JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS

Husserl and Hilbert on Completeness and Imaginary Elements in
Mathematics1

ABSTRACT. In this paper I discuss Husserl’s solution of the problem of imaginary ele-
ments in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures he gave in Göttingen in
1901 and other related texts of the same period, a problem that had occupied Husserl since
the beginning of 1890, when he was planning a never published sequel to Philosophie der
Arithmetik (1891). In order to solve the problem of imaginary entities Husserl introduced,
independently of Hilbert, two notions of completeness (definiteness in Husserl’s termino-
logy) for a formal axiomatic system. I present and discuss these notions here, establishing
also parallels between Husserl’s and Hilbert’s notions of completeness.

0. INTRODUCTION

In 1901 Husserl addressed the Mathematical Society in Göttingen in order

to present his views on a problem that had occupied him, in one form or the
other, since the beginning of 1890:2 the problem of imaginary entities in
mathematics. In the Göttingen lectures this problem is twofold: (1) when
is an object “imaginary” from the perspective of a formal axiomatic sys-
tem (the ontological problem)? (2) how to justify the use of “imaginary”
elements in mathematics (the epistemological problem)? In order to deal
with these questions Husserl appealed to the notion of the formal domain
of objects determined by a formal axiomatic system, and two notions of
completeness of a formal system of axioms, which he called relative and
absolute definiteness.
These concepts offered him the key to the solution of both the on-
tological and the epistemological problems.3 The notion of absolute
definiteness is identical with Hilbert’s notion of deductive or syntactic
completeness, whereas the notion of relative definiteness is a particular
case of it, being nothing more than completeness relative to a particular
set of expressions.4 The notion of relative definiteness, which depends on
the notion of the domain of formal objects determined by a formal system
of axioms, is nonetheless the central notion for the solution of both the
ontological and the epistemological problems.

Synthese 125: 417–438, 2000.

© 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
418 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

In this paper I intend to show how, and why, Husserl arrived at these
notions and explain their relevance for the problem of imaginary elements
in mathematics. I shall also show how Husserl’s notions of definiteness
are related to Hilbert’s axiom of completeness – proposed in Über den
Zahlbegriff (1900) – via the notion of a formal domain of objects, thus
offering a possible explanation for the “close relation” that Husserl con-
sidered evident between them and the notion of completeness involved in
Hilbert’s axiom of completeness.5 Let us go into the details now.
Consider the set N of natural numbers, that is, the smallest set contain-
ing 0 and closed with respect to the successor operation (S). We can define
the operation of addition (+) of natural numbers recursively as follows: for
any numbers n, m: n + 0 = n; n + (Sm) = S(n + m).
Suppose now that we “enlarge” this domain by introducing “imaginary”
elements in the following way: for each number n, let −n be the only
“imaginary” element such that n+(−n) = 0 (∗ ). These elements are called
“imaginary” since, from the perspective of N, they are non-existent; the
equation (∗ ) is, after all, without a solution in N. The problem we face is
the following: if we merely add the negative numbers to N, the equation
(∗ ) is without meaning, for, as defined, addition only makes sense in N;
if we restrict, as we must, addition to its domain, then (∗ ) is impossible.
We could, of course, redefine the operation of addition in order to make
(∗ ) meaningful. The problem now is that the negative “numbers” are not
numbers in the same sense as the natural numbers, that is they are not
possible answers to the question “how many?”
After the publication of Philosophie der Arithmetik (henceforth PA,
1891), in which numbers, exclusively in the guise of natural numbers, are
introduced as instances of the concept of quantity, Husserl had to face the
problem of “imaginary” elements in arithmetic, such as negative, rational,
irrational and complex numbers – which are “imaginary” precisely because
they are not “natural”, i.e., they do not correspond to a notion of quantity
– in order to give them solid philosophical foundations, as Husserl under-
stood it, in the never published second volume of PA. The problems raised
above were among those Husserl had to deal with.
In the course of his ensuing investigations, Husserl discovered, inde-
pendently of Hilbert as is clear from Husserl’s writings, two notions of
definiteness for a system of axioms that are both very close to Hilbert’s
concept of completeness. I shall show here that one of Husserl’s notions
coincides with Hilbert’s (as Husserl himself realized), and that both of
Husserl’s notions involve an idea of maximality – of the formal multiplicity
or formal manifold 6 (the domain of formal objects determined by a formal
axiomatic system), in the case of one of the notions of definiteness, or
 HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS 419

the system itself, in the case of the other – that explains the connection
that Husserl saw between his notions of definiteness and the concept of
completeness involved in Hilbert’s axiom of completeness.
Husserl’s investigations on this topic influenced the whole of his later
philosophy. In the particular case of his philosophy of mathematics,
Husserl’s characterization, Bourbakian avant la lettre, of mathematics as
the science of formal systems7 was probably born in the course of these
investigations. In general, it is arguable that they played a more important
role in his turning away from psychologism than Frege’s criticisms (pub-
lished in 1894) of Husserl’s first work on the foundations of arithmetic
(PA). As we shall see, in order to justify “imaginary” numbers Husserl
chose to embrace a variant of formalism, in which these numbers are seen
as mere practical tools. This clearly amounts to giving up a psychological
approach of the type he favored in PA. The fact that Husserl had already
given up such an approach to the foundations of mathematics well before
Frege’s review of PA indicates, I believe, that Frege did not have a major
role in Husserl’s conversion to anti-psychologism.8
Note that in these investigations some of the central themes of Husserl’s
epistemology, which are also present in PA, and which will be even more
important in his later philosophy, are already clearly detectable. For ex-
ample, the interplay between presence (intuition) and absence (intention)
in the construction of knowledge. Natural numbers are clearly at least
partially intuitable whereas imaginary numbers are not.
However, in this paper I intend to concentrate on the genesis of
Husserl’s notions of definiteness and his solution to the problem of the
imaginary in mathematics, as presented in the drafts for the Göttingen
talks and related texts of the same period (Hua XII, 340–500), contrasting
both the solution and the notions with Hilbert’s views on these matters.9
Husserl tackled some very technical questions in the new mathematical
logic of the time in order to solve the problem of imaginary elements. In
particular, questions regarding the definition of the “domain” of a system
of axioms, i.e., the universe described by the system, together with ques-
tions concerning extensions of formal systems and their domains10 I will
show here how Husserl solved these problems. When dealing with these
questions, which were far from being clear in his time, Husserl was as
much a mathematician as a philosopher, and it is precisely this aspect of
Husserl’s intellectual activity that I want to highlight here.
420 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

