Notes and Selected Cases for Criminal Law -1

Compiled by Judge RAAdlawan (2016)

INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS

Case: Gidwani vs People, G.R. No. 195064, January 15, 2014

“Any ambiguity in the interpretation and application of the law

must be made in favor of the accused.”

PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT;

ART. 5

Case: Corpuz vs People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 (en
banc)

Facts: The accused received jewelries from Danilo with a total worth of
P98,000.00. Their agreement was that the accused would remit the
proceeds to Danilo when sold. Unable to pay the amount despite
demand, Danilo filed an estafa case against the accused. The RTC
convicted him. On appeal, the accused argued that one the elements
of the crime which is prior demand was not proven since no demand
letter was offered in evidence. It was further taken up during the
appeal that the penalty on estafa is obsolete.

SC: On the Penalties in crimes against property: There seems to be a

perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the
courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed
today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of
money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify
the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through
this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the
whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed
that the framers of the Revised Penal Code had anticipated this matter
by including Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with

acts which should be repressed but which are
not covered by the law, and in cases of
excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem
proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the
proper decision, and shall report to the
Chief Executive, through the Department
of Justice, the reasons which induce the
court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of penal legislation. In
the same way, the court shall submit to
the Chief Executive, through the
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Department of Justice, such statement as

may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of
the provisions of this Code would result in
the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by
the offense.

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts
borne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds
it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and
thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is
not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by
law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first
except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law
but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive.
The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the
execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the
reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to
provide the proper penalty.

Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court

should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago,
but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for
inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into
consideration “changed conditions” or “significant changes in
circumstances” in its decisions.

Q: What are the exceptions to the principle of

territoriality in Criminal Law?

A: Art. 2 of the RPC enumerates the extra-territorial application of

criminal law which are as follows:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or

airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note
of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by
the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the
introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should
commit an offense in the exercise of their functions;
5. Should commit any crimes against the national security
and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this
Code
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In addition to the above-enumerated exceptions, the following shall

have extra-territorial application by express provision of the law:

6. Should commit an offense within any embassy,

consulate, diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the
Philippine government in an official capacity under the Human
Security Act – RA 9372.

7. Should commit any crime even if committed outside

the Philippines and whether or not such act or acts constitute
an offense at the place of commission, the crime being a
continuing offense, having been commenced in the Philippines
and other elements having been committed in another country,
if the suspect or accused (a) is a Filipino citizen; or (b) is a
permanent resident of the Philippines; or (c) Has committed
the act against a citizen of the Philippines (Section 26-A of RA
10364 amending RA 9208-Anti-Human Trafficking Law).
Q: Is Technical Malversation under Article 220 of the
RPC mala in se or mala prohibita?

A: “xxx But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation.

The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law
or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose.
The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is
not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because
positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public
policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as
defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence,
malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant. (Ysidoro vs People,
G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012)

INTENT TO KILL

Case: Edgar Esqueda vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.

170222. June 18. 2009

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives,

the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the
offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted
homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of:
(a) motive: (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the
commission of the crime: (c) the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim: (d) the manner the crime was committed: and
(e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are
inflicted by him on the victim.

MENS REA
Case: Lily Sy Vs. Hon. Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez, Benito Fernandez Go, Berthold Llm, Jennifer Sy,
Glenn Ben Tiak Sy and Merry Sy, G.R. No. 171579. November
14. 2012
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Respondents should not be held liable for the alleged unlawful

act absent a felonious intent. "Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea".
A crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent.

MOTIVE

Case: Peole vs Babor, G.R. No. 215319, October 21, 2015

Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element

of the crime. Further, the Court has ruled that motive is not essential to
convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit.

IMPOSSIBLE CRIME

Case: People vs Domasian, 219 SCRA 245)

The accused illegally detained a child and sent a ransom note to

the latter’s parents, but the child was rescued even before the ransom
note was received. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means, and the delivery
of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the
offense, which had already been consummated when the accused
deprived the child of his liberty.

Case: Gemma T. Jacinto vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.

162540. July 13. 2009

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check

belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value,
as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on
whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced. The Court
must resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to

the present case. In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a person,
peppered the letter's bedroom with bullets, but since the intended
victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court
and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by
this Court, he .'.as adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as
defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, - relation to Article 59.
both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of
producing the crime.

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act
performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that
the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate
or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing
the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Q: In estafa and other crimes against property, where the penalty
depends on the value of the property, can the Court modify the penalty
on the ground that it is excessive?
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A: No. The Court cannot modify the imposable penalties because that
would constitute judicial legislation. In this case, Art. 5 of the RPC will
apply which allows the courts to submit to the Chief Executive, through
the DOJ, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement
of the provisions of the RPC would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and
the injury caused by the offense.

MISTAKE OF FACT

Case: Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez Vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan

and The People of the Philippines/Mario D. Reyes, Andres S.
Reyes and Virgilio A. Manguerra/Gervacio B. Cunanan, Jr. and
Ernesto Puno Vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan and People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 120744-46/G.R. No. 122677/G.R. No.
122776, June 25, 2012

In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a

misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or
omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a
reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it
negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if
the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The inquiry is
into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to
the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of
this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable:
(b) that it be a matter of fact: and (c) that it negate the culpability
required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state
which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.

The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability

is found in United States v. Ah Chong, but in that setting, the principle
was treated as a function of self-defense where the physical
circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the accused an
aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful
of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being
broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having
demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He
threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a
chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving that he was
under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who
turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he was
acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact.

As held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an

act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must
preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused.

STAGES OF EXECUTION

Case: People vs Orande, November 12, 2003

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The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape due to

the fact that the latter did not succeed in inserting his penis in the
victim’s vagina.

SC: There is no such crime as frustrated rape. Instead, the

accused is guilty of consummated rape since perfect penetration is not
essential for the consummation of rape.

Case: Valenzuela vs People, 525 SCRA 306

The accused argued that he should only be convicted of

frustrated theft for taking cartons of detergent from the supermarket
since he was immediately apprehended by the security guards. Thus,
was not able to freely dispose of the said articles.

SC: Theft cannot have a frustrated stage and the accused is

guilty of consummated theft since he has obtained possession over the
stolen item and the presumed inability of the offender to freely dispose
of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have
already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion
of the taking. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing. The ability of the offender
to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of
the crime of theft.

Case: Jovito Canceran vs People, G.R. No. 206442, July 1, 2015

Facts: Canceran et.al. were charged for the crime of Frustrated Theft
for unlawfully taking boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream from
Ororama Grocery in Cagayan de Oro City. Canceran went to the cashier
bringing with him a box of Magicflakes and paid it. The security guard
asked Canceran whether or not the box has been checked. When the
security guard checked it, it was found out that the contents of the box
is not Magicflakes but 14 boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream. When
confronted the accused ran away leaving the boxes in the grocery
store. The information charged him of frustrated theft “xxxx
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of theft as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of some cause independent of accused’s
willxxx.” After trial, the RTC convicted Canceran for Consummated
Theft in line with the decision on Valenzuela vs People (2007).

On appeal with the CA, Canceran contended that he could not be guilty
of consummated theft because that was not alleged in the Information.
The CA affirmed the conviction.

Issue: Whether or not Canceran may be convicted of Consummated

Theft when the Information merely charged him Frustrated Theft as the
accused did not produce the crime of theft by reason of some cause
independent of the will of the accused..

SC: Under Article 308 of the RPC, the essential elements of theft are (1)
the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another;
(3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away
was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is
accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or force
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upon things. “Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s

personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an
act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.”

“It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of
the property stolen delves into the concept of ‘taking’ itself, in that
there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of
control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect
would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated
stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not
been completed, the "taking not having been accomplished.”

The Information can never be read to charge Canceran of

consummated Theft
because the indictment itself stated that the crime was never
produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to
mean that Canceran was being charged with theft in its
attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran may only be
convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.

“[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than

that with which he was charged in the complaint or
information and on which he was tried. It matters not how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an
accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any offense,
unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which
he is tried, or necessarily included therein. He has a right to be
informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is
charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of an
offense higher than that charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized
denial of that right.

Indeed, an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly

proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter.

The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly

includes the crime in its attempted stage. In this case,
although the evidence presented during the trial prove the
crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of
Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming
evidence to convict him for consummated Theft, because the
Information did not charge him with consummated Theft, the
Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against
him, as he so protests.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that “the real nature of
the criminal charge is determined, not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
law alleged to have been violated – these being conclusions of
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law – but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or

information.

Case: People vs PADIT, G.R. No. 202978, February 1, 2016

Facts: XXX was charged for the crime of rape. It was the testimony of
the private complainant that the penis of the accused merely rubbed
his penis against her vagina.

Issue: Whether or not the crime of rape is attempted or consummated.

Held: A, who was then four years old at the time of the molestation,
was not expected to be knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and
every stage thereof. The fact that she claimed that accused-appellant
rubbed his penis against her vagina did not mean that there was no
penetration. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having
sexual bodily connections with a woman. This explains why the
slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. As
such, a mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act already constitutes consummated rape.
In the present case, AAA testified that she felt pain when accused-
appellant “rubbed his penis [against her] vagina.” This Court has held
that rape is committed on the victim's testimony that she felt pain. In
fact, AAA still felt severe pain in her vagina when she was being given
a bath by her mother after her molestation. This kind of pain could not
have been the result of mere superficial rubbing of accused-appellant's
sex organ with that of the victim. Such pain could be nothing but the
result of penile penetration sufficient to constitute rape.

CONSPIRACY

Case: People vs Zabala et. al., G.R. No. 203087, November 23,
2015

SC: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime
need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from
their acts. It was convincingly shown that both appellants had acted in
concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting and killing Joseph.
Appellants were together when they followed Joseph walking along the
road; appellant Romeo held Joseph by his shoulder and boxed him
while appellant Edgardo held Joseph's hands from behind. Appellant
Romeo told Joseph's friends who saw what was happening to go home
and not to be involved; appellants continued mauling Joseph and when
he fell to the ground unconscious, appellant Edgardo smashed his face
with a stone. Appellants walked away together from the crime scene as
soon as they had achieved their common purpose.

Q: What is conspiracy?

A: “A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law
specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and
sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an
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indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime

is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as
the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their
malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and
the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed. However, when in
resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two
or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal
importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators.”
(People vs Henry Go, March 25, 2014; People vs Gambao
et.al., G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013 en banc)

“Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime
need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from
their acts. Here, conspiracy between the accused can be inferred from
the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. PO2
Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting
by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly
shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of
assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in
concert was manifest not only from their going together to the betting
station on board a single motorcycle, but also from their joint attack
that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and
immediately followed by Edwin’s shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one
after the other. It was also significant that they fled together on board
the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common
purpose. To be a conspirator, one need not have to participate in every
detail of the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part
performed by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.
Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and
Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their acts that were
indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.”
(People of the Philippines v. PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin
Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, January 18, 2012.)

