ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR.,
petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
She was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year
and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito
died in a car accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage
was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would
affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and
wife for at least five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage
license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead
Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that
five-year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as
“husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract
of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been
for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years
immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is,
unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, v. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ,
respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
Facts:
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife
of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966
in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four
children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however,
her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were “separated.”
Ruling:
No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be
necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. Respondent Judge cannot take refuge
on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just
like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for
at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when
he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know
that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without
the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According
to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would
have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, Manzano could be
charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found

guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in

question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid?

DE CASTRO VS DE CASTRO G.R. NO. 160172
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They
planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had
their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of
the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in
order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back
to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the
instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has
no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is

valid.

HELD:

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in
any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in
effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a
mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses
with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
REPUBLIC VS DAYOT GR NO. 175581, MARCH 28, 2008 nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does
not prescribe and may be raised any time.
FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November
24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit
that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then
filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an
administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the
other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering

that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license
requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together
for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June
1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in
the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation

of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception
to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity,
for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and
Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for
DOMINGO V. COURT OF APPEALS GR NO. 104818, 17 SEPTEMBER 1993
FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married
to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage
when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she
came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she
discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The
latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the
declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the
other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not
for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for
purposes of remarriage.
RULING:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed
of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the
subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner
was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is
freed from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Other
specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits
of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse
who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if
such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith
shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and
intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of
marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other
are revoked by operation of law.
Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be
separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is
baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA, GR NO. 141528, 2006-10-31
Facts:
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking
a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara
under Article 36 of Executive Order No.209... the RTC denied the petition
in a decision[2] dated November 11, 1997... upon the finding that
petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant
of the relief he is seeking."
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality,
petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition[5] for declaration of
nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that
his marriage with respondent was null and... void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Issues:
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter
of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential
requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same
proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground... of a
party's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds
for the same cause of action.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage
is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due
to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had... been
solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now
bound by this admission.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their
marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any
defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action
for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of... marriage
license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC,
Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
Principles:
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. I
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common
law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2)...
the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of
the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the... preservation of the
public tranquility and happiness
On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as
"conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter
action pendant which ordains that issues actually and... directly resolved
in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the
same parties involving a different cause of action
HALILI V. HALILI G.R. NO. 165424 JUNE 6, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to
respondent Chona Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a
joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and
wife. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which
point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating
other women. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that
the marriage was not "fake."
things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied
with fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological
condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause.
Based on the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed
suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him
unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the
Court declared the marriage null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and

void on the basis of his psychological incapacity.

RULINGS:

In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this
Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on
psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis - guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and
by decisions of church tribunals.

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder characterized by

a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually
lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear
criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.

Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others
to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend
to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do
MARCOS V. MARCOS
Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had
five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material
support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void
under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the
dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines
as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina

Issues

Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the

respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.

Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show

psychological incapacity.

Held

Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a

marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such
declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to
a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely
no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of
respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during
this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged
psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
respondent. celebration” of the marriage.

Facts: Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag and begot two
children. Avelino would disappear for months without explanation and
attend to drinking sprees with friends and return home drunk when with
the family; forced his wife to have sexual intercourse and if she resisted,
would inflict injure to the latter. He left his family again and never heard
of him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job to fend for themselves.
Erlinda then learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and
that he escaped from jail who remains at-large at date.Erlinda filed for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered a
decision declaring the marriage void under Artcile 36 of the Family Code.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals raising that the
lower court erred in declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino Dagdag
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter,
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychological incapacity of
the nature contemplated by the law not having been proven to exist.
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
Issue: Whether or not immaturity and irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic,
and a fugitive from justice constitutes psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code to declare the marriage null and void.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

Ruling: No. The ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina case is
reiterated herein in which the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
ANTONIO VS. REYES GR NO. 155800, MARCH 10, 2006 contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an
inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship
FACTS: between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her
age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married but her behavior remain unchanged.
at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of
December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even
did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to
her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in
August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for
good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have
his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of
the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as

basis for declaring their marriage null and void.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the

obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with
them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying
and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in
a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts.
The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from
Spouses Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced
the lots taken from the estate.
G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003

FACTS:

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the

parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of
defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all
surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this
action by their respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void
ab initio are certain deeds of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed by
defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of
their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title
issued in their names. In seeking the declaration of nullity of the
aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their
complaint, aver that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the
result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of
the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

ISSUE:

Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of

the Deeds of Sale

RULING:

Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of
the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to
their parents’ properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their
parents’ death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to
dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their
future legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots
to their siblings does not affect the value of their parents’ estate. While
Choa v. Choa

G.R. No. 1473376, 26 November 2002
FACTS:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children
namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of
his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso
presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the
dismissal of the case.Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury,
concubinage and deportation which shows latter’s psychological
incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not
only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The law provides that: “Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and (c) incurability.” In the case
at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and
his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no
showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the
problems besetting their marital union.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does
not constitute psychological incapacity.Furthermore, the testimonial
evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity.
It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect
that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The
totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical,
psychiatric or psychological examination.

RULING:

The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of
the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of
discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained
about three aspects of Leni’s personality namely lack of attention to
children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality
and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological
incapacity.
DAVID B. DEDEL v. CA, GR No. 151867, 2004-01-29
Facts: Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz
Dedel... and... the exchange of marital vows before the City Court
ofPasay on September 28, 1966. The civil marriage was ratified in a
church wedding on May 20, 1967.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an
irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital
affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian
national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by
Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite
the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and...
with whom she had two children.
Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join
Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only
return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed
on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article
36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 149.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that Sharon
was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and
had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General...
appealed alleging that ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial
court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
Issues:
does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by
petitioner fall within the... term "psychological incapacity?"
Ruling:
In this case, respondent's sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or psychically ill to such... an extent that she could not have
known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given a valid assumption thereof.
Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation
of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate
court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of
petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances,
like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide... the specific
answers to every individual problem.[19] While we sympathize with
petitioner's marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply
the law no matter how harsh it may be
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, GR No. 158896,
2004-10-27
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City,... dated 31
January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco
("respondent Manuel").
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life
together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that
all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over... domineering
and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her
extremely volatile and bellicose nature
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still
living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he
invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry
his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was...
respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations;
that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his
philandering; that she was raised in a real h
In the pre-trial order,[3] the parties only stipulated on the following:
That they were married on 27 June 1973;
That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the
witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition.
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel's Clerk of Court, testified that
petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuel's office.[19] But
when she was there, she would call witness to complain about the
curtains and the cleanliness of the... office.
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA
GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted
by petitioner Juanita.[23] From her psychiatric evaluation,[24] Dr. Garcia
concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-
Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational
problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with
love, support and understanding.
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel's
allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple who had their
own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent
Manuel started having extra-marital affairs[26] which... he had admitted
to her
Even when he already filed the present case, she would still attend to his
needs.[29] She remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in
the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to... give him a chance to
have a new family.[30]
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be
psychologically... capacitated to comply with the basic and essential
obligations of marriage.[32
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel's petition
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying
mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel
and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED
IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING
TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE
PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi
despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar.
In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led
respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to
psychological incapacity to comply... with the essential marital
obligations
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the
issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita
and/or respondent Manuel.
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as
from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only
essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to
fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.[49]Sexual infidelity, per se,
however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by
respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically
capacitated to comply with... the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.[54]
Dr. Garcia's report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their... individual
dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing
intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by
respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination
n unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.
Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and... effect.
No costs.
Principles:
we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals[47] that the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel
herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of... the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-
law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987.
Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.
Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was
never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would
have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through
an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing
marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence,
Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated

In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a

month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio
sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991,
she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not
bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued
to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex
parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The
motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the
petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving
Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse
of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case
to the prosecutor for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his

marital obligation.

