 16 (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its

Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may

HELD: The petitioner wholly misconceives the function of the judiciary under our system of govt. [T]he

In Angara v Electoral Commission, supra, the SC held that the then Electoral Commission was an

Under Vera v Avelino, supra, the house may conduct "exclusion proceedings," and by a vote of the

In the earlier case of Angara vs Electoral Commission (63 Phil 139), it was held that the respondent

In Daza vs Singson, 180 SCRA 496, the petitioner questioned his replacement in the Commission on

The Commission on Appointments shall meet to discharge its powers and functions only while the

Art. VI, Sec. 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an

Art. VI, Sec. 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the

Exception: When such priest, et. al., is assigned to (a) the AFP; (b) any penal institution; (c) any

Art. VI, Sec. 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an

Art. VI, Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme

Fifth. xxx To presume that the purpose is lawmaking where the purpose is different is to place an

Art. VII, Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander­in­Chief of all armed forces of the

Art. VII, Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on

In Sarmiento vs Mison, 156 SCRA 549, the Commissioner of Customs was held not to be subject to

Art. VII, Sec. 4. The President and VicePresident shall be elected by direct vote of the people

Finally, in Tio Tam v Republic (1957), the SC tried to resolve the flipflop rulings by stating that we

Sec. 5. Declaration of intention. One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine

HELD: By filing its complaint in intervention, the govt in effect waived its right of nonsuability. Stated

Art. VI, Sec. 5(2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total

Cruz: Purpose. The doctrine of separation of powers is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the

Sec. 4. Manifestation to Participate in the PartyList System. Any party, organization, or coalition already

Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio, or upon verified

Sec. 13. How PartyList Representatives Are Chosen. Partylist representatives shall be proclaimed by the

Sec. 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the

Sec. 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or

(2) Letter was not libelous. The letter was not libelous bec. it mentions that herein appellants as

Art. VII, Sec. 18. The President shall be the CommanderinChief of all armed forces of the

The six year term for the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986

In In re Saturnino Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160, the SC held that the "incumbent President and Vice

1. If the Presidentelect cannot assume his post at the beginning of his term because i) he has not

Cruz: Kinds of Pardon. Pardon may be classified into absolute or conditional and plenary or partial. An

This overrules the holding in Aquino v PonceEnrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974), that when the President

HELD: Section 31 of Proclamation No. 5A prohibited courts and administrative agencies from issuing any

Sec. 11. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in

Section 14. Decision. Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in