Cite this article Research Article Keywords: education & training/failure/

Burrell PA (2018) Paper 1900003 knowledge management

What lies hidden behind structural errors and failures within the UK? Received 05/03/2019; Accepted 10/05/2019
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Forensic Engineering 171(4): 171–178, Published online 10/06/2019
https://doi.org/10.1680/jfoen.19.00003
ICE Publishing: All rights reserved

Forensic Engineering

What lies hidden behind structural errors and

failures within the UK?
Paul A. Burrell PhD, CEng, FIStructE, FICE, FCABE, MAE
Associate, Mott MacDonald Ltd, Lingwood, UK (pa.burrell@btinternet.com)

Government figures from a House of Commons research briefing confirms that the components of the gross domestic
product by industry are accounted for by the service sector at 79%, production at 14%, construction at 6% and
agriculture at 1%. In its 2018 construction statistics, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) records that the construction
industry is worth c. £100 billion annually to the UK economy. However, the Get it Right Initiative suggested in 2017
that a minimum of 10% of this is lost in errors and litigation. According to the ONS figures there were 30 fatalities. To
investigate these errors and failures, this paper considers key areas in the education of chartered engineers, quality
management systems and knowledge sharing in order to gain experience. A series of open-ended, semi-structured
interviews was undertaken with senior professionals, including the judiciary, professors of engineering, global
consultants and professional indemnity insurers. Research findings revealed that technical knowledge is deliberately
withheld due to non-disclosure clauses in mediated settlements and through the practices of global professional
indemnity insurers. A study of pass rates for chartered membership of the Institution of Structural Engineers showed a
decrease despite an increase in academic requirements. Companies that promote corporate social responsibility
credentials often seek the best commercial deal regarding litigation settlement. This research concludes that there is a
sound business case for sharing knowledge, which would reduce claims, increase profits and save lives. Primary
legislation must be changed to compel a free exchange of technical knowledge regarding errors and structural failures.
A ‘no-blame’ repository needs to be established that should help reduce the adversarial nature of the construction
industry. Additionally, the suitability of the academic degree curriculum for structural engineers needs to be reassessed.

1. Introduction 2. Conceptual framework

The only real mistake is the one from which we learn nothing.
(John Powell (1925–2009))
In the aftermath following a significant structural error or
failure, the causation as to how the error or failure occurred
can generally be determined. However, the underlying question
of what lies behind structural errors and failures occurring is a
more nebulous proposition. This paper seeks to determine why
these errors and failures are seemingly repetitive and the lessons
are not learnt.
Even with entrance requirements to become a chartered engineer
ever increasing, continuing whole-career training through
continued professional development and company integral quality
management systems, there still remains an unacceptable level of
repetitive construction errors and failures. Therefore, what factors
are preventing the lessons from being learnt?
While there are numerous causes that lead to structural errors
and failures, the author contends the main contributing factor to
be adequacy of education, which gives young aspiring engineers
the building blocks that they will need for a career in engineering.
This education is acquired through being taught at university in
the first instance and secondly gained post-university through
professional knowledge. The third is through companies’ quality
management systems and how they are applied, and the fourth is
through the experience gained from the lessons learnt.
The boundary conditions of education, both explicit and tacit,
quality management and experience are given in Figure 1.
It is these boundary conditions that this paper seeks to explore to
improve the understanding of better experience, which should
lead to a reduction in errors and failures. The outcome is
highlighted in Figure 2.
To understand the effect of these key factors and how they interact,
each was considered in turn. In order to provide context and a deeper
understanding, 14 semi-structured interviews, each approximately
80 min long, were undertaken with district judges, barristers,
arbitrators, mediators, the chief executive officer of a professional
institution, an executive member of Confidential Reporting on
Structural Safety (CROSS), professors of engineering, global insurers
and executives of global consulting companies. Each interviewee was
invited to participate on a voluntary basis, and anonymity of both the
interviewee and their employer was considered paramount. As an
integral part of the interview design, consideration of how the data
from the transcriptions could be extracted had to be established.
Bazeley (2013) helps the researcher in resolving qualitative data
analysis using the NVivo software. Briefly, NVivo allows the
researcher to convert qualitative data such as interviews into concepts
by grouping words or phrases into order of significance or repetitive
themes that appear across the interviewees. This gives a high level of
confidence through self-verification as they are direct statements by
the interviewees themselves, with themes and trends being easily
identifiable across the groupings.

