G.R. No.

L-8937 November 29, 1957

OLEGARIO BRITO SY, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MALATE TAXI CAB & GARAGE, INC.,
defendant-appelant;
MALATE TAXICAB & GARAGE, INC., third-party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JESUS DEQUITO
Y DUPY, third-party defendant-appellee.
Paredes, Gaw and Acevedo for appellee.
Diaz and Baizas for appellant.
ENDENCIA, J.:
On June 26, 1952, at Dewey Boulevard in front of the Selecta Restaurant, Olegario Brito Sy
engaged a taxicab bearing plate No. Taxi-1130, owned and operated by Malate Taxicab and
Garage, Inc. and driven by Catalino Ermino, to take him to his place of business at Dencia's
Restaurant on the Escolta where he was the general manager. Upon reaching the Rizal Monument
he told the driver to turn to the right, but the latter did not heed him and instead countered that they
better pass along Katigbak Drive. At the intersection of Dewey Bolevard and Katigbak Drive, the
taxi collided with an army wagon with plate No. TPI-695 driven by Sgt. Jesus De quito, as a result
of which Olegario Brito Sy was jarred, jammed and jolted. He was taken to the Santa Isabel
Hospital suffering from bruises and contusions as well as fractured right leg. Thereafter he was
transferred to the Gonzales Orthopedic Clinic and was accordingly operated on. He spent some
P2,266.45 for medical bills and hospitalization.
On September 30, 1952, Sy filed action against the Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc., based upon a
contract of carriage, to recover the sums of P7,200 as actual or compensatory damages, P20,000
as moral damages, P15,000 as nominal and exemplary damages, and P3,000 a attorney's fees. On
October 2, 1952, a copy of the complaint was served on and received by the defendant, but the
latter filed its answer only on October 20, 1952, wherein it alleged that the collision subject of the
complaint was not due to the negligence of its driver but to that of Sgt. Jesus Dequito, the driver
of the army wagon; and, by way of counterclaim, sought to recover the sum of P1,000 as damages
caused by the alleged malicious and frivolous action filed against it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The record reveals that upon plaintiff's motion filed on October 23, 1952, the lower court ordered
on October 25, 1952 that the answer which was filed by defendant out of time be stricken out, and
declared the Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. in default. Thereafter, on October 30, 1952, plaintiff
presented his evidence, and on November 20, 1952 judgment was rendered awarding plaintiff the
sum of P14.000 as actual, compensatory, moral, nominal and exemplary damages including
attorney's fees and costs, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the action. Defendant then
filed a motion on December 17, 1952, for relief from the order of default and for new trial, which
was granted. Hence, plaintiff filed his reply to defendant's answer and counterelaim, and by leave
of court, the latter filed on February 24, 1953 a third-party complaint against Sgt. Jesus Dequito
alleging that the cause of the collision between the taxicab and the army wagon was the negligence
of the army sergeant, and praying that whatever amount the court may assess against it in the action
filed by plaintiff, be paid to said third-party plaintiff, plus an additional amount of P1,000
representing attorney's fees. It appears, however, that the summons and copy of the third-party
complaint were never served upon third-party defendant Dequito in view of his continued
assignment from place to place in connection with his army duties, and for this reason the main
case was set for trial on May 10, 1953, obviously for the sole purpose of disposing of the issue
arising from plaintiffs complaint. On the day of the trial, defendant failed to appear, whereupon
plaintiff presented his evidence, and judgment was rendered against the defendant in the total sum

Page 1 of 61
of P4,200 representing actual, compensatory and moral damages, as well as attorney's fees, with
interest at the legal rate from the filing of the action, plus costs of suit. Aga nst said judgment
defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned in its brief two errors of the lower court,
namely:
1. The trial court erred in not finding that the third-party complaint involves a prejudicial question,
and therefore, the main complaint cannot be decided until the third-party complaint is
decided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. The trial court erred in not deciding or making an express finding as to whether the defendant
appellant Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. was responsible for the collision, and hence, civilly
responsible to the plaintiff-appellee.
Finding the quoted assignment of errors as involving a purely question of law, the Court of
Appeals, by virtue of the provisions of section 17, paragraph 6 of the judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, certified the case to this Court for adjudication, in its Resolution of February 7,
1955.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We find no merit in the first assignment of error that the third-party complaint is a pre-judicial
question. As enunciated by this Court in Berbari vs. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837, "Pre-judicial
question in understood in law to be that which precedes the criminal action, or that which requires
a decision before final judgment is rendered in the principal action with which said question is
closely connected. Not all previous questions are pre-judicial questions are necessarily previous",
although all pre-judicial questions are necessarily previous." In the present case, the third-party
complaint is not a pre-judicial question, as the issue in the main action is not entirely dependent
upon those in the third-party complaint; on the contrary, it is the third-party complaint that is
dependent upon the main case at least in the amount of damages which defendant appellant seeks
to be reimbursed in its third-party complaint. Furthermore, the complaint is based on a contractual
obligation of transportation of passenger which defendant-appellant failed to carry out, and the
action is entirely different and independent from that in the third-party complaint which is based
an alleged tortious act committed by the third-party defendant Sgt. Dequito. The main case,
therefore, is entirely severable and may be litigated independently. Moreover, whatever the
outcome of the third-party complaint might be would not in any way affect or alter the contractual
liability of the appellant to plaintiff. If the collision was due to the negligence of the third-party
defendant, as alleged, then defendant appellant may file a separate civil action for damages based
on tort ex-delicto or upon quasi-delict, as the case may be.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Coming to the second assignment of error that the lower court erred in not making an express
findings as to whether defendant appellant was responsible for the collision, we find the same to
be unjustified. The pertinent, provisions of the new Civil Code under the heading Common
Carriers, are the following:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reason of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers
is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Page 2 of 61
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers to safety as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, under these provisions of law, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the defendant appellant in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages
sought for by the plaintiff, for the action initiated therefor is based on a contract of carriage and
not on tort. When plaintiff rode on defendant-appellant's taxicab, the latter assumed the express
obligation to transport him to his destination safely, and to observe extraordinary diligence with a
due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right
away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, supra). This is an exception
to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it was therefore incumbent upon the carrier
to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of
the new Civil Code. It is noteworthy, however, that at the hearing in the lower court defendant-
appellant failed to appear and has not presented any evidence at all to overcome and overwhelm
the presumption of negligence imposed upon it by law; hence, there was no need for the lower
court to make an express finding thereon in view of the provisions of the aforequoted Article 1756
of the new Civil Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed with cost against the appellant.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 194554, December 07, 2016
ROMEO M. LANDICHO, Petitioners, v. WILLIAM C. LIMQUECO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 194556
EDGAR PEÑALOSA, DARWIN P. LANDICHO, JURIS P. LANDICHO, IVY P. LANDICHO, and FELIPE PEÑALOSA,
Petitioners, v. WILLIAM C. LIMQUECO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

These are consolidated petitions1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
review the June 28, 2010 Decision2 and November 23, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 75482, which reversed and set aside the January 15, 2003 Decision4 of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case Nos. 10392, 10392-A, 10392-A-1, 10392-
A-2 and 10392-A-3.

The January 15, 2003 DARAB Decision affirmed the March 5, 2001 Decision5 of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator in Region IV, Lucena City (PARAD) in DARAB Case Nos. R-0408-004-00, R-0408-015-
00, R-0408-016-00, R-0408-017-00, R-0408-018-00, R-0408-019-00, R-0408-020-00, and R-0408-021-00.

The DARAB and PARAD earlier ordered respondent William C. Limqueco (respondent) to immediately
surrender to the petitioners6 their respective owner's copies of the Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) Nos. 00125976, 00125977, 00125978, 00125979, 00125980, 00122648, 00122649,

Page 3 of 61
00122650, 00122659 or, in case of failure, ordering the Registry of Deeds (RD) of Quezon Province to
cancel the aforementioned CLOAs and for the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Office to
issue new owner's duplicate CLOAs to petitioners.

The Antecedents

Sometime in the year 2000, petitioners Felipe Peñalosa, represented by Joel Peñalosa and Edgar
Peñalosa, Darwin P. Landicho, Juris P. Landicho, and Ivy P. Landicho each filed petitions before the
PARAD against respondent and Yang Chin Hai (Hai), his Taiwanese investor-partner. Petitioner Romeo
Landicho (Romeo Landicho) was impleaded via third-party complaint in the said cases. The petitions
sought the nullification of the contracts of sale in favor of respondent and the return to the petitioners
of their respective owner's duplicate copies of the CLOAs issued by the DAR back in 1992 or, in the
alternative, the cancellation of the CLOAs and the issuance of the RD of new certificates in petitioners'
names.

The CLOAs and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covered five (5) parcels of land located in Mabang
Parang, Lucban, Quezon, which originally formed part of a bigger landholding with an area of 177,763
square meters, previously covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-29365 or Free Patent No.
593794 and registered in the name of spouses Romeo and Evangeline Landicho (Spouses Landicho). By
virtue of a Voluntary Land Transfer, the land covered by OCT No. P-29365 was placed under the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1992. As a consequence, Spouses
Landicho were able to retain five (5) hectares of said landholding, while the remaining portion was
subdivided among the petitioners, to wit:

BENEFICIARY
CLOA NO.
TCT NO.
AREA(sq. m.)
LOCATION
Juris P. Landicho
00125976
T-4006
29,345
Mahabang
Parang
Darwin P. Landicho
00125977
T-4007
21,393
Mahabang
Parang
Ivy P. Landicho
00125978
T-4008
27,592
Mahabang
Parang
Felipe L. Peñalosa

Page 4 of 61
00125979
T-4009
24,717
Mahabang
Parang
Edgar L. Peñalosa
001259801
T-4010
24,716
Mahabang
Parang
TOTAL LAND AREA =
127,763

Petitioner Felipe Peñalosa averred that respondent was able to obtain physical possession of his CLOA as
well as his TCT to the property and that he came to know that respondent and Romeo Landicho entered
into a contract of sale of his property and as a result thereof, respondent was able to take hold of the
copy of the TCT to his land.

Petitioners Edgar Peñalosa, Darwin P. Landicho, Juris P. Landicho, and Ivy P. Landicho, on the other
hand, contended that sometime in June 1994, they were asked by respondent and Romeo Landicho to
sign certain documents which turned out to be contracts of sale and lease involving their properties
covered by the CLOAs; that by reason of such sale, the owner's duplicate copies of their TCTs were
delivered to respondent; and that in affixing their signatures, they did not receive any consideration and
the legal implications of the said contracts were not explained to them.

Petitioners Darwin Landicho, Juris Landicho and Ivy Landicho further stated that they had entrusted
their owner's duplicate copies of their TCTs and the CLOAs to their father, Romeo Landicho. In June
1994, however, they came to know that respondent and their father entered into a contract of sale
and/or lease involving their properties and by virtue thereof, the TCTs were given to respondent.

Hence, the petitioners claimed that the transfers of lands covered by their individual CLOAs by Romeo
Landicho to respondent were made in violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), which prohibited the sale, transfer or conveyance of land for a
period of ten (10) years;7 and that their consent to such transactions was vitiated by fraud, undue
influence and mistake. For said reason, they filed the cases before the PARAD to recover their lands.

Respondent opposed the petitions. He asserted that he was a purchaser in good faith and for value and
that the PARAD had no jurisdiction over the subject petitions because no agrarian dispute was involved.