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a

crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy cannot be presumed.
Conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt like the crime
subject of the conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proved by direct
evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during
and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common
design. (People vs. Huang Zhen Hua, September 29, 2004)

What is RADIAL CONSPIRACY

Case: Estrada vs Sandiganbayan

In “radial conspiracy” even if the people who is within the radius do

not know what is the purpose of one, as long as he achieved the
purpose for which the principal offender has attained. You are
supposed to be guilty considering the theory of “radial conspiracy”.
They say that “radial conspiracy” is just like a wheel. In the middle of
the wheel there is what we call the places or persons where you
connect the scopes towards the outer part of the wheel, etc. and those
spaces in between the scopes are the participants.
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EFFECTS OF CONSPIRACY ONCE PROVEN

“xxxxConspiracy having been established, evidence as to who
delivered the fatal blow is no longer indispensable. Hence, it is
immaterial if Caballero’s role was merely to signal the gunmen and
Alvarez’s, to act as back up. Each of the offender is equally guilty of
the criminal act since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
(People vs Dimacuha et.al., February 2, 2015)

THE CO-CONSPIRATORS NEED NOT PERFORM ALL

ACTS OF EXECUTION

Case: People vs Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013

“The mere circumstance that accused-appellant Niegas did not

personally perform all the acts necessary to consummate the crime is
irrelevant when conspiracy is proven, since in conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. While it is mandatory to prove it by competent evidence,
direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy — it may be deduced
from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.”

Case: People vs Charlie Orosco, G.R. No. 20927, March 25,

2015

Facts: A while in the store of Yap about to buy something saw two (2)
men arguing with the owner. When Yap opened the door, the two (2)
men entered, one of them is Orosco. Orosco held the hands of Yap
while his companion placed his left arm around the neck of Yap and
stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When Yap fell down, Orosco
then took the money. Thereafter, Orosco left together with the man
who stabbed Yap. Orosco was convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. On appeal, Orosco argued that his liability should only be
limited to Robbery and not Robbery with Homicide because he was not
the one who stabbed the victim

SC: Having acted in conspiracy with the other, Orosco is equally liable
for the killing of Yap. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on
the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they
actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was
an endeavor to prevent the killing.

Q: What do you understand by CONSPIRACY BY SILENCE AND

INACTION under RA 3019?

A: “When the accused are all heads of their respective offices that
perform interdependent functions in the processing of cash advances
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and, exhibit an attitude of “BUCK-PASSING” (the practice of shifting

the responsibility for something to someone else) in the face of the
irregularities. Their indifference to their individual and collective duties
to ensure the laws and regulations are observed in the disbursement of
the funds of the LGU lead to a finding of conspiracy of silence and
inaction.” (JACA, ET.AL. VS PEOPLE, January 28, 2013)

INVOCATION OF SELF-DEFENSE

“By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to

the commission of the acts for which they were charged, albeit under
circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With this
admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that
the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were
attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense.

The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the

nature and number of wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to
prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other
things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of
the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained
by the victim. The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab
wounds David suffered and which eventually caused his death, and the
thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the
prosecution's theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously
attacked David and Erwin. In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-
trial that "the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordonez would have
caused his death were it not for immediate medical attendance."
(Guevarra vs People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014)

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION

Case: People vs Gamez, G.R. No. 202847, October 23,

2013

Facts: Apolinario, father of the accused manifested his dislike with the
wife of his son because of the wife’s infidelity. On August 21, 2004,
enraged by the stories circulating in their place, accused went to the
house of their father and confronted the latter. Accused was carrying a
long bolo and a scythe that was tucked on his waist. Aware of the
animosity between father and son, Maura daughter of Apolinario ran
away. Apolinario attacked the accused and thereafter flee. But
accused-appellant gave him a chase. Apolinario was able to run for
about 20 meters before the accused-appellant was able to catch up.
The accused-appellant then hacked Apolinario on the right side of his
head using the bolo. Apolinario fell down and the accused-appellant
finished him off by slashing his neck with the scythe. The autopsy
conducted on Apolinario’s cadaver by Dr. Leonita Azores, MD, showed
that he sustained two (2) fatal wounds one of which almost
decapitated his head while the other hit the parietal aspect thereof
exposing the skin and connective tissue. Apolinario also obtained two
(2) incised wounds on his neck and left forearm and two (2) lacerations
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on his fingers. He perished at the crime scene. The RTC held that when
accused-appellant hacked and killed Apolinario, the unlawful
aggression which the latter initially perpetrated has already ceased
because he has already ran away for 20 m. Hence, accused-appellant’s
act was not self-defense but rather one of retaliation which, in turn,
props up the conclusion that he intentionally killed his father.

Ruling: Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance

implies the admission by the accused that he committed the criminal
act. Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the
accused that he was in fact innocent. However, if the accused admits
killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is
shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression
on his part.

In order to escape criminal liability, it becomes incumbent upon the

accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of
the following requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of
the Revised Penal Code, viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked.

“There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he

puts in actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person
invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical force or actual
use of a weapon.” It is present only when the one attacked faces real
and immediate threat to one’s life. It must be continuous; otherwise, it
does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.

The aggression initially staged by Apolinario was not of the continuous

kind as it was no longer present when the accused-appellant injured
Apolinario. As testified by the accused-appellant himself, he was able
to grab the bolo from Apolinario. From that point on, the aggression
initially staged by Apolinario ceased to exist and the perceived threat
to the accused-appellant’s life was no longer attendant.

Hence, the accused-appellant was no longer acting self-defense, when

he, despite having already disarmed Apolinario, ran after the latter for
about 20 m and then stabbed him. The accused-appellant’s claim of
self-defense is further negated by the fatal incision on Apolinario’s
neck that almost decapitated his head, a physical evidence which
corroborates Maura’s testimony that after stabbing Apolinario with the
bolo, the accused-appellant pulled out the scythe on his waist and
used the same to slash Apolinario’s neck. The use of a weapon
different from that seized from the victim and the nature of the injury
inflicted show the accused-appellant’s determined resolve to kill
Apolinario. When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer
has any justification to kill or wound the original aggressor. The
assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against
the original aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already
 13

ceased when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense the

aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.

Case: People vs Abrazaldo, 397 SCRA 137

While the accused admitted the commission of the crime in order

to preserve his own life, he maintained that the victim accidentally
stabbed himself while they were grappling for the knife.

SC: The justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot be

appreciated considering the accused-appellant's flight from the crime
scene, his failure to inform the authorities of the incident and his
failure to surrender the knife to the authorities. The aforesaid
circumstances are inconsistent with having a clean conscience and,
instead, indicate his culpability to the crime charged.

Case: People vs Patotoy, 261 SCRA 37

The accused admitted to having killed the victim but claims to

have done so in self-defense. The victim appeared to draw something
from his waist during their confrontation.

SC: The victim's alleged act of drawing "something" from his

waist certainly is not the "unlawful aggression" meant in the law that
would justify a fatal strike at him and no veritable physical force on the
part of the latter has been shown that could have really , endangered
the life of the accused. Hence, self-defense cannot exist in this case.
Without unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot exist nor be an
extenuating circumstance.
Case: People vs Cristina Samson, G.R. No. 214883, September
2, 2015

Facts: On June 27, 2002, CRISTINA SAMSON (Cristina) was in their

house watching television together with her children when her
husband, Gerry Delmar (Gerry), who was drunk at that time, arrived.
Gerry asked Cristina if she had cooked food already but the latter
answered in the negative because she had no money to buy food.
Gerry scolded and uttered words against her, and then slapped her.
They had an altercation for about ten (10) minutes when Cristina’s
father arrived and pacified them. Gerry left but after thirty (30)
minutes, he returned. He pointed a knife at Cristina’s neck. The latter
begged Gerry not to hurt her and to pity their children if something
happens to her. Gerry continued pointing the knife and told Cristina to
stop talking or otherwise, he will put a hole in her neck. Then, Gerry
slapped Cristina’s face twice. While Gerry was still holding the knife,
Cristina pushed him and he fell on the ground. She took the knife
which Gerry was holding and begged him not to come near her. She
was holding the knife near her chest pointed at Gerry when he
suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the knife went in
contact with his chest. When she saw her husband bloodied, she
shouted for help and her father (Rodolfo Samson) and brother (Allan
Samson) came and brought Gerry to the hospital. Her relatives told her
that Gerry died in the hospital.
 14

RTC convicted her which was affirmed by the CA. They were in unison
in telling that since Gerry has fallen down the unlawful aggression had
ceased.

SC: Contrary to the conclusion of the CA that Gerry’s aggression had

already ceased when he was disarmed, it is the Court’s view that the
aggression still continued. Her perceived peril to her life continued and
persisted until she put an end to it.

It must be noted that after she was able to take hold of the knife from
her husband, he did not stand down but, instead, continued to move
towards her despite her plea that he should not come nearer. He
grabbed her by the arm which could have precipitated her well-
grounded belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able to
wrest the weapon from her. It was not farfetched to presume that,
being stronger, he could have easily overpowered her and eventually
killed her.

In the case at bench, the unlawful aggression would have ceased if he

just walked away from the scene considering that Cristina had gained
the upper hand, being the one in possession of the knife. Instead,
Gerry chose to ignore her plea not to come near her and continued
moving towards her without regard to his safety despite the fact that
the knife was pointed towards his direction.

In both Rabandaban and the present case, the victims, despite having
been disarmed, still posed a threat to the lives of the accused. The
danger to their lives persisted leaving them with no other choice but to
defend themselves lest they be the ones to be victimized.

In that situation, Cristina had reasons to believe that her life was still in
danger. It is to be noted that before she was able to take hold of the
weapon, her husband held the same knife and pointed it at her throat.
So when he, who was taller and stronger, approached her and grabbed
her by the arm, it was instinctive for her to take the extreme
precautionary measure by stabbing him before he could get back the
knife and make good his earlier threat of putting a hole in her throat.

Contrary to the trial court’s assessment, she did not show aggression
towards her husband when she pushed him after he pointed the knife
away from her. She was, in fact, manifesting a passive attitude towards
him when she just stood her ground, with the knife in hand, asking him
not to come near her.