1. THE PROBLEM OF IMAGINARY NUMBERS

By an “imaginary” number Husserl understands any number that is not a

natural number. Hence negative, rational, irrational and complex numbers
are all imaginary (Hua XII, 433). This is how Husserl understands the
problem they give rise to:
Let a domain of objects be given, in which certain forms of operation and relation, determ-
ined according to the particular nature of the objects, are expressed in a certain system of
axioms A. Based on this system, hence on the particular nature of the objects, certain forms
of operation do not have any real meaning, that is, these forms of operation are absurd. How
can what is absurd be used in computations, how can it be employed in deductive reasoning
as if it were consistent? How can it be explained that one can operate with absurdities
according to rules, and that, if no absurdity appears inside propositions, the propositions
obtained are true? (Hua XII, 433).11

Consider the example above, that of the natural numbers to which we

arbitrarily add the negative numbers. We can prove, using a suitable system
of axioms for N, that for any natural numbers n, m, k: n + k = m + k ⇒
n = m. But we can also prove the same thing using negative numbers
and their defining property (∗ ) together with some general properties of
addition: n + k = m + k ⇒ (n + k) + (−k) = (m + k) + (−k) ⇒
n + (k + (−k)) = m + (k + (−k)) ⇒ n + 0 = m + 0 ⇒ n = m.
Except the first and two last equations in the above derivation, the others
are meaningless in N. Nonetheless, the fact the derivation “proves” is true.
Husserl’s problem is to explain in what circumstances this is acceptable.
In fact, Husserl has a still more basic problem to solve before explain-
ing how negative numbers can be used in proving true facts about natural
numbers, namely, in what sense negative numbers are numbers? Husserl
notices that “if we understand by numbers the answers to the question ‘how
many?’, the sequence of [natural] numbers is then the closed multiplicity
of instances that are possible in the sphere of the ‘how many’ ” (Hua XII,
434). Therefore, negative numbers are not genuine numbers at all. The only
way, Husserl believes, in which this problem can be tackled and derivations
involving absurdities, like the one we carried out above, can be justified is
by abandoning the concept of number as we understand it and moving into
a sphere of purely formal reasoning. The axioms that are derived from
our understanding of the concept of number are now to be seen as an
implicit definition of a purely formal concept, that of the positive integers.
With appropriate modifications this system of axioms can also be used to
define without contradiction the notion of integer, since the meanings of
these concepts are given exclusively by their formal definitions. This is
how Husserl sketches a first approach to the solution of the problem of
imaginary numbers:
 HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS 421

To abandon the concept of number, and, through the formal system of definitions and
operations that are valid for the numbers, to define a new, purely formal, concept, that of
positive whole number. This formal concept of positive number, to the extent that it is itself
delimited by the definition, can be enlarged by new definitions without contradiction. (Hua
XII, 435).

But this cannot be the whole solution. Suppose that A is a system

of axioms which implicitly defines certain operations and relations in a
completely undetermined way, that is, without specifying their objective
domains, and let B be a system extending A, i.e., A is properly contained
in B. Suppose that B is consistent, then nothing can be derived from B that
contradicts anything derived from A, for otherwise B would be inconsist-
ent. Can we take what is derived from B and only involves operations and
relations that make sense in A as “acceptable” from the perspective of A?
Is consistency the only criterion for the acceptability of these assertions,
as Hilbert had claimed (claims which were well known to Husserl)? These
are the questions that Husserl had to face in order to solve the problem of
imaginary numbers. Hilbert’s solution, which conditions the acceptability
of imaginaries exclusively to the consistency of the system in which they
are defined, was considered by Husserl, but abandoned as incomplete. How
do we know, he asks, that what is not inconsistent with A is also true
in the “domain” of A (whatever this is)12 ? Certainly, Husserl thinks, a
proposition that makes sense for A and that is derived from B does not
necessarily have to be true in the domain of A. It is as if A had to be
exclusively responsible for what is true in its domain, and not depend on
arbitrary extensions of itself in order to settle this question.
These problems led Husserl to investigate many technical questions of
formal logic, such as: what is the domain of a formal system of axioms?
What is the equivalent of truth in formal axiomatic systems? In what sense
can formal systems of axioms and their domains be extended? To mention
only a few of the questions that had to be answered if the problem of
imaginary numbers was to be adequately solved.
Before presenting what I believe to be the solution Husserl presented
to the problem of imaginary entities in mathematics and how they can
be vindicated, let me present and discuss a reading of Husserl’s solution
(which was actually presented by some authors),13 which is at first sight
consistent with Husserl’s texts, but that can be shown, on a closer analysis,
to be incorrect. Suppose that A is a system of axioms that is extended by
another system B, that is B has at least all the axioms of A and possibly
some more. Suppose also that A is consistent and complete, that is, given
any assertion in the language in which the axioms of A are written – L(A),
the language of A – A does not prove this assertion and its negation, but
either this assertion or its negation is provable in A. Moreover suppose that
422 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

B is also consistent, although not necessarily complete and that in B we

can define “imaginary” elements. Can an assertion written in L(A) – and
so supposedly “making sense” from the perspective of A – that is proved in
B – therefore “depending” on imaginary entities - be accepted? The solu-
tion some authors interpret as being Husserl’s goes like this: yes, because
the use of imaginary elements in the proof of the assertion in question is
in principle unnecessary. Since A is complete, either this assertion or its
negation is provable in A, if the negation can be proved then B is incon-
sistent, for B is an extension of A and therefore proves everything that A
proves, contrary to our hypothesis. Therefore the assertion in question can
be proved in A, showing that the use of imaginary elements is indeed in
principle unnecessary.
Here is why this solution does not work. Since A is complete and the ex-
istence of imaginary elements cannot be proved in it, then the nonexistence
of these elements must be provable in A. Therefore, there cannot exist any
consistent extension of A in which the existence of these imaginary ele-
ments can be proved. For instance, suppose for the sake of argumentation
that A is a complete system for the arithmetic of natural numbers. In A we
can prove “if n 6 = 0, then there is no m such that n + m = 0”, but if we
define the negative numbers in an extension B of A, we can prove “for any
n, there is an m such that n + m = 0” in B. Therefore B is inconsistent.
What is going on here is the following. The system B, having extra
axioms, changes the meaning of the symbols of L(A) and consequently of
any assertion written in L(A). In other words, it is not the case that any
assertion written in L(A) is interpreted by A and B in the same way. The
puzzle that led Husserl into considering the notion of a formal multiplicity
determined by an axiomatic system can be expressed as follows: how to
guarantee that the meaning that A attributes to the symbols of L(A) is
preserved by B? His answer can be interpreted in the following way: as-
sertions of L(A) preserve their meaning in systems that extend A provided
that these assertions refer exclusively to the elements of the domain of A,
that is provided that they refers exclusively to the objects A “has in mind”;
or, as I prefer to put it, provided that their variables are restricted to the
formal domain determined by A.
Husserl’s solution for the problem of imaginary elements has, I believe,
the following form: given systems A and B such that A and B are con-
sistent and B extends A, let D be the formal manifold determined by A
(a concept that will be analyzed below) and suppose that A is complete
relative to the assertions of LD (A), i.e., the assertions of L(A) with all
variables restricted to D. Now, if any of these assertions (i.e., assertions
of LD (A)) is proved by B, it can also be accepted from the perspective of
 HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS 423