In its March 5, 2001 Decision,8 the PARAD ruled in favor of the petitioners. On the procedural aspect, it
held that it had jurisdiction as the cases involved an agrarian dispute or the "rights and obligations of
persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural
lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws." It further declared that respondent was already
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction over the subject matter because his motion to dismiss was
filed seven (7) months after he had submitted his answer. On the merits, the PARAD ordered
respondent to surrender the subject CLOAs and TCTs over the properties. The dispositive portion of the
PARAD decision reads:

Page 5 of 61
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners as follows:

A ORDERING respondent, Atty. William Limqueco to immediately surrender and deliver to petitioners
their respective owner's copies of CLOA No. 00125976 (T-4006); CLOA No. 00125977 (T-4007); CLOA No.
00125978 (T-4008); CLOA No. 00125979 (T-4009); CLOA No. 00125980 (T-4010); CLOA No. 00122648 (T-
3747); CLOA No. 00122649 (T-3749); CLOA No. 00122650 (T-3748) and CLOA No. 00122659 (T-3785),
within five (5) days from receipt of this decision;chanrobleslaw

B. In the event respondent Limqueco refuses or fails to surrender subject CLOAs/titles to petitioner
within the aforesaid 5-day period, ORDERING, the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province to cancel the
subject owner's copies of said CLOAs/titles as lost and therefore, null and void and without legal effect,
and further ORDERING the DAR Provincial Office, Talipan, Pagbilao, Quezon, in coordination with the
Register of Deeds of Quezon Province to cause immediate issuance of new owner's duplicate
CLOAs/titles to petitioners which new CLOAs/titles shall immediately be released to the latter, and be
accorded full faith, value and credit.

C. ORDERING respondent William L. Limqueco and Yang Chin Hai to pay jointly and severally each of the
petitioners in the eight (8) petitions herein the amount of P20,000.00 as for compensatory damages,
P50,000.00 as for exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as for attorney's fees.

D. Ordering defendant Atty. Romeo Landicho to pay petitioners Felipe Peñalosa and Edgar Peñalosa the
amount of P20,000.00 each as for compensatory damages, P50,000.00 as for exemplary damages and
P50,000.00 each as for attorney's fees.
E. DISMISSING the counter-claims of respondents in the herein petitions, and
F. DISMISSING the third-party complaints/cross-claims and the counter-claim in DARAB CASE NOS. R-
0408-00 and DARAB CASE NO. R-0408-015-00.
SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved, respondent and Hai appealed before the DARAB. In its January 15, 2003 Decision,10 the
DARAB affirmed in toto the decision of the PARAD, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Adjudicator a quo dated March 5, 2001 is hereby
AFFIRMED and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Undaunted, respondent and Hai appealed12 to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. They averred that the DARAB gravely erred in ruling that it had jurisdiction over the cases
despite the absence of an agrarian issue. This appeal was, however, dismissed due to the failure of Hai
to sign the certification of non-forum shopping. Respondent moved for reconsideration and prayed for
the admittance of his amended petition with him as the sole petitioner. In a resolution, dated May 26,
2013, the CA granted the same.13

Ruling of the CA
In its June 28, 2010 Decision,14 the CA ruled that the DAR Secretary, and not the PARAD/DARAB, had
jurisdiction to hear the subject petitions in the absence of an agrarian dispute. Thus, the petition was
granted by the CA, to wit:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 15, 2003 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DRAB) in DARAB Case Nos. 10392, 10392-A, 10392-A-1, 10392-A-2
and 10392-A-3 and the Decision dated March 5, 2001 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial

Page 6 of 61
Adjudication Board (PARAD) in Region IV, Lucena City, in DARAB Case Nos, R-048-004-00, R-048-015-00,
R-0408-016-00 R-0408-017-00, R-0408-018-00, R-0408-019-00, R-0408-020-00, and R-0408-021-00, are
SET ASIDE. DARAB Case Nos. 10392, 10392-A, 10392-A-1, 10392-A-2 and 10392-A-3 as well as DARAB
Case Nos. R-048-004-00, R-048-015-00, R-0408-016-00, R-0408-017-00, R-0408-018-00, R-0408-019-00,
R-0408-020-00, and R-0408-021-00 are DISMISSED. This is without prejudice to the re-filing of the
petitions in these aforementioned cases following DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2000,
within (30) days from the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The petitioners separately moved for reconsideration. Nevertheless, in a Resolution,16 dated November
23, 2010, the motions for reconsideration were denied.

Hence, these petitions.

ISSUES
The Court of Appeals seriously erred in admitting Atty. Limqueco's amended petition for review despite
dismissal of the original petition for review on the ground of Atty. Limqueco's violation of the rule
against forum shopping disregarding the settled rule that a violation of the rule against forum shopping
is not curable by mere amendment under para. 2, Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
in relation to Supreme Court Adm. Circular No. 04-94.

The Court of Appeals seriously erred in not holding that respondent's remedy of appeal by petition for
review under Rule 43 is procedurally improper because the correct remedy is a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 in view of respondent's assertion that the DARAB/PARAD lacked jurisdiction
over the cases decided a quo.

The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the herein DARAB Decision, which affirmed in totothe PARAD
Decision, disregarding that, by settled jurisprudence, the DARAB has exclusive jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of the DAR Secretary, to try and decide any agrarian dispute or "any incident involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)" such as the herein petitions a
quo which seek the principal relief of getting back the owners' copies of petitioners certificates of land
ownership award (CLOAs) in the illegal possession of respondent Limqueco.

The Court of Appeals erred in invoking the case of Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos et.al. v. Court of
Appeals (327 SCRA 293) because, unlike in said Santos Case which involves conflicting ownership claims
over a parcel of land sold at auction sale, the DARAB Petitions do not involve any conflicting ownership
claims as therein petitioners are farmers-beneficiaries, and admittedly CLOA-registered owners to the
exclusion of respondent Limqueco who admittedly is but the illegal possessor of the owners' copies of
CLOAs and has no title or claim whatsoever over said CLOAs.

The Court of Appeals seriously erred in suggesting to the parties to refer their petitions to the DAR
Secretary supposedly pursuant to DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2000, ignoring and/or negligently not knowing
that said DAR AO NO. 6, Series of 2000 had long been repealed by DAR AO No. 3, Series of 2003 issued
by the DAR Secretary on January 15, 2003 and, hence, the said suggestion is incorrect, invalid and
misleading.

The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that respondent's amended petition for review (Annex "N"
hereof) filed under Rule 43 suffers from the procedural infirmity of non-exhaustion of administrative

Page 7 of 61
remedy by way of a motion for reconsideration of the subject DARAB Decision in view of the settled
ruling that the non-exhaustion doctrine is mandatory specially if it applies to decisions of quasi-judicial
bodies like DARAB.17

The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that respondent is in estoppel to question the jurisdiction of
both the PARAD and the DARAB in view of his filing of answer with counter-claims to petitioners'
petitions below and his subsequent filing of a third-party complaint against respondent Romeo
Landicho.

The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ignoring petitioners' request for clarification as to which petition
the subject Decision dated June 28, 2010 (Annex "A" hereof) pertains, i.e., the original petition for
review dated February 11, 2003 (Annex "K" hereof) or the amended petition for review dated March 3,
2003 (Annex "N" hereof) considering that both the notice of decision (Annex "A-1") and the Decision
itself (Annex "A") in CA-G.R. SP No. 75482 are similarly captioned with Atty. William Limqueco
(Limqueco) and Yang Chin Hai (Hai) still indicated as the two (2) petitioners.18

Position of Respondent

In his Comment,19 respondent countered that (1) the PARAD and DARAB had no jurisdiction over the
petitions considering that the petitioners expressly admitted the non-existence of an agrarian
relationship – a requirement in agrarian cases following the ruling of the Court in the Santos case;20 (2)
that the petition for review under Rule 43 filed before the CA was the proper remedy because the
requirement of non-existence of an appeal in order for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to prosper
was wanting; (3) that he was not estopped in questioning the DARAB's jurisdiction as the same could be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal; (4) that the failure to file a motion for
reconsideration before appealing to the CA was of no moment as it was not a mandatory requirement
under Rule 43; (5) that the CA did not err in denying petitioners' motion for clarification asking whether
the CA decision pertained to the original petition or the amended one because both raised the same
principal issues; and (6) that the CA correctly held that the claims could be properly ventilated under the
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary.

Position of Petitioners

In their consolidated replies,21 the petitioners averred (1) that the absence of tenancy relationship did
not deprive the DARAB and PARAD of their jurisdiction, citing Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes v. Miranda22
where the Court held that "if the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an
issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and resolved by
the DARAB;" (2) that the proper remedy from the decision of the DARAB should have been a petition for
certiorari Rule 65 instead of Rule 43 as held in Fortich v. Corona;23 (3) that the CA erred in giving due
course to the petition despite respondent's failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the DARAB
following the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; (4) that the CA erred in admitting the
amended petition for review despite the rule that non-compliance with the requirements of certification
of non-forum shopping could not be cured by mere amendment; and (5) that the decision of the CA
resolved the earlier-dismissed original petition instead of the amended petition as shown in its caption
and body.

The primordial issue in this case is whether the CA correctly ruled that PARAD and DARAB had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed by the petitioners.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Page 8 of 61
The Court's Ruling

Procedural Matters

Petitioners attempt to question the ruling of the CA on two (2) procedural fronts. First, they claim that
respondent's recourse to the CA via Rule 43 was improper because the correct remedy should have
been a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in view of respondent's assertion that the DARAB
or PARAD lacked jurisdiction over the cases. Second, it was an error on the part of the CA to have
admitted respondent's amended petition for review for it disregarded the settled rule that a violation of
the rule against forum shopping is not curable by mere amendment under paragraph 2, Section 5, Rule 7
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.

Respondent impugns the jurisdiction of the DARAB and PARAD over the cases filed by the petitioners. In
other words, the question posed before the CA pertained to jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case. In Sevilleno v. Carilo24 the Court has reiterated that such kind of question is a pure question of
law.25cralawred Thus, considering that Section 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court permits appeal whether
the questions involved are of fact, of law or both,26 respondent's resort via Rule 43 was certainly
proper.

As regards the admission by the CA of the amended petition despite Hai's non-compliance with the rule
on certification of non-forum shopping, petitioners must be reminded that in Altres v. Empleo,27 the
Court has categorically stated that when the certification against forum shopping was not signed by all
the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case, the effect would be that only those who did not sign would be
dropped as parties in the case.

Accordingly, the failure of respondent's co-appellant to affix her signature should not prejudice his
rights. As far as respondent is concerned, he complied with the rules on certification of non-forum
shopping to the extent of correcting the apparent lack of Hai's signature by asking the CA to admit the
amended petition with him as the sole petitioner.

On Jurisdiction

The CA was of the view that the claims of the petitioners should have been filed with the DAR Secretary
following DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2000, which provides:

SECTION 2. Cases Covered — These Rules shall govern cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the DAR Secretary which shall include the following:
(a) xxx
(q) Such other matters not mentioned above but strictly involving the administrative implementation of
RA 6657 and other agrarian laws, rules and regulations as determined by the Secretary. (Emphasis
supplied).28

First, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2000 has already been repealed by DAR Administrative
Order No. 3, Series of 2003. Section 38, Rule VII of DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 2003
expressly provides "this order modifies or repeals DAR-A0-6-2000 and all other issuances or portions
thereof that are inconsistent herewith." Section 3, Rule I of the same administrative order recognizes
that the DARAB and the PARAD have exclusive original jurisdiction, among others, over the annulment

Page 9 of 61
or cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments involving lands under the
administration and disposition of the DAR or Land Bank of the Philippines29 and those cases involving
the sale, alienation, pre-emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARL
or other agrarian laws.30
On this score alone, it is clear that the CA erred in ruling that the DAR Secretary had jurisdiction over the
case.
Further, R.A. No. 6657 vests with the DAR the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters including those involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).31
To strengthen and expand the functions of the DAR,32 the DARAB was created by then President
Corazon Aquino through Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A.33

When the petitions were filed in the year 2000, the proceedings before the PARAD and the DARAB were
governed by the DARAB New Rules of Procedures, which were adopted and promulgated on May 30,
1994, and came into effect on June 21, 1994 after publication (1994 DARAB Rules). The 1994 DARAB
Rules identified the cases over which the DARAB shall have jurisdiction, to wit:

RULE II
JURISDICTION OF THE ADJUDICATION BOARD
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary and
exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic
Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the
following:
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management,
cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;chanrobleslaw
b) The valuation of land, and the preliminary determination and payment of just compensation, fixing
and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes
concerning the functions of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);chanrobleslaw
c) The annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments involving lands
under the administration and disposition of the DAR or LBP;
d) Those case arising from, or connected with membership or representation in compact farms, farmers
cooperatives and other registered farmers associations or organizations, related to lands covered by the
CARP and other agrarian laws;chanrobleslaw
e) Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of
agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws;chanrobleslaw
f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;
g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of
Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of Presidential No. 946, except sub-paragraph (Q) thereof and
Presidential Decree No. 815.