It would have been a different story if Gerry, after dropping the knife,
walked away and Cristina still went after him. If that were the case, she
could not assert self-defense. She was no longer acting in self-defense
but in retaliation for the earlier aggression. Retaliation is inconsistent
with self defense and in fact belies it. In retaliation, the aggression that
was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused
attacked him; while in self-defense the aggression still existed when
the aggressor was injured by the accused.

Case: Pp vs Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012

 15

In the instant case, in invoking self-defense, Fontanilla admitted

inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that
once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his
infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden
to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying
circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus
admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came
to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless
he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. In this
case, Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records
reveals that, one,Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against
Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head with a
stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and
constituted an unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and
kicks.

Case: People vs Nestor Roxas, G.R. No. 218396, February 10,

2016

This case is a classic illustration of the time-honored principle in

criminal law that while the prosecution has the burden of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden is shifted to
the accused when he admits the commission of the crime but
interposes self-defense to justify his act.

Facts: Severino Manalo (Severino/victim) and Vicente were talking to

each other in front of the house of Alfredo Asi (Alfredo). Then, Vicente
saw the accused-appellant approach Severino from behind and
suddenly stab the latter thrice with a white sharp bladed weapon. The
three successive stab blows landed on Severino's back, his stomach
and on his side. Vicente testified that Severino was caught off guard
when he was stabbed by the accused-appellant as the victim was
facing the former while they were talking. Immediately after Severino
was stabbed, the accused-appellant fled from the place of the incident.
For fear that he might also be attacked, Vicente scampered away to a
safer distance until he reached his place where he called for help.
Vicente, together with some people, returned to the crime scene where
they found Severino sprawled on the ground already dead.

Accused invoked self-sefense.

SC: The unlawful aggression on the part of the victim must be

unmistakable. The number of stab wounds sustained by the victim
should also be taken into account. The several stab wounds sustained
by the victim belies the claim of self defense. Moreover, the accused-
appellant's flight negates his plea of self-defense and indicates his
guilt.

Case: Alberto Almojuela vs People, G.R. No. 183202, June 2,

2014

Facts: On November 21, 1993 at around 8:00 in the evening, Masula,

Quejong, Jose Buenhijo Paz (Paz), along with some others, were on
their way home from a party when they encountered Almojuela, who
 16

was having a drinking spree with his friends in front of his house.
Almojuela called on Paz and shouted, “Matagal ka nang namumuro sa
akin,” to which, Paz replied, “Ganoon ba? What do you want?”
Immediately, a fight ensued between the two. In the course of the
fight, Almojuela stabbed Paz in his right arm, causing the latter to
retreat. It was at this point that Quejong joined in the fight and
grappled with Almojuela to the ground. A certain Dale Abarquez
(Kagawad Abarquez) at that point, came to pacify the parties. But the
two men did not heed the kagawad’s order and continued wrestling
with each other. This prompted Kagawad Abarquez to hit Quejong twice
in his back and to fire two warning shots in the air. On hearing the
gunshots, Quejong and his group immediately ran away. Quejong died
due to the stab wound found in his back. When the policemen came to
their house, Almojuela hid at the thicket but when he learned that
Quejong died, he went to the police station and surrendered himself.

Almojuela claimed that there was incomplete self-defense.

SC: There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,

unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against
the person who resorted to self-defense. This mitigating
circumstance is inapplicable in the present case because the unlawful
aggression did not start from the victim Quejong but from Almojuela.
The prosecution proved that it was Almojuela who first challenged Paz
and his group to a fight. Almojuela came prepared to fight and was in
fact armed with a bladed weapon.

Moreover, the third element is also absent since there is no lack of

sufficient provocation on Almojuela’s part as shown by his
confrontational stance right from the start.

Although Almojuela hid when policemen first visited him in his home, it
was also duly proven that soon after he learned of Quejong’s death,
Almojuela voluntarily gave himself up to a certain SPO4 Soriano who
then turned him over to SPO1 Danilo Vidad of the Western Police
District. Under these facts, all the elements of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender are present in this case.

DEFENSE OF RELATIVE

Case: Medina vs People, January 15, 2014

Facts: Lino’s son(Ross) was involved in a fight during a basketball game

with Ronald Medina, younger brother of Ricardo and Randolf. . In that
fight, Ronald had hit Ross with a piece of stone. Hearing about the
involvement of his brother in the fight, Randolf rushed to the scene and
sent Ronald home. Ross was brought to the hospital for treatment.
Once Lino learned that his son had sustained a head injury inflicted by
one of the Medinas, he forthwith went towards the house of the
Medinas accompanied by his drinking buddies, Jose Tapan and Abet
Menes. Lino had a breadknife tucked on his waist while the other do
not have. Along the way, Lino encountered Randolf whom he
confronted about the fight. The two of them had a heated argument.
Although Randolf tried to explain what had really happened between
Ross and Ronald, Lino lashed out at Randolf and gripped the latter’s
 17

hand. Tapan almost simultaneously punched Randolf in the face. Lino,

already holding the knife in his right hand, swung the knife at Randolf
who was not hit. Randolf retreated towards the store and took two
empty bottles of beer, broke the bottles and attacked Lino with them.
Arriving at the scene, Ricardo saw what was happening, and
confronted Lino. A commotion ensued between them. Ricardo entered
their house to get a kitchen knife and came out. Lino made a thrust at
Ricardo but failed to hit the latter, who then stabbed Lino on the left
side of his chest, near the region of the heart. Lino fell face down on
the ground who died. After that, Ricardo walked away, while Randolf
threw the broken bottles at the fallen Lino.

Randolf and Ricardo were charged for homicide for the death of Lino.
The defense claimed that Lino accidentally stabbed himself by falling
frontward and into his own knife. The RTC convicted Ricardo but
acquitted Randolf saying that there was no conspiracy between the
two. On appeal, Ricardo argued that it was error on the part of the
lower court not to have considered the justifying circumstance of
defense of relative.

SC: In order that defense of a relative is to be appreciated in favor of

Ricardo, the following requisites must concur, namely: (1) unlawful
aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person making
the defense took no part in the provocation. Like in self-defense, it is
the accused who carries the burden to prove convincingly the
attendance and concurrence of these requisites because his invocation
of this defense amounts to an admission of having inflicted the fatal
injury on the victim.

In invoking defense of a relative, Ricardo states that his immediate

impulse upon seeing Randolf being attacked by Lino with a knife was
to get his own weapon and to aid in the defense of Randolf. But that
theory was inconsistent with his declaration at the trial that Lino’s fatal
wound had been self-inflicted, as it presupposes direct responsibility
for inflicting the mortal wound. Thus, his defense was unworthy of
belief due to its incongruity with human experience

ACCIDENT

Case: People vs. Roy San Gaspar, G.R. No. 180496, April
2, 2014

Facts: In the afternoon of April 25, 1999, appellant, without informing

his lawfully married wife Imelda, went to Norala, South Cotabato
together with his father to attend the funeral of a relative. At that time,
appellant and Imelda were not on speaking terms for about a week
already. At around 11:30 p.m. of the same day and while Imelda and
her two children Joramel and Cherme were already fast asleep,
appellant returned home and pounded on their front door. The
thudding sound roused the whole household. Apparently, appellant was
mad because nobody immediately opened the door for him. He got
even more furious when he entered the house and saw Imelda sleeping
side-by-side with her grown-up children. Appellant thus kicked Imelda
on the leg while she was still lying on the floor and this started a
 18

heated altercation between them. Appellant exclaimed, “What kind of

wife [are you?],” to which Imelda retorted, “what kind of a husband is a
person who just leaves his family behind without asking permission or
informing his wife of his whereabouts”? Imelda also told appellant that
her sleeping with Joramel and Cherme is without any malice as they
are her children.

Still enraged, appellant went upstairs and returned with a .12 gauge
shotgun. He loaded it and lit a kerosene lamp which he placed near the
door of their room. He then aimed the .12 gauge shotgun at his wife
and in front of Joramel and Cherme, shot Imelda on the head. Appellant
thereafter immediately ran away.

The accused put up the defense of accident. He said that in the

morning of April 25, 1999, appellant went to Norala, South Cotabato
with his father to attend the funeral of a relative. He returned home by
himself at around 7:00 p.m. just to change clothes and again returned
to Norala after asking permission from Imelda. Imelda and her two
children from her previous relationship, Joramel and Cherme, were left
behind in their house. It was already around11:00 p.m. when appellant
came home. But as he pushed the door to enter their room, he heard a
gunshot from a .12 gauge shotgun. Since it was dark, appellant rushed
downstairs to fetch a lamp to see what had just happened. With a lit
lamp, he saw Imelda lying on the floor drenched in her own blood.
Joramel and Cherme were beside her crying. Appellant thus
immediately went out of their house to look for a tricycle to transport
Imelda to the hospital. From the above narration, the defense
postulates that when appellant pushed the door open, it hit the
shotgun, causing it to accidentally discharge and hit Imelda.

SC: While appellant describes the prosecution’s version of events as

“unnatural, implausible, and contrary to human nature and
experience”, the Court finds that it is his story of accidental discharge
of the shotgun that is incredulous and unbelievable. Contrary to what
appellant wants this Court to believe, a .12 gauge shotgun will not go
off unless it is loaded, cocked, and its trigger squeezed. To this Court,
appellant’s allegation is nothing but a self-serving statement without
an ounce of proof or a lick of credibility. Moreover, the same does not
jibe with the result of the autopsy conducted on Imelda’s body.

Q: May the justifying circumstance of self-defense be invoked

at the same time with the exempting circumstance of
accident?

A: No. “Self-defense as a defense is inconsistent with the exempting

circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to kill. On the
other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated
intent to kill in order to defend oneself from imminent danger.”
(Pomoy vs People, September 29, 2004)

Case: People vs Macal, G.R. No. 211062, January 13, 2016

Facts: W and H are husband and wife. H killed W. H alleged that when
he arrived at the house, he saw W sitting beside a man conversing with
each other. Furious, he went out the bedroom to get a knife. Once back
 19

inside the bedroom, he delivered a stab blow towards the man but the
latter was shielded by Auria. In the process, the stab blow landed on
Auria. After Auria was accidentally stabbed, the man ran outside and
fled. The accused-appellant testified that out of frustration for not
killing the man, hewounded himself on the chest.

SC: The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal

Code to release the accused-appellant from criminal liability. Pursuant
to said provision, the essential requisites of accident as an exempting
circumstance are: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due
care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4)
without fault or intention of causing it. A close scrutiny of the
transcripts of stenographic notes would reveal that the accused-
appellant was not performing a lawful act at the time Auriawas
stabbed. He testified in open court that he intended to kill the man but
instead it was Auria who was hit.