A, for we are sure that its meaning, as determined by A, was not altered
by B and moreover A can also in principle prove it. So, in order to solve
the problem of imaginary entities, Husserl only needs a restricted notion
of completeness, as is clear from the relevant texts, not the full-blown no-
tion of completeness due to Hilbert. However, his solution depends on the
notion of a formal manifold determined by a system of axioms, to which
we turn our attention now.

2. DOMAINS OF FORMAL SYSTEMS

With respect to the definition of the domain of a formal system, Husserl’s

notes from 1900–01 are anything but clear. Two different notions can be
found there with the same name, one concerns what Husserl calls “formal
objects” (I will refer to this as the formal ontological concept of domain),
the other concerns judgments (which I will refer to as the apophantic
concept of domain). The ontological concept is by far the most difficult
to define, and will be the focus of my attention for most of this section.
In what follows, if nothing is said to the contrary, by “domain” I mean
exclusively the formal ontological concept of domain.
Generally speaking, by the domain of a formal system Husserl under-
stands “the sphere of existence” defined by the system. But for Husserl the
elements of a domain are, this much at least is clear, not specified objects
but, rather, unspecified “formal objects”, or also, as he sometimes calls
them, “forms of objects”. By specification, i.e., by “filling” these forms
with the appropriate “stuff”, we obtain the different objects the system
in question refers to by means of the formal objects of its domain. The
idea is that these “formal objects” are structures of some sort that are
transformed into genuine objects when “filled” by the appropriate matter.
Formal objects are “unsaturated” objects, in Frege’s special sense of the
word, that a formal language denotes and singularizes. Their unsaturated-
ness is what makes them merely formal objects, i.e., forms that can be
“filled” in different ways.14
Consider a system of axioms A. According to Husserl, all the formal
objects that A can specify in a non-ambiguous way, that is, all the formal
objects whose “existence” A presupposes or implies belong to the domain
of A (Hua XII, 470–71). Let us suppose that A is expressed in a first-
order language and define the formal ontological domain of A as the set of
all formal objects whose “existence” the theory can prove (also called the
formal multiplicity or manifold determined by A). Of course, this definition
will not take us very far if we do not have a proper definition of the notion
of a formal object. This is how I propose, based on Husserl’s suggestions,
424 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

to interpret this concept. Formal objects are the referents of two types
of linguistic entities: (i) terms without variables expressed in L(A), the
language of A, and (ii) formulas of L(A) in one free variable. The formal
object denoted by the term t is thought of as constructed from the formal
objects denoted by the constants occurring in it by means of the operations
involved in the term t (it is in this sense an object that is “constructed” from
previously given objects). Objects denoted by terms are all in the domain
of A, for A proves ∃!x(x = t), for any term t. Any formula ϕ(x), with
one free variable, that can be expressed in the language of A is an implicit
definition of a formal object. In general a formula ϕ(x) may exist such that
A does not prove either ∃!xϕ or the negation of this sentence. But if A
proves ∃!xϕ, then the uniquely determined object specified by ϕ belongs
to the domain of A.
In other words, if the language of A has symbols for constants then
these symbols denote objects in the domain, for they are non-ambiguous
names determined by A (the existence of formal objects denoted by con-
stants of the language of A is required by A). If the language of A has
symbols for single valued functions (or operations), then all the objects
denoted by terms (with their usual logical meaning) generated from these
symbols and terms denoting objects already in the domain are also in the
domain, for these terms also denote objects whose existence A requires.
The above restriction to single valued operations, explicitly imposed by
Husserl, is easy to understand. A term generated by a multivalued opera-
tion does not single out a unique object, so it does not have the uniqueness
we usually associate with objects. Finally, if ϕ(x) is a formula of the
language of A in one free variable (we can think of the formula as a
description of a purported object), and if A proves ∃!xϕ(x) (i.e., that there
is a unique object satisfying ϕ(x)) then the idea is that the unique formal
object determined by ϕ(x) is in the domain of A. We can accomplish this
by adding a new constant c to the language of A, a new axiom to A, namely
(ϕ(x) ↔ x = c), and putting the object denoted by c in the domain of A.
But this explanation is not complete yet. Husserl explicitly says that the
domain of a formal system is the collection of all formal objects determ-
ined by the system on the basis of a collection of formal objects arbitrarily
given. In order to accommodate this requirement the notion of domain
cannot be absolute, but must be relative to the set of formal objects we
begin with, which we will call a basis. So, given a set of new constants
which we add to the language of A (and which we think of as denoting the
elements of the basis), in order to obtain the domain of A relative to this
basis we proceed as above considering these new constants as bona fide
constants of L(A).
 HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS 425

We must keep in mind that formal objects are not linguistic entities.
Formal objects are denoted by terms and singularized by descriptions,
but they cannot be reduced to them. On the other hand we cannot simply
identify them with specific objects denoted by the terms and descriptions
of the language. They are formal objects precisely because they constitute
the form to which all these specific objects conform. Similarly, the formal
domain that a system of axioms determines is not simply a collection of
names. It transcends language in the sense that it is the generic form of
objective realms this system describes.
Moreover, since A supposedly describes its domain, the axioms of A
are supposed to be true in the domain of A, although the description
A provides need not to be complete or exhaustive. However, we cannot
simply identify the notion of a formal domain to the modern notion of
a model for the system. A model contains (“materially filled”) objects, a
formal domain contains (“materially empty”) formal objects. Moreover, a
system may have many different models but it has only one formal domain
(Husserl always refers to the domain of a formal axiomatic system). But
Husserl at least once considered abandoning the notion of a formal domain
for the more natural concept of a collection of objects satisfying, under
an appropriate interpretation, the axioms of a system, as the following
quotation indicates:
Domain of a system of axioms. We restrict ourselves to systems of axioms that have a
domain. (Why not simply: set of objects that satisfy the system of axioms.) [. . . ] Everything
remains correct if we simply take the word domain in its natural sense: objects that satisfy
the axioms (Hua XII, 457)