HELD:

he Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen

the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
Republic vs. CA and Molina The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological
incapacity laid set forth in this case:
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of
the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year,
Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as
husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom
he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance
and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986,
the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their
child. Since then he abandoned them.
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying
with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic
Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to
act on behalf of the state.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of

psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.
What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is
indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not
meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some
psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did
not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed
that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not
shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.
Najera v. Najera Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
G.R. No. 164817, 3 July 2009 essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity RULING:
of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal separation, with Appliction
No. The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical
for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal violence or grossly abusive conduct toward petitioner and respondent’s
Partnership of Gains. Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are abandonment of petitioner justifiable cause for more than one year are
residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in
grounds for legal separation only and not for annulment of marriage
the (United States of America). They were married but are childless. under Article 1: of the Family Code.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage,
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became
manifest only after marriage; (1) that respondent was jobless and was
not exerting effort to find a job at the time of marriage; only with the
help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent
able to land a job as a seaman; (2) that while employed as a seaman,
respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support); (3) that
respondent would quarrel with petitioner and falsely accuse her of
having an affair with another man whenever he came home, and took to
smoking marijuana and drinking; (4) that on July 1, 1994, while he was
quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical
violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo; and (6) after the
said incident respondent left the family home, taking along all their
personal belongings, and abandoned the petitioner. Petitioner reported
the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.

ISSUE:
G.R. No. 161793 – 579 SCRA 193 – Civil Law – Family Code – Article 36:
Psychological Incapacity – Molina Case Merely a Guideline
Every case involving psychological incapacity must be resolved on a case-
to-case basis
Note: This case relaxed the application of the Molina Guidelines
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu in a Filipino-
Chinese gathering in a school campus. They did not have interest with
each other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness due
to the fact that they share the same angst with their families. In 1996,
while still in college, Rowena proposed to Kenneth that they should
elope. Kenneth initially refused on the ground that he was still young and
jobless. But due to Rowena’s persistence Kenneth complied bringing
with him P80K. The money soon after disappeared and they found
themselves forced to return to their respective home. Subsequently,
Rowena’s uncle brought the two before a court and had had them be
married. After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena stayed with her uncle’s
house where Kenneth was treated like a prisoner.
Meanwhile, Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home otherwise he
will be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he
was hidden from Rowena’s family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena
urging her to live with his parents instead. Rowena however suggested
that he should get his inheritance instead so that they could live together
separately or just stay with her uncle.
Kenneth however was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena
said that it is better if they live separate lives from then on. Four years
later, Kenneth filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with
Rowena. Rowena did not file an answer. The City Prosecutor, after
investigation, submitted that he cannot determine if there is collusion
between the two parties. Eventually, the case was tried. The opinion of
an expert was sought wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that
both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship
between Kenneth and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck
and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties’
unreadiness to commitment and their young age. Kenneth was still in
the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while Rowena was still
egocentrically involved with herself. The trial court ruled that the
marriage is void upon the findings of the expert psychologist. The
Solicitor General (OSG) appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity of both
parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable (Molina case). The clinical psychologist did not personally
examine Rowena, and relied only on the information provided by
Kenneth. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. All these
were requirements set forth in the Molina case to be followed as
guidelines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be
admitted despite the guidelines established in the landmark case of
Molina.
HELD: Yes, such is possible. The Supreme Court ruled that admittedly,
the SC may have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules in
ascertaining Psychological Incapacity in the Molina case. So much so that
the subsequent cases after Molina were ruled accordingly to the
doctrine set therein. And that there is not much regard for the law’s
clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.”• The SC however is not
abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that
there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36 such as in the case at bar. The principle that each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and
void due to both parties’ psychological disorder as evidenced by the
finding of the expert psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with grave,
severe and incurable psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume
the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others. He is too
dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the essential marital
obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.
G. R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001356
FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot
four children. She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
“psychological incapacity” to perform his marital obligations starting
1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He
was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon until 1:00 o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or,
to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick
her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and
threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children
themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of
her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways.
Two months later, she returned home to give him a chance to change.
But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the
morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about
half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and
blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
The trial court declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio on the
basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, which in turn reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the
marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.
 who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non
ISSUES: respicit.”
(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law,
the trial court. was given legal life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of
(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Molina, additional procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the
Appeals and Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
mandatory in nature. psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and
Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case
HELD: of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.

(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was
absolutely no evidence showed and proved by petitioner the
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the case of
Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support.

(2) The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter
as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law
as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
Ting vs Tingv G.R. No. 166562
Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were
classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on
July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with
their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than
18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years
old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological
incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which,
however, only became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of
the following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship
and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular
drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it
necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from
his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money
to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and
refusal to give regular financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm.
He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of
their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a
week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each
others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the marriage
null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines
should not be applied to this case
Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to
follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof
of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void is in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
Held:
1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in
Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary
to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated
distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove
that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected
of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18)
years ago.
Renato Reyes So vs. Lorna Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, the
Supreme Court was faced with the unique situation where the husband
and the wife were in a common law relationship for 18 long years, had 3
children, and then got married. The husband subsequently filed a
petition for annulment of marriage based on his wife’s alleged
psychological incapacity.
Renato and Lorna first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and
wife, without the benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In
the course of their relationship, they had three (3) children (born in
1975, 1978 and 1984) and established a business.
On May 14, 1996, Renato filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lorna. He
alleged that their marriage was null and void for want of the essential
and formal requisites. He also claimed that Lorna was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as shown
by the following circumstances: Lorna failed and refused to cohabit and
make love to him; did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful
to him; did not give him emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological
help and support; failed and refused to have a family domicile; and failed
and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal and
family life with him.
The RTC nullified the marriage of Renato and Lorna in its decision of
November 8, 1999. The RTC concluded that Lorna was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her martial obligations.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA,
in its Decision dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set aside the RTC decision
and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The CA ruled that Renato failed to prove Lorna’s psychological
incapacity. According to the CA, Lorna’s character, faults, and defects
did not constitute psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of the
parties’ marriage. The CA reasoned out that while Lorna “appears to be a
less than ideal mother to her children, and loving wife to her husband,”
these flaws were not physical manifestations of psychological illness. The
CA further added that although Lorna’s condition was clinically identified
by an expert witness to be an “Adjustment Disorder,” it was not
established that such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. The prosecution also failed to
establish that Lorna’s disorder was incurable and permanent in such a
way as to disable and/or incapacitate Lorna from complying with
obligations essential to marriage.
The CA likewise held that Lorna’s hostile attitude towards Renato when
the latter came home late was “a normal reaction of an ordinary
housewife under a similar situation”; and her subsequent refusal to
cohabit with him was not due to any psychological condition, but due to
the fact that she no longer loved him. Finally, the CA concluded that the
declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper when the
psychological disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth by the
Supreme Court in the case of Molina.
Renato moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion
in its resolution dated October 18, 2001.
The Supreme Court agreed with the CA and ruled that the totality of
evidence presented by Ramon failed to establish Lorna’s psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations. The Supreme
Court did not give much credence to the testimony and report of
Renato’s expert witness. According to the Supreme Court:
Our own examination of the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions
leads us to conclude that they are not sufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts on which the
psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by
the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It
does not appear to us that the psychologist read and interpreted the
facts related to her with the awareness that these facts could be slanted.
In this sense, we say her reading may not at all be completely fair in its
assessment. We say this while fully aware that the psychologist appeared
at the petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement between them was not
pro bono. While this circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist
for reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her
conclusions must be read carefully with this circumstance and the source
of the facts in mind.
In examining the psychologist’s Report, we find the “Particulars” and the
“Psychological Conclusions” disproportionate with one another; the
conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are
from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The
“particulars” are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a running account of
the respondent’s life from which her whole life is totally judged. Thus,
we do not see her psychological assessment to be comprehensive
enough to be reliable. . .
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she
lived with the petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him born in
1975, 1978 and 1984 – developments that show a fair level of stability in
the relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the parties
for some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and joined her
husband in the communications business – traits that do not at all
indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the
comment that she had been strict with employees and in business
affairs. The petitioner’s Memorandum itself is very revealing when, in
arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the petitioner
interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) “[S]ince at that time, the
relationship between the petitioner and respondent was going well,and
future marriage between the two was not an impossibility, the petitioner
signed these documents.”
The Supreme Court also noted that there was no proof that Lorna’s
psychological disorder was incurable:
. . . the psychologist’s testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the
respondent’s behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent
or incurable as established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the
psychologist testify that the disorder was grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. . .
In Molina, we ruled that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.” In the present case, the psychologist simply
narrated adverse “snapshots” of the respondent’s life showing her
alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove
her permanent incapacity to meet her marital duties and responsibilities;
the root or psychological illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and that
this psychological illness and consequent incapacity existed at the time
the marriage was celebrated.
Given the foreoging, the Supreme Court ruled that based on the
evidence, psychological incapacity was not proved:
Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case
here of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been
together for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact
the respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife,
the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady
whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital
support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be
tired and to give up on one’s situation and on one’s husband are not
necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be
so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the
marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple
remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a
limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation – a
relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded
because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable
psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not
appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly
entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless
to provide any permanent remedy
Azcueta v. Republic G.R. No. 180668, 26 May 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24,
1993. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage and bore no
child.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, claiming that her
husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature,
irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and
perform the essential responsibilities and duties of husband
Petitioner also complained of physical violence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to
sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations.
RULING:
Yes. After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that
there was sufficient compliance with the guidelines in the Molina case to
warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.
The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
and Molina stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
In all, the Court agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity
of the parties’ marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is
proper under the premises.
Jordan Chan Pazvs Jeanice Pavon
Facts:
In 1996, Jordan and Jeanice met when Jeanice was 19 and Jordan was 27.
They had their civil wedding in 1997. They have one son, who was born
on 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home on 1999.
Jeanice then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Jordan alleging that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming
the essential obligations of marriage; manifested by Jordan's tendency to
be self-preoccupied and violent.
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted
with “Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive
behavior, delinquency and instability.”[5] Gates concluded that Jordan’s
psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his
family background. Gates added that with no indication of reformation,
Jordan’s personality disorder appears to be grave and incorrigible.
Jordan denied Jeanice allegations and denied any interview or
psychological tests by Gates. RTC Ruling: granted Jeanice petition.
Jordan then filed a notice of appeal which was promptly approved.
Jeanice filed a motion to dismiss with the court of appeals.
CA: dismissed Jordan's appeal and the next motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Jordan is incapacitated to comply with the marital
obligations.
Held: Petition has merit.
Jeanice failed to prove Jordan's incapacity. Saying that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity, judicial antecedence and
incurability.
Spouses Prudencio and Filomena Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl S. Lim, et. al.
Facts: In 1979, Cheryl married Edward, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore
Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of
petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing
grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano).
Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of
P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of
income. On October 14, 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park
residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife
of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising
situation." Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward,
Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in RTC for support. RTC ordered
Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite. On January
31, 1996, RTC rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to
"jointly" provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward
shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to
Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability. The defendants sought reconsideration,
questioning their liability. RTC, while denying reconsideration, clarified
that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward
because of the latter’s “inability to give sufficient support”.
Petitioners appealed to the CA assailing, among others, their liability to
support respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edward’s income is
insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal
support should be "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"
under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No.
209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).
On April 28, 2003, CA affirmed RTC. Parents and their legitimate children
are obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends
down to the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren. Should
the person obliged to give support does not have sufficient means to
satisfy all claims, the other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order
shall provide the necessary support. This is because the closer the
relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus,
the obligation to support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the
closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the
next nearer relatives and so on. CA denied motion for reconsideration.
Issue: WON petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide
support to respondents.
Held: Yes. Petitioners are liable to provide support but only to their
grandchildren. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of
ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil.
Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to the
narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable.
Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on
Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated
only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its
termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the
time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the
obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.
Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents
if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of
supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of
support under Art. 199. There is no showing that private respondent is
without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove
that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily
provide for her grandson's legal support.
There is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to
provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It
is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to
respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic
needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the
nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines,
following the ordering in Article 199.1avvphi1
Petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their
descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives,
by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this
category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family
extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support RTC awarded cannot
be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand
the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed
to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners’
Makati residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners. The
application of Article 204 which provides that the person obliged to give
support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling
the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative
cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
The persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildren
and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will
secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also
force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her
husband’s infidelity.
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE V. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 168796, [April 15, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.
Private respondent’s act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically
be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were
ignored.
In the midst of these, Silvino’s deep love for her, the thought of saving
their marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of May
to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to
reconcile with her.
May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when
Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be
found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking
beer with a male lover. Later, May confessed that she had no more love
for him. They then lived separately.
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina
Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The psychologist certified
that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young
and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and
incurable.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May
null and void. Its findings were based on the Psychological Evaluation
Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private
respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code and that the psychologist failed to
identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage
null and void due to psychological incapacity.
It is the Court’s considered view that petitioner’s evidence failed to
establish respondent May’s psychological incapacity.
Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of private respondent’s condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio
failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.
More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the
level of the “psychological incapacity” that the law requires. Private
respondent’s act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be
equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that
respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state.

HELD:

Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

RATIO:

In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of

discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA decision dismissing
petitioner’s complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) in-
curability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
RICARDO P. TORING V. TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE:
A marriage will be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code if it is characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Furthermore, the root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint and duly
proven. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ricardo and Respondent Teresita are husband and wife with
three children. After 20 years of marriage, Ricardo filed a petition for
annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior
to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage.
Therefore, he asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita null and
void. He alleges that Teresita is a squanderer because she did not know
how to manage the funds of the family and is always incurring debts.
Aside from this, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she collected
as sales agent of a plastic-ware and cosmetics company. She left the
family’s utility bills and their children’s tuition fees unpaid. She also
missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo
acquired for the family. He also alleges that Teresita is an adultress
because she presents herself as a single woman and sees other men
while Ricardo is away for work as an overseas contract worker. He also
suspected that she was pregnant with another man’s child and proved
himself correct when Teresita incurred a miscarriage. He claims that he
could not have fathered the child because his three instances of sexual
contact with Teresita were characterized by “withdrawals”.
To bolster his position, Ricardo introduced the testimony and evidence
prepared by Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran. The doctor stated that the demise of
the marriage of the spouses was due to the Narcissistic Personality
Disorder of Teresita. Her behavioral patterns indicate this kind of
disorder which is considered to be grave and incurable based on the fact
that individuals do not recognize the symptoms as it is ego syntonic and
they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Interestingly, the doctor based
her diagnosis from the testimony given by Ricardo and Richardson, the
eldest child of the couple. This is because Dr. Albaran was not able to
conduct a personal psychiatric evaluation over Teresita.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) contended that there was no basis to declare Teresita
psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological
evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed
a vague and general conclusion on these parties’ personality traits but
not on Teresita’s psychological makeup. The OSG also argued that the
evidence adduced did not clinically identify and sufficiently prove the
medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the
evidence indicate that the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior
to or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and
incurable.
The RTC ruled to annul the marriage on the basis of the evidence and
testimony presented in court. However, the Solicitor General appealed
the case and the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling on the ground that
the RTC did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. The RTC failed point out the
root illness or defect that caused Teresita’s psychological incapacity, and
likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of
celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran’s psychological
evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from well-rounded and
fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors.
Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo’s allegations on Teresita’s
overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for
declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for
legal separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
HELD:
No, the CA is correct in reversing the decision made by the trial court
because the decision of the latter failed to comply with the standards
and guidelines provided for by jurisprudence.
RATIO:
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,et al.,11we held that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability,
to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage.
We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and
laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability established in the
Santos case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. The root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
“the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.”
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not
be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the
law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the
most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that
result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give
meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted.
Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have been
there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise
the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a
marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the
first place because the affliction – already then existing – was so grave
and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to
assume or had assumed.
In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality
of the petitioner’s evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. First of all,
the testimony given by Dr. Albaran was based solely on the testimony of
Ricardo, the petitioner and their son, Richardson. No personal evaluation
was made as to the condition of Teresita to properly conclude that she is
indeed inflicted with the Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Conclusions
and generalizations about Teresita’s psychological condition, based
solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.
Second, it was not proven that the condition of Teresita was present
from the moment the marriage was celebrated. The only other party
outside of the spouses who gave statements for purposes of Teresita’s
psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses’ eldest son who
would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case
because he could not have been there when the spouses were married
and could not have been expected to know what was happening
between his parents until long after his birth.
Finally, the contention of Ricardo that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity need not be alleged in the petition is without
merit. While in other cases, the court has allowed the petition to do
away with the root cause, it is because the root cause has been
described based on the physical manifestations which are indicative of
the psychological incapacity. The statement of the root cause does not
need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes
of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough
to merely allege the physical manifestations constituting the root cause
of the psychological incapacity. Hence, the statement of the root cause is
a requirement that cannot be dispensed with but it may be proven either
by an express statement or through the description of its physical
manifestations.
CASE DIGEST: SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, VS RAMON REYES (EXPERT
OPINION; HEARSAY EVIDENCE)
FACTS:
Marital difficulties, which mostly is due to the respondent’s actions,
caused the petitioner to file a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with the respondent alleging psychological incapacity to fulfill
the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that
he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he
was not remiss in performing his obligations to his family—both as a
spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that
[respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan
diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality
Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder).
Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering
from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent
features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from
Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense
of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic
features.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the
parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
reversed the RTC decision and declared the parties’ marriage valid and
subsisting. It held that the petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. It
held:
“In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the
[respondent’s] alleged mixed personality disorder, his “come and go”
attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support
to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner’s] feelings,
irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits,
unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed
business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. [Respondent’s] “defects” were not
present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in
harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two
children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that
initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in
keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation
changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat
Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures.
It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with
Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by
the [petitioner].”
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it rejected
the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court held:
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale,
the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since
they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or
any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se
invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as
evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two
persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly
by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual
assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage from the
perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner,
during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience,
respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to
the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment
were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the
petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and
in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own
observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them,
spanning the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the
basis of the doctors’ assessments.
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the
psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled
from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will
not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of
behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare
denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a
person has personality disorder is not automatically believed by the
courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical
psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not
exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by
one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the
factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and
established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.
The respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as
shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money
obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the
family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
PETITION GRANTED.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports

and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas,
i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include
chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards
providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts;
substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner, vs. MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent,
Legal Issue:
Is psychological evaluation a necessity for the establishment of
psychological incapacity of a spouse for declaration of nullity of
marriage?
Legal Facts:
In 1967 petitioner Rosalino Marable and respondent Myrna Marable
were students in Arellano University who became lovers after they met
in a bus. They got married on December 19, 1970, in civil rites of Tanay,
Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra, and that following day is a
church wedding at the Chapel of Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison. Somehow
they were blessed with 5 children but several years after the marriage
their relationship got soured with frequent quarrels as a consequence,
their daughter rebelled and unexpectedly she got pregnant at her young
age. Eventually, the petitioner had incessant marital conflicts leading to
withdrawal of marital obligations. Rosalino Marable filed a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of his own
psychological incapacity. In support of his petition, petitioner presented
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who reported that petitioner is
suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a
pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-
centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse which rooted in deep
feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his
experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. The
RTC granted the petition; on the other hand the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC thus judgment of the
Court denied the appeal.
Holding and Reasoning:
In this case yes but the examination still doesn’t corroborate the
contention of psychological incapacity. The Court said that the petitioner
was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities apparently, it
doesn’t constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity
must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the
concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The CA did
not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid
and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to
establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential
marital obligations.
Policing:
Psychological examination by means of getting the emotional quotient
through test must be properly observed in every couple prior to
marriage. Greater advantage if sets of personality and psychological
examination after attending marriage seminars should be one of the
additional requisites prior to the solemnization and in order to prevent
any future relationship hostilities before entering marriage life.
Synthesis:
In Marable v. Marable, 639 SCRA 557, 567, The Supreme Court ruled that
conflicting personalities do not constitute psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the provision in Article 36 does not stress either of its
characteristic as to the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability,
indicating such guidelines that the burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff to which its medical or psychological examination clearly
explains or bring about such totality of evidence in establishing
psychological incapacity.
G.R. No. 167459 Ochosa v. Alano and Republic January 26, 2011
Facts:
Jose is a military man who got married to Bona. Due to the former’s work
requirements, he was often assigned to different areas in Mindanao.
Bona chose to stay in her place instead of following her husband in his
detail assignments in other areas in Mindanao.
Sometime during their marriage, Jose got promoted and was given a
quarter for him and his family at Fort Santiago in 1985.
During this period, it appeared that Bona was unfaithful to her spouse as
she later on admitted having sexual relations with Jose’s driver whenever
the latter was out on duty.
This prompted Jose to file an annulment case on the ground of Bona’s
psychological incapacity to perform the basic obligations of marriage.
The trial court granted the annulment but was later on overturned by
the CA upon appeal on the ground that evidentiary facts do not establish
Bona’s psychological incapacity. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Bona was psychologically incapacitated to warrant the
dissolution of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
No. The case of Bona having sexual infidelity alone was not enough to
show that she was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the
Family Code to warrant the petition for annulment by Jose.
While the Court agrees that Bona’s act of sexual infidelity shows the
gravity of her incapacity to carry out the essential duties required of
marriage, such incapacity was not proven to have juridical antecedence
and was not shown to be incurable.
The Court in this case stressed that the incapacity must be proven to
have existed at the inception of marriage even though its manifestation
was seen after the celebration of marriage. In this case, the psychiatrists
who gave her testimony regarding Bona’s psychological condition relied
heavily only on the uncorroborated testimony of Jose’s witness.
However, the court did not say that a personal examination of witness is
necessary in this case. Accordingly, testimonies of those who knew Bona
would have strengthened the allegations of Bona’s psychological
incapacity.
Finally, the court in this case once again pronounced that a case of
annulment by reason of psychological incapacity should be examined by
the trial court in light of the unique facts of the case and not rely on pre-
adjudged notions or conditions.
YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Yambao (hereinafter petitioner wife) filed a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of her marriage with respondent Patricio
Yambao (hereinafter respondent husband) after 35 years of marriage.
She invoked the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.
Petitioner wife alleged that since the beginning, her marriage with the
respondent husband had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and
recrimination due to the latter’s inability to comply with the essential
obligations to married life. She elaborated by saying that through all the
years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and
took care of the children and that respondent husband just ate and slept
all day and would spend time with friends. In addition, she claimed that
respondent husband would venture into several businesses but all of
these failed. Respondent husband was also a gambler. Petitioner wife
also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not
even help to change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner
was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that
he knew nothing about children. Later, respondent husband became
insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see
petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When
respondent husband started threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to
leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him. She then
consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Respondent husband denied that he has refused to work. He claimed
that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to
because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he
did not stay long in the jobs he had because the same could not support
the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not
commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small
businesses but they failed due to various economic crises. Respondent
further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living with
petitioner’s relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle
eyes. He also denied that he gambled. He alleged that even without a
steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of the
amortization of their house in BF Homes, Parañaque City. He also denied
that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never
any evidence that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on
petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown. He further
alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit holding that petitioner wife’s
evidence failed to support her argument that respondent husband was
indeed psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
Thus:
• The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the
marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty years
and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without
suffering any major parenting problems.
The court also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and
never physically abused her.
Likewise, when the parties lived with petitioner’s parents, respondent
got along well enough with her family.
• The court recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults,
such as his indolence and utter irresponsibility. However, the RTC said,
respondent’s failure to find decent work was due to his not having
obtained a college degree and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise,
respondent’s failure in business could not be entirely attributed to him,
since petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures.
• RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondent’s
Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC said that, although the
evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly rely upon
petitioner to earn a living for the family, there was no evidence to show
that the latter resented such imposition or suffered with the additional
financial burdens passed to her by her husband.
• The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in
providing financial support, his presence, companionship, and love
allowed petitioner to accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could
be relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations
expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code.
• Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioner’s claim that she suffered through
respondent’s overbearing jealousy. It found that respondent only
became jealous when he thought that petitioner was cheating on him.
The RTC determined that jealousy was not a character trait that
contributed to respondent’s psychological dysfunction; much less did it
amount to psychological or mental torture on petitioner.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that:
Petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
Petitioner exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his
family. However, his failure to find a suitable job and the failure of his
business ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence,
could not be considered “psychological incapacity” as contemplated
under the law.
The fact that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three
children well, and the fact that respondent never physically abused
petitioner belied the former’s psychological incapacity.
The respondent’s refusal to care for the children was not psychological
incapacity but “merely constituted refusal to perform the task,” which is
not equivalent to an incapacity or inability.
• It rejected petitioner’s allegation of respondent’s unbearable jealousy.
It said that the same must be shown as a manifestation of a disordered
personality which would make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. The CA averred
that a jealous attitude simply evinced respondent’s love for his wife,
whom he could not bear to lose to another man.
The the purported threats to kill petitioner is an “emotional immaturity”
and not psychological incapacity.
Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan
Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be unsupported by sufficient evidence since
the findings therein were not corroborated by any other witness.
Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioner’s testimony
established that respondent’s psychological condition was grave enough
to bring about the inability of the latter to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or
incurable.
ISSUE:
WON the totality of petitioner wife’s evidence establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage?
HELD:
No.
RATIONALE:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article
36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under
Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse
must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume.
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a
psychological condition so severe that he was unaware of his obligations
to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondent’s efforts, though few
and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to
provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success.
Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or
irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What
is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his
family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological
incapacity.
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological illness.
That respondent, according to petitioner, “lack[ed] effective sense of
rational judgment and responsibility” does not mean he is incapable to
meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his
neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy
may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have
been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even
assuming that respondent’s faults amount to psychological incapacity, it
has not been established that the same existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA, respondent never
committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or their children. In
fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to
assume that both made an impact in the children’s upbringing. Still, the
parties were able to raise three children into adulthood “without any
major parenting problems,” and such fact could hardly support a
proposition that the parties’ marriage is a nullity.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and

to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This
incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself
to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must
refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
MENDOZA vs. REPUBLIC
Facts: Petitioner Arabelle J. Mendoza and private respondent Dominic C.
Mendoza met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his
employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors
in the apartelle they were renting while in college – she, at Assumption
College while he, at San Beda taking a business management course.
After a month of courtship, they became intimate which led to the
pregnancy with their Daughter Alyssa Blanca. They got married when she
was eight months into her pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay
City, June 24, 1991, after which they moved to her place, remaining
dependent on their parents for support.
Dominic remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support
until he finished college in October 1993. She took on various jobs, being
the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s
expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational
needs). In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with
Zaida, Dominic’s co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually,
communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in
separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship.
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a
birthday present and later asked her to issue two blank checks for the
car’s insurance coverage, only to find out that the checks were not paid
for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she
also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on
her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear
the balance.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he
ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally
charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which
he was arrested and incarcerated. She and her mother bailed him out of
jail, but discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of
whom were even threatening her, her mother and her sister.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal home because
Arabelle asked him for "time and space to think things over." A month
later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten
to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house
to live in another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the
declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. In the RTC,
petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist,
Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part,
Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence. On
August 18, 2000, the RTC found all characteristics of psychological
incapacity – gravity, antecedence, and incurability as set forth in Molina
and declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute
nullity. On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision
reversing the judgment of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s
psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, self-serving and
uncorroborated because only Arabelle was evaluated. Dr. Samson even
conceded that there was a need to verify her findings concerning
Dominic’s psychological profile which were colored by Arabelle’s ill-
feelings toward him during her evaluation. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. Santos
v. Court of Appeals sets the guidelines for psychological incapacity as
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." These guidelines do not necessarily require the root cause
to be “medically or clinically identified” by a physician or a psychologist.
What is important is that totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Finally,
petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10
rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required. On the contrary, the
Resolution explicitly requires the OSG to actively participate in all stages
of the proceedings as seen in its provisions.
People v. Aragon
G.R. No. L-10016, 28 February 1957
FACTS:
roceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in Cebu
. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused
under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with
Maria Faicol in Iloilo City. The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol
were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an employee of the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the
said office. After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol
established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling
salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria
Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in
Cebu City. After Maria Gorrea’s death, and seeing that the coast was
dear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940,
where she worked as a teacher-nurse. It would seem that the accused
and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for Faicol
suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the
hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria
Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her
eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage
with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang.
The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C.
Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu. Although the accused made an attempt to
deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however,
believes that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage
was fully established not only by the certificate of the said marriage, but
also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of EulogioGiroy, one of the
sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by
Maria Faicol.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an
express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for
judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could
not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the
dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the
latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the
instance of the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.
RULING:
No. The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife
whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the
first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last
marriage was a valid one and prosectuion againts Rosima for contracting
marriage cannot prosper.
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613)
plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during
the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and
no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished
from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that
appellant’s second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief
that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven
consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said
marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.
(People v. Mendoza)
CONSUEGRA V GSIS G.R. NO. L-28093 JANUARY 30, 1971
J. ZALDIVAR
Facts:
Appeal on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Norte, dated March 7, 1967, in its Special
Proceeding No. 1720.
The late Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman in the
province of Surigao del Norte. He contracted two marriages, the first
with Rosario Diaz and the second, which was contracted in good faith
while the first marriage was subsisting, with Basilia Berdin.
Consuegra died, while the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance were paid
to petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries
named in the policy. They received Php 6,000.
Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who would receive the
retirement insurance benefits due to him. Respondent Rosario Diaz, the
widow by the first marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS asking that the
retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of
Consuegra, considering that the deceased did not designate any
beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance benefits.
Petitioner Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the
GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance
policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the
retirement insurance benefits due the deceased Consuegra.
The GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were
Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage who is entitled to one-half,
or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on the one hand; and
Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage and their seven
children, on the other hand, who are entitled to the remaining one-half,
or 8/16.
Basilia Berdin didn’t agree. She filed a petition declaring her and her
children to be the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries of the
retirement insurance.
The trial court affirmed stating that: "when two women innocently and
in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they
and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate
children and each family be entitled to one half of the estate.”
Hence the present appeal by Basilia Berdin and her children.
Issue: To whom should this retirement insurance benefits of Jose
Consuegra be paid, because he did not designate the beneficiary of his
retirement insurance?
Held: No. Petition denied.
Ratio:
Berdin averred that because the deceased Jose Consuegra failed to
designate the beneficiaries in his retirement insurance, the appellants
who were the beneficiaries named in the life insurance should
automatically be considered the beneficiaries to receive the retirement
insurance benefits.
The GSIS offers two separate and distinct systems of benefits to its
members — one is the life insurance and the other is the retirement
insurance. These two distinct systems of benefits are paid out from two
distinct and separate funds that are maintained by the GSIS.
In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to
whoever is named the beneficiary in the life insurance policy. As in the
case of a life insurance provided for in the Insurance Act, the beneficiary
in a life insurance under the GSIS may not necessarily be a heir of the
insured. The insured in a life insurance may designate any person as
beneficiary unless disqualified to be so under the provisions of the Civil
Code. And in the absence of any beneficiary named in the life insurance
policy, the proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate of the insured.
Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the
employee, to provide for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering
service in the government for a required number of years. If the
employee reaches the age of retirement, he gets the retirement benefits
even to the exclusion of the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his
application for retirement insurance. The beneficiary of the retirement
insurance can only claim the proceeds of the retirement insurance if the
employee dies before retirement. If the employee failed or overlooked
to state the beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the retirement
benefits will accrue to his estate and will be given to his legal heirs in
accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is
named in the insurance policy.
GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds should be
divided equally between his first living wife and his second. The lower
court has correctly applied the ruling of this Court in the case of Lao v
Dee.
Gomez vs. Lipana- in construing the rights of two women who were
married to the same man, held "that since the defendant's first marriage
has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new
Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she
survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husband's share in the property here in dispute....
With respect to the right of the second wife, although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration
of its nullity, "the only lust and equitable solution in this case would be ODAYAT V AMANTE
to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as FACTS: Petitioner filed an administrative case against respondent for
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage." Oppression, Falisfication and Immorality.

For Immorality, petitioner claims that respondent is cohabiting with one

Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his
spouse Filomena Abella is still alive;

Long before he filed his complaint against respondent, he came to know

that the respondent and one Beatriz Jornado were living as husband and
wife; that they had several children and that one of the reasons why he
filed his complaint against the respondent was because of their land
dispute.

Respondent admits his marriage with Filomena Abella. He also admits

that he has been living with Beatriz Jornada whom he married.
Respondent, however, claims he was coerced into marrying Filomena
Abella, unaware that she was already married to another man, and they
separated in 1949 after Filomena Abella told him of her previous
marriage; that from 1949 to 1964, the respondent did not hear or
received any communication from Filomena Abella, much less knew of
her whereabouts.

To rebut the charge of immorality, respondent presented in evidence the

certification of the Local Civil Registrar attesting that Filomena Abella
was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent’s
contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio,
because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales.

HELD:

The Investigator finds for the respondent and recommends his

exoneration from this charge. Indeed, there is no question that Filomena
Abella’s marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80
of the New Civil code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages.
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY
Facts:
Karl Wiegel filed for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Lilia
Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to another
man. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage
claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband
Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital
union. She asked to be allowed to present evidence to support her claim.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence.
Issues:
W/N there was a need for Lilia to present evidence.
Held:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was
vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this
to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil
Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to Karl
Wiegel is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for
then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a
judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes
she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel);
accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
petition for "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of
Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that:
they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with
Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to
her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25,
1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the
prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them
for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been
working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only
when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted
by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00,
which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without
her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter
appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take
care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession
and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact;
and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account
of the nullity of their marriage.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appealsdismissed the petition. The
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.

Issues:
a)Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
purposes of remarriage.
b)Whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
belonging to her exclusively.
Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The invalidity of
a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41. The Court
of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with
the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties."
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according
to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason
that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage
is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent
court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO v. CONSUELO TAN, GR No. 137110, 2000-
08-01
Facts:
accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got
married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge
Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly
executed and... signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the
status of accused was 'single'. There is no dispute either that at the time
of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was
actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma
Oliva in a... marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge
Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate
issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by
Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the
Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City.
"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by
complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City,
which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before
this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1,...
1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. more than a month after
the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor's Office, accused filed an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V.
Oliva... when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo
Tan on June 27, 1991, accused's prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial
declaration obtained as to the nullity... of such prior marriage with Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage
ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that
accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage
with complainant on June 27,... 1991. He was still at the time validly
married to his first wife.
Issues: That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay
order to convict petitioner. in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply... file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency
of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot
Ruling: allow that.

"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former against him.
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered...
in the proper proceedings." Principles:

all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the
The elements of this crime are as follows: offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage
has... not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the
"1. That the offender has been legally married; absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
requisites... for validity
according to the Civil Code;
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
for validity." been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered...
in the proper proceedings."
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although
there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In
fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void
only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint... charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.

SUSAN NICDAO-CARINO vs. SUSAN YEE CARINO
Facts:
SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969,
with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10,
1982, SPO4 Cariño also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4
Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies
pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from
MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received
a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao,
praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the
P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was
declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took
place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But
she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage
until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the
wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño’s marriage to Nicdao
was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage
license.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;
b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is
entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite
the nullity of their marriage.
Ruling:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to
certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not
follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased
was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property.
ANTONE V. BERONILLA
DOCTRINE:
As reiterated in a long line of cases, Article 40 of the Family Code has
been established as a new provision expressly requiring judicial
declaration of nullity of a prior marriage for purposes of remarriage.
Therefore, a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior
judicial declaration of nullity is guilty of bigamy.
FACTS:
Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint,filed in March 2007,
that she and Leo were married in 1978. However, Leo contracted a
second marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. The prosecution filed the
Information in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense because his marriage with Myrna was declared null and void as
of April 2007 and became final and executory on May 2007. Leo argues
that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Thus, absent
the first marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute
the crime of bigamy. The prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna
and Leo on 1978 was not severed prior to his second marriage on 1991,
for which bigamy has already been committed before the court declared
the first marriage null and void on 2007.
The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying on Morigo v. People.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage only
after contracting the subsequent marriage is immaterial in the crime of
bigamy.
HELD:
Yes.
RULING:
Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the previous ruling of People
v. Mendoza (under the Civil Code) declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy
based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is no
need fora judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is
invalid; and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal
effect such that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after
all, which renders the elements of bigamy complete.
In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v. Tan. It stated that,
under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then the
crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person who
contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage is guilty of bigamy.
While, Morigo v. People was promulgated after Mercado, the facts are
different. In Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized,
although later declared void ab initio. While in Mendoza, no marriage
ceremony was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer,
because what occurred was a mere signing of a marriage contract
through a private act. Thus, there is no need to secure a judicial
declaration of nullity before Morigo can contract a subsequent marriage.
The ruling of Morigo is not applicable to this case.
LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four
(4) years (from 1974-1978). After school year 1977-78, LucioMorigo and
Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, LucioMorigo was
surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The
former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for
Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de
Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia
reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On
August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant
Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgensa Barangay
Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol to seek the
declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground
that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993,
appellant was charged with Bigamy in the Information filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The
RTC of Bohol rendered a decision finding Lucio Morigo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial
court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
RTC decision on the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead,
what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two,
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held
that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of
the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin
with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the
date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date
of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes
of the law, never married."
The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final
and executory. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there
is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
"from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS
Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one
Maria Dulce Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled the
same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda
Marbella- Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with
a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s complaint a n
information for bigamy was files against respondent. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was
celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the
pending civil case as a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
the marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case of respondent
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered the Trial Court to immediately proceed with
the Criminal Case. A pending civil case is not a prejudicial question. A
prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. I t is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO
Facts:
Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his
ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica
Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until
they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19
November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic
rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration,
he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife
with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while
working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother
informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same
letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent
claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return
home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that
all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet
Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he
inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration
of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41
of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be
declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be
declared null and void.The trial court granted Nolasco's petition.The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his
absent spouse had already died.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already
dead.
Ruling:
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can
be granted. As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4)
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search
for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded
belief" that she is dead.In the case at bar, the Court considers that the
investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to
give any information as to her personal background even after she had
married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to
locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters
respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters,
under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare
assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts,
considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to
rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of
evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is
not synonymous with credibility
Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his
petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied.
The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. In fine,
respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief
required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain
the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. On May 28, 2001,
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismissthe petition, which was,
however, denied by the court.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on
January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6,
1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being
always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work
the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home
later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.However, Lea did not
return to their house anymore.Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go
to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the
town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the
fiesta. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks
with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On June 20,
2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to
prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is
meant by a well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or
condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably
founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character,
habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which
usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions,
was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or
throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate
question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest
to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief
of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by present spouse.In sum, the Court finds and so holds
that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief,
before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea)
Julaton was already dead.
Valdez v. Republic
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to
a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was
unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the
latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972,
they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed
without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up
and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It
was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since.
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in
June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied
because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March
2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established
by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise.
Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of
absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there
existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the
marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of

declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration

of presumptive death of Sofio.

Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil Code, any marriage subsequently

contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO
Facts:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on
June 12, 1987. Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found
it safer to leave him behind and decided to go back to her parents
together with her three (3) children. In order to support the children,
Gloria was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical
separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all.
She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his
relatives. On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband,
Gloria filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the
summary petition, rendered judgment granting the same. In a decision
dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals, treating the case as an
ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, denied the Republic’s appeal and accordingly affirmed the
appealed RTC decision.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction
over the appeal on a final and executory judgment of the Regional Trial
Court
b) Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code
were established in this case.
Ruling:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. Article 238 of the Family
Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY
LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered by these rules. In Summary Judicial
Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period
within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments
rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code,
supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous,
therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s
appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the
Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which,
by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. The
Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to
appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. But, if only to set the
records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let
it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, was
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was
erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give
due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over
the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should
have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and
reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was
immediately final and executory.
As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when
it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of
lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of law, the judgment
was not appealable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERVENTINO U. TANGO
In 1987, Ferventino Tango, respondent, and Maria Jose Villarba were
married in civil rites. Tango and Villarba had only spent a night together
and had been intimate once when Villarba told Ferventino that she and
her family will soon be leaving for the USA. Villarba assured Tango that
the former will file a petition so that the latter can live with her in the
USA and in the event that the petition is denied, Villarba promised to
return to the Philippines to live with Tango. Thereafter, Villarba and her
family flew to Seattle, USA. Tango and Villarba kept in touch for a year
before Villarba stopped responding to Tango’s letters. Tango had
inquired from Villarba’s uncle of Villarba’s whereabouts but it turned out
that even the latter’s relatives had no idea. Tango solicited the assistance
of a friend in Texas, but to no avail. Finally, Tango sought the aid of his
parents in Los Angeles and his aunt in Seattle, but again, to no avail.
This prompted Tango to file a petition before the RTC for the declaration
of presumptive death of Villarba under Article 41 of the Family Code. The
RTC issued an Order declaring Villarba presumptively dead. On appeal by
the Republic of the Philippines, the CA affirmed the RTC’s order.
ISSUE:
Whether Tango has established a basis to form a well-founded belief
that his absent spouse is already dead
HELD:
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without
saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari
to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and
the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse
when it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a
petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to said
appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the
appellate court. By no means did the Court of Appeals acquire
jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC which, by express
provision of law, was immediately final and executory. Adding to the
confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal and treated the
same as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As it
were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it
failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of the law, the
judgmenz was not appealable.
Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of
appeal at this level, the hands of the Court are tied. Without a doubt, the
decision of the trial court had long become final. Deeply ingrained in our
jurisprudence is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.

In light of the foregoing, it would be unnecessary, if not useless, to
discuss the issues raised by petitioner. The doctrine of finality of
judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of
courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on
some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule
are the correction of clerical errors, the so called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its
execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions obtains here to
merit the review sought.
Social Security System v. Bailon
FACTS:
In 1955, Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon.
More than 15 years later, Clemente filed an action to declare the
presumptive death of Alice, she being an absentee. The petition was
granted in 1970.
In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until
Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS
benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain
Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a
certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the
reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who
shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.
They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with
Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred
that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged. Cecilia
claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive
death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not
he could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in
Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon learning
that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs.
SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her
and to return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial
expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her
reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque.
Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be
presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the
SSS before the Social Security Commission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The
CA however ruled the contrary.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law,
presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage. Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998,
respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

RULING:

No. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the

subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such
absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in
the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.

Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a

presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of
law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the
subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an

affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either
spouse as in the case at bar, the action for annulment became
extinguished as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code,
requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the
lifetime of any one of the parties involved.

Voidable marriage under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code,

cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties
and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might

have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out “in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,” as expressly
provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.
BUCCAT vs. MANGONON DE BUCCAT
G.R. NO. 47101 April 25, 1941
Facts:
On March 1938, Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat first
met, then they came engaged September of the same year. After few
months later, on November 26, 1938, they got married.However, after
89 days of their marriage dated February 23, 1939, Luida gave birth to a
son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to
married life with her. On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of
their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she
assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on
the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
Ruling:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a
sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society
rests.In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment.
It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect
anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an
advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation,
ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.
SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.
Aquino v. Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853, 27 July 1960
FACTS:
The trial court dismissed the complaint for Aquino did not show any birth
certificate to show the child was born within 180 days after the marriage
between the parties. Later on Aquino presented evidence to show proof
of the child’s birth but still his petition was denied. The CA denied
Aquino’s appeal on the theory that it was not impossible for the parties
to have sex during their engagement so that the child could be their own
and finding it absurd for Aquino not to notice or suspect that Delizo was
pregnant when he married her. In a motion for reconsideration filed by
Aquino, Delizo and her counsel did not file an answer thus the motion for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Aquino’s complaint is correct.
RULING:
No. The dismissal is not correct. Under the new Civil Code, concealment
by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant
by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage.
Concealment of the wife the fact that at the time of the marriage she
was pregnant by a man other than his husband constitutes fraud and is a
ground for annulment of marriage.
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are
not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially
since she was “naturally plump” or fat as alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy,
the enlargement of a woman’s abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that
is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so
that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat
formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month
of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a
height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more
general and apparent.
VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 132955
Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the crime of Illegal
Falsification of Public Documents. It appears that petitioner Villanueva
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties and among
them is the IBC 13. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. IBC
13 appealed to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). IBC 13 filed
a surety bond but this document was found to be falsified. The two
complaints for falsification of document was brought before Manila
prosecutor’s office and dismissed the charges against Atty. Eulalio Diaz III
and respondent Villadores. The petitioned filed for review of the case
with the DOJ, the latter affirmed the dismissal of Atty. Diaz III but
ordered the inclusion of respondent Villadores as an accused in the two
criminal cases. Accordingly, the original informations were amended to
include the respondent among those charged. Following the
arraignment, the private prosecutor, Rico and Associates, filed a new
Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging damages sustained by
the petitioner as a result of the crimes committed by the accused. The
motion was admitted by the trial court. The respondent moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Subsequently, respondent
moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates and the appellate
court pronounced that petitioner did not sustain any damages for the
crime committed by the respondent and the same has redounded to his
benefit. Rico and Associates opposed such pronouncement since it is a
mere obiter dictum.
Issue:
Whether or not the pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner
Villanueva is not an offended party is a mere obiter dictum.
Ruling:
The pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not
an offended party is not a mere obiter dictum. An adjudication on any
point within the issue presented by the case cannot be considered as
obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although
incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular
course of the consideration of the case and led up to the final conclusion
and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated.
Hence, in the instant case, the pronouncement of the appellate court is
not an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by
respondent Villadores in his petition assailing the admission of the
amended informations. Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva was
the offended party was, thus, clearly raised by respondent. The body of
decision contains the discussion on that point and it clearly mentioned
certain principles of law.
CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA
DE LA ROSA MENDOZA
Facts:
In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred
that she was married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they
lived together as husband and wife until 14 July 1954, when the husband
departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his
profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or
reason deliberately abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite
repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and still
fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff,
who is allegedly to be pregnant, sickly and without any source of
revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in
the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where
earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made prior the filing
of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit
between members of the same family (in this case between husband and
wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear
when the suit isfiledis by a proper averment to that effect in the
complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated filed or maintained
unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in
question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the
cause of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to plead that
plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court
renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked
at any stage of the case even on appeal.
While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a
correct statement of the general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless
constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First
Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on
its face, the same involved a claim for future supportthat under Article
2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines cannot be subject of a valid
compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of
Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from
the last proviso of said Article 222, future support.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY
Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford
Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union,
they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos –
who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger
and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States
of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then
being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year
after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from
her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded
the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through
the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came
back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza
Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely
because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the
pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times
more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992,
for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for
unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in
New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her
American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as
"Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been
13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there
was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent
Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger
and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles
68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code.

On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court
of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the trial court’s declaration of
the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is
insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely?
b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is applicable to the case at bar?
and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact
date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed
before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged
that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

Ruling:

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before

the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for
being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence.
He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on
the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on
16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr.,
their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname.
Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not
enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation

wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain
SIN VS SIN
GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001
FACTS:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen
in January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In
June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout its
trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson
filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating
that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively
participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings,
nothing more was heard of him.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the
absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings.
HELD:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should
have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the
petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State
participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for
proper trial.
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007
FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who
once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a
son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when
petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual
affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a
case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour.
Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological
incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said
case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the
AGREEMENT. This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that
the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her
from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.
ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a
disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property?
HELD: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil
interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose
of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be
read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of
prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The
offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of
adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose
of such property inter vivos.
EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972.
Lopez alleged that at the time of the marriage. Emilio was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in
violent fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a
womanizer and gave minimal support to the family. Likewise, he became
spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the conjugal partnership
by alienating some of their assets without Victoria’s consent. Attempts
for reconciliation failed because Emilio’s refusal to reform. In the prayer
of Victoria for annulment of marriage, she further prayed for powers of
administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial
ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary
evidence consisting of newspaper articles of Emilio’s relationship with
other women, his apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies
of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case,
reception for Emilio’s evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and on
the reset date, he failed to appear. The court then declared Emilio to
have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case
submitted for decision.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity
of Victoria’s marriage to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to
Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for relief from judgment but was
denied.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under
the circumstance of the case where petitioner was declared in default
due to non-appearance during the hearing.
Ruling:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for
relief from judgment. Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or
order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the
petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and
meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the
court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion
for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of
counsel to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the
latter to appeal there from is negligence that is not excusable. Similarly
inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the trial court of his
client’s confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-
appearance at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from
judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in exceptional cases
where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
VALDES vs. RTC AND VALDES
Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971.
Begotten during their marriage were five children. In a petition dated
June 22, 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
pursuant to article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing the parties
following the joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and
Consuelo Gomez is declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, on the ground of their mutual Psychological Incapacity to comply
with their essential marital obligations. The three older children shall
choose which parent they would want to stay with, the younger children
shall be placed in the custody of their mother. The petitioner and
respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted
that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage.”
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a
joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father Antonio
Valdes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern
the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage is
declared null and null and void because of Psychological Incapacity on
the part of either or both parties to the contract.
Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of
cause thereof, the property relation of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 137 or Article 148.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
obtained through their joint efforts.The rules set up to govern liquidation
of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains,
the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between
common-law spouses.
DIÑO V. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should
be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of
the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article
40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got
married on 14 January 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas
City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was incurable and deeply ingrained in her system since
her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage and declared
their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51
of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner,
modified its decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial
court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of
its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
must be present:
The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution
of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling
has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of
the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.
In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which
are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed
either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of
gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a
marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the
property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled
that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
“[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties
of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA
Facts:
Private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed a complaint
against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage,
with a petition for support and payment of damages. Private respondent
also filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for concubinage.
Respondent Judge then issued a decree ordering petitioner to provide
support to the private respondent.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for
support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case
for concubinage filed against him the private respondent since the civil
action arises from the criminal action of concubinage. Petitioner also
argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured
before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the
basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of
concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of petitioner is valid, that the civil action
for legal separation should first be suspended and that he must first be
convicted before deciding upon the said civil action.
Ruling:
A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed
ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or
are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to
obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof,
such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the
innocent spouse, among others. An action for legal separation is not to
recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of
the spouses and their relations to each other.
Also, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this
end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case
was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then
allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation
under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former law,
that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final
judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not been
reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the
omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent
rule in Francisco v. Tayao.
WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO
Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance
of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao.
He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders,
from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his
wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl. Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945,
upon his release from internment. Thereafter the spouse lived
separately. Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown lived
martially with another woman and had begotten children by her. The
court denied the legal separation filed on the ground that Brown’s action
had already prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the action had already prescribed.
Ruling:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's
action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal
separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's
adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under
Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be
filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date
when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the
correctness of such findings and conclusion.
The courts can take cognizance of prescription as a defense because
actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage,
involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree
be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.