“xxx contrary to what the accused-appellant wants the Court to

believe, his actuations closely after Auria was stabbed tell a different
story. If Auria was really accidentally stabbed by him, the accused-
appellant’s natural reaction would have been to take the lead in
bringing his wife to a hospital. Instead, his priority was to come up with
an improvised bladed weapon that he could use to hurt himself.
Additionally, the fact that the accused-appellant ran away from the
crime scene leaving Auria’s relatives and neighbors to tend to his
dying wife is indicative of his guilt.

As disclosed by the accused-appellant, when he saw Auria with a man,

the two were just seated beside each other and were simply talking.
Evidently, the absolutory cause embodied in Article 247 is not
applicable in the present case.

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE;INSANITY

Verdadero vs People, G.R. No. 216021, March 2, 2016

Facts: X stabbed A after they have a confrontation at the police station.

A died. X claimed insanity as his defense. Evidence showed that he has
been in and out of the hospital from the Psychiatric Department and
that during the time of the stabbing hat he had suffered a relapse of
his schizophrenia.

Ruling: Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by

inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. A showing that an
accused is suffering from a mental disorder, however, does not
automatically exonerate him from the consequences of his act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.

In this case, the defense successfully proved that indeed Verdadero

had a relapse of his schizophrenia even before, during and after the
commission of the crime. xxxxx he was officially diagnosed to have
suffered a relapse of schizophrenia. Generally, evidence of insanity
after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may be
appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior before or simultaneous to the crime.
 20

Case: People vs Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014

Facts: The accused was charged for murder for hacking Maureen, a
two year old baby girl that resulted to her death and frustrated murder
for hacking one Jeffrey. At around 4 o’clock in the afternoon of
November 26, 2002, Vicente Ringor (Vicente) was staying with his two
(2)-year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor (Maureen), at the
terrace of their house located at Villanueva, San Manuel, Isabela.
Suddenly, Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente with a
panabas with neither reason nor provocation. While Vicente was able
to evade Umawid’s blows, the latter nevertheless hit Maureen on her
abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous death. Upon seeing
Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked away. Umawid proceeded to the
house where Jeffrey lives which was only 5 meters away from Vicente’s
house. Once there, Umawid attacked Jeffrey. Umawid only stopped his
barrage upon seeing Jeffrey, who was then pretending to be dead,
leaning on the wall and blood-stained.

Umawid set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however, take the
witness stand to attest to the same. Instead, he presented the
testimonies of Dr. Quincina to bolster his claim. The doctor said that
he evaluated Umawid’s psychiatric condition in May 2002, February
2003, and on March 24, 2003 and found that the latter was manifesting
psychotic symptoms. However, he could not tell with certainty whether
Umawid was psychotic at the time of the commission of the crimes.

SC: As case law instructs, the defense of insanity is in the nature

of confession and avoidance because an accused invoking the
same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or
she is not guilty because of such insanity. As there is a
presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said
defense bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence. Accordingly, the evidence on this matter must
relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the
commission of the offense/s with which he is charged.

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence

while committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason,
he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of
the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough,
especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the
mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. Thus, in
order to lend credence to a defense of insanity, it must be shown that
the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his or her acts.

COMPULSION OF AN IRRESISTIBLE FORCE/IMPULSE OF

AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
 21

Case: People vs Anticamara et.al. G.R. No. 178771, June 8,

2011

Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt

from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible
force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury, because such person does not act with freedom. To avail of this
exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the
existence of an uncontrollable fear: (2) that the fe^r must be real and
imminent: and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal
to. that committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear
or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
nature as to induce a well- grounded apprehension of death or serious
bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.

Case: Manansala vs People, December 9, 2015, G.R. No.

215424

Facts: Manansala was charged for the crime of falsification of a private

document. Denying the accusation, she likewise invoked the mitigating
circumstance that she merely acted under an impulse of uncontrollable
fear. The fear of losing her job being only a subordinate to the one who
instructed her falsify the document. The MTC appreciated in her favor
the said mitigating circumstance.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in appreciating the

circumstance of acting under the impulse of uncontrollable fear.

SC: To begin with, “acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear” is

not among the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of
the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article 12
(6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be
appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must
concur: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear
must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater
than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to prosper,
the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough.

In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was
apprehensive in committing a falsity in the preparation of the subject
report as she did not know the repercussions of her actions, nothing
would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at UMC for that
matter, threatened her with loss of employment should she fail to do
so. As there was an absence of any real and imminent threat,
intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala to do
what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor

INSANITY

Q: What is the nature of insanity as a defense?

 22

A: Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance and

as such must be adequately proved. The law presumes that all persons
are of sound mind, and that acts are done consciously. xxxxx In the
eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Proof of the existence of some
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability, if it
can be shown that the offender was not completely deprived of
freedom and intelligence (People vs Belonio, May 27, 2004)

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY

Case: People vs Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 4, 2014

Facts: Roxas was charged for five (5) counts for raping the minor
victim. The defense presented Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist
of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology who testified that
based on her examination of the accused, she concluded that he is
suffering from a mild mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9)
to ten (10) years old. She observed that the subject was aware that he
was being accused of rape, but he had consistently denied the
allegations against him. The RTC convicted the accused. The RTC held
that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal responsibility
on the ground that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or
insane person, since Dr. Aglipay merely testified that he was an
eighteen-year old with a mental development comparable to that of
children between nine to ten years old.

On appeal, the accused claims that under Republic Act No. 9344,
minors fifteen (15) years old and below are exempt from criminal
responsibility. Accused-appellant Roxas claims that since he has a
mental age of nine years old, he should also be exempt from criminal
liability although his chronological age at the time of the commission of
the crime was already eighteen years old. He further argued that the
relationship was not properly alleged in the information as it mentions
only the word “niece”.

SC: In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal

liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age as determined by the
anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued by
accused-appellant Roxas.

The allegation that AAA was accused-appellant Roxas’s “niece” in each

Information is therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship.
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

Case: Rosario de Vera vs Geren de Vera, April 6, 2009

Facts: Geren was charged for the crime of Bigamy. The Information was
filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005, the court
issued an Order finding probable cause for the accused to stand trial
for the crime of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In
the afternoon of the same day, Geren surrendered to the court and
filed a motion for reduction of bail.
 23

Upon arraignment, Geren pleaded "Guilty." However, he later prayed

that he be allowed to withdraw his plea in the meantime in order to
prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The wife
opposed on the ground that not all the elements of the mitigating
circumstance of "voluntary surrender" were present. She added that
"voluntary surrender" was raised only as an afterthought, as Geren had
earlier invoked a "voluntary plea of guilty" without raising the former.
Finally, she posited that since the case was ready for promulgation,
Geren's motion should no longer be entertained. RTC granted and
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in the
determination of the penalty to be imposed. The wife moved for a
reconsideration but the same was denied. The wife went to the CA
which also affirmed the order of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not voluntary surrender may be appreciated even

after the accused had already pleaded guilty

Held: “xxxxFor voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following

requisites should be present: 1) the offender has not been actually
arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority
or the latter's agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence
of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to
give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble
and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without
these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed
surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his
safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be
characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating
circumstance. xxxxx The foregoing circumstances clearly show the
voluntariness of the surrender. As distinguished from the earlier cases,
upon learning that the court had finally determined the presence of
probable cause and even before the issuance and implementation of
the warrant of arrest, Geren already gave himself up, acknowledging
his culpability. This was bolstered by his eventual plea of guilt during
the arraignment. Thus, the trial court was correct in appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender." xxxxx We would like
to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance
of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender
"involuntary."

Persons in authority/agents of persons in authority

Q: Who are persons in authority and who are agents of persons in

authority?
A: Ruben del Castillo vs People, January 30, 2012 “xxxx The Local
Government Code also contains a provision which describes the
function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority.
Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads:

SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For

purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the
punong barangay, sangguniang barangay
 24

members, and members of the lupong

tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be
deemed as persons in authority in their
jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and
members who may be designated by law or
ordinance and charged with the maintenance of
public order, protection and security of life and
property, or the maintenance of a desirable and
balanced environment, and any barangay member
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall
be deemed agents of persons in authority.

BARANGAY TANOD; ARE THEY AGENTS OF PERSONS IN

AUTHORITY

In People v. Malngan barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were

deemed as law enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III
of the Constitution. In People v. Lauga, this court held that a “bantay
bayan,” in relation to the authority to conduct a custodial investigation
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, “has the color of a
state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a
suspect to his constitutional rights”(Dela Cruz vs People, January
11, 2016)

IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE

Case: Gregorio Pelonia vs People of the

Philippines, April 13, 2005, 521 SCRA 220

Facts: On the evening of 17 August 1986, the deceased,

Ignacio Nacilla, along with some friends, went to the
barrio of Tawan-Tawan, Davao City to attend the
celebration of the eve of the fiesta of the said barrio. One
of the deceased’ friends invited their group to have
supper at the house of the accused. The group accepted
the invitation and proceeded to the house of the accused.
Upon their arrival, the accused bade them to come up to
the balcony. The accused prepared the table, set it for
dining, laid the food on it and called the group into the
sala to enjoy what he had offered.

His friends stood up to approach the table. The deceased,

however, remained seated and declared that his purpose
in coming to the accused's house was not to eat but to
kill. The deceased had a long-standing grudge against the
accused because some time ago the accused had
reported the deceased to the Marines for being abusive,
for which reason the Marines picked up the deceased and
brought him to the camp and manhandled him, obviously
to teach him a lesson. Incidentally, the deceased is husky
in built and relatively tall in contrast to the accused
 25

whose head could reach up only until the deceased's

shoulders.

Enraged by the deceased's insulting comment, spoken in

his (the accused's) own home, in front of his visitors and
family, by one whom he had not even invited to the
event, the accused rushed to his room to get his rifle. The
accused returned to the sala and fired a warning shot
towards the ceiling and ordered the deceased to go
downstairs because he was being abusive. The deceased
declared, "I will not go down if nobody is killed." The
accused shot the deceased with his rifle.

HELD: The mitigating circumstance of having acted in

the immediate vindication of a grave offense was,
likewise, properly appreciated. Petitioner was humiliated
in front of his guests and kin in his own house. It is
settled, however, that the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from
the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These
two circumstances arose from one and the same incident
so that they should be considered as only one mitigating
circumstance.

TREACHERY

The Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden,

unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest
provocation on the latter’s part. The victim must not have known the
peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack. Should it appear,
however, that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and,
instead of fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a result, then the
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated.