Nonetheless, the original notion of a formal domain is meant as the

formal structure which an axiomatic system “intends” to describe.
To make things worse there is no easy way, if any at all, of explaining
what it means for an axiom of A to be true in the formal domain determ-
ined by A. So, I will not try it. It is enough for my purpose of clarifying
Husserl’s notions of definiteness to establish the following:
1. Any axiomatic system determines a (unique) domain of purely formal
objects, or forms of objects.
2. No formal object belongs to this domain that is not required to exist
by the axioms of the system.
3. All concepts and operations involved in the axioms of the system, and
whose meaning is given by the system, are interpreted in the domain
of the system in such a way that it is possible to say that all axioms of
the system are true in this domain.
Although this notion of formal domain is the most general one, it is not
the only such notion Husserl presents in the texts under analysis. Husserl
426 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

also had a more restricted notion of domain which he calls a mathematical

or constructive manifold. A system of axioms A determines a constructive
manifold, he says, if its domain contains only “constructible” objects, i.e.,
if A proves ∃!x ϕ(x), or in general if A proves ∃x ϕ(x), then there is a term
t involving only constants of the basis such that A proves ϕ(t).
In Husserl’s words:
A system of axioms defines a mathematical or ‘constructive multiplicity if the sphere of
formal objects that it defines has the property that any object existing in this sphere on the
basis of the axioms is uniquely determined by its operational relation to objects ‘given in
a determined way’, that is, uniquely established and no longer specifically distinguishable.
Hence if all objects in general existing in the domain and that are thought of according
to any concept defined in virtue of the axioms are part of the objects that are obtained
from those objects that are given in a determined way by definite concept formations, by
definite junctions and relations. Any concept of object that is defined by the axioms is
either a concept of object of the domain of determined objects, or does not have an object
(in the domain), i.e., among the objects whose existence the system of axioms can establish
(prove) there is no object corresponding to the concept (Hua XII, 452–53).

In different, hopefully somewhat clearer, words. A system of axioms

defines a mathematical or constructive multiplicity when any formal object
whose existence can be inferred from the axioms, be it uniquely determ-
ined or only ambiguously determined by the axioms (the latter occurs
when the object is determined by a formula which is not satisfied by a
single element only) is generated from the elements of the basis. Again
in the words of Husserl, a system of axioms determines a constructive
multiplicity when:
[. . . ] all assertions of existence which are valid on the basis of the axioms, even if they
do not determine their objects uniquely or even if they only determine an infinite class
of objects, find their equivalents in the sphere of existence due to uniquely determining
constructions, hence when all objects whose existence follows from the axioms are among
those that can be constructively, hence uniquely, produced from no matter which previously
given objects (Hua XII, 471).

A still more restrictive notion is obtained when we require that the basis
in question be finite. In this case we say that A defines a finite multiplicity
(Hua XII, 471–72).
Having available the notion of a formal domain, or manifold, de-
termined by an axiomatic system, Husserl can now tackle the following
problem: Suppose that A and B are two systems of axioms such that
A ⊂ B, i.e., B contains all axioms of A together with some extra ax-
ioms which are consistent with but not derivable from A (A and B may
have the same language). Can the domain of A be changed by B? Can
B, for instance, enlarge the domain of A by proving certain existential
statements in the language of A which A itself was incapable of proving?
 HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS 427

Before we go on with this discussion, one observation is necessary here.

If we understand by the domain of a formal system the totality of formal
objects that this system determines, then the notion of an “extension” of
the domain of a specific formal system appears to be devoid of sense. But
the senselessness is, in this case, only apparent. When Husserl talks about
an extension of the domain of the system A he means, in fact, the domain
of another formal system B that extends A by the introduction of new
axioms. Let us keep in mind that these new axioms may be written in the
same language of A, but need not be.
Before I proceed to the next section, let me introduce the apophantic
notion of domain. As mentioned above, besides the formal ontological
notion Husserl has yet another notion of the domain of a formal axiomatic
system, which I have called the apophantic notion. This is how I propose to
understand this notion: given a system A, by the apophantic domain of A
I mean the collection of all statements that A can either prove or disprove,
i.e., the apophantic domain of a system is the collection of statements this
system can decide. If an assertion belongs to the apophantic domain of a
system, then it is either true on the basis of the axioms of the system, if
they can prove it, or it is false on the basis of these axioms, if they can
prove its negation. Therefore, the principle of the excluded middle is valid
for the apophantic domain of any axiomatic system.

3. EXTENSIONS OF DOMAINS , IMAGINARY ELEMENTS AND THE

NOTION OF RELATIVE DEFINITENESS

The concept of the formal ontological domain of a system of axioms A al-

lows us to define what is, from the perspective of A, an imaginary element,
that is, to solve what I have called the ontological problem. An imaginary
element is simply any element that is not in the ontological domain of A, no
matter which basis. In other words, it is an element that, from the point of
view of A, does not exist. Or still, an element that cannot be singularized
by the axioms of the system. To introduce an imaginary element in the
domain of A is simply to extend A by a consistent system of axioms B
whose ontological domain includes the domain of A together with this
new imaginary element. This can be done, for instance, by adding new
constants to L(A) and new axioms to A stating the properties that the new
formal objects they denote must satisfy, or also by adding to A assertions
of L(A) that do not belong to the apophantic domain of A, that is assertions
that A cannot either prove or disprove. In this way, expressions of L(A) of
the form “there is a unique x such that . . . ” that could not be proved by A
may now be proved in the extended system. Note that in this case, even if
428 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

the defining expression that introduces a new element in the domain of B is

a sentence of L(A), this new element is imaginary from the perspective of
A, for A cannot prove that it exists. This again shows us that the meanings
of the assertions of L(A) are not determined once and for all, but depend
on the system in which they can be proved. Symbols have their meanings
constantly open to new interpretation, provided by new systems of axioms.
A fixed system cannot guarantee that the meaning of its symbols is not
reinterpreted by an arbitrary extension of the system, but it can guarantee
that, at least with respect to the elements of its ontological domain, this
meaning is given once and for all, or so Husserl seems to think. This leads
us to the notion of relative definiteness, which is the key notion for solving
what I have called the epistemological problem. Husserl writes:
A system of axioms is “definite” in a relative manner if any proposition that has a sense
according to it is decided in the limits of the domain of this system (Hua XII, 440)

There are two questions related to the above “definition” that must be
answered before this purported definition makes any sense: (1) when does
a proposition “have a sense” according to a system of axioms? (2) when is
a proposition “decided in the limits of the domain of a system?”
The obvious answer to (1) is that a proposition has a sense according
to a system of axioms if it belongs to the language of this system. As we
have already explained above, by extending the axioms of a system we can
reinterpret the meaning of the symbols of its language. Although it is ob-
vious that any assertion of L(A) has a sense according to A, A cannot rule
out different senses for the same assertion. This leads Husserl, I believe,
to impose the crucial restriction contained in (2). Instead of considering
assertions of the language of A in general, Husserl considers only those
that refer exclusively to the elements of the domain of A. In this way we
can be sure that the meaning of the assertion in question is fixed once
and for all. For any proposition P of L(A), the restriction of P to the
domain D – PD – which is also supposedly a proposition of L(A), denotes
a state of affairs in the domain of A, therefore it is not affected by arbitrary
extensions of A. It is far from obvious, though, that the restriction of the
variables of a proposition of L(A) to the domain of A can be accomplished
by the expressive powers of this language. In fact, in most cases this will
not be possible. To investigate this problem here would take us far afield,
so we will simply suppose, for the sake of exposition, that the restriction of
all variables in any assertion of the language of a system A to the domain
of A is still an assertion of the same language.
Now we can answer the question (2) above. A proposition is decided
in the limits of the domain of a system when its restriction to the domain
of this system is decided by the system, that is, it is either a consequence
 HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS 429

of the system or it is in contradiction to it, in the sense that the negation

of this proposition is a consequence of the axioms of the system. Hence,
this is how I propose we should understand Husserl’s notion of relative
definiteness: a system of axioms A is definite relative to its domain D if
for any proposition P in L(A), either PD or its negation is a consequence
of the axioms of A. We can now solve the epistemological problem: when
is it legitimate to operate with imaginary elements?
Suppose that A and B are two consistent systems of axioms, and that
B extends A. Suppose also that the ontological domain of B includes
properly that of A, i.e., B has imaginary elements (from the perspective
of A). If B proves a proposition P of L(A) then the imaginary elements of
B contributed not only to the proof of P , but possibly also to changing the
meaning of the concepts A implicitly defines – in which case A does not
prove P . But if we restrict all the variables of P to the domain D of A, then
the proposition PD thus obtained refers exclusively to the formal manifold
A determines, i.e., there is no implicit reference to imaginary elements.
Hence the concepts involved in PD have the sense A gives them; therefore
A must decide this proposition. These were the considerations, I believe,
that led Husserl to reject Hilbert’s solution of the problem of imaginary
entities in mathematics, a solution that, as we know, requires only that
imaginaries do not introduce inconsistencies, in favor of more stringent
requirements, namely that A must be definite relative to its domain, i.e.,
A must either prove PD or ¬PD for any proposition P of L(A). In other
words, B cannot prove any assertion of L(A) that, when restricted to the
domain of A, A itself cannot decide (not necessarily prove). In particular, if
B proves PD then A must prove it too. That is, imaginary elements are not
necessary in order to prove assertions exclusively involving objects of the
domain of A. A must be, so to speak, master of its domain. Notice that this
version of Husserl’s solution is free from the problems, pointed out above,
that arise from the requirement that A be complete. If A proves ¬PD this
will not conflict with the fact that B proves P , because PD and P are two
different propositions, in the sense that they “refer” to different domains.
Let me now offer some pieces of textual evidence for my reading. De-
fining the notion of relative definiteness for a system of axioms Husserl
says:
[the system of axioms] defines a manifold in such a way that for each proposition involving
the concepts defined and purely logical concepts, it is objectively determined whether it
holds or does not hold for this manifold, instead of remaining indeterminate (Hua XII,
447) [my emphasis]

It is also clear from the context in which this quotation occurs that
Husserl considers the requirement of relative definiteness as a necessary
430 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

and sufficient condition for the legitimate use of imaginary entities (defined
in extensions of the system in question).
Also with respect to the notion of relative definiteness:
I define a system of axioms that formally defines a domain of objects in such a way that
every question that has a meaning for this domain of objects is answered by this system of
axioms [. . . ] every proposition that has a meaning according to the axioms, if we restrict
ourselves exclusively to the objects that the axioms establish as existing, either is a con-
sequence of the axioms or contradicts them. If P is a proposition that says: P holds for the
manifold whose existence is proved by A, then this proposition is, for this manifold, either
true or false on the basis of the axioms.
The manifold contains all the objects whose existence is proved by A, which does not
rule out that the same axioms hold for a larger manifold, but in such a way that the extra
elements are not defined as existing or proved to exist by the axioms (without the inclusion
of new axioms) (Hua XII, 454) [my emphasis]

Another remark is needed here, if we take seriously the suggestion that

the symbols of a language are not really the same if interpreted by different
axiomatic systems, as I believe Husserl did,15 it is not quite right to say that
a system B extends another system A, even if B contains what may look
like the same axioms of A plus some extra axioms. Although some axioms
of B may have the same form as the axioms of A, they are not really the
same, for the axioms in B that are not in A change the meaning of those
axioms of B that both A and B apparently share. A more adequate form of
expression is, I believe, to say that B extends A when B incorporates the
axioms of A by reinterpreting them in a larger context.
It is clear from Husserl’s notes, and I tried to do him justice in my
reading of these notes, that his earliest attempt to solve the problem of
imaginary entities in mathematics involves a complex, and far from clear,
interplay between syntactic and semantic notions, and therefore cannot be
formulated in a purely formalist way, such as Hilbert’s answer to the same
problem. Husserl’s refusal to accept Hilbert’s solution (a purely formal
solution that requires of imaginary elements only that they do not introduce
inconsistencies in the system to which they are added) seems to indic-
ate that Husserl could still not admit an axiomatic system as something
completely independent of a domain of objects. One way of interpreting
Husserl’s unwillingness to consider an axiomatic system independently of
any domain of objects, including the ghostly formal domain determined
by it, is to admit that, despite his criticism of Frege’s inability to accept
Hilbert’s new conception of a formal system of axioms (Hua XII, 448–9).16
Husserl himself was not yet completely free from the same prejudices in
favor of the traditional concept of axiomatic system that he criticizes in
Frege. However, by admitting, contrary to Frege, that the system takes
precedence over the domain it defines, and not vice-versa, the domain
 HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS 431

preceding the system that describes it, Husserl is, so to speak, halfway
between Hilbert’s new ideas and Frege’s old prejudices. Another inter-
pretation, more sympathetic to Husserl, would be to consider his ideas
concerning formal domains and the concept of relative definiteness as
belonging to a formal semantics which would be a precursor of modern
model theory. But these questions should not concern us here.
In fact, Husserl’s concept of relative definiteness is equivalent to the
notion of a system of axioms A that simultaneously completely defines
and completely describes a manifold M of objects, which are nonetheless
only formally determined by this system. By a complete description we
mean that any possible question that we can raise about this manifold
can be answered by A. If we allow extensions of A, then the “aboutness”
mentioned above, I claim, can only be obtained by somehow restricting all
the variables of the question we are asking to the manifold M. Otherwise
the question loses its “grip” on M, for it can be, and often is, reinterpreted
differently in extensions of A.
In Husserl’s words:
[A] system of axioms is “definite” if it circumscribes a domain of objects as existing, and
in such a way that for this domain no new axiom is possible. (Hua XII, 457) [my emphasis]

To say that no new axiom is possible for the domain of a system is,
obviously, equivalent to saying that this system decides any proposition
referring to its domain.

4. ABSOLUTE DEFINITENESS AND HILBERT ’ S AXIOMS OF

COMPLETENESS

As I mentioned above, in order to extend the domain of an axiomatic

system A we must adjoin new axioms to it. But this is only possible if
there is some proposition in L(A) that A does not decide, assuming that
we require the new axioms to be expressible in the same language of the
system A. Otherwise, if A decides any proposition that can be expressed
in L(A), then any possible candidate for a new axiom of A is already a
consequence of A, hence it cannot be a new independent axiom, or it is
contradictory with A, in the case that A proves its negation. When a system
of axioms has the property that any proposition that can be expressed in
its language is either a consequence of the axioms of the system or is in
contradiction with it, Husserl calls this system absolutely definite:
[. . . ]a system of axioms is “definite” in an absolute manner if any proposition that has a
sense according to it is decided in general (Hua XII,p.440) [my emphasis].
432 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

Obviously, if a system A is absolutely definite, it is also definite relative

to its domain, for the propositions expressed in L(A) that refer exclusively
to the domain of the system are (supposedly) among the propositions that
can be expressed in L(A), which can all be decided in A.
It is clear that Husserl is aware of the identity between his notions of
absolute definiteness and Hilbert’s notion of completeness:

So, “definite” in an absolute manner [equals] complete in the sense of Hilbert. (Hua XII,
440)

If a system is definite only relative to its ontological domain, no new

proposition referring to this domain can be added to the system, but this
does not rule out the possibility that propositions that do not refer exclus-
ively to its domain could be consistently adjoined to the system. However,
if a system is absolutely definite, no new axiom can be consistently added
to it, that is:
[. . . ] If not only no axiom (that gets a sense from the axioms already given) can be added
for the objects of the domain, but if in general no new axiom can be added. (Hua XII, 440)

Of course, the enlargement to which we are referring considers only

assertions in the language of the system. Otherwise, if we admit sentences
whose symbols do not belong to the language of the system, we can always
enlarge the original system by adding to it sentences that it can neither
prove nor disprove.
The fact that a relatively definite system completely determines and
completely describes a domain of formal objects, so that this domain does
not admit being extended and does not admit new axioms, together with
the fact that the apophantic domain of an absolutely definite system is the
largest possible, i.e., it coincides with the totality of all assertions that
can be expressed in the language of this system, show that both notions
of definiteness are closely associated with the idea of a system whose
domains (formal ontological or apophantic) do not admit being extended,
unless the system itself is modified. The connection between the notion of
absolute definiteness, which as we saw implies relative definiteness, and
the impossibility of extending the domain of an axiomatic system without
altering it is clearly indicated by Husserl in the passage below:

But this implies that the multiplicity (the domain) cannot be enlarged in such a way that for
the enlarged domain the same system of axioms valid for the old [domain] is [still] valid.
(Hua XII, 440).

This helps to explain, I believe, Husserl’s famous remark in a footnote

to §72 of Ideen I:
 HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS 433

The close relation of the concept of definiteness to the “Axiom of Completeness” intro-
duced by D. Hilbert for the Foundations of Arithmetic will be apparent without further
remark on my part to every mathematician.

In fact, relative definiteness is already sufficient for the unextendibility

of the domain of a system. In order to extend the domain of a system A it
is necessary to add new axioms to A. If A is definite relative to its domain,
these axioms cannot refer exclusively to the domain of A. Indeed, their
restriction to this domain can be disproved in A. Therefore the introduction
of new elements in the domain of A creates new “situations” in this domain
that A cannot describe. Hence, if A is definite relative to its domain, we
cannot extend the domain of A and still have it described by A.
Hilbert’s axiom of completeness is nothing but a way of selecting
among all possible models for a system of axioms the one that cannot
be enlarged by the introduction of new elements. Let us call a model for
a system of axioms complete if no object can be adjoined to it and the
enlarged structure be still a model of the system. An axiomatic system
satisfies Hilbert’s axiom of completeness if any of its models is complete in
the sense just defined. Now, if a system of axioms is definite in an absolute,
or even relative way, its domain is complete in this sense, as explained
above. Although obviously neither Husserl’s notion of absolute nor his
notion of relative definiteness are the same or equivalent with Hilbert’s
notion of semantic completeness involved in the axiom of completeness,
all these notions capture the same idea: the unextendibility of objective
domains, formal domains in the case of Husserl, ‘material’ domains in
the case of Hilbert. Despite the common opinion among commentators17
that Husserl confuses the notions of semantic and syntactic completeness,
I think that my presentation and discussion of Husserl’s two concepts of
definiteness makes it evident that there is indeed a relation between these
concepts and Hilbert’s axiom of completeness.
As far as I know, the only example Husserl gives of an absolutely def-
inite axiomatic system is not a very good one. According to Husserl, any
system of arithmetic is absolutely definite, and the reason for this is that
formulas of the language of arithmetic can always be reduced to systems
of equations and inequations, which are decidable:
Any arithmetic, however narrow it may be, that of positive or real integers, rational positive
or rational numbers in general, etc., any arithmetic is defined by a system of axioms such
that we can prove from them that: any proposition in general constructed exclusively from
the concepts which (taken axiomatically) are established by the axioms, any such proposi-
tion is in the domain, that is, it is either a consequence of the axioms or it is in contradiction
with them. The proof of this assertion consists in noticing that any definite formation of
operation [any variable-free term, my note] is a natural number and that any natural number
is in a relation of magnitude determinable on the basis of the axioms with respect to any
434 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

other number. If a proposition has in general a meaning in virtue of the axioms, it is either
valid as a consequence of the axioms or it is not valid for it contradicts the axioms [. . . ]
Any numerical equation is true if it can be transformed [via the axioms, my note] into an
identity, otherwise it is false. Any algebraic formula is then also decided, for it is decided
for any numerical instance (Hua XII, 443).

This quotation is a bit puzzling for, despite Husserl’s claim that any
arithmetical system is absolutely definite, his justification for this relies on
the decidability of quantifier-free formulas only. So, we seem to have a
problem of interpretation. But notice that the final sentence of the passage
quoted above says that ‘[a]ny algebraic formula is [. . . ] also decided, for
it is decided for any numerical instance’. It is clear, then, that Husserl
calls a general statement ‘decidable’ when its instances are decidable. This
way of understanding the notion of decidability, certainly not the same
one that is behind Gödel’s theorem, bears some resemblance to Poincaré’s
notion of verifiability for mathematical propositions (cf. his La science et
l’hypothèse). So, since Husserl does not understand the concept of decid-
ability in the same way as Gödel, we should not blame Husserl for making
a claim that apparently so blatantly contradicts the famous, although at that
time not yet proved, Gödel incompleteness theorem.

5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In PA Husserl had already faced the problem of justifying computations

with big numbers, numbers that could not be obtained by a process of
abstraction from manageable collections, that is, reasonably small collec-
tions that actually could be counted by a human agent. Imaginary numbers,
however, pose a still more difficult problem. If “huge” natural numbers are
non-intuitable due only to our minds’ limited powers, imaginary numbers
are not accessible to intuition in a much stronger way. No matter how much
we free our mental processes of their natural limitations, imaginary num-
bers cannot be generated by abstraction from given collections of objects.
Imaginary numbers are only symbols. Symbolic reasoning is justified in
PA by appealing to idealization, which guarantees that to any symbolic
computation there is an intuitive construction that could, if we abstract
from our inessential mental limitations, give it intuitive support. In the
case of imaginary numbers nothing of the sort is the case and Husserl must
find another way of justifying their use. He chooses to see these “num-
bers” as pure symbols to which nothing can correspond in our intuitions,
and computations with them as mere formal manipulations. The question
now is whether or not they can contribute to our knowledge about genuine
numbers, that is numbers that correspond to a notion of quantity.
 HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS 435

The requirement that imaginary numbers must be definable in consist-

ent extensions of relatively definite systems amounts to saying that they
cannot introduce new elements into the formal ontological domain of the
system in whose extensions they are definable or contribute to the descrip-
tion of this domain. In other words, imaginary numbers cannot disturb
either the ontology or the epistemology of the systems for which they are
precisely what they are: imaginary. Still another way of saying the same
thing is to say that no object can exist and, in general, no assertion refer-
ring exclusively to a certain domain can be proved solely in virtue of the
introduction of imaginary entities.
The notion of absolute definiteness, Husserl says, escaped him at first
because of his focusing exclusively on the problem of imaginary num-
bers, for which the restricted notion sufficed (Hua XII, 443). But once the
broader notion was available, Husserl immediately recognized its utility
for a much more important problem posed by formalism: what can cor-
respond to the notion of truth in formal axiomatic systems? The answer
to this question is now clear to him, a proposition of the system is true if
it is derivable in the system and false if it is in contradiction with it (i.e.,
its negation is derivable in the system). In order to preserve the validity of
logical laws in the context of formal systems, tertium non datur in partic-
ular, these systems must, of course, be absolutely definite, or complete in
Hilbert’s sense. Their consistency suffices to guarantee the validity of the
law of non-contradiction.
In Ideen I §72, a notion of definiteness is presented again, but with an
important difference. This time a mathematical structure is under consid-
eration, and it is called a definite manifold or a mathematical manifold if
its complete theory (that is, the set of all sentences that are true in this
structure) is finitely axiomatizable. That is, the manifold is described by
a complete and finite theory or, as Husserl puts it, it is “mathematically,
exhaustively definable”. “It [a definite manifold-my note] has the following
distinctive feature, that a finite number of concepts and propositions – to be
drawn as occasion requires from the essential nature of the domain under
consideration – determine completely and unambiguously on lines of pure
logical necessity the totality of all possible formations in the domain, so
that in principle, therefore, nothing further remains open within it”.
A theory is called definite if its domain is definite in the above sense:
“I also refer to a system of axioms which on purely analytic lines ‘ex-
haustively defines and describes’ a manifold in the sense described as a
definite system of axioms” (idem). Husserl seems to be, again, presenting
the notion of a system of axioms that is definite relative to its domain.
In the earlier texts of the Göttingen lectures a theory is definite relative
436 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

to its domain if it defines and completely describes a domain of formal

objects, whereas in the later text of Ideen I a domain of objects (possibly
only formal objects) is definite if there is a finite theory that exhaustively
defines and completely describes it. Despite some differences in presenta-
tion, we still have the same notion of relative definiteness. It is interesting
to notice the similarity between the notion of definiteness of a theory
presented in Ideen I, as that condition that guarantees that a domain is
exhaustively defined and described by a finite theory, with the notion of
a finite mathematical or constructive manifold presented above, as that
domain constructively and completely determined from a finite basis.
As already observed, both Husserl’s concept of relative definiteness
and Hilbert’s concept of completeness associated with the axiom of com-
pleteness involve the idea of a domain of objects which is exhaustively
determined and completely described by a theory, therefore a domain that
cannot be enlarged unless this theory is modified. As we have already
observed, any adjunction of new elements to the domain of a relatively
definite system (by means of new axioms) creates situations in that domain
that are inconsistent with the former theory.
The notion of (absolute) definiteness appears again in Formale und
Transzendentale Logik (1929) as an ideal presiding over nomological (Eu-
clidean) theories. It seems to me that Husserl introduces this ideal for
two basic reasons. On the one hand, definiteness is obviously the ideal to
which any theory aspires: to provide complete description of the domain,
or domains, of (either purely formal or materially filled) objects that this
theory refers to. On the other, definiteness, together with consistency, are
required in order to ensure the validity of classical logical laws, the law of
the excluded middle in particular, in formal contexts.

NOTES

1 I want to thank Claire Ortiz Hill for her many corrections, suggestions and comments
on an earlier version of this paper.
2 This is the date Husserl himself gives in a note to Ideen I §72. Husserl was by then
involved with the problem of imaginary entities in mathematics, which was to be dealt
with in the sequel to Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891). In his review (1891) of Schröder’s
Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik (1890), Husserl presents a sketch for a solution
of the problem of imaginary entities – in this case the null class in Schröder’s calculus
of classes – which is essentially identical with the solution presented to the problem of
imaginaries in arithmetic in the Göttingen lectures of 1901. Also, in his letter to Frege dated
18.7.1891 Husserl hints at a formalistic solution of the problem of imaginary numbers in
arithmetic.
 HUSSERL’S TWO NOTIONS OF COMPLETENESS 437
3 Besides also providing an equivalent of the notion of truth in formal contexts: in ab-
solutely definite systems the notion of derivability is a formal equivalent of the notion of
truth.
4 I will use the terms “definite” and “definiteness” when referring to Husserl’s notions and
“complete” and “completeness” when referring to Hilbert’s notions.
5 Husserl expresses his belief in the self-evidence of this correlation in a well-known
footnote to §72 of Ideen I.
6 “Multiplicity” and “manifold” are used here as synonymous. They both translate
Husserl’s term Mannigfaltigkeit.
7 “Mathematics is, in the highest and widest sense, the science of theoretical systems
in general, abstracting from what is being theorized about in given theories of different
sciences” (Hua XII, 430). “Mathematics is, in its highest ideal, a theory of theories, the
most general science of possible systems in general” (idem, 431).
8 In connection with this question see Hill, 1991.
9 As mentioned above (note 2) Husserl is already considering a formalist solution to the
problem of imaginary elements in mathematics in 1890, years before moving to Göttingen
and entering in the circle of Hilbert (1901). So, my comparison between Husserl’s and
Hilbert’s notions of completeness for a formal axiomatic system does not intend to estab-
lish the originality of Husserl’s ideas, a fact that I believe does not need to be established,
but simply to highlight his widely ignored contribution to a theory of formal systems by
comparing them with Hilbert’s much better known ideas on the same subject.
10 In Logical Investigations (Prolegomena §§69–71), a work written in the period in which
Husserl was struggling with the problem of imaginary entities, he presents a better version
of the notion of formal manifold, a version that he considered definitive. Also, Husserl
suggests (Prolegomena §70) that the notion of formal manifold contains “the key” to the
problem of imaginary entities. However, Husserl does not discuss this problem there.
11 All quotations from Hua XII in the text were translated by me from the French version
of pp.340–500 of Hua XII published in Husserl 1995.
12 An interpreted axiomatic system, that is, a system that is intended to describe a given
mathematical structure, such as the intuitively given structure of natural numbers, has a nat-
ural domain, precisely the structure that is designed to describe. But for a non-interpreted
or purely formal axiomatic system there is no such given domain. One of the problems
Husserl had to face in order to solve the problem of imaginary numbers was to provide a
“natural” notion of domain for non-interpreted formal systems.
13 For instance, Majer 1997, a variant of the same solution can be found in Hill 1995, 144.
14 The notions of formal object and formal manifold that Husserl presents in the Logical
Investigations (cf. n.10 above) are better elaborated than the earlier ideas he presents in the
drafts for the Göttingen lectures, developed in the wake of his attempts to complete PA.
The reason I stick to this less elaborated version of these notions is that the problem of
imaginary numbers is not explicitly discussed in the Logical Investigations.
15 “Every axiom brings a contribution to the definition” (Hua XII, 449)
16 Husserl was granted access to a correspondence between Hilbert and Frege on the
subject of formal axiomatic systems, which he summarizes and comments on Hua XII
447–51. Husserl criticizes the descriptive role Frege assigns to axioms, siding with Hil-
bert, who views axioms as nothing but implicit definitions. As we have seen, this move is
fundamental in Husserl’s approach to the problem of imaginary elements.
17 S. Bachelard in particular - see Bachelard 1968, 58–63. Also Jean Sebestik in his
postface to Cavaillès 1997, 135.
438 JAIRO JOSÉ DA SILVA

REFERENCES

Bachelard, S.: 1968, A Study of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic, Northwestern
University Press, Evanston.
Cavaillès, J.: 1997, Sur la Logique et la Théorie de la Science, Vrin, Paris.
Frege, G. and E. Husserl: 1987, Frege-Husserl Correspondence, Editions T. E. R.,
Mauvezin.
Hill, C.: 1991, Word and Object in Husserl, Frege and Russell: the Roots of Twentieth-
Century Philosophy, Ohio University Press, Athens.
Hill, C.: 1995, ‘Husserl and Hilbert on Completeness’, in J. Hintikka (ed.), From Dedekind
to Gödel, Synthese Library v. 251, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Hill, C. and G. Rosado Haddock: forthcoming, Meaning, Objectivity and Mathematics,
Husserl and Mainstream Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics.
Husserl, E.: 1970, Philosophie der Arithmetik, mit ergänzenden Texten (1890–1901),
Husserliana Volume XII, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.
Husserl, E.: 1970, Logical Investigations, Humanities Press, New York.
Husserl, E.: 1972, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (English trans. of
Ideen I), Collier-Macmillan, New York.
Husserl, E.: 1994, Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, trans. by
Dallas Willard, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Husserl, E.: 1995, Articles sur la Logique (1890–1913), PUF, Paris.
Majer, U.: 1997, ‘Husserl and Hilbert on Completeness: A Neglected Chapter in Early
Twenty Century Foundation of Mathematics’, Synthese 110.
Poincaré, H.: 1968, La Science et l’Hypothèse, Flammarion, Paris (first published in 1902).
Scanlon, J.:1991, ‘Tertium non Datur: Husserl’s Conception of a Definite Multiplicity’, in
T. M. Seebohm, D. Follesdal and J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Phenomenology and the Formal
Sciences, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Sebestik, J.: ‘Postface’, in Cavaillès [1997], pp. 91–142.

UNESP
Department of Mathematics
Rio Claro SP
Brazil