It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with the DARAB after
August 29, 1987.

Page 10 of 61
Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARP) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by
pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the
DAR.

SECTION 2. Jurisdiction of the Regional and Provincial Adjudicator. The RARAD and the PARAD shall have
concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and
disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned territorial jurisdiction.
(Emphases supplied.)

Specifically, the PARAD and the DARAB have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the CARP
under R.A. No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No. 9700, E.O. Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844, as
amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their Implementing Rules and
Regulations.34

The question here boils down to whether this case falls under the DARAB's jurisdiction as contemplated
under the CARL and the 1994 DARAB Rules. Consequently, the question as to what an agrarian dispute is
and whether sufficient allegations were indeed made in the petitioners' complaints showing to establish
an agrarian dispute must first be resolved.

Agrarian Dispute

Section 3(d) of the CARL defines an agrarian dispute as:

xxx, any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

In this case, the petitions filed before the PARAD asking for the nullification of the contracts of sale and
recovery of the CLOAs did not contain any allegation of tenurial relations constitutive of an agrarian
dispute as the parties were not subjects of a landowner and tenant relationship, or an allegation that
they were lessors and lessees of each other as reinforced by the categorical admission of the parties in
their pleadings that no such contract exists.35 These circumstances, however, do not mean that the
controversy is no longer agrarian in nature.

The second sentence of Section 3(d) of the CARL clearly provides that an agrarian dispute also includes
"any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under the CARP law and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."

Page 11 of 61
Here, the controversy pertains to respondent's act of selling to a third person the lands acquired by the
petitioners under the CARP. Hence, the case is still an agrarian dispute and within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB and PARAD.

Allegations in the complaints

In order for the DARAB and PARAD to exercise jurisdiction over such controversies, sufficient allegations
establishing the existence of an agrarian dispute must be made in the complaint following the rule that
the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature
and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to
any or all such reliefs.

In the case at bench, the subject properties, which originally formed part originally of Romeo Landicho's
property covered by OCT No. P-29365, were subjected to voluntary land transfer, thereby placing it
under the coverage of the CARL. The petitioners became the beneficiaries of the subdivided properties
by operation of Section 6 and Section 22 of the CARL,36 commonly referred to as the retention limits of
a landowner, who in this case was Romeo Landicho.

The petitioners made the following allegations m their complaints/petitions:37

(8) Sometime in June 1994, petitioner was asked by respondent (now petitioner) Limqueco and Romeo
Landicho to sign certain documents which turned out to be contracts of sale and lease involving
petitioner's aforesaid property covered by TCT No. T-4007. Having utmost trust in confidence in his
father and respondent Limqueco that they were supposedly protecting petitioner's interest, petitioner
without examining said contracts which are undated and which do not indicate the names of the buyer
or the lessee, had affixed his signature to said contracts of sales and lease of TCT No. T-4007.
Respondent Limqueco and Romeo Landicho did not furnish or give petitioner a copy of said contract
which are being used by respondent Limqueco with DAR to harass petitioner.

(9) In affixing his signature as aforesaid, petitioner did not receive any consideration and was not told
the legal implications of said contracts. He came to learn later that by reason of said contracts, the
owner's copy of petitioner's TCT No. T-4007 was delivered by his father Romeo Landicho to respondent
Limqueco who, by his own admission, has custody and physical possession of said title up to the present.

(10) Petitioner learned thereafter that the contracts involving the sale and/or lease of his TCT No. T-
4007, which is a CLOA title, are null and void as they are prohibited and violates R.A. No. 6657 because
under the express restriction incorporated in the CLOA title, the parcel of land subject thereof "shall not
be sold transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the Government, or to the
Land Bank of the Philippines, or to the other qualified beneficiaries for a period often (10) years. x x x x:"

(11) Petitioner should not be penalized by way of cancellation of his TCT No. T-4007 because he acted in
good faith and is not guilty of any fraud considering that his consent to the contracts of sale was vitiated
by fraud, undue influence and mistake when he affixed his signature thereto and hence he should be
protected under Articles 1412(2) and 1416 of the New Civil Code and other pertinent provisions of
law.38

xxx

Page 12 of 61
These allegations plainly show that the petitioners are invoking their rights as beneficiaries of the CARL;
that they consider the conveyance of their properties as having been made in violation of the terms and
conditions of the CARL; and that all of the transfers should be nullified because they were procured
through fraud, undue influence and mistake. All these constitute an agrarian dispute in the context of a
controversy relating to terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to agrarian
reform beneficiaries. This is because the main contention of the parties was clearly couched on the
alleged denial by the respondent of their established rights as beneficiaries over the subject properties
under agrarian reform laws.

Accordingly, it is undeniable that the DARAB and PARAD have jurisdiction over this controversy. It was,
therefore, an error on the part of the CA to have overturned the rulings of the concerned quasi-judicial
bodies on the ground that they had no jurisdiction over the controversy.

Question on Vitiation of Consent

Settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. In that regard, the Court notes that the CA failed
to pass upon the question on whether fraud, undue influence and mistake occasioned the procurement
by respondent of the titles to the properties and whether there was indeed a violation of the CARL.

As there were none, the Court finds it necessary to remand this case to the CA for the proper review of
the substantive issues as raised by the parties concerning the legality of the transfer of the properties to
the respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 28, 2010 Decision and November 23, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75482 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals to determine the merits of the alleged violation of the CARP
Law as well as the allegations of fraud in respondent's procurement of the CLOAs and titles over the
subject properties.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 52159 December 22, 1989
JOSE PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., respondents.
Martin Badong, Jr. for petitioner.
Eufronio K. Maristela for private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision* rendered by the Court of Appeals dated 19
October 1979 in CA-G.R. No. 57354-R entitled "Jose Pilapil, plaintiff-appellee versus Alatco
Transportation Co., Inc., defendant-appellant," which reversed and set aside the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 7230 ordering respondent transportation company to
pay to petitioner damages in the total sum of sixteen thousand three hundred pesos (P 16,300.00).

The record discloses the following facts:

Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-defendant's bus bearing No.
409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City on 16 September 1971 at about 6:00 P.M. While said bus No. 409 was in

Page 13 of 61
due course negotiating the distance between Iriga City and Naga City, upon reaching the vicinity of the
cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a
bystander along said national highway, hurled a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner
above his left eye. Private respondent's personnel lost no time in bringing the petitioner to the
provincial hospital in Naga City where he was confined and treated.

Considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired, petitioner was taken to Dr. Malabanan of Iriga
City where he was treated for another week. Since there was no improvement in his left eye's vision,
petitioner went to V. Luna Hospital, Quezon City where he was treated by Dr. Capulong. Despite the
treatment accorded to him by Dr. Capulong, petitioner lost partially his left eye's vision and sustained a
permanent scar above the left eye.

Thereupon, petitioner instituted before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I an action
for recovery of damages sustained as a result of the stone-throwing incident. After trial, the court a quo
rendered judgment with the following dispositive part:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered:

1. Ordering defendant transportation company to pay plaintiff Jose Pilapil the sum of P 10,000.00,
Philippine Currency, representing actual and material damages for causing a permanent scar on the face
and injuring the eye-sight of the plaintiff;
2. Ordering further defendant transportation company to pay the sum of P 5,000.00, Philippine
Currency, to the plaintiff as moral and exemplary damages;
3. Ordering furthermore, defendant transportation company to reimburse plaintiff the sum of P 300.00
for his medical expenses and attorney's fees in the sum of P 1,000.00, Philippine Currency; and
4. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED 1

From the judgment, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals where the appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57354R. On 19 October 1979, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of Five,
rendered judgment reversing and setting aside the judgment of the court a quo.

Hence the present petition.

In seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner contends that said court has
decided the issue not in accord with law. Specifically, petitioner argues that the nature of the business
of a transportation company requires the assumption of certain risks, and the stoning of the bus by a
stranger resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger is one such risk from which the common carrier may
not exempt itself from liability.

We do not agree.

In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting
passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all
risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law
imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.

Page 14 of 61
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are required to observe extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passenger transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
The requirement of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is restated in Article 1755:
"A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."
Further, in case of death of or injuries to passengers, the law presumes said common carriers to be at
fault or to have acted negligently. 2

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of
their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the
carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. 3

Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and precaution in the
carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide. what
constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the circumstances.

Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the
common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from
introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the
place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the
common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance of its
contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
4

In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and Congress to curb the
recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business.

Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company makes it
an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its passenger
rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law requires. 5

Petitioner contends that respondent common carrier failed to rebut the presumption of negligence
against it by proof on its part that it exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers.

We do not agree.

First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a disputable
presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are established proving either that the carrier had
exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the injury suffered by the passenger was due to a
fortuitous event. Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due
to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or willful
acts of private respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to
provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from
causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have
prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule
otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers which is
not the intention of the lawmakers.

Page 15 of 61
Second, while as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
safe transport of their passengers, it would seem that this is not the standard by which its liability is to
be determined when intervening acts of strangers is to be determined directly cause the injury, while
the contract of carriage Article 1763 governs:

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.

Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger
does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common
carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from
being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the
same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of
strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for
the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

Petitioner has charged respondent carrier of negligence on the ground that the injury complained of
could have been prevented by the common carrier if something like mesh-work grills had covered the
windows of its bus.

We do not agree.

Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the injury complained of, the rule of ordinary
care and prudence is not so exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or
unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. The carrier is not charged with the
duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely prevent any and all injuries to passengers.
Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved type, in general use by others engaged in the same
occupation, and exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in suitable condition, the carrier
cannot be charged with negligence in this respect. 6

Finally, petitioner contends that it is to the greater interest of the State if a carrier were made liable for
such stone-throwing incidents rather than have the bus riding public lose confidence in the
transportation system.

Sad to say, we are not in a position to so hold; such a policy would be better left to the consideration of
Congress which is empowered to enact laws to protect the public from the increasing risks and dangers
of lawlessness in society.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5044
PARAS, C.J.:
On March 21, 1948, Moros Lambayong and Amsia were paid passengers in bus No. 24, bearing TPU plate
No. 7629, and belonging to the Guinoo Transportation Company, on its return trip from Digos to Davao
City. When said bus came to kilometer 44, it capsized on the road, as a result of which Lambayong died

Page 16 of 61
and Amsia suffered physical injuries Amsia, Ampang and Lumpitan instituted the present action in the
Court of First Instance of Davao, to recover from the Guinoo Transportation Company and its manager,
Vicente Guinoo, P2,000.00 as damages for the death of Lambayong and P1,000.00 as damages suffered
by Amsia for the physical injuries. After hearing, the court dismissed the complaint on the following
grounds: "Sin embargo, del contenido de la declaracion jurada suscrita por Amsia Puna y Lumpitan
Dumingay se infiere claramente, que el accidente que causo la muerte de Lambayong, las lessiones
causadas en la persona de Amsia, y la imposibilidad de los pasajeros de llegar a su destino, se debio' a un
caso forfuito que estaba fuera del alcance de los demandados y del chofer Quirino Piezas." The plaintiffs
have appealed.
It appears that the case was submitted for decision practically on the pleadings and the meager
stipulation of facts entered into by the parties in open court, without any attempt on the part of the
plaintiffs to show by proper evidence that the accident in question was due to any fault of the
defendants' driver, and not to a fortuitous event. Upon the other hand, the records show that, as a
result of the accident, a criminal case was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Sta. Cruz against the
driver, Quirino Piezas, but said case was dismissed upon the joint affidavit of Amsia and Lumpitan. This
affidavit was presented in evidence and the lower court based its decision mainly thereon. In said
affidavit Amsia and Lumpitan declared as follows:

"That as the HABACCO bus No. 39 was overtaking the QUITRANCO bus we felt that the HABACCO bus
struck the QUITRANCO bus somewhere on its left side, thus suddenly pushing the said QUITRANCO bus
toward the canal on the right side of the road, and the driver of the QUITRANCO bus swerved the truck
to the left in order to prevent the truck from falling into the canal, and striking a tree standing on the
side of the road, and the HABACCO bus which was running very fast proceeded on its way.

"Then when the driver of the truck of the QUITRANCO suddenly swerved the truck to the left in order to
prevent it from falling to the canal and striking a tree on the side of the road, the truck skidded, thereby
turning the truck upside down and as a result of which we suffered injuries including Lamayong
Mantuching who later died because of the injuries she received."

It is obvious from these statements that the accident could not be attributed in any manner to any fault
or omission of the defendants' driver. Of course, it is now pretended by counsel for the appellants that
"After investigation made by the PC officers and policemen in charge of the case, the negligence
imputed to the driver of the HABACCO truck No. 39 was found not true, because no sign or mark of any
collision was found on said two trucks and the driver of the Habacco truck and the passengers of said
two trucks denied that any such collision has ever taken place." However, this allegation cannot be given
any weight, there being nothing in the record to sustain it. Upon the other hand, the affidavit of Amsia
and Lumpitan was introduced at the hearing without any objection from counsel for appellants.

It is urged for the appellants that the appellees are liable under their contract as transport safely
passengers Lambayong and Amsia to their destination, regardless of any fault or negligence that cause
the accident, reliance being placed on the case of Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657. This authority, however,
comes to the aid of the appellees, because the carrier is thereunder excused from liability if the accident
is due to a fortuitous event, and this was the ruling in the appealed decision. This Court, in interpreting
"fortuitous event", stated that "As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary
circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a
caso fortuito." From the facts of the case at bar it is clear that the defendants' bus which carried
Lambayong and Amsia capsized after being bumped on the left side by Habacco bus No. 39, which
caused the defendants' driver to swerve his bus to the left so as to prevent it from falling into the canal

Page 17 of 61
and striking a tree, a maneuver which led the bus to skid and capsize. This, in our opinion, resulted from
the extraordinary circumstance of being resulted from the extraordinary circumstance of being struck by
the Habacco bus, independent of the will of, and unforseen by the defendants' driver, in the absence of
any showing to the contrary.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, and it is so ordered without costs.

G.R. No. L-22272 June 26, 1967
ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.
Pedro Panganiban for plaintiff-appellant.
Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual
Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.

Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found guilty, he was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000.
Appeal from said conviction was taken to the Court of Appeals.1äwphï1.ñët

On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's
mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and
Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense,
since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that
the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.

The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against
defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff
and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting
on non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier
mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final judgment was entered
therein. (Rollo, p. 33).

Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884,
that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The
attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the
Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee.
As this Court there found:

x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the
transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when
Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains,
and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he
was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of
the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the Calamba-
Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The

Page 18 of 61
position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting
transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad
had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a
breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)

Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose
hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the
Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and
when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.

Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the
present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers
against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in
the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art.
1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where
the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein
significantly lies the statutory difference between the old and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the
factual situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result in the Gillaco case. Unlike the
old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for
intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which
categorically states that

Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful
acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and were taken from Anglo-
American Law.2 There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its
drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's
implied duty to transport the passenger safely.3

Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is
within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of
employment only.4

Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault
happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done
in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders.5 The carrier's liability here is absolute in
the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.6

As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on
the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As explained in Texas Midland
R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1)
the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of
protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from
violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the

Page 19 of 61
carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the
servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the
performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of
protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the
passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees
against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.

Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard
not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total
personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.

Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the
defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the
defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7
and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he
was convicted by final judgment.

In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant.
This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with
Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As has been the
policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to other alleged
actual damages, the lower court's finding that plaintiff's evidence thereon was not convincing,8 should
not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages in addition to compensatory damages,
to the parents of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim
therefor, having been properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral damages.9 Plaintiff
demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages,
in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due
to plaintiff-appellant. 10

Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in plaintiff's favor to P6,000,
plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both from the filing of the complaint on December
6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No
costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and
ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its
owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo,

Page 20 of 61
Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about
eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan,
seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another
passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not
knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated
just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running
within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it
fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed
to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them
named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they
had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help
from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to
show whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and the
conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the
vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour,
came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end,
evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers
trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from
the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the
ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the
call for help set it on fire.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and
duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name
and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After
trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee,
plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was
lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the
latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.

Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their
goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735,
and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further
set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.

Page 21 of 61
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755

ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the
Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also
agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the
driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as
testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the
witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the
canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The
chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150
meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to
what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was
not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-
passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have
suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his
death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate
cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in
their brief. It is as follows:

. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing
him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on
fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger

Page 22 of 61
is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not
the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same,
we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to
carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with
a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in
part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the
witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could
and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from
the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the
agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733,
1759 and 1763.

As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the deceased,
as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX
THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory,
moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing
the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the
appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at
EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is
adequate and will not be disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence, one of
the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital,
she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him
speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed
immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver
to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove
that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of
his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been
instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not have
occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently,
resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and
destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his
consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony
he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the
record of the case before us shows the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and
unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the public interest the
prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the

Page 23 of 61
promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX
HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's
fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. L-19161 April 29, 1966
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
MACARIA BALLESTEROS, TIMOTEO CAMAYO, JOSE REYES and JULIAN MAIMBAN, JR., respondents.
Gov't Corp. Counsel S. M. Gopengco and Atty. R. G. Fernando, for petitioner.
George G. Arbolario, for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:

In civil case No. 45968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Macaria Ballesteros, Timoteo Camayo,
Jose Reyes and Julian Maimban, Jr. vs. Manila Railroad Company) the defendant was adjudged to pay
damages in the following amounts: P2,400 to Macaria Ballesteros; P4,000 to Timoteo Camayo; P3,000 to
Jose Reyes: and P2,000, plus P1,000 as attorney's fees, to Julian Maimban, Jr.

The defendant appealed from the judgment, but upon motion by the plaintiffs, the trial court, by order
dated October 14, 1961, dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was "manifestly and palpably
frivolous and interposed ostensibly to delay the settlement of the just and reasonable claims of the
herein plaintiffs, which have been pending since 1958." The defendant moved to reconsider, and upon
denial of its motion instituted in this Court the instant petition for mandamus to set aside the order of
dismissal and to order respondent court to give due course to the appeal.

In filing the petition directly with this Court, petitioner evidently intended to raise only questions of law
in the appeal contemplated, since under Rule 41, section 15, "when erroneously a motion to dismiss an
appeal is granted or a record on appeal is disallowed by the trial court, a proper petition for mandamus
may be filed in the appellate court;" and under section 17(6) of the Judiciary Act this Court may review
on appeal only questions of law in civil cases decided by inferior courts unless the value in controversy
exceeds P200,000.1äwphï1.ñët

The fact that an appeal is frivolous and interposed only for purposes of delay has been recognized as a
valid ground to deny issuance of the writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to approve and certify
the appeal. In De la Cruz vs. Blanco and Quevedo, 73 Phil. 596, We held:
And where as in the instant case, the dismissal has been ordered by the trial court, it would not be
disturbed in the Appellate Court if the latter finds the appeal to have been interposed ostensibly for
delay. It has been held that a frivolous appeal is one presenting no justiciable question or one so readily
cognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little, if any, prospect that it can
over succeed. The instant case is one such instance in which the appeal is evidently without merit, taken
manifestly for delay.

And in Paner vs. Yatco, 87 Phil. 271, We denied the writ prayed for and held that "while strictly and
legally speaking the petition may be granted, we may, before acting thereon, inquire into the facts
involved in order to determine whether once the writ is granted and the case is brought up here on
appeal the appellant has any chance, even possibility, of having the basic decision of the trial court set

Page 24 of 61
aside or modified; for if the appellant has not that prospect or likelihood then the granting of the writ
and the consequent appeal would be futile and would mean only a waste of time to the parties and to
this Court."

The material facts, as found by respondent court in its decision, are as follows: Private respondents
here, plaintiffs below, were passengers on petitioner's bus, the driver of which was Jose Anastacio. In
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Anastacio stopped the bus and got off to replace a defective spark plug.
While he was thus engaged, one Dionisio Abello, an auditor assigned to defendant company by the
General Auditing Office, took the wheel and told the driver to sit somewhere else. With Abello driving,
the bus proceeded on its way, from time to time stopping to pick up passengers. Anastacio tried twice to
take the wheel back but Abello would not relinquish it. Then, in the language of the trial court, "while
the bus was negotiating between Km. posts 328 and 329 (in Isabela) a freight truck ... driven by Marcial
Nocum ... bound for Manila, was also negotiating the same place; when these two vehicles were about
to meet at the bend of the road Marcial Nocum, in trying to evade several holes on the right lane, where
his truck was running, swerved his truck towards the middle part of the road and in so doing, the left
front fender and left side of the freight truck smashed the left side of the bus resulting in extensive
damages to the body of the bus and injuries to seventeen of its passengers, ... including the plaintiffs
herein."

In rejecting petitioner's contention that the negligence of Marcial Nocum could not be imputed to it and
relieved it from liability, the trial court found that Dionisio Abello "was likewise reckless when he was
driving the bus at the rate of from 40 to 50 kilometers per hour on a bumpy road at the moment of the
collision."

Another defense put up by petitioner is that since Abello was not its employee it should not be held
responsible for his acts. This defense was correctly overruled by the trial court, considering the
provisions of Article 1763 of the Civil Code and section 48 (b) of the Motor Vehicle Law, which
respectively provide as follows:

Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilfull
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.

Sec. 48(b). No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed person to drive the motor vehicle
under his control, or permit a person, sitting beside him or in any other part of the car, to interfere with
him in the operation of the motor vehicle, by allowing said person to take hold of the steering wheel, or
in any other manner take part in the manipulation or control of the car.

It appears further, and so the trial court found, that there were negotiations between the parties to
compromise the case, as a result of which respondents herein, plaintiffs below, considerably reduced
their claims to the amounts subsequently awarded in the judgment; that petitioner had in fact settled
the claims of the other passengers who were also injured in the same accident and even the claim for
damages filed in another action by the owner of the freight truck; and that the Government Corporate
Counsel himself, who represents herein petitioner, rendered two separate opinions (Op. No. 86, May 19,
1960; and Op. No. 99, series of 1961) wherein, after analyzing the facts and the law applicable, he
reached the conclusion that the acts of the bus personnel, particularly "in allowing Mr. Abello to drive
despite two occasions when the bus stopped and the regular driver could have taken over, constitute

Page 25 of 61
reckless imprudence and wanton injurious conduct on the part of the MRR employees." On the basis of
those opinions the Government Corporate Counsel advised petitioner that the offer of the claimants
was reasonable and should be accepted. His advice, however, was not favorably acted upon, petitioner
obviously preferring to litigate.

The issues proposed to be taken up on appeal, as set forth in the petition, are whether or not Dionisio
Abello acted with reckless negligence while driving petitioner's bus at the time of the accident, and
whether or not petitioner may be held liable on account of such negligence, considering that he was not
its employee. These are no longer justiciable questions which would justify our issuing the peremptory
writ prayed for. The first is a question of fact on which the affirmative finding of respondent court is not
reviewable by Us; and the second is one as to which there can be no possible doubt in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code and of the Motor Vehicle Law hereinbefore cited. There would be no point in
giving the appeal due course.

The writ prayed for is denied, with costs against petitioner.

[ G.R. No. 125862, April 15, 2004 ]
FRANCISCO CULABA AND DEMETRIA CULABA, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE “CULABA
STORE,” PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS. D E C I
SION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19836 affirming in toto the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 138, in Civil Case No. 1033 for collection of sum of money, and the Resolution[3]
denying the motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

The Undisputed Facts

The spouses Francisco and Demetria Culaba were the owners and proprietors of the Culaba Store and
were engaged in the sale and distribution of San Miguel Corporation’s (SMC) beer products. SMC sold
beer products on credit to the Culaba spouses in the amount of P28,650.00, as evidenced by Temporary
Credit Invoice No. 42943.[4] Thereafter, the Culaba spouses made a partial payment of P3,740.00,
leaving an unpaid balance of P24,910.00. As they failed to pay despite repeated demands, SMC filed an
action for collection of a sum of money against them before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138.

The defendant-spouses denied any liability, claiming that they had already paid the plaintiff in full on
four separate occasions. To substantiate this claim, the defendants presented four (4) Temporary
Charge Sales (TCS) Liquidation Receipts, as follows:

April 19, 1983

Receipt No. 27331
for P8,000[5]
April 22, 1983
Receipt No. 27318
for P9,000[6]
April 27, 1983
Receipt No. 27339
for P4,500[7]
April 30, 1983

Page 26 of 61
Receipt No. 27346
for P3,410[8]

Defendant Francisco Culaba testified that he made the foregoing payments to an SMC supervisor who
came in an SMC van. He was then showed a list of customers’ accountabilities which included his
account. The defendant, in good faith, then paid to the said supervisor, and he was, in turn, issued
genuine SMC liquidation receipts.

For its part, SMC submitted a publisher’s affidavit[9] to prove that the entire booklet of TCSL Receipts
bearing Nos. 27301-27350 were reported lost by it, and that it caused the publication of the notice of
loss in the July 9, 1983 issue of the Daily Express, as follows:
NOTICE OF LOSS

OUR CUSTOMERS ARE HEREBY INFORMED THAT TEMPORARY CHARGE SALES LIQUIDATION RECEIPTS
WITH SERIAL NOS. 27301-27350 HAVE BEEN LOST.

ANY TRANSACTION, THEREFORE, ENTERED INTO WITH THE USE OF THE ABOVE RECEIPTS WILL NOT BE
HONORED.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION

BEER DIVISION
Makati Beer Region[10]

The Trial Court’s Ruling

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of SMC, and held the Culaba spouses
liable on the balance of its obligation, thus:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, as follows:

Ordering defendants to pay the amount of P24,910.00 plus legal interest of 6% per annum from April 12,
1983 until the whole amount is fully paid;

Ordering defendants to pay 20% of the amount due to plaintiff as and for attorney’s fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
According to the trial court, it was unusual that defendant Francisco Culaba forgot the name of the
collector to whom he made the payments and that he did not require the said collector to print his
name on the receipts. The court also noted that although they were part of a single booklet, the TCS
Liquidation Receipts submitted by the defendants did not appear to have been issued in their natural
sequence. Furthermore, they were part of the lost booklet receipts, which the public was duly warned of
through the Notice of Loss the plaintiff caused to be published in a daily newspaper. This confirmed the
plaintiff’s claim that the receipts presented by the defendants were spurious ones.

The Case on Appeal

On appeal, the appellants interposed the following assignment of errors:

I

Page 27 of 61
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RECEIPTS PRESENTED BY DEFENDANTS EVIDENCING HIS
PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, ARE SPURIOUS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVED ITS
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANTS TO PAY 20% OF THE AMOUNT DUE TO PLAINTIFF
AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.[12]
The appellants asserted that while the trial court’s observations were true, it was the usual business
practice in previous transactions between them and SMC. The SMC previously honored receipts not
bearing the salesman’s name. According to appellant Francisco Culaba, he even lost some of the
receipts, but did not encounter any problems.

According to appellant Francisco, he could not be faulted for paying the SMC collector who came in a
van and was in uniform, and that any regular customer would, without any apprehension, transact with
such an SMC employee. Furthermore, the respective receipts issued to him at the time he paid on the
four occasions mentioned had not yet then been declared lost. Thus, the subsequent publication in a
daily newspaper declaring the booklets lost did not affect the validity and legality of the payments
made. Accordingly, by its actuations, the SMC was estopped from questioning the legality of the
payments and had no cause of action against the appellants.

Anent the issue of attorney’s fees, the order of the trial court for payment thereof is without basis.
According to the appellant, the provision for attorney’s fees is a contingent fee, already provided for in
the SMC’s contract with the law firm. To further order them to pay 20% of the amount due as attorney’s
fees is double payment, tantamount to undue enrichment and therefore improper.[13]

The appellee, for its part, contended that the primary issue in the case at bar revolved around the basic
and fundamental principles of agency.[14] It was incumbent upon the defendants-appellants to exercise
ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence to verify and identify the extent of the alleged agent’s
authority. It was their burden to establish the true identity of the assumed agent, and this could not be
established by mere representation, rumor or general reputation. As they utterly failed in this regard,
the appellants must suffer the consequences.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, thus:
In the face of the somewhat tenuous evidence presented by the appellants, we cannot fault the lower
court for giving more weight to appellee’s testimonial and documentary evidence, all of which establish
with some degree of preponderance the existence of the account sued upon.

ALL CONSIDERED, we cannot find any justification to reject the factual findings of the lower court to
which we must accord respect, for which reason, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects.

SO ORDERED.[15]
Hence, the instant petition.

Page 28 of 61
The petitioners pose the following issues for the Court’s resolution:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAD PROVEN BY PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD
PROPERLY AND TIMELY NOTIFIED PETITIONER OF LOST BOOKLET OF RECEIPTS

II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT HAD PROVEN BY PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS
REMISS IN THE PAYMENT OF HIS ACCOUNTS TO ITS AGENT.[16]
According to the petitioners, receiving receipts from the private respondent’s agents instead of its
salesmen was a usual occurrence, as they had been operating the store since 1979. Thus, on four
occasions in April 1983, when an agent of the respondent came to the store wearing an SMC uniform
and driving an SMC van, petitioner Francisco Culaba, without question, paid his accounts. He received
the receipts without fear, as they were similar to what he used to receive before. Furthermore, the
petitioners assert that, common experience will attest that unless the attention of the customers is
called for, they would not take note of the serial number of the receipts.

The petitioners contend that the private respondent advertised its warning to the public only after the
damage was done, or on July 9, 1993. Its belated notice showed its glaring lack of interest or concern for
its customers’ welfare, and, in sum, its negligence.

Anent the second issue, petitioner Francisco Culaba avers that the agent to whom the accounts were
paid had all the physical and material attributes or indications of a representative of the private
respondent, leaving no doubt that he was duly authorized by the latter. Petitioner Francisco Culaba’s
testimony that “he does not necessarily check the contents of the receipts issued to him except for the
amount indicated if [the] same accurately reflects his actual payment” is a common attitude of
customers. He could, thus, not be faulted for paying the private respondent’s agent on four occasions.
Petitioner Francisco Culaba asserts that he made the payment in good faith, to an agent who issued SMC
receipts which appeared to be genuine. Thus, according to the petitioners, they had duly paid their
obligation in accordance with Articles 1240 and 1242 of the New Civil Code.

The private respondent, for its part, avers that the burden of proving payment is with the debtor, in
consonance with the express provision of Article 1233 of the New Civil Code. The petitioners miserably
failed to prove the self-serving allegation that they already paid their liability to the private respondent.
Furthermore, under normal circumstances, an obligor would not just pay a substantial amount to
someone whom he saw for the first time, without even asking for the latter’s name.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is dismissed.

The petitioners question the findings of the Court of Appeals as to whether the payment of the
petitioners’ obligation to the private respondent was properly made, thus, extinguishing the same. This
is clearly a factual issue, and beyond the purview of the Court to delve into. This is in consonance with
the well-settled rule that findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal. Such
findings are binding and conclusive on the Court.[17] Furthermore, it is not the Court’s function under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative
value of the evidence presented.[18]

Page 29 of 61
To reiterate, the issue being raised by the petitioners does not involve a question of law, but a question
of fact, not cognizable by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45. The jurisdiction of the Court
in such a case is limited to reviewing only errors of law, unless the factual findings being assailed are not
supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[19]

A careful study of the records of the case reveal that the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s factual
findings as follows:

First. Receipts Nos. 27331, 27318, 27339 and 27346 were included in the private respondent’s lost
booklet, which loss was duly advertised in a newspaper of general circulation; thus, the private
respondent could not have officially issued them to the petitioners to cover the alleged payments on the
dates appearing thereon.

Second. There was something amiss in the way the receipts were issued to the petitioners, as one
receipt bearing a higher serial number was issued ahead of another receipt bearing a lower serial
number, supposedly covering a later payment. The petitioners failed to explain the apparent mix-up in
these receipts, and no attempt was made in this regard.

Third. The fact that the salesman’s name was invariably left blank in the four receipts and that the
petitioners could not even remember the name of the supposed impostor who received the said
payments strongly argue against the veracity of the petitioners’ claim.

We find no cogent reason to reverse the said findings.

The dismissal of the petition is inevitable even upon close perusal of the merits of the case.

Payment is a mode of extinguishing an obligation.[20] Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides that
payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his
successor-in-interest, or any person authorized to receive it.[21] In this case, the payments were
purportedly made to a “supervisor” of the private respondent, who was clad in an SMC uniform and
drove an SMC van. He appeared to be authorized to accept payments as he showed a list of customers’
accountabilities and even issued SMC liquidation receipts which looked genuine. Unfortunately for
petitioner Francisco Culaba, he did not ascertain the identity and authority of the said supervisor, nor
did he ask to be shown any identification to prove that the latter was, indeed, an SMC supervisor. The
petitioners relied solely on the man’s representation that he was collecting payments for SMC. Thus, the
payments the petitioners claimed they made were not the payments that discharged their obligation to
the private respondent.

The basis of agency is representation.[22] A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must
discover upon his peril the authority of the agent.[23] In the instant case, the petitioners’ loss could
have been avoided if they had simply exercised due diligence in ascertaining the identity of the person
to whom they allegedly made the payments. The fact that they were parting with valuable consideration
should have made them more circumspect in handling their business transactions. Persons dealing with
an assumed agent are bound at their peril to ascertain not only the fact of agency but also the nature
and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish
it.[24] The petitioners in this case failed to discharge this burden, considering that the private
respondent vehemently denied that the payments were accepted by it and were made to its authorized
representative.

Page 30 of 61
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.[25] In the case at bar, the most prudent thing the
petitioners should have done was to ascertain the identity and authority of the person who collected
their payments. Failing this, the petitioners cannot claim that they acted in good faith when they made
such payments. Their claim therefor is negated by their negligence, and they are bound by its
consequences. Being negligent in this regard, the petitioners cannot seek relief on the basis of a
supposed agency.[26]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 16, 1996, and the
Resolution dated July 19, 1996 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
_____________________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 119756 March 18, 1999
FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PAULIE U.CAORONG, and minor childrenYASSER KING CAORONG, ROSE HEINNI and
PRINCE ALEXANDER, all surnamed CAORONG, and represented by their mother PAULIE U. CAORONG,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of the Court of
Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan City. The aforesaid
decision of the trial court dismissed the complaint of public respondents against petitioner for damages
for breach of contract of carriage filed on the ground that petitioner had not exercised the required
degree of diligence in the operation of one of its buses. Atty. Talib Caorong, whose heirs are private
respondents herein, was a passenger of the bus and was killed in the ambush involving said bus.

The facts of the instant case are as follows:

Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. Private respondent Paulie Caorong is the widow of
Atty. Caorong, while private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander are their minor
children.

On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. Crisanto
Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit No. X, conducted an
investigation of the accident. He found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao residing in
Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner
by burning some of its buses. Generalao rendered a report on his findings to Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa of
the Philippine Constabulary Regional Headquarters at Cagayan de Oro. Upon the instruction of Sgt.
Bastasa, he went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of petitioner, its main office in Cagayan de
Oro City. Bravo assured him that the necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property
would be taken.1

Page 31 of 61
At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers,
seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Among the
passengers of the bus was Atty. Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as one Bashier
Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the side of the highway.
Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which caused him to slump on the steering wheel. The one
of the companions of Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the
passenger at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then ordered the passenger to get off the bus. The
passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes in a field some
distance from the highway.2

However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack. at that time,
one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who had meantime
regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to spare the driver as he was
innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a living. The armed men were, however,
adamant as they repeated the warning that they were going to burn the bus along with its driver. During
this exchange between Atty. Caorong and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left window of the
bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side of the highway. He heard shots from inside the bus.
Larry de la Cruz, one of the passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire.
Some of the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush him to the
Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died while undergoing operation.3

The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch VI, Iligan City. In its decision, dated December 28, 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint,
holding as follows:

The fact that defendant, through Operations Manager Diosdado Bravo, was informed of the "rumors"
that the Moslems intended to take revenge by burning five buses of defendant is established since the
latter also utilized Crisanto Generalao as a witness. Yet despite this information, the plaintiffs charge,
defendant did not take proper precautions. . . . Consequently, plaintiffs now fault the defendant for
ignoring the report. Their position is that the defendant should have provided its buses with security
guards. Does the law require common carriers to install security guards in its buses for the protection
and safety of its passengers? Is the failure to post guards on omission of the duty to "exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family" which could have prevented the killing of Atty. Caorong? To our
mind, the diligence demanded by law does not include the posting of security guard in buses. It is an
obligation that properly belongs to the State. Besides, will the presence of one or two security guards
suffice to deter a determined assault of the lawless and thus prevent the injury complained of? Maybe
so, but again, perhaps not. In other words, the presence of a security guard is not a guarantee that the
killing of Atty. Caorong would have been definitely avoided.

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, the failure of defendant to accord faith and credit to the report of Mr. Generalao and the
fact that it did not provide security to its buses cannot, in the light of the circumstances, be
characterized as negligence.

Finally, the evidence clearly shows that the assalants did not have the least intention of the harming any
of the passengers. They ordered all the passengers to alight and set fire on the bus only after all the
passengers were out of danger. The death of Atty. Caorong was an unexpected and unforseen

Page 32 of 61
occurrense over which defendant had no control. Atty. Caorong performed an act of charity and
heroism in coming to the succor of the driver even in the face of danger. He deserves the undying
gratitude of the driver whose life he saved. No one should blame him for an act of extraordinary charity
and altruism which cost his life. But neither should any blame be laid on the doorstep of defendant. His
death was solely due to the willfull acts of the lawless which defendant could neither prevent nor to
stop.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby dismissed. For lack of merit, the counter-
claim is likewise dismissed. No costs.4

On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed. It held:

In the case at bench, how did defendant-appellee react to the tip or information that certain Maranao
hotheads were planning to burn five of its buses out of revenge for the deaths of two Maranaos in an
earlier collision involving appellee's bus? Except for the remarks of appellee's operations manager that
"we will have our action . . . . and I'll be the one to settle it personally," nothing concrete whatsoever
was taken by appellee or its employees to prevent the execution of the threat. Defendant-appellee
never adopted even a single safety measure for the protection of its paying passengers. Were there
available safeguards? Of course, there were: one was frisking passengers particularly those en route to
the area where the threats were likely to be carried out such as where the earlier accident occurred or
the place of influence of the victims or their locality. If frisking was resorted to, even temporarily, . . . .
appellee might be legally excused from liabilty. Frisking of passengers picked up along the route could
have been implemented by the bus conductor; for those boarding at the bus terminal, frisking could
have been conducted by him and perhaps by additional personnel of defendant-appellee. On hindsight,
the handguns and especially the gallon of gasoline used by the felons all of which were brought inside
the bus would have been discovered, thus preventing the burning of the bus and the fatal shooting of
the victim.

Appellee's argument that there is no law requiring it to provide guards on its buses and that the safety
of citizens is the duty of the government, is not well taken. To be sure, appellee is not expected to assign
security guards on all its buses; if at all, it has the duty to post guards only on its buses plying
predominantly Maranaos areas. As discussed in the next preceding paragraph, least appellee could have
done in response to the report was to adopt a system of verification such as the frisking of passengers
boarding at its buses. Nothing, and no repeat, nothing at all, was done by defendant-appellee to protect
its innocent passengers from the danger arising from the "Maranao threats." It must be observed that
frisking is not a novelty as a safety measure in our society. Sensitive places — in fact, nearly all
important places — have applied this method of security enhancement. Gadgets and devices are
avilable in the market for this purpose. It would not have weighed much against the budget of the bus
company if such items were made available to its personnel to cope up with situations such as the
"Maranaos threats."

In view of the constitutional right to personal privacy, our pronouncement in this decision should not be
construed as an advocacy of mandatory frisking in all public conveyances. What we are saying is that
given the circumstances obtaining in the case at bench that: (a) two Maranaos died because of a
vehicular collision involving one of appellee's vehicles; (b) appellee received a written report from a
member of the Regional Security Unit, Constabulary Security Group, that the tribal/ethnic group of the
two deceased were planning to burn five buses of appellee out of revenge; and (c) appelle did nothing
— absolutely nothing — for the safety of its passengers travelling in the area of influence of the victims,

Page 33 of 61
appellee has failed to exercise the degree of dilegence required of common carriers. Hence, appellee
must be adjudge liable.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another rendered ordering defendant-
appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants the following:

1) P3,399,649.20 as death indemnity;

2) P50,000.00 and P500.00 per appearance as attorney's fee and
Costs against defendant-appellee.5
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends:

(A) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DATED DECEMBER 28, 1990 DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AS WELL AS THE COUNTERCLAIM, AND
FINDING FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BY ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY THE GARGANTUAN SUM OF
P3,449,649.20 PLUS P500.00 PER APPEARANCE AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, AS WELL AS DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION FRO RECONSIDERATION AND THE SUPPLEMENT TO SAID MOTION, WHILE HOLDING, AMONG
OTHERS, THAT THE PETITIONER BREACHED THE CONTRACT OF THE CARRIAGE BY ITS FAILURE TO
EXCERCISE THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF DILIGENCE;

(B) THAT THE ACTS OF THE MARANAO OUTLAWS WERE SO GRAVE, IRRESISTABLE, VIOLENT, AND
FORCEFULL, AS TO BE REGARDED AS CASO FORTUITO; AND

(C) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
COULD HAVE PROVIDED ADEQUATE SECURITY IN PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM AREAS AS PART OF ITS
DUTY TO OBSERVE EXTRA-ORDINARY DILIGENCE AS A COMMON CARRIER.

The instant has no merit.

First. Petitioner's Breach of the Contract of Carriage.

Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could
have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present
case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by
Mananggolo and his men was made possible.

Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to
take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation
manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to
protect the safety of its passengers.

Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors
had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to
protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably
with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been
employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. As this Court amended in Gacal v.

Page 34 of 61
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 6 a common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by
frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages.

From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner's employees failed to prevent the attack on one of
petitioner's buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence,
petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.

Second. Seizure of Petitioner's Bus not a Case of Force Majeure

The petitioner contends that the seizure of its bus by the armed assailants was a fortuitous event for
which it could not be held liable.

Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurence which could not be foreseen, is
inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, 7 we held that to considered as force majeure, it is necessary
that (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event
must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the occurence must be render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or
aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would
prevent the obligor from being excused from liability.

Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 8 it was held that the common carrier was liable for its failure to
take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in the
loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was forseeable, and, thus, the second requisite
mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report
of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to
safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was
foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner from liabilty.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 9 and De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 10 in
support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes force majeure. In Pilapil
v. Court of Appeals, 11 it was held that a common carrier is not liable for failing to install window grills
on its buses to protect the passengers from injuries cause by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless
elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 12 it was ruled that a common carriers
is not responsible for goods lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or irresistable threat,
violence, or force.

It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the prensent case. Art. 1755 of the
Civil Code provides that "a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances." Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents therein were not negligent
in failing to take special precautions against threats to the safety of passengers which could not be
foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the present case, this factor of
unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is lacking. As already
stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of
petitioner's buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the
necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of
passengers.

Page 35 of 61
Third. Deceased not Guilty of Contributory Negligence

The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning to the bus
to retrieve something. But Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that the
intended targets of the violence were petitioners and its employees, not its passengers. The assailant's
motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between
petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the
group which had hijacked the bus, ordered the passengers to get off the bus as they intended to burn it
and its driver. The armed men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What
apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was
playing the role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot considered an act of negligence, let
alone recklessness.

Fourth. Petitioner Liable to Private Respaondents for Damages

We now consider the question of damages that the heirs of Atty. Caorong, private respondents herein,
are entitled to recover from the petitioner.

Indemnity for Death. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 2206 thereof, provides for the
payment of indemnity for the death of passengers caused by the breach of contract of carriage by a
common carrier. Initially fixed in Art. 2206 at P3,000.00, the amount of the said indemnity for death has
through the years been gradually increased in view of the declining value of the peso. It is presently
fixed at P50,000.00. 13 Private respondents are entitled to this amount.

Actual Damages. Art. 2199 provides that "except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as has duly proved." The trial
court found that the private respondents spent P30,000.00 for the wake and burial of Atty. Caorong. 14
Since petitioner does not question this finding of the trial court, it is liable to private respondent in the
said amount as actual damages.

Moral Damages. Under Art. 2206, the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants
of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased." The trial court found that private respondent Paulie Caorong suffered pain from the death of
her husband and worry on how to provide support for their minor children, private respondents Yasser
King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander. 15 The petitioner likewise does not question this finding of the
trial court. Thus, in accordance with recent decisions of this Court, 16 we hold that the petitioner is
liable to the private respondents in the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages for the death of Atty.
Caorong.

Exemplary Damages. Art. 2232 provides that "in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
reckless manner." In the present case, the petitioner acted in a wanton and reckless manner. Despite
warning that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge against the petitioner by burning some of its
buses, and contary to the assurance made by its operations manager that the necessary precautions
would be take, the petitioner and its employees did nothing to protect the safety of passengers. Under
the circumtances, we deem it reasonable to award private respondents exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00.17

Page 36 of 61
Attorney's Fees. Pursuant to Art. 2208, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case,
exemplary damages are awarded. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 18 we
held an award of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees to be reasonable. Hence, the private respondents are
entitled to attorney's fees in that amount.

Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 2206 thereof,
provides that in addition to the indemnity for death arising from the breach of contrtact of carriage by a
common carrier, the "defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter." The formula established in decided cases for
computing net earning capacity is as follows:19

Gross Necessary
Net Earning = Life x Annual — Living
Capacity Expectancy Income Expenses

Life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference of eighty (80) and the age
of the deceased. 20 Since Atty. Caorong was 37 years old at that time of his death, 21 he had a life
expectancy of 28 2/3 more years.22 His projected gross annual income, computed based on his monthly
salary of P11,385.00. 23 as a lawyer in the Department of Agrarian Reform at the time of his death, was
P148,005.00. 24 Allowing for necessary living expenses of fifty percent (50%) 25 of his projected gross
annual income, his total earning capacity amounts to P2,121,404.90. 26 Hence, the petitioner is liable to
the private respondents in the said amount as a compensation for loss of earning capacity.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner Fortune Express, Inc. is ordered to pay the following amounts to private
respondents Paulie, Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander Caorong:

1. death indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);

2. actual damages in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00);
3. moral damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);
4. exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);
5. attorney's fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
6. compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of two million one hundred twenty-one
thousand four hundred four pesos and ninety centavos (P2,121,404.90); and
7. cost of suits.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Page 37 of 61
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had
been allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.

Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an information which
reads:

That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and with intent to
kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into the
vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and
prejudice of her relatives. (66)

When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits.

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie
Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino
Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr.
Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta (15)
Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20)
2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon Caber, (23)
Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.

On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the testimonies of (1)
Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val
Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.

The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are
summarized in its decision, as follows:

The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter
brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel
along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen from among a bunch of
street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias
"Egan", was the first to take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do
the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures
depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on top of the table. Other things which were taken out
and placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks
inhaler. One of these objects the accused played with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of
which is grayish blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was inserted inside the
vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers against
pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in
the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the accused. He then started
masturbating the young boy and also guided the boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so that they
masturbated each other, while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When
Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join
him in bed. The accused then placed himself between the two (2) children and accused started fingering
Rosario.

Page 38 of 61
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention. He looked, and
he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate the
vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he was
sleepy and fell asleep.

The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an "American, paid Ramirez alias
"Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the American left, they went
downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something in her vagina. But they could
not do anything anymore, because the American had already left, and neither did they report the matter
to the police. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was
already removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the
evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan
asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another occasion
wherein Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to
talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore
because he already went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed his
studies in the primary grades.

On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the
gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21,
being ogled by people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and foul smelling.
Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to the Olongapo City
General Hospital in an unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was
the one who gave the personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as
Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was
already in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name of
Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the Information
clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that it was Alcantara who supplied the
personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives more credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as
against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness, for the reason that through his own
testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had already known Rosario
Baluyot for more than one (1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to the house of his twin brother,
Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the name of "Nora"
who was then in the custody of his brother. His brother Melchor was also living with their mother,
brother and sister-in-law and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's testimony even
stays for one week or a few days at his brother's house when she visits Nora. So the Court can safely
assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at his brother's house,
he must have already did come to know the name of Rosario Baluyot including her age. In his testimony
in Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks money which can safely be
concluded that he knows her very well. It is against normal behavior especially to a Filipino who have a
characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the real name of the girl he claims to know only as
"Tomboy".

While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital, nobody was attending to her
since she is a street child, having stowed away from the custody of her grandmother. Three (3) good
samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel
and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who was all

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alone with no relatives attending to her and after finding out that she was only 12 years old decided to
help her. After a short interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only because she clamped up
about her residence and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the medicine she
needed during her confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able to get the
name and age of Rosario Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time. For
Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because their program assisted only
indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.

Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel movement and vomiting,
which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to
a massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she was examined by
the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal
canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul smelling odor emanating from her body.
One of the doctors who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the
foreign object by means of a forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said object was deeply
embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and
distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent when she was scheduled
for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly
because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The surgeon who
operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario had to be operated even in that
condition in order to save her life. Her condition was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz,
the anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when
Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He found out that the
fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches
of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to have septicemia, poisoning of the
blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were traced to have been caused through infection by the foreign
object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object which was already
agreed upon by both parties that it is a portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of
Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to
the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the authorized person.
This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation successful and
the patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the ward for
about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz
who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20, 1987.

Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein
that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to septicemia caused by the foreign
object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.

The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent small jar and labelled
"Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign object, and it was given to her under
proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who helped financially Rosario's case, and
afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the said object until Mr.
Salonga came and asked her for the object.

After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in
locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos

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Turla, and informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St. Martin Funeral
Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for Rosario.

Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked her
if she was interested in filing a case against the person who caused the death of her granddaughter. Of
course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same.

After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came to
her house and told her that the accused was willing to settle the case, but that accused Ritter had only
P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she knows that the accused is liable to pay
damages anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer for her
case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case settled once and for all giving the reason
that she can no longer bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her
nephew obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in
the records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay
tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty.
Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told
Rosario's grandmother that they are willing to settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00,
so she received the money with the understanding that there was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was
made to sign a statement, and she was asked to change the age of her granddaughter Rosario. With the
document prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went to the Fiscal's office to have it subscribed,
and was subscribed before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00 was not paid, because
later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo City and he could no longer attend to it. Atty.
Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even apologized to her.

As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A", was directed by Col. Daos,
Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department to make a follow up of the case of Rosario
Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign object inside Rosario's vagina
was said to be an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted its investigation headed by
criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva
Palencia, since Rosario was a street child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street children
and from some of them they learned that Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an American at
the MGM Hotel when the foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they
asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot sometime
before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought them to the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was
taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement. Then he was brought to Mr.
Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the description supplied by Ramirez, a composite
drawing was photocopied and copies thereof were distributed to the local police and to the sentries at
the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some American servicemen who had resemblance to the composite
drawing were photographed and these were shown to Jessie Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside
from the physical description by Ramirez about the appearance of the suspect, he also described him as
having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.

After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the
so-called American may be European or Australian national, the team composed of Agent Salonga, Mr.
Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael Johnson,
another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter
checked in a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987. On the first night, they went to Luneta Park where

Page 41 of 61
foreign homo-sexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result was negative. Then on September 25,
at about 11:00 p.m., while they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a
male caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles,
Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity
with the American suspect, so the two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner and to strike a
conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner
was the one who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that
this foreigner had no beard while the one previously described by Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez
told them that maybe he have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a bar, and after several
minutes he came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that
the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western Police District.
It could be mentioned at this stage that in this operation they were accompanied by two (2) policemen
from the Western Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed and was told that he was a suspect for
Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they first went to the pension house of the suspect in Ermita,
Manila to get his shoulder bag which contained his personal belongings, and from there they brought
him to the Western Police Department. At the said police headquarters, they were allowed a permissive
search by the foreigner of his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3
inhalers, money in the form of dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about
P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that the suspect's name was Heinrich
Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of Hitter, Salonga and his team already left
the headquarters and went to their hotel, because at this time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with
fear after he identified the accused.

The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo City Jail.
The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the preliminary
investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla
because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita Burgos died on January
12, 1982, and their father Policarpio Baluyot had left them under her custody. When this case was filed,
the father's whereabouts was unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this case before the
Court was already in progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about
the death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was already gone.

The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime of Rape with Homicide
because the suspect was described as an American while Ritter is an Austrian. Also advanced by the
defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time of the commission
of the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having been born on December 26, 1973 as per
baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 and
was born on December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish Church who
issued the Baptismal Certificate, having custody and possession of the book of baptism for the year
1975, but admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered therein.
Likewise, the defense's stand is that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a vibrator is not
a weapon of death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and that the death of
Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and Director of the Olongapo
City General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)

On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:

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WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the prosecution has established
the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and
penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER
to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of
attorney's fees to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)

The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly committed by the court:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED
OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO
COMMITTED IT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT
WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT
REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.

Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the
accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort
to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience
that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).

The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a young girl who
died after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.

As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—whether or not Rosario
Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged incident happened on October 10,
1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there was statutory rape, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12
years of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious state do not have to
be present.

The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually abused by the accused
and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.

In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's grandmother
and father who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975. These oral declarations were
admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a birth

Page 43 of 61
certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable fact in the
life of a member of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which permits the
admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p.
54).

The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth date because her
brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the only one who failed to
attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).

The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on December 22, 1975
(T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she
was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).

The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record and the death
certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City General
Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the
hospital's clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot
also testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this as
adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared
that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he
was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)

The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father supported by other
independent evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate and the testimonies of Fe Israel and
Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the defense without any probative or
evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)

The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the application of
evidentiary rules.

The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of
Court).

For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:

(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;

(2) That pedigree is in issue;

(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or marriage;

(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante litem motam; and

(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must as a
general rule be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the declarations fall
within the purview of the rule.

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The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age were admitted by the
trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify in court. Their
declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the controversy arose. The other
witnesses who testified on Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The testimonies of
Rosario's relatives must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of what happened and
not as hearsay evidence on matters of family history.

At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.

The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to the ruling laid
down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of the mother
that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the age because
the child was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from
one who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.

It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness.
(People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])

With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral was never
established, which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be remembered. The father's
declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had direct
knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than one (1) year old at the
time she was baptized.

The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was there any basis
shown to establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical records were based on Gaspar
Alcantara's incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came
to know her only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the
circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based on
the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.

All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old
at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of birth, much less offset
a documentary record showing a different date.

The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as being
hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses establishing
Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of
belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).

By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St. James
Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and stated that he
is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a
latin term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book, there appears the
name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25, 1974, and born on December 26, 1973.

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Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as
the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.

In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:

xxx xxx xxx

In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal
certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378,
23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child,
but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that
concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their
truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)

In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the
course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms
administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and
recorded in a book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914]
Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on
December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's
father testified that he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different from the one presented in
court. However, no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a date different from that
brought by the official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that Rosario was baptized on
December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that Rosario could have been born on December
22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22" may be proof only of
baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in 1975. With the father's assertion
that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree
that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry.

In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly not been registered, her
baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, was sufficient to establish that Mary Rose was
below twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426)

Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document as
to Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she was born on December 26, 1973.
Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.

Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies on the
prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident in a
charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.

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Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged sexual
violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that there was
force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows
that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to have
consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez
was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with the
testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor
street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to
submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come under the purview of force or
intimidation needed to convict for rape.

In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was committed. But was
Ritter guilty of homicide?

The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a consequence of the
insertion of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the appellant.

We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which led
to her death?

The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the
circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.

Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario's vagina. Neither
could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object which the appellant
was holding at that time of the alleged incident.

In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he answered that:

xxx xxx xxx

T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa
kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?

S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa
kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos
niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.

T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng Amerikano?

S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay
bilog na patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na
may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.

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T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin
kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng
Amerikano sa kanyang bag?

S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na
inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay
kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)

Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not deny
having possessed at that time. He was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)

Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with color blue
(Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of the
witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements made especially when he answered
on additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same
object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the prosecution (T.S.N. pp.
109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because he did
not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.

What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the foreigner
inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted such statement as part of the res gestae.
In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the trial court focused the test of
admissibility on the lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the average 13 years old,
the insertion of a mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a young girl is
undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence to show that the
statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the event was so
startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)

Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's vagina, the evidence
is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.

Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her vagina. We quote:

Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even categorically admitted to you
that she was already able to remove the object allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CARAAN:

Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by Rosario Baluyot later on when you
met her when you asked her and when she told you that she was already able to remove that object
from her vagina?

A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already removed?" And she
answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the same night, she again complained of pain of her stomach. She

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sent one of her friends to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering defamatory words
against me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)

This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children were invited by
the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so we
can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by the
appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and discomfort
until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA
429 [1986]).

At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the
defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate of the State University in
1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the Institute of
Criminology University. He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a
graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan
1965. He was appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940 until 1944.
He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984.
He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of
Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical
Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less than 13
conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine" and "Medical
Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and medical background, his testimony is too authoritative to
ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:

Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2" which object was described
as a part of a sexual vibrator battery operated. Now, given this kind of object, would you kindly tell us
what would be the probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted into her vagina?

A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human being and as such be
considered a foreign object. As a foreign object, the tendency of the body may be: No. 1—expel the
foreign body—No. 2.—The tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body. One of the reactions
that maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is concerned is to cover the foreign
body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury to the body.

Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest symptoms and changes in the
area where the foreign body is located.

In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but may be felt all over the
body, we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering the fact that this foreign body as shown to me is
already not complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for the body to react. If there is
mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of power from within and that
power must be a dry cell battery. [The] composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide ammonium,
salts, water and any substance that will cause current flow. All of these substances are irritants including
areas of the container and as such, the primary reaction of the body is to cause irritation on the tissues,
thereby inflammatory changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes
would be a supervening infection in a way that the whole generative organ of the woman will suffer

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from diseased process causing her the systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area, and other
systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19,1988)

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction such as an infection would
set in, how many days after the insertion of this object in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?

A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal
secretion has more chance to get in, well, liberation of this irritant chemicals would be enhanced and
therefore in a shorter period of time, there being this vaginal reaction.

Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the insertion?

A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in the vaginal canal usually
developed within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina on
October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on May 19, 1987 the following year, so it took more than 7
months before this was extracted, would you say that it will take that long before any adverse infection
could set in inside the vagina?

A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?

A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this lipstick of women usually,
there are only about two (2) weeks time that the patient suffer some abnormal symptoms.

Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you mentioned, this object has a
shorter time?

A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)

The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame wherein
infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is not
more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame."

A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is facing a
penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be based on probabilities which are less
likely than those probabilities which favor him.

It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged inside the body.
An examination of the object gave the following results:

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(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.

(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per certification dated 01 June
1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop
51, Subic (see attached certification).

(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator depicted in the catalog because
no actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical characteristics were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit
"LL")

The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the open end portion
which revealed the following:

Result of Examination

Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows the following
inscription:

MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")

From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis'
testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in much earlier. Considering also that the object was
inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ which is lined with
a very thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more susceptible to
infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)

The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case. We see no
reason why his opinions qualified by training and experience should not be controlling and binding upon
the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469
[1988]).

Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot on May 17,
1986 as a referral patient from the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to the patient
prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)

Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The patient was brought to the
delivery room wheel-chaired then from the wheel chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able
to walk from the door to the examining table. On examination, the patient is conscious, she was fairly
nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at that time and examination deals

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more on the abdomen which shows slightly distended abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness
all over, with maximum tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)

xxx xxx xxx

Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein I placed my index finger and
middle finger inside the vagina of the patient and was able to palpate a hard object. After which, I made
a speculum examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion of the vaginal canal, there I
saw purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a foreign body invaded on the
posterior part of the vaginal canal.

xxx xxx xxx

A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try to remove the said foreign
object by the use of forceps which I tried to do so also but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in the first and second
instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you able to talk to her when you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and placed the foreign object
on her vagina?

A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from the time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after that?

(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)

The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled
that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal conversation with the doctors and would be
sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to
the hospital, she was unconscious and writhing in pain.

It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that time because there
were several instances testified to by different witnesses that she was still able to talk prior to her
operation:

(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal
Movement testified that as a member of this group she visits indigent children in the hospital every
Saturday and after office hours on working days.

Page 52 of 61
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to Rosario Baluyot.
In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May
25, 1988)

(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who worked at Pope John
23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she encountered Rosario
Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated
on the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there, she was told that it was too hot in
the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7,
1988)

(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified that she was
conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he brought her
to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)

From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still answer questions
asked of her although she was complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical attention given
to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.

Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis,
which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual
vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian
tubes and into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.

The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC

He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:

xxx xxx xxx

The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it
fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The defendant
faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a
manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is
important, therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the
innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)

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The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of witnesses and
preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and convincing proof
that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her death
seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were mere
circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though, that the
following requisites should concur:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)

For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this case the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the
appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)

We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death exemplified
starkly the daily terrors that most street children encounter as they sell their bodies in order to survive.
At an age when innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in their lives, they experience life in
its most heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle disappointments occupying
their young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults should never be made to carry.

It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of Government to
dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street
children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could
be brought to justice so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the formulation and
implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as
much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-
abiding people.

The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that
the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.

By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:

1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt about her being less than 12
years old when the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for the prosecution is to be believed,
she was not yet born on the date she was baptized.

Page 54 of 61
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory, the prosecution has to
prove force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to convict for rape. There is no such proof. In
fact, the evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary considerations.

3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie
Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning after the insertion, he was only
told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who informed him that she was able to
remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second encounter, he saw
Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach. She was even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is
not only hearsay, it is also contradictory.

4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active properties
to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only after seven months inside a young girl's vaginal
canal. Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that the incident happened in
December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence, however shows that the appellant
was not here in the Philippines that December. As per the Commission on Immigration Arrival and
Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October 12,
1986. He never returned until September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident could have
happened only in October, but then it would have been highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay
inside the vagina for seven (7) months with the kind of serious complications it creates.

5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement testified that she told him
"Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.

Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the hotel incident.
Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months prior
to admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility that she
could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator or
vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.

Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime renders
the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection with the requisite
moral certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).

The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a
foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the
appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon
mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken
against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)

Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken into
account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates the
mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason. The
strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):

. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in criminal
cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls

Page 55 of 61
for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof "to the satisfaction of the court,
keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that
which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though
strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the
fact to a reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the
conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379,
citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .

In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt of
the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.

This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez
and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are convinced
that he comes to this country not to look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate
pleasures but in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.

With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant who picked
him and Rosario from among the children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the hotel he was
shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each other, such actuations clearly
show that the appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young children.
Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:

Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive desire to have sexual
intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various ages participate in sexual activities, like fellatio,
cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually committed by a homosexual
between a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.

Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself.
Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth. (Article II,
Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles,
especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our country.

In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not only
to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The state has
expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. (Art.
XV, Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing
them with money. The appellant should be expelled from the country.

Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a
person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano
v. IAC, supra.

. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code).
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a

Page 56 of 61
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily
exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission
as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one
of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to
the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility,
and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from
each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for the reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved
party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish)
Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every
private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any
less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will
correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.

Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house.1âwphi1 Circumstances
forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs
who have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous
death as reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of
rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there
is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that
the vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil
liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity
on the facts found in the records of this case.

The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy
(see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing
them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the
Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the

Page 57 of 61
appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, we are
awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.

And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children
from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from
the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never
intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the
forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college
dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the
appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue
to advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We
have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the
Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them. Something
must be done about it.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is
ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00
by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation proceedings against the
appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry into the country.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 161946 : November 14, 2008]

MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE, Petitioner, v. BITHUEL MACAS, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated September 16, 2002 and the Resolution2 dated
December 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64103, which affirmed the Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 23,723-95.

The facts are undisputed.

Eyewitness Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, at about 4:00 p.m., at the intersection of
Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in Davao City, 15-year old high school student Bithuel Macas, herein
respondent, was standing on the shoulder of the road. She was about two and a half meters away from
the respondent when he was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C. Cimafranca.
Rosalinda and another unidentified person immediately came to the respondent's rescue and told
Cimafranca to take the victim to the hospital. Cimafranca rushed the respondent to the Davao Medical
Center.

Dr. Hilario Diaz, the orthopedic surgeon who attended to the respondent, testified that the respondent
suffered severe muscular and major vessel injuries, as well as open bone fractures in both thighs and
other parts of his legs. In order to save his life, the surgeon had to amputate both legs up to the groins.4

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Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in
the name of herein petitioner, Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente. However, Cadiente claimed that when the
accident happened, he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to
Engr. Rogelio Jalipa on March 28, 1994,5 and turned over the Certificate of Registration and Official
Receipt to Jalipa, with the understanding that the latter would be the one to cause the transfer of the
registration.

The victim's father, Samuel Macas, filed a complaint6 for torts and damages against Cimafranca and
Cadiente before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 10. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint7 against
Jalipa.

In answer, Jalipa claimed that he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera at the time of the accident.
He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Abraham Abubakar on June 20, 1994.8 He thus filed a fourth-party
complaint9 against Abubakar.

After trial, the court ruled:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente and
Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for damages to the plaintiff for their own negligence as
stated above, and ordering them to indemnify the plaintiff jointly and severally as follows:

(a) P300,000.00 as compensatory damages for the permanent and almost total disability being suffered
by him;

(b) P150,000.00 for moral damages;

(c) P18,982.85 as reimbursement of medical expenses;

(d) P30,000.00 for attorney's fees; andcralawlibrary

(e) costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.10

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the findings of the trial court were in accordance with the
established facts and was supported by the evidence on record. Thus, it decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City in Civil Case No. 23723-95 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.11

From the aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals and the subsequent denial of the motion for
reconsideration, only Cadiente appealed to this Court.

The instant petition alleges that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in affirming the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner Cadiente raises the following as issues:

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I.

WAS THERE - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE INJURED PARTY?

II.

ARE BOTH DEFENDANT CADIENTE AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO
THE INJURED PARTY?

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] COMMIT[T]ED GRAVE LEGAL ERROR IN ORDERING DEFENDANT
CADIENTE AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT JALIPA JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE.12

Essentially, the issues to be resolved are: (1) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of
the victim; and (2) whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally
liable to the victim.

The petitioner contends that the victim's negligence contributed to his own mishap. The petitioner
theorizes that if witness Rosalinda Palero, who was only two and a half meters away from the victim,
was not hit by the Ford Fiera, then the victim must have been so negligent as to be bumped and run
over by the said vehicle.13

The petitioner further argues that having filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa, to whom he had
sold the Ford Fiera, the Court of Appeals should have ordered the latter to reimburse him for any
amount he would be made to pay the victim, instead of ordering him solidarily liable for damages.14

The respondent, for his part, counters that the immediate and proximate cause of the injuries he
suffered was the recklessly driven Ford Fiera, which was registered in the petitioner's name. He insists
that when he was hit by the vehicle, he was standing on the uncemented portion of the highway, which
was exactly where pedestrians were supposed to be.15

The respondent stresses that as the registered owner of the Ford Fiera which figured in the accident, the
petitioner is primarily liable for the injury caused by the said vehicle. He maintains that the alleged sale
of the vehicle to Jalipa was tainted with irregularity, which indicated collusion between the petitioner
and Jalipa.16

After a careful consideration of the parties' submissions, we find the petition without merit.

Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:

When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full, but must proportionately bear the

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consequences of his own negligence. The defendant is thus held liable only for the damages actually
caused by his negligence.17

In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on the shoulder,
which was the uncemented portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was
intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading or unloading
passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said
uncemented portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much as slowing
down, took off from the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and
recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim. The victim was just where he should be when the
unfortunate event transpired.

Cimafranca, on the other hand, had no rightful business driving as recklessly as she did. The respondent
cannot be expected to have foreseen that the Ford Fiera, erstwhile speeding along the cemented part of
the highway would suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and run him over. Thus, we are unable
to accept the petitioner's contention that the respondent was negligent.

Coming now to the second and third issues, this Court has recently reiterated in PCI Leasing and Finance,
Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.,18 that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had
already sold it to someone else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury the
vehicle may cause. We explained,

'Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or
owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility
and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to
respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is
usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has
no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is
the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the
registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.19

In the case of Villanueva v. Domingo,20 we said that the policy behind vehicle registration is the easy
identification of the owner who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by
the vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity
cannot be secured.21

Therefore, since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the
misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the
respondent, who had since stopped schooling and is now forced to face life with nary but two remaining
limbs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated September 16, 2002
and Resolution dated December 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64103 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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