“xxx the Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated in

instances when the victim had the opportunity to flee or defend
himself. In this case, the records show that a fistfight ensued between
Eligio and Casas. Joel, seeing that Casas had stabbed Eligio, wanted to
help the latter by using a bamboo pole but slipped and fell. As he was
lying prostrate on the floor, Casas delivered the blows that ended Joel’s
life. Under these circumstances, it is the Court’s observation that Joel
was fully aware of the danger posed in assisting Eligio. He knew that
Casas was armed with a knife and had just used the same on Eligio.
Joel elected to intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole.
Accordingly, it is rather obvious that Joel was aware of the danger to
his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and there being no
showing that no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from Joel’s
mishap to his stabbing so as to allow for the assailant’s careful
reflection, it does not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted
means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate. Palpably, Casas just happened to stab Joel as the
latter had just slipped on the floor when the formercaught up with him
(Joel). Evidently, this lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well
as Joel’s obvious awareness of the danger to his life, prompts this Court
 26

to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance. (People vs Casas,

G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015)
Case: People vs Charlie Fieldad et.al., G.R. No. 196005,
October 1, 2014

Inmates killed the jailguards inside the jail. After killing them,
inmates fled using a Tamaraw FX then parked outside of the jail
without the consent of the owner. Fieldad argued that treachery should
not be appreciated because JAILGUARDS are presumed to be in danger
of attack always by the nature of their duties.

SC: Treachery is present.

TREACHERY ABSORBS ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

“As per jurisprudence, when the circumstance of abuse of

superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the
latter” (People vs Joel Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15,
2014)

Q: Does frontal attack negates the presence of treachery?

A: No. “xxxThe essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or to escape. Thus, this Court has ruled that even frontal attack
can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is
unarmed. Treachery can still be appreciated even when the victim was
forewarned of the danger to his/her person. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself/herself or to retaliate. In the present case, the victim did not
even have sufficient warning of the danger that was looming, since the
attack against her came from behind and was so sudden and
unexpected, thus giving the victim no time to flee or to prepare her
defense or enable her to offer the least resistance to the sudden
assault.xx”(People vs Celino Nabong, April 4, 2007)

ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

Case: People vs Cañaveras, G.R. No. 193839,

November 27, 2013

Facts: A went to the house of Oriel looking for Judas. B

and 3 other unidentified persons who were having a
drinking spree answered that Judas were them. The 3
persons went out and punched A followed by B who
struck A’s head with a beer bottle. A died as a result. B
was charged for the crime of murder qualified by
treachery and superior strength. RTC convicted B on
appeal,

SC: Treachery involves not only the swiftness, surprise,

or suddenness of an attack upon an unsuspecting
victim, rendering the victim defenseless. It should also
be shown that the mode of attack has knowingly been
intended to accomplish the wicked intent.
 27

Thus, the second element is the subjective aspect of

treachery. It means that the accused must have made
some preparation to kill the deceased in a manner that
would insure the execution of the crime or render it
impossible or hard for the person attacked to resort to
self-defense or retaliation. The mode of attack,
therefore, must have been planned by the offender and
must not have sprung from an unexpected turn of
events.

We have had occasion to rule that treachery is not

present when the killing is not premeditated, or where
the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately
adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on
the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act
of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of
the moment.

In this case, there was no time for appellant and his

companions to plan and agree to deliberately adopt a
particular means to kill Claro. The first query of Claro
was regarded as innocent enough and was given no
attention. It was the second query that was considered
impertinent, and witnesses testified that appellant and
his companions went after Claro immediately after it
was uttered. Even the choice of weapon, a beer bottle
readily available and within grabbing range at the table
as appellant followed outside, shows that the intent to
harm came about spontaneously.

Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to the

qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength. It must be shown that the aggressors combined
forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority in
strength.

When appreciating this qualifying circumstance, it must be

proven that the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased.
Indeed, when assailants attack a victim alternately, they cannot be
said to have taken advantage of their superior strength.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; DISGUISE; CONSPIRACY

Case: People vs Feliciano, Jr. et.al, G.R. No. 196735, May 5,

2014

Facts: On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon,

seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at
the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the UP Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men (their heads were
covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts) carrying baseball bats and
lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
Cases for murder and several frustrated murder were filed against the
accused who are members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity. The charge
was qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength, disguise. The
 28

RTC convicted the accused for murder. Some of the attackers, the RTC
declared, is not liable since no evidence of intent to kill.

It was established that during the attack, some of the attacker’s

masked fell off thus the victim was able to see clearly the face.

SC:

On treachery:

The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at
a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for
any sudden attack by rival fraternity men. The victims, who were
unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The
only way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation
where they were unarmed and outnumbered, it would be impossible
for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened
in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the
bystanders being able to help them until after the incident. The
swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the
victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore,
was present in this case.

On conspiracy:

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and

confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability
of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and
the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene
of the crime.

The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose from a single

incident wherein the accused-appellants were armed with baseball
bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount of
damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take
cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers.
The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that
intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the
presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to
distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the
victims to determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is
relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that
intent to kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or
mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.

The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants

guilty only of slight physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume
that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the attackers
intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended
to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was
evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing,
all of them were liable for that intent to kill.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; AID OF ARMED MEN

 29

Case: People vs Enojas, G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014

Facts: Policemen were patrolling when they spotted a taxi driven by

Enojas suspiciously parked in front of an auto glass. When asked for his
documents, Enojas failed to present one for which reason that they
brought Enojas to the police station leaving the taxi. On their way, they
stopped in a 7-11 store as some of the policemen would relieve
themselves. It was at that time that they chanced upon men who
attempted to rob the store. A fire fight ensued resulting to the death of
one policeman. Some of the robbers were also wounded. In the course
of the firefight, Enojas fled. Returning to where the taxi was
abandoned, they were able to recover the cellphone of Enojas. From
there, they were able to confirm their suspicion that Enojas was
involved in the attempted robbery and was part of the taxi drivers’
syndicate in the series of robbery. The RTC convicted all of them for the
crime of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed
men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the lower court correctly ruled the presence
of the aggravating circumstance of “aid of armed men” as to qualify
the same to murder” as well as the special aggravating circumstance
of use of unlicensed firearms.

(1)Can text messages from the cellphone be admitted in evidence?

SC: (1) In “aid of armed men,” the men act as accomplices only. They
must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same
purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as
co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the
other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among
the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as qualifying a homicide to murder. Consequently, the accused in this
case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of
unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

(2) Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who

was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here,
PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages
with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the
recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and
was competent to testify on them.

ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH; EMPLOYING MEANS TO

WEAKEN THE DEFENSE

Case: People vs Tamayo, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 2014

Facts: Joey’s group was having a drink and merriment when someone
hurled empty bottles of gin at them. As Wilson went to look for
whoever had done it, he saw accused Erwin and John, in the company
of several others, also having their drink. Retaliating, Joey and his
group threw stones and empty gin bottles at accused Erwin and his
companions. Enraged, the latter group gave chase to Joey and the
 30

others with him. Unfortunately, Joey tripped on an iron chain that

guarded the INC’s parking area and fell to the ground. He was in this
position when Erwin and his companions attacked and mauled him.
Some, including Erwin, stabbed Joey with their knives. About 15 men
attacked the victim.

Issue: Whether or not abuse of superior strength is present

SC: Yes. Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on

their one helpless victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and
stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead, there is no question
that the accused took advantage of their superior strength.

CRUELTY

Q: Is the number of wounds inflicted on a victim conclusive proof of

cruelty?

A: No. The crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the

victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For cruelty
to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof
that, in inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the perpetrator
intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the victim. The
number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not proof of cruelty
(Simangan vs People, July 8, 2004)

Q: May “use of a deadly weapon” be appreciated as either aggravating

or alternative circumstance?

A: No. Use of a deadly weapon is not, however, among those provided

in Article 14 of the RPC enumerating aggravating circumstance nor in
Article 15 of the RPC enumerating alternative circumstances.
Consequently, use of a deadly weapon cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating or alternative circumstance against appellant (People vs
Carpio, May 27, 2004)

On Qualfiying Aggravating Circumstance under the Dangerous

Drugs Act (R.A. No. 9165)

Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the

Commission of a Crime by an Offender Under the
Influence of Dangerous Drugs. – Notwithstanding the
provisions of any law to the contrary, a positive finding
for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime
by an offender, and the application of the penalty
provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be
applicable. (NOTE: CROSS-REFERRENCE TO THE
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN JAIME DELA
CRUZ VS PEOPLE, July 23, 2014 CJ Sereno)

INTOXICATION
 31

Q: When will intoxication be considered as a mitigating circumstance?

A: “xxxx For intoxication to be considered as mitigating circumstance,

it must be shown that the intoxication impaired the will power of the
accused and that he did not know what he was doing or could not
comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. The person pleading
intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic
beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his
reason. This, the appellants failed to do. The records are bereft of any
evidence that the quantity of liquor they had taken was of such
quantity as to affect their mental faculties. On the contrary, the fact
that appellants could recall details of what had transpired after their
drinking session is the best proof that they knew what they were doing
during that occasion. The deception, the device, the place and manner
of perpetrating the crime all point to the fact that appellants had
complete control of their minds.” (People vs Celino Nabong, April
4, 2007)
DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION

Q: Does lower degree of instruction automatically allow an accused to

claim it as a mitigating circumstance?

A: Neither can appellant Nabong's alleged lack of instruction be

appreciated in his favor. Illiteracy alone will not constitute such
circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence
and knowledge of the full significance of one's act. Besides, one does
not have to be educated or intelligent to be able to know that it is
unlawful to take the life of another person.” (People vs Celino
Nabong, April 4, 2007)

Effect of aggravating circumstance proven during trial but not

alleged in the Information

Q: What is the effect of an aggravating circumstance proven during the

trial but not alleged in the information?

A: “Even if dwelling is proven but is not alleged in the Information as

an aggravating circumstance, the same will not serve to aggravate the
penalty.” (People vs Baldogo, January 24, 2003)

However, the Supreme Court said that “aggravating circumstance even

if it is not alleged but proven could be used as basis in awarding
exemplary damages (Pp vs Blancaflor, G.R. No. 130586, January
29, 2004).

WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHETHER A GUILTY

PARTICPANT IN A CRIME PERFORMED THE ROLE OF
PRINCIPAL OR ACCOMPLICE, THE COURT SHOULD
FAVOR THE "MILDER FORM OF RESPONSIBILITY".

Case: People vs PO1 Eusebio et.al. G.R. No.