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 Forensic Engineering What lies hidden behind structural errors
Volume 171 Issue FE4 and failures within the UK?
Burrell

70

60

50

Pass rate: %
Lack of
experience Professional 40
Education knowledge
30

Errors 20

10
Lack of Lack of 0
experience experience 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Time: years

Figure 3. UK trend line for Structural Engineers Chartered

Management Membership examination 1950–2018
systems

Since the advent of tuition fees following the publication of the

report by Dearing (1997), universities have sought to increase the
academic standard of lecturers to PhD. Table 1 details staff
Figure 1. The relationships between key issues that lead to errors
percentage taken from three randomly chosen universities that
provide civil engineering degrees. The results were based on the
numbers of academic staff listed on the individual universities’
websites within the appropriate faculty.

Barr (2008) reflects on the ever-widening gap between universities’

aspirations and industry’s expectations. He argues that successive
Experience Professional government education policies have aimed to improve secondary
Education knowledge education pass rates at the General Certificate of Secondary
Education and A levels. These changes in education policy have also
Free of seen a decline in the number of students taking mathematics, which
errors
then elicits more strain on the university to teach them to the normal
entrance quality that is expected. Figures obtained from the Bolton
Experience Experience report (Bolton, 2012) indicate there has also been an increase in
university entrants of 400% over the period 1990–2012 from 77 000
to 350 000, although the number of students opting to take
engineering degrees has remained reasonably constant over the same
Management period. Barr (2008) further contends that one of the outcomes of this
systems
trend is the significant increase in the number of non-scientific or
engineering degree scheme titles now on offer to prospective
engineering departments. Engineering education is expensive, as seen
by Barr (2008), since it requires a wide range of support facilities,
Figure 2. The relationships of key issues in reducing errors
Table 1. Comparison of academically qualified university staff
with those who have gained professional qualification through
3. Is education and lack of professional working within the industry
knowledge contributing to failures and
Number of
errors in construction? Number Number of academically
% of PhD
The academic requirements to become a chartered engineer have staff with
of academically qualified
University chartered
increased since the 1950s. This has seen a rise in ‘A’ level grade faculty qualified staff with
IStructE
passes to 98·1% for grades A* to E in 2016, from 68·2% in 1982. staff staff PhD chartered
status
Further, the minimum requirement to become a chartered engineer IStructE status
has risen from non-degree to an MEng. Yet, the pass rate of the A 24 23 2 8
chartered membership exam for the Institution of Structural B 37 36 1 3
C 72 63 6 10
Engineers (IStructE) has continued to fall, as shown in Figure 3.

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and vice chancellors would rather see the expansion in the more cost-
effective subject areas. He further avers that there should be closer
ties between industry and academia, which the Joint Board of
Moderators (JBM) has taken to be a majorly significant, but
necessary, change in direction. Barr (2008) also contends that the gap
between employers’ expectations and academic institutions’
aspirations widened when the method of funding was changed by the
Dearing (1997) report. This change saw the need to attract income
from the private sector by providing and undertaking research by the
universities. However, this has become something of a poisoned
chalice. Although income is welcomed as a cash cow, researchers
have evolved and become detached from engineering per se and
have continued with a purely academic career to the detriment of
belonging to a professional body. This point has not gone unnoticed
by the JBM, where the chairman stated in his 2009 annual report
(Parke, 2009: p. 4) the following.
In July I wrote to you to outline the new JBM policy had been
endorsed by the four JBM member Institutions that by 2015, 50% of
all academic staff designated as delivering the accredited degree
programmes must be professionally qualified with one of the four
JBM member Institutions.
The research data and analysis indicated disquiet on the current
success of educational attainment at various levels. These
sentiments were expressed by both the university professors and
all three of the employers. The reports by Chilver (1975) and
Finniston (1980) were meant to raise standards of attainment for
engineers of the future. The university professors were unanimous
in their opinion on the capability of A level students. They felt
that the year-on-year increase in A* attainment did not reflect
positively on the candidates. Also, most students are provided
with standard formulae for their A level exams. In their
experience, the depth, breadth and understanding of first-year
MEng undergraduates at deriving formulae from first principles
was poor. While both the academics and the employers embraced
progress, particularly in the area of computer-aided design for
both the production of drawings and analytical design software,
all agreed that students had an over-reliance on computers at the
cost of derivation of formulae from first principles. The data
analysis revealed how important the core skills of education were
to the majority of the interviewees. Some of the comments
relating to the quality of education had a nostalgic undertone,
‘well in my day ….’ even emanating from the academics.
Mustoe (2002) considers that the two main problems currently facing
many teachers of mathematics to engineering undergraduates are the
diversity of the intake and the lack of basic skills in numeracy and
algebra among many of the student population, which severely
hinders the exposition and development of mathematical ideas.
Engineering modules assume knowledge and skills which some
students do not have, nor do they have the ability to solve multistage
problems. Further research on students’ mathematical abilities was
carried out by Lawson (2003). From his paper, data from diagnostic
testing at Coventry University were used to illustrate how student
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What lies hidden behind structural errors
and failures within the UK?
Burrell
entry competencies in basic mathematical skills have changed over
the period 1991–2001. The data show that there has been a
significant decline in many mathematical skills that are regarded by
higher education as essential for those undertaking degree courses
with a significant mathematical content. As previously stated, all of
these concerns were, and continue to be, reported at the yearly
academic conference held at the IStructE, with representatives from
many UK universities’ chairs of engineering (IStructE 2010–2016
inclusive). The author’s research has shown that the IStructE
Chartered Membership examination pass rate has been in decline
since 1950. Indeed, Mustoe’s opinion (Mustoe, 2002) is shared by
the Engineering Council report Measuring the Mathematical
Problem (EngC, 2000), which catalogues the decline in both the
standards achieved in mathematics and the quality of staff
teaching A level mathematics. This supports the author’s research,
which concludes that, in mathematics, both the standard of the
undergraduate and the standard of education is poor. Mathematics
which is at the heart of engineering principles and design.
The employers interviewed had become so concerned with the
standard of university education that they had introduced their
own ‘in-house’ practice examinations when interviewing
prospective applicants, irrespective of the university that they had
attended.
There also seemed an over-reliance on the use of computer
software at the expense of understanding and knowledge of
structural behaviour. This research shows that there has been no
increase in the pass rate for the Structural Engineers Chartered
Membership Part 3 examination. The examination requires both
explicit and tacit knowledge. The candidate has to design and
draw two creditable structural solutions to a posed question. The
majority of failures are due to a poor understanding of structural
behaviour, an inability to prepare their own handwritten
calculations due to over-reliance on computer programs and poor
drawing skills needed to communicate their design. If
examination results are to rise, then both employers and educators
have a significant role to play. Greater emphasis on mathematics
is required to improve the ability of graduates to produce
handwritten calculations rather than place reliance on computers
(which are not permitted within the examination). Employers
must also engage more with their graduate engineers to help them
understand and produce simple structures by hand. However,
there has to be a leading force to take on this challenge. The
author would suggest that the JBM is best placed to bring about
either direct change or recommendation to the government as it is
the body supported by the relevant institutions and accredits
university courses. Table 2 records the main areas of discussion
and concerns.
4. Quality management assurance and the
construction industry
Quality assurance is an indicator or standard of compliance in
guaranteeing the consistency of a product or service. However, how
does quality assurance sit within the construction industry, when
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Table 2. State of education
From the research
Currently A level education and mathematical skills do not meet the
construction profession’s expectation.
Too many soft skills in university masters are being taught at the
expense of structural analysis.
Companies routinely test those being interviewed for employment for
core competencies.
There is failure to maintain professional membership examination pass
rates.
Universities have tended to focus on the academic skills of lecturers in
construction engineering rather than on the core skills needed in the
profession. There is a greater emphasis on employing engineering
lecturing staff with doctorates rather than those with professional
experience. In the higher engineering education of engineers, there is
insufficient emphasis on understanding and knowledge of
engineering core skills.
Continuing errors and failures
the service and product is predominantly individual to each
building that it is applied to? In contrast, due to the nature of their
business, the manufacturing, automotive, information technology
and pharmaceutical industries have an approach to quality control
that is significantly different from that of the construction industry.
A product manufacturer produces a ‘widget’; this is then
replicated through a production process. There may be several
elements that need to come together in order to produce the final
widget. However, when one looks at the quality control to ensure
that each widget is identical, the system relies on there being a
mass-repetitive production, a stable and fixed location and no
external change control.
In contrast, both Latham (1994) and Egan (1998) concluded that
the construction industry was wasteful, adversarial, nomadic and
fragmented. This narrative echoes the author’s own experience.
Consider the first aspect of a construction project process: the
design. Even when working for a repeat client, the project can
never be the same. The client together with their cost consultants
knows within tolerable limits the cost of the structure above
ground level. While it was accepted that the elevational treatment
would be subject to the local planning authority, this cost could be
allowed for. Of greater concern is the substructure, as this was
indeterminate, in terms of both scope and cost, as this would be
entirely different for every site. Through investigations, this
would eventually be resolved for each individual project. Thus,
each building was different; there was no stable and fixed location
and numerous external change controls. Therefore, when
considering the quality assurance at the design stage, in reality
this consisted of the individual professional advisors having their
own bespoke quality control systems with appropriate audit trails
for their benefit, rather than an integral system with the client’s
widget at its centre as for manufacturing.
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Suggested possible corrective actions required
Despite government figures, mathematics remains an area of
contested attainment. The JBM should review course content for
future accreditation.
Since the reports by Finniston (1980) and Chilver (1975), there have
been what are seen as soft subjects. Employers expressed a wish for
a return to core subjects.
The JBM should consult with employers as to improvements required
for future MEng courses.
The reports by Finniston (1980) and Chilver (1975) did raise results for a
limited period. A new report into engineering education is overdue.
Within engineering departments, there is a need to ensure that staff
have appropriate professional experience in addition to academic
qualifications.
Reducing errors and failures
Following the design phase of a project, a contractor is appointed
to construct the building. Again, the contractor could be different
on each and every project. Even with the same contractor, a
different construction team would be in place, depending on the
location of the project. While a degree of quality control could be
maintained with certain items supplied due to them being
manufactured ‘off-site’ and hence subject to a management
system, the installation was site based with only commissioning
checking rather than a quality control. Indeed, most of the
construction processes are subject to either the local authority’s
building control or limited stage inspections. This situation, both
in the author’s experience and included in the reports by Latham
(1994) and Egan (1998), is typical and not only shows a complete
dislocation between the design and construction phases, but can
also be applied to all the individual parties involved in each and
every project.
This situation with a lack of coherence of an overarching quality
control system is made worse with smaller domestic-scale
projects. The design phase could simply be a design calculation
for a modest structural extension or alteration, which could be the
subject of an audit-style quality control only for the designer, as
again each beam and each extension or alteration would be
different, in either span or loading; so, again, the quality control is
for the benefit of the professional. Further, the production of a
calculation sheet with the beam size would be, in probability, the
sole limit and involvement of the designer. The construction
phase generally involves a modest local builder with no positive
need or requirement for a quality assurance assessment. The scale
of the project means that there is little engagement with the
interested parties and no continuity of quality control. These were
the very problems, particularly concerning defects, latent defects
and dispute resolution, that Latham (1994) and Egan (1998) tried
to address. Further, the Wolstenholme review, Never Waste a
 Forensic Engineering What lies hidden behind structural errors
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Burrell

Good Crisis (Wolstenholme, 2008), concluded that the 6. Lessons learnt through experience
construction industry had made little progress against the Latham
and Egan targets and identified a range of actions needed to drive The only source of knowledge is experience. (Albert Einstein
performance improvement. (1879–1955))

5. What did the research find regarding
management systems?
All three of the companies interviewed had management systems in
place. They also considered that their systems were in fact better
than those deemed necessary to qualify for the ISO 9000:2015
requirements (ISO, 2015). None of their systems was able to
predict errors or failures, and, while simple checking procedures
covered the most common of human computational errors, errors of
judgement could not be seen to be covered in practice. Even when
there had been a breakdown leading to an error, companies were
left to their own devices to resolve and implement any remedial
actions that were deemed necessary. Insurers had instances where
repetitive failures had occurred within the same practice, but neither
the practice’s own management systems nor the checking
procedures within their own ISO 9000:2015 policy gave a coherent
opportunity to learn from the immediate problem or facilitate the
passing on of those lessons to be learnt. The companies were not
required to review or revise their systems other than to record an
audit trail for an annual inspection of their ISO 9000:2015
accreditation. In the event of an error or failure, they only had to
demonstrate a procedure for recording errors and failures and a
procedure for reviewing their protocol. Quality assurance
management as applied to the construction industry and professions
as a whole or to individual companies does not provide similar
results as those for manufacturing. This is because construction
sites, unlike most manufacturing ones, are not easily controlled
environments. Both Latham (1994) and Egan (1998) were highly
critical of the number of latent defects, wastage and the amount of
litigation in the construction industry. The research showed that,
despite this history, there is, as described by insurers, a certain
arrogance and over-reliance on in-house checking procedures rather
than getting the job done correctly in the first instance. Some
employers who were interviewed considered such systems were put
in place only in order to satisfy pre-qualification on government
framework tenders as most quality system plans were a set of ‘tick
boxes’ and paid little attention to the specific project. Table 3
records the key findings from the research.
This paper has not sought to offer a single cure to rid the
profession of errors and failures, but to review current practice
given that, despite significant advances in education and
technology generally, there does not appear to be a reciprocal rise
in professional examinations, and there is a continuance of
repetitive errors costing the profession millions of pounds
annually, despite even more project quality systems being in place.
The responses of the interviewees confirmed that information and
knowledge, while collected by the judiciary, insurers and
companies, was not communicated to other professionals. Wood
(1998) contends that there is a natural human instinct to avoid
association with failures and to seek to minimise their importance
and impact. Even within major construction organisations,
instances of failure are often hushed up, rather than being used to
highlight the organisational and technical causes so that all can
learn from the failure and are then less likely to repeat it. Wood
(1998) also states that distorting the figures of failures or
reoccurrences can lead to misinterpretation and false
representation of the facts.
Along with shipbuilding and aerospace, the construction industry
is one of the oldest and most established project-based sectors
(Keegan and Turner, 2003). Indeed, the last 100 years has seen
the industry evolve from a predominantly craft-based industry to a
multifaceted service, production and manufacturing sector.
Because the industry has largely continued to construct in situ, the
project-based approach has remained one of bringing together a
diverse collection of craft, professional and managerial staff to
different locations working collectively for short periods of time,
before they disband to work on other ventures.
Within the temporary organisation of the project, participants have a
range of objectives, not all of which will be complementary in
nature. For many years, poor communication practices have been
recognised as a serious delimiting factor within the construction
industry. Within the UK, a succession of government-commissioned

Table 3. Management systems

From the research
Over-reliance on checking procedures to capture
errors
Using management systems not suited for site-
based construction
Systems are often used as a
marketing/procurement platform only
Tendency to regard in-house systems as better
than ISO 9000:2015 (ISO, 2015)
Suggested possible corrective actions required
Better preparation at the beginning of a project ensuring that relevant experiences are
available and learnt, rather than reacting to a situation having happened
Introduction of building information modelling needs to be embraced across all of the
construction industry
‘Tick-boxing’ management systems should be discouraged, and real engagement employed
for realistic quality systems, including corrective actions
Insurers to provide claims data such that appropriate corrective actions can be incorporated
across the professions

Continuing errors and failures Reducing errors and failures

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reports has berated the industry for its apparent inability to
communicate effectively, both internally and externally (Banwell,
1964; Egan, 1998; Emmerson, 1962; Latham, 1994). This lack of
communication has been seen to lead to waste in terms of both
materials and delays, which as a result has led to adversarial conflicts
often ending in costly litigation. The interviews saw many instances
where a breakdown in communication led to repetitive errors; these
often involved client expectation. This commonly evolved from what
a client had intended or understood from a drawing which was
different when physically constructed on-site. Again, this emphasises
where the construction industry is different from others in that the
product (the building) is paid for during the construction process
rather than as a finished product. This payment during construction
applied to all clients in both the domestic and large commercial
sectors. To increase their profit, contractors often substituted cheaper
alternatives while citing that the alternative complies with the
specification. The author witnessed this first-hand under the auspice
of a design-and-build contract. For example, materials were routinely
substituted with a significant saving to the contractor.
In contrast to the construction industry, the aviation and maritime
professions are governed by international treaties. International
legislation has been put in place such that even the slightest error,
fault or anything to do with the safeguard of the passengers must
be disclosed. Contrary to belief that this adds cost and therefore
stifles competition, the additional cost of acting immediately is a
unit cost borne by all the companies. Collectively, the cost of safety
far outweighs the cost of an international lawsuit for damages.
Where errors and failures in the construction have been
documented – for example, Ronan Point and Pipers Row car park –
significant changes have subsequently been made in the design of
buildings and structures. Arnold (2004) revisited the Ronan Point
partial collapse, which caused a fundamental change in structural
engineering design throughout the world. While building codes
have been changed to prevent disproportionate and progressive
collapse, there remains an irony about the original explosion, which
was caused by a broken gas main. In the immediate aftermath of
the failure, the gas supply was removed from the building and all
similar tower blocks had their main gas supply removed. Arnold
(2004) found, as with corporate memory loss, that newer tenants
appear to be unaware of the significant history that exists and have
been actively pursuing methods of reintroducing gas supplies,
including bottled gas, to the high-rise block. Thus, although
information about the failure has resulted in changes to building
codes, the information regarding the danger of having a gas supply
is not well known by those living in tower blocks.
Within the construction industry, however, interviewees responded
that companies did wish to learn from their failures and errors, but it
was information that was privileged to them and was regarded as too
commercially sensitive to reveal or share with the professions as a
whole. Interestingly, some respondents were prepared to share
knowledge gained from failures for the common good, but only if
others adopted the same moral standing. This suggests that this
release of knowledge about failures and errors would need to be
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mandatory, perhaps similar in context to the aviation profession.
From a moral perspective, if knowledge of them was made public
within the domain, this would help to not only reduce those errors
and failures, but also remove the distress they cause to homeowners.
This might lead to a potential reduction in household insurance
premiums, and it would improve the general public’s perception of
and confidence in the construction industry and professions.
7. Availability of knowledge and information
and outcomes from the research
The analysis of the qualitative data from the semi-structured
interviews revealed that there were copious amounts of valuable
data held by insurers at both the national and global levels as well
at the individual company level. However, both parties did not see
any ‘commercial benefit’ or incentive to make knowledge or
information available in a transparent manner. Both did agree there
was a case for ethical and moral concession for the greater good of
‘all’ but were less inclined to have their data released into the public
domain. All of this information and knowledge is a highly valuable
asset, which can be taught not only at the company level, but also at
the university level in order to give graduates a better understanding
of both how structures work and the litigious nature of the
construction industry and professions. There currently exist methods
for reporting errors and failures within the structural and civil
engineering community, these being the Standing Committee on
Structural Safety (SCOSS) and CROSS. However, it was clear from
the interviewees that these bodies were not known beyond a limited
audience consisting of the IStructE and the Institution of Civil
Engineers. The judiciary had no knowledge of their existence, and
global insurers had limited knowledge of these bodies beyond the
higher courts. SCOSS and CROSS need their profile to be elevated
drastically, similar to that successfully operated by the aviation
profession, in order to be an effective body and for them to be
recognised and acknowledged by the judiciary and global insurers.
The Technology and Construction Court has in part been the
victim of its own success. It has become so overwhelmed with
construction cases that litigants have to declare that they have
attempted to mediate or arbitrate the case, with court action being
the last resort. This process has seen a proliferation of ‘closed-
door’ agreements which are then sealed with binding non-
disclosure clauses, meaning access to technical data is severely
restricted to the litigants. In addition, global professional indemnity
insurers have significant amounts of claims data, which they use to
project premiums for their clients. These data, however, would
appear to be for their benefit only. Rarely are trends or risk areas
highlighted to their clients, in particular smaller clients, even
though these smaller clients may operate as a bespoke specialist in
high-risk areas. The release of these data to a big-data repository
would help address the problems identified by Latham (1994) and
Egan (1998) in reducing waste, latent defects and litigation. This
would then reduce professional indemnity claims and should
ultimately reduce both the need for remedial works and the
fatalities that have costs in both economic and human terms. Table
4 summarises the main findings from the interviews.
 Forensic Engineering
Volume 171 Issue FE4
Table 4. The barriers to knowledge
From the interviews
There is ‘nothing in it for me’ in reporting on failures and errors
Cases go to mediation rather than the open court
Non-disclosure clauses restrict data sharing
Global professional indemnity insurers have much historical data, which can be used
to predict trends and high-risk areas
Lack of knowledge about existing current reporting systems
Weak legislation regarding the sharing of knowledge surrounding failures and errors
Continuing errors and failures
8. Conclusions
Both the construction profession and industry are complex, more
so than most. However, there is much they can do to reduce errors
and failures that blight the industry.
■ While mediated settlements can continue so as to protect the
names of the parties and any settlement reached, the valuable
technical knowledge should be made public so as to reduce
repetitive errors and failures.
■ Professional indemnity insurers pool their technical
knowledge of repetitive errors and failures through the
provision of a no-blame repository, to record error and failure-
related issues insofar as the pooling of knowledge would lead
to identifying repetitive patterns or trends.
■ That companies and individuals consider acting in a socially
responsible manner with strong ethical values, leading to
change in society’s moral behaviour to disseminate valuable
technical knowledge without fear or favour.
■ It is recommended that, despite the government’s reliance on
A level results and continued engineering graduate numbers,
an enquiry be convened with participants from the JBM, the
institutions and leading employers to review both the
capability of entrant undergraduates with specific regard to
mathematics and the calibre of graduates entering the
professions. University education is not providing for or
fulfilling the skill sets that the construction industry and
professions need.
The research has shown that there is abundant technical
knowledge and information regarding errors and failures within
the construction professions. However, while there is a
willingness to share this knowledge, this is conditioned by
‘what is in it for me?’ The other stance is that of a reluctance
to disseminate knowledge due to legally enforced non-disclosure
clauses. However, the author is drawn to events surrounding
US Airways flight 1549, on 15 January 2009. The actions
of Captain Sullenberger are well documented, but it is
his statement after the event that is both haunting and profound
regarding the value of learning from knowledge. Sullenberger
stated the following.
Downloaded by [] on [11/09/19]. Copyright © ICE Publishing, all rights reserved.
What lies hidden behind structural errors
and failures within the UK?
Burrell
Suggested possible corrective actions required
Compulsory reporting
A ‘no-blame’ system that gives access to technical data
Introduce a repository for big data (technical data)
SCOSS and CROSS need a higher profile throughout
the construction industry
There is currently no legislation to share information
unless it is a criminal case
Reducing errors and failures
Everything we know in aviation, every rule in the rule book, every
procedure we have, we know because someone somewhere has died.
We have purchased at great cost, lessons literally bought with blood
that we have to preserve as institutional knowledge to pass on to
succeeding generations. We cannot have the moral failures of
forgetting these lessons and have to relearn them. (Syed, 2015: p. 44)
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