182152, February 25, 2013)
 32

Facts: On August 7, 1999, at around 6:00PM, Jaime

received a phone call prompting him to leave onboard
his motorcycle and proceed to a store owned by Jesus,
a police officer, and stop in front of Jesus. At this point,
Ricardo, Romeo, Jojit, Boyet and Robert took positions
near Jaime. When Jaime alighted from his vehicle,
Jesus shot him. The others drew their guns and fired
too at the fallen Jaime. All of the them approached
Jaime, turned his body over and kicked him. They then
ordered Rommel, a tricycle driver, to bring Jaime to the
hospital. The incident was witnessed by several
bystanders who testified during the trial. As a result of
the incident, murder charges were brought against
Jesus, Ricardo, Romeo, Jojit, Boyet and Robert before
the RTC of Pasay City. Only Jesus, Ricardo, Romeo and
Jojit were brought to trial, as the others remained at
large. In their defense, Jesus admitted shooting Jaime,
but averred that it was done in self defense. Romeo
and Jojit interposed alibi as a defense. After trial, the
RTC convicted Jesus as principal, sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay damages
to the heirs of Jaime. Ricardo, Romeo, and Jojit, on the
other hand, were found guilty as accomplices, and
sentenced to lesser terms. None of the accused
appealed the decision. The People, and Miriam, wife of
Jaime, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
The OSG argues that while the RTC found all the
accused acted in conspiracy with each other, it should
also have imposed the penalty for principal against
Ricardo, Romeo and Jojit, since in conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of all The CA partially granted the
appeal, holding the three other accused jointly and
severally liable for the damages, but ruled that it
cannot increase the criminal liability of Ricardo, Romeo
and Jojit from principles to accomplices, since it will
place them in double jeopardy. The OSG elevated the
case to the Supreme Court when the CA denied its
motion for reconsideration.

The line that separates a conspirator by concerted

action from an accomplice by previous or
simultaneous acts is indeed slight. Accomplices do not
decide whether the crime should be committed; but
they assent to the plan and cooperate in its
accomplishment. The solution in case of doubt is that,
as the RTC said with ample jurisprudential support,
such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.

It was held that when there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant

in a homicide performed the role of principal or accomplice, the Court
should favor the “milder form of responsibility.” He should be given the
benefit of the doubt and can be regarded only as an accomplice.

PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION

 33

Case: People of the Philippines Vs. Dina Dulay y Pascual, G.R.

No. 193854. September 24, 2012
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a
principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable
cooperation. To be a principal by in dispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal
purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.

Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it

show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the
commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from
the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant
received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not
indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied
AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA
could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own
services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being
raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in
the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as
well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee
by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed."

ACCOMPLICE
Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in accordance
with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may
be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of
design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the
crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between
the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.

The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her

criminal liability. Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort
thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired
knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan
being guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected
something was wrong and would have reported such incident to the
police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that,
she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that
being present and giving moral support when a crime is being
committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the
crime committed.61 It should be noted that the accused appellant’s
presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as
an accomplice. Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v.
Clemente, et al., where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the
participation of the offender will be considered as that of an
accomplice rather than that of a principal. (People vs Gambao
et.al., G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013 en banc)
 34

ACCESSORIES; OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Case: Padiernos et.al. vs People, G.R. No. 181111, August 17,

2015

Facts: On November 15, 2002, the a DENR official named Balico

approached a truck loaded with lumber, which was parked at a national
highway in Dingalan, Aurora. The truck bore the name “JEROME” with
Plate No. TFZ-747. Balico requested from the truck driver, Frederico,
and the truck helper, Mostera, the lumber’s supporting documents but
they failed to produce any. Balico reported the matter to the policemen
Thereafter, he proceeded to the DENR office to report the incident.
Some of the DENROs represented that the transportation of the seized
lumber had the required permit but they, too, failed to produce any
supporting document. The truck was not allowed to leave. The lumber
was unloaded from the truck and the truck was left parked along the
national highway in Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and some police
officers.

On November 16, 2002, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners

Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos arrived at the place where the truck was
being held in custody. Santiago, the owner of the truck agreed with the
DENR officials and police officers that the truck should be brought to
the police station. Santiago gave the truck key to Mesina who
volunteered to drive the truck; Mesina started the engine and Roxas,
Santiago, and Padiernos immediately got on board at the front of the
truck. The DENRO group also got on board at the back of the truck
while the policemen on board their motorcycle followed them.

Since the truck was then parked opposite the direction to the police
station, Balico thought that Mesina would maneuver the truck so that
they could proceed to the police station. To their surprise, Mesina
increased the truck’s speed and headed towards the direction of Nueva
Ecija, leaving behind their two policemen escorts who chased the truck
and fired three warning shots.

As the truck sped faster, Balico yelled “Saklolo! Saklolo!” but the truck
maintained its speed. SPO2 Mendoza corroborated this testimony; he
and Fajardo saw the three DENROs waving but could not hear what
they were saying. When the truck had exited Dingalan, SPO2 Mendoza
and Fajardo decided not to pursue the truck anymore and simply
reported the incident to the Philippine Army stationed at Brgy.
Tanawan. The Philippine Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber
machine gun and flagged down the truck at Brgy. Bagting, Gabaldon,
Nueva Ecija.

All the accused were charged in the RTC as accessories to the crime
of illegal possession of lumber, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. According to
the Information, the petitioners took away the truck that carried
the lumber to prevent its use as evidence and to avoid its
confiscation and forfeiture.

The RTC convicted the petitioners as accessories to the crime of

violation of P.D. 705. The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a
 35

common design to take away the truck that earlier had been
used in violating P.D. No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code.

On appeal to the CA, considered the subject truck as an “instrument”

in the commission of the offense, within the meaning of Article 19,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). While the lumber had
already been unloaded and placed in police custody, the truck still
served as the essential link to the discovery of the loaded
undocumented lumber. Similarly, its presentation as evidence is
material in proving the commission of the offense of violation of P.D.
705, as amended.

The petitioners argue that they could not be held liable as accessories
for violation of P.D. 705 because the DENROs and the police authorities
had already discovered the crime and had, in fact, control over the
truck when the petitioners drove it towards Nueva Ecija. Article 19 of
the RPC only punishes accessories who prevent the discovery of the
crime.

Issue: Are the petitioners liable as accessories to the crime?

SC: Reading the facts alleged in the Information and proved at the
trial, in relation with the legal definition of “accessories” under Article
19 of the RPC, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the
accused as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705.

Article 19, paragraph 251 defines “accessories” as those who, with

knowledge of the commission of the crime and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the
body of the crime, its effects or instruments, in order to
prevent its discovery.

Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed
for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime. In the
present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 – the illegal
possession of lumber – had already been discovered at the time
the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of
the truck and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The
petitioners took the truck on November 16, 2002, after its confiscation.

In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime
charged in the Information as the legal definition of the technical term
“accessories” does not coincide with the factual allegations in the
Information that serves as the actual criminal charge against the
petitioners.

The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual

allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense
committed by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC,
constitute instead the criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which
is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 entitled “Penalizing
Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders.”
 36

P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which

obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the
successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is

committed through the following acts:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in

its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000
to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who knowingly or willfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or
concealing any paper, record, document, or
object, with intent to impair its verity,
authenticity, legibility, availability, or
admissibility as evidence in any
investigation of or official proceedings in
criminal cases, or to be used in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in
criminal cases;

The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of

taking and carrying away the truck so that it could not be used
as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor
of the government as a tool or instrument of the crime.

In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber
serves as material evidence that is indispensable in the criminal
investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the
truck is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal
possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the permit for the
transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the
lumber. According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna,53 the
transport of lumber should be covered with supporting documents that
should be in the possession of the transporter.

Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or “suppressed”

this particular evidence. The term “suppress” means to subdue or end
by force. Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the
truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its availability and
prevent its use as evidence in the criminal investigation or
proceeding for violation of P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved
during trial.

QUASI-RECIDIVISM

Q: What is Quasi-recidivism?

A: “xxx any person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence,
 37

or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period

of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.” (Article 160,
RPC)

Case: People vs Baldogo, January 24, 2003

“xxxxx Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance. The

prosecution is burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same
quantum of evidence as the crime itself. In the present case, to prove
quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence
a certified copy of the judgment convicting accused-appellant of
homicide and to prove that the said judgment had become final and
executory. The raison d’etre is that:

“x x x Since the accused-appellant entered a plea

of not guilty to such information, there was a
joinder of issues not only as to his guilt or
innocence, but also as to the presence or absence
of the modifying circumstances so alleged. The
prosecution was thus burdened to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and
the existence of the modifying circumstances. It
was then grave error for the trial court to
appreciate against the accused-appellant the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism simply
because of his failure to object to the
prosecution’s omission as mentioned earlier.”

“In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt
of the prison record of accused-appellant showing that he was
convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6) with a penalty of from six years and
one day as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day as
maximum and that the sentence of accused-appellant commenced on
November 19, 1992 and that the minimum term of the penalty was to
expire on August 16, 1997. The excerpt of the prison record of
accused-appellant is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Cour to prove the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had become final
and executory. Said excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary
evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of the
judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the same cannot be
produced without the fault of the prosecution. The barefaced fact that
accused-appellant was detained in the penal colony does prove the
fact that final judgment for homicide has been rendered against him.
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the
crime, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised penal Code.”

Q: Is Article 160 a crime in itself?

A: NO. It is not a crime. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating
circumstance which directs the court to impose the maximum period of
the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. The court will do
away or will ignore mitigating and aggravating circumstances in
considering the penalty to be imposed. There will be no occasion for
 38

the court to consider imposing the minimum, medium or maximum

period of the penalty. The mandate is absolute and is justified by the
finding that the accused is suffering from some degree of moral
perversity if not total incorrigibility (People vs. Alicia, et al., 95
SCRA 227).

Quasi-recidivism is an aggravating circumstance which cannot be

offset by any mitigating circumstance (People vs. Bautista, 65
SCRA 460). To be appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance,
it must be alleged in the information. Unlike generic aggravating
circumstances which may be proved during the trial even if not alleged
in the information, quasi-recidivism must be specifically mentioned in
the formal indictment, otherwise, it will be an error for the court to
consider it even if there is evidence on record to prove the same.

Applicability of the Provision of the RPC to the

Dangerous Drugs Law

Q: Are the provisions of the Revised Penal Code applicable to RA 9165?

A: Section 98, Article XIII of Republic Act No. 9165 expressly provides
for the limited application of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on said law. This section reads:

SEC. 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal

Code. - Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to
the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code (Act No. 3815), as amended, shall not apply to
the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor
offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the
penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to
death provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.

Under the aforesaid section, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
shall no longer apply to the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 except
when the offender is a minor. Thus, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal
Code shall not be used in the determination of the penalty to be
imposed on the accused. Since Section 98 of the said law contains the
word "shall," the non-applicability of the Revised Penal Code provisions
is mandatory, subject only to the exception in case the offender is a
minor.

FENCING; ELEMENTS

The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed;

2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken
during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have
known that the thing was derived from that crime; and (4) he intends
by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. Here, someone
carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years
 39

later in December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00.

Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino was not
properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old
certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could
not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had
no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his
promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat
that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the
same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the
papers covering her purchase. Hence, the decision of the Court of
Appeals finding Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law is
affirmed. (Mel Dimat v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
181184, January 25, 2012.)

Article 22; Retroactivity of law; Age of Criminal

Responsibility; RA 9344.

Q: Does RA 9344 apply to cases already decided by the trial court but
pending in the SC at the time of the effectivity of the law?
A: Yes. (Ortega vs People, G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008;
Estioca vs People, G.R No. 173876, June 27, 2008)

Q: What do you understand on the phrase: “a child fifteen years of age

or under” at the time of the commission of the crime?
A: The phrase “a child fifteen years of age or under” means that the
minor to claim unconditional criminal exemption must be either 15
years of age or exactly 15 years of age at the time of the commission
of the crime. If the minor commits the crime the day after his 15 th
birthday, he is not exempt from criminal liability unless he acted
without discernment.

Q: Who bears the burden of proof for purposes of determining

exemption from criminal liability based on the age of the minor at the
time the crime was committed?
A: (Declarador vs Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208, August 18, 2006)

Q: Does the testimony of the accused that he is a minor in the absence

of evidence to the contrary enough to sustain a finding that accused is
a minor?

A: In Sierra v. People, SC clarified that testimonial evidence of the

accused who claimed the privilege of the mitigating circumstance of
minority may be considered sufficient provided the following
conditions concur, namely: “(1) the absence of any other satisfactory
evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the
presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and
minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without
any objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any
contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or his relatives'
testimonies are untrue.” (People vs Henry Arpon, December 14,
2011)

Q: Is without discernment equivalent to lack of premeditation?

 40

A: “The surrounding circumstance must demonstrate that the minor

knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance
includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning
and shrewdness.” (Llave vs People, G.R. No. 166040, April 26,
2006; Guevarra vs Almodovar, 169 SCRA 476; Cortezano vs
Cortezano, G.R. No. 123140, September 23, 2003)

Q: Disputable presumption of non-discernment. How to dispute the

presumption?

A: Cross examination is the proper occasion for the prosecution to

determine the indicators whether the minor offender acted with or
without discernment.

Q: Can there be an automatic suspension of sentence when the minor

offender has been found guilty of a heinous crime?

Case: Declarador vs Judge Gubaton, August 18, 2006

SC: NO. Automatic suspension does not apply to one who has been
convicted of an offense punishable by death, RP or life imprisonment.

People vs Sarcia, September 10, 2009

SC: Yes. The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the
offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No.
603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC)
Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to
a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is
guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of
a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser
offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law
who has been found guilty of a heinous crime

People vs Jacinto, March 16, 2011

SC: Yes. "xxxx we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can
no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only
until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section 48 of the Rule
are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five
(25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the

Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law
should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-
one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she
was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act
in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and
become a productive member of the community. The age of the child
in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment
of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
 41

Thus., appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any

other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No.
9344.

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural

Camps and Other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law
may, after conviction and upon order of the court be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in
an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD

Case: People of the Philippines & AAA versus CA et.al. G.R. No.
183652; February 25, 2015
SC: Yes. “xxxx Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape
committed by two or more persons is punishable by reclusion perpefua
to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of
an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of
reclusion perpefua shall be imposed upon them, for each count. With
regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is
reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpefua
to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be
within the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to
reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the
range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there
being no aggravating circumstance. With that, the Court shall impose
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape
committed.
xxxxx
However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
Section 51, R.A. 9344, which extends even to one who has exceeded
the age limit of 21 years, so long as he committed the crime when he
was still a child, and provides for the confinement of convicted
children, as follows:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in

Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. - A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction
and upon order of the court be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.

Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the

foregoing provision should be taken into consideration by the judge in
 42

order to accord children in conflict with the law, who have already gone
beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment envisioned
by law.

Corpus Delicti on Drugs

In prosecution involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself

constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its
existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution is duty-bound to establish with
unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as
evidence against the accused is the same prohibited substance seized
from him. (People vs Sherin Bis, G.R. No. 191360, March 10,
2014)

Q: Is Article 48 applicable to crimes defined and penalized

under Article 365?
A: NO.

Case: Jason Ivler vs. Hon. Rowena Modesto-San

Pedro, November 17, 2010

Facts: Ivler was charged before the MeTC in 2004 with two
(2) separate offenses of (1) Reckless Imprudence resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries in Criminal Case No. 82367 for
the injuries sustained by Evangeline Ponce and (2)
Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the death of
Evangeline’s husband involving the vehicular collision in
August 2004. Ivler pleaded guilty in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out a penalty of censure. Invoking
this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him jeopardy of the
second punishment for the same offense in reckless
imprudence.

MeTC refused the quashal finding no identity of offenses in

the two (2) cases. Ivler elevated to the RTC via certiorari
which affirmed MeTC’s ruling and dismissed the certiorari
case.

Issue: Whether or not the 2nd case after Ivler pleaded guilty
to the 1st case constitute double jeopardy.
SC: There is double jeopardy. “xxxxx The two charges
against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365. xxxxx Article 48
Does not Apply to Acts Penalized. xxxx Under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.xxxxxA becoming regard of this
Court's place in our scheme of government denying it the
power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the
conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is
 43

incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article

365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to
stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary
means for committing another. This is why, way back in
1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General's argument
that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be
joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code.

“xxx The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the

charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only
the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the
case of People vs. Silva. xxxxxIndeed, this is a
constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the
splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the
number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.xxxx”

“xxx Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365

should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged
and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges
under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in
the same first level court.”

Can a Person Be Convicted of 3-counts of Rape When

the Intention To Lie on the Victim Came From One
Single Criminal Intent.

Case: People vs Lucena, G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014

Facts: AAA, a minor, was arrested by the accused for violation of an

ordinance on curfew on minors. AAA pleaded that she be allowed to
go home. The accused pretending of bringing back AAA to her home,
brought her instead to a grassy area using a tricycle. Once there,
accused took the back seat of the tricycle and placed in on the grass.
He ordered AAA to lie down and to take off her clothes. At a point of a
gun, the accused inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina despite the
latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after
a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again,
 44

inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the

third time, the appellant inserted again his penis into AAA’s vagina.
Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered
AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill
her should she tell anyone about what happened between them.

The accused was charged for three (3) counts of rape for that three
insertions of his penis toAAA’s vagina. The RTC convicted which was
affirmed by the CA. The accused assigned as error the decision of
convicting him for three (3) counts of rape. Accused averred that he
cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening period of
five (5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove
that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He maintains
that what is of prime importance is that he was motivated by a single
criminal intent.

SC: It appears from the facts that the accused thrice succeeded in
inserting his penis into the private part of AAA. The three (3)
penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5)
minutes wherein the accused would rest after
satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape AAA. Hence, it can be clearly
inferred from the foregoing that when the accused decided to
commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon
AAA, he was not motivated by a single impulse but rather by
several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of
rape is indubitable.

Case: Pp vs Aaron (2002)

The accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then
withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the
second time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina; the
accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near
the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted
again his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping
motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused
therein for only one count of rape despite the three successful
penetrations because there is no indication in the records from which it
can be inferred that the accused decided to commit those separate
and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to
change positions inside the room where the crime was
committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations
occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was
obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.

APPLICATION OF ART. 64

Case: Pedro Ladines vs People & Erwin de Ramon, G.R. No.

167333, January 11, 2016
 45

We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four
months of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which was the
ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the maximum of
the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so
imposing. They thereby ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, which has set the rules “for the application of penalties
which contain three periods,” requires under its first rule that the
courts should impose the penalty prescribed by law in the medium
period should there be neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that “[w]ithin the
limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil
produced by the crime.” By not specifying the justification for imposing
the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the
indeterminate sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious.
In the absence of the specification, the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal.

PROBATION

Disqualification after accused appealed his case

Q: May an accused who was convicted for frustrated homicide the

penalty of which is not probationabie appealed his judgment of
conviction where the appellate court found only the crime of attempted
homicide which is probationabie still appiy for probation?
A: Yes.

Case: Arnel Colinares vs People, December 13, 2011 (EN BANC)

Facts: Arnel was charged for the crime of frustrated homicide. During
trial, accused invoked justifying circumstance of self-defense. RTC
rendered judgment, finding accused guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months
of prision correctional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision
mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationabie imprisonment
under the law was only up to six years, accused did not qualify for
probation. Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), again invoking
self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime
of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty
imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision. Not
satisfied, accused appealed to the SC.

Issue: Given a finding that the accused is entitled to conviction for a

lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he
may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

Held: "xxxx Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for

probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting
him for frustrated homicide.
 46

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him
should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years and four months of prision correctional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the
right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere

privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders.
Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." The question in
this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right
to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on
him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to
probation? xxxx This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a
correct judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of
the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess
of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a
crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only
committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years
and 4 months.

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation
under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind
bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo
reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the
probation law.

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months
maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one
could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right
had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed
his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.

Q: Can an accused convicted under the Dangerous Drugs Act avail of

the Probation Law?

A: No. Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug

Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person convicted for drug trafficking or
pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court,
cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (NOTE: Probation can
still be availed of if the crime committed is not trafficking or
pushing)

Case: Alejandra Pablo vs Hon. Castillo, August 3, 2000

Facts: Accused was charged for violation of BP 22 in three (3) separate

Informations. One case fell in Branch 1 while the other two cases fell in
Branch 2. Unfortunately, these cases were not consolidated. In June
1995 Branch 1 convicted the accused imposing upon her a fine of P4,
648.00.. In September 1995, Branch 2 also convicted the accused and
sentenced her to pay the amount of P4, 668.00 and to serve a prison
term of thirty (30) days in each case.
 47

Accused applied for probation in Branch 2 but the Court denied based
under Section 9 of PD 968. Section 9 states:

The following offenders cannot avail of the benefits of probation:

a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more

than six years;

b) those convicted of subversion or any crime against the national

security or the public order;

c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an

offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one
day and/or fine of not less than two hundred pesos;

d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this
Decree; and

e) those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33
hereof.

Held: “xxxx Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to

the effect that a person who was previously convicted by final
judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than
one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred
pesos, is disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law
is definitive and unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph
(c) which qualifies "previous conviction" as referring to a conviction for
a crime which is entirely different from that for which the offender is
applying for probation or a crime which arose out of a single act or
transaction as petitioner would have the court to understand.

In the case of Rura vs. Lopeña relied upon by petitioner, the Court
declared that "previous" refers to conviction, and not to commission of
a crime. At the time Rura was convicted of the crime for which he was
applying for probation, he had no prior conviction. In the present case
of petitioner, when she applied for probation in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-
00197-D and 94-00198-D, she had a previous conviction in Criminal
Case No. 94-00199-D, which thereby disqualified her from the benefits
of probation.

It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and

therefore, the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And
when the meaning is clearly discernible from the language of the
statute, there is no room for construction or interpretation.”

Case: Dimakuta vs People G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015

(en banc)

Mustapha Dimakuta was indicted for Violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A.

7610. He was found guilty of committing a lascivious conduct upon a
16 year old victim by touching her breast and private part against her
will. The RTC sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
 48

minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

He appealed it to the CA and argued among other things, that even

assuming he committed the acts imputed, still there is no evidence
showing that the same were done without the victim’s consent or
through force, duress, intimidation or violence upon her. Surprisingly,
when asked to comment on the appeal, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), relying heavily on People v. Abello,5 opined that the
accused should have been convicted only of Acts of Lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC in view of the prosecution’s failure to
establish that the lascivious acts were attended by force or coercion
because the victim was asleep at the time the alleged acts were
committed.

The CA adopted the observation of the OSG and modified the

conviction by convicting the accused only of Acts of Lasciviousness
under Art. 336 of the RPC. The CA sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.

Instead of further appealing the case, he filed on July 23, 2012 before
the CA a
manifestation with motion to allow him to apply for probation upon
remand of the case to the RTC. Petitioner invoked the case of
Colinares v. People (2011) which allowed petitioner therein to apply for
probation after his sentence was later reduced on appeal by the
Supreme Court.
The CA issued a Resolution on September 3, 2012 denying his motion.
It ruled that Colinares is inapplicable since petitioner therein raised as
sole issue the correctness of the penalty imposed and claimed that the
evidence presented warranted only a conviction for the lesser offense.
Instead, the appellate court viewed as appropriate the case of Lagrosa
v. People(, wherein the application for probation was denied because
petitioners therein put in issue on appeal the
merits of their conviction and did not simply assail the propriety of the
penalties imposed.

SC: In view of the latest amendment to Section 4 of the Probation Law

that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction,”
prevailing jurisprudence35 treats appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies because the law is unmistakable about it. Indeed,
the law is very clear and a contrary interpretation would counter its
envisioned mandate. Courts have no authority to invoke "liberal
interpretation” or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute
themselves, and as illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no
room for doubt or interpretation. To be sure, the remedy of convicted
felons who want to avail of the benefits of probation even after the
remedy of an appeal is to go to the Congress and ask for the
amendment of the law. To surmise a converse construal of the
provision would be dangerously encroaching on the power of the
legislature to enact laws and is tantamount to judicial legislation.
 49

With due respect, however, to the ponente and the majority opinion in
Colinares, the application of the Probation Law in the said case
deserves a second hard look so as to correct the mistake in the
application of the law in that particular case and in similar cases which
will be filed before the courts and inevitably elevated to Us like this
petition.

To refresh, Colinares concluded that since the trial court imposed a

penalty beyond what is allowed by the Probation Law, albeit
erroneously, the accused was deprived of his choice to apply for
probation and instead was compelled to appeal the case. The
reprehensible practice intended to be avoided by the law was,
therefore, not present when he appealed the trial court’s decision.
Taking into account that the accused argued in his appeal that the
evidence presented against him warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, the majority of the Court opined
that the accused had purposely sought to bring down the impossible
penalty in order to allow him to apply for probation.

It was obvious then, as it is now, that the accused in Colinares should

not have been allowed the benefit of probation. As I have previously
stated and insisted upon, probation is not a right granted to a
convicted offender; it is a special privilege granted by the State to a
penitent qualified offender, who does not possess the disqualifications
under Section 9 of P.D. No. 968, as amended.40 Likewise, the Probation
Law is not a penal law for it to be liberally construed to favor the
accused.

If allowed, the notice of appeal should contain the following

averments:

(1) that an earlier motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied
by the trial court;
(2) that the appeal is only for reviewing the penalty imposed by the
lower court or the conviction should only be for a lesser crime
necessarily included in the crime charged in the information; and

(3) that the accused-appellant is not seeking acquittal of the

conviction.

To note, what Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits is an appeal

from the judgment of conviction, which involves a review of the merits
of the case and the determination of whether the accused is entitled to
acquittal. However, under the recommended grounds for appeal which
were enumerated earlier, the purpose of the appeal is not to assail the
judgment of conviction but to question only the propriety of the
sentence, particularly the penalty imposed or the crime for which the
accused was convicted, as the accused intends to apply for probation
upon correction of the penalty or conviction for the lesser offense.

On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in

the following instances:

1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where

the penalty imposed is within the probationable period or a fine, and
the accused files a notice of appeal; and
 50

2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of
his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer for the
correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction
to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the crime in which he
was convicted where the penalty is within the probationable period.

In this case, petitioner appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction

before the CA alleging that it was error on the part of the RTC to have
found him guilty of violating Section 5(b), of R.A. 7610. He argued that
the RTC should not have given much faith and credence to the
testimony of the victim because it was tainted with inconsistencies.
Moreover, he went on to assert that even assuming he committed the
acts imputed on him, still there was no evidence showing that
the lascivious acts were committed without consent or through force,
duress, intimidation or violence because the victim at that time was in
deep slumber. It is apparent that petitioner anchored his appeal on a
claim of innocence and/or lack of sufficient evidence to support his
conviction of the offense charged, which is clearly inconsistent with the
tenor of the Probation Law that only qualified penitent offender are
allowed to apply for probation. The CA, therefore, did not err in
applying the similar case of Lagrosa v. People46 wherein the
protestations of petitioners therein did not simply assail the propriety
of the penalties imposed but meant a profession of guiltlessness, if not
complete innocence.

Case: Almero vs People, March 12, 2014

Facts: Almero was convicted by the MTC for reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide and multiple physical injuries and sentenced him
to suffer prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Petitioner applied for Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning that
he was informed of his conviction only upon being served the warrant
for his arrest. The Prosecutor opposed his application on the ground
that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had
even neglected to inform the court of his change of address. The MTC
denied his application. Almero then brought a special civil action with
the RTC questioning on the denial of his application and that the
promulgation of judgment is null and void because aside from the fact
that he was not present, the MTC did not rule on his formal offer of
exhibits. Thus, the promulgation is pre-mature.

The RTC granted the certiorari and remanded the case to the MTC for
further proceedings. The CA reversed the RTC on the ground that when
the accused applied for probation, it is considered as a waiver of the
right to appeal from the judgment of conviction and effectively renders
the same final. The CA ruled that even assuming petitioner failed to be
present at the promulgation of judgment, he had no one but himself to
blame for failing to inform the MTC of his change of address.

SC: Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and
clemency conferred by the State, and may be granted by the court to a
deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely
upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.
 51

An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the

judgment.
The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an
accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. This
was the reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a
stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction – even if
the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal
and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.

PAROLE

May a person convicted of a crime and punished to suffer the

penalty of reclusion perpetua be eligible for parole?

“It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for
parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that
‘persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended (People vs
Bacatan, G.R. No. 203315, February 2, 2014)

Pendency of another case may be a ground for

disqualification of parole

Case: Lex Adonis vsTesoro-DAPECOL, G.R. No. 182855, June 5,

2013

While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on

parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the
pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the
disqualification of such convict from being released on parole

EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILTY

Art. 89-Effect of the Death of the Accused Pending Appeal of

the Case Before the Supreme Court.

“xx Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as
well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal casexxx” (People vs Soria, G.R. No. 179031, February
24, 2014 citing People vs Amistoso, G.R. No. 201447, August
25, 2013)

Q: What is the new basis for the imposition of

subsidiary imprisonment?
 52

A: Under RA 10159, April 5, 2012

Formula: Subsidiary civil liability divided by highest

minimum wage at the time of conviction by the trial
court = number of days of subsidiary imprisonment

DAMAGES

Damages unaffected by the Anti-Death Penalty Law

“We would like to stress that even if the death penalty is not to be
imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in RA No. 9346,
the award of damages under prevailing jurisprudence is not affected.
This award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death
penalty, but on the fact that the qualifying circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
offense. (People vs Filomeno Villanueva, April 13, 2007)

DAMAGES THAT MAY BE AWARDED DUE TO A CRIME

Case: People vs Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014

Damages that may be awarded are: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for
the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.

EFFECT OF DEATH OF THE ACCUSED

Case: People vs Dadao, G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014

Death of the accused during the pendency of his case extinguishes

both his criminal and civil liability

Case: People vs Soria, G.R. No. 179031, February 24, 2014

Death of the accused pending appeal of the conviction extinguishes

criminal and civil liability ex delicto.

ON AWARD OF DAMAGES

the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards

criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds
of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and
exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or
temperate damages in some instances. First, civil indemnity ex delicto
is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party,
in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart
from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual
or compensatory damages in civil law.

This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." It is to be
noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence,
 53

it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the

Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by

a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the

earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support

according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient
who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance
by the law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing the death, for
a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to
be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants

and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a

kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the
damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which
in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity.
Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to
pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from
Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards
of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a
ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be
changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be
validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it.

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages,
which are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals
expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be

awarded to compensate one for manifold
injuries such as physical suffering, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be
understood to be in the concept of grants, not
punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to
compensate the claimant for the injury
 54

suffered. Although incapable of exactness and

no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral damages may be awarded, the
amount of indemnity being left to the
discretion of the court, it is imperative,
nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been
suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury
must have sprung from any of the cases
expressed in Article 221946 and Article 222047
of the Civil Code. x x

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as

"compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong."48 They may also be
considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for
humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of
his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the
reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating
circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress."

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in

Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is
aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also
does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the
suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages
can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not
exceed the award of civil indemnity.

Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to

exemplary damages, thus:

ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages

are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary

damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines
and shall be paid to the offended party.

Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages, exemplary or

corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
 55

and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a

result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the
theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by
the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated with
such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud –
that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are
often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either
case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

WHEN TO IMPOSE TEMPERATE DAMAGES

Case: Pedro Ladines vs People & Erwin de Ramon, G.R. No.

167333, January 11, 2016

Article 2224 of the Civil Code authorizes temperate damages to be

recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be proved with certainty. There is no longer any doubt that
when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not
substantiated with receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00
are warranted, for it is certainly unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of
the victim the compensation for such expenses as actual damages.
This pronouncement proceeds from the sound reasoning that it would
be anomalous that the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in
proving actual damages of less than P25,000.00 would only be put in a
worse situation than others who might have presented no receipts at
all but would still be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages.