Remedial Law Principles in Philippine Court Rulings

REMEDIAL LAW
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REMEDIAL LAW

A. CONCEPTS IN REMEDIAL LAW
Alfonso Singson Cortal vs Inaki Larrazabal
G.R. No. 199107. August 30, 2017, Leonen, J.
Procedural rules "are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases [so] [c]ourts and litigants
alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules." They provide a system for forestalling
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in dispute settlement. Thus, they are not to be
ignored to suit the interests of a party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance on a
"policy of liberal construction."
FACTS:
The assailed Court of Appeals September 30, 2010 Resolution dismissed petitioners' appeal under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on account of several technical defects. First was an
inconsistency between the listing of petitioners' names in their prior Motion for Extension of Time
and subsequent Petition for Review, in which the accompanying verification and certification of
non-forum shopping were laden with this same inconsistency and other defects. Second was the
non--inclusion of the original Complaint filed by the adverse party, now private respondent Inaki
A. Larrazabal Enterprises, before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. And last was petitioners' counsel's failure to indicate the place of issue of the
official receipt of his payment of annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of petitioners' appeal was justified by the errors noted by the Court
of Appeals.
RULING:
No, the dismissal was not justified by the errors.
ignored to suit the interests of a party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance
on a "policy of liberal construction."
Still, this Court has stressed that every party litigant must be afforded the fullest opportunity to
properly ventilate and argue his or her case, "free from the constraints of technicalities."34 Rule 1,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court expressly stipulates their liberal construction to the extent that
justice is better served.
In this case, the Court of Appeals was harsh in denying petitioners the opportunity to exhaustively
ventilate and argue their case.
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Rather than dwelling on procedural minutiae, the Court of Appeals should have been impelled by
the greater interest of justice. It should have enabled a better consideration of the intricate issues
of the application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, social justice, expropriation, and
just compensation. The reversals of rulings at the level of the DARAB could have been taken as an
indication that the matters at stake were far from being so plain that they should be ignored on
mere technicalities. The better part of its discretion dictated a solicitous stance towards petitioners.
Vivencio, Eugenio, Joji and Myrna, All Surnamed Mateo vs. Department of
Agrarian Reform, Land Bank of the Philippines and Mariano T. Rodriguez, et al.
G.R. No. 186339, February 15, 2017, REYES, J.
While the Court recognizes the primacy of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in
our judicial system, it bears emphasizing that the principle admits of exceptions, among which is when
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that irretrievably prejudices a complainant.
FACTS:
The Mateos were the registered owners of [coconut and rice lands] with a total area of 1,323,112
square meters situated at Fabrica, Bacon, Sorsogon and [were] covered by TCT No. T-22822. A
portion of the land[s] was brought under the coverage of the CARP of the government and for this
reason, the DAR entered the premises sometime in June 1994. LBP valued the Mateos' land at fifty-
two thousand pesos (₱52,000.00) per [ha]. The Mateos, however, rejected the LBP's valuation.
On April 30, 1997, the Mateos filed a complaint against LBP, DAR, and the farmer beneficiaries of
the land for just compensation. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-6331 and raffled to the
RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), presided by respondent
Judge Honesto A. Villamor.7
The LBP and DAR filed their respective answers arguing that since no summary administrative
proceedings to determine the amount of just compensation had been conducted yet, the complaint
of the Mateos was premature.
The SAC fixed the amount of just compensation to P71, 143, 623.00 and ordered LBP to pay the
Mateos the said amount. The CA rendered a decision setting aside the SAC's judgment and
dismissing without prejudice the complaint of the Mateos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in negating the jurisdiction of the RTC, as a SAC, to determine in the
first instance and in the absence of the conduct of prior administrative proceedings, questions of
just compensation to be paid to landowners.
RULING:
Yes, While the Court recognizes the primacy of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies in our judicial system, it bears emphasizing that the principle admits of exceptions, among
which is when there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that irretrievably prejudices a
complainant. This exception is attendant herein where the LBP and the DAR entered the property
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of the Mateos sometime in 1994, but deposited cash and Agrarian Reform Bonds as payment
therefor only on December 13, 1996 and February 11, 1997. The LBP and the DAR were indisputably
aware that the Mateos rejected the price offered as just compensation for the subject property. Still,
at the time the Mateos filed their suit before the SAC, no summary administrative proceeding was
yet initiated by the DAR to make further valuation. The SAC even had to issue no less than three
orders dated November 12, 1997, January 7, 1998 and March 18, 1998 for the DAR to conduct the
necessary proceedings. DAR's delay and inaction had unjustly prejudiced the Mateos and
precluding them from filing a complaint before the SAC shall result in an injustice, which the law
never intends.
B. SUBSTANTIVE LAW VIS-À-VIS-REMEDIAL LAW

Rodante Guyamin, et.al. v. Jacinto Flores, et.al.,
G.R. No. 202189, April 25, 2017, Del Castillo, J.
This Court has time and again reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed
at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of
the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to
enhance fair tria.ls and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive
rights of the other party.
FACTS:
The respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession against petitioners. They alleged that
they were the registered owners of a 984 sq.m. property in Gen. Trias, Cavite, which they allowed
Petitioners to occupy as their relatives. After demand to vacate, Petitioners however, refused to do
so and conciliation in the barangay only proved to be futile. Thus, compelling them to file an action.
Summons were served upon the Petitioners, however they refused to sign the receipt. Respondent
filed a motion to declare petitioners in default contending that despite service of summons they
still failed to appear. The RTC granted the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly declared Petitioners in default.
RULING:
YES. The court process server's Return of Summons dated September 26, 2006 exists, and must be
presumed regular. The mere fact that the RTC, and even the respondents, requested at different
stages in the proceedings that summons be served once more upon petitioners does not prove that
the service thereof made on September 25, 2006 was invalid; it only means that the court and parties
desire the service of summons anew which was clearly unnecessary. The claim that Lucinia was
then abroad is of no moment either; there is no evidence to support this self-serving claim.
The filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default, and the
latter's filing of a reply, do not erase the fact that petitioners' answer is late. Respondents' reply filed
thereafter is, like the belated answer a mere scrap of paper, as it proceeds from the said answer.
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C. NATURE OF PHILIPPINE COURTS
BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc., Petitioner vs.

Total Distribution & Logistic Systems, Inc., Respondents
G.R. No. 214406, February 6, 2017, PERALTA, J.:
A close reading of the present petition shows that what this Court is being asked to resolve is, what
should prevail - the findings of facts of the RTC or the findings of facts of the CA on the alleged
misapprehension of facts of the RTC. The findings of facts of both Courts are obviously conflicting,
hence, the need for this Court to rule on the present petition.
FACTS:
A Complaint for Sum of Money was filed by petitioner BP Oil against respondent Total Distribution
& Logistic Systems, Inc. (TDLSI) on April 15, 2002, seeking to recover the sum of ₱36,440,351.79
representing the total value of the moneys, stock and accounts receivables that TDLSI has allegedly
refused to return to BP Oil.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, while the CA ruled in favor of respondent. Hence, petitioner
filed the present petition before the Supreme Court raising questions of fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may entertain the present petition.
RULING:
YES. The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under
Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings
of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt" when
supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor
disturbed on appeal to this court.
However, these rules do admit exceptions: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding
of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted
by the evidence on record.
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Spouses Sergio C. Pascual and Emma Servillion Pascual, Petitioners, v.

First Consolidated Rural Bank (Bohol), Inc., Robinsons Land Corporation and
Atty. Antonio P. Espinosa, Register of Deeds, Butuan City, Respondent
G.R. No. 202597, February 8, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
On February 14, 2011, the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of
Appeals (CA) in order to nullify and set aside the decision rendered in Special Proceedings Case
No. 4577 by the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC) ordering the cancellation of their notice
of lis pendens recorded in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-42190 of the Register of Deeds of
ButuanCity.
After the responsive pleadings to the petition were filed, the CA scheduled the preliminary
conference on October 4, 2011, and ordered the parties to file their respective pre-trial
briefs. Instead of filing their pre-trial brief, the petitioners filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and a Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance. At the scheduled preliminary conference, the
petitioners and their counsel did not appear. The CA dismissed the petition, citing Sections 4 to 6
of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 16
November 2011), which the CA denied on January 9, 2012 for being filed out of time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time
RULING:
YES. The petitioners received the assailed resolution of November 16, 2011 on November 24, 2011.
Under Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, they had 15 days from receipt (or until December 9,
2011) within which to move for its reconsideration or to appeal to the Supreme Court. They
dispatched the Motion for Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 16 November 2011) on
December 9, 2011 through private courier (LBC). The CA actually received the motion on December
12, 2011. Considering that Section 1(d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
provided that motions sent through private messengerial services are deemed filed on the date of
the CA's actual receipt of the same, the motion was already filed out of time by December 12, 2011.
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Needless to remind, the running of the period of appeal of the final resolution promulgated on
November 16, 2011 was not stopped, rendering the assailed resolution final and executory by
operation of law.
The petitioners contend that their Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in
Abeyance needed to be first resolved before the pre-trial could proceed; that the CA erred in
declaring that "it is only at the pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court;" and
that the CA overlooked their submission in their Opposition with Explanation to the effect that
Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court was superseded by Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated
January 15, 1999 and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC dated August 16, 2004.
The petitioners' contentions have no merit. We consider it erroneous on the part of the CA to
declare that "it is only at the pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court." The
filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done prior to the pre-trial. Section 1, Rule 35 of
the Rules of Court permits a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or
seeking declaratory relief to file the motion for a summary judgment upon all or any part thereof
in his favor (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) "at any time after the pleading
in answer thereto has been served;" while Section 2 of Rule 35 instructs that a party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may file the motion
for summary judgment (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) upon all or any
part thereof "at any time." As such, the petitioners properly filed their motion for summary
judgment prior to the pre-trial (assuming that they thereby complied with the requirement of
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions).
We remind that the summary judgment is a procedural technique that is proper under Section 3,
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court only if there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact,
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.15 It is a method intended to
expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record.16 The term genuine issue is defined as
an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue that is
sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions,
documents, affidavits, and/or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. Where the
facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot
take the place of a trial.17 The party moving for the summary judgment has the burden of clearly
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact.18 Upon the plaintiff rests the burden to
prove the cause of action, and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay.
After the plaintiffs burden has been discharged, the defendant has the burden to show facts
sufficient to entitle him to defend.19
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Sps. Proceso and Helen Pontillas v. Carmen Vda. De Pontillas,

G.R. No. 207667, April 17, 2017, Tijam, J.
Courts should not be unduly strict in cases involving procedural lapses that do not really impair the
proper administration of justice. Since litigation is not a game of technicalities, every litigant should
be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the
constraints of technicalities.
FACTS:
Respondent averred that during the lifetime of her husband, they allowed petitioners to occupy ¼
of the land they owned, however, upon his death, the Petitioners refused to vacate the property.
Respondent filed an action for unlawful detainer. The MTC dismissed the case. On appeal, the RTC
reversed the MTC. Hence, the Petitioners filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42. The CA
dismissed the appeal outright for failure to append the proof of service to the adverse party and
failure to provide the updated PTR number of petitioner’s counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the case.
RULING:
NO. While petitioners failed to attach the proof of service in their petition before the CA,
petitioners submitted an Affidavit of Service when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration. In
this case, we deem it proper to consider that their belated submission of said proof of service
constitutes substantial compliance.
As to the failure of petitioners' counsel to update her PTR number, it must be considered that the
purpose of requiring a counsel to indicate her PTR number is merely to protect the public from
bogus lawyers. Notably, petitioners' counsel has a corresponding PTR number. However, she
merely failed to indicate the updated one inadvertently. Her belated submission of the same must
also be treated as substantial compliance for the danger which the law seeks to protect the public
from is not present in this case.
Senator Leila de Lima vs Hon. Juanita Guerrero, et al

G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017, En Banc, Velasco
FACTS:
4 complaints, which were later consolidated, were filed against petitioner concerning her
involvement on the illegal drug trade at the New Bilibid Prison. These 4 cases were later
consolidated and the DOJ Panel, headed by Senior Assistant State Prosecutor Peter Ong was
directed to conduct preliminary investigation.
In the preliminary hearings conducted by the DOJ Panel, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to
have the consolidated cases endorsed to the Ombudsman. Petitioner alleges that Ombudsman has
exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the complaints against her. The complainants filed an
Opposition against this Omnibus Motion to which petitioner filed a Reply thereto. Petitioner also
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submitted a Manifestation with Motion to First Resolve Pending Incident and to Defer Further
Proceedings.
During the next hearing, petitioner submitted that she has decided to not yet submit her counter-
affidavits considering the pendency of her two motions. This was denied by the DOJ Panel and
declared all pending incidents and cases submitted for resolution.
Petitioner thereafter filed before the CA a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari assailing the
jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints against her. At the time of the promulgation of
this decision, these petitions were still pending before the CA. The DOJ Panel, in the absence of
any restraining order issued by the CA recommended the filing of informations against petitioner.
Accordingly, 3 informations were filed against her. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Quash
these informations.
Respondent judge thereafter issued the assailed Order finding probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioner. Accordingly, the warrant was issued and served on petitioner
who was committed to the PNP Custodial Center.
Petitioner thereafter filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court praying that the court
grant a writ of certiorari to annul the Order by respondent judge which issued that warrant of arrest,
grant a writ of prohibition to enjoin respondent judge from further proceeding with the case until
petitioner’s Motion to Quash has been resolved, and the issuance of a status quo pro ante order to
restore petitioner to her liberty and freedom.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the rule on the hierarchy of
courts
2. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash renders the present petition
premature
3. Whether or not petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping
RULING:
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure
that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.
Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this Court were
allowed in some instances. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following
grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed
immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4)
when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the
essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no
other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes
questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was
considered as an inappropriate remedy.
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Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present petition so as
to convince this court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts. Petitioner's allegation
that her case has sparked national and international interest is obviously not covered by the
exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does
not also merit a special treatment of her case. The right to equal treatment before the law accorded
to every Filipino also forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her position and status
in the government.
The court also held the present petition is premature. Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner
explicitly ask for the dismissal of criminal case against her. What is clear is she merely asked the
respondent judge to rule on her Motion to Quash before issuing the warrant of arrest. As such,
there is no other recourse but to dismiss the instant petition and let the respondent judge rule on
the said motion.
Petitioner likewise violated the rule on forum shopping. The test to determine the existence of
forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia, or whether a final judgment in one case
amounts to res judicata in the other. Forum shopping therefore exists when the following elements
are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
In this case, the parties in the present Petition and in the Motion to Quash are the same. The
arguments raised in the two pleadings are likewise the same. With the presence of these two
requisites, the third one necessarily obtains.
Loloy Unduran, et.al. v. Ramon Aberarturi, et.al.,

G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017, Peralta, J.
The NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they
arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. When such claims and disputes
arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court En Banc’s decision denying their petition.
In their motion, they aver that the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) has
jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous People (IPs) regardless of the parties involved. They also
argue that the Court’s interpretation of Section 66 of RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act
(IPRA), to the effect that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group, is
contrary to law and the Constitution. They posit that the State recognizes that each ICC or IP group
is, and has been since time immemorial, governed by their own customary laws, culture, traditions
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and governance systems, and has the right to preserve and develop them as they may deem fit and
necessary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over disputes and controversies
involving ancestral domain of ICCs and IPs.
RULING:
NO. Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes or which can be
exercised only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute. Primary jurisdiction
is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to
act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence. Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction is that
which is "exercised by different courts at the same time over the same subject matter and within
the same territory, and wherein litigants may in the first instance resort to either court indifferently,
that of several different tribunals, each authorized to deal with the same subject matter, and when
a proceeding in respect of a certain subject matter can be brought in any one of several different
courts, they are said to have concurrent jurisdiction.
As held in the main decision, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP
group because of the qualifying provision under Section 66 of the IPRA that "no such dispute shall
be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws." Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of a proviso is to limit or restrict the
general language or operation of the statute, and that what determines whether a clause is a proviso
is the legislative intent, the Court stated that said qualifying provision requires the presence of two
conditions before such claims and disputes may be brought before the NCIP.
The Court thus noted that the two conditions cannot be complied with if the parties to a case either
(1) belong to different ICCs/IP groups which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct
customary laws, or (2) if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by
customary laws or a Council of Elders/Leaders, for it would be contrary to the principles of fair play
and due process for parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own
distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.
Section 66 of the IPRA which, to reiterate: (1) did not use the words "primary" and/or "original and
exclusive" to describe the jurisdiction of the NCIP over "all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs" and (2) contained a proviso requiring certification that the parties have exhausted their
remedies provided under customary laws.
After a careful perusal of the provisions of the entire IPRA, the Court discerns nothing therein that
expressly or impliedly confers concurrent jurisdiction to the NCIP and the regular courts over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs between and among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP group. What the Court finds instead is that the NCIP's limited jurisdiction is vested under
Section 66 of the IPRA, while its primary jurisdiction is bestowed under Section 52(h) and 53, in
relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, and Section 54 thereof.
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On a final note, the Court restates that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have limited
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise between or
among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and disputes arise between
or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have
jurisdiction. However, under Sections 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, as well as
Section 54, the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over adverse claims and border disputes arising
from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands, and cancellation of fraudulently-issued CADTs,
regardless of whether the parties are non-ICCs/ IPs, or members of different ICCs/IPs groups, as
well as violations of ICCs/IPs rights under Section 72 of the IPRA where both parties belong to the
same ICC/IP group. When the parties belong to different ICC/IP group or where one of the parties
is a non-ICC/IP, jurisdiction over such violations shall fall under the proper Regional Trial Court.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION

A. JURISDICTION OF COURTS
Joseph Regalado vs Emma de la Rama vda. de la Pena, Jesusa de la Pena,
Johnny de la Pena, Johanna de la Pena, Jose de la Pena,
Jessica de la Pena, and Jaime Antonio de la Pena
G.R. No. 202448, December 13, 2017, First Division, del Castillo
Jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot be presumed or implied and must distinctly appear
from the law. It cannot also be vested upon a court by the agreement of parties; or by the court’s
erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction over a case.
FACTS:
Respondents Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime de la Pena were the registered owners
of two parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares located in Murcia, Negros Occidental.
Sometime in 1994, petitioner, without the knowledge and consent of the respondents entered, took
possession of, and planted sugar cane on the subject properties without paying rent to the
respondents. Respondents discovered such entry in the crop year 1995-6 and promptly demanded
petitioner to vacate the subject properties to no avail.
The parties appeared before the Barangay Office but failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.
Thus, the Lupon Tagapamayapa issued a certificate to file action dated September 29, 1997.
Respondents filed a case for recovery of possession in the RTC on March 9, 1998.
Petitioner, in his Answer, claims that respondents already renounced their rights to the subject
properties in favor of Jaime, and Jaime, in turn, waived his rights and interests therein to petitioner.
Petitioner also filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as the case was for ejectment and
was filed within a year from the barangay conciliation proceedings, and thus, the MTC has
jurisdiction.
Respondents, in their Reply, argue that the waiver of rights to Jaime was conditioned on the
payment of their P6.7 million loan with the Republic Planters Bank and the Philippine National
Bank. They further claim that the subsequent waiver by Jaime to petitioner was also conditioned
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on the same consideration. As there was no payment to the banks, the waivers of right should be
considered void. Respondents also argue that the demand to vacate was already made in the crop
year of 1995-6.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and held that as the area of the subject properties was 44
hectares, it was safe to assume that value is P20,000.00. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and
held that petitioner was not entitled to the properties as he failed to pay the consideration. The CA
affirmed the RTC and noted that the latter had jurisdiction over the case because the parties
stipulated the jurisdiction of the RTC, and that the presumed value of the subject properties exceed
P20,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
The material averments in the complaint and the law in effect at the time of the commencement of
action determine which court has jurisdiction over the case. A complaint for forcible entry must
allege the plaintiff’s prior possession, and that he was deprived of the same through force,
intimidation, thread, strategy, or stealth, and that the action must be filed within a year of
knowledge of dispossession. A complaint for unlawful detainer, on the other hand, must state that
the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the real property after the expiration or
termination of his right to possess it, and that is also filed within a year from such time possession
became unlawful. The complaint in this case had none of these averments. In the absence of the
required jurisdiction facts, the case cannot be considered as one for ejectment.
There is also no clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not
specify the value of the subject properties. In the absence of this material fact, it cannot be
determined which court has original exclusive jurisdiction over the action.
1. COURTOF APPEALS
Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez vs. Director of Lands

G.R. No. 168065/G.R. No. 168070. September 6, 2017, Martires, J.
Failure of the Director of Lands to appeal does not prevent the appellate court from declaring the land
in question to be public land. Under the Public Land Law, the presumption always is that the land
pertains to the state.
FACTS:
The Saclolos filed a joint application for registration of title over 3 parcels of land. They averred that
they had acquired title to the subject lands through purchase and that together with their
predecessors-in-interest, they had been in actual and exclusive possession, occupation, and
cultivation of the subject lands since time immemorial. The government, thru the Director of
Lands, filed oppositions to the application. The Director of Lands argued that the subject lands are
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not alienable and disposable because: they are located within the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation, segregated from the public domain by Proclamation No. 307; that by virtue of RA No.
6236, the right to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Law,
with respect to lands having an area of more than 144 hectares, has expired; that the Saclolos had
not acquired title over the subject lands through any recognized mode of acquisition of title; that
the Saclolos and their predecessors-in-interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lands for at least 30 years immediately
preceding the filing of the application; and that PSU 68, 69, and 70, the plans which cover the
subject lands, have not been verified by the Bureau of Lands as required by PD No. 239.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court may declare that the lands sought to be registered are not alienable
and disposable notwithstanding the failure of the Director of Lands to appeal from the decision of
the trial court decreeing the issuance of certificates of title.
RULING:
YES. The subject lands may still be declared public lands notwithstanding the Director of Lands'
failure to appeal from the RTC decision. In Laragan v. Court of Appeals,the Court held:
x x x While it may be true that the Director of Lands did not appeal from the decision of the
trial court, his failure to so appeal did not make the decision of the trial court final and
executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the other oppositors, Teodoro Leafio, Tomas
Leafio, Francisco Leafio, and Consolacion Leafio, who also seek the confirmation of their
imperfect title over the land in question.
Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate
court from declaring the land in question to be public land, since the oppositors and
the herein petitioners are both seeking the registration of their title pursuant to the
provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law where the presumption always is
that the land pertains to the state, and the occupants and possessors claim an
interest in the same, by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for
the required number of years. Thus, in their application for registration, the petitioners
alleged that they "hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act, and to have the title thereto registered and
confirmed." The petitioners are deemed to thereby admit that, until such confirmation, the
land remains public.
Consequently, the appellate court may still determine whether the subject lands are indeed
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, notwithstanding the Director of Lands' failure
to appeal from the RTC decision.
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Diaz-Enriquez v. Director of Lands, Court of Appeals, and the Saclolos

G.R. No. 168065, September 6, 2017, Third Division, Martires, J.
Courts can still adjudicate on the nature of land as public or otherwise notwithstanding the Director
of Lands’ failure to appeal from the court a quo’s decision.
Absent any positive act declaring the land as alienable and disposable, lands of the public domain
presumably belong to the State and are inalienable.
FACTS:
On December 27, 1974, the Saclolos filed before the Naic RTC a joint application for registration
of title over three parcels of land worth 375.2 hectares at Sitio Sinalam, Ternate, Cavite. They claim
title through purchase and actual and exclusive possession, occupation, and cultivation of the
subject lands since time immemorial. The government, through the Director of Lands, opposed
on the grounds that (1) the lands are not alienable and disposable because they are located within
the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, which Proclamation No. 307 segregated from the public
domain; (2) the right to confirmation of imperfect title under Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act with
respect to lands having an area of more than 144 hectares has prescribed; and (3) the Saclolos and
their predecessor-in-interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive, adverse, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lands for at least 30 years immediately preceding the
filing of the application. Diaz-Enriquez intervened as the vendee of the lands in question.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Saclolos as Proclamation No. 307 itself indicated the segregation of
the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation was subject to private rights. The CA reversed on the
ground that the informacion possessiora by which the Saclolos heavily rely to support their claim
did not indicate the area covered by the claim and that other proof adduced by the Saclolos did
not show the nature of their possession. It also held judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act with respect to lands having an area of more htan 144 hectares had
lapsed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals may declare lands sought to be registered as not alienable
and disposable given the failure of the Director lf Lands to appeal the decision of the trial court
decreeing the issuance of certificates
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding the lands are not alienable and disposable
RULING:
The failure of the Director of Lands to appeal from the RTC decision does not preclude the Court
of Appeals from declaring subject lands as public land. The Saclolos are seeking the registration of
their title pursuant to the Public Land Act where the presumption always is that the land pertains
to the state, and the occupants and possessors claim an interest in the same in the same, by virtue
of their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
under a bona fide claim ownership for the required number of years. Further, an applicant must
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show, even though there is no opposition to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute
owner in fee simple.
In applications for land registration, the question of whether the subject lands were declared
alienable and disposable is of primordial importance because it is determinative if the land can in
fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and is thus registrable under the Torrens system. Though
Proclamation No. 307 recognizes private rights over parcels of land included in the reservation, a
mere invocation of private rights does not automatically entitle an applicant to have the property
registered in his name. The investigator’s report contradicted the Saclolos’ claim, the informacion
possessoria neither states the lands were alienable and disposable nor the area covered thereby,
and the deed of sale indicates a smaller land area than was claimed by the Saclolos. The Saclolos
failed to discharge the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain.
2. REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs.Royal Ferry Services, Inc.

G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017, LEONEN, J.
To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a corporation should be the
actual place where its principal office has been located for six (6) months before the filing of the
petition.
FACTS:
According to its Articles of Incorporation, Royal Ferry’s principal place of business is located at 2521
A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal, Makati City. However, it currently holds office at Room 203, BF
Condominium Building, Andres Soriano comer Solano Streets, Intramuros, Manila. It filed a
verified Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the RTC of Manila, which declared Royal Ferry
insolvent. Pilipinas Shell filed before the RTC of Manila a Formal Notice of Claim and a Motion to
Dismiss. In the Notice of Claim, Pilipinas Shell asserted that Royal Ferry owed them a sum of
money. In its Motion to Dismiss, Pilipinas Shell alleged that the Petition should have been filed
before the RTC of Makati and not before the RTC of Manila as Royal Ferry’s Articles of Incorporation
stated that the corporation’s principal office is located in Makati City. The RTC of Manila denied
Pilipinas Shell’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. However, the RTC reconsidered the denial of
the Motion to Dismiss. It held that a corporation cannot change its place of business without
amending its Articles of Incorporation. The RTC thus granted the dismissal of the Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency.
The CA reinstated the insolvency proceedings and held that the Motion to Dismiss failed to comply
with Section 81 of the Insolvency Law, which required the written consent of all creditors before a
petition for insolvency can be dismissed. It overturned the grant of the Motion to Dismiss since
Pilipinas Shell failed to secure the written consent of all the creditors of Royal Ferry. Pilipinas Shell
moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied. Hence, Pilipinas Shell filed the instant
Petition.
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Royal Ferry moved to dismiss the case on the ground that it entered into a Compromise
Agreement with Pilipinas, which was duly approved by the CA, thus making the present petition
moot and academic. However, Pilipinas Shell claimed that the Compromise Agreement was only
between Pilipinas Shell, and Antonino R. Gascon, Jr., and Jonathan D. Gascon (the Gascons). Royal
Ferry was not a party to the agreement. Pilipinas Shell argued that it had agreed to waive any action
against Royal Ferry’s officers, directors, employees, stockholders, and successors-in-interest, but
that it did not agree to waive its claim against Royal Ferry.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the present Petition is moot and academic in light of the Compromise Agreement
entered into by the parties.
(2) Whether the Petition for Insolvency was properly filed.
RULING:
(1) No. Pilipinas Shell has not abandoned its claim against Royal Ferry. The Compromise
Agreement was between Pilipinas Shell and the Gascons. Contrary to its claim, Royal Ferry was not
a party to the agreement. Nowhere in the Compromise Agreement did Pilipinas Shell agree to waive
its claim against Royal Ferry. In CA-GR. CV No. 102522, Pilipinas Shell held the Gascons solidarily
liable with Royal Ferry for the same debt that Pilipinas Shell was claiming in these proceedings. It
is on this basis that Royal Ferry now asserts that it is a solidary debtor with the Gascons and can,
thus, acquire the benefit stipulated in Article 1215 of the Civil Code. Royal Ferry did not present any
other proof of this alleged solidary liability. In CA-GR. CV No. 102522, one of Pilipinas Shell’s
contentions was whether the corporate veil should be pierced to make the Gascons liable for Royal
Ferry’s liabilities. Before the Court of Appeals could rule on the matter, however, the Compromise
Agreement had been executed and the case was closed.
A case is moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of
supervening events so that a declaration would be of no practical use or value. As Royal Ferry has
failed to establish that Pilipinas Shell has abandoned its claim against it, Pilipinas Shell continues
to have an interest in the insolvency proceeding.
(2) Yes. The Petition for Insolvency was properly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The first insolvency law, Republic Act No. 1956, was entitled “An Act Providing for the Suspension
of Payments, the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, the Protection of Creditors, and the Punishment of
Fraudulent Debtors (Insolvency Law)”. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 10142, otherwise
known as the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010 (FRIA), the Insolvency Law was
expressly repealed on July 18, 2010. The FRIA is currently the special law that governs insolvency.
However, because the relevant proceedings in this case took place before the enactment of the
FRIA, the case needs to be resolved under the provisions of the Insolvency Law.
Royal Ferry argues that the Regional Trial Court of Manila obtained jurisdiction because in its
Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, Royal Ferry alleged that its principal office was then found in
Manila. On the other hand, Pilipinas Shell argues that filing the petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila was a patent jurisdictional defect as the Regional Trial Court of Manila did not have
territorial jurisdiction over respondent’s residence. Pilipinas Shell confuses the concepts of
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jurisdiction and venue. Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional
impediment. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, while venue is a matter of procedural
law. Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the Insolvency Law vests jurisdiction in the Court of First
Instance – now the Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is acquired based on the allegations in the
complaint.
Section 14 of the Insolvency Law specifies that the proper venue for a petition for voluntary
insolvency is the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the insolvent debtor has resided
in for six (6) months before the filing of the petition. In this case, the issue of which court is the
proper venue for Royal Ferry’s Petition for Voluntary Insolvency comes from the confusion on an
insolvent corporation’s residence.
As there is a specific law that covers the rules on venue, the Rules of Court do not apply.
The old Insolvency Law provides that in determining the venue for insolvency proceedings, the
insolvent corporation should be considered a resident of the place where its actual place of business
is located six (6) months before the filing of the petition. If there is a conflict between the place
stated in the articles of incorporation and the physical location of the corporation’s main office, the
actual place of business should control. Requiring a corporation to go back to a place it has
abandoned just to file a case is the very definition of inconvenience. There is no reason why an
insolvent corporation should be forced to exert whatever meager resources it has to litigate in a city
it has already left. Moreover, the six (6)-month qualification of the law’s requirement of residence
shows intent to find the most accurate location of the debtor’s activities. If the address in a
corporation’s articles of incorporation is proven to be no longer accurate, then legal fiction should
give way to fact.
We cannot sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the “petition for voluntary insolvency
[was filed] in the proper venue since the cities of Makati and Manila are part of one region[.]” This
is untenable. Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides several judges to preside over the
different branches assigned to Manila and Makati. Thus, the two venues are distinct. Despite being
in the same region, Makati and Manila are treated as two distinct venues. To deem them as
interchangeable venues for being in the same region has no basis in law.
Royal Ferry is a resident of Manila. The law should be read to lay the venue of the insolvency
proceeding in the actual location of the debtor’s activities. If it is uncontroverted that Royal Ferry’s
address in its Articles of Incorporation is no longer accurate, legal fiction should give way to fact.
Thus, the Petition was correctly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Development Bank of the Philippines vs.Hon. Emmanuel C. Carpio, et al.

G.R. No. 195450, February 1, 2017, MENDOZA, J.
Before the trial court can be said to have residual jurisdiction over a case, a trial on the merits must
have been conducted; the court rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party appealed therefrom.
FACTS:
Abad, et al. filed a complaint for delivery of certificates of title, damages, and attorney’s fees against
DBP and Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise (GFSME) before the RTC. Abad, et
al. prayed, among others, for the issuance of a writ of seizure, pending hearing of the case, for
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delivery of their certificates of title they claimed to be unlawfully detained by DBP and GFSME.
They alleged that their certificates of title were submitted to DBP for safekeeping pursuant to the
loan agreement they entered into with DBP. The same certificates of title were turned over by DBP
to GFSME because of its call on GFSME’s guarantee on their loan, which became due and
demandable, and pursuant to the guarantee agreement between DBP and GFSME.
As prayed for, the RTC issued the Writ of Seizure accompanied by a bond issued by CBIC. DBP
filed its Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash Writ of Seizure on the ground of
improper venue, among others. Abad, et al. opposed on the ground that court sheriff took
possession of 228 certificates of title from GFSME. The RTC granted DBP’s omnibus motion and
dismissed the case for improper venue. Consequently, DBP and GFSME filed their Joint Motion to
Order Plaintiffs to Return Titles to DBP and GFSME. The RTC then issued an Order directing Abad,
et al. to return the 228 certificates of title. Abad, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the SC praying, among others, for the nullification and reversal of the Order of the RTC. The
SC, however, dismissed the petition.
Upon motion by DBP, the RTC issued the Writ of Execution. The Sheriff’s Return of Service,
however, indicated that Abad, et al. failed to deliver the certificates of title. Due to the non-delivery
of the certificates of title by Abad, et al., DBP filed its Motion/Application to Call on Plaintiff’s Surety
Bond praying for the release of the bond issued by CBIC to answer for the damages it sustained as
a result of the failure to return the 228 certificates of title. The RTC denied the subject motion
explaining that the resolution of the motion was no longer part of its residual power. It pointed out
that although there was indeed an order to return the 228 certificates of title to DBP, it was not
made as a result of a trial of the case, but as a consequence of the order of dismissal based on
improper venue. DBP’s MR was denied.
The CA dismissed DBP’s petition for certiorari and mandamus. It noted that DBP did not move for
reconsideration of the RTC’s Order of dismissal, thus, it is considered as final and executory. It
added that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provided that the claim for damages against
the bond must be filed before trial or before appeal was perfected or before the judgment became
executory.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the RTC has residual jurisdiction on DBP’s claim for damages.
(2) Whether DBP’s application for damages was belatedly filed.
RULING:
(1) None. Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by indigent litigants; to order execution
pending appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal,
provided these are done prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, even
if the appeal has already been perfected or despite the approval of the record on appeal or in case
of a petition for review under Rule 42, before the CA gives due course to the petition.
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The “residual jurisdiction” of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This
stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In
either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal,
and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. From the foregoing, it is clear that before the trial court
can be said to have residual jurisdiction over a case, a trial on the merits must have been conducted;
the court rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party appealed therefrom.
In this case, there was no trial on the merits as the case was dismissed due to improper venue and
respondents could not have appealed the order of dismissal as the same was a dismissal, without
prejudice. Section 1 (h), Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that no appeal may be taken
from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. Indeed, there is no residual jurisdiction to
speak of where no appeal has even been filed. Section 1(h), Rule 41 also provides that in such an
instant where the final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65.
Here, the RTC dismissed the replevin case on the ground of improper venue. Such dismissal is
one without prejudice and does not bar the refiling of the same action; hence, it is not appealable.
Clearly, the RTC did not reach, and could not have reached, the residual jurisdiction stage as the
case was dismissed due to improper venue, and such order of dismissal could not be the subject of
an appeal. Without the perfection of an appeal, let alone the unavailability of the remedy of appeal,
the RTC did not acquire residual jurisdiction. Hence, it is erroneous to conclude that the RTC may
rule on DBP’s application for damages pursuant to its residual powers.
(2) YES. Section 10, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that in replevin cases, as in receivership
and injunction cases, the damages to be awarded to either party upon any bond filed by the other
shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 57. In other words,
to recover damages on a replevin bond (or on a bond for preliminary attachment, injunction or
receivership), it is necessary (1) that the defendant-claimant has secured a favorable judgment in
the main action, meaning that the plaintiff has no cause of action and was not, therefore, entitled
to the provisional remedy of replevin; (2) that the application for damages, showing claimant’s right
thereto and the amount thereof, be filed in the same action before trial or before appeal is perfected
or before the judgment becomes executory; (3) that due notice be given to the other party and his
surety or sureties, notice to the principal not being sufficient; and (4) that there should be a proper
hearing and the award for damages should be included in the final judgment. Likewise, to avoid
multiplicity of suits, all incidents arising from the same controversy must be settled in the same
court having jurisdiction of the main action. Thus, the application for damages must be filed in the
court which took cognizance of the case, with due notice to the other parties.
In this case, DBP filed the application for damages long after the order of dismissal had become
final and executory. It explained that this belated filing was due to its recourse to other remedies,
such as the enforcement of the writ of execution. The Court, however, finds this reason to be
wanting in persuasiveness. To begin with, the filing of an application for damages does not preclude
resort to other remedies. Nowhere in the Rules of Court is it stated that an application for damages
bars the filing of a motion for a writ of seizure, a writ of execution or any other applicable remedy.
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DBP, from the beginning, had already perceived the attachment to be improper; hence, it could
have easily filed an application before the judgment became executory.
Philippine Bank of Communications, Petitioner, vs.

Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr., In his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 56, Traveller Kids Inc., Cely
L. Gabaldon-Co and Jeannie L. Lugmoc, Respondents.
G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017, CAGUIOA, J.:
The power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances specified in the afore-quoted
provision. In other words, the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on an entirely
different ground - such as "that an appeal is not a proper remedy."
FACTS:
PBCOM filed a collection suit against private respondents. The RTC directed PBCOM to pay
additional docket fees. While PBCOM paid the additional fees, it belatedly filed its compliance.
Thus, the RTC issued an Order dismissing PBCOM's Complaint. PBCOM filed a Notice of Appeal
which was denied due course by the RTC on the ground that it was not the proper remedy. Thus,
PBCOM filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the CA which denied the same. Again,
PBCOM filed a Petition for Certiorari, this time, against the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC was correct in denying due course to PBCOM’s Notice of Appeal
RULING:
NO. At the onset, the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a
petition for review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. However, under exceptional circumstances, as when stringent application of the
rules will result in manifest injustice, the Court may set aside technicalities and proceed with the
appeal. Considering that what is at stake in the present case is PBCOM's statutory right to appeal
and the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of its cause, the Court resolves
to set aside PBCOM' s procedural mistake and give due course to its petition.
The Supreme Court held that the RTC erred in denying due course to the Notice of Appeal. The
power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances specified in the afore-quoted
different ground - such as "that an appeal is not a proper remedy." The authority to dismiss an
appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and not the RTC, pursuant
to Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
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Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, Petitioner vs.

Carlos* Duque & Teresa Duque, Respondents
G.R. No. 216467, February 15, 2017, PERALTA, J.:
The power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances specified in the afore-quoted
different ground - such as "that an appeal is not a proper remedy."
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a lessee of a building known as Shell
House at 156 Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On August 23, 2000, PSPC subleased a 500-
meter portion of the 2nct Floor of the Shell Building to the The Fitness Center (TFC).4 Thereafter,
TFC encountered problems in its business operations. Thus, with the conformity of PSPC, TFC
assigned to Fitness Consultants, Inc, (FCI) all its rights and obligations under the contract of
sublease executed by PSPC in its favor.5 Respondent Carlos Duque is the proprietor, while
respondent Teresa Duque is the corporate secretary of FCI. Subsequently, FCI failed to pay its
rentals to PSPC. FCI subsequently issued a check, with respondents as signatories, which would
supposedly cover FCI's obligations to PSPC. However, the check was dishonored, thus, leading to
the filing of a criminal complaint against respondents for their alleged violation of BP 22. The parties
then went to trial, which subsequently resulted in a verdict finding herein respondents guilty as
charged.
Respondents appealed the above MeTC Decision with the RTC of Makati. On March 16, 2011, the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered judgment acquitting respondents but holding them civilly
liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents, as corporate officers, may still be held civilly liable despite their
acquittal from the criminal charge of violation of BP 22.
RULING:
NO. The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can be held
civilly liable when he is convicted. The criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing
checks in behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself,
such civil liability arising from the Civil Code. But BP 22 itself fused this criminal liability with the
corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to recover such
civil liability, not from the corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its behalf.
As held above, it is clear that the civil liability of the corporate officer for the issuance of a bouncing
corporate check attaches only if he is convicted. Conversely, therefore, it will follow that once
acquitted of the offense of violating BP 22, a corporate officer is discharged from any civil liability
arising from the issuance of the worthless check in the name of the corporation he represents. This
is without regard as to whether his acquittal was based on reasonable doubt or that there was a
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pronouncement by the trial court that the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
Moreover, in the present case, nothing in the records at hand would show that respondents made
themselves personally nor solidarily liable for the corporate obligations either as accommodation
parties or sureties. On the contrary, there is no dispute that respondents signed the subject check
in their capacity as corporate officers and that the check was drawn in the name of FCI as payment
for the obligation of the corporation and not for the personal indebtedness of respondents. Neither
is there allegation nor proof that the veil of corporate fiction is being used by respondents for
fraudulent purposes. The rule is that juridical entities have personalities separate and distinct from
its officers and the persons composing it. Generally, the stockholders and officers are not personally
liable for the obligations of the corporation except only when the veil of corporate fiction is being
used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work injustice, which is not the case here. Hence,
respondents cannot be held liable for the value of the checks issued in payment for FCI's obligation.
Mercedita C. Coombs v.Victoria C. Castaneda, Virgilio Veloso Santos, Sps. Pancho &
Edith Leviste, BPI Family Savings Bank and the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City
G.R. No. 192353 March 15, 2017 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In a long line of cases, the Court has held that the RTC has no jurisdiction when the certificate sought
to be reconstituted was never lost or destroyed but is in fact in the possession of another person. In
other words, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional.
FACTS:
Mercedita C. Coombs (Coombs) allegedly is the owner of the real property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 6715 situated on Apitong Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
Sometime in March 2005, when she tried to pay the real property tax due relative to the real
property covered by TCT No. 6715, she was told that said real property was no longer listed under
her name. Upon further verification, TCT No. 6715 had already been cancelled and had been
replaced by TCT No. 14115 issued in the name of herein respondent Virgilio Veloso Santos (Santos).
TCT No. 6715 was ordered cancelled by the RTC in a Decision dated August 26, 2004 in LRC Case
No. 04-035, entitled "In Re: Petition for the Issuance of Second Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 6715, by Mercedita C. Coombs, represented by her Atty.-in-Fact
Victoria C. Castaneda". Coombs averred that she neither authorized Victoria C. Castaneda
(Castaneda) to file petition for issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715
sometime in 2004, nor asked her to sell the subject property to Santos. Santos, in turn, sold the
same to herein respondents Pancho and Edith Leviste (spouses Leviste). The spouses Leviste
executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of herein respondent Bank of the
Philippine Islands Family Savings Bank (BPI Family).
A petition for annulment of judgment to declare the Decision of RTC Muntinlupa as null and void,
was filed by Coombs before the Court of Appeals, on the ground that, since the owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 6715 had never been lost as it had always been in her custody, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The CA dismissed the petition for
annulment of judgment, since the petitioner failed to avail the remedies in Section 1 without
justification and that the ground relied upon, i.e. extrinsic fraud, was not substantiated, this
petition has no prima facie merit. Petitioner Coombs moved for the reconsideration, insisting that
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her petition was grounded on lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals denied the same explaining
that the RTC has jurisdiction over all proceedings involving title to real property and land
registration cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred when it dismissed outright Coombs' petition for annulment of judgment
RULING:
YES. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by petitioner Coombs was clearly grounded on
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case, and not extrinsic fraud. Coombs
sought to annul the RTC Decision for being rendered without jurisdiction. According to her, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035-one for the
reconstitution of a lost certificate of title-because the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 was
never lost in the first place, which argument has been upheld by the Court in a catena of cases that
she cited to support her assertion. The above-stated allegations made out a prima facie case of
annulment of judgment to warrant the CA's favourable consideration. In a long line of cases, the
Court has held that the RTC has no jurisdiction when the certificate sought to be reconstituted was
never lost or destroyed but is in fact in the possession of another person. In other words, the fact of
loss of the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional. Moreover, the CA's dismissal based on technical
grounds was also erroneous. This is because a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is
fundamentally void. Thus, it may be questioned any time unless laches has already set in.
3. METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
Danilo Cariaga v. Emmanuel Sapigao and Ginalyn Acosta

G.R. No. 223844, June 28, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing appeals process in the NPS with regard
to complaints subject of preliminary investigation would depend on two factors, namely: where the
complaint was filed, i.e., whether in the NCR or in the provinces; and which court has original
jurisdiction over the case, i.e., whether or not it is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs.
FACTS:
A complaint affidavit was filed by the Petitioner before the fiscal of Urdaneta accusing the
Respondents of the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False Certification and Slander by
Deed. It was alleged that respondents, in their capacities as Barangay Chairman and Secretary,
made spurious entries in the barangay blotter that an unidentified man was firing a gun inside
Petitioner’s compound. According to petitioner, the said blotter was used by the police to search
his house and his cattle farm resulting to the confiscation of his firearms and a criminal case of
illegal possession of firearms. The Prosecutor’s office dismissed the complaint for lack of probable
cause which was affirmed by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP). He then filed a
petition for review in the CA which was also denied. According to the CA, the proper remedy was
to appeal the decision of the ORSP before the Secretary of Justice and not to directly resort to the
CA, otherwise, there will be a violation of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the principle of exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
RULING:
NO. Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the ORSPs the authority to rule with finality cases
subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided that: (a) the case
is not filed in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should it proceed to the courts,
is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts (MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs) - which includes not only violations of city or municipal
ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years,
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties
attached thereto. 36 This is, however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP
ruling should the former deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing
amendment is further strengthened by a later issuance, i.e., Department Circular No. 018-14
The rule in Department Circular No. 018-14 shall be as follows:
(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for
review before the ORSP, which ruling shall be with finality;
(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is notcognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for
review before SOJ, which ruling shall be with finality;
(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for
review before the Prosecutor General, whose ruling shall be with finality;
(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for
review before the SOJ, whose ruling shall be with finality;
(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c), the SOJ may, pursuant to his power of
control and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or
reverse the ruling of the ORSP or the Prosecutor General, as the case may be.
In the instant case, Cariaga filed a complaint before the OPP in Pangasinan (i.e., outside the NCR)
accusing respondents of committing the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False
Certification, and Slander by Deed, defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the
RPC. Of the crimes charged, only False Certification and Slander by Deed are cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, while Falsification of Public Documents is cognizable by the Regional Trial
Courts.
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Applying the prevailing rule on the appeals process of the NPS, the ruling of the ORSP as regards
Falsification of Public Documents may still be appealed to theSOJ before resort to the courts may
be availed of. On the other hand, the ruling of the ORSP pertaining to False Certification and
Slander by Deed should already be deemed final - at least insofar as the NPS is concerned – and
thus, may already be elevated to the courts.
Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga's petition before it on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as only the ORSP ruling regarding the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents may be referred to the SOJ, while the ORSP ruling regarding the
crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed may already be elevated before the courts. Thus,
the CA should have resolved Cariaga's petition on the merits insofar as the crimes of False
Certification and Slander by Deed are concerned. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that
the instant case be remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits. In view of the foregoing - as
well as the fact that Cariaga prayed for a resolution on the merits – the Court finds it appropriate
to resolve the substantive issues of this case.
A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause- that is, one made for the purpose of filing
an information in court – is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond
the pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.
In the instant case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that the ORSP correctly ruled that
there is no probable cause to indict respondents of the crimes of Slander by Deed and False
Certification. As aptly found by the ORSP, there was no improper motive on the part of respondents
in making the blotter entries as they were made in good faith; in the performance of their official
duties as barangay officials; and without any intention to malign, dishonor, or defame Cariaga.
4. SHARI’AH COURTS
The Municipality Of Tangkal, Province Of Lanao Del Norte, Petitioner, Vs. Hon.
Rasad B. Balindong, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a District Court, 4th
Judicial District, Marawi City, and Heirs Of The Late Macalabo Alompo,
represented by
Sultan Dimnang B. Alompo, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193340, January 11, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines1 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws) vests
concurrent jurisdiction upon Shari'a district courts over personal and real actions wherein the parties
involved are Muslims, except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
FACTS:
The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaintwith the Shari'a
District Court of Marawi City (Shari'a District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality of
Tangkal, for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with an area of approximately
25 hectares located at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte. They alleged that Macalabo
was the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an agreement with the Municipality of
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Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow" the land to pave the way for the construction of the
municipal hall and a health center building. The agreement allegedly imposed a condition upon
the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise,
ownership of the land would revert to Macalabo. Private respondents claimed that the Municipality
of Tangkal neither paid the value of the land within the agreed period nor returned the land to its
owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be returned to them as successors-in-interest of Macalabo.
The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismisson the ground of improper venue
and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural
or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
Moreover, since the complaint for recovery of land is a real action, it should have been filed in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery
of possession filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim.
RULING:
NO. Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari' a Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to
dismiss, this procedural rule may be relaxed when the ground relied on is lack of jurisdiction which
is patent on the face of the complaint. The Court held that instead of invoking a procedural
technicality, the respondent court should have recognized its lack of jurisdiction over the parties
and promptly dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be, as they
were, a futile and invalid exercise. A summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss
should not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction when the jurisdictional
infirmity is patent on the face of the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental procedural
doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court may be challenged at anytime and at any stage of the action.
Indeed, when it is apparent from the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, it is duty-bound to dismiss the case motu propio, regardless of whether the defendant filed
a motion to dismiss.
As a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular purposes and
in ways that have primarily secular effects35-consistent with the non-establishment clause. Hence,
even if it is assumed that juridical persons are capable of practicing religion, the Municipality of
Tangkal is constitutionally proscribed from adopting, much less exercising, any religion, including
Islam.
The Shari' a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded that
the Municipality of Tangkal "is neither a Muslim nor a Christian." Yet it still proceeded to attribute
the religious affiliation of the mayor to the municipality. This is manifest error on the part of the
Shari' a District Court. It is an elementary principle that a municipality has a personality that is
separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor, sanggunian, and other officers composing it. And
under no circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations-as the
Shari' a District Court has done-without running afoul the inviolability of the separation of Church
and State enshrined in the Constitution.
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C. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Jonathan Y. Dee v. Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bond
East Private Limited, and Albert Hong Hin Kay, as Minority Shareholders of
Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and Hedy S.C. Yap-Chua, as Director and
Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., Harvest All Investment
Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bond East Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin Kay,
as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and Hedy
S.C. Yap-Chua, as a Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods
International, Inc. v. Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., George E. Sycip,
Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H. See, Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis,
Erwin M. Elechicon, And Barbara Anne C. Migallos
G.R. No. 224834 G.R. No. 224871March 15, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The mere mention of Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot transform the nature of
Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All, et
al. do not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of the SRO; and (b) such
mention was merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution that their voting
interest as minority shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO was
completed.
FACTS:
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin
Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities, minority stockholders
of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc. (Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a member
of Alliance's Board of Directors. As per Alliance's by-laws, its Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM)
is held every June 15. However, in a Special Board of Directors Meeting held at three (3) o'clock in
the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed
a Board Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM pending complete subscription to
its Stock Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of ₱l Billion which was earlier
approved in a Board Resolution passed on February 17, 2015. As per Alliance's Disclosure dated May
29, 2015 filed before the Philippine Stock Exchange, such postponement was made "to give the
stockholders of [Alliance] better representation in the annual meeting, after taking into
consideration their subscription to the SRO of Alliance." This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file
the instant Complaint (with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) involving an intra-
corporate controversy against Alliance, and its other Board members, namely, George E. Sycip,
Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H. See, Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis, Erwin M.
Elechicon, and Barbara Anne C. Migallos (Alliance Board). In said complaint, Harvest All, et
al. principally claimed that the subscription to the new shares through the SRO cannot be made a
condition precedent to the exercise by the current stockholders of their right to vote in the 2015
ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their full voting rights proportionate to their existing
shareholdings. Thus, Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the declaration of nullity of the Board
Resolution dated May 29, 2015 indefinitely postponing the 2015 ASM, as well as the Board Resolution
dated February 17, 2015 approving the SRO. The Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et
al. with filing fees amounting to ₱8,860.00 which they paid accordingly. Later on, Harvest All, et
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al. filed an Amended Complaint: (a) deleting its prayer to declare null and void the Board
Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SRO; and (b) instead, prayed that the Alliance
Board be enjoined from implementing and carrying out the SRO prior to and as a condition for the
holding of the 2015 ASM.
For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest
All, et al.'s failure to pay the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should have paid P20 Million,
more or less, in filing fees based on the SRO which was valued at Pl Billion. However, Harvest All, et
al. did not mention such capital infusion in their prayers and, as such, were only made to pay the
measly sum of ₱8,860.00. On the other hand, Harvest All, et al. maintained that they paid the
correct filing fees, considering that the subject of their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM
and not a claim on the aforesaid value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed out that they
simply relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention to defraud the
government. RTC dismissed the instant complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to Harvest All, et al.'s
failure to pay the correct filing fees. Aggrieved, Harvest All, et al. appealed to the CA. The CA
reversed the RTC's order of dismissal and, accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same
to the court a quo for further proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees. The parties moved
for reconsideration, which were denied. Hence, these consolidated petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Harvest All, et al.’s complaint involves matters capable of pecuniary estimation,
and, thus, paid insufficient filing fees for their complaint
RULING:
NO. Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of holding the
2015 ASM as scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money. The mere
mention of Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot transform the nature of Harvest
All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do
not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of the SRO; and (b) such
mention was merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution that their
voting interest as minority shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO
was completed. If, in the end, a sum of money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would
be recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint, then it would simply be the consequence
of their principal action. Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
While the Court is not unaware that the amendments brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated
October 5, 2016 only came after the filing of the complaint subject of this case, such amendments
may nevertheless be given retroactive effect so as to make them applicable to the resolution of the
instant consolidated petitions as they merely pertained to a procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not
substantive law. In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.'s action as one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay
the appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3)
of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in
conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to
the RTC in order: (a) to FIRST Determine if Harvest, et al.'s payment of filing fees in the amount of
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₱8,860.00, as initially assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M.
No. 04-02-04-SC; (b) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is insufficient, to require
Harvest, et al.' s payment of any discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and
after such payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or (c) if Harvest
All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the
case with dispatch.
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. The Honorable Regional Agrarian Reform
Officer
G.R. No. 200369, March 1, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. For the PARAD
and DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must be a prima facie showing that there is a
tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship between the parties.
FACTS:
Petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) is the duly registered owner of the subject
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-137846 and T-156610. Union Bank offered
these parcels of land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) through the Voluntary Offer to
Sell (VOS) arrangement under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the
government.
The DAR started issuing Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in the names of private
respondents as agrarian reform beneficiaries for the land covered by TCT No. T-156610. Union Bank
filed a "Motion to Withdraw Voluntary Offer To Sell On Property from CARP Coverage" in the land
valuation proceedings for the land covered by TCT No. T-156610 pending before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Union Bank submitted a letter to the DAR requesting that
its VOS be withdrawn and that the properties be exempted from CARP coverage. Union Bank
alleged that the properties had a slope exceeding 18% and were undeveloped, thus, exempt from
CARP pursuant to Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
The DAR secretary denied Union Bank’s request for failing to prove by substantial evidence that
the properties were underdeveloped. Union Bank filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the
Court of Appeals (CA), which later on sustained the DAR secretary.
In another petition for cancellation of CLOAs filed by the Union Bank which eventually reached
the Court of Appeals, the CA ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the case because of the
absence of a tenancy relationship between Union Bank and the agrarian reform beneficiaries. In its
petitions before us, Union Bank insists that the DARAB is expressly granted quasi-judicial powers
by Executive Order (EO) No. 229.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PARAD/DARAP has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
NO. The PARAD/DARAB has no jurisdiction over the petitions for cancellation of the CLOAs.
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The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred
by law.Section 50 of the CARL and Section 17 of EO No. 229 vested upon the DAR primary-
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Through EO No. 129-A, the power
to adjudicate agrarian reform cases was transferred to the DARAB, and jurisdiction over the
implementation of agrarian reform was delegated to the DAR regional offices. To simplify, the
jurisdiction conferred to the DAR was twofold: (1) primary jurisdiction over the adjudication of
agrarian disputes; and (2) original jurisdiction over agrarian reform implementation. EO No. 129-A
effectively split these two jurisdictions between the newly created DARAS with respect to the
former and to the DAR regional offices as regards the latter.
In Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, the Court held that consistent with the DARAB Rules
of Procedure, the agrarian reform cases that fall within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB
are those that involve agrarian disputes. Section 3(d) of the CARL defines an "agrarian dispute" as
any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Given the technical legal meaning of the term
"agrarian dispute," it follows that not all cases involving agricultural lands automatically fall within
the jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. For the
PARAD and DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must be a prima facie showing that
there is a tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship between the parties. The essential requisites
of a tenancy relationship are key jurisdictional allegations that must appear on the face of the
complaint. These essential requisites are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there
is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.
The records clearly show that the two petitions filed by Union Bank with the PARAD did not involve
agrarian disputes. Specifically, Union Bank's petitions failed to sufficiently allege-or even hint at-
any tenurial or agrarian relations that affect the subject parcels of land. In both petitions, Union
Bank merely alleged that respondents were beneficiaries of the CLOAs. That Union Bank questions
the qualifications of the beneficiaries suggests that the latter were not known to, much less tenants
of, Union Bank prior to the dispute. There was no tenancy relationship between the parties.
Consequently, the PARAD did not have jurisdiction over the case.
As held in Valcurza v. Tamparong, Jr., in cases concerning the cancellation of CLO As that involve
parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees - cases related to the administrative
implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations – the jurisdiction is with the DAR,
and not the DARAB.
Thus, in the absence of a tenancy relationship between Union Bank and private respondents, the
PARAD/DARAB has no jurisdiction over the petitions for cancellation of the CLOAs.
Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or
palpable excess of authority," the general rule applies that discretion cannot be checked via this
petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot issue.1âwphi
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D. JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES

TGN Realty Corporation v. Villa Teresa Homeowners Association (VTHA),
G.R. No. 164795, April 19, 2017, Bersamin, J.
The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by
the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a
question of fact
FACTS:
Petitioner owned and developed Villa Teresa Subdivision in Pampanga. Respondent was the
association of the community. The Repondent raised some concerns and made some demands
about the facilities of the village to Petitioner. However, the latter refused to heed to the same.
Thus, Respondent filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for
specific performance and violation of PD 957 and 1216. The HLURB ruled in favour of Respondent
which was also affirmed by the Board of Commissioners, the Office of the President(OP), and the
CA. Hence, it filed a petition under Rule 45. During its pendency, the Petitioner presented a
Certificate of Completion issued by the HLURB Regional Ofiice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HLURB erred in not dismissing the complaint despite the issuance of Certificate
of Completion.
RULING:
YES. Ordinarily, the appeal by petition for review on certiorari should not involve the consideration
and resolution of factual issues. Section I, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court limits the appeal to
questions of law because the Court, not being a trier of facts, should not be expected to re-evaluate
the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in the fora below. There may be exceptions to the
limitation of the review to question of law. Yet, none of the exceptions to the limitation applies to
this case.
But the attention of the Court has been directed to the conflict in the findings on the state of the
development of the project. As adverted to earlier, however, the Regional Office of the HLURB
meanwhile issued the Certificate of Completion dated September 28, 2004 stating that "upon
inspection, the subdivision project of the instant case has been completed in accordance with the
approved development plan." Justice demands that the conflict be resolved and settled especially
considering that the findings and the Certificate of Completion were both issued by the HLURB
itself, through its agents.
The resolution and settlement of the conflict require the evaluation and re-evaluation of factual
matters. Yet, the Court cannot itself resolve and settle the conflict in this appeal because it is not a
trier of facts. A remand to the HLURB becomes necessary, therefore, in order that an objective but
full inquiry into the level of completion of the improvements in the project can be assured.
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E. JURISDICTION OVER CASES COVERED BY THE REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE

FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES, THE REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE,
AND BARANGAY CONCILIATION
Jose Audie Abagatnan et al vs.Spouses Jonathan Clarito And Elsa Clarito
G.R. No. 211966. August 7, 2017, Del Castillo, J.
Where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities (unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit
their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon),the lupon has no jurisdiction over
their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing
in court.
FACTS:
Wenceslao and Lydia acquired a parcel of land at Roxas City. Respondents allegedly asked for
permission to construct a residential house on a portion at the subject property. They were allowed
subject to the condition that respondents will vacate the subject property should he need the same
for his own use. Petitioners decided to sell portions of the property which was then still being
occupied by respondents. Petitioners sent respondents a Demand Letter to vacate the subject
property. The respondents, however, refused to heed such demand. Petitioners filed a Complaint
for Unlawful Detainer and Damages11 against respondents before the MTCC. Notably, the
Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as a pre-condition
for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are residents of Roxas City. In their
Answer with Counterclaim,13 respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation is a mandatory
requirement that cannot be dispensed with, considering that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already
executed a SPA in favor of their co-petitioner and sister, Josephine, who is a resident of Roxas City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prior barangay conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the LGC is mandatory
in this case despite the fact that not all real parties in interest resided in the same city or
municipality.
RULING:
NO. Section 412(a) of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court. The
LGC further provides that "the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes,"
subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law. One such exception is in cases where the
dispute involves parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to
submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon. Thus, parties who do not
actually reside in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays are not required to submit
their dispute to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court. In Pascual v.
Pascual,32 the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC
pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It further explained that said
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requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so

would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2,33 in relation to
Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real
parties in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City:35 Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan,
Laguna, while Jenalyn resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City.36 As such, the lupon has no
jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is
not a precondition to its filing in court. Besides, as the RTC correctly pointed out, the lack
of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought on appeal because it was not
included in the Pre-Trial Order. In effect, the non-inclusion of this issue in the Pre-Trial
Order barred its consideration during the trial. This is but consistent with the rule that parties
are bound by the delimitation of issues that they agreed upon during the pre-trial proceedings.
III. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. ACTIONS
1. PERSONAL ACTIONS AND REAL ACTIONS
United Alloy Philipines Corporation, Spouses David C. Chua and Luten Chua vs.
United Coconut Planters Bank
G.R. No. 175949, January 30, 2017, PERALTA, J.
In general, personal actions must be commenced and tried (i) where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, (ii) where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or (iii) in the case
of a resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the parties
may agree in writing to limit the venue of future actions between them to a specified place.
FACTS:
UNIALLOY applied for and was granted a credit accommodation by UCPB. Part of UNIALLOY’s
obligation under the Credit Agreement was secured by a Surety Agreement executed by
UNIALLOY’s officers: Chairman Van Der Sluis, President David Chua and his spouse, Luten Chua
(Spouses Chua), and one Yang. Six Promissory Notes, were later executed by UNIALLOY in UCPB’s
favor. In addition, as part of the consideration for the credit accommodation, UNIALLOY and
UCPB also entered into a “lease-purchase” contract wherein the former assured the latter that it
will purchase several real properties which UCPB co-owns with the DBP.
Subsequently, UNIALLOY failed to pay its loan obligations. As a result, UCPB filed against
UNIALLOY and its officers an action for Sum of Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment
with the RTC of Makati. Consequently, UCPB also unilaterally rescinded its lease-purchase contract
with UNIALLOY. On the other hand, UNIALLOY filed against UCPB, UCPB Vice-President Chua
and Van Der Sluis a complaint for Annulment and/or Reformation of Contract with Damages, with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order. Claiming that it holds
office and conducts its business operations in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, UNIALLOY filed the
case with the RTC of CDO. UNIALLOY contended that Van Der Sluis, in cahoots with UCPB Vice-
President Chua, committed fraud, manipulation and misrepresentation to obtain the subject loan
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for their own benefit. UNIALLOY prayed, among others, that three of the six Promissory Notes it
executed be annulled or reformed or that it be released from liability thereon.
UNIALLOY filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the collection case filed by UCPB on the ground of
litis pendentia and forum shopping. UNIALLOY contended that its complaint for annulment of
contract and the collection case filed by UCPB involves the same parties and causes of action. The
RTC of Makati denied the motion. In the meantime, UCPB and its co-defendants also filed a Motion
to Dismiss UNIALLOY’s complaint for annulment of contract on the grounds of improper venue,
forum shopping, litis pendentia, and harassment or nuisance suit. The RTC of CDO dismissed
UNIALLOY’s complaint for annulment of contract.
UNIALLOY then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA and also prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA granted UNIALLOY’s prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. UCPB filed a petition for certiorari with the SC which restrained
the CA from enforcing its Resolution granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Eventually, the SC rendered its Decision denying UCPB’s petition for certiorari and affirming the
CA Resolution granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, the CA dismissed UNIALLOY's certiorari petition and affirmed the RTC of CDO.
UNIALLOY then filed a petition for review on certiorari, which the SC denied. Meanwhile,
UNIALLOY filed with the RTC of Makati an omnibus motion praying for the suspension of the
proceedings of the collection case in the said court on the ground of pendency of the certiorari
petition it filed with the SC. However, the RTC denied UNIALLOY’s motion. Subsequently, the
RTC of Makati rendered Judgment in the collection case in favor of UCPB. The CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether UNIALLOY’s complaint for annulment of contract should be dismissed on the ground
of improper venue.
(2) Whether UNIALLOY, together with their co-defendants Van Der Sluis and Yang, are liable to
pay UCPB the amounts awarded by the RTC of Makati. (Main Issue)
RULING:
(1) YES.The RTC was correct in dismissing UNIALLOY’s Complaint on the ground of improper
venue. In the case at bench, paragraph 18 of the LPA expressly provides that “[a]ny legal action
arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be brought exclusively in the proper courts
of Makati City, Metro Manila.” Hence, UNIALLOY should have filed its complaint before the RTC
of Makati City, and not with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City. But to justify its choice of venue,
UNIALLOY insists that the subject matter of its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2001-219 is not the LPA,
but the fictitious loans that purportedly matured on April 17, 2001. UNIALLOY’s insistence lacks
merit. Its Complaint unequivocally sought to declare “as null and void the unilateral rescission
made by defendant UCPB of its subsisting Lease Purchase Agreement with [UNIALLOY].” What
UCPB unilaterally rescinded is the LPA and without it there can be no unilateral rescission to speak
of. Hence, the LPA is the subject matter or at least one of the subject matters of the Complaint.
Moreover, and to paraphrase the aforecited paragraph 18 of the LPA, as long as the controversy
arises out of or is connected therewith, any legal action should be filed exclusively before the proper
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courts of Makati City. Thus, even assuming that the LPA is not the main subject matter, considering
that what is being sought to be annulled is an act connected and inseparably related thereto, the
Complaint should have been filed before the proper courts in Makati City.
(2) YES.UNIALLOY and its officers do not deny their liability under the Surety Agreement. As
correctly held by both the RTC and the CA, Article 1159 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
“[o]bligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith.” The RTC as well as the CA found nothing which would
justify or excuse UNIALLOY and its officers from non-compliance with their obligations under the
contract they have entered into. Thus, it becomes apparent that they are merely attempting to
evade or, at least, delay the inevitable performance of their obligation to pay under the Surety
Agreement and the subject promissory notes which were executed in UCPB’s favor.
The Court notes, however, that the interest rates imposed on the subject promissory notes were
made subject to review and adjustment at the sole discretion and under the exclusive will of UCPB.
Moreover, aside from the Consolidated Statement of Account attached to the demand letters
addressed to spouses Chua and their co-defendants, no other competent evidence was shown to
prove the total amount of interest due on the above promissory notes. In fact, based on the attached
Consolidated Statement of Account, UCPB has already imposed a 24% interest rate on the total
amount due on UCPB’s peso obligation for a short period of six months. Settled is the rule that any
contract which appears to be heavily weighed in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to an
unconscionable result is void. Any stipulation regarding the validity or compliance of the contract
which is left solely to the will of one of the parties, is likewise, invalid.
Moreover, courts have the authority to strike down or to modify provisions in promissory notes
that grant the lenders unrestrained power to increase interest rates, penalties and other charges at
the latter’s sole discretion and without giving prior notice to and securing the consent of the
borrowers. This unilateral authority is anathema to the mutuality of contracts and enable lenders
to take undue advantage of borrowers. Although the Usury Law has been effectively repealed,
courts may still reduce iniquitous or unconscionable rates charged for the use of
money. Furthermore, excessive interests, penalties and other charges not revealed in disclosure
statements issued by banks, even if stipulated in the promissory notes, cannot be given effect under
the Truth in Lending Act.
B. CAUSE OF ACTION
1. MEANING OF CAUSE OF ACTION
Manuel C. Ubas, Sr. vs.Wilson Chan

G.R. No. 215910, February 6, 2017
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
FACTS:
Ubas, Sr. filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for Writ of Attachment against
Chan. Ubas, Sr. alleged that Chan, doing business under the name and style of Unimaster, owed
him a sum of money for the price of boulders, sand, gravel, and other construction materials
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allegedly purchased by Chan from him for the construction of the Macagtas Dam project. He
claimed that Chan failed to pay despite repeated demands. Further, he averred that Chan had
issued three bank checks, but were dishonored when presented for encashment. As such, Chan
was guilty of fraud in incurring the obligation.
Chan moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds: (a) the complaint states no cause of
action, considering that the checks do not belong to him but to Unimasters (b) there is no contract
that ever existed between him and Ubas, Sr.; and (c) if Ubas, Sr. even had a right of action at all, the
complaint should not have been filed against him but against Unimasters, a duly registered
construction company which has a separate juridical personality from him. According to Chan, the
subject checks were issued for the replenishment of the revolving fund, but Engr. Merelos, the
project engineer, lost the same. Upon being informed about the loss of the checks, Chan, as
President of Unimasters, instructed its comptroller Murillo to issue a Stop Payment Order.
The RTC ruled that Ubas, Sr. had a cause of action against Chan. At the outset, it observed that
Ubas, Sr.’s demand letter – which clearly stated the serial numbers of the checks, including the
dates and amounts thereof – was not disputed by Chan. Also, it did not lend credence to Chan’s
claim that the subject checks were lost and only came into the possession of Ubas, Sr., considering
the fact that Ubas, Sr. mentioned the details of the subject checks in the said demand letter and,
thus, would have incriminated himself had he actually stolen them. It also took note that Chan did
not file a case for theft in relation to the lost checks found in possession of Ubas, Sr. The CA
reversed and dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether Ubas, Sr.’s complaint states a cause of action.
RULING:
Yes. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. In this case, Ubas, Sr.’s cause of action is anchored on his claim that Chan personally
entered into a contract with him for the delivery of construction materials amounting to
₱1,500,000.00, which was, however, left unpaid. He also avers that Chan is guilty of fraud in the
performance of said obligation because the subject checks issued to him by Chan were dishonored
on the ground of stop payment. As proof, Ubas, Sr. offered in evidence, among others, the demand
letter he sent to Chan detailing the serial numbers of the checks that were issued by the latter,
including the dates and amounts thereof. He also offered the dishonored checks which were in his
possession.
Jurisprudence holds that “in a suit for a recovery of sum of money, as here, the plaintiff-creditor
[(Ubas, Sr. in this case)] has the burden of proof to show that defendant [(Chan in this case)] had
not paid [him] the amount of the contracted loan. However, it has also been long established that
where the plaintiff-creditor possesses and submits in evidence an instrument showing the
indebtedness, a presumption that the credit has not been satisfied arises in [his] favor. Thus, the
defendant is, in appropriate instances, required to overcome the said presumption and present
evidence to prove the fact of payment so that no judgment will be entered against him.” This
presumption stems from Section 24 of the NIL.
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Ubas, Sr. had presented in evidence the three (3) dishonored checks which were undeniably signed
by Chan. As the RTC correctly ruled, it is presumed that the subject checks were issued for a valid
consideration, which therefore, dispensed with the necessity of any documentary evidence to
support Ubas, Sr.’s monetary claim. Unless otherwise rebutted, the legal presumption of
consideration under Section 24 of the NIL stands. Verily, “the vital function of legal presumption is
to dispense with the need for proof.”
Chan’s defense that the subject checks were lost and, thus, were not actually issued to Ubas, Sr. is
a factual matter already passed upon by the RTC. As aptly pointed out by the trial court, it would
have been contrary to human nature and experience for Ubas, Sr. to send Chan a demand letter
detailing the particulars of the said checks if he indeed unlawfully obtained the same. In fact, it is
glaring that Chan did not present Engr. Merelos, the project engineer who had purportedly lost the
checks, to personally testify on the circumstances surrounding the checks’ loss. Further,
Unimasters’ comptroller, Murillo, testified during trial that “she came to know that the lost checks
were deposited in the account of [Ubas, Sr. as] she was informed by the [o]ffice[r]-in-charge of the
drawee bank, the Far East Bank of Tacloban, City Branch.” However, there was no showing that
Unimasters and/or Chan commenced any action against Ubas, Sr. to assert its interest over a
significant sum of ₱1,500,000.00 relative to the checks that were supposedly lost/ stolen. Clearly,
this paucity of action under said circumstances is again, inconsistent with ordinary human nature
and experience.
Besides, Section 16 of the NIL provides that when an instrument is no longer in the possession of
the person who signed it and it is complete in its terms, “a valid and intentional delivery by him is
presumed until the contrary is proved,” as in this case.
Although the checks were under the account name of Unimasters, it should be emphasized that
the manner or mode of payment does not alter the nature of the obligation. The source of
obligation, as claimed by Ubas, Sr. in this case, stems from his contract with Chan. When they
agreed upon the purchase of the construction materials on credit for the amount of ₱1,500,000.00,
the contract between them was perfected. Therefore, even if corporate checks were issued for the
payment of the obligation, the fact remains that the juridical tie between the two (2) parties was
already established during the contract’s perfection stage and, thus, does not preclude the creditor
from proceeding against the debtor during the contract's consummation stage. That a privity of
contract exists between Ubas, Sr. and Chan is a conclusion amply supported by the averments and
evidence on record in this case.
First, the Court observes that Ubas, Sr. was consistent in his account that he directly dealt with
Chan in his personal and not merely his representative capacity. Moreover, the demand letter,
which was admitted by Chan, was personally addressed to Chan and not to Unimasters as
represented by the latter. Also, it deserves mentioning that in his testimony before the RTC, Ubas,
Sr. explained that he delivered the construction materials to Chan absent any written agreement
due to his trust on the latter.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA erred in dismissing Ubas, Sr.’s complaint against Chan on the
ground of lack of cause of action. Chan was not able to overcome the presumption of consideration
under Section 24 of the NIL and establish any of his affirmative defenses. On the other hand, as the
holder of the subject checks which are presumed to have been issued for a valuable consideration,
and having established his privity of contract with Chan, Ubas, Sr. has substantiated his cause of
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action by a preponderance of evidence. “‘Preponderance of evidence’ is a phrase that, in the last

analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.” Consequently, Ubas, Sr.’s Complaint
should be granted.
2. FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
Asia Brewery Inc. and Charles Go v. Equitable PCI Bank (now BDO),
G.R. No. 190432, April 25, 2017, Sereno, C.J.
If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive
pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory
pleading. On the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be
filed after the plaintiff has rested its case.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for payment, reimbursement or restitution against respondents.

Petitioners alleged that 10 to 16 crossed checks were issued in the name of Charlie Go. However,
none of the checks were received by Go. Instead a certain Raymond Keh was able to receive the said
checks and deposited the same to Respondent bank pretending to be Go. In demanding payment
from respondent, petitioners relied on Associated Bank v. CA, in which this Court held "the
possession of check on a forged or unauthorized indorsement is wrongful, and when the money is
collected on the check, the bank can be held for moneys had and received." The RTC, however,
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the case.
RULING:
NO. A reading of the Order dated 30 January 2008 reveals that the RTC dismissed the Complaint
for lack of cause of action prior to trial. At that time, this Court, in the 2003 case Bank of America
NT&SA v. CA, had already emphasized that lack or absence of cause of action is not a ground for
the dismissal of a complaint; and that the issue may only be raised after questions of fact have been
resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.
Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not
interchangeable. It may be observed that lack of cause of action is not among the grounds that may
be raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The dismissal of a Complaint
for lack of cause of action is based on Section 1 of Rule 33.
We said that ''dismissal due to lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of
fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented by the
plaintiff." In the case at bar, the action has not even reached the pre-trial stage. Even assuming that
the trial court merely used the wrong terminology, that it intended to dismiss the Complaint on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action, the Complaint would still have to be reinstated.
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Butuan Development Corporation(BDC) v. Court of Appeals (Mindanao Station),

et.al.
G.R. No. 197358, April 5, 2017, Reyes, J.
Failure to state a cause of action is different from lack of cause of action. Failure to state a cause of
action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does
not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. The remedy in the first is to move for the
dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence.
FACTS:
While BDC was still in the process of incorporation, a certain Max Arriola armed with a notarized
Resolution of BDC board of directors, mortgaged a property owned and bought for BDC to De Oro
Resources Inc. (DORI) After incorporation, BDC filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the
real estate mortgage (REM) against Arriola and DORI alleging that the Arriola’s misrepresented
themselves as the owners and directors of the BDC. DORI claims that the case should be dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action, because at the time the REM was constituted, BDC had not yet
existed as a corporation. The RTC ruled in favour of BDC but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BDC has a cause of action.
RULING:
YES. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
Based on the foregoing allegations, BDC's complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of the REM. Basically, BDC alleged in its complaint that it is the owner of the
subject property as evidenced by TCT No. RT-4724, which was issued in its name after it purchased
the subject property, through Satorre, from the Spouses Sering on March 31, 1966. It bears stressing
that a certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein. BDC further alleged that the subject property
was mortgaged to DORI and Libarios without their knowledge or consent and that the Arriolas
were not in any way connected with BDC.
The respondents' affirmative defense that BDC, at the time of the execution of the REM, had no
right to hold the subject property in its name being merely an unincorporated association, if at all,
amounts to an allegation that BDC has no cause of action against the respondents. However, failure
to state a cause of action is different from lack of cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action
refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules
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of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not
prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. The remedy in the first is to move for the dismissal
of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence.
3. TEST OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
Jose Diaz, Jr. and Adelina McMullen vs Salvador Valenciano, Jr.

G.R. 209376, December 6, 2017, Peralta
In ascertaining the identity of causes of action, the test is to look into whether or not the same
evidence fully supports and establishes both the present and the former causes of action. If the answer
is in the affirmative, the former judgment would be a bar; otherwise, that prior judgment would not
serve as such a bar to the subsequent action.
FACTS:
Petitioners Diaz and McMullen filed a case for unlawful detainer against Salvador, Sr., father of
respondent Salvador, Jr. Petitioners in that complaint allege that they are the owner of the subject
property. On the other hand, respondent Salvador Jr. countered that his father and the rest of his
family have been in open, peaceful, and continuous possession of the subject property from when
Diaz mortgaged it to his father. The parties in this case entered in to a compromise agreement
where they agreed to amicably settle the case provided that Salvador, Sr. will vacate the and
surrender the property to petitioner Diaz within a period of 1 and ½ years, and that Diaz shall pay
to Salvador, Sr. the sum of P1,600.00.
Salvador, Sr. failed to vacate the subject property. As such, Diaz field an ex parte Motion for
Execution which the MTCC granted. A writ of execution was then issued to cause Salvador, Sr. to
surrender possession of the subject property to Diaz. However, petitioners by sheer tolerance chose
not to implement the writ and allowed Salvador, Sr. and his family to stay, subject to the condition
that they will cavate when petitioners need it. Salvador, Sr. eventually passed away.
15 years after, petitioners sent a demand letter to Salvador, Jr., who refused to vacate. This led
petitioners to filed a new case for unlawful detainer. In his Answer, Salvador, Jr. contended that the
complaint was barred by res judicata in view of the compromise agreement. He also claimed that
he and his predecessor in interest have been occupying the subject property in the concept of an
owner for more than 45 years already.
The MTCC held that the present complaint is already barred by res judicata because the same
evidence in the first action would support and establish the cause of action in the second one. The
RTC held that res judicata does not apply because the compromise agreement was not a judgment
on the merits. The CA reinstated the MTCC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second case for unlawful detainer is barred by res judicata
RULING:
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Res judicata applies in the concept of "bar by prior judgment" if the following requisites concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
(4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.
In this case, the court held that the first action did not bar the second applying the same evidence
rule. In ascertaining the identity of causes of action, the test is to look into whether or not the same
evidence fully supports and establishes both the present and the former causes of action. In an
unlawful detainer case, the evidence needed to establish the cause of action would be the lease
contract and the violation of that lease. However, in this case where a person occupies the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, what must be·
proven is that such possession is by mere tolerance, and that there was a breach of implied promise
to vacate the land upon demand.
The refusal to comply with the earlier demand letter sent to Salvador, Sr. creates a different cause
of action different from the one created by the refusal to comply with the second demand letter by
Salvador, Sr. The first deals with possession by mere tolerance while the second refers to possession
by tolerance which only arose when they neglected to execute the earlier judgment.
Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo and AV Manila Creative Production Co. v. Philippine

Information Agency and Department of Public Works and Highways
G.R. No. 223751 March 15, 2017 LEONEN, J.:
Sections 46, 47, and 48 of Book V, Title I, Subtitle B, Chapter 8 of the Administrative Code expressly
declares void a contract that fails to comply with the two requirements, namely, an appropriation law
funding the contract and a certification of appropriation and fund availability. The clear purpose of
these requirements is to insure that government contracts are never signed unless supported by the
corresponding appropriation law and fund availability.
FACTS:
In the last few months of Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration (Arroyo
Administration), then Acting Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
Victor Domingo (Acting Secretary Domingo) consulted and discussed with Miguel "Lucky"
Guillermo (Guillermo) and AV Manila Creative Production, Co. (AV Manila) allegedly for the
urgent need for an advocacy campaign (Campaign) to counteract the public's negative perception
of the performance of the outgoing Arroyo Administration. Guillermo and AV Manila formally
submitted in a letter-proposal dated February 26, 2010 the concept of "Joyride," a documentary film
showcasing milestones of the Arroyo Administration. Acting Secretary Domingo signed a marginal
note on the letter-proposal, which read, "OK, proceed!" Petitioners alleged that under the foregoing
exchanges, they committed to the following deliverables: reproduction and distribution of (a) a
revised, expanded, and more comprehensive "Joyride" documentary; (b) "Joyride" coffee table
book; (c) "Joyride" comics; (d) "Joyride" infomercial entitled "Sa Totoo Lang!"; and (e) "Joyride"
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infomercial entitled "Sa Totoo Lang-GFX", which was a representation of improved government
services. On April 20, 2010, Guillermo and AV Manila submitted samples and storyboards of the
foregoing to DPWH. They further alleged that Acting Secretary Domingo informed them that the
total consideration of ₱25,000,000.00 for their services and deliverable items was acceptable and
approved. A Memorandum addressed to Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo pertaining to
the "Joyride" materials was issued by Acting Secretary Domingo.
Thereafter, Joan Marzan, Philippine Information Agency's (PIA) representative, advised that, in
light of the foregoing agreement, a separate written contract was no longer necessary. Thus, the
Philippine Information Agency instructed Guillermo to send billings directly to the Philippine
Information Agency.Guillermo and AV Manila averred to have delivered copies of the "Joyride"
documentary, and thereafter, the "Joyride" comics. No funds were released by the Philippine
Information Agency. Guillermo and AV Manila alleged that because of lack of funds, petitioner
Guillermo had to secure financial assistance to deliver the subsequent deliverable items to DPWH
and PIA. Thus, Guillermo and AV Manila delivered copies of the "Joyride" coffee table book with
DVD inserts, and comics, to the DPWH. After all the deliverables had been delivered, petitioners
followed up on the payment from the PIA. Despite several demands, no payments were made.
Guillermo and AV Manila said that they made demands through letters dated August 19, September
20, and October 12, 2010, to various officials of the PIA, under the Administration of Former
President Benigno Aquino III. However, it refused and failed to pay the amount of
₱25,000,000.00.On December 10, 2010, Guillermo and AV Manila filed a Complaint for a sum of
money and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The Office of the Solicitor General
moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a cause of action and for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
On August 14, 2012, the RTC granted the OSG's Motion to Dismiss, finding that, although a contract
existed, this contract was not binding because of absence of legal requirements for entering into a
contract with the government. Guillermo and AV Manila moved for reconsideration but were
denied. They appealed to the Court of Appeals, but it affirmed the RTC’s Order of dismissal holding
that the Complaint sought to enforce a legal right based on a contract, however, Guillermo and AV
Manila failed to prove the existence of a contract, considering that the elements of a contract were
absent. The C A also found the doctrine of quantum meruit inapplicable because of absence of any
contract or legal right in favor of petitioners. MR denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action
RULING:
YES. A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission, on the part of the named defendant,
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of
the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable
to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
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It is well to point out that the plaintiff's cause of action should not merely be "stated" but,
importantly, the statement thereof should be "sufficient." This is why the elementary test in a
motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true would
justify the relief demanded. As a corollary, it has been held that only ultimate facts and not legal
conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of applying the test. This is consistent
with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that the complaint need only allege the
ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if
they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. Since
the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations, it follows that the
analysis should be confined to the four comers of the complaint, and no other. Thus, to determine
the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint
should be considered, in relation to whether its prayer may be granted.
Sections 46, 47, and 48 of Book V, Title I, Subtitle B, Chapter 8 of the Administrative Code expressly
declares void a contract that fails to comply with the two requirements, namely, an appropriation
law funding the contract and a certification of appropriation and fund availability. The clear
purpose of these requirements is to insure that government contracts are never signed unless
supported by the corresponding appropriation law and fund availability. The Complaint, however,
completely ignored the foregoing requisites for the validity of contracts involving expenditure of
public funds. The RTC could not order the enforcement of the alleged contract on the basis of the
Complaint, and the same was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
Finally, the invocation of the principle of quantum meruit could not save the Complaint from
dismissal. A careful reading reveals that the Complaint does not mention the principle of quantum
meruit, or any facts showing that the public has derived any benefit from the "Joyride" project. Even
assuming that basis exists to reimburse petitioners under the principle of quantum meruit, no
factual basis for its application was laid down in the Complaint. Its belated invocation does not
retroactively make the Complaint sufficient. However, petitioners are not without recourse. Under
the Administrative Code, officers who enter into contracts contrary to the Administrative Code are
liable to the government or to the other contracting party for damages. Thus, assuming petitioners
are able to prove a contract was entered into, they may go after the officers who entered into said
contract and hold them personally liable.
C. PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

1. REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST; INDISPENSABLE PARTIES; REPRESENTATIVES AS
PARTIES; NECESSARY PARTIES; INDIGENT PARTIES; ALTERNATIVE DEFENDANTS
Philippine Veterans Bank, Petitioner, V.

Spouses Ramon And Annabelle Sabado, Respondents
G.R. No. 224204. August 30, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined in a
suit. An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party
who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such
nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in
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such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience.
FACTS:
HTPMI and respondents entered into a Contract to Sell6whereby HTPMI agreed to sell a real
property to respondents. In consideration therefor, respondents paid HTPMI the total amount of
P869,400.00, consisting of a P174,400.00 down payment and the balance of P695,000.00 payable in
120 equal monthly instalments. The parties further agreed that respondents' failure to pay any
amount within the stipulated period of time shall mean the forfeiture of the down payment and
any other payments made in connection thereto, as well as the cancellation and rescission of the
Contract to Sell in accordance with law.
Petitioner, through a Notice of Cancellation by Notarial Act, cancelled or rescinded respondents'

Contract to Sell due to the latter's failure to pay their outstanding obligations thereunder.
Consequently, petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the subject property, but to no avail.
Hence, a Complaint was filed.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling in this case, and accordingly: (a) remanded the case
to the MTCC for HTPMI to be impleaded therein; and (b) directed the MTCC to proceed with the
trial of the case with dispatch. The CA also ruled that HTPMI is an indispensable party to the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that HTPMI is an indispensable party to petitioner's
ejectment suit against respondents and, thus, must be impleaded therein.
RULING:
No, the CA erred in ruling that HTPMI is an indispensable party.
The law provides, Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties
should be joined in a suit. Relatedly, an indispensable party is a party who has x x x an interest in
the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
In this case, the CA erred in holding that HTPMI is an indispensable party to the ejectment suit
filed by petitioner against respondents. Under the Deed of Assignment, HTPMI assigned its rights
to petitioner under the Contract to Sell. By this assignment, the ASSIGNEE hereby acquires all
rights of the ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell and under the law, including the right to
endorse any and all terms and conditions of the Contracts to Sell and the right to collect the
amounts due thereunder from the purchaser of the Property.
Teodulfo E. Lao, Jr. vs. LGU of Cagayan De Oro City

G.R. No. 187869. September 13, 2017, Leonen, J.
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Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, requires prior authorization
from the Sangguniang Panlungsod, law, or ordinance, before a city mayor may sign a contract in
behalf of the city. If the city mayor has no authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod to sign a
contract, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod have standing to file a case to have this contract
declared null and void.
FACTS:
On March 19, 2007, the City Council of Cagayan De Oro passed an ordinance which approved See’s
unsolicited proposal “for the redevelopment of Agora Complex into a Modern Integrated Terminal,
Public Market, and Vegetable Landing Area.”The redevelopment would be under a build-operate-
transfer scheme. At the time, the City Mayor was Vicente Y. Emano. On January 27, 2009, Mega
Farm, through See, and the then newly elected Mayor Jaraula executed the Build-Operate-Transfer
Contract for the Redevelopment of Agora. On March 19, 2009, petitioners filed their Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of the Re-Development of Agora Market and Terminal Contract Under Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) Scheme and All Ordinances, Resolutions and Motions of the City Council
Relative Thereto with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) & Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction with Damages with the RTC of Misamis Oriental. This complaint was filed against City
Government of Cagayan De Oro and the incumbent Cagayan De Oro City officials, in their personal
and official capacities. In their complaint, petitioners, as public officers and in their personal
capacity, questioned the execution and the contents of the Agora Complex BOT Contract. They
alleged that it was issued in bad faith and with fraudulent maneuvers between Mega Farm and the
City Government of Cagayan De Oro.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint due to lack or personality to file
suit.
RULING:
YES. The dismissal by the trial court of the complaint due to petitioners’ lack of personality to file
suit is erroneous. Petitioners, as members of the City Council of Cagayan De Oro, may file a case to
question a contract entered into by the city mayor allegedly without the City Council’s authority.
The real party in interest which may file a case, questioning the validity of a contract entered into
by the city mayor, who is alleged to have no authority to do so, is the city itself. It is the local
government unit which stands to be injured or benefited by any judgment that may be made in this
case. The city councilors merely represent the city in the suit
City councilors may file a suit for the declaration of nullity of a contract on the basis that the city
mayor had no authority to do so because the city mayor’s authority to bind the city to obligations
must emanate from the City Council. Under Title III, Chapter III, Article I, Section 455(b)(l)(vi) of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the city mayor may sign
all bonds, contracts, and obligations on behalf of a city only upon authority of the sanggumang
panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance.
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As the City Council is the source of the mayor’s power to execute contracts for the city, its members
have the authority, interest, and even duty to file cases in behalf of the city to restrain the execution
of contracts entered into in violation of the Local Government Code.
Spring Homes Subdivision Co., Inc., Spouses Pedro L. Lumbres and

Rebecca T. Roaring vs.Spouses Pedro Tablada, Jr. and Zenaida Tablada
FACTS:
Pursuant to their JVA, the Spouses Lumbres transferred the titles to the parcels of land in the name
of Spring Homes. In 1995, Spring Homes entered into a Contract to Sell with Spouses Tablada for
the sale of a parcel of land. The Spouses Lumbres filed with the RTC a complaint for Collection of
Sum of Money, Specific Performance and Damages with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against Spring Homes for its alleged failure to comply with the terms of
the JVA. Unaware of the pending action, the Spouses Tablada began constructing their house on
the subject lot and thereafter occupied the same. Spring Homes executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of the Spouses Tablada, who paid Spring Homes an amount more than the purchase price.
The title over the subject property, however, remained with Spring Homes for its failure to cause
the cancellation of the TCT and the issuance of a new one in favor of the Spouses Tablada, who only
received a photocopy of said title.
Subsequently, the Spouses Tablada discovered that the subject property was mortgaged as a
security for a loan. In fact, since the loan remained unpaid, extrajudicial proceedings were
instituted. Meanwhile, without waiting for trial on the specific performance and sum of money
complaint, the Spouses Lumbres and Spring Homes entered into a Compromise Agreement,
approved by the RTC, wherein Spring Homes conveyed the subject property, as well as several
others, to the Spouses Lumbres. By virtue of said agreement, the Spouses Lumbres were authorized
to collect Spring Homes’ account receivables arising from the conditional sales of several properties,
as well as to cancel said sales, in the event of default in the payment by the subdivision lot buyers.
In the exercise of the power granted to them, the Spouses Lumbres started collecting deficiency
payments from the subdivision lot buyers, including the Spouses Tablada. When no payment was
received, the Spouses Lumbres caused the cancellation of the Contract to Sell previously executed
by Spring Homes in favor of the Spouses Tablada. In 2000, the Spouses Lumbres and Spring Homes
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property, and as a result, a new TCT was issued
in the name of the Spouses Lumbres.
The Spouses Tablada filed a complaint for Nullification of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against
Spring Homes and the Spouses Lumbres praying for the nullification of the second Deed of
Absolute Sale executed in favor of the Spouses Lumbres, as well as the title issued as a consequence
thereof, the declaration of the validity of the first Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor, and
the issuance of a new title in their name. The Sheriff’s Return indicated that while the original copy
of the complaint and the summons were duly served upon the Spouses Lumbres, summons was not
properly served upon Spring Homes because it was reportedly no longer existing as a corporate
entity.
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The Spouses Lumbres filed a Motion to Dismiss the case against them on the grounds of non-
compliance with a condition precedent and lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter.
The Motion to Dismiss was eventually denied by the trial court. The Spouses Lumbres also filed an
ejectment suit of their own before the MTCC demanding that the Spouses Tablada vacate the
subject property and pay rentals due thereon. The MTCC, however, dismissed the suit ruling that
the Spouses Lumbres registered their title over the subject property in bad faith. Such ruling was
reversed by the RTC which found that there was no valid deed of absolute sale between the Spouses
Tablada and Spring Homes. Nevertheless, the CA, on appeal, agreed with the MTCC and reinstated
the decision thereof. This was affirmed by the SC in Spouses Lumbres v. Spouses Tablada on
February 23, 2007.
Meanwhile, on the nullification and reconveyance of title suit filed by the Spouses Tablada, the RTC
noted that Spring Homes has not yet been summoned. This caused the Spouses Tablada to move
for the discharge of Spring Homes as a party on the ground that the corporation had already ceased
to exist. The Spouses Lumbres, however, opposed claiming that Spring Homes is an indispensable
party. The RTC ordered the motion to be held in abeyance until the submission of proof on Spring
Homes’ corporate status. In the meantime, trial ensued. Eventually, it was shown that Spring
Homes’ certificate of registration was revoked.
The RTC dismissed Spouses Tablada’s action for lack of jurisdiction over the person of Spring
Homes, an indispensable party. However, the CA reversed and ruled that Spring Homes is not an
indispensable party. The CA also upheld the ruling of the Court in Spouses Lumbres v. Spouses
Tablada that notwithstanding the fact that the Spouses Lumbres, as the second buyer, registered
their Deed of Absolute Sale, in contrast to the Spouses Tablada who were not able to register their
Deed of Absolute Sale precisely because of Spring Home’s failure to deliver the owner’s copy of the
TCT, the Spouses Tablada’s right could not be deemed defeated as the Spouses Lumbres were in
bad faith for even before their registration of their title, they were already informed that the subject
property was already previously sold to the Spouses Tablada, who had already constructed their
house thereon.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Spring Homes is an indispensable party.
(2) Whether Spouses Tablada are purchasers of the property in good faith.
RULING:
(1) No. Spring Homes is not an indispensable party. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final
determination of an action and who, for this reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as
defendants. Time and again, the Court has held that a party is indispensable, not only if he has an
interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also if his interest is such that a final decree
cannot be made without affecting this interest or without placing the controversy in a situation
where the final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He is
a person whose absence disallows the court from making an effective, complete, or equitable
determination of the controversy between or among the contending parties. Conversely, a party is
not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and
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divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment
which does complete justice to the parties in court. If his presence would merely permit complete
relief between him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation,
he is not indispensable.
In dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the trial court relied on Uy v. CA, et. al. and
held that since Spring Homes, an indispensable party, was not summoned, it had no authority to
proceed. But as aptly observed by the CA, the doctrine in Uy hardly serves as basis for the trial
court’s conclusions and actually even bolsters the finding that it is the Spouses Lumbres, as assignee
of the subject property, and not Spring Homes, as assignor, who are the indispensable parties. By
virtue of the second Deed of Absolute Sale between Spring Homes and the Spouses Lumbres, the
Spouses Lumbres became the absolute and registered owner of the subject property herein. As such,
they possess that certain interest in the property without which, the courts cannot proceed for
settled is the doctrine that registered owners of parcels of land whose title is sought to be nullified
should be impleaded as an indispensable party. Spring Homes, however, which has already sold its
interests in the subject land, is no longer regarded as an indispensable party, but is, at best,
considered to be a necessary party whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy,
but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in its absence without
affecting it. This is because when Spring Homes sold the property in question to the Spouses
Lumbres, it practically transferred all its interests therein to the said Spouses. In fact, a new title
was already issued in the names of the Spouses Lumbres. As such, Spring Homes no longer stands
to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in the instant suit regardless of whether the new
title registered in the names of the Spouses Lumbres is cancelled in favor of the Spouses Tablada or
not. Thus, contrary to the ruling of the RTC, the failure to summon Spring Homes does not deprive
it of jurisdiction over the instant case for Spring Homes is not an indispensable party.
(2) Yes. The Court likewise affirms the findings of the CA. The issue here involves what appears to
be a double sale. First, the Spouses Tablada entered into a Contract to Sell with Spring Homes in
1995 which was followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale in 1996. Second, in 2000, the Spouses Lumbres
and Spring Homes executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same property. The Spouses Lumbres
persistently insist that the first Deed of Sale executed by the Spouses Tablada is void for having no
valuable consideration. They argue that out of the ₱409,500.00 purchase price under the Contract
to Sell, the Spouses Tablada merely paid ₱179,500.00, failing to pay the rest in the amount of
₱230,000.00 despite demands. There is no merit in the contention.
As the CA held, it is clear from the first Deed of Absolute Sale that the consideration for the subject
property is ₱157,500.00. In fact, the same amount was indicated as the purchase price in the second
Deed of Absolute Sale between Spring Homes and the Spouses Lumbres. As for the varying amounts
contained in the Contract to Sell, the Court notes that the same has already been duly addressed
by the Court in the 2007 Spouses Lumbres v. Spouses Tablada case. Thus, while the Spouses
Lumbres would like Us to believe that based on the Contract to Sell, the total selling price of the
subject property is ₱409,500.00, the contract itself, as well as the surrounding circumstances
following its execution, negate their argument. As appropriately found by the Court, said amount
actually pertains to the sum of: (1) the cost of the land area of the lot at 105 square meters priced at
₱1,500 per square meter; and (2) the cost of the house to be constructed on the land at 42 square
meters priced at ₱6,000 per square meter. But it would be a grave injustice to hold the Spouses
Tablada liable for more than the cost of the land area when it was duly proven that they used their
own funds in the construction of the house. As shown by the records, the Spouses Tablada was
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forced to use their own money since their PAG-IBIG loan application did not materialize, not
through their own fault, but because Spring Homes failed, despite repeated demands, to deliver to
them the owner’s duplicate copy of the subject property’s title required by the loan application. In
reality, therefore, what Spring Homes really sold to the Spouses Tablada was only the lot in the
amount of ₱157,500.00, since the house was constructed thereon using the Spouses Tablada’s own
money. In fact, nowhere in the Contract to Sell was it stated that the subject property includes any
improvement thereon or that the same even exists. Moreover, as previously mentioned, in both the
first and second Deeds of Absolute Sale, it was indicated that the amount of the property subject of
the sale is only ₱157,500.00.
There is, therefore, no factual or legal basis for the Spouses Lumbres to claim that since the Spouses
Tablada still had an outstanding balance of ₱230,000.00 from the total purchase price, the sale
between Spring Homes and the Spouses Tablada was void, and consequently, they were authorized
to unilaterally cancel such sale, and thereafter execute another one transferring the subject property
in their names. As correctly held by the Court in Spouses Lumbres v. Spouses Tablada, the first Deed
of Sale executed in favor of the Spouses Tablada is valid and with sufficient consideration. Thus, in
view of this validity of the sale subject of the first Deed of Absolute Sale between Spring Homes and
the Spouses Tablada, the Court shall now determine who, as between the two spouses herein,
properly acquired ownership over the subject property. In this regard, Article 1544 of the Civil Code
reads:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession, and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith. (Emphasis supplied)
The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains greater
significance in case of a double sale of immovable property. Thus, the Court has consistently ruled
that ownership of an immovable property which is the subject of a double sale shall be transferred:
(1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in
default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof,
to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. The requirement of the
law then is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in good faith. Good faith must concur
with the registration – that is, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack of title
of his vendor or must not have been aware of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry
and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
If it is shown that a buyer was in bad faith, the alleged registration they have made amounted to no
registration at all.
Here, the first buyers of the subject property, the Spouses Tablada, were able to take said property
into possession but failed to register the same because of Spring Homes’ unjustified failure to
deliver the owner’s copy of the title whereas the second buyers, the Spouses Lumbres, were able to
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register the property in their names. But while said the Spouses Lumbres successfully caused the
transfer of the title in their names, the same was done in bad faith. As correctly observed by the
Court in Spouses Lumbres v. Spouses Tablada, the Spouses Lumbres cannot claim good faith since
at the time of the execution of their Compromise Agreement with Spring Homes, they were
indisputably and reasonably informed that the subject lot was previously sold to the Spouses
Tablada. They were also already aware that the Spouses Tablada had constructed a house thereon
and were in physical possession thereof. They cannot, therefore, be permitted to freely claim good
faith on their part for the simple reason that the First Deed of Absolute Sale between Spring Homes
and the Spouses Tablada was not annotated at the back of the subject property’s title. It is beyond
the Court’s imagination how spouses Lumbres can feign ignorance to the first sale when the records
clearly reveal that they even made numerous demands on the Spouses Tablada to pay, albeit
erroneously, an alleged balance of the purchase price.
Indeed, knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights
except only as provided by law, as in cases where the second buyer first registers in good faith the
second sale ahead of the first. Such knowledge of the first buyer does bar her from availing of her
rights under the law, among them, first her purchase as against the second buyer. But conversely,
knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register
the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.
Accordingly, in order for the Spouses Lumbres to obtain priority over the Spouses Tablada, the law
requires a continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale that would
enable their contract to ripen into full ownership through prior registration. But from the very
beginning, the Spouses Lumbres had already known of the fact that the subject property had
previously been sold to the Spouses Tablada, by virtue of a valid Deed of Absolute Sale. In fact, the
Spouses Tablada were already in possession of said property and had even constructed a house
thereon. Clearly then, the Spouses Lumbres were in bad faith the moment they entered into the
second Deed of Absolute Sale and thereafter registered the subject property in their names. For this
reason, the Court cannot, therefore, consider them as the true and valid owners of the disputed
property and permit them to retain title thereto.
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), Petitioner vs.
Court Of Appeals (21st Division), and Francisco Labao, as General Manager of San Miguel
Protective Security Agency (SMPSA), Respondents
G.R. No. 194226, February 15, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.:
An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made in its absence without injuring or affecting that interest."
FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) set a public bidding for the security package in NPC MinGen.
Among the participating bidders was San Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA), represented
by Labao. However, NPC's Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) disqualified SMPSA for its alleged
failure to meet the equipage requirements. The disqualification prompted Labao, as the general
manager of SMPSA, to bring a petition for certiorari against NPC and its officials in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Lanao del Norte. On January 30, 2009, the RTC issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) directing NPC and its officials to desist from awarding the security package, as well as
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from declaring a failure of bidding. On February 17, 2009, the RTC issued the writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining NPC and its officials from committing said acts.
On August 17, 2009, the RTC, ruling in favor of SMPSA, made the injunction permanent.
In due course, NPC appealed to the CA. In the meantime, on March 9, 2009, NPC and PSALM
entered into an operation and maintenance agreement (OMA) whereby the latter, as the owner of
all assets of NPC by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), had the obligation to provide for the security of all the plants, assets
and other facilities. Accordingly, on March 29, 2009, PSALM conducted a public bidding of its own
for the security package of various power plants and facilities in Mindanao, including those of NPC
MinGen. During the public bidding, Tiger Investigation, Detective & Security Agency (TISDA) was
declared the winning bidder for the package corresponding to NPC MinGen. On April 7, 2010,
PSALM received the TRO issued by the CA on April 5, 2010. It is noted, however, that Labao did not
furnish PSALM a copy of SMPSA's Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction. Notwithstanding the fact that PSALM was not a party in the case brought
by Labao against NPC, and the fact that PSALM was not furnished a copy of Labao 's Urgent Motion
for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, the CA issued the assailed
resolution granting the TRO in order to maintain the status quo, and expressly included PSALM as
subject of the writ. Hence, PSALM has come to the Court by petition for certiorari, insisting that
the CA thereby acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or gravely abused its discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunctionenjoining the petitioner
from offering or bidding out or accepting bid proposals for the procurement of security services for
the MinGen Headquarters despite the fact that private respondent Labao is not entitled to the
injunctive relief.
RULING:
YES. First of all, Section 49 of Republic Act No. 9136, or EPIRA, expressly created PSALM as a
corporate entity separate and distinct from NPC. Accordingly, the CA blatantly erred in holding
that PSALM, without being made a party itself, was subject of the writ of injunction issued against
NPC. PSALM and NPC, despite being unquestionably invested by law with distinct and separate
personalities, were intolerably confused with each other.
Secondly, Labao was quite aware that under EPIRA, PSALM became the owner as early as in mid-
2001 of all of NPC's existing generation assets, liabilities, IPP contracts, real estate and all other
disposable assets, as well as all facilities of NPC. NPC-MinGen was among the assets or properties
coming under the ownership of PSALM. As such owner, PSALM was an indispensible party without
whom no final determination could be had if it was not joined. An indispensable party is one who
has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made
in its absence without injuring or affecting that interest. As such, Labao should have impleaded
PSALM in the proceedings in the RTC, or the RTC should have itself seen to PSALM 's inclusion as
an indispensable party.
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Spouses Amado O. Ibañez and Esther R. Ibañez, Petitioners vs. James Harper as
Representative of the Heirs of Francisco Muñoz, Sr., the Register of Deeds of Manila and
the Sheriff of Manila, Respondents
G.R. No. 194272, February 15, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.:
Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and the judgment of the
trial court infirm because the court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. Nevertheless,
there are instances when formal substitution may be dispensed with.
FACTS:
Sometime in October 1996, spouses Amado and Esther Ibañez (spouses Ibañez) borrowed from
Francisco E. Muñoz, Sr. (Francisco), Consuelo Estrada (Consuelo) and Ma. Consuelo E. Muñoz (Ma.
Consuelo) the amount of ₱1,300,000, payable in three months, with interest at the rate of 3% a
month.7
On October 14, 1996, the spouses Ibanez issued a Promissory Note8 binding themselves jointly and
severally to pay Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo the loan amount with interest, to wit:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I jointly and severally, promise to pay to MA. CONSUELO E. MUÑOZ &
CONSUELO C. ESTRADA, at their office at x x x, the principal sum of ONE MILLION THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (₱1,300,000.00), Philippine Currency, with interest thereon at the
rate of three percent (3%) per month, subject to one (1%) percent penalty if not paid on monthly
due date. Interest not paid when due shall be added to and become part of the principal and shall
likewise bear interest at the same rate compounded monthly. Payable within a period of three (3)
months from the date hereof, beginning Nov. 14, 1996 and every month thereafter, until the whole
sum of principal and interest shall have been fully paid.
Upon default of three (3) monthly installments when due, all the other installments shall become
due and payable. Interest not paid when due shall be added to, and become part of the principal
and shall likewise bear interest at the same rate, compounded monthly.9
As security, on October 1 7, 1996, the spouses Ibañez executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage10 in
favor of Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo over a parcel of land and its improvements covered by Transfer
of Certificate Title (TCT) No. 202978. The mortgage contained the same terms as the promissory
note. It further stipulated that Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo shall have the right to immediately
foreclose the mortgage upon the happening of the following events: (1) filing by the mortgagor of
any petition for insolvency or suspension of payment; and/or (2) failure of the mortgagor to perform
or comply with any covenant, agreement, term or condition of the mortgage.11
On September 23, 1997, alleging that the conditions of the mortgage have been violated since
November 17, 1996 and that all check payments were dishonored by the drawee, Ma. Consuelo and
Consuelo applied for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.12
On December 8, 1997, the spouses Ibañez filed in the RTC of Manila a Complaint13 for injunction
and damages with prayers for writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
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against Francisco, Ma. Consuelo, Consuelo, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Sheriff-in-
Charge and Register of Deeds of the City of Manila. Docketed as Civil Case No. 97-86454, the
Complaint alleged that there is no reason to proceed with the foreclosure because the real estate
mortgage was novated.14 They prayed that the public auction of the property be enjoined and that
Francisco, Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo be held liable for actual and compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs of suit.15
On December 12, 1997, the spouses Ibañez filed an Amended Complaint.16 They alleged that the
public auction was conducted, with Francisco, Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo as the highest
bidders17 and prayed that the Ex-Officio Sheriff and the Sheriff-in-Charge be enjoined from
executing the certificate of sale in favor of Francisco, Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo. In the event the
certificate of sale is already issued, they alternatively prayed for that the Register of Deeds of Manila
be enjoined from registering the certificate of sale.18
On December 16, 1997, the RTC issued a status quo order.19
On June 11, 2002, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Approval of Amended Compromise
Agreement.20
On June 29, 2006, the spouses Ibañez filed a Motion for the Implementation of the Amended
Compromise Agreement.33 They argued that since there was no proper substitution of the heirs of
Francisco, the proper parties to substitute him are Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo. They also argued
that the Amended Compromise Agreement had already been partially complied with: (1) they have
already executed a Deed of Assignment assigning to Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo the proceeds of
the GSIS loan pursuant to paragraph 2.3; and (2) on May 19, 2006, they have already executed the
Real Estate Mortgage provided under paragraph 2.4.34 They further allege that the delay in the
implementation of the assignment was due to the assignees' failure to deliver to the GSIS the
owner's copy of TCT No. 202978 (the same lot which served as security for the Promissory Note
executed by the spouses Ibañez on October 14, 1996) and the discharge of the corresponding Real
Estate Mortgage executed by the spouses Ibañez on October 17, 1996.
The spouses Ibañez thus prayed that the Amended Compromise Agreement be considered initially
implemented and that Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo be ordered to surrender the owner's copy of
TCT No. 202978 or to consider the title lost should the same not be surrendered.35
On even date, Atty. Bermejo filed a Notice of Death37 of Francisco and named James Harper (James)
as Francisco's legal representative. Atty. Bermejo also filed his Entry of Appearance38 as counsel for
James, Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo.
In an Order dated August 11, 2006,43 the RTC granted the spouses Ibañez' motion, thus:
x x x It appearing that all the stipulations in the "Hatol", dated June 10, 2002, have been complied
with accordingly to the entire satisfaction of each one of the contending parties and the terms and
conditions set forth therein were duly performed and satisfied. As prayed for, the said "Hatol ",
dated June 10, 2002, is considered, regarded and adopted as this Court's decision on the merits with
finality which was approved by this Court on June 17, 2002.
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On August 24, 2006, James, as Francisco's legal representative, and through Atty. Bermejo, sought
reconsideration48 of the RTC's August 11, 2006 Order. He argued that the trial court erred in holding
that all the stipulations in the Hatol have been complied with to the satisfaction of all the parties.
According to James, the spouses Ibañez made it appear that only Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo
remained as parties after Francisco's death. Since James, as Francisco's representative, was excluded
from the Deed of Assignment, the Amended Compromise Agreement could not have been
completely complied with.
Aggrieved, the heirs of Francisco, identified as Maria C. Muñoz, Angelina M. Crocker and Maria
Elena M. Webster and represented by James Harper, filed before the CA a Petition
for Certiorari51 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The CA ruled that the Amended Complaint and the Hatol identified Francisco, Ma. Consuelo and
Consuelo as the creditors and the parties who were supposed to receive the proceeds of the
Amended Compromise Agreement. Since the Deed of Assignment was executed only in favor of
Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo, the loan obligation of the spouses Ibañez to Francisco remained
unsettled. The heirs of Francisco thus retain the right to invoke paragraph 2.5 of the Compromise
Agreement which provides for the lifting of the trial court's status quo order.60 The CA disagreed
that there was no valid substitution of parties and noted from the records that the RTC was notified
of Francisco's death on June 29, 2006. The late filing of the notice of death did not divest the RTC
of jurisdiction to favorably act on the heirs' motion to lift the status quo order and issue the writ of
execution. Based on Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is the counsel, not the heirs
of the deceased, who will be penalized for the failure to comply with the duty to notify the court of
the client's death.61
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Francisco was a real party in interest;
2. Whether there was valid substitution of parties;
RULING:
1. YES. In their Complaint and Amended Complaint, the spouses Ibañez impleaded Francisco as a
defendant and described him as the capitalist. They also alleged that they took a loan from
Francisco, Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo. They also narrated that a public auction over the mortgaged
property was conducted where Francisco, Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo emerged as the highest
bidders. Further, attachments to the Complaint and Amended Complaint show that Amado Ibañez
and Francisco communicated with each other regarding the payment of the loan. The Amended
Compromise Agreement, approved by the trial court and which served as the basis for the Hatol,
referred to the spouses Ibañez as the plaintiffs while the defendants they covenanted to pay are
Francisco, Consuelo and Ma. Consuelo. It was signed by the spouses Ibañez and Francisco, for
himself and on behalf of Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo. These facts indicate that Francisco has a
material interest in the case as it is in his interest to be paid the money he lent the spouses Ibañez.
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Any judgment which will be rendered will either benefit or injure Francisco; thus, he is a real party
in interest.
2. Yes.The rationale behind the rule on substitution under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
is to apprise the heir or the substitute that he is being brought to the jurisdiction of the court in
lieu of the deceased party by operation of law. It serves to protect the right of every party to due
process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the
suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the rule on
substitution would render the proceedings and the judgment of the trial court infirm because the
court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom
the trial and the judgment would be binding. Nevertheless, there are instances when formal
substitution may be dispensed with.
Here, while there may have been a failure to strictly observe the provisions of the rules and there
was no formal substitution of heirs, the heirs of Francisco, represented by James, voluntarily
appeared and actively participated in the case, particularly in the enforcement of the Hatol. As the
records show, they have filed multiple pleadings and moved several times to implement the Hatol
to protect Francisco's interest. Following our rulings in Vda. de Salazar and Berot, a formal
substitution of parties is no longer required under the circumstances.
2. EFFECT OF DEATH OF PARTY LITIGANT
CONCHITA S. UY, ET AL. v. CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO, substituted by his heirs

PAULITA MANATAD-DEL CASTILLO ET AL.
G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017, FIRST DIVISION, (PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)
Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, substitution of parties takes place when the party to
the action dies pending the resolution of the case and the claim is not extinguished. like Moreover,
Section 20, Rule 3 applies in cases where the defendant dies while the case is pending and
not before the case was even filed in court, as in this case.
FACTS:
The present case is an offshoot of an action for quieting of title, reconveyance, damages, and
attorney's fees involving a parcel of land, known as Lot 791 and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title, filed by Crispulo Del Castillo (Crispulo) against Jaime Uy (Jaime) and his wife, Conchita, on
November 12, 1996. However, since Jaime had died six (6) years earlier in 1990, Crispulo amended
his complaint and impleaded Jaime's children, i.e., the Uy siblings, as defendants. Meanwhile,
Crispulo died during the pendency of the action and hence, was substituted by his heirs,
respondents Paulita Manalad-Del Castillo, et al.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, and accordingly: (a) declared them as the true and lawful
owners of Lot 791; (b) nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 576, as well as TCT No. 29129; and
(c) ordered petitioners to pay respondents moral damages and litigation costs in the amount of P20,
000.00 each, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to twenty five percent (25%) of the zonal value of
Lot 791. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the CA, and subsequently, to the Court, but the
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same were denied for lack of merit. The ruling became final and executory on April 8, 2010, thus,
prompting the Court to issue an Entry of Judgment dated May 4, 2010.
Then the respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution which was granted by the
RTC. The sheriff issued a Notice of Garnishment seeking to levy petitioners' properties in an amount
sufficient to cover for the attorney's fees and moral damages and litigation costs.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the writ of execution be quashed and set aside
alleging that the Writ of Execution is invalid because it altered the terms of the RTC Decision which
did not state that the zonal value mentioned therein referred to the zonal value of the property at
the time of execution. Before the RTC could act upon petitioners' Omnibus Motion, they filed a
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on Jurisdictional Grounds, claiming that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the Uy siblings in the Quieting of Title Case as they were never served with
summons in relation thereto.
The RTC issued two (2) orders: (a) one granting petitioners' Omnibus Motion, nullifying the Notice
of Garnishment, and setting a hearing to determine the proper computation of the award for
attorney's fees; and (b) another denying their motion to quash, since they never raised such
jurisdictional issue in the proceedings a quo.
Petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC's twin Orders. In said
motion, petitioners contended that the RTC failed to definitely rule on the validity of the writ of
execution, and that it erred in holding that the RTC Decision was already final and executory
despite the absence of summons on the Uy siblings.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the RTC's twin Orders.
Petitioners argued that instead of just declaring the Notice of Garnishment void, the RTC should
have also declared the writ of execution void because the Uy siblings were never served with
summons; and like the Notice of Garnishment, the Writ of Execution also altered the terms of the
RTC Decision. Petitioners further added that the writ of execution was void because it made them
liable beyond their inheritance from Jaime. They maintain that the estate of Jaime should instead
be held liable for the adjudged amount and that respondents should have brought their claim
against the estate, in accordance with Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
The CA affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC. With respect to the validity of the writ of execution,
the CA ruled that since the Writ of Execution made express reference to the RTC Decision without
adding anything else, the same was valid, unlike the Notice of Garnishment and, in the process,
exceeded the purview of the said Decision. Undaunted, petitioners moved for
reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA hence, the present petition.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether or not Petitioners were served with summons – YES
b.) Whether or notpetitioners are personally liable to the extent of their inheritance – YES
c.) Whether or not the doctrine of immutability of judgment applies - NO
RULING:
On the claim that the petitioners were never served with summons, the CA correctly pointed out
that in the Manifestation/Motion, petitioners, through their counsel, Atty. Trinidad, explicitly
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stated, among others, that they received the Summons with a copy of the Second Amended
Complaint and that the Answer earlier filed serves as the Answer to the Second Amended
Complaint. It is settled that judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course
of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence
to prove them. They are legally binding on the party making it, except when it is shown that they
have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was actually made, neither of
which was shown to exist in this case.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons for the amended complaint, they
were nonetheless deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing an
Answer to the amended complaint and actively participating in the case. It is settled that the active
participation of the party against whom the action was brought, is tantamount to an invocation of
the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar
said party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction. After all, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant in civil cases is obtained either by a valid service of summons upon him or by his
voluntary submission to the court's authority.
As to petitioners' contention that respondents should have proceeded against Jaime's estate
pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is well to point out that based on the records,
the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in Jaime's place as defendant; rather, they were
impleaded in their personal capacities. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, substitution
of parties takes place when the party to the action dies pending the resolution of the case and the
claim is not extinguished, viz:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered
as costs. (Emphases supplied)
Here, Jaime died on March 4, 1990, or six (6) years before private respondents filed the
Quieting of Title Case. Thus, after Conchita filed an Answer informing the RTC of Jaime's death
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in 1990, the complaint was amended to implead the Uy siblings. Accordingly, the Rules of Court
provisions on substitution upon the death of a party do not apply and the Uy siblings were not
merely substituted in place of Jaime in the Quieting of Title Case. Instead, they were impleaded in
their personal capacities. In this regard, petitioners' argument that they cannot be held solidarily
liable for the satisfaction of any monetary judgment or award must necessarily fail.
In this light, petitioners can no longer invoke Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. - When the action is for recovery
of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before
entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. (Emphasis supplied)
A cursory reading of the foregoing provision readily shows that like Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, it applies in cases where the defendant dies while the case is pending and
not before the case was even filed in court, as in this case.
At this point, the Court notes that if petitioners truly believed that Jaime's estate is the proper party
to the Quieting of Title Case, they could and should have raised the lack of cause of action against
them at the earliest opportunity. Obviously, they did not do so; instead, they actively participated
in the case, adopted the answer earlier filed by Conchita, and even litigated the case all the way to
the Court. Petitioners cannot now question the final and executory judgment in the Quieting of
Title Case because it happened to be adverse to them.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that "a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This principle, known as the doctrine of
immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration
of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put
an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.
Verily, it fosters the judicious perception that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not
hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality
to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must be faithfully
complied." However, this doctrine "is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and
prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby."
In this case, a punctilious examination of the records, especially the Amended Complaint in the
Quieting of Title Case reveals that the disputed Lot 791 was covered by TCT No. 29129 in the names
of Jaime and Conchita. Thus, while the Uy siblings were indeed impleaded in their personal
capacities, the fact remains that they are merely succeeding to Jaime's interest in the said lot and
title. As successors-heirs, they cannot be personally bound to respond to the decedent's obligations
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beyond their distributive shares. Verily, this is a special or a compelling circumstance which would
necessitate the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment, so as to somehow limit the
liability of the Uy siblings in the payment of the monetary awards in favor of respondents in the
Quieting of Title.
In sum, while the courts a quo correctly ruled that the Uy siblings may be held answerable to the
monetary awards in the Quieting of Title Case, such liability cannot exceed whatever value they
inherited from their late father, Jaime. For this purpose, the RTC is tasked to ensure that the
satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the judgment in the Quieting of Title Case will not result in
the payment by the Uy siblings of an amount exceeding their inheritance from Jaime. After all, the
other party, i.e., respondents, shall not be unjustly prejudiced by the same since Jaime's spouse,
Conchita, is still alive and the rest of the monetary awards may be applied against her, if need be.
D. VENUE
Planters Development Bank v. Spouses Victoriano and Melanie Ramos

G.R. No. 228617, September 20, 2017, Reyes Jr., J.
The complaint being one for annulment of real estate mortgages and promissory notes is in the nature
of a personal action, the venue of which may be fixed by the parties to the contract.
FACTS:
Spouses Ramos obtained a loan with Planters Development Bank (PDB) amounting to P40 million
for the construction of a warehouse. It was secured by several Real Estate Mortgages (REMs) over
Spouses Ramos’ properties. Unfortunately, Spouses Ramos were unable to pay the loans. PDB
sought to foreclose the REMs extrajudicially in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Spouses Ramos, on the
other hand, filed a complaint to annul the REMs in the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. PDB
moved to dismiss the complaint of Spouses Ramos alleging improper venue. PDB argued that the
REMs contained an exclusive venue clause limiting actions arising therefrom to Makati City.
However, the RTC denied PDB’s Motion to Dismiss. The CA affirmed the RTC’s denial when PDB
elevated the matter through Rule 65. Hence, this appeal before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not venue was improperly laid in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija despite the stipulation of
the REMs limiting the venue to Makati City.
RULING:
Yes. The general rules on venue admit of exceptions in Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules Court, i.e.,
where a specific rule or law provides otherwise, or when the parties agreed in writing before the
filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. Written stipulations as to venue may be
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive
in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed
by law. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
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In the instant case, the stipulation in the real estate mortgages executed by the parties pertaining
to venue reads as follows: “In the event of suit arising from out of or in connection with this mortgage
and/or the promissory note/s secured by this mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their causes
of action exclusively in the proper court/s of Makati, Metro Manila, the MORTGAGOR waiving
for this purpose any other venue.” Thus, Spouses Ramos had validly waived their right to choose the
venue for any suit or action arising from the mortgages or promissory notes when they agreed to
the limit the same to Makati City only and nowhere else.
True enough, the stipulation on the venue was couched in a language showing the intention of the
parties to restrict the filing of any suit or action to the designated place only. It is crystal clear that
the intention was not just to make the said place an additional forum or venue but the only
jurisdiction where any suit or action pertaining to the mortgage contracts may be filed. There being
no showing that such waiver was invalid or that the stipulation on venue was against public policy,
the agreement of the parties should be upheld. It is therefore a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC to deny the motion to dismiss filed by PDB on the ground of improper venue, especially
when the said issue had been raised at the most opportune time, that is, within the time for but
before the filing of an answer. The CA should have given this matter a more serious consideration
and not simply brushed it aside.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

represented by its President, JANET C. LEY, Petitioner, vs.MARVIN MEDEL
SEDANO,
doing business under the name and style "LOLA TABA LOLO PATO PALENGKE AT
PALUTO SA SEASIDE,", Respondent.
G.R. No. 222711. August 23, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has jurisdiction where
the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.As an exception, parties may,
through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
FACTS:
A Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages against respondent Marvin Medel
Sedano, respondent, was instituted by the defendant, Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC). PNCC subleased a parcel of land to the respondent, however, the latter failed
to pay the rent due for the period August 2011 to December 2011 amounting to P 8 828 025. 46 and
despite demands, refused to settle his obligation, hence the complaint.
In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint, respondent pointed out that the venue was improperly
laid pursuant to a stipulation in the lease contract which provided that “"[a]ll actions or case[s] filed
in connection with this case shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of
all others."
In its Comment/Opposition-- to respondent's affirmative defense of improper venue, petitioner

argued that Section 21 of the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue, but a stipulation on
jurisdiction which is void.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the Valenzuela-RTC erred in ruling that venue was improperly laid.
RULING:
No, Valenzuela-RTC did not err in ruling that the venue was improperly laid.
The law provides that the venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court
which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.As
an exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a
certain exclusive venue.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner's action was one for collection of sum of money in an
amount that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Since the lease contract already
provided that all actions or cases involving the breach thereof should be filed with the RTC of Pasay
City, and that petitioner’s complaint purporting the said breach fell within the RTC's exclusive
original jurisdiction, the latter should have then followed the contractual stipulation and filed its
complaint before the RTC of Pasay City…; hence, the same is clearly dismissible on the ground of
improper venue, without prejudice, however, to its refiling in the proper court.
||| Planters Development Bank v. Spouses Ramos

G.R. No. 228167, September 20, 2017, Second Division, Reyes, Jr., J.
The general policy of the rules of venue is to make it more convenient for the parties to institute
actions arising from or in relation to their agreements. Because restrictive stipulations are in
derogation of this general policy, the language of the parties must be so clear and categorical as to
leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places for their actions.
FACTS:
Spouses Ramos applied for credit lines with petitioner for the construction of a warehouse with
the capacity to house 250,000 cavans in Nueva Ecija, and with said credit lines approved to the
extent of P140,000,000. Despite Planters Development Bank’s (PDB) assurance, only P25,000,000
in additional loan was approved and released by PDB. Due to financial woes, the Spouses Ramos
were unable to pay obligations as they fell due. They appealed for deferment of debt servicing and
requested for a restricting scheme but both sides failed to reach an agreement.
PDB filed a Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the San Jose
City RTC. The Spouses Ramos filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgages and
Promissory Notes, Accounting and Application of Payments, Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining order against PDB and its officers. PDB filed an Urgent
Motion to Dismiss alleging venue was improperly laid and the complaint failed to state a cause of
action.
The RTC denied the urgent motion to dismiss. The CA denied PDB’s petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
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Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the order of dismissal
RULING:
The general rules on venue admit of exceptions i.e. where a specific rule or law provides otherwise,
or when the parties agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
Stipulations on venue, however, may either be permissive or restrictive, in the sense the suit may
be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit
not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. What is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
In this case, the real estate mortgage executed by the parties has an identical stipulation pertaining
to venue, which states that venue is exclusively laid in the Courts of Makati, with the mortgagor
waiving for this purpose any other venue. The words “exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any
other venue” are restrictive. The employment of the same language in the subject mortgages
signifies the clear intention of the parties to restrict the venue of any action or suit that may arise
out of the mortgage to a particular place, to the exclusion of all other jurisdictions.
E. RULES ON PLEADINGS
1. KINDS OF PLEADINGS
i. COMPLAINT
Arlyn Almario-Templonuevo v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 198583, June 28, 2017, Mendoza, J.
[A] complainant [is] not entitled to any corrective recourse by motion for reconsideration in the
Ombudsman, or by appeal to the courts if the penalty imposed was not higher than public censure,
reprimand, one-month suspension or a fine equivalent to a one month salary.
FACTS:
In 2007, Templonuevo was elected as councilor of Caramoan, Catanduanes. In 2010, she was elected
as Vice Mayor of the same. She was charged before the Ombudsman for violation of Sec. 2, par. 1,
of R.A. No. 9287 for acts she committed while she is a councilor. The Ombudsman found her guilty
and suspended her for one month. However, when she received the Ombudsman’s decision in
September 2010, her term as councilor had already ended and her term as Vice Mayor had already
begun. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Templonuevo directly filed before the CA a
certiorari petition. The CA dismissed outright the petition due to absence of a prior motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed an error in dismissing outright the petition filed by
Templonuevo on the ground of failure to file a motion for reconsideration from the decision of the
Ombudsman imposing upon her a penalty of one month suspension.
RULING:
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Yes. The Court, in interpreting Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 7, Rule
III of the Ombudsman Rules, recognizes only two instances where a decision of the Ombudsman
is considered as final and unappealable and, thus, immediately executory. The first is when the
respondent is absolved of the charge; and second is, in case of conviction, where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary.
In this case, Templonuevo was meted with a penalty of one month suspension. Accordingly, the
decision of the Ombudsman is final, unappealable and immediately executory. Being the case, the
Ombudsman's decision was beyond the reach of an appeal or even of a motion for reconsideration.
This was the same ruling in Reyes v. Belisario, where the Court explained that a complainant was
not entitled to any corrective recourse by motion for reconsideration in the Ombudsman, or by
appeal to the courts if the penalty imposed was not higher than public censure, reprimand, one-
month suspension or a fine equivalent to a one month salary. Left without any remedy in the
ordinary course of law, Templonuevo was justified in resorting directly to the CA via a Rule 65
petition. Indeed, an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and certiorari is not a
substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
ii. ANSWER
The Provincial Government of Surigao Del Sur

G.R. No. 220211, June 5, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
If a defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such defense shall be deemed waived, and consequently,
defendant is already estopped from relying upon the same in further proceedings.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action for Specific Performance against respondent, alleging that they entered
into 3 separate construction agreements to build a Learning Resource Center of Tandag, Tandag
Bus Terminal and Tandag Public Market. That despite completion of the projects and demands for
payment, the Respondent refuse to pay them. The latter on the other hand, claim that they have no
unpaid balance; that the Petitioners were the ones liable to them for defective works and that their
claim is already barred by prescription. The respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action. The motion however was denied. The RTC ruled in
favour of the Petitioner which was however, reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal for lack of cause of action was proper.
RULING:
NO. Except for the defences of: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (b) litis
pendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d) prescription, other defenses must be invoked when an answer
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or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent awaiver thereof. Otherwise stated, if a defendant
fails to raise a defense not specifically excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, such defense shall be deemed waived, and consequently,
defendant is already estopped from relying upon the same in further proceedings.
In the instant case, a judicious review of the records reveals that respondent's Answer with
Counterclaim dated January 6, 2009 did not raise as an issue or as a defense petitioners' non-
execution of the sworn statement pertained to in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction
agreements. In fact, such matter was only raised in its Motion to Dismiss filed more than a year
later after the Answer, or on May 24, 2010, to support the ground relied upon in the said Motion,
which is failure to state a cause of action. More importantly, such matter/ defense raised in the
motion does not fall within the exceptions laid down in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
In light of the foregoing, the CA erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on a ground belatedly
and improperly raised by respondent. Thus, the Court is constrained to overturn said dismissal and
in tum, uphold the RTC's finding of liability on the part of respondents, especially considering that
it issued Certificates of Final Acceptance essentially stating that the projects were satisfactorily
completed, free from major defects, and that it was formally accepting the same.
2. PARTS OF A PLEADING
i. VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., Yvonne S. Yuchengco, Atty. Emmanuel G. Villanueva,

Sonny Rubin, Engr. Francisco Mondelo, and Michael Requijo, Petitioners. vs.
Emma Concepcion L. Lin, Respondent.
G.R. No. 207277, January 16, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another. On the other hand, for litis pendentia to be a ground for
the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending
case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
FACTS:
Emma Concepcion Lin filed a collection suit with damages against Malayan Insurance, alleging that
she obtained various loans from RCBC secured by six clustered warehouses located at Plaridel,
Bulacan; that the five warehouses were insured with Malayan against fire for ₱56 million while the
remaining warehouse was insured for ₱2 million; that on February 24, 2008, the five warehouses
were gutted by fire; that on April 8, 2008 the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) issued a Fire Clearance
Certification to her (April 8, 2008 FCC) after having determined that the cause of fire was
accidental; that despite the foregoing, her demand for payment of her insurance claim was denied
since the forensic investigators hired by Malayan claimed that the cause of the fire was arson and
not accidental; that she sought assistance from the Insurance Commission (IC) which, after a
meeting among the parties and a conduct of reinvestigation into the cause/s of the fire,
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recommended that Malayan pay Lin's insurance claim and/or accord great weight to the BFP's
findings; that in defiance thereof, Malayan still denied or refused to pay her insurance claim; and
that for these reasons, Malayan's corporate officers should also be held liable for acquiescing to
Malayan's unjustified refusal to pay her insurance claim.
Lin also filed an administrative case before the Insurance Commission against Malayan, claiming
that since it had been conclusively found that the cause of the fire was "accidental," the only issue
left to be resolved is whether Malayan should be held liable for unfair claim settlement practice
under Section 241 in relation to Section 247 of the Insurance Code due to its unjustified refusal to
settle her claim; and that in consequence of the foregoing failings, Malayan's license to operate as
a non-life insurance company should be revoked or suspended, until such time that it fully complies
with the IC Resolution ordering it to accord more weight to the BFP's findings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lin committed forum shopping.
RULING:
NO. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another. On the other hand, for litis pendentia to be a ground
for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the
two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case.
The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters,
such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa." In the
context of the case at bar, matters handled by the IC are delineated as either regulatory or
adjudicatory, both of which have distinct characteristics.
Go v. Office of the Ombudsman is apropos:
**The findings of the trial court will not necessarily foreclose the administrative case before
the [IC], or [vice versa]. True, the parties are the same, and both actions are predicated on
the same set of facts, and will require identical evidence. But the issues to be resolved, the
quantum of evidence, the procedure to be followed[,] and the reliefs to be adjudged by these
two bodies are different.
Petitioner's causes of action in Civil Case No. Q-95-23135 are predicated on the insurers'
refusal to pay her fire insurance claims despite notice, proofs of losses and other supporting
documents. Thus, petitioner prays in her complaint that the insurers be ordered to pay the
full-insured value of the losses, as embodied in their respective policies. Petitioner also
sought payment of interests and damages in her favor caused by the alleged delay and
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refusal of the insurers to pay her claims. The principal issue then that must be resolved by
the trial court is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the payment of her insurance claims
and damages. The matter of whether or not there is unreasonable delay or denial of the
claims is merely an incident to be resolved by the trial court, necessary to ascertain
petitioner's right to claim damages, as prescribed by Section 244 of the Insurance Code.
On the other hand, the core, if not the sole bone of contention in Adm. Case No. RD-156, is
the issue of whether or not there was unreasonable delay or denial of the claims of
petitioner, and if in the affirmative, whether or not that would justify the suspension or
revocation of the insurers' licenses.
Moreover, in Civil Case No. Q-95-23135, petitioner must establish her case by
a preponderance of evidence, or simply put, such evidence that is of greater weight, or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. In Adm. Case No. RD-156, the
degree of proof required of petitioner to establish her claim is substantial evidence, which
has been defined as that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify the conclusion.
In addition, the procedure to be followed by the trial court is governed by the Rules of Court,
while the [IC] has its own set of rules and it is not bound by the rigidities of technical rules
of procedure. These two bodies conduct independent means of ascertaining the ultimate
facts of their respective cases that will serve as basis for their respective decisions.
If, for example, the trial court finds that there was no unreasonable delay or denial of her
claims, it does not automatically mean that there was in fact no such unreasonable delay or
denial that would justify the revocation or suspension of the licenses of the concerned
insurance companies. It only means that petitioner failed to prove by preponderance of
evidence that she is entitled to damages. Such finding would not restrain the [IC], in the
exercise of its regulatory power, from making its own finding of unreasonable delay or
denial as long as it is supported by substantial evidence.
While the possibility that these two bodies will come up with conflicting resolutions on the
same issue is not far-fetched, the finding or conclusion of one would not necessarily be
binding on the other given the difference in the issues involved, the quantum of evidence
required and the procedure to be followed.
Moreover, public interest and public policy demand the speedy and inexpensive disposition
of administrative cases.
Hence, Adm. Case No. RD-156 may proceed alongside Civil Case No. Q-95-23135.
FCD Pawnshop and Merchandising Company, et al. vs.
Union Bank of The Philippines, et al.

G.R. No. 207914, January 18, 2017, Del Castillo, J.
The rules of procedure are geared toward securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. “Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice,
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namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that
obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.”
FACTS:
Petitioners Fortunato C. Dionisio, Jr, (Fortunato) and Franklin C. Dionisio (Franklin) owned FCD
Pawnshop and Merchandising Company, which in turn was the registered owner of a pared of fond
in Makati. In 2009, Fortunato and Franklin entrusted the original owner’s copy to Atty. Rowena
Dionisio. It was later discovered that the said title was used as collateral by Sunyang Mining
Corporation (Sunyang) to obtain a ₱20 million loan from from respondent Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP).
Fortunato and Franklin filed against UBP, Sunyang, the Registry of Deeds of Makati, and several
others Civil Case No. 11-116, a Petition to annul the Sunyang mortgage and claim for damages, based
on the premise that TCT (168302) S-3664 was fraudulently mortgaged.
Meanwhile, UBP caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property, and it bought the
same at the auction sale. In the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale published prior to the auction sale,
however, the title to the subject property was at one point erroneously indicated as “Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 163302 (S-3664);” but elsewhere in the notice, the title was correctly indicated
as “Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168302 (S-3664).” The publisher later circulated an Erratum
admitting its mistake, and it made the corresponding correction.
On account of perceived irregularities in the foreclosure and sale proceedings, Fortunato and
Franklin filed in December 2011 a Complaint against UBP, the Registry of Deeds of Makati, and
several others for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure and certificate of sale issued, with
injunctive relief. In a written opposition, UBP claimed that the filing of Civil Case No. 11-1192
violated the rule against forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping?
RULING:
YES. There is forum shopping ‘when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.’ The different ways by which forum
shopping may be committed were explained in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company:
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause
of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the
ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal
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is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with
different prayers (splitting causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also
either litis pendentia or res judicata).
Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different
cases filed. Cause of action is defined as ‘the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another.’
The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to
its allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodland’s right to
the mortgaged property. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the
REM. The Injunction Case involves the same cause of action, inasmuch as it also invokes
the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the extrajudicial
foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. While the main relief sought
in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from the main
relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and
injunction against consolidation of title), the cause of action which serves as the basis for
the said reliefs remains the same – the alleged nullity of the REM. Thus, what is involved
here is the third way of committing forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action, but with different prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still
forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so long as both cases
raise substantially the same issues.
There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the
propriety of injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity of
the REM, which is already the subject of the Annulment Case. The identity of the causes of
action in the two cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled upon in both,
and creates a possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each other. This is precisely
what is sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping.
The substantial identity of the two cases remains even if the parties should add different grounds
or legal theories for the nullity of the REM or should alter the designation or form of the action. The
well-entrenched rule is that ‘a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or adopting a
different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and
the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.’
The factual milieu in the present case is the same as in the above-cited cases. The plaintiffs in both
cases first filed a case for annulment of the mortgage, followed by the case for annulment of the
foreclosure proceedings. For this reason, the underlying principle in these previously decided cases
must apply equally to the instant case. Thus, the Court completely agrees with the CA’s findings
that in the event that the court in Civil Case No. 11-116 (annulment of mortgage case) should nullify
the Sunyang mortgage, then subsequent proceedings based thereon, including the foreclosure, shall
also be nullified. Notably as well, the CA’s observation in Civil Case No. 11-1192 (case for annulment
of foreclosure and sale) – that since the complaint therein repeatedly makes reference to an
“unlawful” and “fraudulent” Sunyang mortgage, then the same evidence in Civil Case No. 11-116 will
have to be utilized- is well-taken.
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Petitioners maintain that Civil Case No. 11-1192 (case for annulment of foreclosure and sale) is
grounded on specific irregularities committed during the foreclosure proceedings. However, their
Complaint in said case reiterates the supposed illegality of the Sunyang mortgage, thus presenting
the court in said case with the opportunity and temptation to resolve the issue of validity of the
mortgage. There is therefore a danger that a decision might be rendered by the court in Civil Case
No. 11-1192 that contradicts the eventual ruling in Civil Case No. 11-116, or the annulment of mortgage
case.
The rules of procedure are geared toward securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.“ Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of
justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system
that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.”24
With these principles in mind, the Court would rather have petitioners try their cause of action in
Civil Case No. 11-116, rather than leave the trial court in danger of committing error by issuing a
decision or resolving an issue in Civil Case No. 11-1192 that should properly be rendered or resolved
by the court trying Civil Case No. 11-116.
F. FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND

RESOLUTIONS
1. PERIODS OF FILING OF PLEADINGS
Henry E. Yu, et al. v. SR Metals, Inc., et al.

G.R. No. 214249, September 25, 2017, Peralta, J.
Failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused if the
dates are evident from the records. The more material date for purposes of appeal to the CA the date
of receipt of the order or resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed several illegal dismissal cases against SR Metals, Inc. (SRMI). Petitioners lost in the
NLRC. They went to the CA through Rule 65 but the CA dismissed their petition on procedural
grounds. The CA said that their certiorari petition failed to state the date of filing of the motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Petitioners’ certiorari petition on a procedural
ground.
RULING:
Yes. There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under
Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received, (b) the
date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration when one such was filed, and, (c) the date
when notice of the denial thereof was received. These dates should be reflected in the petition to
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enable the reviewing court to determine if the petition was filed on time. The reason being that, as
a rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required by law renders the judgment final and
executory. Nonetheless, procedural rules are designed to promote or secure rather than frustrate
or override, substantial justice. Thus, we have consistently held that failure to comply with the rule
on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused if the dates are evident from the
records. The more material date for purposes of appeal to the CA the date of receipt of the order or
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Yet concomitant to a liberal application of the
rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party to at least explain its failure to comply
with the rule.
In this case, there is at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. In their motion for
reconsideration before the CA, petitioners in fact pointed out that in that in their motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC, a copy of which was attached as Annex "B" of their petition for
certiorari before the CA, it was mentioned that their motion for reconsideration was timely filed on
December 7, 2012. As proof, they even attached in their motion for reconsideration before the CA,
as Annex "A" thereof, the original copy of registry receipt no. 13543 issued by Robinson's Ermita
Postal Station showing that the mail matter was posted on "Dec 7 2012." Certainly, petitioners made
a persuasive explanation as to the inadvertence and were not obstinate in their non-observance of
procedural rules. Such actuation is consistent with their plea for liberality in construing the rules
on certiorari. The procedural lapses cited by the CA do not affect the merits petition; procedural
rules should have been relaxed in order to serve substantial justice. Indeed, a strict interpretation
of technical rules of procedure that is unduly detrimental to the working class is contrary to the
constitutional mandate of affording full protection to labor and enhancing social justice.
2. MODES OF SERVICE
Steven Pavlow v. Cherry Mendenilla

G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017, Leonen, J.
Jurisprudence has long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the
availability of extra-territorial services does not preclude substituted service
FACTS:
Petitioner, an American citizen, married Maria Sheila, a Filipino. Barely 3 months into their
marriage, Sheila filed a complaint for slight physical injuries including maltreatment in relation to
Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act (VAWC). Makati Assistant City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint for failure to substantiate the allegations. The mother of Petitioner, Cherry
Mendenilla (Mendenilla), filed a Petition praying for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order(TPO)or Permanent Protection Order (PPO) against the Petitioner. When the service of
summons with the TPO was served, Petitioner was out of the country, hence, it was served to one
of his employees who was also residing in the same building.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Mendenilla had the personality to file the Petition.
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2. Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s person.
3. Whether or not there was forum shopping.
RULING:
1. YES. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly
given personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-
VAWC Law. However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file
such a petition is suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this
case, respondent Mendenilla filed her petition after her daughter's complaint-affidavit had already
been dismissed.
2. YES. We see no reason for holding as ineffectual the substituted service of Summons.
Jurisprudence has long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the
availability of extraterritorial services does not preclude substituted service. Resort to substituted
service has long been held to be fair, reasonable and just. This Court has noted that a contrary,
restrictive view is that which defeats the ends of justice. It has been emphasized that residents who
temporarily leave their residence are responsible for ensuring that their affairs are in order, and
that, upon their return, they shall attend to exigencies that may have arisen. Rule 14, Section 7
stipulates that substituted service may be resorted to "if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be personally served within a reasonable time."
Time was of the essence. The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable causes and how,
by the convenience of petitioner Steven Pavlow's temporary absence, immediate personal service
was rendered impossible. These exigencies justified substituted service of summons upon petitioner
during his temporary absence through Monette Tolentino, a person of suitable age and discretion,
who also resided at petitioner's own residence. Jurisdiction over petitioner's person was then validly
acquired, and the dismissal of respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla's petition on this score was
correctly held by Judge Natividad Giron-Dizon to be unwarranted.
3. NO. The filing of Maria Sheila's complaint-affidavit did not even commence proceedings on her
own petition for the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the
level of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the
issuance of a protection order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Maria Sheila's
Complaint-Affidavit did not engender the risk of either litis pendentia or res judicata, which would
serve the basis of a finding of forum shopping by her mother.
Alfonso Singson Cortal vs Inaki Larrazabal

ignored to suit the interests of a party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance on a
"policy of liberal construction."
FACTS:
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The assailed Court of Appeals September 30, 2010 Resolution dismissed petitioners' appeal
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on account of several technical defects. First was
an inconsistency between the listing of petitioners' names in their prior Motion for Extension of
Time and subsequent Petition for Review, in which the accompanying verification and certification
of non-forum shopping were laden with this same inconsistency and other defects. Second was the
non--inclusion of the original Complaint filed by the adverse party, now private respondent Inaki
A. Larrazabal Enterprises, before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. And last was petitioners' counsel's failure to indicate the place of issue of the
official receipt of his payment of annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of petitioners' appeal was justified by the errors noted by the Court
of Appeals.
RULING:
No, the dismissal was not justified by the errors.
ignored to suit the interests of a party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance
on a "policy of liberal construction."
Still, this Court has stressed that every party litigant must be afforded the fullest opportunity to
properly ventilate and argue his or her case, "free from the constraints of technicalities."34 Rule 1,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court expressly stipulates their liberal construction to the extent that
justice is better served.
In this case, the Court of Appeals was harsh in denying petitioners the opportunity to exhaustively
ventilate and argue their case.
Rather than dwelling on procedural minutiae, the Court of Appeals should have been impelled by
the greater interest of justice. It should have enabled a better consideration of the intricate issues
of the application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, social justice, expropriation, and
just compensation. The reversals of rulings at the level of the DARAB could have been taken as an
indication that the matters at stake were far from being so plain that they should be ignored on
mere technicalities. The better part of its discretion dictated a solicitous stance towards petitioners.
Carson Realty & Management Corporation vs.

Red Robin Security Agency and Monina C. Santos
G.R. No. 225035, February 8, 2017, VELASCO, JR., J.
Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility
of personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the
defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
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who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business of the
defendant.
FACTS:
On March 23, 2007, respondent Monina C. Santos (Santos) filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages against petitioner Carson Realty & Management Corp. (Carson) with the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court (RTC). As per the Officer's Return dated April 12, 2007 of Process Server
Jechonias F. Pajila, Jr. (Process Server Pajila), a copy of the Summons dated April 11, 2007, together
with the Complaint and its annexes, was served upon Carson at its business address at Unit 601
Prestige Tower Condominium, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, through its "corporate
secretary," Precilla S. Serrano. Thereafter, the appointed Corporate Secretary and legal counsel of
Carson, Atty. Tomas Z. Roxas, Jr. (Atty. Roxas), filed an Appearance and Motion dated April 25,
2007 with the court wherein the latter entered his appearance and acknowledged that the Summons
was served and received by one of the staff assistants of Carson. Atty. Roxas prayed for an extension
of fifteen (15) days from April 27, 2007 within which to file a responsive pleading. Instead of filing a
responsive pleading, Atty. Roxas moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Summons dated
April 11, 2007 was not served on any of the officers and personnel authorized to receive summons
under the Rules of Court.
The RTC denied Carson's Motion to Dismiss and directed the issuance of an alias summons to be
served anew upon the corporation. On November 9, 2007, Process Server Pajila submitted his
Officer's Report stating in essence that he attempted to serve the alias Summons dated September
24, 2007 on the President and General Manager of Carson, as well as on the Board of Directors and
Corporate Secretary, but they were not around. Hence, he was advised by a certain Lorie Fernandez,
the "secretary" of the company, to bring the alias Summons to the law office of Atty. Roxas. Process
Server Pajila attempted to serve the alias Summons at the law office of Atty. Roxas twice, but to no
avail. This prompted him to resort to substituted service of the alias Summons by leaving a copy
thereof with a certain Mr. JR Taganila, but the latter also refused to acknowledge receipt of the alias
Summons.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson.
RULING:
Yes, In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. However, because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service and personal service of summons
is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted
service of summons. Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a)
indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the
efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person
of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
regular place of business of the defendant.
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Given the circumstances in the case at bench, We find that resort to substituted service was
warranted since the impossibility of personal service is clearly apparent. A perusal of the Officer's
Return dated October 28, 2008 detailing the circumstances surrounding the service of the second
alias Summons dated September 9, 2008 shows that the foregoing requirements for a valid
substituted service of summons were substantially complied with.
Indeed, the Return established the impossibility of personal service to Carson's officers, as shown
by the efforts made by Process Server Pajila to serve the September 8, 2008 alias Summons on
Carson's President/General Manager. In particular, several attempts to serve the summons on these
officers were made on four separate occasions: October 2, 2008, October 16, 2008, October 27, 2008,
and October 28, 2008, but to no avail.
On his fourth and final attempt, Process Server Pajila served the summons on Fernandez, Carson's
receptionist, due to the unavailability and difficulty to locate the company's corporate officers. The
pertinent portion of the Return states: [S]ubstituted service of summons was resorted to by leaving
the copy of the Alias Summons at the company's office through its employee, MS. LORIE
FERNANDEZ, however, she refused to acknowledge receipt of the process.
Based on the facts, there was a deliberate plan of Carson's for its officers not to receive the
Summons. It is a legal maneuver that is in derogation of the rules on Summons. We cannot tolerate
that. The facts now show that the responsible officers did not intend to receive the alias Summons
through substituted service. The Summons is considered validly served.
In any event, even if We concede the invalidity of the substituted service, such is of little
significance in view of the fact that the RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over Carson early on
due to its voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Carson voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed, through Atty. Roxas, the Appearance and Motion dated April
25, 2007 acknowledging Carson's receipt of the Summons dated April 11, 2007 and seeking
additional time to file its responsive pleading. As noted by the CA, Carson failed to indicate therein
that the Appearance and Motion was being filed by way of a conditional appearance to question
the regularity of the service of summons. Thus, by securing the affirmative relief of additional time
to file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
Carmelita Borlongan v. Banco De Oro (formerly Equitable PCI Bank)

G.R. No. 217617 and 218540, April 5, 2017, Velasco, J.
"Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition,
the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service
can be confirmed or accepted.
FACTS:
Upon requesting a copy of their TCT, Eliseo and Carmelita Borlongan, learned that their title
contained an annotation that the property was the subject of an execution sale. Apparently, BDO
filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho Corporation (Tancho) and Carmelita supposedly
signed 4 security agreements to guarantee the obligation of Tancho. It appears that the RTC
directed the service of summons to all the defendants at the business address of Tancho in Pasig.
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BDO filed an ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against the defendants,
including Carmelita and subsequently, a motion to conduct an auction where BDO was the highest
bidder of the subject property. Eliseo filed an action for annulment of the surety agreements and
notice of levy on attachment, while Carmelita filed a petition for annulment of judgement with
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction claiming that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person for failure to serve the summons. The TRO, however, was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over Carmelita’s person.
RULING:
NO. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process and compliance
with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of
jurisdiction.As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When summons
cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted service may be resorted
to. Service of summons by publication can be resorted to only if the defendant's "whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. For substituted service of summons to be
available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of
prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different
dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
In the case now before us, the summons was served on the petitioner by publication. Yet, the
circumstances surrounding the case do not justify the resort. Immediately after this single
attempt at personal service, the respondent bank moved for leave to serve the summons by
publication (and not even substituted service), which motion the RTC granted. Clearly, there was
no diligent effort made to find the petitioner and properly serve her the summons before the service
by publication was allowed. Neither was it impossible to locate the residence of petitioner and her
whereabouts.
Express Padala (Italia) S.P.A., now BDO Remittance S.P.A. v. Ocampo

G.R. No. 202505, September 6, 2017, First Division, JARDELEZA, J.
Defendant permanently residing in a foreign country must be summoned through publication or

extraterritorial service, which require leave of court. Substituted service to a defendant who
permanently resides abroad is ineffective and renders the court without jurisdiction over him or her.
FACTS:
Helen Ocampo was dismissed as remittance processor for BDO in September 2002 for
misappropriating €24,035.60 by falsifying invoices of money payments relating to customers’
money transfer orders. She was found criminally liable by the Court of Turin, Italy, which
convicted and sentenced her to suffer imprisonment of six months and a penalty of €300, but
granted her the benefit of suspension of the enforcement of sentence after pleading guilty.
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On September 22, 2008, petitioner filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment and
cancellation or restriction of Ocampo’s Philippine passport with the Mandaluyong RTC. On
November 21, 2008, the sheriff tried to personally serve summons in her local address in Tanuan,
Batangas, but no one lived therein; he was directed to the house of Ocampo’s father, where her
uncle resided. The uncle informed the sheriff Ocampo and family were already in Italy but the
sheriff proceeded to serve summons upon him. After Ocampo failed to file an answer, petitioner
filed a motion to declare her in default which the RTC granted.
After Ocampo received a copy of the RTC decision through her mother, she filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. The CA set aside the RTC decision, saying
summons should have been served pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The CA decided the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Ocampo, rendering the
decision null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not summons was properly served on Ocampo
RULING:
The general rule is that summons must be served personally. For justifiable reasons, other modes
of serving summons may be resorted to. Substituted service may be resorted to when defendant
cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him or her have failed.
This is effected by leaving copies of the summons at defendant’s residence with a person of
suitable age and discretion, or leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
When defendant’s whereabouts are unknown, the rules allow service of summons by publication.
It may only be resorted to when the whereabouts of the defendant are not only unknown but
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. The diligence requirement means there must be prior
resort to personal service under Section 7 and substituted service under Section 8, and proof these
modes were ineffective before summons by publication may be allowed. Summons by publication
also requires plaintiff to file a written motion for leave of court to effect service of summons by
publication, supported by an affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf, setting forth
the grounds for the application.
The Court held substituted service was improper because the place where the summons is being
served must be the defendant’s current residence or office/regular place of business. Her father’s
house is neither her office or her current residence. Further, Ocampo’s residence in Italy is not
temporary, rendering the service ineffective.
Mercedes S. Gatmaytan,vs.
Francisco Dolor (Substituted by his Heirs) and Hermogena Dolor
G.R. No. 198120, February 20, 2017, LEONEN, J.:
When a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court, and the court acknowledges
this change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's former address is
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ineffectual. Service is deemed completed only when made at the updated address. Proof, however, of
ineffectual service at a counsel's former address is not necessarily proof of a party's claim of when
service was made at the updated address. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of when
service was made is distinct from the burden of proving the allegation of where service was or was not
made. A party who fails to discharge his or her burden of proof is not entitled to the relief prayed for.
FACTS:
Spouses Dolor entered a contract to sell with Cammayo over a parcel of land located in Novaliches
amounting to Php 30, 000. Upon payment of the full amount a deed of sale and the TCT were
executed. Later on Gatmayan then filed an action for ejectment against Sps. Dolor claiming that
she was the registered owner of the lot. In response, Sps. Dolor filed a complaint for Reconveyance
of Property and Damages against Gatmayan and Cammayo. RTC then rendered a decision on May
27, 2006 ordering to convey the lot to Sps. Dolor. Gatmayan then filed her Motion for
Reconsideration on June 16, 2006 which was later on denied. It appealed to the CA which decided
dismissing its appeal on the ground that the March 27, 2006 decision has already attained finality
because her MR on June 16, 2008 was filed beyond the requisite 15 day period. Gatmayan alleged
that the decision has not attained finality since the service was made at her counsel’s former
address.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision already attained finality albeit the decision was served to the previous
address of Gatmayans counsel
RULING:
No, the decision has not yet attained finality.
Reckoning the date when a party is deemed to have been given notice of the judgment or final order
subject of his or her Motion for Reconsideration depends on the manner by which the judgment of
final order was served upon the party himself or herself. When, however, a party is represented and
has appeared by counsel, service shall, as a rule, be made upon his or her counsel.
To reiterate, service upon the parties' counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties
themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their lawyers.
The reason is simple-the parties, generally, have no formal education or knowledge of the rules of
procedure, specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may
also be unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a decision. More
importantly, it is best for the courts to deal only with one person in the interest of orderly
procedure-either the lawyer retained by the party or the party him/herself ifs/he does not intend
to hire a lawyer.
Rule 13, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three (3) modes of service of
judgments or final orders: first, personal service; second, service by registered mail; and third,
service by publication. It reads:
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Section 9. Service of Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions. - Judgments, final orders or

resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by
publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him
shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
Rule 13, Section 10 specifies when the first two (2) modes - personal service and service by registered
mail - are deemed completed, and notice upon a party is deemed consummated:
Section 10. Completeness of Service. - Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by
ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court
otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or
after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is
earlier. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court, and the court
acknowledges this change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's former
address is ineffectual. Service is deemed completed only when made at the updated address. Proof,
however, of ineffectual service at a counsel's former address is not necessarily proof of a party's
claim of when service was made at the updated address. The burden of proving the affirmative
allegation of when service was made is distinct from the burden of proving the allegation of where
service was or was not made. A party who fails to discharge his or her burden of proof is not entitled
to the relief prayed for.
Cecilio Abenion, at al., Petitioners vs.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, Respondent

G.R. No. 200749, February 6, 2017, REYES, J.:
When a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court, and the court acknowledges
this change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's former address is
ineffectual. Service is deemed completed only when made at the updated address. Proof, however, of
ineffectual service at a counsel's former address is not necessarily proof of a party's claim of when
service was made at the updated address. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of when
service was made is distinct from the burden of proving the allegation of where service was or was not
made. A party who fails to discharge his or her burden of proof is not entitled to the relief prayed for.
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 09-749 and Civil Case No. 09-941, both instituted by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (PSPC) with the RTC Makati, are offshoots of Civil Case No. 95-45, which is a
complaint11 for damages filed in 1996 with the RTC of Panabo City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 4 by
1,843 plaintiffs12 (plaintiffs) that included herein petitioners, against Shell Oil Company (Shell Oil),
among several other defendants.13 The defendants in Civil Case No. 95-45 were all foreign
corporations that manufactured, sold, distributed, used and/or made available in commerce
nematocides against the parasite nematode prevalent in banana plantations. These nematocides
contained the chemical dibromochloropropane (DBCP). The plaintiffs identified themselves as a
group of banana plantation workers who were exposed to DBCP, which caused their sterility and
other serious and permanent health injuries.14
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During the pendency of Civil Case No. 95-45, Shell Oil entered into a compromise agreement15 with
its claimants for a total consideration of US$17 Million, a copy of which was submitted for approval
by Shell Oil to RTC Panabo City. The copy submitted to the court did not bear the agreement's
exhibits which, according to Shell Oil, indicated the list of 26,328 "worldwide plaintiffs" intended
to be covered by the compromise.16 The agreement, sans the list, was approved by RTC Panabo City
in its Omnibus Order dated December 20, 2002.17 In view of the compromise, the complaint against
Shell Oil was dismissed in an Order18 dated March 24, 2003.
Civil Case No. 95-45 was later transferred to the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14. The plaintiffs again
sought recourse from the RTC Davao City, via a Motion for Execution (Re: Enforcement of
Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement between plaintiffs and Shell Oil), after Shell Oil
allegedly failed to fully satisfy its obligations to them under the compromise agreement. For its
defense, Shell Oil argued that it had fully complied with the terms of the compromise agreement.
The approved compromise and amount stated therein covered 26,328 agricultural workers from
across the globe who filed various cases against it and not just the 1,843 plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
95-45. When it resolved the motion, the RTC Davao City ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and thus
issued the Order19 dated July 17, 2009 that directed the issuance of a writ of execution to be enforced
against Shell Oil, its subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled and related entities, successors or assigns.
Although not a defendant in Civil Case No. 95-45, PSPC was brought into the case when the
plaintiffs filed with the RTC Davao City an ex parte motion alleging that PSPC was one of Shell Oil's
"subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled and related entities or assigns," in relation to Clause 28 of the
compromise agreement.
The RTC Davao issued an alias writ of execution addressed to Sheriff Roberto Esguerra, citing PSPC
as one of the parties against whom the writ of execution may be implemented.
PSPC filed with the RTC Makati the petition26 for prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) docketed as Civil Case No. 09-
749 against Sheriff Esguerra and the plaintiffs, as it sought to prohibit the sheriff from enforcing
the Alias Writ of Execution dated August 12, 2009 and the notice of garnishment that was issued
pursuant thereto. PSPC insisted that it was never a party to Civil Case No. 95-45 and the
compromise agreement between Shell Oil and the plaintiffs; thus, the enforcement of the alias writ
of execution and the garnishment of its bank accounts were a violation of law and settled
jurisprudence.
After hearing the parties, the RTC Makati issued the Order41 dated April 30, 2010 indicating that
the bonds posted by Malayan Insurance, totaling ₱40 Million, were to answer for the damages
suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the injunctive writs issued. In this case, the injunction
prevented the sheriff from demanding the payment of the RTC Davao City's awards through PSPC'
s garnished deposit accounts with BDO.
In the meantime, PSPC filed on May 5, 2010 a Notice of Appeal to assail the Order dated April 30,
2010, while Malayan Insurance filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) with the RTC Makati. PSPC
also filed on June 15, 2010 with the CA a Petition for Certiorar'i (With Prayer for Issuance of TRO
and WPI), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114420, which sought to set aside the RTC Makati's Order
dated June 8, 2010 and Writ of Execution dated June 9, 2010. It contended that the RTC Makati
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order and writ on the following grounds: first,
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Malayan Insurance's MR of the RTC Makati's Order dated April 30, 2010 was still pending
resolution; second, the RTC was divested of any jurisdiction to allow an execution pending appeal
when PSPC' s notice of appeal was perfected; and third, the plaintiffs' motion for execution was
based on Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and was not a motion for execution pending
appeal. Even granting that the motion for execution prayed for an execution pending appeal, there
were no serious and compelling reasons to support the relief prayed for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSPC committed forum shopping in appealing from the RTC Makati’s Order and
at the same time filing a petition for certiorari.
RULING:
NO.Given the nature of the petition for certiorari and the challenged appeal, it is evident that the
issues involved and reliefs sought by PSPC in the two actions were distinct. Even the RTC orders
being challenged in the two cases were different. While the two actions may be related as they arose
from the same prohibition case, the appeal was intended to assail the judgment on the injunction
bonds, while the petition for certiorari was filed specifically to challenge only the ruling that granted
an execution pending appeal.
G. AMENDMENT
Central Bank Board of Liquidators vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank
G.R. No. 173399, February 21, 2017, SERENO, CJ.
If the purpose is to set up a cause of action not existing at the time of the filing of the complaint,
amendment is not allowed. If no right existed at the time the action was commenced, the suit cannot
be maintained, even if the right of action may have accrued thereafter.
FACTS:
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) is a savings bank, pursuant to MB
Resolution No. 223 issued by the Monetary Board (MB) of the then Central Bank of the Philippines
(CB). However, after granting Banco Filipino’s loan applications worth billions of pesos, the CB
placed Banco Filipino under conservatorship. Thereafter, CB, through MB Resolution No. 75,
ordered the closure of Banco Filipino and placed the latter under receivership. In another
resolution, the CB placed Banco Filipino under liquidation. The Banco Filipino, on separate
instances, filed complaints with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) assailing the resolutions as it sought
to annul the conservatorship order, receivership order, and liquidation order. The Court ordered
the consolidation of these cases.
During the pendency of the consolidated cases, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, or the New Central
Bank Act of 1993, took effect. Under the new law, the CB was abolished and, in its stead, the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) was created. The new law created the Central Bank Board of Liquidators
(CB-BOL) for the purpose of administering and liquidating the CB's assets and liabilities. Pursuant
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to the order of the Court which nullified MB Resolution No. 75, BSP reopened Banco Filipino and
allowed it to resume business on 1 July 1994.
In the consolidated cases, Banco Filipino filed a Motion to Admit Amended/Supplemental

Complaint where it sought to substitute the CB-BOL for the defunct CB and its MB. The RTC
admitted the amended/supplemental complaint. Banco Filipino again filed a Motion to Admit
Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint as it sought to include the BSP and its MB - "the
purported successor-in-interest of the old CB" - as additional defendants based on the latter's
alleged acts or omissions. Banco Filipino claimed that the BSP employed "coercive measures" that
forced it to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) regarding the collection of advances
extended to the latter by the defunct CB. The RTC granted the Motion to Admit Banco Filipino's
Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in admitting Banco Filipino's Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint
in the consolidated civil cases before it.
RULING:
YES.The Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint should not have been admitted as it is not in
conformity with Rule 10 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
The causes of action subject of the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint only arose in 1994 -
well after those subject of the original Complaint. The original Complaint was based on the alleged
illegal closure of Banco Filipino effected in 1985 by the defunct CB and its MB. On the other hand,
the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint stemmed from the alleged oppressive and arbitrary
acts committed by the BSP and its MB against Banco Filipino after respondent bank was reopened
in 1994. Since the acts or omissions allegedly committed in violation of respondent's rights are
different, they constitute separate causes of action.
The prevailing rule on the amendment of pleadings is one of liberality, with the end of obtaining
substantial justice for the parties. However, the option of a party-litigant to amend a pleading is
not without limitation. If the purpose is to set up a cause of action not existing at the time of the
filing of the complaint, amendment is not allowed. If no right existed at the time the action was
commenced, the suit cannot be maintained, even if the right of action may have accrued thereafter.
With regard to a supplemental pleading, it only serves to bolster or add something to the primary
pleading. Its usual function is to set up new facts that justify, enlarge, or change the kind of relief
sought with respect to the same subject matter as that of the original complaint. A supplemental
complaint must be founded on the same cause of action as that raised in the original complaint.
In Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings & Development Corporation, the Court clarified that
the fact that a supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of action should not be a bar
to its allowance, still, the matter stated in the supplemental complaint must have a relation to the
cause of action set forth in the original pleading. That is, the matter must be germane and
intertwined with the cause of action stated in the original complaint so that the principal and core
issues raised by the parties in their original pleadings remain the same.
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In the instant case, Banco Filipino, through the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint,
attempted to raise new and different causes of action that arose only in 1994.These causes of action
had no relation whatsoever to the causes of action in the original Complaint.
The amendment/supplement violates

the rules on joinder of parties and
causes of action.
Moreover, the admission of the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint is inappropriate

because it violates the rule on joinder of parties and causes of action. In the instant case, Banco
Filipino is seeking to join the BSP and its MB as parties to the complaint. However, they have
different legal personalities from those of the defunct CB and its MB: firstly, because the CB was
abolished by R.A. 7653, and the BSP is created in its stead; and secondly, because the members of
each MB are natural persons. These factors make the BSP and its MB different from the CB and its
MB. Since there are multiple parties involved, , the joinder is made subject to the rules on joinder
of parties under Section 6, Rule 3. Specifically, before causes of action and parties can be joined in
a complaint involving multiple parties, (1) the right to relief must arise out of the same transaction
or series of transactions and (2) there must be a question of law or fact common to all the parties.
First, the reliefs for damages prayed for by respondent did not arise from the same transaction or
series of transactions. While the damages prayed for in the first Amended/Supplemental Complaint
arose from the closure of Banco Filipino by the defunct CB and its MB, the damages prayed for in
the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint arose from the alleged acts of oppression
committed by the BSP and its MB against respondent.
Second, there is no common question of fact or law between the parties involved. The acts
attributed by Banco Filipino to the BSP and its MB pertain to events that transpired after this Court
ordered the respondent bank's reopening in 1994. These acts bear no relation to those alleged in
the original Complaint, which related to the propriety of the closure and liquidation of respondent
as a banking institution way back in 1985.
I. MOTIONS (GENERAL PRINCIPLES, MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS,

MOTION TO DISMISS)
1. MOTIONS IN GENERAL
i. NOTICE OF HEARING AND HEARING OF MOTIONS
Bernice Joan Ti vs Manuel Dino

G.R. No. 219260, November 06, 2017, Second Division, Peralta
All motions must be set for hearing and notice must be sent to adverse parties in such a manner that
will ensure their receipt 3 days before the scheduled date. Failure to comply with these requirements
renders a motion fatally defective which does not toll the reglementary period to appeal.
FACTS:
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The City Prosecutor filed on February 19, 2008 a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information against Petitioner Ti and a certain Julieta Fernandez for falsification of public
documents. The MeTC reversed the ruling of the City Prosecutor. Respondent subsequently filed
an MR, through a private prosecutor, which was granted by the MeTC, which found probable cause
to indict petitioner and Fernandez.
Petitioner and Fernandez thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC seeking to enjoin the
MeTC from proceeding with the case on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and held that the MeTC committed
grave abuse when it acted on the MR filed by respondent without the conformity of the public
prosecutor. Respondent filed an MR, dated March 5, 2010, arguing that no such conformity or
concurrence by the public prosecutor was required.
Petitioner and Fernandez then filed a Motion to Expunge the MR dated March 5, 2010 for violation
of the 3-day notice rule for motions. The RTC denied respondent’s MR for failure to comply with
the 3-day notice rule noting that petitioner was only able to receive a copy of the motion 3 days
after the scheduled hearing. Respondent thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal which was disapproved
by the RTC for failure to file within the reglementary period. Respondent then filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
not transmitting the records of the case despite the notice of appeal being filed on time. The CA
granted this petition and reversed the RTC.
RULING:
All motions, except those which the court may act on without prejudice to the other party, must be
set for hearing, including MRs. The notice of hearing on any motion must be directed to the other
party informing him of the date and time of the hearing and must be served in such a manner that
will ensure receipt 3 days before the scheduled hearing. Failure to comply with these requirements
renders the motion fatally defective.
The RTC, in this case, correctly treated the March 5, 2010 as a mere scrap of paper for failure to
comply with the 3-day notice rule as petitioner was only able to receive a copy 3 days after the date
of hearing.
Hence, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the appeal was filed out of
time as a defective motion does not toll the running period to appeal from a judgment or final order.
2. MOTION TO DISMISS
Samuel M. Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc., et al.

G.R. No. 208426, September 20, 2017, Leonen, J.
Two (2) categories of motions to dismiss may be recognized under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
first, those that must be filed ahead of an answer, and second, those that may be entertained even
after an answer has been filed. Motions to dismiss under the first category may plead any of the 10
grounds under Rule 16, Section 1. Those under the second category may only plead four (4) of Rule 16,
Section 1’s 10 grounds: lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and
prescription.
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FACTS:
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Capitol) owned a 15,598-square-meter lot in Quezon City
(QC). This lot was levied entirely by the QC Treasurer due to unpaid real estate taxes. Then, it was
subjected to a tax deliquency sale. The lot was sold to Petitioner Alvarado, being highest bidder.
Individual respondents, who are members of Capitol, and Ayala Land, whose subdivision is inside
the subject property, filed a complaint against Alvarado to nullify the sale. Respondents (plaintiffs)
alleged irregularities in the delinquency sale of the subject property. Alvarado invoked three
grounds to dismiss answer: (1) that a condition precedent was not complied with (mandatory
judicial deposit of taxes due under the LGC); (2) that there was failure to state a cause of action
(plaintiffs were not the registered owners of the levied property); and (3) that the court has no
subject-matter jurisdiction (plaintiffs have no legal interest over the property). After filing an
Answer, Alvarado filed a Motion to Dismiss on the same grounds. The RTC denied Alvarado’s
Motion to Dismiss, it being filed after the Answer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC is correct in denying Alvarado’s motion to dismiss.
RULING:
Yes. The RTC correctly observed that petitioner filed his Answer ahead of his Motion to Dismiss.
The filing of an answer precludes a motion to dismiss. It is basic, then, that motions to dismiss are
not to be entertained after an answer has been filed. Out of Rule 16, Section 1's 10 grounds, four (4)
survive the anterior filing of an answer: lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia,
res judicata, and prescription. Common to all these four (4) grounds that survive the filing of an
answer is that they persist no matter the resolution of the merits of the case by the court. A
judgment issued by a court without jurisdiction is null and void. Judgments on a similar prior case
will be redundant. Thus, res judicata and litis pendencia can be raised even after an answer has been
filed. Prescription attaches regardless of the resolution of the case on the merits. Apart from the
exceptions recognized in Rule 9, Section 1, jurisprudence has also clarified that, despite the prior
filing of an answer, an action may still be dismissed on a ground which became known subsequent
to the filing of an answer. In Obando v. Figueras, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion
to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia,(3) lack of cause of
action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal. [NB:
none of the exceptions applies to this case]
2. Whether or not the RTC has subject matter jurisdiction.
RULING:
YES. It is elementary that jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. It is not contingent on the
personal circumstances of the parties. Thus, it is inconsequential to subject matter jurisdiction that
respondents are allegedly bereft of any real, actual, material or substantial legal rights or interest
on the auctioned property.
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3. Whether or not Alvarado’s belatedly filed Motion to Dismiss is superfluous.
RULING:
NO. It is error to assume that the grounds pleaded by petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss deserved
no consideration since it preceded his Answer. While a belatedly filed motion to dismiss is not a
valid independent plea for terminating the action, it still serves practical purposes. It emphasizes
and :aims attention at the need for immediately dismissing the complaint. To this end, it should
specifically be treated as a plea for a court to hear the grounds for dismissal, just as it would have
had a proper motion to dismiss been filed. Petitioner's pleaded grounds for dismissal in his Answer
sufficed for the Regional Trial Court to consider the propriety of dismissing the Complaint of the
respondents. Their reiteration in petitioner's Motion to Dismiss did not amount to the negation of
their prior expression. While nominally it was an independent motion to dismiss, it was more
appropriately a reiterative manifestation and a prayer to hear grounds for dismissal which had
previously been properly pleaded.
J. PRE-TRIAL
1. APPEARANCE OF PARTIES; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO APPEAR
Ultra Mar Aqua Resource Inc. v. Fermida Construction Services

G.R. No. 191353, April 17, 2017, Tijam, J.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the realm
of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the implied
authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the
suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority
is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself.
FACTS:
Respondent entered into a construction agreement with Petitioner for the construction of a
warehouse in Subic. After completing the project, Respondent sent a billing statement for the work.
The latter refused to pay alleging substandard work and delay on the part of respondent.
Resultantly, Respondent filed an action for collection of sum of money. During the pre-trial
Petitioner’s counsel failed to appear despite numerous postponements and failed to submit its pre-
trial brief. As a result, the RTC declared petitioner in default. Petitioner’s counsel in his omnibus
motion, reasoned that his failure to appear is due to the sudden drop of his blood sugar level,
however, when ordered by the court to present a medical certificate, he again failed to comply. The
RTC denied petitioner’s motion and rendered a decision in favour of respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ultra Mar was properly declared in default.
RULING:
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YES. Section 4, Rule 18 requires the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial conference.
The failure of a party to appear at pre-trial has adverse consequences: if the absent party is the
plaintiff then he may be declared non-suited and his case is dismissed; if the absent party is the
defendant, then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof.
By way of exception, the non-appearance of a party and counsel may be excused if (1) a valid cause
is shown; or (2) there is an appearance of a representative on behalf of a party fully authorized in
writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution,
and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. What constitutes a valid
cause is subject to the court's sound discretion and the exercise of such discretion shall not be
disturbed except in cases of clear and manifest abuse.
Pointedly, Ultra Mar's counsel repeatedly moved for the postponement of the pre-trial conference,
and yet still failed to appear. Clearly then, the justifications advanced by Ultra Mar's counsel for its
repeated failure to comply with the RTC's Order to appear at the Pre-Trial Conference, to submit
the Pre-Trial Brief and to present the supporting Medical Certificate do not constitute a valid cause
to excuse such non-compliance.
K. INTERVENTION
Office of the Ombudsman v. Leticia Barbara B. Gutierrez

G.R. No. 189100, June 21, 2017, Velasco, J.
[E]ven if the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, part of its broad powers
include defending its decisions before the CA. And pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court, the Ombudsman may validly intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest on the
matter is beyond cavil.
FACTS:
Owing to an irregular procurement of LCD projectors in the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD),
respondent Gutierrez, then its Director, was charged administratively for grave misconduct. The
Ombudsman found respondent liable and penalized her with dismissal. Respondent went to the
CA through Rule 65. The CA reversed the Ombudsman. Aggrieved, the Ombudsman sought
intervention in the CA and reconsideration of the CA’s reversal. The CA denied the Ombudsman’s
motions for intervention and reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene on appeal in this case.
RULING:
Yes. The Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene on appeal in administrative cases that it has
resolved. Preliminarily, the Court rules that petitioner has legal standing to intervene. The issue of
whether or not the Ombudsman possesses the requisite legal interest to intervene in the
proceedings where its decision is at risk of being inappropriately impaired has been laid to rest in
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Ombudsman vs. De Chavez. In the said case, the Court conclusively ruled that even if the
Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, part of its broad powers include
defending its decisions before the CA. And pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court,
the Ombudsman may validly intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest on the matter is
beyond cavil.
[However, in this case, the Court ruled that the Ombudsman’s motion for intervention was
belatedly filed.]: Thus, in the three cases that seemingly strayed from Samaniego, it can be said that
under the circumstances obtaining therein, the appellate court had a valid reason for disallowing
the Ombudsman to participate in those cases because the latter only moved for intervention after
the CA already rendered judgment. By that time, intervention is no longer warranted. In the same
vein, there is no cogent reason for the Court to disturb the ruling of the CA. The appellate court did
not abuse its discretion and neither did it commit reversible error when it denied the Office of the
Ombudsman's Omnibus Motion, having been filed after the appellate court promulgated the
assailed Decision.
L. TRIAL
1. REQUISITES OF MOTION TO POSTPONE TRIAL
SPOUSES LORETO AND MILAGROS SIBAY and SPOUSES RUEL AND OLGA ELSA v.
SPOUSES BIENBVENIDO AND JUANITA BERMUDEZ
G.R. No. 198196; July 17, 2017, (PERALTA, J.)
As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, which should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience
of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby.
FACTS:
The petitioners-spouses Loreto and Milagros Sibay (Spouses Sibay) were registered owners of the
subject parcel of land. Spouses Sibay obtained a loan from respondent Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) and, as a security, they mortgaged the subject lot to LBP. LBP foreclosed the mortgaged
property and, thereafter, transferred the title over the said property in its name.
Subsequently, LBP sold the subject property to Nemesia Bermudez (Nemesia) through the private
respondents Spouses Bienvenido and Juanita Bermudez (Spouses Bermudez) for Two Million Pesos
(Php2,000,000.00). Consequently, LBP executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Nemesia. By virtue of a
writ of possession, the subject property was transferred to LBP. LBP transferred the same to
Nemesia, who thereafter assigned Spouses Bermudez as caretakers.
Spouses Sibay filed a complaint for annulment of the loan contract before the Regional Trial Court.
However, on March 18, 2008, when the case was called for the presentation of the Spouses Sibay’s
evidence, Loreto Sibay failed to attend due to arthritis. Thus, the court a quo, upon motion of the
Spouses Bermudez, reset the hearing on July 29, 2008. It also directed Loreto Sibay, through
counsel, to submit his medical certificate, otherwise, they will have to reimburse the defendants of
the expenses incurred for unjustified postponement of the hearing.
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Spouses Sibay filed a motion for postponement due to a conflict in the hearing schedule of its
counsel before another court. The court a quo denied the motion for postponement ordered
Spouses Sibay to reimburse the Spouses Bermudez in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(Php5,000.00) and pay another Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) for their unexcused absences
on the first scheduled hearing, or a total of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php 10,000.00).
Aggrieved, the Spouses Sibay filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. The court
a quo resolved to reduce the amount to be reimbursed and the fine to a total of Five Thousand
Pesos (Php5,000.00). Thus, before the Court of Appeals (CA), the Spouses Sibay filed a petition
for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo when it fined the
Spouses Sibay and their counsel for being absent due to illness and conflict of scheduled hearings,
respectively. The appellate court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Spouses Sibay moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied anew. Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of Spouses Sibay’s motion for postponement and in imposing a fine
therein is justified.
RULING:
YES. As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court, which should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be
served thereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of the procedural
system of dispensing justice. When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is
not manifest with the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly,
it is sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully
ventilated. Thus, in considering motions for postponements, two things must be borne in mind: (1)
the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant. Unless grave abuse
of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or
appeal. Because it is a matter of privilege, not a right, a movant for postponement should not
assume beforehand that his motion will be granted.
The court a quo committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Spouse Sibay’s motion for
postponement, and in imposing fine and reimbursement of expenses. To recapitulate: First, when
Loreto Sibay failed to appear during the March 18, 2008 hearing, the court a quo directed him,
through counsel, to submit his medical certificate to support his defense of illness. However, Loreto
Sibay took four (4) months to submit the medical certificate which is actually dated July 17,
2008; Second, the court a quo categorically notified the Spouses Sibay’s counsel that failure to
submit the medical certificate would entail the reimbursement of defendants’ expenses due to
unjustified postponement. Nevertheless, despite sufficient notice, even during the hearing on July
29, 2008, no medical certificate was submitted, thus, the court a quo granted the motion to
reimburse defendant’s expenses and the corresponding fine for unjustified absence; and Third, the
Spouses Sibay’s counsel’s absence on the July 29, 2008 hearing was unjustified, considering that
said hearing was scheduled months in advance.
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From the foregoing, Loreto Sibay’s unexcused absence, albeit he subsequently submitted a four-
month late medical certificate, and his counsel’s absence due to conflict of schedule are valid
justification for the court a quo’s denial of the motion of postponement and the resulting directive
to reimburse defendants’ counsel of incurred expenses and payment of fine imposed upon them.
The Court, likewise, find the counsel’s absence as “not unavoidable and one that could not have been
foreseen“ considering that the July 29, 2008 hearing was set with prior agreement of the parties and
consultation with their respective calendars, four months in advance. In some instances, resort to
postponements may be allowed because of extraordinary circumstances — such as a party’s or
counsel’s sudden death, force majeure or an act of God rendering impossible the accomplishment
of its purpose. Here, no such circumstances existed. Loreto Sibay grounded his motion on an
unsubstantiated claim of illness, while his counsel’s excuse is conflict of schedule. Even if these
were true, there is still no reason why both Loreto Sibay and his counsel could not have submitted
his medical certificate, or fix the schedule and file the motion for postponement, seasonably.
Thus, it must be emphasized anew that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like
all rules, they are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. While it is true that a litigation is
not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and
at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution.
O. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner, vs. Alfredo R. De Borja, Respondent.

G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017, CAGUIOA, J.
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is a remedy

available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in
point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue. The question in a demurrer
to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to establish a prima facie
case.
FACTS:
Republic, through PCGG, filed a complaint for "Accounting, Reconveyance, Forfeiture, Restitution,
and Damages" before the Sandiganbayan for the recovery of the ill-gotten assets allegedly amassed
by the individual respondents therein, singly or collectively, during the administration of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Geronimo Z. Velasco, one of the defendants in the complaint, was
the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC). Herein respondent De Borja is Velasco' s nephew.
It appeared that PNOC, in the exercise of its functions, would regularly enter into charter
agreements with vessels and, pursuant to industry practice, vessel owners would pay "address
commissions" to PNOC as charterer, amounting to five percent (5%) of the total freight. Allegedly,
during the tenure of Velasco, no address commissions were remitted to PNOC. It was alleged that
the commissions were remitted to the account of Decision Research Management Company
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(DRMC) and Velasco was alleged to have diverted government funds by entering into several
transactions involving the purchase of crude oil tankers and by reason of which he received bribes,
kickbacks, or commissions in exchange for the granting of permits, licenses, and/or charters to oil
tankers to service PNOC. Moreover, Republic claimed that it was De Borja who collected these
address commissions in behalf of Velasco, basing its allegation on the testimony of Epifanio F.
Verano and he also alleged to have acted as Velasco's dummy, nominee, and/or agent for
corporations he owned and/or controlled, such as DRMC.
After the filing of the parties' responsive pleadings, trial on the merits ensued. Subsequently, upon
the conclusion of its presentation of evidence, petitioner Republic submitted its Formal Offer of
Evidence dated March 6, 1995.On April 15, 2005, respondent De Borja filed his Demurrer to
Evidence of even date, stating therein, among others: (i) that Verano, on two (2) occasions, testified
that he delivered an envelope to Velasco who, in turn, instructed him to deliver the same to De
Borja; (ii) that Verano admitted that the envelope was sealed; (iii) that Verano did not open the
envelope and therefore had no knowledge of the contents thereof; (iv) that Verano did not deliver
the envelope personally to De Borja; and (v) that Verano did not confirm whether De Borja in fact
received the said envelope.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the opposition against Demurrer to Evidence filed by De Borja should be sustained.
RULING:
No. The Sandiganbayan has ruled correctly in granting the Demurrer to evidence filed by De Borja.
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is a

remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue. The question
in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to establish
a prima facie case. In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of "preponderance
of evidence" because it is filed prior to the defendant's presentation of evidence; it is precisely the
office of a demurrer to evidence to expeditiously terminate the case without the need of the
defendant's evidence. Hence, what is crucial is the determination as to whether the plaintiffs
evidence entitles it to the relief sought.
Specifically, the inquiry in this case is confined to resolving whether petitioner Republic is entitled
to "Accounting, Reconveyance, Forfeiture, Restitution, and Damages" based on the evidence it has
presented.
The testimony of Verano, the insinuations of petitioner Republic in the instant Petition can best be
described as speculative, conjectural, and inconclusive at best. Nothing in the testimony of Verano
reasonably points, or even alludes, to the conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy or conduit of
Velasco in receiving address commissions from vessel owners.The Court joins and concurs in the
SB's observations pertaining to Verano's want of knowledge with respect to the contents of the
envelopes allegedly delivered to respondent De Borja's office, which remained sealed the entire
time it was in Verano' s possession. As admitted by Verano himself, he did not and could not have
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known what was inside the envelopes when they were purportedly entrusted to him for delivery. In
the same vein, Verano did not even confirm respondent De Borja's receipt of the envelopes, despite
numerous opportunities to do so. Relatedly, it was further revealed during the cross-examination
of Verano that in the first place, Velasco did not even deal directly with brokers.
All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support the allegations
of the Complaint before the SB. Thus, for failure of petitioner Republic to show any right to the
relief sought, the Court affirms the SB in granting the Demurrer to Evidence.
P. JUDGEMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS

1. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Iloilo Jar Corporation v. Comglasco Corporation/Aguila Glass

G.R. No. 219509, January 18, 2017, Mendoza, J.
Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment
is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any
issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material
allegations of the adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to
deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the
Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative
defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the
issue raised is not genuine.
FACTS:
Petitioner Iloilo Jar Corporation (Iloilo Jar), as lessor, and respondent Comglasco
Corporation/Aguila Glass (Comglasco), as lessee, entered into a lease contract over a portion of a
warehouse building. On December 1, 2001, Comglasco requested for the pre-termination of the lease
effective on the same date. Iloilo Jar, however, rejected the request on the ground that the pre-
termination of the lease contract was not stipulated therein. Despite the denial of the request for
pre-termination, Comglasco still removed all its stock, merchandise and equipment from the leased
premises on January 15, 2002. From the time of the withdrawal of the equipment, and
notwithstanding several demand letters, Comglasco no longer paid all rentals accruing from the
said date.
On September 14, 2003, Iloilo Jar sent a final demand letter to Comglasco, but it was again ignored.
Consequently, Iloilo Jar filed a civil action for breach of contract and damages before the RTC on
October 10, 2003. On June 28, 2004, Comglasco filed its Answer and raised an affirmative defense,
arguing that by virtue of Article 1267 of the Civil Code (Article 1267),it was released from its
obligation from the lease contract. It explained that the consideration thereof had become so
difficult due to the global and regional economic crisis that had plagued the economy. Likewise,
Comglasco admitted that it had removed its stocks and merchandise but it did not refuse to pay
the rentals because the lease contract was already deemed terminated. Further, it averred that
though it received the demand letters, it did not amount to a refusal to pay the rent because the
lease contract had been pre-terminated in the first place.
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On July 15, 2004, Iloilo Jar filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing that Comglasco
admitted all the material allegations in the complaint. It insisted that Comglasco's answer failed to
tender an issue because its affirmative defense was unavailing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate and valid when the defense interposed
by the defendant in the answer is not applicable as a defense to the cause of action as stated in the
complaint.
RULING:
NO. In Basbas v. Sayson,25 the Court differentiated judgment on the pleadings from summary
judgment in that the former is appropriate if the answer failed to tender an issue and the latter may
be resorted to if there are no genuine issues raised, to wit:
Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment
is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any
issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material
allegations of the adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting
to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when
the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts
affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper
provided that the issue raised is not genuine. "A 'genuine issue' means an issue of fact which
calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived
or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial."
xxx
In this case, we note that while petitioners' Answer to respondents' Complaint practically admitted
all the material allegations therein, it nevertheless asserts the affirmative defences that the action
for revival of judgment is not the proper action and that petitioners are not the proper parties. As
issues obviously arise from these affirmative defenses, a judgment on the pleadings is
clearly improper in this case.
In the case at bench, Comglasco interposed an affirmative defense in its answer. While it admitted
that it had removed its stocks from the leased premises and had received the demand letter for
rental payments, it argued that the lease contract had been pre-terminated because the
consideration thereof had become so difficult to comply in light of the economic crisis then existing.
Thus, judgment on the pleadings was improper considering that Comglasco's Answer raised an
affirmative defense.
Although resort to judgment on the pleadings might have been improper, there was still no need
to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings. In Wood Technology Corporation v.
Equitable Banking Corporation (Wood Technology),27 the Court ruled that summary judgment may
be availed if no genuine issue for trial is raised, viz:
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Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage
of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses offered
by petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary judgment,
the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify a summary
judgment? A "genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does
not constitute a genuine issue for trial.28 [Emphasis supplied]
It bears noting that in Wood Technology, the RTC originally rendered a judgment on the pleadings
but was corrected by the Court to be a summary judgment because of the issue presented by the
affirmative defense raised therein. In the said case, the Court, nonetheless, ruled in favor of the
complainant therein because there was no genuine issue raised.
Similar to Wood Technology, the judgment rendered by the RTC in this case was a summary
judgment, not a judgment on the pleadings, because Comglasco's answer raised an affirmative
defense. Nevertheless, no genuine issue was raised because there is no issue of fact which needs
presentation of evidence, and the affirmative defense Comglasco invoked is inapplicable in the case
at bench.
A full blown trial would needlessly prolong the proceedings where a summary judgment would
suffice. It is undisputed that Comglasco removed its merchandise from the leased premises and
stopped paying rentals thereafter. Thus, there remains no question of fact which must be resolved
in trial. What is to be resolved is whether Comglasco was justified in treating the lease contract
terminated due to the economic circumstances then prevalent.
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 213027, January 18, 2017, Sereno, C.J.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta v.

Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 213253, January 18, 2017, Sereno, C.J.
A request for admission may even complement a summary judgment in that the request for admission
may be used as basis for filing a summary judgment.
FACTS:
This case emanated from the Petition dated 17 December 1991 (1991 Petition) filed by the Republic
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Republic Act No. (R.A.) 1379 in relation to Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. The 1991 Petition sought the recovery of the assets and properties pertaining
to the Marcoses, who acquired them directly or indirectly through, or as a result of, the improper
or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the government. By way of a motion, the Republic
asked the Sandiganbayan to render judgment declaring the pieces of jewelry, known as the
Malacañang Collection and specifically mentioned under paragraph 9 (6) of the 1991 Petition, as ill-
gotten; and to subsequently cause this collection of jewelry to be declared forfeited in favor of the
Republic. The latter categorized the pieces of jewelry recovered from the Marcoses into three
collections and singled out the Malacañang Collection as the object of the motion.
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In support of the motion, the Republic cited the letter dated 25 May 2009 sent to the PCGG by
Imelda Marcos, through counsel, demanding "the immediate return of all her pieces of jewelry (i)
taken by PCGG from Malacañang Palace and (ii) those turned over to PCGG by the U.S.
Government." The Republic argued that the letter proved the claim of the Marcoses that they
owned the Malacañang Collection, including the Hawaii Collection.31 It further argued that in the
1991 Petition, they were deemed to have admitted the allegations regarding the pieces of
jewelry. The Republic said that the words or stock phrases they used in their Answer dated 18
October 1993 had been declared by this Court in the Swiss deposits case as a "negative pregnant"
and, as such, amounted to an admission if not squarely denied. As a result, the republic filed a
request for admission. The Republic also submitted a Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgmentdated 14 July 2009.
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta filed their Manifestation and Preliminary
Comments dated 21 July 2009 stating that the Request for Admission was inconsistent with the
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the Supplement thereto and further reserved their right
to present additional arguments or comments on the Motion and the Supplement.
Consequently, Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Expunge dated 25 July 2009 stating that the filing of the Request for Admission was tantamounto
an abdication of the earlier position of the Republic that the case was ripe for summary
judgment.They argued that the Request for Admission entertained a possibly genuine issue as to a
material fact, which was needed for the grant of the motion for summary judgment. Furthermore,
in the filed rejoinder, the Marcoses contended that the collection was not part of the case, because
the collection was “trivially mentioned” in the statement of facts in the 1991 petition.
After the submission of the parties of their respective memoranda, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Partial Summary Judgmentdated 13 January 2014 ruling that (1) the Malacañang Collection was part
and subject of the forfeiture petition;(2) the Motion for Summary Judgment was proper;and (3) the
forfeiture of the Malacañang Collection was justified pursuant to R.A. 1379. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Marcoses but the Sandiganbayan denied the said motion.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the properties; - YES
(2) Whether the Malacañang Collection can be the subject of the forfeiture case;- YES
(3) Whether forfeiture is justitied under R.A. 1379;- YES
(4) Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was not inconsistent with the Request for Admission; and - YES
(5) Whether the Sandiganbayan conectly declared that the forfeiture was not a deprivation
of petitioners' right to due process of law.-YES
RULING:
The Sandiganbayan correctly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The properties are included in the
1991 Petition. The Sandiganbayan correctly noted the Annexes, which were mentioned in
subparagraph 6 and made an integral part of the 1991 Petition, itemizing and enumerating the
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pieces of jewelry with their estimated values. It ultimately found that the 1991 Petition had
categorically alleged that the Malacañang Collection was included in the assets, monies and
properties sought to be recovered.
The 1991 Petition is compliant with the requirements stated in law and jurisprudence. The
sufficiency of its allegations is thus established with respect to the pieces of jewelry. Not only were
these listed in paragraph 9 (6)of that petition as part of the properties subject to forfeiture but these
were also itemized in the documents annexed thereto. The 1991 Petition is more than enough
fulfillment of the requirement provided under Section 3(d) of R.A. 1379.
Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the forfeiture was justified and that the
Malacañang Collection was subject to forfeiture. The legitimate income of the Marcoses had been
pegged at USD 304,372.43. We reiterate what we have already stated initially in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, and subsequently in Marcos v. Republic:138 that "whenever any public officer or
employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have
been unlawfully acquired." Petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that the properties were lawfully
acquired; hence, the prima facie presumption that they were unlawfully acquired prevails.
The Sandiganbayan also properly ruled that there was no inconsistency or incongruity between
Republic's Request for Admission and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Indeed, we have held
that a request for admission can be the basis for the grant of summary judgment. The request can
be the basis therefor when its subject is deemed to have been admitted by the party and is requested
as a result of that party's failure to respond to the court's directive to state what specifically
happened in the case.140 The resort to such a request as a mode of discovery rendered all the matters
contained therein as matters that have been deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the basis of respondent Imelda Marcos's letter dated 25 May 2009; respondents' Answer to the
1991 Petition, which was considered to be a "negative pregnant" in Republic v. Sandiganbayan; and
respondents' failure to timely respond to petitioner's Request for Admission, the Sandiganbayan
thus correctly granted the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Republic.
A careful scrutiny of the three bases used by the Sandiganbayan in justifying the absence of a
genuine issue and eventually granting the Motion for Pmtial Summary Judgment leads us to no
other course of action but to affirm the ruling of the Sandiganbayan. The prima facie presumption
on unlawfully acquired property indeed finds application on the first basis. Section 2 of R.A. 1379
provides that "[w]henever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of propmtion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired." And in this regard, the
Sandiganbayan had taken judicial notice of the legitimate income of the Marcoses during their
incumbency as public officers for the period 1966-1986 which was pegged at USD 304,372.43.
With respect to the second basis the Answer to the 1991 Petition the denial of the Marcoses cannot
be considered a specific denial because similar to their denial in the Arelma case, in which insisted
that they were not privy to the transactions, the Marcoses gave "the same stock answer to the effect
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that [they] did not engage in any illegal activities, and that all their properties were lawfully
acquired." That they were not privy to the actual data in the possession of the PCGG and the
Solicitor General is simply a line of defense which necessarily results in their failure to allege the
lawfulness of the mode of acquiring the property subject of forfeiture, considering the amount of
their lawful income.144 As in the Arelma case, the Marcoses are deemed to have admitted that the
Malacañang Collection itemized in the annexes were found in the palace and subsequently proven
to have been owned by Mrs. Marcos as she admitted in her letter dated 25 May 2009.
In light of the third basis, the factual antecedents of the case bear restating. The Republic filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 24 June 2009, after which it filed and served a Request
for Admission on 3 July 2009. Afterwards, it submitted a Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment dated 14 July 2009. On 28 July 2009, the Marcoses filed their Manifestation and
Preliminary Comments. The Sandiganbayan noted the objection they had raised in their
Manifestation and Preliminary Comments.145 In that manner, rather than declaring that the matters
raised in the Request for Admission were deemed admitted, the Sandiganbayan instead ruled on
the objection raised by the Marcoses. In short, it ruled that the Request for Admission was not
inconsistent with the motion for summary judgment.146 The Sandiganbayan reasoned that there
was no inconsistency between the two. It said that a request for admission may even complement
a summary judgment in that the request for admission may be used as basis for filing a motion for
summary judgment.147 It then denied the Manifestation and Preliminary Comments and
Manifestation and Motion to Expunge filed by the Marcoses relative to the Republic's Request for
Admission. Thereafter, it required the Marcoses to file and serve their sworn answer to the Request
for Admission.148 The Marcoses filed numerous pleadings, but none of these was made in response
to the Request for Admission as required by Rule 26, Section 2149 of the Rules of Court until the
Sandiganbayan eventually issued the Partial Summary Judgment dated 13 January 2014 and the
Resolution dated 11 June 2014.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that "a request for admission may even complement a summary
judgment in that the request for admission may be used as basis for filing a summary
judgment" citing three cases as follows: Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. CA,151Diman v.
Alumbres, and Allied Agri-Business v. CA. The first case instructs that a request for admission
"should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with
the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense."154
The second case, on the other hand, teaches the nature of modes of discovery in this wise:
Particularly as regards request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the law ordains
that when a party is served with a written request that he admit: (1) the genuineness of any material
and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request, or (2) the truth of any material
and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request, said party is bound within the period designated
in the request, to file and serve on the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either (10)
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or (2) setting forth in details
the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. If the party served does
not respond with such sworn statement, each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall
be deemed admitted.
On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist - i.e., facts are
asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification;
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or specific denials or atllnnative defenses are in truth set out in the answer - but the issues thus
arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown by admissions, depositions or
admissions.155
The third case demonstrates how failure to answer the request for admission within the period
resulted in the admission of the matters stated therein. The Court, in that case, specifically ruled:
The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission
rather than upon the party seeking the admission. Hence, when petitioner failed to reply to a
request to admit, it may not argue that the adverse party has the burden of proving the facts sought
to be admitted. Petitioners silence is an admission of the facts stated in the request.
This Court finds that the motion for summary judgment filed by respondent CHERRY VALLEY on
the ground that there were no questions of fact in issue since the material allegations of the
complaint were not disputed was correctly granted by the trial court. It is a settled rule that
summary judgment may be granted if the facts which stand admitted by reason of a partys failure
to deny statements contained in a request for admission show that no material issue of fact exists.
By its failure to answer the other partys request for admission, petitioner has admitted all the
material facts necessary for judgment against itself.
Beverly Anne C. Yap v.Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Regional Executive
Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
G.R. No. 199810 March 15, 2017 REYES, J.:
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, as a concept of res judicata, states that a fact or question
which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that
action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future
action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by
proper authority.
The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself.
Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the
registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered.
FACTS:
Consuelo Vda. de dela Cruz applied for free patent over a parcel of land located in Daliao, Toril,
Davao City. As she could not wait for the approval of her application, she executed a Deed of
Waiver/Quitclaim on November 25, 1981 in favor of Rollie Pagarigan (Pagarigan). Pagarigan filed
his own Free Patent Application (FPA) and subsequently, Free Patent No. (XI-1)5133 was issued to
him over said lot. Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-11182 was thereby issued in his name on
November 25, 1982. On September 5, 1989, Pagarigan mortgaged the lot to Banco Davao-Davao City
Development Bank (the Bank). For failure to pay his loan, the property was foreclosed, and was
eventually sold to the Bank at public auction on October 26, 1990. These proceedings were duly
annotated in the title. However, the land covered by OCT No. P-11182 was allegedly occupied by
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Teodoro Valparaiso and Pedro Malalis (Protestants). On October 24, 1990, the Protestants filed a
formal protest with the Bureau of Lands (Bureau), praying for the recall of the free patent issued to
Pagarigan, and for the institution of a corresponding action for reversion considering that they have
been in adverse, exclusive, and continuous occupation of the subject property since 1945, cultivating
it, and planting various crops, nipa palms and coconut trees on said land.
On January 27, 1992, the Protestants caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens in the title.
Said notice of lis pendens pertained to the Civil Case instituted by the Protestants against Pagarigan,
Menardo Metran and Rene Galope to enjoin them from demolishing the former's houses pending
the determination of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on the
propriety of cancelling the title obtained by Pagarigan. The administrative protest reached the
Office of the Secretary of the DENR, which rendered a Decision against Pagarigan, since the
protestants have been in actual occupation of the land in dispute since 1945 and have introduced
improvements thereon. Pagarigan never occupied the same nor his predecessor-in-interest,
Consuelo dela Cruz. He, likewise, misrepresented in his application that he was the actual occupant
and that there were no others who occupied the lot in dispute. The title was issued sans an actual
ground survey and Pagarigan did not post a copy of his Notice for FPA on both the Bulletin Boards
of Daliao and Lizardo as required by law.
Meanwhile, on November 5, 1992, the Bank sold the subject property to Beverly Anne C. Yap (Yap)
and Rosanna F. Villamor (Villamor). Upon the execution of the deed of sale, the OCT was delivered
to them and TCT was eventually issued in the name of Yap and Villamor. DOTC filed a complaint
for expropriation of a portion of the subject lot before the RTC of Davao City. On February 19, 2003,
the RTC Branch 13 rendered its Decision, ruling that the DENR is entitled to expropriate the land
subject of this case for the purpose of road right of way to the Davao Fish Port, which is for public
use. The just compensation for the land is ₱278,000.00, andVillamor and Yap are the ones entitled
to the payment of just compensation for the property, and DOTC is directed to pay the said amount
to Villamor and Yap. The DENR, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed the
Complaint for Cancellation of Patent, Nullification of Title and Reversion with the RTC of Davao
City. The RTC dismissed the DENR's complaint since the subject land has already been sold to third
persons, it must be shown that the latter were part of the fraud and/or misrepresentation
committed by the original grantee, or at least were aware of it. However, since the RTC Branch 13
already declared in its decision that Yap and Villamor were purchasers in good faith and for value
of the land in question, RTC Branch 16 maintained that, as a court of co-equal jurisdiction, it is
bound by the said finding under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. Moreover, the fact
that it took the respondent 26 years, from the issuance of the free patent before it instituted an
action for reversion, militates against its cause. The Regional Director of DENR elevated its case to
the CA which reversed the trial court. In so ruling, the CA held that neither the Bank nor Yap and
Villamor were innocent purchasers for value. Further, the CA maintained that the decision of the
RTC Branch 13 did not constitute res judicata insofar as the same has not yet attained finality. The
Bank, Yap, and Villamor sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but their motion was evenly
denied in the Resolution dated November 14, 2011.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or notthe decision of the CA run counter to the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
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(2) Whether or not the subsequent conveyances of the subject lot from Pagarigan, to the Bank, and
thereafter, Yap and Villamor, were conveyances made to innocent purchasers for value
RULING:
(1) NO. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, as a concept of res judicata,states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the
parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated
in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed by proper authority. It is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of
that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will
be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in
the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
RTC Branch 16 falsely appreciated the decision of RTC Branch 13. The foregoing shows that the
question of whether or not Yap and Villamar are innocent purchasers was not an actual issue of fact
in the case before the RTC Branch 13, and which called for said court's adjudication. "An issue of
fact is a point supported by one party's evidence and controverted by another's." Yap and Villamor
being buyers in good faith was merely an allegation which was not proven in court and RTC Branch
13 did not actually make any clear pronouncement on the matter. The expropriation proceeding
was filed on February 28, 1997. The protestants caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on
the original title on January 27, 1992. Accordingly, if indeed the question on whether Yap and
Villamar are buyers in good faith was an actual issue of fact before the expropriation proceeding,
the protestants could have easily controverted such claim by the mere expedience of presenting a
certified original copy of the title. Indeed, the notice at the back of a Torrens title serves as notice
to the whole world of the pending controversy over the land so registered.
The RTC Branch 13 basically anchored its judgment on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title. Pursuant
to the well-settled rule that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can only
be altered, modified, or cancelled in a direct proceeding in accordance with law, it was clear that
the trial court was without jurisdiction in an expropriation proceeding, to rule whether the title
issued to Pagarigan is void - notwithstanding the decision of the DENR Secretary.
(2) NO. Neither the Bank, nor Yap and Villamor were purchasers in good faith and for value.
Reversion of subject lot is in order. The fact that Pagarigan fraudulently secured his free patent was
duly established by the investigation conducted by the DENR through Senior Special Investigator
Domingo Mendez. Thus, the DENR ordered for the institution of the present action seeking the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued in the name of Pagarigan, and for the reversion of the
land covered thereby to the government. However, as adverted to above, Section 32 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 mandates that for a reversion case to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
original grantee of a patent has obtained the same through fraud; it must also be proven that the
subject property has not yet been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value, because fraudulent
acquisition cannot affect the titles of the latter. It cannot be overemphasized that the Bank, being
in the business of extending loans secured by real estate mortgage, is familiar with rules on land
registration. As such, it was, as here, expected to exercise more care and prudence than private
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individuals in its dealings with registered lands. Accordingly, given inter alia the suspicion-
provoking presence of occupants other than the owner on the land to be mortgaged, it behooved
them to conduct a more exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagor's title. That
appellee Bank accepted in mortgage the property in question notwithstanding the existence of
structures on the property and which were in actual, visible, and public possession of persons other
than the mortgagor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to bad faith. As pointed out by the CA,
the respondent argued that at the time Yap and Villamar purchased the said lot from the Bank, a
notice of lis pendens was already annotated on OCT No. P-11182; hence, they cannot be considered
as innocent purchasers for value. Yap and Villamor, on the other hand, contended that the owner's
duplicate copy they received from the Bank did not contain any annotations of encumbrance or
liens; hence, they cannot be bound by such annotation.Time and again, the Court has ruled that
the burden of proof to establish the status of a purchaser and registrant in good faith lies upon the
one who asserts it. This onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the legal
presumption of good faith.
It must be emphasized that even before Yap and Villamar purchased the subject property, it was
also established that when they did so, the said property was still registered in the name of
Pagarigan since the Bank did not consolidate its title thereto. Stated simply, Yap and Villamor
purchased the subject property not from the registered owner. The law protects to a greater degree
a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of
prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land
object of the transaction is registered. While one who buys from the registered owner does not need
to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is
expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him
to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the
land. This Court has consistently applied the stricter rule when it comes to deciding the issue of
good faith of one who buys from one who is not the registered owner, but who exhibits a certificate
of title. The instant action does not undermine the indefeasibility of Torrens title. A Torrens title
emanating from a free patent which was secured through fraud does not become indefeasible
because the patent from whence the title sprung is itself void and of no effect whatsoever.
Nonetheless, a free patent that was fraudulently acquired, and the certificate of title issued pursuant
to the same, may only be assailed by the government in an action for reversion, pursuant to Section
101 of the Public Land Act.
Q. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
1. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
Torres et al. v. Aruego

G.R. No. 201271, September 20, 2017, First Division, Del Castillo, J.
Jurisprudence holds that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that controls for purposes of
execution. The proper remedy to contest a decision would have been to file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal before the decision became final and executory.
FACTS:
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Respondent and her sister Evelyn, represented by their mother, filed a Complaint for Compulsory
Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights against Jose Aruego Jr. and the five minor
children of Gloria Torres, represented by their father Justo M. Torres (petitioners in this case).
The sisters alleged they are illegitimate children of Aruego with their mother Luz Fabian,
anchored in continuous possession of the status of being Aruego’s children and being unaware of
any intestate proceeding having been filed in court for the settlement of Aruego’s estate.
On June 15, 1992, the RTC ruled in favor of the sisters, prompting petitioners to file a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The Petition and a
subsequent Petition filed with the SC were denied. The CA executed a Writ of Execution to
execute its June 15, 1992 decision. Respondent filed a Motion for Partition with the RTC alleging
its became final and executory in view of the CA’s denial of their petition.
On December 12, 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking to nullify the Deed of Sale dated May
14, 1998 and the corresponding titles issued in relation thereto executed by respondent in favor
of Sharon Cuneta, covering ½ portion of the lot covered by TCT No. 30730. Respondent again
filed anew a Motion for Partition praying for the implementation of the June 15, 1992. The Regional
Trial Court deferred the resolution of the Motion for Partition on the ground the controversy
involved in the case for nullification would constitute a prejudicial question to the issue involved
in the Motion for Partition.
Respondent filed a petition for Certiorari in the CA, which decided there was no prejudicial
question between the two cases involved. The decision became final and executory and
respondent again filed her Motion for Partition. Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing the
partition of the estate of Aruego could not take place by virtue of respondent’s mere motion
considering there was no conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the properties declared as
constituting the estate of Aruego and that identities of his heirs had yet to be determined.
The RTC decided in favor of respondent. The CA dismissed the petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the June 15, 1992 decision, which attained finality 20 years ago, may still be subject to
review and modification by the Court
RULING:
The insistence of petitioners on Heirs of Francisco v. Munoz-Palma is misplaced: in such case, on

appeal was an order of execution, which although generally not appealable, was allowed because
the Court found the Project of Partition submitted to implement the decision was not in accordance
with the final decision in the case. An appeal from an order of execution would be allowed as an
exception to the general rule so that the appellate tribunal might pass upon the legality and the
correctness of the said order.
Such doctrine is inapplicable to this case, as petitioners seek an order to allow them to present
evidence with regard to properties comprising the estate of Aruego and the heirs to share in the
inheritance. This constitutes an appeal from the June 15, 1992 decision which has long become final
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and executory, and not from an order of execution which is yet to be carried out through a Project
of Partition still to be submitted and approved by the Court.
Further, the June 15, 1992 Decision is already conclusive with respect to the properties comprising
the estate of Aruego. It is the dispositive portion of the decision that controls for purposes of
execution. If petitioners believed that the dispositive portion of the June 15, 1992 decision is
questionable, they should have filed a motion for reconsideration or appeal before the decision
became final and executory.
ANGELITO L. CRISTOBAL V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. AND LUCIO TAN

G.R. No. 201622, October 4, 2017, Third Division, LEONEN, J.
Where a tribunal renders a decision substantially reversing itself on a matter, a motion for
reconsideration seeking reconsideration of this reversal, for the first time, is not a prohibited second
motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Cristobal became a pilot for respondent PAL on October 16, 1971.In May 1998, in line with a
downsizing program of PAL, Cristobal applied for leave without pay from PAL. PAL approved the
application and advised him that he would continue to accrue seniority during his leave and that
he could opt to retire from PAL during this period. Cristobal advised PAL of his intent to retire.In
response, PAL advised him that he was deemed to have lost his employment status on June 9,
1998.Thus, on May 12, 1999, Cristobal filed a complaint with the NLRC.
LA found Cristobal's dismissal illegal. On the matter of retirement benefits, the Labor Arbiter noted
PAL's claim that Cristobal could only be entitled to a retirement pay of ₱5,000,00 per year, pursuant
to the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan of 1967. However, he found that Cristobal's retirement benefits
should not be less than the amount provided under the law. Thus, the Labor Arbiter found him
entitled to an amount computed pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code.
In a Decisiondated September 30, 2010, NLRC affim1ed the LA Decision but reduced the award of
moral and exemplary damages to ₱l00,000 each. On Cristobal's retirement pay, it noted PAL's
argument that any retirement benefits should be pursuant to the terms of the CBA and affirmed
the LA's computation.
Cristobal filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration arguing among others, that since
Respondents acted in bad faith, the award of Php 500,000 each for Moral and Exemplary Damages
should be reinstated, instead of the reduced amount of Php 100,000. PAL also filed an MR, claiming
that it was error to find that Cristobal was illegally dismissed and to base his retirement benefits on
Article 287 of the Labor Code.
NLRC resolved both motions in its Decisiondated May 31, 2011, deleting the award of moral and
exemplary damages and reducing the amount of Cristobal's retirement benefits. It agreed that
Cristobal's retirement benefits should not be computed in accordance with Article 287 of the Labor
Code as Cristobal. Cristobal was entitled to receive only ₱5,000 per year of service, under the 1967
PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan.
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On June 24, 2011, Cristobal filed his MR seeking reconsideration of the reduction of retirement
benefits. He pointed out that the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan is different from the PAL
ALPAP Retirement Plan, and that it is an investment plan.
NLRC Resolution dated August 24, 2011 denied Cristobal's MR, deeming it a second MR of its May
31, 2011 Decision.
Cristobal filed his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which was dismissed. CA accepted the
NLRC premise that petitioner's June 24, 2011 MR was a second MR. Thus, it did not toll petitioners
period to file a petition for certiorari assailing the May 31, 2011 Decision. Consequently, the petition
for certiorari was filed out of time.
Petitioner points out that his November 12, 2010 Partial MR only assailed the NLRC May 31, 2011
Decision, which reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages. On the other hand, his June
24, 2011 MR assailed the reduction of his retirement benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the June 24, 2011 MR filed by petitioner assailing the NLRC May 31, 2011 Decision
was a prohibited second MR.
RULING:
Petition is granted. Rule VII, Section 15 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure prohibits a party from
questioning a decision, resolution, or order, twice. In other words, this rule prohibits the same party
from assailing the same judgment. However, a decision substantially reversing a determination in
a prior decision is a discrete decision from the earlier one.
In Solidbank Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held: The Amended Decision is an entirely new
decision which supersedes the original decision, for which a new motion for reconsideration
may be filed again.
In Barba v. Licea De Cagayan University, where CA denied MR from an amended decision on the
ground that it was a prohibited second MR, this Court held that the prohibition against a second
MR contemplates the same party assailing the same judgment.
Here, the NLRC May 31, 2011 Decision substantially modified its September 30, 2010 Decision. Thus,
petitioner was not precluded from seeking reconsideration of the new decision, and it was clearly
an error for CA to find that petitioner's petition for certiorari was filed out of time on that ground.
As for the purported failure to attach the records necessary to resolve the petition, in Wack Wack
Golf & Country Club v. NLRC, this Court held: “the subsequent submission of the requisite
documents constituted substantial compliance with procedural rules. There is ample jurisprudence
holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation
of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice.” Thus, this Court finds that CA committed
reversible error in dismissing the petition outright, considering the circumstances of this case.
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Petitioner raises in issue whether or not the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan is part of the
retirement benefits that should be computed in comparing the retirement benefits accorded to him
under the Labor Code as against what he is entitled to under PAL policy. However, the matter of
retirement benefits is not addressed in respondent's memorandum. It would better serve th1e
interest of substantial justice to remand this case to the Court of Appeals to allow the parties
to folly discuss this issue.
2. APPEALS
i. FINAL JUDGMENT RULE; EXCEPTIONS
Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando J. Del Rosario, Petitioners, v.

Spouses Richard Y. Huang & Carmen G. Huang, and Stephen G. Huang,
Respondents.
A judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This doctrine admits the
following exceptions:
 The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or
correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had become final.
 The doctrine of immutability of judgment is premised upon the existence of a final and
executory judgment. It is, therefore, inapplicable where the judgment never attains finality,
as in the case of void judgments.
 The happening of a supervening event is likewise a ground to set aside or amend a final and
executory judgment.
FACTS:
Stephen Huang (Stephen) and his parents, Spouses Richard Y. Huang and Carmen G. Huang, filed
a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against Mercury Drug Corporation. Mercury Drug
was the registered owner of a six (6)-wheeler truck driven by Del Rosario, which figured in an
accident with Stephen's car on the night of December 20, 1996. As a result of the tragic incident,
Stephen suffered serious spinal cord injuries. He is now a paraplegic.RTC held Mercury Drug as
liable, and the CA affirmed the same.
As a result of garnishment proceedings, Citibank N.A. issued in favor of Richard Y. Huang a

Manager's Check in the amount of P40,434,062.00.28 Afterwards, Stephen and his parents filed a
Satisfaction of Judgment29 before the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case falls under any of the exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of
judgments.
RULING:
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No, it does not.
A judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable. It can neither be modified
nor disturbed by courts in any manner even if the purpose of the modification is to correct
perceived errors of fact or law. Parties cannot circumvent this principle by assailing the execution
of the judgment. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. This doctrine admits the
following exceptions:
 The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no

amendment or correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had
become final.
 The doctrine of immutability of judgment is premised upon the existence of a final
and executory judgment. It is, therefore, inapplicable where the judgment never attains
finality, as in the case of void judgments.
 The happening of a supervening event is likewise a ground to set aside or amend a
final and executory judgment.
In this case, the petitioner asserts that the case falls in the first exception. This Court notes that the
amendments sought by petitioners affect the very substance of the controversy. While it appears
on the surface of the Petition that they merely seek the clarification of the judgment, a careful
review of petitioners' assertions and arguments reveal their true intention of appealing the merits
of the case. This cannot be done without violating the doctrine on immutability of judgments. A
correction pertaining to the substance of the controversy is not a clerical error.
Roberto A. Torres, et al v. Antonia F. Aruego

G.R. No. 201271; 20 September 2017, Del Castillo, J.
The doctrine on the immutability of judgments is subject to exceptions such as: [i] the correction of
clerical errors; [ii] the making of nunc pro tunc entries when there is no prejudice to any party; [iii]
when the judgment is void.
FACTS:
In 1983, the respondent filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights against the estate of the late Jose Aruego and the petitioners, the nieces and
nephews of the deceased. Respondent alleged they were the illegitimate children of Jose Aruego
and were in continuous possession of the status of children, hence the action for compulsory
acknowledgement and participation in the inheritance. The respondent enumerated parcels of land
that were part of her father’s estate. The petitioners denied the allegations and disputed
respondent’s claim. In June 1992, the RTC found the respondent to be an illegitimate child and
granted her shares in the inheritance.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which was denied in 1983. In 1993, the
petitioners filed a notice of appeal, which was denied by the RTC for being filed out of time. The
petitioners then filed a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction before the CA. In 1993, the CA dismissed this petition for lack of merit, and further
denied the MR of the petitioners.
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The petitioners then appealed the CA decision to the SC through Petition for Review on Certiorari.
In 1996, the SC denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision. The RTC then issued a writ of
execution for its 1992 decision. The respondents then filed a Motion for Partition and motion to
implement the decision, which were both granted by the RTC.
The second case arose in 1998, when the petitioners filed a verified complaint seeking to nullify the
Deed of Absolute Sale over the 2 parcels of land in the estate. The respondents again filed a Motion
for Partition, and the RTC held that the complaint for nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
filed by the petitioners constituted a prejudicial question to the issue involved in the motion for
partition.
After the respondents’ MR was denied, they filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which
granted the petition as there was no prejudicial question between the two cases. The Motion for
Partition was thereafter granted. The MR of the petitioners was denied, and they thereafter filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition and also denied their MR.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON the decision of decision of the court which attained finality over 20 years ago may still be the
subject of review.
RULING:
NO. The first resolution assailed by the petitioners is the dismissal of their petition for certiorari,
with the CA holding that it cannot issued a writ of certiorari to allow parties to present evidence in
a case that has long attained finality. While the doctrine on the immutability of judgments is subject
to exceptions such as: [i] the correction of clerical errors; [ii] the making of nunc pro tunc entries
when there is no prejudice to any party; [iii] when the judgment is void; such are not present in this
case. In the CA’s denial of the petitioner’s MR in 2012, it held that there was no ground to modify
the 1992 RTC decision.
Petitioners now assert that the terms in the 1992 decision were not clear or conclusive as to the
properties comprising the estate, and therefore the decision still had room for interpretation, hence
the judgment may still be appealed despite its finality.
The question as to what properties are deemed included in the estate of Jose Aruego had been
finally settled by the RTC in 1992. As seen from the records, the petitioners never opposed the offer
of evidence of the respondent, which contained certificates of title to the properties of the estate of
Aruego. The petitioners also did not raise this issue in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the 1992 RTC decision. They also failed to appeal this decision. Also, from the records it can be seen
that the petitioners actively participated in the trial and formally offered their own evidence, which
did not contain anything contesting the respondent’s evidence.
Moreover, petitioners allege that the dispositive portion of the RTC decision enumerating the
properties part of the estate has no discussion thereof in the decision. As held in jurisprudence, the
dispositive portion of the decision is controlling for purposes of execution. If the petitioners
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believed such was questionable, they should have filed a MR or appeal before the decision became
executory contesting such. However, as seen in the records, the petitioners filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration and did not raise this contention therein.
b. MODES OF APPEAL
i. PETITION FOR REVIEW
Mario Magat, Sr., et al. vs. Tantrade Corporation and Pablo S. Borja, Jr.
Motions for extension to file Rule 42 petitions are permissible. Rule 42 permits a second extension of
another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only be “for the most compelling reason.”
FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
arising from the original action which is a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money filed by
Tantrade Corporation against now deceased Juliana S. Magat.
Ultimately, the MTC found Juliana liable to pay Tantrade but ordered Borja, an impleaded third-
party defendant to reimburse Juliana the amount she was ordered to pay Tantrade. The RTC
affirmed in toto the MTC’s decision.
Petitioners filed their Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule
42 in the CA, one day before the lapse of the 15-day period. They justified their First Motion for
Extension by citing financial constraints; that the same constraints prevented the counsel from
timely preparing the Petition for Review.
The CA denied the First Motion for Extension, hence a second motion was filed and an extension
was sought for the filing of their Petition for Review since they were yet to receive a copy of the May
31, 2011 Resolution. It was only in June 29, 2011 when they received the aforementioned. The second
motion was denied and the appeal was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying the extensions sought
by petitioners and in dismissing their appeal.
RULING:
Yes, the CA committed a reversible error.
The last two (2) sentences of Section 1 of the Rule 42 of the Rules on Civil Procedure set that motions
for extension to file Rule 42 petitions are permissible. Rule 42 permits a second extension of another
15 days. This second extension shall, however, only be “for the most compelling reason.”
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This Court finds petitioners here to have effectively pleaded grounds that warrant the extensions
prayed for. They should not be faulted for maximizing the period that Rule 42 allows. Petitioners
can neither be faulted for the receipt by the ponente’s office of the Rollo on May 24, 2011. Their
Second Motion for Extension was filed two (2) days before the end of the first 15-day extension. It
was filed, not only within, but in advance of the lapse of the period for seeking the second extension
of Rule 42, Section 1. Petitioners were simultaneously afflicted with the tragedy of death and
constrained by their mean; these were compelling reasons warranting a solicitous stance towards
them.
In sum, the technical requirements of Rule 42 were satisfied.
ii. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Vs. BCA International Corporation & Ad Hoc
Arbitral Tribunal, composed of Chairman Danilo L. Concepcion and members,
Custodio O. Parlade and Antonio P. Jamon, Jr.
G.R. No. 225051. July 19, 2017, Peralta, J.
An appeal by certiorari to the SC is from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA and only
questions of law may be raised. An interlocutory order of an Arbitral Tribunal is not appealable by
certiorari.
FACTS:
DFA awarded the Machine Readable Passport and Visa Project to respondent in a BOT Agreement.
Conflict arose and petitioner sought to terminate the Agreement. Respondent opposed the
termination and filed a Request for Arbitration. Later, the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted.
Much later, respondent manifested that it shall file an Amended Statement of Claims so that its
claim may conform to the evidence they have presented.
Petitioner objected to respondent's Amended Statement of Claims, averring that its belated filing
violates its right to due process and will prejudice its interest and that the Tribunal has no
jurisdiction over the alternative reliefs sought by respondent. The Arbitral Tribunal issued
Procedural Orders No. 11 and 12.
Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
Procedural Order No. 11 and Procedural Order No. 12. Petitioner stated that it opted to file the
petition directly with this court in view of the immensity of the claim concerned, significance of the
public interest involved in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was proper to set aside the
orders of the arbitral tribunal
RULING:
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NO. An appeal by certiorari to the SC is from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA and
only questions of law may be raised. In this case, the appeal by certiorari is not from a final Order
of the CA or the RTC, but from an interlocutory order of the Arbitral Tribunal; hence, the petition
must be dismissed for failure to observe the rules on court intervention allowed by RA No. 9285
and the Special ADR Rules.
William R. Wenceslao, et al. vs. Makati Development Corporation,
Dante Abando and Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 230696. August 30, 2017, Martires, J.
A petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and
a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
Failure to attach the pertinent records of the case justifies the dismissal of the petition.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Monetary Claims filed by the
petitioners against private respondent Makati Development Corporation (MDC) before the Labor
Arbiter.
In their complaint, the petitioners claimed that they were regular employees of MDC and were
illegally dismissed for refusing to apply and be transferred to another contractor, Asiapro Multi-
Purpose Cooperative.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that repeated re-employment does not make a project employee a regular
employee. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Fourth Division affirmed in toto the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. In their petition for certiorari, petitioners failed to attach the
pertinent records of the case. The CA, likewise dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was justified in dismissing the petition for certiorari due to the failure of the
petitioners to attach the pertinent records of the case.
RULING:
Yes, CA was justified.
The law provides that the petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46.
Based on the foregoing rules, we rule that the CA was justified in initially dismissing the petition
based on the petitioners' failure to attach to the petition the certified true copies of the assailed
decision and resolution of the NLRC, as well as other portions of the records of the case. As noted
by the CA, only photocopies, not the certified true copies, of the NLRC decision and resolution
complained of were attached; neither were the pleadings and other papers filed before the labor
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arbiter and the NLRC appended. Absent such required documents, the CA correctly opined that it
would have no basis to determine whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding the
petitioners as project employees and that their termination was not illegal.
iii. PERIOD OF APPEAL
Nueva Ecija II Electric Cooperative, Inc., Area I, Mr. Reynaldo Villanueva, President,
Board of Directors, and Mrs. Eulalia Castro, General Manager, Petitioners, v.
Elmer B. Mapagu, Respondent.
G.R. No. 196084, February 15, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.:
The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law.
FACTS:
Elmer Magapu filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. The Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of petitioner, but the NLRC ruled in Elmer’s favor. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, which was dismissed outright since petitioners failed to sign the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari which was
denied for being filed out of time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court correctly denied the petition.
RULING:
YES. The facts and material dates are undisputed. Petitioners received the September 2, 2010
Resolution of the CA on September 14, 2010. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration and received
the Resolution denying the same on March 17, 2011. Thereafter, they filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari with Payment of Docket Fees. They sought an
extension of 20 days from April 1, 2011 or until April 21, 2011 within which to file the appeal. On May
6, 2011, they filed this petition. They allege that they have 60 days to file the appeal and in fact, they
claim that they are filing it 11 days ahead of the reglementary deadline. Petitioners insist that
following Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bello v. National Labor Relations Commission, petitions
for review on certiorari can be filed within 60 days from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioners are gravely mistaken. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege
and must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. One
who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirement of the rules.
Failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
3. ANNULMENTS OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
Joy Vanessa M. Sebastian v. Spouses Nelson C. Cruz and Cristina P. Cruz and
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan
G.R. No. 220940 March 20, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
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Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment
refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of
the claim. In case of absence, or lack, of jurisdiction, a court should not take cognizance of the case.
Thus, the prevailing rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment
is rendered null and void.
FACTS:
A petition for annulment of judgment was filed by Joy Vanessa M. Sebastian (Sebastian) before the
CA, praying for the annulment of the Decision dated March 27, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen (RTC) in LRC Case No. 421. Sebastian alleged that Nelson C. Cruz (Nelson), married to
Cristina P. Cruz (Cristina; Spouses Cruz), is the registered owner of a 40,835-square meter parcel of
land located in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and covered by Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Big. (OCT
No.) P-41566 (subject land). Sometime in November 2009, Nelson, through his father and attorney-
in-fact, Lamberto P. Cruz (Lamberto), then sold the subject lot in favor of Sebastian, as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the parties. Upon Sebastian's payment of the purchase price,
Lamberto then surrendered to her the possession of the subject land, OCT No. P-41566, and his
General Power of Attorney together with a copy of Tax Declaration and Property Index
Number. Sebastian then paid the corresponding capital gains tax, among others, to cause the
transfer of title to her name. However, upon her presentment of the aforesaid documents to the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan (RD-Pangasinan), the latter directed her to secure
a Special Power of Attorney executed by Spouses Cruz authorizing Lamberto to sell the subject land
to her. Accordingly, Sebastian requested the execution of such document to Lamberto, who
promised to do so, but failed to comply. Thus, Sebastian was constrained to cause the annotation
of an adverse claim in OCT No. P-41566 on August 2, 2011 in order to protect her rights over the
subject land.
According to Sebastian, it was only on July 14, 2014 upon her inquiry with RD-Pangasinan about the
status of the aforesaid title when she discovered that: (a) Nelson executed an Affidavit of Loss dated
September 23, 2013 attesting to the loss of owner's duplicate copy of the title, which he registered
with the RD-Pangasinan; (b) the Spouses Cruz filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of a
second owner's copy, docketed as LRC Case No. 421; and (c) on March 27, 2014, the RTC
promulgated a Decision granting Spouses Cruz's petition and, consequently, ordered the issuance
of a new owner's duplicate copy of title in their names. In view of the foregoing incidents, Sebastian
filed the aforesaid petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Essentially, she contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of LRC
Case No. 421 as the duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566 - which was declared to have no further
force in effect - was never lost, and in fact, is in her possession all along. The CA did not give due
course to Sebastian's petition and, consequently, dismissed the same outright. It held that the
compliance by Spouses Cruz with the jurisdictional requirements of publication and notice of
hearing clothed the RTC with jurisdiction to take cognizance over the action in rem, and
constituted a constructive notice to the whole world of its pendency. As such, personal notice to
Sebastian of the action was no longer necessary. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the CA correctly denied due course to Sebastian's petition for annulment of
judgment, resulting in its outright dismissal.
RULING:
NO, the CA erred in denying due course to Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment and,
resultantly, in dismissing the same outright.Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only
grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction
as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In case of absence, or lack, of jurisdiction,
a court should not take cognizance of the case. Thus, the prevailing rule is that where there is want
of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained,
which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing
out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory.
It also follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res
judicata.
The governing law for judicial reconstitution of title is Section 15 of Republic Act No. (RA) 26. From
the foregoing, it appears that the following requisites must be complied with for an order for
reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the
documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost
or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had
an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed;
and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those
contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title
denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting
the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after
observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has
been when the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is
sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System.
Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial in
clothing the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings. In this case,
Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment before the CA clearly alleged that, contrary to the
claim of Spouses Cruz in LRC Case No. 421, the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566 was not
really lost, as the same was surrendered to her by Lamberto, Nelson's father and attorney-in-fact,
and was in her possession all along. Should such allegation be proven following the conduct of
further proceedings, then there would be no other conclusion than that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 421. As a consequence, the Decision dated March 27, 2014
of the RTC in the said case would then be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the
Court finds prima facie merit in Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment before the CA. As
such, the latter erred in denying it due course and in dismissing the same outright. In this light, the
Court finds it more prudent to remand the case to the CA for further proceedings.
Rene H. Imperial and Nidsland Resources AND Development Corporation vs.
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Hon. Edgar L. Armes, Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial
Region, Legazpi City and Alfonso B. Cruz, Jr./ ALFONSO B. CRUZ vs.Rene Imperial and
Nidsland Resources and Development Corporation
G.R. Nos. 178842 & 195509, January 30, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.
An action for the annulment of a void judgment, like the remedy of appeal, is a statutory right. No
party may invoke it unless a law expressly grants the right and identifies the tribunal which has
jurisdiction over this action. While a void judgment is no judgment at all in legal contemplation, any
action to challenge it must be done through the correct remedy and filed before the appropriate
tribunal.
FACTS:
Napal and Imperial entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to organize a domestic
corporation to be named NIDSLAND. Under the MOA, Napal undertook to convey to NIDSLAND
the Subject Property and to Imperial certain parcels of land. Imperial, on the other hand, as his
contribution to NIDSLAND, committed to perform several obligations such as settling Napal’s
obligation to a bank. While Imperial faithfully complied with his obligations under the MOA, Napal
failed to convey to NIDSLAND the Subject Property. Thereafter, Napal sold the Subject Property
to Cruz. As Napal continued to refuse to convey the Subject Property to NIDSLAND under the
MOA, Imperial filed for himself and in representation of NIDSLAND, a derivative suit (SEC
Petition) before the SEC. This was filed after the sale to Cruz but before its registration. Imperial
also filed a notice of lis pendens for the SEC Case with the Registry of Deeds. Since the annotation
of the lis pendens occurred after the sale of the Subject Property to Cruz but before its registration
with the Registry of Deeds, the notice of lis pendens was carried over to the new TCT issued in
Cruz’s name. Meanwhile, the SEC Case proceeded without the participation of Cruz who had
possession of the new TCT covering the Subject Property during the continuation of the hearings.
The SEC ruled in favor of Imperial and NIDSLAND and declared that the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Napal and Cruz is void ab initio as the SEC found that the sale was simulated. The SEC
ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Cruz. Further, the SEC directed Napal to execute
the proper deed of conveyance of the Subject Property in favor of NIDSLAND. The SEC also
mandated Napal to deliver the possession of the Subject Property to NIDSLAND. Since Napal did
not appeal the SEC Decision, it became final and executory. Subsequently, Napal filed with the CA
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
SEC Decision, on the ground that the SEC has no jurisdiction over the SEC Case as it did not involve
any intra-corporate controversy. The CA dismissed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment,
explaining that Rule 47 is not available to annul the judgment of the SEC.
Cruz filed a pleading denominated as a “Petition” before RTC, which sought to nullify the SEC
Decision. The petition was initially dismissed by the RTC, but when elevated to the CA, it was
remanded back to the RTC. The petition was then re-raffled to another branch presided by Judge
Armes. Imperial and NIDSLAND filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the dismissal of the RTC
Petition on the ground that Cruz failed to state the required material dates in his initiatory Petition
necessary in order to determine compliance with the 60-days reglementary period. Judge Armes
denied the Omnibus Motion and said that the issues raised by Imperial and NIDSLAND have
already been settled by the CA in the certiorari case filed by Cruz. Since their MR was denied,
Imperial and NIDSLAND filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
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of Court (First Petition) before the CA, but it was dismissed for lack of merit (First Assailed
Decision). Hence, Imperial and NIDSLAND filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
While the First Petition was pending, the RTC rendered a Decision (RTC Main Decision) and ruled
that the SEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the Deed of Sale of the Subject
Property between Napal and Cruz, ordering the cancellation of Cruz’s TCT, and directing Napal to
execute a deed of conveyance in favor of NIDSLAND. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC (Second
Assailed Decision). Thus, Cruz filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Second Petition)
challenging the Second Assailed Decision. Cruz argued, among others, that he should have been
impleaded in the SEC Case as he is an indispensable party being the registered owner of the Subject
Property. The two petitions are now consolidated.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to declare the nullity of the Decision of the SEC.
RULING:
We rule that that the RTC Petition should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We likewise
rule that the SEC Decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess of
jurisdiction. The nature of an action is determined by the material allegations in the complaint and
the type of relief prayed for. We have examined the RTC Petition, and we rule that contrary to the
findings of the lower courts, it is an action for the annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The meat of the RTC Petition’s allegation is that the SEC declared as void ab initio the
sale between Napal and Cruz without impleading Cruz in the proceedings. The SEC also had no
power to order the transfer of title over the Subject Property from Cruz to NIDSLAND because Cruz
was never heard in these proceedings. Cruz asserts that the SEC never acquired jurisdiction over
his person. Cruz thus prayed in the RTC Petition that the SEC Decision be declared null and void.
The RTC Petition clearly captures the material allegations in a petition for annulment of judgment
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of one of the parties under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court. In sharp contrast, the RTC Petition makes no allegations that the SEC Decision was
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. It cannot be treated as a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65.
We rule that there is no law at the time pertinent to this case, which allows the filing of a petition
for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Courts and the CA to set aside a void judgment
of the SEC on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. We hasten to emphasize, however, that this pertains
only to cases filed prior to Republic Act No. 8799 (RA 8799) which transferred the jurisdiction over
intra-corporate disputes to Regional Trial Courts designated as commercial courts. As to the latter,
Rule 47 clearly applies. This leads to the conclusion that the RTC Petition is not the proper remedy
to assail the SEC Decision. Since it is an action for the annulment of judgment, the RTC Petition
cannot prosper as we have already ruled that this remedy is not available in this particular case.
However, the error in Cruz’s RTC Petition does not automatically warrant a dismissal of these
proceedings. We rule that the SEC, in nullifying the sale between Napal and Cruz and in ordering
the cancellation of Cruz’s TCTs in favor of NIDSLAND, overstepped its jurisdiction. The SEC
Decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion. It is true that the trend is towards vesting
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administrative bodies like the SEC with the power to adjudicate matters coming under their
particular specialization, to insure a more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to
them. This would also relieve the regular courts of a substantial number of cases that would
otherwise swell their already clogged dockets. But as expedient as this policy may be, it should not
deprive the courts of justice of their power to decide ordinary cases in accordance with the general
laws that do not require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply. Otherwise, the
creeping take-over by the administrative agencies of the judicial power vested in the courts would
render the judiciary virtually impotent in the discharge of the duties assigned to it by the
Constitution. Applying these principles to this case, we rule that the SEC does not have jurisdiction
to order the cancellation of the sale between Napal and Cruz. It also has no jurisdiction to cancel
Cruz’s TCT and order its transfer to NIDSLAND.
To assail the validity of the sale, Imperial and NIDSLAND sought to prove that the sale to Cruz was
simulated. This involves the application of the law on sales. As we have already held in Intestate
Estate of Alexander T. Ty, the issue of whether a sale is simulated falls within the jurisdiction of
ordinary civil courts. It does not concern an adjudication of the rights of Imperial, NIDSLAND and
Napal under the Corporation Code and the internal rules of the corporation. The resolution of these
questions requires the application of an entire gamut of laws that goes well beyond the expertise of
the SEC. Meanwhile, the question of whether Cruz’s TCT should be cancelled goes into the proper
application of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and related doctrines. Specifically, there is a need to
take into consideration whether the SEC Petition is a collateral attack on the certificate of title
which goes against the well-established rule of indefeasibility. The resolution of this question
demands the application of our laws on land title and deeds, a matter outside the ambit of the SEC’s
special competence.
In this case, the SEC, in rendering the decision, disregarded established law and jurisprudence on
the jurisdiction of the SEC. Further, it adjudicated on the rights of Cruz, cancelled the deed of sale,
and took away his property without giving him the opportunity to be heard. It is a breach of the
basic requirements of due process. Because the SEC Decision was issued with grave abuse of
discretion and is therefore void, all acts emanating from it have no force and effect. Thus, the Deed
of Conveyance issued pursuant to it has no legal effect.
Baclaran Marketing Corporation (BMC) v. Fernando Nieva and Mamerto Sibulo Jr.,
G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017, Jardaleza, J.
Fraud is not extrinsic if the alleged fraudulent act was committed by petitioner's own counsel. The
fraud must emanate from the act of the adverse party and must be of such nature as to deprive
petitioner of its day in court.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of cement. It is one of the defendants
in an action for damages before the RTC of Antipolo for the collision of its 10-wheeler truck and a
car owned by Sibulo, where he was awarded with damages. The decision having attained finality,
the RTC subsequently issued a writ of execution and levied upon Petitioner’s real property in
Paranaque City, subsequently sold to Nieva. For failure to redeem the property, Nieva consolidated
his ownership to the property and subsequently sought the possession of the property. In view of
the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate issued against it, BMC filed a Petition for Annulment
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of Judgment before the CA on the ground that it was their counsel’s fault that they were not
informed of the appeal made by Sibulo and the transfer of the property. The same however, was
dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed its Petition.
RULING:
NO. It bears stressing that Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies only to a petition to annul
a judgment or final order and resolution in civil actions, on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction or due process. The rule does not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public
auction of petitioner's properties or the certificate of sale executed by the deputy sheriff over said
properties. Neither does it apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because a writ of
execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in
the enforcement of a final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or
judgment against the losing party.
In fine, only the Decision of the Paranaque Court ordering the cancellation of BMC's title over the
property qualifies as a final judgment. Be that as it may, BMC failed to prove that any of the grounds
for annulment are present in this case.
Extrinsic fraud refers to a fraud committed to the unsuccessful party by his opponent preventing
him from fully exhibiting his case by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise;
or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or when an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat. Fraud is not
extrinsic if the alleged fraudulent act was committed by petitioner's own counsel. The fraud must
emanate from the act of the adverse party and must be of such nature as to deprive petitioner of its
day in court.
Estrella Mejia-Espinoza and Norma Mejia Dellosa vs.Nena A. Cariño

Rule 47 does not apply to an action to annul a writ of execution because a writ of execution is not a
final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a
final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the
losing party.
FACTS:
Espinoza filed separate ejectment suits against Nena and Alberto which was later consolidated. The
MTC ruled in favor of Espinoza. However, the RTC reversed and dismissed the case against Nena.
The CA reversed the RTC and affirmed the MTC. Nena sought to elevate the case to the SC, but
failed to file her petition for review within the extended period. An entry of judgment was
thereafter issued.
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Espinoza filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution before the MTC, which Nena
opposed. The MTC granted the motion and subsequently issued a writ of execution. Sheriff
Hortaleza served the writ upon Nena and when he proceeded to the property subject of the
ejectment suit, he found out that Nena had voluntarily vacated the place and turned over the
padlock to Nena’s caretaker. Thus, he was able to peacefully turn over the property to Dellosa,
Espinoza’s attorney-in-fact. Sheriff Hortaleza then levied a separate commercial lot owned by Nena
to cover the monetary awards for rent, litigation expenses, and attorney’s fees, and correspondingly
issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property.
Nena filed a complaint captioned as “Annulment of Court’s Processes with prayer for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and/or Prohibition, and Damages”
before the RTC. Nena argued that she was deprived of the opportunity to ask for reconsideration
of the order granting Espinoza’s motion for issuance of writ of execution because she was not
furnished a copy of the order. She claimed that Espinoza, through Dellosa, illegally caused the
demolition, without a special court order, of a one-story building which Nena allegedly constructed
on the land subject of the ejectment suit. Furthermore, she questioned the levy on her commercial
lot for being premature, as well as the computation of the judgment debt. The RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action and held that Nena availed of the wrong remedy; instead of a
petition for annulment under Rule 47, Nena should have filed a petition for relief from judgment
under Rule 38. The CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 47 of the Rules of Court may be used to annul court processes pursuant to a final and
executory judgment whose validity is not being questioned.
RULING:
NO. A petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is an extraordinary remedy
that may be availed of only under certain exceptional circumstances. Under the Rules, there are
three requirements that must be satisfied before a Rule 47 petition can prosper. First, the remedy
is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This
means that a Rule 47 petition is a remedy of last resort – it is not an alternative to the ordinary
remedies under Rules 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 45. Second, an action for annulment of judgment
may be based only on two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Third, the action must
be filed within the temporal window allowed by the Rules. If based on extrinsic fraud, it must be
filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; if based on lack of jurisdiction,
must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. There is also a formal requisite that the
petition be verified, and must allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for
annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be.
The averments of Nena’s complaint a quo, however, do not make out an action for annulment of
judgment or final order. It was therefore inaccurate for both the CA 4th Division and the RTC
Branch 41 to characterize it as a Rule 47 petition. While the non-compliance with the requisites laid
down in Rule 47 is glaring – there is neither any averment in the complaint showing prima
facie compliance with the aforementioned requisites nor even a reference to Rule 47 – the first thing
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the lower courts should have considered is the subject of the complaint. Nena is challenging the
MTC’s order granting the issuance of the writ of execution, the writ of execution itself, as well as
the sheriff’s notice of levy and notice of sale on her real property. Clearly, these are not the
judgments or final orders contemplated by Rule 47. A final order or resolution is one which is
issued by a court which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court. Rule 47 does not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public
auction. Neither does it apply to an action to annul a writ of execution because a writ of execution
is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the
enforcement of a final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or
judgment against the losing party.
The proper remedy for Nena was to file a motion to nullify the writ of execution and notices of levy
and sale before the MTC, instead of instituting a new complaint before the RTC. This is because the
execution of a decision is merely incidental to the jurisdiction already acquired by a trial court.
Even assuming that Nena availed of the appropriate remedy, her complaint is still without merit.
Nena sought to annul the writ of execution because she did not receive a copy of the MTC order
granting the issuance of the writ of execution. Yet, she received a copy of the writ without any
protest and voluntarily vacated the premises and turned over possession to Espinoza’s
representative. These actions evince Nena’s recognition of, and acquiescence to, the writ of
execution; she is therefore estopped from questioning its validity. After all, she is fully aware of the
finality of the decision in the ejectment case and that execution of the decision is its logical
consequence. “[W]hen a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction being
the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby
established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who
acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal
therefrom.” Furthermore, as a result of Nena’s voluntary compliance with the writ, any issue arising
from the issuance or enforcement of such writ is rendered moot. Injunction is no longer available
to question the transfer of possession to Espinoza, as the act sought to be enjoined is already fait
accompli.
R. EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS

5. PROCEEDINGS WHERE PROPERTY IS CLAIMED BY THIRD PERSONS
i. IN RELATION TO THIRD PARTY CLAIM IN ATTACHMENT AND REPLEVIN
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) vs.

Maunlad Homes, Inc.
G.R. No. 215933, February 8, 2017, PERALTA, J.
The third-party claimant may file an independent action to vindicate its claim of ownership to the
levied property.
FACTS:
Maunlad Homes, Inc. filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Malolos City, Bulacan,
an unlawful detainer case with damages against National Power Corporation (NPC). After trial, the
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MTCC issued its Decision dated October 26, 2009, ordering NPC to vacate the subject premises and
surrender physical possession thereof to respondent. Maunlad Homes filed a Motion for Execution
which was opposed by the NPC. Maunlad Homes then filed an urgent motion for issuance of a
Break Open Order since the sheriff who tried to implement the writ of execution, by serving the
notice of levy on the NPC Warehouse at Barangay Lagundi, Mexico, Pampanga, was prevented by
the security guards assigned therein. On October 26, 2010, the RTC issued a Break Open Order.
On November 9, 2010, PSALM filed an Affidavit of third-party claim with the sheriff pursuant to
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and alleging that it is the owner of the levied properties
pursuant to the EPIRA Law. On November 10, 2010, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Urgent Ex
Parte Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Order with the RTC arguing that it is the owner of the
subject properties pulled out by the sheriff by operation of law; that it is not a party to the instant
case and therefore cannot be bound by the judgment therein; that the obligation to pay respondent
had not been transferred to it. PSALM also prayed for the nullification of the levy of its properties
and restoring their immediate possession to it. The RTC issued an Order denying all the claims of
the PSALM. On July 30, 2012, the CA issued its assailed Decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari for being an incorrect remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing PSALM's petition for certiorari assailing the denial of the
latter's third party claim for being a wrong remedy.
RULING:
No, A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Notably, PSALM cannot appeal from the denial of its third-party claim since it is not one of the
parties in the action where the writ of execution was issued, as the unlawful detainer case was
between respondent and the NPC. Also, the denial of the third-party claim is not appealable as
provided under the above-quoted Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court since the remedy of a
third party claimant is to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his claim of ownership
or right of possession of the levied properties against the judgment creditor or the purchaser of the
property at the public auction sale. It is in this separate and independent action that the issue of
the third-party claimant's title to the levied properties can be resolved with finality.
Hence, PSALM's claim in their jurisdictional allegations in its petition for certiorari filed with the
CA that it was constrained to file the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to protect its rights and
interest over the subject properties because of the absence of a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
is contradicted by the procedure laid down under Section 16 of Rule 39, i.e., the third-party claimant
may file an independent action to vindicate its claim of ownership to the levied property. Where a
specific remedy has been laid down by our rules for the protection or enforcement of rights, the
same should be resorted to.
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IV. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

A. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
Security Bank Corporation vs.

Great Wall Commercial Press Company, Inc.,Alfredo Buriel Atienza,
Fredino Cheng Atienza and Sps. Frederick Cheng Atienza and Monica Cu Atienza
G.R. No. 219345, January 30, 2017, MENDOZA, J.
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the order of the court where an
action is pending. Through the writ, the property or properties of the defendant may be levied upon
and held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be
secured by the attaching creditor against the defendant. The provisional remedy of attachment is
available in order that the defendant may not dispose of the property attached, and thus prevent the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff from the former.
FACTS:
Security Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money (with Application for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment) against Great Wall and its sureties before the RTC. The complaint sought
to recover from Great Wall and its sureties their unpaid obligations under a credit facility covered
by several trust receipts and surety agreements, as well as interests, attorney’s fees and costs. After
due hearing, the RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary attachment of Security Bank,
which then posted a bond.
Great Wall and its sureties filed their Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary Attachment Ad Cautelam,
claiming that the writ was issued with grave abuse of discretion based on the following grounds: (1)
Security Bank’s allegations in its application did not show a prima facie basis therefor; (2) the
application and the accompanying affidavits failed to allege at least one circumstance which would
show fraudulent intent on their part; and (3) the general imputation of fraud was contradicted by
their efforts to secure an approval for a loan restructure. The RTC denied the motion, but on
appeal, the CA lifted the writ of preliminary attachment. The appellate court explained that the
allegations of Security Bank were insufficient to warrant the provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment. It pointed out that fraudulent intent could not be inferred from a debtor’s inability to
pay or comply with its obligations. The CA opined that the non-return of the proceeds of the sale
and/or the goods subject of the trust receipts did not, by itself, constitute fraud and that, at most,
these were only averments for the award of damages once substantiated by competent evidence. It
also stressed that Great Wall and its sureties’ act of offering a repayment proposal negated the
allegation of fraud. The CA held that fraud must be present at the time of contracting the obligation,
not thereafter, and that the rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly
against the applicant.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in nullifying the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial court.
iRULING:
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YES. In this case, Security Bank relied on Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court as basis of its
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. For a writ of preliminary attachment to issue
under the said rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged
fraud. It is settled that fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor’s mere non-payment
of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. While fraud cannot be presumed, it need not
be proved by direct evidence and can well be inferred from attendant circumstances. Fraud by its
nature is not a thing susceptible of ocular observation or readily demonstrable physically; it must
of necessity be proved in many cases by inferences from circumstances shown to have been involved
in the transaction in question.
After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that Security Bank was able to substantiate
its factual allegation of fraud, particularly, the violation of the trust receipt agreements, to warrant
the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. The Court is of the view that Security Bank’s
allegations of violation of the trust receipts in its complaint was specific and sufficient to assert
fraud on the part of Great Wall and its sureties. These allegations were duly substantiated by the
attachments thereto and the testimony of Security Bank’s witness.
Previously, Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided that a writ of preliminary
attachment may be issued “[i]n an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought xxx” Thus, the
fraud that justified the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment then was only fraud committed
in contracting an obligation (dolo casuante). When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was issued
by the Court, Section 1(d) of Rule 57 conspicuously included the phrase “in the performance
thereof.” Hence, the fraud committed in the performance of the obligation (dolo incidente) was
included as a ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. This significant change
in Section 1 (d) of Rule 57 was recognized recently in Republic v. Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. The
Court stated therein that “[a]n amendment to the Rules of Court added the phrase ‘in the
performance thereof’ to include within the scope of the grounds for issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment those instances relating to fraud in the performance of the obligation.”
Accordingly, the alleged fraud committed by Great Wall and its sureties in the performance of their
obligation should have been considered by the CA. Security Bank detailed in its complaint that
Great Wall and its sureties, knowing fully well that they were in default, submitted a Repayment
Proposal. Then, they requested for a meeting with the bank to discuss their proposal. For unknown
reasons, they did not meet the representatives of the Security Bank. Great Wall and its sureties
even attached to its Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary Attachment Ad Cautelam the
correspondence they had with Security Bank, which revealed that they did not meet the
representatives of the latter despite providing a specific date to discuss the proposed repayment
scheme. They merely offered lame excuses to justify their absence in the arranged meeting and,
ultimately, they failed to clarify the non-compliance with their commitments. Such acts bared that
Great Wall and its sureties were not sincere in paying their obligation despite their maturity,
substantiating the allegations of fraud in the performance thereof. These circumstances of the
fraud committed by Great Wall and its sureties in the performance of their obligation undoubtedly
support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Security Bank.
While the Court finds that Security Bank has substantiated its allegation of fraud against Great Wall
and its sureties to warrant the issuance of writ or preliminary attachment, this finding should not
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in any manner affect the merits of the principal case. The writ of preliminary attachment is only a
provisional remedy, which is not a cause of action in itself but is merely adjunct to a main suit.
B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Bicol Medical Center, represented by Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva, and the Department of
Health, represented by Health Secretary Enrique T. Ona v. Noe B. Botor, Celjun F.
Yap, Ismael A. Albao, Augusto S. Quilon, Edgar F. Esplana II, and Josefina F.
Esplana
Prima facie evidence is evidence that is not rebutted or contradicted, making it good and sufficient on
its face to establish a fact constituting a party's claim or defense.
A preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where both parties are given
the opportunity to present their respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence should be considered.
FACTS:
Road Lot No. 3, which stretched from Panganiban Road to J. Miranda Avenue, is a service road
which leads to the Bicol Medical Center (BMC).Sometime in 2009, BMC constructed a steel gate
along J. Miranda Avenue to control the flow of vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering the hospital
premises.
On March 21, 2012, Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva, BMC Chief I, issued Hospital Memorandum which ordered
the rerouting of traffic inside the BMC Compound. This rerouting scheme closed the steel gate for
vehicles and pedestrians along J. Miranda Avenue, relocating it from the eastern side of the hospital
to the western side effective April 1, 2012. The relocation of this gate was implemented for security
reasons and to make way for "[m]assive development within the Complex."
Atty. Botor wrote to Naga City Mayor Bongat, asking for the reopening or dismantling of the gate
for being a public nuisance. Mayor Bongat filed a Verified Petition with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against BMC.
RTC denied Naga City's application for injunctive relief, ruling that Naga City failed to prove a clear
and unmistakable right to the writ prayed for. CA later granted the petition for certiorari and
emphasized that only a prima facie showing of an applicant's right to the writ is required in an
application for writ of injunctive relief.
Petitioners BMC and the Department of Health filed this Petition for Review on Certioraribefore
this Court. Petitioners claim that although Road Lot No. 3 has been open to vehicles and pedestrians
as BMC's service road, it was never intended for use by the general public and was not owned by
Naga City, as evidenced by the certification issued by the Office of the City Engineer of Naga City.
Dr. Nerva's closure of the road and relocation of the gate was in preparation for the construction of
the Cancer Center Building. Thus, the preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the CA had the
effect of halting construction of a government project, a violation of PD 1818and this Court's
Administrative Circular No. 11-2000. Petitioners applied for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
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and/or WPI to prevent the reopening of the gate since doing so would affect the construction of
the Cancer Center Building.
SC issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the CA decision which directed the RTC to issue
a WPI on the closure of Road Lot No. 3.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in directing the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary injunction on the
closure of Road Lot No. 3.
RULING:
The Petition is meritorious. [A] writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) is an ancillary and
interlocutory order issued as a result of an impartial determination of the context of both
parties. It entails a procedure for the judge to assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the
complainant will be rendered moot simply as a result of the parties' having to go through the full
requirements of a case being fully heard on its merits.
A WPI is issued to: [P]reserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's showing of two important
requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought
to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented
would cause an irreparable injustice.
Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a WPI may be issued.
Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be proven first before a
WPI, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued:
(1) applicant must have a clear & unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.
In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or her claim with
complete and conclusive evidence since only prima facie evidenceor a sampling is required "to give
the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case
on the merits." Tan v. Hosanadefines prima facie evidence as evidence that is "good and sufficient
on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or
the group or chain of facts constituting the· party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or
contradicted, will remain sufficient.
Naga City presented before the trial court the 1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll
and its Identification Map which both identified Road Lot No. 3 as being in the name of the Province
of Camarines Sur.Witnesses' testimonies were also presented to corroborate Naga City's claims of
the public nature of Road Lot No. 3. BMC presented TCT within Barrio Concepcion, Naga City with
the Ministry of Health, now Department of Health, as the registered owner. It is not disputed that
Road Lot No. 3 is part of the property covered by such TCT. BMC likewise presented a
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certification from the City Engineer of Naga City which says that “the road from Panganiban Drive
up to the entrance and exit gate of Bicol Medical Center is not included in the list of Inventory of
City Road[s] of Naga City.”
A careful reading of the records convinces this Court that respondents failed to
establish prima facie proof of their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever
right they sought to establish by proving the public nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted
by the DOH’s certificate of title and the City Engineer's categorical statement that "the road
from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of BMC was not included in the
list" of city roads under Naga City's control.
Absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga City's ownership or control over Road Lot No.
3, the DOH’s title over the BMC compound must prevail over the unsubstantiated claims of Naga
City and respondents. Department of Health's ownership over Road Lot No. 3, with the
concomitant right to use and enjoy this property, must be respected.
Respondents likewise cannot rely on the supposed customary use of Road Lot No. 3 by the public
to support their claimed right of unfettered access to the road because customary use is not one (1)
of the sources of legal obligation;hence, it does not ripen into a right.
This Court finds that the CA erred in limiting prima facie evidence merely to the evidence presented
by Naga City and respondents and in disregarding altogether petitioners' evidence, which had the
effect of squarely rebutting Naga City and respondents' assertions. The CA failed to appreciate the
nature of the ancillary remedy of a WPI as against the ex parte nature of a TRO. By focusing solely
on Naga City and respondents' evidence to determine if there was prima facie evidence to issue the
WPI while the case was being heard in the lower court, CA misappreciated the nature of a WPI. A
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where both parties
are given the opportunity to present their respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence
should be considered.
There was no reason for the CA to reverse the trial court's denial of respondents' application for the
issuance of a WPI. Respondents were unable to present prima facie evidence of their clear and
unmistakable right to use Road Lot No. 3.
Rosario E. Cahambing vs.Victor Espinosa and Juana Ang

The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be
heard. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment or
final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a
preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the
final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed
emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a
litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
FACTS:
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Rosario and Victor are siblings and the children of deceased spouses Librado and Brigida Espinosa,
the latter bequeathing their properties, among which is Lot B or Lot 354, to the said siblings in the
same deceased spouses’ respective Last Wills and Testaments which were duly probated. Deceased
Librado and Brigida bequeathed their respective shares over Lot 354 to Victor, however, Brigida
subsequently revoked and cancelled her will, giving her one-half (1/2) share over Lot 354 to Rosario.
Brigida and Victor, after the death of Librado, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate
subdividing Lot 354 into Lot 354-A adjudicated to Brigida, and Lot 354-B adjudicated to Victor, who
eventually obtained a certificate of title in his name. Not being included in the partition of Lot 354,
Rosario filed a complaint against Victor and his representative, Juana, for, among others, the
annulment of the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Property.
Incidentally, a commercial building named as Espinosa Building stands on Lot No. 354. At the time
of the filing of the complaint, the same building had twelve (12) lessees, four (4) of whom pay rentals
to Rosario, namely: Pacifica Agrivet Supplies, Family Circle, Ariane’s Gift Items, and Julie’s
Bakeshop. Rosario alleged that Juana prevailed upon Pacifica Agrivet Supplies not to renew its lease
contract with Rosario but to enter into a contract of lease with Victor instead. According to Rosario,
Juana also threatened to do the same thing with Julie’s Bakeshop. In one of the pre-trial
conferences, the Clerk of Court, acting as Commissioner, issued an Order directing the parties to
maintain the status quo.
Thereafter, Victor filed an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order against Rosario alleging that the latter
violated the status quo ante order by allowing her sons to occupy the space rented by Jhanel’s
Pharmacy which is one of Victor’s tenants. Victor, through his attorney-in-fact, Juana, alleged that
Rosario’s sons constructed a connecting door through the partition separating their cellular phone
shop from Jhanel’s Pharmacy and that the contract of lease between the latter and Victor is still
subsisting, hence, the entry by Rosario’s sons into the pharmacy’s commercial space disturbed
the status quo ante. The RTC granted Victor’s application and issued an Order for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA dismissed Rosario’s petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is proper.
RULING:
YES. The grounds for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction are prescribed in Section 3
of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. For a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following
requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that the very foundation of the jurisdiction
to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of
irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of
suits. Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case, rests in
the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation
of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not
be interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion in the
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issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
This Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that the elements for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction are present in this case. As aptly ruled by the CA:
In this case, the RTC correctly found that Victor had established a clear and unmistakable right to
a commercial space heretofore occupied by Jhanel’s Pharmacy. He had an existing Contract of Lease
with the pharmacy up to December 2009. Without prejudging the main case, it was established
that, at the time of the issuance of the status quo order dated April 16, 1998, Jhanel’s Pharmacy was
recognized as one of Victor’s tenants. In fact, Rosario identified only Pacifica Agrivet Supplies,
Family Circle, Ariane’s Gift Items and Julie's Bakeshop. As such, pursuant to the status quo order,
it is Victor who must continue to deal with Jhanel’s Pharmacy. Correspondingly, the commercial
space occupied by Jhanel’s Pharmacy must be deemed to be under the possession and control of
Victor as of the time of the issuance of the status quo order. The right of possession and control is
a clear right already established by the circumstances obtaining at that time. Hence, Rosario’s act
of entering the premises of Jhanel’s Pharmacy, through her sons, is a material and substantial
violation of Victor’s right, which act must be enjoined.
The RTC was also able to make the following factual findings that shows the urgency and the
necessity of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in order to prevent serious damage:
By allowing Rosario to disturb the status quo ante which, for purposes of this instant application,
is limited to the admission by Rosario regarding the lease by twelve lessees, including Jhanel’s
Pharmacy, of the subject commercial building, the rentals of which only four pertains to her,
excluding Jhanel’s Pharmacy, great and irreparable injury would result to Victor not just because
he would be deprived of his right to collect rent from Jhanel’s Pharmacy but more importantly,
because it would make doing business with him risky, unstable and unsound, especially with
respect to his other tenants having existing contracts with Victor.
V. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

A. DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
1. PROCEEDINGS CONSIDERED AS SIMILAR REMEDIES
i. QUIETING OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY
Bernadette Bilag, et.al. v. Estela Ay-ay, et.al.,

G.R. No. 189950, April 24, 2017, Perlas- Bernabe, J.
The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better right over the
disputed property which is admittedly still part of the public domain.
FACTS:
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A case for Quieting Title with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction was filed by Respondents against
Petitioners, alleging that the Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest sold to them a land situated in
Baguio City which they have registered under their name before the Register of Deeds. They also
allege that they have been in continuous possession of said property since 1976. Petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, prescription, estoppel, and res judicata.
They also aver that the subject property forms part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation classified as
public domain, hence, the RTC has no jurisdiction over it. The RTC dismissed the case, however,
the CA reversed the same and remanded the case to the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
NO. In a catena of cases, and more importantly, in Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1271, it was
expressly declared that all orders and decisions issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet in connection with the proceedings for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO
Record 211, covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation are null and void and without
force and effect. While PD 1271 provides for a means to validate ownership over lands forming part
of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, it requires, among others, that a Certificate of Title be issued
on such lands on or before July 31, 1973. In this case, records reveal that the subject lands are
unregistered and untitled, as petitioners' assertion to that effect was not seriously disputed by
respondents. Clearly, the award of lots 2 and 3 of the 159,496-square meter parcel of land designated
by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 - which includes the subject lands
- to Iloc Bilag by virtue of the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, is covered
by the blanket nullification provided under PD 1271, and consistently affirmed by the prevailing case
law.
In view of the foregoing, it is only reasonable to conclude that the subject lands should be properly
classified as lands of the public domain as well. Therefore, since the subject lands are untitled and
unregistered public lands, then petitioners correctly argued that it is the Director of Lands who has
the authority to award their ownership. Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly recognized its lack of power
or authority to hear and resolve respondents' action for quieting of title.
It should be stressed that the court a quo's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case renders
it without authority and necessarily obviates the resolution of the merits of the case. To reiterate,
when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
action, as any act it performs without jurisdiction is null and void, and without any binding legal
effects.
B. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

1. DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS
i. CERTIORARI DISTINGUISHED FROM APPEAL BY CERTIORARI
Alexis C. Almendras, Petitioner vs South Davao Development Corporation, Inc.,

(SODACO), Rolando Sanchez, Leonardo Dalwampo and
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Caridad C. Almendras, Respondents

G.R. No. 198209, March 22, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is glaringly different from a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. “A petition for review under Rule 45 of the
x x x Rules of Court is generally limited only to questions of law or errors of judgment. On the other
hand; a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of to correct errors of jurisdiction including
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
FACTS:
From the decision of the RTC, petitioners herein filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
RULING:
YES. The instant Petition denominated as a petition for review, wrongfully alleged grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is glaringly different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. “A
petition for review under Rule 45 of the x x x Rules of Court is generally limited only to questions
of law or errors of judgment. On the other hand; a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be
availed of to correct errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” Moreover, it must be stressed that only questions of
law may be properly raised in a petition for review.
2. WHEN PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS IS

PROPER
Maharlika A. Cuevas, vs. Atty. Myrna v. Macatangay, in her capacity as Director IV

of the Civil Service Commission and Members of the Board of the National
Museum, namely; Virgilio Almario, Corazon Alvina, Sen. Edgardo Angara, Jeremy
Barns, Felipe De Leon, Cong. Salvador Escudero III, Marinella K. Fabella, Fr. Rene
Pio B. Javellana, Maria Isabel G. Ongpin, Felice P. Sta. Maria And Benito S. Vergara
G.R. No. 208506, February 22, 2017, PERALTA, J.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal.
This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the
findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of
the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter
remedy is the unavailability of appeal.
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FACTS:
Petitioner Maharlika Cuevas was appointed by the National Museum Board of Trustees Chairman,
Antonio O. Cojuangco as Director III of the National Museum under a temporary status. Another
applicant for the same position, Elenita Alba, filed a protest with the CSC, the latter referring the
matter to the National Museum for resolution. The National Museum dismissed the protest and
informed the CSC that the decision on petitioner's appointment is final. Thereafter, Cuevas was
appointed on a permanent status by Cojuangco. Alba appealed the dismissal of her protest to the
CSC.
The CSC, through Resolution No. 10-1438, found no merit on Alba’s claim. Based on the same
resolution, the CSC found that the issuance of Cuevas’ appointment was not in accordance with
Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8492, which states that the Board of Trustees shall appoint the
Dirrector III. Director Jeremy Barns, Director IIV of the National Museum, was informed through
a letter from the CSC regarding the invalidated permanent appointment of Cuevas. Barns wrote the
CSC asking for a clarification and reconsideration. Thereafter, the CSC replied in a letter (June 27
letter) declaring that its resolution is final and executory because the proper party – the appointing
authority or the appointee failed to appeal the resolution. Cuevas moved for the reconsideration of
the said letter, claiming that he received the letter on July 18 and it was the first time that he learned
of the matter regarding his appointment.
Cuevas received a copy of the CSC’s letter which states that the letter sent to Director Barns is a
mere clarification of the action invalidating his appointment. It further stated that it is not the
proper subject of a motion for reconsideration. Cuevas then elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of a petition for certiorari under rule 65 is the proper remedy.
RULING:
NO. In the present petition, the letter-responses of the CSC did not decide the issue on the validity
or invalidity of petitioner's appointment.The letter merely stated the procedural rules ought to be
followed by parties who wish to appeal decisions of the CSC, which procedure, both the appointing
authority, the NM BOT, and Cuevas, failed to avail of within the reglementary period. It is,
therefore, CSC Resolution No. 10-1438 that should have been the subject of an appeal as it contained
the decision of the said Commission as to the invalidity of petitioner's appointment as Director III
of the National Museum.
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action of certiorari will not be
entertained - remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is
appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of
discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence
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and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal.
Clearly, Cuevas should have moved for the reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 10-1438
containing the Commission's resolution as to the invalidity of his appointment and, thereafter,
should have filed an appeal. Sadly, failing to do so, Cuevas utilized the special civil action of
certiorari. And to make matters worse, Cuevas questioned, not the proper resolution of the CSC,
but the mere letter-responses of the same Commission.
Crisanto M. Aala, Robert N. Balat, Datu Belardo M. Bungad, Cesar B. Cuntapay, Laura S.
Domingo, Gloria M. Gazmen-Tan, and Jocelyn P. Saludares-Cadayona, Petitioners, vs.
Hon. Rey T. Uy, in his capacity as the City Mayor of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Mr.
Alfredo H. Silawan, in his capacity as City Assessor of Tagum City, Hon. De Carlo L. Uy,
Hon. Allan L. Rellon, Hon. Maria Lina F. Baura, Hon. Nicandro T. Suaybaguio, Jr., Hon.
Robert L. So, Hon. Joedel T. Caasi, Hon. Oscar M. Bermudez, Hon. Alan D. Zulueta, Hon.
Geterito T. Gementiza, Hon. Tristan Royce R. Aala, Hon. Francisco C. Remitar, in their
capacity as City Councilors of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Hon. Alfredo R. Pagdilao, in
his capacity as ABC representative, and Hon. Marie Camille C. Manansala, in her capacity
as SKF representative, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017, LEONEN, J.
Parties must comply with the doctrines on hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Otherwise, they run the risk of bringing premature cases before this Court, which may result
to protracted litigation and overclogging of dockets.
FACTS:
This resolves the original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus1 filed by petitioners
Crisanto M. Aala, Robert N. Balat, Datu Belardo M. Bungad, Cesar B. Cuntapay, Laura S. Domingo,
Gloria M. Gazmen-Tan, and Jocelyn P.Saludares-Cadayona.2 They question the validity of City
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 of the City of Tagum, Davao del Norte, which the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Tagum City enacted on March 19, 2012.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City passed City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011, entitled An
Ordinance Approving the New Schedule of Market Values, its Classification, and Assessment Level
of Real Properties in the City of Tagum which was amended by City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 in
March 2012.
On April 30, 2012, Engineer Crisanto M. Aala (Aala) and Colonel Jorge P. Ferido (Ferido ), both
residents of Tagum City, filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte an
Opposition/Objection to City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not the contract between the Municipality and the Laygos fall under contract of lease
in order to enforce SB Resolution No. 183-2004.
(2)Whether or not the proper remedy to enforce the contract is by way of Mandamus.
RULING:
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(1) Yes. We have no reason to doubt the certifications of the former mayor of Solano, Mayor Galima,
and the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPD0)37 which show that the contract of the
Municipal Government with petitioners' mother, Clarita, was converted into a BOT agreement for
a time in 1992 due to the fire that razed the public market. These certifications were presented and
offered in evidence by petitioners themselves. They prove that Clarita was allowed to construct her
stalls that were destroyed using her own funds, and with the payment of the lease rentals being
suspended until she recovers the cost she spent on the construction. The construction was, in fact,
supervised by the MPDO for a period of three months. The stalls were eventually constructed
completely and awarded to Clarita. She thereafter reoccupied the stalls under a lease contract with
the Municipal Government. In fact, in his Notice dated August 21, 2007, the Municipal Treasurer of
Solano reminded petitioners of their delinquent stall rentals from May 2006 to July 2007. 38 As
correctly posited by the Municipal Government, if the stalls were under a BOT scheme, the
Municipal Treasurer could not have assessed petitioners of any delinquency.39
Also, petitioners themselves raised, for the sake of argument, that even if the contract may be
conceded as one of lease, the municipality is nonetheless estopped from canceling the lease
contract because it subsequently accepted payment of rentals until the time of the filing of the
case.40
In the same vein, the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 183-2004, which quoted Items No. 9 and
11 of the lease contract on the absolute prohibition against subleasing and the possible termination
of the contract in view of back rentals or any violation of the stipulations in the contract, is
presumed to have been regularly issued. It deserves weight and our respect, absent a showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the members of the Sanggunian.
(2) No, Mandamus is not proper. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or
from operation of law.41 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following
grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person bas unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. Neither
will the extraordinary remedy of mandamus lie to compel the performance of duties that are
discretionary in nature.
The find that the Petition for Mandamus must fail because the acts sought to be done are
discretionary in nature. The petition sought an order to direct Mayor Dickson to cancel the lease
contract of petitioners with the Municipal Government and to lease the vacated market stalls to
interested persons. We have already settled in the early case of Aprueba v. Ganzon that the privilege
of operating a market stall under license is always subject to the police power of the city government
and may be refused or granted for reasons of puplic policy and sound public administration. Being
a delegated police power falling under the general welfare clause of Section 16 of the Local
Government Code, the grant or revocation of the privilege is, therefore, discretionary in nature.
In Angchango, Jr. v. Ombudsman, we also held that in the performance of an official duty or act
involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not
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to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is
gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. Such exceptions do
not apply in this case.
Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo, Petitioners, vs.

Municipal Mayor Of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, Respondent.
G.R. No. 188448, January 11, 2017, JARDELEZA, J
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or
the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. As a rule, mandamus will
not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person
against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer,
board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which he is entitled.
FACTS:
In 2005, Aniza Bandrang (Bandrang) letter-complaints to then Municipal Mayor Santiago O.

Dickson (Mayor Dickson) and the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing
them of the illegal sublease she entered into with petitioners Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo over
Public Market Stalls which petitioners leased from the Municipal Government. The SB endorsed
the letter of Bandrang and a copy of Resolution No. 183-2004to Mayor Dickson for appropriate
action. Mayor Dickson however claimed that the contract with the market vendors was under a
stalls were constructed under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, which meant that the
petitioners had the right to keep their stalls until the BOT agreement was satisfied.
The Sanggunian informed Mayor Dickson that the matter falls under the jurisdiction of his office
since it has already passed and approved Resolution No. 183-2004, which authorized Mayor Dickson
to enforce the provision against subleasing of stalls in the public market. Complaints of Bandarang
remained unheeded, she then filed a Petition for Mandamus against Mayor Bandarang and
impleaded Rodolfo and Willie Laygo. She maintained that despite clear violations against
subleasing, Mayor Dickson failed to act on the matter and that such inaction can only be construed
as an unlawful neglect in the performance and enforcement of his public duty as the Chief Executive
of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Petitioner Laygos denied being the lesses and claimed that the provisions
of the resolution on subleasing will not be applicable to them since the contract with the
Municipality is not in a contract of lease but one of BOT scheme.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the contract between the Municipality and the Laygos fall under contract of
lease in order to enforce SB Resolution No. 183-2004.
(2) Whether or not the proper remedy to enforce the contract is by way of Mandamus.
RULING:
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(1) Yes. We have no reason to doubt the certifications of the former mayor of Solano, Mayor Galima,
and the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPD0)37 which show that the contract of the
Municipal Government with petitioners' mother, Clarita, was converted into a BOT agreement for
a time in 1992 due to the fire that razed the public market. These certifications were presented and
offered in evidence by petitioners themselves. They prove that Clarita was allowed to construct her
stalls that were destroyed using her own funds, and with the payment of the lease rentals being
suspended until she recovers the cost she spent on the construction. The construction was, in fact,
supervised by the MPDO for a period of three months. The stalls were eventually constructed
completely and awarded to Clarita. She thereafter reoccupied the stalls under a lease contract with
the Municipal Government. In fact, in his Notice dated August 21, 2007, the Municipal Treasurer of
Solano reminded petitioners of their delinquent stall rentals from May 2006 to July 2007. 38 As
correctly posited by the Municipal Government, if the stalls were under a BOT scheme, the
Municipal Treasurer could not have assessed petitioners of any delinquency.39
Also, petitioners themselves raised, for the sake of argument, that even if the contract may be
conceded as one of lease, the municipality is nonetheless estopped from canceling the lease
contract because it subsequently accepted payment of rentals until the time of the filing of the
case.40
In the same vein, the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 183-2004, which quoted Items No. 9 and
11 of the lease contract on the absolute prohibition against subleasing and the possible termination
of the contract in view of back rentals or any violation of the stipulations in the contract, is
presumed to have been regularly issued. It deserves weight and our respect, absent a showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the members of the Sanggunian.
(2) No, Mandamus is not proper. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or
from operation of law.41 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following
grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person bas unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. Neither
will the extraordinary remedy of mandamus lie to compel the performance of duties that are
discretionary in nature.
The find that the Petition for Mandamus must fail because the acts sought to be done are
discretionary in nature. The petition sought an order to direct Mayor Dickson to cancel the lease
contract of petitioners with the Municipal Government and to lease the vacated market stalls to
interested persons. We have already settled in the early case of Aprueba v. Ganzon that the privilege
of operating a market stall under license is always subject to the police power of the city government
and may be refused or granted for reasons of puplic policy and sound public administration. Being
a delegated police power falling under the general welfare clause of Section 16 of the Local
Government Code, the grant or revocation of the privilege is, therefore, discretionary in nature.
In Angchango, Jr. v. Ombudsman, we also held that in the performance of an official duty or act
involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not
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to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is
gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. Such exceptions do
not apply in this case.
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Florita C. Tarobal

Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. No error or mistake committed by a court
will be corrected by certiorari unless said court acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with
such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Dela Cruz mortgaged the subject property to secure a housing loan she obtained from China Bank.
The bank assigned the loan to NHMFC through a Purchase of Loan Agreement. Dela Cruz failed
to pay the loan, thus, NHMFC initiated foreclosure proceedings where it acquired the subject
property being the highest bidder in the public auction. Dela Cruz failed to redeem the property
within the one-year period of redemption from the date of the registration of the sale.
NHMFC conducted a Housing Fair and a third party had applied for the subject property. NHMFC,
upon the initiative of the buyer in the Housing Fair, filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of Possession
before the RTC. The RTC granted the petition and ratiocinated that the period of redemption had
already expired with no redemption having been made, there was no justifiable ground why the
writ of possession should not be issued. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Tarobal alleging
that she bought the subject property as a result of the broker-assisted negotiation with the
authorized unit holders. She claimed that she was neither notified of the public auction nor was a
party to the foreclosure proceedings in violation of her right to due process. Hence, the certificate
of sale cannot be enforced against her.
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession ejecting Dela Cruz and all persons claiming
rights under her as mortgagor, including Tarobal, from the subject property. The subject property
was then delivered and turned over to NHMFC as the mortgagee, and subsequently to Torres, as
the buyer in the Housing Fair Program of NHMFC. Tarobal, who is a transferee of mortgagor Dela
Cruz, filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA contending that there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued the writ of possession without resolving first her
motion for reconsideration in violation of her right to due process. The CA, however, denied the
petition for certiorari.
A motion for reconsideration/clarification was filed by NHMFC with regard to the last sentence in
the dispositive portion of the CA Decision ordering NHMFC to give priority to Tarobal to reacquire
the subject property under the provisions of the laws and rules related. NHMFC argued that re-
acquisition by Tarobal of the subject property would adversely affect or defeat the rights of the
buyer in the Housing Fair. Further, NHMFC averred that the Order giving priority to NHMFC to
re-acquire the subject property “clashes” with the CA’s Decision sustaining the propriety of the
issuance of the writ of possession. The motion was denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
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Whether the assailed portion of the CA’s Decision is within the function, office and scope of the
writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
NO. The doctrine is that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and that no error
or mistake committed by a court will be corrected by certiorari unless said court acted without
jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of
jurisdiction. The writ is available only for these purposes and not to correct errors of procedure or
mistake in the findings or conclusions of the judge. It is strictly confined to the determination of
the propriety of the trial court's jurisdiction whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so,
whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The issue brought by Tarobal before the CA is whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC when it issued the writ of possession without resolving first the motion for
reconsideration filed by Tarobal allegedly in violation of her right to due process. Hence, the subject
of the petition for certiorari filed by Tarobal is the questioned Order of the RTC dated July 17, 2011
which granted the ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession in favor of NHMFC.
Therefore, the CA erred when it passed judgment on the right of Tarobal to reacquire the subject
property. It overstepped the bounds of its authority in ordering NHMFC to give priority to Tarobal
to repossess the subject property.
As correctly argued by NHMFC, delving into the issue on whether Tarobal has a right over the
property is not for the CA to pass upon. Not even the sale involving the subject property between
NHMFC and its buyer in the Housing Fair Program was made an issue in the petition before the CA
which could have a bearing and materiality; neither its nullity was sought which could justify a
reacquisition by Tarobal. Because in the petition for certiorari, the authority of the CA was limited
to ruling upon the issue of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the Order dated January 17, 2011 granting the petition for the issuance of writ of possession in favor
of the NHMFC of the subject property.
In the case of Municipality of Biñan, Laguna v. Court of Appeals, We reiterated that a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 is limited only to challenges against errors of jurisdiction. In the
instant case, Tarobal raised as an additional issue before the CA – the validity of the foreclosure sale
for failure to allegedly comply with the notice requirement. The CA correctly ruled that any
question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for the
refusal to issue a writ of possession, and the issue as to whether there was compliance with the
notice requirement in the conduct of foreclosure sale is not proper in the petition for certiorari.
Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines Inc., et.al. v. Hon. Janette Garin,
et.al., G.R. No. 217872 and 221866, April 26, 2017, Mendoza, J.
When there is grave abuse of discretion, such as denying a party of his constitutional right to due
process, the Court can come in and exercise its power of judicial review. It can review the challenged
acts, whether exercised by the FDA in its ministerial, quasi-judicial or regulatory power.
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FACTS:
The petitioners seek the partial reconsideration of the decision of the court directing them to
observe due process in the re-certification, procurement and administration of contraceptive drugs
and devices. They contend that due process need not be observed because FDA in registering, re-
certifying, procuring, administering contraceptive drugs and devices were all done in the exercise
of its regulatory power and beyond the court’s power of review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has the power to review the administration of drugs by FDA.
RULING:
YES. On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the FDA in the exercise
of its "regulatory powers" and, therefore, beyond judicial review, the Court holds that it has the
power to review all acts and decisions where there is a commission of grave abuse of discretion. No
less than the Constitution decrees that the Court must exercise its duty to ensure that no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government..
The fact that any appeal to the courts will involve scientific matters will neither place the actions
of the respondents beyond the need to comply with the requirements of Ang Tibay nor place the
actions of the FDA in certification proceedings beyond judicial review.
It should be pointed out that nowhere in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, are the courts
ousted of their jurisdiction whenever the issues involve questions of scientific nature. A court is not
considered incompetent either in reviewing the findings of the FDA simply because it will be
weighing the scientific evidence presented by both the FDA and its oppositors in determining
whether the contraceptive drug or device has complied with the requirements of the law.
Incidentally, Section 32 of R.A. No. 3720 and Section 9 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 247 provide
that any decision by the FDA would then be appealable to the Secretary of Health, whose decision,
in turn, may be appealed to the Office of the President (OP). In view thereof, the Court should
modify that part of the Decision which allows direct appeal of the FDA decision to the Court of
Appeals. Considering that the Executive Secretary is not a party herein, the appeal should be to the
OP as provided in Section 9.
Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes Inc., et.al.,

G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017, Carpio, J.
The power of the Court in mandamus petitions does not extend to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise
of either."
FACTS:
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DMCI was able to acquire a 7, 716 sq. m. lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, which
was earmarked as the location of its Torre de Manila condominium project. After securing all the
necessary clearances for construction, the City Council of Manila issued a Resolution to temporarily
suspend its building permit because the building will clearly dwarf the statue of our national hero.
The Manila City government ant DMCI sought the opinion of the National Historical Commission
of the Philippines (NHCP), it opined that the building will be outside the boundaries of the Rizal
Park and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the view of the monument. The Petitioner filed a Petition
for injunction for the construction of the condominium project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Petition for Mandamus will lie against the City government of Manila to enjoin
the construction of the condominium.
RULING:
NO. The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal
duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when
the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the
background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal Monument. There is nothing in Sections
47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a building outside the boundaries
of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the background of a historic site.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for
that matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building
is within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on
the part of the City of Manila "to consider," in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, the standards
set under Ordinance No. 8119" in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila
since under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal
Park.
To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 to the
Torre de Manila project will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot apply outside of the
Rizal Park and the Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only if the officials
if the City of Manila have a ministerial duty to consider these standards I to buildings outside of
the Rizal Park. There can be no such ministerial duty because these standards are not applicable to
buildings outside of the Rizal Park.
Roberto Martinez v. Noel Buen

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as a "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or
hostility.
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FACTS:
Buen filed an action for recovery of personal property, specifically a Toyota Tamarraw Revo,
claiming ownership over the same based on a certificate of registration under his name. He alleged
that he organized a corporation named Fairdeal Chemical Industries (Fairdeal) with Martinez
allowing the use by the company of his car. Martinez now claims that the vehicle was owned by
Fairdeal and refuses to return the same to Buen. During the trial for the civil case, the counsel for
Buen moved that the case be archived. Martinez, despite notice, failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing and to comment on the motion, thus, the MeTC granted the same. Martinez
subsequently filed a comment to the motion claiming that he did not have knowledge of said
motion. The MeTC considered the comment as a reconsideration of the previous order and
dismissed the case pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Buen filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the RTC to question the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy was a Petition for Certiorari.
RULING:
YES. The May 5, 2006 Order of the MeTC is an order of dismissal pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17.
Since it was silent as to whether the dismissal of the case was with prejudice, the general rule would
apply, that is, the same would be considered to be one with prejudice. Under the circumstances,
Buen's remedy would have been to file an ordinary in the RTC pursuant to Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court. Here, Buen filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The rule that certiorari will not lie
as a substitute for appeal, however, admits of exceptions: "(a) when it is necessary to prevent
irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment; xxx
The second exception is present in this case. We find that the MeTC judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment. First, the Comment/Opposition cannot be treated as a motion
for reconsideration as it does not comply with the requisites for the same. Second, while the Order
indicated that the dismissal was made pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, it did not provide for the
specific ground upon which the dismissal was made, leaving Buen (and the appellate courts) to
speculate as to the same. Third. The MeTC granted a relief of not prayed for or in excess of what
was sought by the party in his pleading. Fourth, an order of dismissal that has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits should conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, otherwise,
the dismissal shall be considered as a denial of due process and is thus a nullity.Here, the MeTC
Order of Dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits. However, far from being clear,
the MeTC Order of Dismissal left all the parties and the courts guessing as to its basis. It is therefore
a patent nullity.
People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan and Juan Roberto L. Abling

G.R. No. 198119, September 27, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
[T]o prove that an acquittal is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner must show that
the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.
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FACTS:
Juan Abling was charged with malversation of public funds. Abling was then the Executive Director
of the Economic Support Fund Secretariat (ESFS), which was tasked to implement the use of
economic assistance proceeds from the Military Bases Agreement. A special audit by the
Commission on Audit (COA) of ESFS’s funds revealed that the ESFS made several cash advances
amounting to P35 million to Abling. Of the P35 million, however, only P13 million was refunded to
the ESFS. Thus, the COA required Abling to liquidate the balance of P22 million. Abling, however,
failed to comply with the foregoing demand. Thus, he was charged as above-stated. As defense,
Abling said that the P22 million was delivered to President Marcos upon his written orders, which
he presented as Exhibits “15”, “16”, and “17”. Thus, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Abling on the
ground that the delivery of the P22 million to President Marcos upon his order negated the
presumption that Abling misappropriated the funds to his personal use. The People seeks to nullify
such acquittal by filing the instant certiorari petition (Rule 65) before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Rule 65 petition of the People must be granted.
RULING:
NO. The general rule is that a judgment of acquittal rendered after trial on the merits shall be
immediately final and unappealable because further prosecution will place the accused in double
jeopardy. However, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in a Rule 65 petition. Unlike in an
appeal, this remedy does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits, an examination of
evidence and a determination of its probative value, or an inquiry on the correctness of the
evaluation of the evidence. Judicial review in certiorari proceedings shall be confined to the
question of whether the judgment for acquittal is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.
[T]o prove that an acquittal is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner must show that
the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. Measured
against the foregoing standard, the Court finds that petitioner People has nonetheless failed to meet
the exacting criteria required in availing of this exceptional legal remedy. First, petitioner People
faults the court a quo for giving probative value to Exhibits "15", "16", and "17", the three ESFS
memoranda that were undated and unsigned; thus, of questionable authenticity. These averments
directly question public respondent Sandiganbayan’s appreciation of evidence.
We have already ruled that, in certiorari proceedings, the court shall not examine and assess the
evidence of the parties, weigh its probative value of the evidence, or inquire on the correctness of
the evaluation of the evidence. Second, petitioner People failed to assail public respondent
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction by not substantiating the grave abuse of discretion that the latter
supposedly committed when it acquitted private respondent Abling of the crime charged. In the
petition, there is no allegation that public respondent Sandiganbayan acted with bias, partiality or
bad faith when it rendered the assailed judgment. Moreover, the petition oes not even aver that
petitioner People's right to due process was violated or that the trial before the court a quo was a
sham. Third, even if we assume that public respondent Sandiganbayan's error in judgment resulted
in a denial of due process or a sham trial and the same was properly alleged, the Court is still
prevented from making a complete evaluation of this aspect because petitioner People did not even
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attach to the present Petition the very documents at the center of its argument, pursuant to Section
1, Paragraph 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Failure to comply with the dictates of the Section 1[,]
[Paragraph 2, Rule 65], vis-a-vis Section 3, Paragraph 3 ofRule 46, is a ground for the dismissal of
the petition under the last paragraph of the same section.
Marvin Cruz and Francisco Cruz v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 224974; 03 July 2017, Leonen, J.
The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error committed by the lower courts and tribunals,
but it issued to prevent them from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction.
Moreover, the writ requires that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available to correct the error. Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not a mere error of judgment.
The manifest disregard of basic rules and procedures constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The proper
remedy is therefore a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
FACTS:
The petitioner Marvin Cruz was charged with robbery in an uninhabited place and by a band.
Cruz posted a cash bond and the private complainant eventually filed an affidavit of desistance as
he was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the case was dismissed. Cruz, through his
bondsman, filed a motion to release the cash bond. The RTC denied the motion on the ground
that the case was dismissed through desistance and not through acquittal. Cruz’s MR was also
denied.
Cruz then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, arguing that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the motion to release the cash bond. The CA dismissed the
petition, ruling that Cruz should have instead filed an appeal. Their MR was also denied by the
CA.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari as the wrong remedy to question the
denial of a motion to release cash bond / YES.
RULING:
The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error committed by the lower courts and
tribunals, but it issued to prevent them from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of
their jurisdiction. Moreover, the writ requires that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy available to correct the error.
Rule 114, Sec. 22 of the Rules of Court is clear as to the cancellation of bail. Bail shall be deemed
automatically cancelled in 3 instances, namely: [i] the acquittal of the accused; [ii] the dismissal of
the case; or [iii] the execution of the judgment of conviction. The Rules do not limit the
cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused.
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Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not a mere error of judgment. The manifest disregard
of basic rules and procedures constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The proper remedy is
therefore a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The case of Babasa v. Linebarger states that an appeal should be available in denials of petitions
for the cancellation of a bond. However, nothing in the case explicitly limits the remedy to only
an appeal.
Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and

Development (DSWD), Department of Finance and Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR),
G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017, Reyes, J.
In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of Finance, et al., prohibition was also recognized as a proper remedy
to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority.
And, in a number of jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail the
constitutionality of a law or prohibit its implementation.
FACTS:
RA 9257 and RA 9442 were enacted, granting a 20% discount to senior citizens and Persons with
disability. The Petitioners question the constitutionality of the provisions of said laws alleging that
it amounts to unlawful taking without just compensation. The Petitioners filed a Petition for
Prohibition with prayer for TRO to enjoin the implementation of said provisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the a Petition for Prohibition is proper to assail the constitutionality of the law.
RULING:
YES. Generally, the office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of
authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. This is, however, not the lone office of an action for prohibition. In
Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of Finance, et al., prohibition was also recognized as a proper remedy
to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority.
And, in a number of jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail the
constitutionality of a law or prohibit its implementation.
Clearly, prohibition has been found an appropriate remedy to challenge the constitutionality of
various laws, rules, and regulations.
3. WHEN AND WHERE TO FILE PETITION

Adtel, Inc. And vs. Marijoy A. Valdez
G.R. No. 189942. August 9, 2017,Carpio, J.
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While the filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration must be made not later than 60 days from the notice of the denial of the motion, said
period may be extended only for exceptional or meritorious cases anchored on special or compelling
reasons.
FACTS:
Maryjoy Valdez works is the purchasing and logistics supervisor of Adtel, Inc. Adtel then entered
into a dealership agreement with Mr. Valdez, respondent’s husband, to distribute Adtel’s wideband
VHF-UHF television antennas. The agreement was initially for 12 months, then extended for
another 3 months.
On February 3, 2006, Mr. Valdez filed against Adtel a case for specific performance and damages
for the execution of the agreement; and a criminal complaint for libel against the chairman and
officers of the Adtel.
On May 22, 2006, Adtel issued a memo directing respondent to show cause in writing why she
should not be terminated for conflict of interest and breach of trust and confidence. She was placed
under preventive suspension thereafter.
On May 29, 2006, Adtel terminated respondent from the company. Hence, respondent filed an
illegal dismissal case against it alleging that she did not violate any company rule or policy, neither
was she guilty of fraud nor willful breach of trust.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint ruling but the NLRC reversed the decision for failure to
substantially prove the act attributable to serve as a just case.
Adtel filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. On the last day for fling a petition for
certiorari, it filed a Motion for Extension of Time. 15 days after the last filing, Adtel filed its petition
for certiorari with the CA, which the CA dismissed for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in denying the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the sole basis of technicality.
RULING:
NO. A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases where a motion for reconsideration was timely filed,
the filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration must be made not later than 60 days from the notice of the denial of the motion.
While the rule was to be strictly observed, the exception to it wherein said period may be extended
is during exceptional or meritorious cases anchored on special or compelling reasons. Adtel’s
motion for extension was grounded on the counsel’s heavy volume of work.
As stated, there should be an effort on the part of party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable
explanation for his or her failure to comply. Absent a more compelling reason, the CA did not
commit a reversible error in dismissing the petition.
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Dennis M. Concejero vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 223262. September 11, 2017, Peralta, J.
The decision of the NLRC is appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
FACTS:
Petitioner Concejero was the Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Branch Operations Review
Department (BORD) of respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB). He supervised 26 Branch
Operations Review Officers in their operations review of all branches, gave authority to convene
the Regional Fact-Finding Committees, reviewed the reports and indorsed fraud to legal and audit.
PNB charged petitioner with several acts constituting abuse of authority, concealment of
knowledge of commission of fraud, deceit or other forms of irregularity, willful breach of trust
resulting in loss of confidence and gross misconduct. He was placed under preventive suspension
for 30 days thereafter.
On February 13, 2013, petitioner was informed that the Board found him guilty of willful breach of
trust resulting in loss of confidence and he was meted the penalty of dismissal. On April 4, 2013,
petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal and prayed for separation pay and
payment of full backwages and others. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner's dismissal was for a
just and valid cause and that he was afforded due process. Petitioner appealed the decision of the
to the NLRC which the latter denied. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari. The CA dismissed it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal
from the Decision of the NLRC through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
RULING:
YES. The decision of the NLRC is appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court
or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person,
in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts
or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition
shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. Petitioner
had 60 days to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Since petitioner received the NLRC
Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration on September 23, 2014, he had until November
22, 2014 (the 60th day) within which to file his petition. However, November 22, 2014 fell on a
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Saturday; hence, petitioner had until the next working day or until November 24, 2014 (Monday) to
file the petition.
The CA dismissed the case because petitioner failed to file his petition for certiorari on October 23,
2014 as prayed for in his earlier motion for extension, even if the 60-day period to file the petition
under Section 4, Rule 65 had not lapsed. Therefore, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the case on November 3, 2014 before the 60-day period to file
the petition for certiorari expired.
C. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Spouses Bernardito and Arsenia Gaela (Deceased), Substituted by her Heirs
Namely: Bernardito Gaela and Joseline E. Paguirigan V.Spouses Tan Tian Heang
and Sally Tan
G.R. No. 185627 March 15, 2017 REYES, J.:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case is originally
legal but becomes illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The sole issue
for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
FACTS:
A complaint for ejectment over two parcels of land both situated in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of
Pasig, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. PT-126446 and PT-126450 was filed by
Spouses Tan Tian Heang and Sally Tan (Spouses Tan) against Spouses Bernardito and Arsenia Gaela
(Spouses Gaela), who claims that they are the lawful owners of the subject properties, saying that
sometime in 2002, their daughter Bernardita Gaela (Bernardita) took the certificates of title
registered in their names and forged their signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage that Bemardita
executed in favor of Alexander Tam Wong (Wong). Thus, their certificates of title were cancelled
and new ones were issued to Wong, who then sold the subject properties to Spouses Tan on
December 20, 2004. Afterwards, they sought the annulment of sale of the subject properties and
cancellation of TCT Nos. PT-126446 and PT-126450 in the name of Spouses Tan in a Civil Case before
the RTC of Pasig City. Spouses Gaela averred that before the transfer of title from Wong to Spouses
Tan, they were able to cause the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the respondents' titles.
Spouses Tan countered that they are the lawful and legal owners of the subject properties which
they acquired in good faith from its former owner Wong. They narrated that the subject properties
were mortgaged by Spouses Gaela to Wong for ₱2,000,000.00, and said mortgage was annotated at
the back of the petitioners' titles. However, Spouses Gaela ceased to pay the real property tax due
on the subject properties. Thereafter, new titles were issued in favor of Wong. On December 18,
2004, they bought the subject properties and paid the taxes due thereon as early as January 13, 2005.
Nonetheless, while they were waiting for the transfer and release of new titles in their names, the
Spouses Gaela filed a Civil Case against Wong and caused its annotation on the latter's titles. This
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annotation was then carried over and appeared in their titles. Subsequently, they made demands
to Spouses Gaela to vacate the subject properties but the latter refused to do so. On February 12,
2007, the MeTC rendered its Decision in favor of Spouses Gaela, dismissing the complaint on the
ground of lack of cause of action. Spouses Tan filed an appeal before the RTC, which granted the
appeal holding that the Spouses Tan have the better right to possess the subject properties since
they are the registered owners of the same. The Spouses Tan's lack of prior physical possession over
the subject properties is of no moment since it is enough that they have a better right of possession
over the petitioners. The RTC further said that the case for annulment of title and the annotation
of a notice of lis pendens on the respondents' TCTs did not in any way legitimize the Spouses Gaela’s
continued possession of the subject properties. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in
toto. Spouses Gaela moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Gaela has a better right of possession over the subject property
RULING:
NO. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case is
originally legal but becomes illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The
sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. For the action to
come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MeTC, the complaint must allege that: (a) the
defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) the defendant's possession of the property eventually became illegal
or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the expiration or the termination of the
defendant's right of possession; (c) the defendant thereafter remained in possession of the property
and thereby deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d) the plaintiff instituted the action
within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
Guided by the foregoing norms, the allegations of Spouses Tan’s complaint made out a case of
unlawful detainer, vesting the MeTC with exclusive original jurisdiction over the complaint. The
record showed that the respondents' TCTs were issued on February 21, 2005. Thereafter, the
demand to vacate was made against the petitioners on March 16, 2005, which is the reckoning point
of the petitioners' unlawful possession. Thus, the filing of the ejectment complaint on April 21, 2005
is within the one-year reglementary period. Indeed, the cause of action of Spouses Tan was to
recover possession of the subject properties from Spouses Gaela upon the latter's failure to comply
with the former's demand to vacate the subject properties after the latter's right to remain thereon
terminated. Spouses Tan initiated the ejectment suit in the MeTC well within the one-year period
from the date of the last demand. Thus, the possession of Spouses Gaela, although lawful at its
commencement, became unlawful upon its non-compliance with the respondents' demand to
vacate. In fine, this Court finds no cogent reason to annul the findings and conclusions of the CA.
Spouses Tan, as the title holders of the subject properties, are the recognized owners of the same
and consequently have the better right to its possession.
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Province of Camarines Sur, represented by Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte,

Jr., Petitioner vs Bodega Glassware, represented by its owner Joseph D. Cabral,
Respondent
G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.
When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of possession alleges that the
opposing party occupied the subject property by mere tolerance, this must be alleged clearly and the
acts of tolerance established. Further, the party seeking possession must identify the source of his or
her claim as well as satisfactorily present evidence establishing it.
FACTS:
Petitioner Province of Camarines Sur is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga
City under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22.6 On September 28, 1966, through then
Provincial Governor Apolonio G. Maleniza, petitioner donated around 600 square meters of this
parcel of land to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos (Deed of Donation). The Deed of Donation prohibited CASTEA from selling,
mortgaging or encumbering the property, otherwise, it would revert to petitioner. Still, CASTEA
entered into a Contract of Lease with Bodega Glassware over the donated property. Under the
Contract of Lease, CASTEA leased the property to Bodega for a period of 20 years commencing on
September 1, 1995 and ending on September 15, 2015. Bodega took actual possession of the property
on September 1, 1995.
Sometime in July 2005, the Office of the Provincial Legal Officer of the Province of Camarines Sur
wrote Bodega regarding the building it built on the property. The Provincial Legal Officer requested
Bodega to show proof of ownership or any other legal document as legal basis for his possession.
Bodega failed to present any proof. Nevertheless, petitioner left Bodega undisturbed and merely
tolerated its possession of the property. On November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega
dated October 4, 2007. In this letter, petitioner stated that Bodega's occupation of the property was
by mere tolerance of the petitioner. As it now intended to use the property for its developmental
projects, petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its peaceful
possession. Bodega refused to comply with the demand.
Thereafter, petitioner revoked the Deed of Denation on October 14, 2007. On March 13, 2008,
petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega before the MTC Naga City. The MTC
ruled in favor of petitioner, but the RTC reversed the same. The CA upheld the RTC’s ruling that
the petitioner cannot demand that Bodega vacate the property. The CA explained that Bodega's
possession of the property is based on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA, in turn, claims
ownership of the property by virtue of the Deed of Donation. According to. the CA, while petitioner
alleges that CASTEA violated the conditions of the donation and thus, the automatic revocation
clause applies, it should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property against CASTEA.
The CA theorized that judicial intervention is necessary to ascertain if the automatic revocation
clause suffices to declare the donation revoked.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA is correct.
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RULING:
NO. When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of possession alleges that the
opposing party occupied the subject property by mere tolerance, this must be alleged clearly and
the acts of tolerance established. Further, the party seeking possession must identify the source of
his or her claim as well as satisfactorily present evidence establishing it.
In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof of its legal
basis for occupying the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For several years,
petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's possession by allowing it to continue using its building and
conducting business on the property. Petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property in
November 2007. This presents a clear case of unlawful detainer based on mere tolerance. Petitioner
proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based on its ownership. This, in turn, is hinged on
its position that the property reverted back to the petitioner when the donation was revoked as
provided in the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation. We shall rule on the effect of
the automatic revocation clause for the purpose of ascertaining who between petitioner and Bodega
has the right to possess the property.
This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation clause in donations in the case of
De Luna v. Abrigo promulgated in 1990. We explained the nature of automatic revocation clauses
by first identifying the three categories of donation. In De Luna, we said that a donation may be
simple, remuneratory or onerous. A donation is simple when the cause is the donor's pure liberality.
It is remuneratory when the donor "gives something to reward past or future services or because of
future charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less than the value
of the donation." A donation is onerous when it is "subject to burdens, charges, or future services
equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated x x x. " This Court found that the donation
in De Luna was onerous as it required the donee to build a chapel, a nursery, and a kindergarten.
We then went on to explain that an onerous donation is governed by the law on contracts and not
by the law on donations. It is within this context that this Court found an automatic revocation
clause as valid.
As to the question of prescription, we rule that the petitioner's right to file this ejectment suit
against Bodega has not prescribed.
First, we reiterate that jurisprudence has definitively declared that Article 764 on the prescription
of actions for the revocation of a donation does not apply in cases where the donation has an
automatic revocation clause. This is necessarily so because Article 764 speaks of a judicial action
for the revocation of a donation. It cannot govern cases where a breach of a condition automatically,
and without need of judicial intervention, revokes the donation.
Second, we cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner should have first filed an
action for reconveyance of the property, and that petitioner's action has prescribed since it did not
file the action within 10 years. This reveals a failure to understand the nature of a donation with an
automatic revocation clause. At the risk of repetition, the breach of the condition in the donation
causes the automatic revocation. All the donor has to do is to formally inform the donee of the
revocation. Judicial intervention only becomes necessary if the donee questions the propriety of the
revocation. Even then, judicial intervention is required to merely confirm and not order the
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revocation. Hence, there can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file an action to speak of. When
the donee does not contest the revocation, no court action is necessary.
Third, as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is entitled to its possession. The
petitioner's action for ejectment is anchored on this right to possess. Under the Civil Code and the
Rules of Court, a party seeking to eject another from a property for unlawful detainer must file the
action for ejectment within one year from the last demand to vacate. This is the prescriptive period
that the petitioner is bound to comply with in this case. The records show that the petitioner served
its last demand letter on November 11, 2007. It filed the action for ejectment on March 13, 2008 or
around four months from the last demand. The action is clearly within the prescriptive period.
Abigail Mendiola v. Venerando Sangalang

G.R. No. 205283, June 7, 2017, Tijam, J.
The RTC and the CA passed upon the parties respective claim of ownership, a procedure that is
sanctioned under Section 16, Rule 70. It is settled that the issue of ownership may be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
FACTS:
A property located in Manggahawa street, Brgy. Teachers Village, was originally registered in the
name of Honorata Sangalang and respondent is the nephew of the former. While he was still alive,
half of the property was used by his grandson and the other half by Petitioner. It was discovered by
the respondent and his siblings that the said property was already registered in the name of
Petitioner and the original owner’s sister, Vilma. When the latter’s son left, the Respondents
forcibly opened the door of the establishment and occupied the same, prompting the Petitioner to
file a complaint for accion pauliana.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has the better right of possession.

RULING:
NO. It is settled that the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. In this case, it is undisputed that the Deed of Sale, through which ownership over the
property had been purportedly transferred to the petitioner and Vilma, was executed in 1996.
However, it is perfectly obvious that Honorata could not have signed the same as she passed away
as early as 1994. If any, Honorata's signature thereon could only be a product of forgery. This makes
the Deed of Sale void and as such, produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify, or
extinguish a juridical relation.
Settled is the rule that an action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is
susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral attack. Hence, respondent is not precluded from
questioning the validity of the petitioner and Vilma's title in the accion publiciana.
A necessary and logical consequence of the foregoing pronouncements is that, title over the
property remained in the name of Honorata as original registered owner thereof. By theory of
succession, petitioner and respondent are co-owners of the property and equally entitled to
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possession thereof, either de facto or de Jure. As such, petitioner and Vilma had no right to exclude
respondent from enjoying possession thereof through a possessory action.
Velia J. Cruz v. Sps. Maximo and Susan Christensen

The prior service and receipt of a demand letter is unnecessary in a case for unlawful detainer if the
demand to vacate is premised on the expiration of the lease, not on the non-payment of rentals or
non-compliance of the terms and conditions of the lease.
FACTS:
Cruz alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land in San Juan City, which she acquired through
inheritance from her late mother, Ruperta D. Javier & that Susan Christensen had been occupying
the property during Javier's lifetime, as they had a verbal lease agreement. Further, she alleged that
she tolerated Susan's occupancy of the property. However, due to Susan's failure and refusal to pay
rentals, she was constrained to demand that Susan vacate the property and pay all unpaid rentals.
The Punong Barangay issued a Certificate to File Actionon August 11, 2005.3 years later, or on
August 5, 2008, Cruz, through counsel, sent Susan a final demand letter, demanding that she pay
the unpaid rentals and vacate the property within 15 days from receipt.
Cruz alleged that despite receipt of the demand letter, Susan refused to vacate and pay the accrued
rentals from June 1989 to Febn1ary 2009. Thus, Cruz was constrained to file a Complaintfor unlawful
detaineron April 27, 2009.
In her Answer,Susan admitted to occupying a portion of the property since 1969 on a month-to-
month lease agreement. However, she denied that she failed to pay her rentals attaching receipts
of her rental payments. Susan likewise denied receiving any demand letter from Cruz and claims
that the signature appearing on the registry return card of the demand letterwas not her signature.
MTC San Juan dismissed Cruz's Complaint. It found that for the registry receipts and registry return
cards to serve as proof that the demand letter was received, it must first be authenticated through
an affidavit of service by the person mailing the letter.
RTC Pasig reversed the MTC. CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the MTC Decision. According to
CA, the filing of a memorandum of appeal within 15 days from the receipt of order is mandatory
under Rule 40, Section 7(b) of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner concedes that while the 15-day period for filing the memorandum of appeal is mandatory
under the Rules of Court, the RTC nonetheless opted to resolve her appeal on its merits, showing
that the issues and arguments raised in the appeal outweigh its procedural defect.Petitioner
likewise submits that a prior demand is not required in an action for unlawful detainer since prior
demand only applies if the grounds of the complaint are non-payment of rentals or non-compliance
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with the conditions of the lease. She points out that where the action is grounded on the expiration
of the contract of lease, as in this instance where the lease was on a month-to-month basis, the
failure to pay the rentals for the month terminates the lease.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the appeal considering that petitioner’s
Memorandum of Appeals was not filed within the required period; and whether or not petitioner
was able to prove Spouses Christensen's receipt of her demand letter before filing her Complaint
for unlawful detainer.
RULING:
The Petition is granted. Procedural rules of even the most mandatory character may be suspended
upon a showing of circumstances warranting the exercise of liberality in its strict application.
The rule in Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requiring the filing of the
memorandum within the period provided is mandatory. Failure to comply will result in the
dismissal of the appeal. In this instance, a Memorandum of Appeal was filed late but was
nonetheless given due course by the RTC. Thus, the jurisdictional defect was cured since petitioner
was able to specifically assign the MTC's errors, which the RTC was able to address and resolve.
This Court also notes that all substantial issues have already been fully litigated before the MTC,
the RTC, and the CA.
Liberality in the application of Rule 40, Section 7 is warranted in this case in view of the potential
inequity that may result if the rule is strictly applied.
The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the action is premised on

the termination of lease due to expiration of the terms of contract. The complaint must be
brought on the allegation that the lease has expired and the lessor demanded the lessee to vacate,
not on the allegation that the lessee failed to pay rents.The cause of action which would give rise to
an ejectment case would be the expiration of the lease.
Admittedly, the Complaintin this case alleges that petitioner's verbal consent and tolerance was
withdrawn due to respondents' ''continuous failure and adamant refusal to pay rentals". However,
respondents' Answerto the Complaint admitted that they only had a month-to-month lease since
1969. They contend that they had been continuously paying their monthly rent until sometime in
2002, when petitioner refused to receive it. Thus, as early as 2002, petitioner, as the lessor, already
refused to renew respondents' month-to-month verbal lease. Therefore, respondents' lease had
already long expired before petitioner sent her demand letters.
Respondents cannot feign ignorance of petitioner's demand to vacate since the matter was brought
to barangay conciliation proceedings in 2005. The barangay certification issued on August 11, 2005
shows that no compromise was reached between the parties.
Respondents' insistence on the non-receipt of the demand letter is misplaced.
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D. EXPROPRIATION
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. APOLONIO V. MARASIGAN, FRANCISCO V.
MARASIGAN, LILIA V. MARASIGAN, BENITO V. MARASIGAN, JR., AND ALICIA V.
MARASIGAN
G.R. No. 220367, November 20, 2017, TIJAM, J.:
The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the
value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement
of the proceedings.
FACTS:
For purposes of constructing and maintaining its steel transmission lines and wooden electric poles,
NPC filed on January 23, 2006, an expropriation complaint against respondents as registered owners
of the parcels of land. Based on the tax declarations allegedly classifying the properties as
agricultural and based on the corresponding BIR zoning valuation therefor, NPC offered to pay PhP
299,550.50.
The owners however claim PhP 47,064,400 for the affected land and seek payment of consequential
damages for the areas left in between each transmission line, like the spaces underneath the
infrastructure, commonly known as "dangling" portions. NPC maintains that it merely seeks to
acquire a right-of-way thus necessitating the payment of a mere easement fee equivalent to 10% of
the market value of the properties. Further, it argued that the award must be reckoned as of the
time of the filing of the complaint instead as of the time of taking in 1970s.
RTC and CA held however that the just compensation to be paid for an easement of a right-of-way
over lands should be the full value of the subject property at the time of filing.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the value of the property be reckoned at the time of the taking in the
1970s.
2. Whether or not consequential damages for the "dangling" area must be awarded.
RULING:
1. No. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination
of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the
commencement of the proceedings.
Sec. 4, Rule 67 lays down the basic rule that the value of the just compensation is to be determined
as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
NPC's expropriation complaint filed on January 23, 2006 clearly sought "to acquire an easement of
right-of-way over portions of the subject properties to enable it "to construct and maintain its steel
transmission lines and wooden electric poles. NPC's action relative to the acquisition of an
easement of right-of-way made prior to the filing of its expropriation complaint was limited only to
the conduct of negotiations with the owners. Even then, such negotiations pertained to the
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construction of HVDC 350 KV transmission lines which was not among the transmission lines
subject of the expropriation complaint. This, as much, was alleged by NPC itself in its expropriation
complaint and was testified to by NPC's right-of-way officer who conducted the negotiations in
1996. The lower courts were thus correct in disregarding NPC's claim of actual taking in the 1970s
as such was not alleged in the expropriation complaint nor was it successfully proven during the
trial.
2. Yes. In arriving at its recommendation to pay consequential damages, the appraisal committee
conducted an ocular inspection of the properties and observed that the areas before and behind the
transmission lines could no longer be used either for commercial or residential purposes. Despite
this determination, NPC insists that the affected areas cannot be considered "dangling" as these
may still be used for agricultural purposes. In so arguing, NPC loses sight of the undisputed fact
that the transmission lines conveying high-tension current posed danger to the lives and limbs of
respondents and to potential farm workers, making the affected areas no longer suitable even for
agricultural production. Thus, the Court finds no reason to depart from the assessment of the
appraisal committee, as affirmed and adopted by the RTC.
E. CONTEMPT
Atty. Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr., Petitioner vs. Armed Forces of The Philippines (AFP)
Chief of Staff, Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang, Brig Gen. Arthur Ang, Camp Aguinaldo Camp
Commander, and Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc, AFP Public Affairs Office Chief, Respondents
When a lawyer chooses to conduct his cases in as public a manner as in this case, it would be an abuse
of our contempt power to stifle the subject of his attention. A lawyer who uses the public fora as his
battleground cannot expect to be protected from public scrutiny.
FACTS:
This refers to Atty. Harry Roque’s Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt against AFP officers for
violating the “confidentiality rule” under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. According to
Roque, the AFP officers held a press conference announcing their plan to file a disbarment
complaint against Roque.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the AFP officers are guilty of indirect contempt.
RULING:
YES. We decline to exercise our contempt power under the conditions of this case. Petitioner assails
two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, respondents' supposed public threats of filing a
disbarment case against him, and second, respondents' public statement that they had filed a
disbarment complaint. Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to
keep private and confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4, 2014, and there
was no proceeding to keep private. As for the Press Statement made on November 4, 2014, a close
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examination reveals that it does not divulge anything that merits punishment for contempt. The
Press Statement declared only three (3) things: first, respondent AFP filed a disbarment complaint
against petitioner; second, petitioner is a lawyer, and thus, must conduct himself according to the
standards of the legal profession; and third, petitioner's "unlawful conduct" is prohibited by the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, this Court agrees with respondents, that they should not be faulted for releasing a subsequent
press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they filed against petitioner. The statements
were official statements made in the performance of respondents' official functions to address a
matter of public concern. It was the publication of an institutional action in response to a serious
breach of security. Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be punished
for responding publicly to such public actions.
The power to punish for contempt is not exercised without careful consideration of the
circumstances of the allegedly contumacious act, and the purpose of punishing the act. Especially
where freedom of speech and press is involved, this Court has given a restrictive interpretation as
to what constitutes contempt.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. FEDERICO A. SERRA, SPOUSES

EDUARDO AND HENEDINA ANDUEZA, ATTY. LEOMAR R. LANUZA, MR. JOVITO
C. SORIANO, ATTY. EDWIN L. RANA, ATTY. PARIS G. REAL, ATTY. PRUDENCIO B.
DENSING, JR., HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, AND ATTY. ERWIN S. OLIVA
G.R. No. 216124, July 19, 2017, SECOND DIVISION, (CARPIO, J.)
Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court and ny improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice
are acts considered as Indirect Contempt.
FACTS:
RCBC filed a motion for execution before the Regional Trial Court, Makati (RTC-Makati) in Civil
Case No. 10054 to execute its Order dated 5 January 1989, which directed respondent Federico A.
Serra (Serra) to sell to RCBC a parcel of land in Masbate covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-232 on which the Masbate Business Center of RCBC is located (subject property).
During the pendency of the case, Serra mortgaged the subject property to respondent Spouses
Eduardo M. Andueza and Henedina V. Andueza (Spouses Andueza) on 21 September 2011. On 26
September 2011, Spouses Andueza had the real estate mortgage (REM) annotated on OCT No. 0-
232 under Entry No. 2011000513.
In an Order dated 16 February 2012, the RTC-Makati denied RCBC's motion for execution because
it had been almost 18 years after the 5 January 1989 Order had become final and executory. In an
Order dated 26 July 2012, RCBC's motion for reconsideration was denied. RCBC filed a petition for
review (G.R. No. 203241) with the Supreme Court (SC) assailing the RTC-Makati's Orders dated 16
February 2012 and 26 July 2012. RCBC prayed for the issuance of a TRO to prevent any attempt to
remove it from the subject property. The SC granted the TRO. RCBC had the TRO issued annotated
on OCT No. 0-232 under Entry No. 2013000087.
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SC, in G.R. No. 203241 which granted RCBC’s petition, set aside the assailed Orders of RTC Makati
and made the issued TRO issued permanent. The Decision became final and executory on 27
November 2013. Meanwhile, Andueza filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of REM, dated 13
August 2013, with the Provincial Sheriff of Masbate since Serra defaulted on his loan obligation.
Pursuant to the Decision in G.R. No. 203241, RCBC filed a new motion for execution before the RTC-
Makati. Andueza filed an opposition to the motion for execution. An Order dated 14May 2014 was
made by RTC-Makati granting the motion for execution. The RTC-Makati held that the REM is
inferior to RCBC's right since the mortgage was constituted when Serra no longer had ownership
and free disposal of the subject property. Accordingly, the RTC-Makati ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution which became final on 14 May 2014. RTC-Makati issued a writ of execution
pursuant to G.R. No. 203241. Meanwhile, acting on the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure,
respondents Atty. Lanuza, Clerk of Court and ExOfficio Provincial Sheriff of the RTC-Masbate, and
Soriano, Sheriff of the RTC-Masbate, scheduled the public auction of the subject property on 26
June 2014.
RCBC filed a petition for injunction before the RTC-Masbate, docketed as Civil Case No. 6971, to
enjoin the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and public auction. Respondent Judge Ables issued a 72-
hour TRO. Soriano scheduled anew the public auction sale of the subject property on 24 September
2014. In the meantime, RCBC filed before the RTC-Makati a motion to divest Serra of his title,
invoking Section 1 O(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In a Resolution dated 23 September 2014, the
RTC-Masbate denied RCBC's motion for the issuance of a 20-day TRO. The public auction sale of
the subject property proceeded on 24 September 2014, with Andueza being the highest bidder. On
25 September 2014, a Certificate of Sale was issued to Andueza.
In an Order dated 26 September 2014, the RTC-Makati granted RCBC's motion to divest Serra of his
title and RCBC's prayer to have the Registry of Deeds for Masbate cancel the mortgage of the subject
property. In his Comment, Serra asserted that due to the public auction sale where the subject
property was sold to Andueza, he could no longer sell the subject property to RCBC.
Spouses Andueza moved that the RTC-Makati vacate its 26 September 2014 Order claiming that
they were not parties in Civil Case No. 10054; thus, they are not bound by whatever decision or
order the trial court issued. RCBC opposed the motion. RCBC had the Decision in G.R. No. 203241
annotated on OCT No. 0-232 under Entry No. 2014000568.
Andueza, through his counsels respondents Atty. Real and Atty. Densing filed before the RTC-
Masbate an ex-parte motion for issuance of writ of possession, which was granted by Judge Ables.
Respondent Atty. Rana, Clerk of Court of RTC-Masbate, issued a writ of possession, directing the
provincial sheriff to place Andueza in possession of the subject property, and to eject all persons
claiming rights under Serra. A Notice to Vacate was directed RCBC to "vacate the subject property
and to peaceably turn-over its possession in favor of the mortgagee within five (5) working days
from receipt hereof."
RCBC filed the present petition for indirect contempt with prayer for a TRO to enjoin respondents
from enforcing the Notice to Vacate and the Writ of Possession issued by RTC-Masbate, and to
enjoin the respondent Register of Deeds from annotating on OCT No. 0-232 the Notice to Vacate
and Writ of Possession. RCBC alleged that respondents disregarded the Court's decisions in G.R.
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Nos. 103338, 182478, 182664, and 203241, as well as the permanent restraining order in G.R. No.
203241. The Court granted and issued the TRO. RCBC argues that Serra is liable for indirect
contempt of court for refusing to obey the Court's restraining order and Decision in G.R. No. 203241,
the RTC-Makati's 5 January 1989 Order, and for colluding with Spouses Andueza for the illegal
mortgage and foreclosure.
Serra alleged that he is not liable for indirect contempt of court because the authority to enforce
the aforesaid Order and Writ of Execution is not being directed to him. Serra alleged he was a
mortgagor in good faith and the Spouses Andueza were mortgagees in good faith when they
executed a REM over the subject property. Spouses Andueza validly annotated the mortgage on the
title of the subject property. At the time of the execution of the mortgage, OCT No. O-232 had no
notice of lis pendens, no adverse claim, and there was no other lien annotated on the title of the
subject property. On the other hand, Spouses Andueza and Atty. Real contended that they are not
guilty of indirect contempt considering that the writ of execution issued by the RTC-Makati was
directed to Sheriff Roberto V. Harina, and not to Spouses Andueza; and the Decision in G.R. No.
203241 was not directed to Spouses Andueza, who are not parties in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Andueza and Serra are liable for indirect contempt.
RULING:
YES. Indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (b) and (d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,

including. the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another
to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to
bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
(Emphasis supplied)
RCBC alleges that respondents are guilty of indirect contempt for disregarding this Court's final
and executory decisions in G.R. Nos. 103338, 182478, 182664, and 203241, which essentially upheld
RCBC's superior right over the subject property. In G.R. No. 103338, which became final and
executory on 15 April 1994, the Court found that "the contract of 'LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY'
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between [Serra] and [RCBC] is valid, effective and enforceable, the price being certain and that
there was consideration distinct from the price to support the option given to the lessee." In G.R.
Nos. 182478 and 182664, the Court issued separate Resolutions dated 30 June 2008 and 22 October
2008, which became final and executory on 27 August 2008 and 3 March 2009, respectively, finding
neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals which held
that Serra's donation of the subject property to Ablao was simulated and was done solely to evade
Serra's obligation of selling the subject property to RCBC. Consequently, the deed of donation was
null and void.
The Decision and TRO in G.R. No. 203241
In its Resolution of 3 December 2012 in G.R. No. 203241, the Court issued a TRO which pertinently
reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Court, You, the respondent [Federico A. Serra], and the Regional Trial Court, Br. 134, Makati
City, your agents, representatives and anyone acting on your behalf are hereby RESTRAINED
from implementing and enforcing the Orders dated 16 February 2012 and 26 July 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 134, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 10054 and from performing any act to
remove or threaten to remove the petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation from the
subject property. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In its Decision of 10 July 2013 in G.R. No. 203241, the Court directed the RTC-Makati to issue the
writ of execution in Civil Case No. 10054 and made the TRO permanent. The Court further stated
that:
In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final
and executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of
sale in favor of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the property to
his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serra's action prompted RCBC to file the
Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own
advantage. x x x.
Serra and Spouses Andueza are guilty of indirect contempt
As a party in G.R. No. 203241, Serra cannot feign ignorance of the Court's decision and restraining
order in that case. The TRO was issued on 3 December 2012 while the decision was promulgated on
10 July 2013. By virtue of the TRO, which was made permanent, Serra was enjoined to perform any
act to remove RCBC from the subject property. Yet, by defaulting on his loan obligation with
Andueza, and Andueza's foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, Serra in effect allowed the removal
of RCBC from the subject property. Serra's conduct tended to impede the administration of justice
by effectively allowing RCBC to be removed from the premises of the subject property, in
contravention of the clear directive in the decision and restraining order in G.R. No. 203241.
Therefore, Serra is guilty of indirect contempt and accordingly fined P30,000.
Serra also claims that "he can no longer execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [RCBC] because
the subject property was already foreclosed and sold in public auction in favor of Spouses Eduardo
and Dina Andueza x x x." In other words, Serra alleges that a supervening event - the foreclosure
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sale in favor of Spouses Andueza - occurred precluding the execution of the Court's decision in G.R.
No. 203241. The Court is not convinced that a supervening event occurred which would effectively
prevent the execution of the decision in G.R. No. 203241. While the foreclosure sale proceeded on
24 September 2014, after the finality of the decision in G.R. No. 203241, the real estate mortgage in
favor of Spouses Andueza was executed on 21 September 2011 while G.R. No. 203241 was pending.
Serra could not possibly be unaware that a foreclosure sale would likely transpire since he was the
mortgagor who defaulted on his loan obligation. Clearly, Serra performed acts intended to defeat
and circumvent the conclusive effects of the final decision in G.R. No. 203241. Serra defaulted on
his loan obligation and did not lift a finger to prevent Andueza or any person for that matter from
removing RCBC from the subject property.
The 5 January 1989 Order of the RTC-Makati, which directed Serra to sell to RCBC the subject
property, became final and executory on 15 April 1994. Serra has delayed for 23 years the execution
of this Order. As the Court observed in G.R. No. 203241, "Serra has continued to evade his obligation
by raising issues of technicality." Clearly, Serra deserves to be sanctioned for such reprehensible
conduct of delaying for 23 years the execution of the final and executory order of the RTC-Makati,
as affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 203241.
Despite being non-parties in G.R. No. 203241, Spouses Andueza have notice of the pendency of such
action. On 14 February 2013, RCBC had the TRO issued by this Court annotated on OCT No. 0-232
under Entry No. 2013000087. Therefore, Spouses Andueza have actual knowledge of the Court's
TRO in G.R. No. 203241 prior to their filing of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject
property on 13 August 2013. Further, the decision in G.R. No. 203241 was promulgated prior to the
Spouses Andueza's initiation of foreclosure proceedings. Spouses Andueza cannot therefore invoke
lack of knowledge of RCBC's interest over the subject property when they filed the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure. Hence, such knowledge should have prevented, or at the very least
cautioned, the Spouses Andueza from proceeding with the foreclosure which had the effect of
removing RCBC from the property, in contravention of the clear language of the Court in G.R. No.
203241. In other words, the Spouses Andueza's act of instituting the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure, which would ultimately result in removing RCBC from the subject property, obviously
tended to impede the administration of justice and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court.
Thus, Spouses Andueza are likewise adjudged guilty of indirect contempt and fined P30,000.
The other respondents, namely the counsels of the Spouses Andueza, merely acted to protect the
interests of their clients over the subject property while the public respondents simply acted
pursuant to their ministerial duties and responsibilities in foreclosure proceedings. These acts do
not constitute indirect contempt of court absent any clear and convincing evidence that they
willfully disobeyed the decision and restraining order in G.R. No. 203241 or committed any act
which tended to impede the administration of justice.
Eddie E. Dizon and Bryan R. Dizonvs.Yolanda Vida P. Beltran

G.R. No. 221071, January 18, 2017, REYES, J.
When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of
title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged
deed acquire any right or title to the property.
FACTS:
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Verona and her mother, together with Bryan and James, resided in the subject property. The
registered owners were “[Verona], married to [Eddie].” While Eddie was abroad working on board
a ship, Verona became ill and died. When Eddie arrived home, a copy of Deed Absolute Sale was
shown to him. It appears that the subject property was sold to Vida. Eddie alleged that the Deed
was falsified, and his and Verona’s signatures thereat were forgeries. Eddie filed two complaints
against Vida. One was a civil case for nullification of the Deed, and for payment of damages and
attorney’s fees. The other was a criminal complaint for falsification of public document. He also
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens upon the TCT, but later, he discovered that a new
TCT was issued in Vida’s name.
Alleging that she is the registered owner of the subject property, Vida filed before the MTCC an
action for unlawful detainer against Eddie, Bryan, James and their unnamed relatives, house helpers
and acquaintances residing in the disputed property. She alleged that Eddie pre-signed the Deed
before he left to work abroad as witnessed by the Spouses Dizon’s respective lawyers. After Verona's
death, Vida tolerated Eddie and his relatives’ stay in the disputed property. Vida sent a formal letter
requiring them to vacate the disputed property, but to no avail.
The MTCC ruled in favor of Vida. The RTC reversed the MTCC, dismissed the complaint, and
denied Vida’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. It held that the MTCC had no
jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer. However, the CA granted the appeal and ruled that the requisites of
unlawful detainer are present.
ISSUE:
Whether the complaint for unlawful detainer should be dismissed.
RULING:
YES. Essentially, Eddie and Bryan allege that the MTCC should have dismissed Vida’s complaint
for unlawful detainer for lack of basis as the Deed she relied upon is falsified and void. It is also
claimed that the CA erred in not upholding the RTC’s ruling that the latter can take cognizance of
the issue of ownership in an unlawful detainer case. The Court finds merit in Eddie and Bryan’s
arguments. In Consolacion D. Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo v. Engracia D. Singson, where
there were similar allegations of forgery and the issue of ownership was raised in the ejectment
case, the Court pronounced:
In arriving at its pronouncement, the CA passed upon the issue or claim of ownership, which both
parties raised. While the procedure taken is allowed – under Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine the issue of possession
– the CA nonetheless committed serious and patent error in concluding that based solely on
respondent’s TCT 12575 issued in her name, she must be considered the singular owner of the
subject property and thus entitled to possession thereof – pursuant to the principle that “the person
who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.” Such provisional
determination of ownership should have been resolved in petitioners’ favor.
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When the deed of sale in favor of respondent was purportedly executed by the parties thereto and
notarized on June 6, 2006, it is perfectly obvious that the signatures of the vendors therein, Macario
and Felicidad, were forged. They could not have signed the same, because both were by then long
deceased: Macario died on February 22, 1981, while Felicidad passed away on September 14,
1997. This makes the June 6, 2006 deed of sale null and void; being so, it is “equivalent to nothing;
it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.”
And while it is true that respondent has in her favor a Torrens title over the subject property, she
nonetheless acquired no right or title in her favor by virtue of the null and void June 6, 2006
deed. “Verily, when the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does
the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.”
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the
property in said person’s name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property.
A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility
of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of
real property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be
an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-
standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The
legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land
is registered holds it as a mere trustee.
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained in the name of
the original registered owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and
respondent thus became, and remain co-owners – by succession – of the subject property. As such,
petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership over the same, including possession -
whether de facto or dejure; respondent thus has no right to exclude them from this right through
an action for ejectment.
With the Court’s determination that respondent’s title is null and void, the matter of direct or
collateral attack is a foregone conclusion as well. “An action to declare the nullity of a void title
does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack;” petitioners were not
precluded from questioning the validity of respondent's title in the ejectment case.
In the case at bar, when the Deed was executed on December 1, 2009, Eddie claimed that he was
abroad while Verona was already unconscious. Vida did not directly refute these allegations and
instead pointed out that the Deed was pre-signed in April of 2008. The foregoing circumstances
reduced the Deed into the category of a private instrument.
In the instant petition, Vida impliedly admits the irregularity of the Deed’s notarization as both of
the vendors were not personally present. Consequently, due execution can no longer be presumed.
Besides, the extant circumstances surrounding the controversy constitute preponderant evidence
suggesting that forgery was committed. Eddie promptly filed a criminal case for falsification of
documents and a civil case to nullify the Deed. Later, the Office of the Davao City Prosecutor found
probable cause to indict Vida for falsification. Consequently, the issue of ownership cannot be
disregarded in the unlawful detainer case. It bears stressing though that while the RTC aptly
resolved the issue of ownership, it is at best preliminary and shall not be determinative of the
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outcome of the two other cases filed by Eddie against Vida. In sum, the Court agrees with the RTC
that the dismissal of Vida’s complaint for unlawful detainer is in order.
VI. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

A. SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
BUOT v. DUJALI
G.R. No. 199885, October 2, 2017, First Division, JARDELEZA, J.
When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial
administration proceedings. The exception is when there already has been (1) extrajudicial settlement
and (2) summary settlement of an estate of small value. Exception to the Exception: When there is a
“good and compelling” reason to still institute judicial administration proceedings.
FACTS:
Jesusa Dujali Buot filed for administration of estate of deceased Gregorio Dujali, who died intestate.
Buot alleged she was a surviving heir along with Roque Dujali, and other heirs. Buot asked that (1)
an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio's estate; (2) a final inventory of the properties
be made; (3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate be ordered distributed in accordance
with law among the legal heirs.
Dujali opposed and asked for dismissal, arguing Buot had no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings because she failed to attach any document, such as a certificate of live birth or a
marriage certificate, to prove her filiation. Buot argued only ultimate facts should be included in an
initiatory pleading. The marriage certificate and certificate of live birth which Dujali demands are
evidentiary matters that ought to be tackled during trial.She attached a copy of the necrological
services program where she was listed as one of Gregorio's heirs, a certification from the municipal
mayor that she is Gregorio's child, and a copy of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement which
includes both Buot and Dujali as Gregorio's heirs. Notably, this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement
pertained to parcels of land not included in the list of properties annexed in Buot's petition.
The RTC sided with Dujali. It held that under the law, there are only two exceptions to the
requirement that the settlement of a deceased's estate should be judicially administered: (1)
extrajudicial settlement and (2) summary settlement of an estate of small value. In this case,
administration has been barred by the fact that Gregorio's estate has already been settled
extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. It also noted that Gregorio
had no creditors since Buot failed to allege it in her petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC properly dismissed the petition on the ground that there has already been an
extrajudicial settlement of certain properties of the estate
RULING:
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When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration
proceedings. The exception is provided in Section 1 of Rule 74 of ROC:
Sec. I. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by
stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the
public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register
of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment
of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent
left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the
death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of

general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof
When the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide
the estate among themselves without judicial administration.
Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition. Since such
proceedings are always "long," "costly," "superfluous and unnecessary,” resort to judicial
administration of cases falling under Section 1, Rule 74 appears to have become the exception rather
than the rule.
Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. What constitutes good reason
depends on the circumstances of each case. Buot’s reasons do not qualify as good and compelling
reason to submit Gregorio’s estate to administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement
in this case did not cover Gregorio's entire estate is not sufficient reason to order the administration
of the estate.
B. WRIT OF AMPARO (A.M. NO. 07-9-12-SC)

Arthur Balao, et Al. Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et Al.
G.R. No. 186050, G.R. No. 186059. August 1, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in
which no immediate action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under
this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which
action thereon can be taken. The Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it is
impelled by a valid cause.
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FACTS:
Relatives of James Balao filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC, alleging
that he was abducted by 5 unidentified men in La Trinidad, Benguet because of his activist/political
leanings as founding member of the Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA). The RTC granted the
privilege of the writ of amparo, thereby commencing the conduct of several investigations by the
AFP and PNP to determine the whereabouts and the circumstances behind the disappearance of
James. In its Formal Report submitted to the RTC, the PNP stated that they encountered problems
in gathering evidence that would lead to the resolution of the case, and thus, proposed that their
investigation be terminated. The RTC recommended the archiving of the case, considering that the
ongoing investigation had reached an impasse. On June 20, 2017, the RTC submitted its
Report dated June 13, 2017 disclosing that the PNP interviewed witnesses but they could not
identify the persons of interest. As such, the RTC concluded that the investigation has reached
another impasse for failure to uncover relevant leads and once more recommended to
archive the cases, to be revived upon motion by any of the parties should a significant lead
arise.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court should adopt the recommendations of the RTC in its Report dated June
13, 2017 relative to these cases.
RULING:
YES. The Court adopts and approves the recommendations of the RTC. As mentioned in the Court's
June 21, 2016 Resolution, "archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to temporarily defer
the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is expected, but where no grounds exist for
their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance
until the situation obtains in which action thereon can be taken.
To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it is impelled by a valid
cause. Section 20 of A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, entitled "The Rule on the Writ of Amparo," reads:
Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court shall not dismiss the petition, but
shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the
failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.
A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu
proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The
petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two
(2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case. The clerks of court shall
submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule
not later than the first week of January of every year.
Based on the report submitted by the RTC, it appears that the PNP had indeed conducted the
required investigation but none of the material witnesses could provide any information on the
identities of these persons. As such, the investigation of the PNP on James's case has once more
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reached an impasse without, this time, any other active leads left to further pursue. Given this
situation, the Court therefore concludes that the archiving of the case is now appropriate and
perforce, adopts and approves the recommendations of the RTC in its June 13, 2017 Report.
Lorie Marie Tomas Callo v. Commissioner Morente, Bureau of Immigration, etc.
G.R. No. 230324; 19 September 2017, Carpio, Acting C.J.
The writ of amparo is a remedy to quickly provide relief to violations of right to life, liberty, and
security, covering threatened or actual extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The elements
of an “enforced or involuntary disappearance” are as follows: [i] that there be an arrest, detention,
abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; [ii] that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; [iii] that it be followed by the State
or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of
the person subject of the amparo petition; and [iv] that the intention for such refusal is to remove
subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
FACTS:
Danielle Tan Parker was issued a Philippine Passport in 2010, which was valid for 5 years. She arrived
in the Philippines in 2011 under the Balikbayan Program, and was authorized to stay for a period of
1 year. In 2013, she was charged for deportation for being an undesirable, undocumented, and
overstaying alien. It was alleged that one “Danielle Nopuente” was a fugitive from justice in the
U.S.A. and had a warrant of arrest issued against her. Given this, her U.S.A. passport was revoked,
and her application for dual citizenship in the Philippines was not approved.
A Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was issued against “Danielle Nopuente” and “Danielle Tan
Parker.” By virtue of the SDO, Parker was arrested in Tagaytay. The Bureau of Immigration reasoned
that Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker are the same person. She was taken to the
Immigration Detention Facility in Taguig, but was not deported as she was charged with
falsification and use of falsified documents before MTC Davao City.
3 months later, Parker filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before RTC Pasig. The Bureau of
Immigration was able to produce the body of Parker before the RTC. The Bureau argued that the
SDO had become final and executory so it had the authority to detain her, and that Parker could
not be released or deported without the final disposition of her pending criminal case.
The RTC dismissed her petition, holding that her detention was legal. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC. It relied on the DFA certification that there is no available data of the
passport with the passport number allegedly issued to Parker. Parker therefore failed to prove that
she was a Filipino citizen. Parker did not appeal the decision of the CA and it became final and
executory, hence this petition for a writ of amparo. Petitioner Callo argues that Parker is a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of the writ of amparo is warranted.
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RULING:
NO. Under Sec. 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the writ of amparo is a remedy to quickly provide relief to
violations of right to life, liberty, and security, covering threatened or actual extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. In RA 9851, the elements of an “enforced or involuntary disappearance”
were laid down as follows: [i] that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty; [ii] that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; [iii] that it be followed by the State or political
organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and [iv] that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
None of the elements are present here. While there is a detention, there is no refusal to
acknowledge the detention of Parker or any information involving it. The Bureau had even
produced Parker before the RTC. Furthermore, there is no intention to remove her from the
protection of the law for a long period of time, as it is explained that she is being detained because
there is a pending criminal case against her.
Moreover, petitioner failed to prove that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen. There is no proof
that Danielle Tan Parker and Danielle Nopuente are not the same person. Based on the facts, the
DFA certified that there were no records of any Philippine passport with the number used by Parker.
Also, Parker’s birth certificate stating she was born in the Philippines to Filipino parents in 1975,
was only registered in 2010. In order to prove that Parker and Nopuente are different people, the
petitioner must prove the life and existence of Parker from birth. There is no record of who Parker
was before 2011.
Lastly, the petition was filed by petitioner Callo, but there is no allegation of her relationship to
Parker. As held in Boac v. Cadapan, the exclusive and successive order of who can file a petition for
a writ of amparo is explained to be a measure to prevent indiscriminate and groundless filing of the
petitions. While Sec. 2(c) of the Rule states that “any person” may file the petition, the section also
provides an order that must strictly be followed. Here there was no allegation that the immediate
family of Parker could not file the petition. Petitioner therefore has no standing to file the petition.
Lt. Sg. Mary Nancy P. Gadian v. AFP Chief of Staff Ibrado et al.
Gen. Ibrado et al. v. Gadian-Diamante
G.R. No. 188163. October 3, 2017, En Banc, Bersamin, J.
In resolving the necessity of issuing a writ of amparo and the corresponding protection order, the
courts must look at the overall circumstance surrounding the applicant and respondents. The writ of
amparo is both preventive and curative. It is preventive when it seeks to stop the impunity in
committing offenses that violates a person's right to live and be free. It is curative when it facilitates
subsequent punishment of perpetrators through an investigation and action.
FACTS:
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Nedina Gadian-Diamante, alleging herself as the older sister of Lt. SG Mary Nancy P. Gadian
(Gadian), filed a writ of amparo on behalf her sister. Respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP).
Gadian was charged with misuse of RP-US Balikatan Excercises 2007 funds amounting to Php 2.7
M. She was investigated for: (a) lavish spending; (b) misuse of funds; and (c) willful disobedience
but she was absolved from liability. She threatened to expose the corruption in the misuse of the
RP-US Balikatan 2007 funds which involved her superior officers. Since she resigned in 2009,
Gadian has received threats and warnings about surveillance conducted on her house. Two
attempts were made to 'snatch' her en route to a hearing in Manila. An apprehension order was
released for Gadian's arrest, along with a "48 hour ultimatum" for her surrender. Again, concerned
individuals told her that there was a verbal shoot to kill order to silence her.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition. It held that receiving messages through SMS warning of
a shoot-to-kill order against a person was not alarming; that, however, the situation became
different when the person threatened was a junior officer of the AFP who had exposed anomalies
regarding the conduct of military exercises involving the country and the United States of America,
and the expose could involve senior officers of the AFP. It held Gadian had presented substantial
evidence to prove the existence of a threat on her life, liberty and security but had not established
the source of the threats. It also held the Secretary of National Defense Gilbert C. Teodoro
(Teodoro) the appropriate person to extend protection to her as the aggrieved party inasmuch as
he had executive supervision over the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of the writ was proper
RULING:
The CA was correct in issuing the writ of amparo in favor of Gadian. Her life was in actual danger
and the possibility of danger was acknowledged to exist. The reason, as she claims, was her expose
of the Balikatan Funds anomaly but she did not exactly know who had threatened her, and merely
points towards the general direction of the military as the source of the threats. The uncertainty
about the identities of the individuals who had knocked at her home, or who had conducted
surveillance in her neighborhood, or who had even attempted to snatch her during her boat trip
cannot be glossed over in order to immediately hold the leadership of the AFP in suspicion of
complicity. Indeed, to do so would convert the proceedings into an unwarranted witch-hunt that
could unfairly implicate many in the country's military service.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the persons or agencies who may provide protection to the
aggrieved parties and any member of the immediate family are limited to government agencies,
and accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety, but in
respect of the latter, they should be accredited in accordance with guidelines still to be issued.
Conformably with the rule, the CA observed that the only official with the capacity to provide
protection to Lt. SG Gadian at that time was incumbent Defense Secretary Teodoro considering
that the AMRSP, despite being her personal choice, was not yet an accredited agency in the context
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
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Although summoned to appear at the AFP's investigation of her expose, she voluntarily chose not
to despite the institutional assurances for her personal safety. The AFP then declared her on AWOL
status as of April 22, 2009, and dropped her from the roster as a deserter on May 2, 2009 following
her unexplained failure to report to her mother unit.
However, the individuals to whom she had attributed the threats to her life and liberty had since
retired from active military service. These circumstances are supervening events that have rendered
the resolution on the merits of the consolidated appeals moot and academic
Republic of the Philippines vs Regina Cayanan and SPO1 Rolando Pascua

G.R. No. 181796, November 07, 2017, En Banc, Bersamin
Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving petitions for the writ of amparo. The
respondent must show in the return the observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced
disappearance is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies should be tasked to
assiduously investigate and determine the disappearance, and, if warranted, to bring to the bar of
justice whoever may be responsible for the disappearance.
FACTS:
Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC alleging that elements of the CIDG, led by
Pascua, were illegally detaining her husband Pablo, that Pablo was forcibly arrested by elements of
the CIDG, that Pablo is being detained at the CIDG, and that despite repeated demands, the CIDG
has not produced Pablo. The CIDG denied having custody of Pablo and prayed for the dismissal of
the petition.
In her memoranda, Regina reiterated her allegations but she amended her petition to now seek the
issuance of a writ of amparo. Pascua did not appear in the proceedings before the RTC. The RTC
ruled in favor or Regina and maintains the issuance of the writ of amparo. The CIDG challenges
this order and alleges that Regina was not able to prove her claims with substantial evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo is proper.
RULING:
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence to establish the allegations of the
petition and to warrant ranting the privilege of the writ.Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to accept a conclusion.
The Court held that Regina was able to establish her claims with substantial evidence and cited the
affidavit of an eyewitness, who was with Pablo when he was taken, and in which Pascua was
positively identified as the one who arrested her husband. Moreover, Pascua admitted the existence
of the abduction, albeit denying his participation and instead alleging that he was also a victim.
Other witness were also presented by Regina to corroborate the affidavit.
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Moreover, CIDG failed to exercise the required diligence as they only issued passive certificates.
Under the Rule, the return should spell out the details of the investigations conducted in a manner
that would enable the court to judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the person missing had been sincere and adequate.
Mayor William N. Mamba, Atty. Francisco N. Mamba, Jr., Ariel Malana, Narding
Aggangan, Jomari Sagalon, Jun Cinabre, Frederick Baligod, Rommel Encollado,
Joseph Tumaliuan, and Randy Dayag vs.Leomar Bueno
G.R. No. 191416, February 7, 2017, REYES, J.
Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor notwithstanding that he has
already been released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the
punishment of those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and action.
FACTS:
On June 13, 2009, the canteen owned by Emelita N. Mamba (Emelita) in Tuao, Cagayan was robbed.
On June 14, 2009, several members of the Task Force, Malana, Aggangan and Sagalon, together with
barangay officials Cinabre and Encollado, went to the. house of the Respondent, then still a minor,
to invite him for questioning on his supposed involvement in the robbery. The respondent and his
mother, Maritess Bueno (Maritess ), acceded to the invitation. Thereupon, the respondent was
brought to the Tuao police station.
The Respondents alleged that at around 3:00 p.m. of June 14, 2009, Tumaliuan and Dayag, both
members of the Task Force, upon the order of Baligod, then Municipal Administrator of Tuao,
fetched the respondent from the police station and brought .him to Mayor Mamba's
house.15 Sometime in the evening of even date, the respondent was made to board a white van
driven by Aggangan. Inside the van, he was beaten with a gun by Malana, who later threatened him
that he would be killed. Thereafter, he was brought back to Mayor Mamba's house.
Meanwhile, Maritess went to the Tuao police station to look for her son; she was told that the
respondent was brought to Mayor Mamba's house. However, when Maritess went to Mayor
Mamba's house, she was not permitted to see her son. The PNP Cagayan Regional Office was then
preparing a case for habeas corpus when the respondent was released on June 18, 2009 to the local
SWD office. Maritess then sought the assistance of the Regional Office of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) in Cagayan as regards the case of the respondent.21 On August 25, 2009, the
respondent, assisted by the CHR, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with the CA.
On September 14, 2009, the CA, gave due course to the petition and directed the issuance of the
writ of amparo.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo.
RULING:
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No, In the seminal case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., the Court
emphasized that the writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation
and action.
Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor notwithstanding that he has
already been released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the
punishment of those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and action.
More importantly, the writ of amparo likewise covers violations of the right to security. At the core
of the guarantee of the right to security, as embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, is
the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person, i.e., houses, papers and
effects, against unwarranted government intrusion. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution not
only limits the State's power over a person's home and possession, but more importantly, protects
the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.
C. CHANGE OF NAME
Republic of the Philippines v. Lorena Sali

G.R. No. 206023, April 3, 2017, Peralta, J.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions
for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
FACTS:
Sali filed a Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, before the RTC
alleging that the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte erroneously entered her name as “Dorothy”
instead of Lorena, and her birthday as June 24, 1968 instead of April 24, 1968. The RTC granted her
petition. The OSG appealed to the SC arguing that the petition was actually a petition for change
of name. The first name being sought to be changed does not involve the correction of a simple
clerical, typographical or innocuous error such as a patently misspelled name, but a substantial
change in Sali's first name. Even if Rule 108 was applicable, she failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies pursuant to RA 9048.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of the Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 was correct.
RULING:
1. First Name: NO. Sali’s petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103
of the Rules but for correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of
clerical errors which were committed in the recording of her name and birth date. The evidence
presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using the name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent
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that she never had any intention to change her name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the
clerical fault or error in her first name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name she grew
up with.
Under RA 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change
of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the
RTC's primary jurisdiction. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should have
dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name.
2. Date of Birth: YES. On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June
24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968," R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15, 2012 that R.A.
No. 10172 was signed into law amending R.A. No. 9048. As modified, Section 1 now includes the day
and month in the date of birth and sex of a person.
VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A. GENERAL MATTERS
1. JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS
Eileen P. David v. Glenda S. Marquez

G.R. No. 209859, June 5, 2017, Tijam, J.
A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment may also be filed where· the offended party actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense and that the court where the criminal action is
first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
FACTS:
Glenda was allegedly approached by Petitioner and invited her to work abroad. She was asked to
pay the placement fee and other expenses. Her application, however, was subsequently denied and
the expenses were never returned. 2 separate informations for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa were
charged against the Petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to quash arguing that City Prosecutor of
Manila had no jurisdiction over the case as the alleged crime was committed in Kidapawan and that
she was deprived of her right to seek reconsideration. The RTC initially denied the Motion to Quash
but eventually granted the same, dismissing the case filed. The CA, subsequently reversed the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases.
RULING:
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It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly
take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense
was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
At the risk of being repetitive, Sec. 9 of RA 8042, however, fixed an alternative venue from
that provided in Section 15(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., a criminal action arising from
illegal recruitment may also be filed where· the offended party actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense and that the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. It has been found by both the RTC and the CA that the
respondent resides in Manila; hence, the filing of the case before the R TC of Manila was proper.
Thus, the trial court should have taken cognizance of the case, and if it will eventually be shown
during trial that the offense was committed somewhere else, then the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.
B. PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
1. SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
John Labsky Maximo and Robert Panganiban v. Francisco Villapando, Jr.,

G.R. No. 214925 & 214965, April 26, 2017, Peralta, J.
An Information, when required by law to be filed· by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by
another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the
Information. There is no point in proceeding under a defective Information that could never be the
basis of a valid conviction.
FACTS:
Respondent is the assignee of a condominium unit at Legazpi Place in Makati. Petitioners
are the directors of ASB (now St. Francis Square Realty), the developer of the said condominium.
Respondent filed violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of PD 957 or Subdivision and Condominium
Buyer’s Protective Decree against Petitioners. Petitioners filed a case of perjury against respondent
claiming that far from what the Respondent alleged, they were not officers nor employees of ASB
at the time of the sale as they were in fact minors then. The Respondent now questions the authority
of the person who filed the information claiming that the resolution finding probable cause and the
information does not have the approval of the City Prosecutor and only has the certification of the
Assistant City Prosecutor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Information was filed with authority.
RULING:
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NO. Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers
therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts. Thus, as a general rule,
complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or approval
of the foregoing authorized ·officers render the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal
pursuant to Section 3 ( d), Rule 117 of the same Rules.
In the cases of People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin,andTolentino v. Paqueo, this Court had already
rejected similarly-worded certifications uniformly holding that, despite such certifications, the
Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked
the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior written authority from any of those
authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112.
There must be a demonstration that prior written delegation or authority was given by the city
prosecutor to the assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of the information. Clearly, we see
nothing in the record which demonstrates the prior written delegation or authority given by the
city prosecutor to the assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of the information. The filing
of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a
jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express
consent.
C. PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

1. WHEN CIVIL ACTION MAY PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY
Jona Bumatay v. Lolita Bumatay,

G.R. No. 191320, April 25, 2017, Caguioa, J.
Inasmuch as the private offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of
the private offended party is limited only to the aspect of civil liability. It follows therefore that in
criminal cases, the dismissal of the case against an accused can only be appealed by the Solicitor
General, acting on behalf of the State.
FACTS:
Respondent allegedly married a certain Amado Rosete (Rosete) when she was 16 years old. Prior to
the declaration of nullity of their marriage she was subsequently married to petitioner’s foster father
Jose Bumatay (Jose). Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. While the
case for bigamy is pending, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Rosete, which was granted by the RTC. Thus, respondent sought the quashal of the information
alleging that the first element of the crime – that she be previously married – is not present.
Consequently, the RTC granted the motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner has the personality to question the dismissal of the case.
RULING:
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NO. Based on the records, it appears undisputed that Petitioner has no legal personality to assail
the dismissal of the criminal case. Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
dictates that all criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In appeals of criminal cases before the
Supreme Court, the authority to represent the State is vested solely in the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
Thus, in criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can represent the
People in criminal proceedings before this Court. Inasmuch as the private offended party is but a
witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the private offended party is limited only to
the aspect of civil liability. It follows therefore that in criminal cases, the dismissal of the case
against an accused can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
To be sure, Jona's personality to even institute the bigamy case and thereafter to appeal the RTC-
San Carlos' Order dismissing the same is nebulous, at best. Settled is the rule that "every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest" who, in turn, is one "who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails
of the suit."
2. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
Renato S. Domingo on his own behalf and on behalf of his co-heirs of the
Late Sps. Domingo v. Sps. Engracia and Manuel Singson
G.R. No. 203287 and 207936, April 5, 2017, Reyes, J.
The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal
actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue
must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed.
Pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a
vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its
dispensation.
FACTS:
Sps. Domingo were the parents of herein Respondent Engracia Singson and Petitioners. During
their lifetime they owned a parcel of land in San Juan and a house built thereon. After their death,
Engracia filed an action for ejectment against petitioners claiming to be the absolute owner of said
property pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale between her and her parents. The Petitioners on the
other hand sought the nullification of the sale alleging that the signatures of their parents on the
said Deed were forged. They also filed a criminal case of falsification of public document, estafa,
and use of falsified documents. The Sps. Singson filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceedings
on the ground of prejudicial question pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The RTC
granted the motion and suspended the proceedings. In the Civil Case, during the pre-trial, the
Petitioners and their counsels failed to appear, prompting the counsel of the defendant to move for
the dismissal of the case. The RTC granted the dismissal for failure to prosecute.
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ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed the criminal case on the basis of prejudicial
question.
2. Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of failure to
prosecute.
RULING:
1. YES. A civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must
be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Based on the issues raised in both Civil Case No. 70898 and Criminal Case No. 137867 against the
Spouses Singson, and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed
appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar. If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in
the Absolute Deed of Sale are genuine, then there would be no falsification and the Spouses Singson
would be innocent of the offense charged. Otherwise stated, a conviction on Criminal Case No.
137867, should it be allowed to proceed ahead, would be a gross injustice and would have to be set
aside if it were finally decided in Civil Case No. 70898 that indeed the signatures of the Spouses
Domingo were authentic.
2. YES. Under the Rules of Court, the parties and their counsel are mandated to appear at the pre-
trial. Pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it
serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its
dispensation. Thus, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the
absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed, which shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court.
It should be stressed that procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules
they are to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Petitioners have not shown any persuasive reason, which
would justify a relaxation of the rules on pre-trial. That petitioners' counsel was supposedly
indisposed during the pre-trial on March 23, 2011 does not excuse the petitioners themselves from
attending the pre-trial. Moreover, the· petitioners have failed to advance any valid justification for
their and their counsel's failure to attend the previously scheduled pre-trial hearings. Accordingly,
the trial court could not be faulted for dismissing the complaint under Section 5 of Rule 18
of the Rules of Court.
D. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
1. WHO MAY CONDUCT DETERMINATION OF EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
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Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. vs Teresita Carandang

G.R. No. 206958, November 08, 2017, Third Division, Leonen
Judges must act with cautious discernment and faithfully exercise their judicial discretion when
dismissing cases for lack of probably cause. An order granting the withdrawal of an information based
on the prosecutor’s findings of lack probably cause must show that the judge did not rely solely on the
prosecution’s conclusions but had independently evaluated the evidence on record and the merits of
the case.
FACTS:
Petitioner PCDS filed a complaint-affidavit against respondent Carandang for estafa with
unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence. An information was filed against Carandang after
preliminary investigation. Subsequently, however, Carandang filed a motion for reinvestigation
alleging that she did not receive and subpoena. She also claims that her failure to completely
liquidate the cash advances was due to her sudden termination by petitioner and that she did not
receive any demand.
The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended that the complaint be dismissed. It concluded that
there can be no estafa because there was no demand and a motion to withdraw information was
filed which the RTC granted. The RTC held that Carandang was able to explain her failure to
account for the cash advances. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA arguing that the
RTC failed to make an independent evaluation of the case. The CA dismissed this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint
RULING
Judges must act with cautious discernment when asked to dismiss cases on the ground of the
absence of probable cause. While the accused is constitutionally given a guarantee of presumption
of innocence, there is also the concern for the right to due process of the prosecution. In granting
or denying a motion to withdraw an information, the court must conduct a cautious and
independent evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and must be convinced that the merits
of the case warrant either the dismissal or continuation of the action. Courts are also not absolutely
barred from reversing a prior determination of probable cause upon the reassessment of evidence.
An order granting withdrawal of an information must state the judge’s assessment of the evidence
and the reasons in resolving the motion.
In this case, the RTC sufficiently explained how the elements of estafa were not met based on the
additional evidence presented by the accused during the reinvestigation.
Robertson Chiang, Nikkia Chiang, Mara Chiang, Ben Javellana and

Carmelita Tuason vs Philippine Long Distance Company
G.R. No. 196679, December 13, 2017, First Division, Jardeleza
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A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction. It is enough that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case were charged with theft and violation of P.D. 401. The Office of the City
Prosecutor dismissed the charges against petitioners and filed a motion to withdraw the
informations before the RTC. The RTC allowed the informations to be withdrawn. Respondent filed
a petition for review before the DOJ which affirmed the OCP. Respondent moved for
reconsideration and manifested that the CA had directed the RTC to proceed with the hearing of
the criminal cases against Lacson and Julio, and that the SC had denied with finality their petition
for review on certiorari. The DOJ denied the motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, PLDT filed a petitioner for certiorari before the raising that the OCP directly
disregarded the evidence PLDT presented in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
RULING:
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. In determining probable cause, the average
person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence
of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, but it
requires less than evidence that would justify a conviction.
In this case, the OCP readily accepted the defenses of petitioner as against the allegations of PLDT.
These counter-allegations, however, delve on evidentiary matters that are best passed upon in a
full-blown trial. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot
be threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for
the presentation of prosecution's evidence in support of the charge. The presence or absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon
after a full-blown trial on the merits. The validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as
well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at
the preliminary investigation level. By taking into consideration the defenses raised by petitioners,
the OCP Pasig already went into the strict merits of the case.
Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casino, And Rafael V. Mariano,

Petitioners vs. Hon. Evelyn A. Turla, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court of Palayan City, Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, in his capacity as Officer-in-
Charge Provincial Prosecutor, Antonio Ll. Lapus, Jr., Edison V. Rafanan, and Eddie C.
Gutierrez, in their capacity as members of the panel of investigating prosecutors, and
Raul M. Gonzalez, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents
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The court’s remanding of the criminal case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of another
preliminary investigation is improper.
FACTS:
Petitioners were suspects to the murder of supporters of Akabayan Party List. Informations were
filed in court. Petitioners thus filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause. The
RTC remanded the case for proper preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration, asking for the dismissal of the case. The motion was denied. From the order of
denial, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Supeme Court.
Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the prosecutors had no
basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had already evaluated the evidence submitted by
the prosecutors along with the Informations, she should have determined the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of arrest warrants or the dismissal of the Palayan cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of petitioners is correct.
RULING:
YES. The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of another
preliminary investigation is improper.
Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides “Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and
its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.”
A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge has
the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable
cause.
The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal evaluation
of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination of probable cause by
the trial court judge is a judicial function, whereas the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutors is an executive function.
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Thus, when Judge Turla held that the prosecutors' conduct of preliminary investigation was
"incomplete" and that their determination of probable cause "has not measured up to [the]
standard," she encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors. Instead of determining
probable cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary investigation.
2. RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR
Heirs of Teodora Loyola, represented herein by Zosimo L. Mendoza, Sr., Petitioners vs.
Court of Appeals And Alicia R. Loyola, Respondent
G.R. No. 188658, January 11, 2017, LEONEN, J.
A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause - that is, one made for the purpose of filing an
information in court - is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale
of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. It is
fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it
properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, questioning the CA’s act of going
beyond the issues raised on appeal. They claim that the Court of Appeals touched on the factual
findings of the Regional Trial Court although these were not even contested by respondent. They
insist that their appeal focused only on the procedural aspect of jurisdiction over indispensable
parties. Thus, the Court of Appeals should have ruled on this matter alone. Petitioners assert that
in any case, they have convincingly proven their claim and allegations as to their rights over the
land and that the patent issued to respondent is null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ contention is correct.
RULING:
NO. We have ruled in a number of cases that the appellate court is accorded a broad discretionary
power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. It is
clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal.
Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals may consider grounds other than those touched upon in the
decision of the trial court and uphold the same on the basis of such other grounds, the Court of
Appeals may, with no less authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds
other than those raised as errors on appeal.
Atty. Allan S. Hilbero, Petitioner, vs. Florencio A. Morales, Jr., Respondent.

A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause - that is, one made for the purpose of filing an
information in court - is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale
Page 177 of 208

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of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. It is
fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it
properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration.
FACTS:
Four persons— Florencio, Primo, Pamplona and Sandy were suspects to the murder of Atty.
Demetrio Hilbero. After preliminary investigation, the prosecutor recommended the filing of
Informations against Primo and Pamplona. Demetrio’s son, Atty. Allan Hilbero appealed before the
DOJ to question the exclusion of Florencio and Sandy. The DOJ eventually directed the filing of
informations against Primo and Pamplona. Hence, Florencio filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA which granted the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA ruled correctly.
RULING:
NO. The Court, at the outset, finds no merit in petitioner's assertion that respondent's failure to
implead the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as a public respondent in his Petition for
Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 111191 before the Court of Appeals and the lack of participation of the
OSG in the said proceedings as counsel for the DOJ warrant the outright dismissal of CA-G.R. SP
No. 111191. As petitioner himself pointed out, the OSG merely represents the government, its
agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials and agents, and generally acts as the government's
counsel in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. The
OSG is not the actual party in any of the cases it handles in representation of the government.
Therefore, respondent need not implead the OSG as a public respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 111191.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is a special civil action that may
be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. It is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court
or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or
agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An extraordinary remedy, a petition for
certiorari may be filed only if appeal is not available. If appeal is available, an appeal must be taken
even if the ground relied upon is grave abuse of discretion. Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 58,
issued by the OP on June 30, 1993, clearly identifies the instances when appeal from or a petition
for review of the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary
investigations of criminal cases may be filed before the OP: In the interest of the speedy
administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4
November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued
by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated
and clarified. No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/ resolutions of the Secretary
of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the
President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death wherein new
and material issues are raised which were not previously presented before the Department of Justice
and were not ruled upon in the subject decision/order/resolution, in which case the President may
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order the Secretary of Justice to reopen/review the case, provided, that, the prescription of the
offense is not due to lapse within six (6) months from notice of the questioned
resolution/order/decision, and provided further, that, the appeal or petition for review is filed
within thirty (30) days from such notice.
Florencio’s petition for certiorari was procedurally erroneous. Based on MC No. 58, Acting DOJ
Secretary De Vanadera's Resolution dated September 30, 2009 is appealable administratively to the
Office of the President since the crime of murder, with which respondent is charged, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. From the Office of the President, the aggrieved party may file an
appeal with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Court further highlights the fact that respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration of
Acting DOJ Secretary De Vanadera's Resolution dated September 30, 2009 prior to filing his Petition
for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 111191 before the Court of Appeals, which was likewise fatal to the
said Petition. Again, the unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against
the acts of the adverse party. In the present case, the plain and adequate remedy of a motion for
reconsideration of Acting DOJ Secretary De Vanadera's Resolution dated September 30, 2009 was
available to respondent under Section 13 of DOJ Department Circular No. 70, the National
Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, dated July 3, 2000. The filing of a motion for reconsideration
is intended to afford public respondent DOJ an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error
attributed to it by way of a reexamination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Respondent's
failure to file a motion for reconsideration is tantamount to a deprivation of the right and
opportunity of the public respondent DOJ to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed or to
vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed.
E. BAIL
Prosecutor Ivy A. Tejano v. Presiding Judge Antonio D. Marigomen and

Utility Worker Emeliano C. Camay, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4103-RTJ], September 26, 2017, Leonen, J.
Without a standing warrant of arrest, a judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where
the case is pending has no authority to grant bail. To do so would be gross ignorance of the law.
FACTS:
Prosecutor Tejano filed a complaint against her husband Andrino for violation of R.A. No. 9262
(Anti-VAWC Law). This case was raffled to Cebu City Judge Saniel. On May 9, 2013 and with no
standing warrant of arrest against him, Andrino posted bail before Bogo City (Cebu) Judge
Marigomen. In posting bail, Andrino was assisted by Camay, a utility worker in Judge Marigomen’s
court. On the same day of the posting, Judge Marigomen ordered Andrino’s release. Thus, Tejano
charged Judge Marigomen of gross ignorance of the law. She alleged that Judge Marigomen violated
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in ordering the release of her husband with no standing warrant of
arrest against him. As for Camay, Tejano charged him with violating the Anti-Red Tape Act for
allegedly fixing Andrino's bail application. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
Judge Marigomen guilty as charged but dismissed the complaint against Camay.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Marigomen committed gross ignorance of the law in ordering the release of
Andrino despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and that the case was not pending before him.
RULING:
YES. The text of Rule 114, Section 17(a) of the Rules of Court shows that there is an order of
preference with respect to where bail may be filed. In the absence or unavailability of the judge
where the case is pending, the accused must first go to a judge in the province, city, or municipality
where the case is pending. Furthermore, a judge of another province, city, or municipality may grant
bail on(y if the accused has been arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the
case is pending. A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending
but approves an application for bail filed by an accused not arrested is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law. The last sentence of Rule 114, Section 17(a) is clear that for purposes of determining whether
or not the accused is in custody of the law, the mode required is arrest, not voluntary surrender,
before a judge of another province, city, or municipality may grant a bail application. In the same
vein, it is gross ignorance of the law if a judge grants an application for bail in a criminal case outside
of his or her jurisdiction without ascertaining the absence or unavailability of the judge of the court
where the criminal case is pending.
Judge Marigomen was not a judge in the province, city, or municipality where the case was pending.
Neither was Andrino arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case was
pending precisely because no warrant of arrest had yet been issued when he posted bail on May 9,
2013. Judge Marigomen violated Rule 114, Section 17(a) and is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Moreover, Judge Marigomen did not ascertain the absence or unavailability of Judge Saniel. This
duty to ascertain is a consequence of Judge Marigomen not being the judge of the place where the
criminal case was pending and could have been satisfied by inquiring and coordinating with the
court personnel belonging to Branch 20, where the criminal casewas pending. Had Judge
Marigomen done his duty, Judge Saniel would have already been informed of the grant of bail on
May 9, 2013, and therefore, would not have superfluously issued a Warrant of Arrest 21 days later.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be appreciated in favor ofJudge
Marigomen.
F. TRIAL
1. INSTANCES WHEN PRESENCE OF ACCUSED IS REQUIRED BY LAW
Mark Montelibano vs Linda Yap

G.R. No 197475, December 06, 2017, Third Division, Martires
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While positive identification is required by the law to convict an accused, it need not always through
in-court identification. This is essential only when there is doubt on whether the one alleged to have
committed the crime is the same person charged and subject to trial.
FACTS:
Petitioner Montelibano obtained from private complainant Yap a loan for additional capital in the
former’s business. Thereafter, petitioner issued a check in the amount of P2,612,500.00 as partial
payment. This check was, however, dishonored when it was presented for payment for the reason
that the account was closed. Montelibano was then charged for violation of BP 22 for failure to
settle his obligations despite repeated demands He pleaded not-guilty to the charge.
Trial was postponed for several times at the instance of petitioner. The prosecution presented the
testimony of Nelson Arendain, an employee of private complainant, who affirmed the contents of
his affidavit which narrated that petitioner signed the check in question in the former’s presence;
and that it was dishonored when presented to the bank. The prosecution also presented the
demand letter sent to petitioner.
Petitioner and his counsel were absent during the date of cross-examination, thus the MTCC
deemed petitioner to have waived this right. The formal offer of evidence by the prosecution was
also admitted as petitioner did not comment and/or object thereto. Petitioner also failed to present
his evidence. Petitioner thereafter filed a memorandum arguing that the prosecution failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because he was never identified as he one how signed
and issued the check. He claims that he was absent on the date of presentation of evidence of the
prosecution and, thus, he was never positively identified in court. The MTCC found petitioner
guilty. The RTC affirmed the MTCC and added that in-court identification was only required in
cases where the defense is alibi. The CA dismissed the case for failure of the petitioner to attach a
certified true copy of the decision of the MTCC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Montelibano was guilty beyond reasonable doubt even without in-court
identification
RULING:
There is no absolute need for an in-court identification. While positive identification is required by
the law to convict an accused, it need not always be by means of a physical courtroom identification.
In-court identification is essential only when there is question or doubt on whether the one alleged
to have committed the crime is the same person charged in the information and subject of the trial.
No such doubt exists in this case as petitioner never denied that he is the person indicted in the
information and he only alleges that the prosecution’s witness did not identify him in court. The
Court also notes that this was because of the petitioner’s absence when the case was called despite
several postponements. Thus, the failure of identification was directly attributable to the petitioner
himself.
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I. JUDGMENT
1. PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT IN ABSENTIA
Loida M. Javier vs. Pepito Gonzales

G.R. No. 193150, January 23, 2017, SERENO, C.J.
If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the promulgation
of judgment in absentia is warranted.
FACTS:
Gonzales was charged with murder with frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder. Upon
motion by private complainant Macatiag (sister of the deceased victim), the case was transferred to
the RTC which was then presided by Judge Buted. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On the
scheduled date of promulgation, Gonzales failed to appear. His lawyer, Atty. Benitez, personally
filed a “Withdrawal of Counsel” with his client’s conformity. The promulgation was rescheduled
but Gonzales still failed to appear without any justification. Judge Buted appointed a counsel de
oficio in lieu of Atty. Benitez. The Branch Clerk of Court thereafter read the dispositive portion of
Judge Buted’s Decision in the presence of the public prosecutor, the counsel de oficio, and the heirs
of Macatiag. Macatiag had been killed just a day before the first promulgation date, and Gonzales
was also an accused in her killing. Gonzales was convicted of the murder charges.
In less than a month after the judgment of conviction was rendered, Gonzales filed, through Atty.
Benitez, an Omnibus Motion asking that the said judgment be reconsidered and set aside. Gonzales
argued that he had not been properly notified of the promulgation of judgment and that he had
not been represented by counsel. The trial court, now presided by Judge Soluren, granted the
motion and set aside the judgment of conviction. Javier, Macatiag’s daughter, filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of Judge Soluren. The CA, however, dismissed the petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether there was a valid promulgation of judgment by Judge Buted in her prior Decision of
conviction.
(2) Whether Judge Soluren’s subsequent judgment of acquittal is valid
RULING:
(1) YES.Judge Buted’s Decision convicting respondent was validly promulgated. Section 6, Rule 120
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to promulgate a judgment in absentia and
gives the accused the opportunity to file an appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice
to the latter or the latter’s counsel; otherwise, the decision becomes final.
Records show that Gonzales was properly informed of the promulgation scheduled on 15 December
2005. The RTC Order dated 30 November 2005 documents the presence of his counsel during the
hearing. It is an established doctrine that notice to counsel is notice to client. In addition, the
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Return of Service states that the Order and Notice of Promulgation were personally delivered to
respondent’s address.
During the promulgation of judgment on 15 December 2005, when Gonzales did not appear despite
notice, and without offering any justification for his absence, the trial court should have
immediately promulgated its Decision. The promulgation of judgment in absentia is mandatory
pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the promulgation
of judgment in absentia is warranted. This rule is intended to obviate a repetition of the situation
in the past when the judicial process could be subverted by the accused by jumping bail to frustrate
the promulgation of judgment. The only essential elements for its validity are as follows: (a) the
judgment was recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) a copy thereof was served upon the accused
or counsel.
Gonzales was not left without remedy. However, instead of surrendering and filing a motion for
leave to explain his unjustified absence pursuant to the fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120,
Gonzales, through Atty. Benitez, filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC praying that the
promulgation be set aside. We cannot countenance this blatant circumvention of the Rules.
(2) NO.Judge Soluren’s Decision acquitting respondent is void and has no legal effect. Judge Soluren
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she gave due
course to Gonzales’ Omnibus Motion. Aside from being the wrong remedy, the motion lacked
merit.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration to question a decision of conviction can only be resorted
to if the accused did not jump bail, but appeared in court to face the promulgation of judgment.
Gonzales did not appear during the scheduled promulgation and was deemed by the judge to have
jumped bail. The fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120, states that if the judgment is for conviction
and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies
available in the Rules against the judgment, and the court shall order his arrest.
In utter disregard of this Court’s circulars, Judge Soluren capriciously, whimsically, and arbitrarily
took cognizance of Gonzales’ Omnibus Motion, granted it, and rendered a totally opposite Decision
of acquittal. What she should have done was dismiss the Omnibus Motion outright, since Judge
Buted’s Decision of conviction was already subject to automatic review by the CA. By acting on the
wrong remedy, which led to the reversal of the conviction, Judge Soluren contravened the express
orders of this Court. Her blatant abuse of authority was so grave and so severe that it deprived the
court of its very power to dispense justice. Considering that Judge Soluren’s order of acquittal was
void from the very beginning, it necessarily follows that the CA ruling dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari must likewise be reversed and set aside.
J. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
People of the Philippines vs. Salim Ismael Y Radang

G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017, J. DEL CASTILLO
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Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until
they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, obviating switching, 'planting,' or
contamination of evidence
FACTS:
On a buy bust operation held by the police, Salim was arrested and charged with violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for selling and possession shabu. The shabu that was seized
by police officers SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez to the Desk Officer, PO3 Floro Napalcruz who
likewise turned over to the Duty Investigator PO2 Tan the placed his initials ‘RDT’. Salim thereafter
convicted with the crime charged. He alleged that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt because the prosecution: (1) failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs allegedly
seized from him and; (2) likewise failed to comply with the strict requirements of Section 21 of RA
9165 due to failure to immediately mark the seized drug.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there compliance of chain of custody of the seized drug.
RULING:
No, Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment-The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall,immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
The first link in the chain is the marking of the seized drug. We have previously held that:
x x x Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, obviating switching, 'planting,' or
contamination of evidence.
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It is important that the seized drugs be immediately marked, if possible, as soon as they are seized
from the accused.
It is evident that there was a break in the very first link of the chain when he failed to mark the
sachet'3 of shabu immediately upon seizing them from the appellant. According to SPO1 Rodriguez,
after finding sachets of shabu in appellant's possession, he turned the drugs over to the desk officer.
SPO1 Rodriguez did not even explain why he failed to mark or why he could not have marked the
seized items immediately upon confiscation. Allegedly, the desk officer, after receiving the seized
items from SPO1 Rodriguez, in turn handed them over to PO2 Tan. Notably, this desk officer was
not presented in court thereby creating another break in the chain of custody. Again, no
explanation was offered for the non-presentation of the desk officer or why he himself did not mark
the seized items. It was only upon receipt by PO2 Tan, allegedly from the desk officer, of the seized
chugs that the same were marked at the police station. This means that from the time the drugs
were seized from appellant until the time PO2 Tan marked the same, there was already a significant
gap in the chain of custody. Because of this gap, there is no certainty that the sachets of drugs
presented as evidence in the trial court were the same drugs found in appellant's possession.
No explanations were given why markings were not immediately made. At this stage in the chain,
there was already a significant break such that there can be no assurance against switching,
planting, or contamination. The Court has previously held that, "failure to mark the drugs
immediately after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence
warranting an acquittal on reasonable doubt."
Both arresting officers testified that they turned over the sachets of shabu to a desk officer in the
person of PO3 Napalcruz at the police station. Notably, PO3 Napalcruz was not presented in court
to testify on the circumstances surrounding the alleged receipt of the seized drugs. This failure to
present PO3 Napalcruz is another fatal defect in an already broken chain of custody. Every person
who takes possession of seized drugs must show how it was handled and preserved while in his or
her custody to prevent any switching or replacement. After PO3 Napalcruz, the seized drugs were
then turned over to PO2 Tan. It was only at this point that marking was done on the seized drugs.
Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the seized item subject of
the sale transaction was switched with the seized items subject of the illegal possession case. This
is material considering that the imposable penalty for illegal possession of shabu depends on the
quantity or weight of the seized drug.
Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting officers also
failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the presence of the appellant. This
requirement must not be brushed aside as a mere technicality. It must be shown that the marking
was done in the presence of the accused to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were
properly preserved. Failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case.
The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs were
likewise omitted without offering an explanation for its non-compliance. This break in the chain
tainted the integrity of the seized drugs presented in court; the very identity of the seized drugs
became highly questionable.
VIII. EVIDENCE
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A. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Republic of the Philippinesvs.Carmen Santorio Galeno

G.R. No. 215009, January 23, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the fact that
the public officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated therein.
FACTS:
Galeno filed a petition for correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 covered by OCT No. 46417 before
the RTC. She alleged that when she and her co-owners had the subject property resurveyed for the
purpose of partition, they discovered a discrepancy in the land area of the subject property as
appearing in OCT No. 46417, in that the title reflects an area of 20,948 square meters, while the
Certification issued by the DENR Office of the Regional Technical Director, Lands Management
Services, shows an area of 21,298 square meters. The RTC granted the petition. The Republic,
through the OSG, moved for reconsideration claiming that the adjoining owners had not been
notified as such notice is a jurisdictional requirement. The RTC denied the MR. The CA affirmed
the RTC and found that Galeno, by a preponderance of evidence, was able to prove, based on the
records of the proper government authority, i.e., the Office of the Technical Director, Land
Management Services of the DENR, that the true and correct area of the subject property was 21,298
square meters as shown in the approved plan.
ISSUE:
Whether the correction of the area of the subject property in OCT No. 46417 is warranted.
RULING:
No.The Court holds that Galeno did not present any competent evidence to prove that the true and
correct area of the subject property is 21,298 square meters instead of 20,948 square meters to
warrant a correction thereof in OCT No. 46417.Unfortunately, the documentary evidence presented
by Galeno are not sufficient to warrant the correction prayed for. The Court cannot accord
probative weight upon them in view of the fact that the public officers who issued the same did not
testify in court to prove the facts stated therein. In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that
certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein, holding that: “The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the
first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect “entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer,” such as entries made by the Civil Registrar
in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook. The certifications are not the
certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal
custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents.”
As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who issued
Galeno’s documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft of
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probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. At best, they
may be considered only as prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but do
not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. In fact, the contents of the
certifications are hearsay because Galeno’s sole witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca,
was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their contents, as she did not prepare any of the
certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned government agencies. Notably, while it
is true that the public prosecutor who represented the Republic interposed no objection to the
admission of the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court below, it should be borne in
mind that “hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule,” which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while Galeno’s documentary evidence may
have been admitted due to the opposing party’s lack of objection, it does not, however, mean that
they should be accorded any probative weight.
B. QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE (WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE)

1. PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
People of the Philippines v. Crisente Pepaño Nuñez

To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a positive identification by a
witness during trial due to the frailty of human memory. It must also show that the identified person
matches the original description made by that witness when initially reporting the crime. The
unbiased character of the process of identification by witnesses must likewise be shown.
FACTS:
In an Information, George Marciales, Orly Nabia, Paul Pobre, and a certain alias "Jun'' were charged
with robbery with homicide committed on or about the 22nd of June 2000.
On July 2, 2006, Nunez was apprehended by PNP Regional Intelligence Office on the premise that
he was the same ''Paul Pobre" identified in the Inforn1ation. Upon arraigru11ent, Nuñez moved that
the case against him be dismissed as he was not the "Paul Pobre" charged in the Information.
However, prosecution witnesses identified him as 1 of the alleged robbers and his MTD was denied.
The information was then amended to state Nuñez's name in lieu of "Paul Pobre."
During trial, the prosecution manifested that it would be adopting the evidence already presented
in the course of Marciales and Nabia's trial. Apart from this, it also recalled prosecution witnesses
Ronalyn Cruz and Relen Perez. In their testimonies, they both positively identified Nunez as among
the perpetrators of the crime.
RTC found Nunez guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed Nunez's conviction, with
modification as to damages.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is the same person, earlier identified as
Paul Pobre, who acted in conspiracy with Marciales and Nabia.
RULING:
Contrary to the conclusions of CA and RTC, this Court finds that it has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt that accused Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is the same person
identified as Paul Pobre. Thus, this Court reverses the courts a quo and acquits accused.
The prosecution's case rises and falls on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Cruz and Perez. When
Cruz, the first witness, was initially put on the witness stand, she asserted that she could not recall
any of the features of Pobre. After many years, with the police presenting her with accused-
appellant, she positively identified him as the missing perpetrator. The second principal witness'
testimony is so fundamentally at variance with that of the other principal witness. The prosecution
did not account for the details of the presentation of accused· to the 2 witnesses after he was
arrested. Finally, these witnesses' alleged positive identification occurred almost 8 years, for the
first witness, and almost 9 years, for the second witness, from the time of the commission of the
offense.
The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact. Eyewitness identification, or what our
jurisprudence commendably refers to as "positive identification," is the bedrock of many
pronouncements of guilt. However, eyewitness identification is but a product of flawed human
memory.
People v. Teehankee, Jr. introduced in this jurisdiction the totality of circumstances test, which
relies on factors already identified by the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers:
(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
A witness' credibility is ascertained by considering the first two factors. Apart from the witness'
opportunity to view the perpetrator during the commission of the Grime and the witness' degree
of attention at that time, the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness is equally vital.
The totality of circumstances test requires a consideration of the degree of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the moment of identification. What is most critical here is the initial identification
made by the witness during investigation and case build-up, not identification during trial.
The test also requires a consideration of the length of time between the crime and the
identification made by the witness. The passage of time is not the only factor that diminishes
memory. Equally jeopardizing is a witness' interactions with other individuals involved in the
event.
People v. Pineda identified 12 danger signals that might indicate erroneous identification.
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(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;
(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no accusation
against him when questioned by the police;
(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness' original description and
the actual description of the accused;
(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously identified some
other person;
(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;
(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited opportunity to see the
accused;
(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;
(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness was
unaware that a crime was involved;
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness' view of the criminal and his
identification of the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.
Nunez's identification, fails to withstand the rigors of the totality of circumstances test.
First, the witnesses failed to even give any prior description of him. Second, a prosecution witness
failed to exhibit even the slightest degree of certainty when originally given the chance to identify
him as the supposed fourth robber. Third, a significantly long amount of time had lapsed since
the criminal incident; the original witness' statement that none of his features were seen as to
enable his identification; and the positive identification made of him when the case was re-
opened. And finally, his presentation for identification before and during trial was peculiarly, even
worrisomely, suggestive as to practically induce in prosecution witnesses the belief that he, to the
exclusion of any other person, must have been the supposed fourth robber.
These deficiencies and the doubts over Cruz's and Perez's opportunity to peruse the fourth robber's
features and their degree of attentiveness during the crime clearly show that this case does not
manage to satisfy even one (1) of the six (6) factors that impel consideration under the totality of
circumstances test.
Cruz and Perez acknowledged the extreme stress and fright that they experienced. Their
recollections of what transpired and of how Nuñez supposedly participated in the crime
are so glaringly different. At issue is precisely the participation of an alleged conspirator whose
name the prosecution did not even know for proper indictment. Yet, where the prosecution
witnesses cannot agree is also precisely how the person who now stands accused actually
participated in the commission of the offense. Their divergences are so glaring that they
demonstrate the prosecution's failure to establish Nunez's complicity.
2. PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
Philippine Trust Company (also known as Philtrust Bank), Petitioner vs
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Redentor R. Gabinete, Shangrila Realty Corporation and Elisa T. Tan,

Respondents
G.R. No. 216120, March 29, 2017, PERALTA, J.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence,
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. In this case, the respondent was not able to
prove the fact that his signature was forged.
FACTS:
Petitioner Philtrust, a domestic commercial banking corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, filed a complaint on March 8, 2006 against Shangrila Realty Corporation, a
domestic corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, together with Elisa Tan and
respondent Redentor Gabinete alleging that petitioner granted Shangrila's application for a renewal
of its bills discounting line in the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (₱20,000,000.00) as shown by a
letter-advice dated May 28, 1997 bearing the conformity of Shangrila's duly-authorized
representatives, Tan and respondent Gabinete. The said loan was conditioned on the execution of
a Continuing Suretyship Agreement dated August 20, 1997, with Shangrila as borrower and
respondent Gabinete and Tan as sureties, primarily to guaranty, jointly and severally, the payment
of the loan.
Respondent Gabinete claimed that when he received a demand for payment from Philtrust, he
immediately replied and denied any participation in the transaction and informed Philtrust that
his signature in the Continuing Surety Agreement had been forged. Respondent presented an NBI
document examiner who testified that his signature was forced. The RTC, however, still ruled in
favor of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC was correct in disregarding the findings of the NBI document examiner.
RULING:
YES. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts and
that the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures
under scrutiny. In this case, the RTC judge was able to exercise his independent judgment in
determining the authenticity or genuineness of the signature in question, and not rely merely on
the testimony of the NBI Document Examiner. Needless to say, the RTC's Decision is more in depth
in its analysis of the absence of forgery than that of the CA's finding that forgery is present.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the
burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight
or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. In this case, the respondent was
not able to prove the fact that his signature was forged. It is also worthy to note that the document
being contested has been notarized and thus, is considered a public document. It has the
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presumption of regularity in its favor and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing,
and more than merely preponderant. As also borne in the records, the notary public who notarized
the Continuing Suretyship Agreement testified in court and confirmed that respondent signed the
said document in her presence.
3. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
Susan A. Yap vs. Elizabeth Lagtapon

G.R. No. 196347, January 23, 2017, CAGUIOA, J.
A public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one’s official duties and
functions. To successfully overcome such presumption of regularity, case law demands that the
evidence against it must be clear and convincing; absent the requisite quantum of proof to the
contrary, the presumption stands deserving of faith and credit.
FACTS:
Lagtapon filed a case for a sum of money against Yap with the RTC. Summons was issued and as
per return of service of summons prepared by Precioso, the process server of the RTC, he served
the summons on Yap who, however, refused to acknowledge receipt thereof, thus, compelling him
to tender the same and left a copy thereof for her. Upon motion, Yap was declared in default for
failure to file an Answer and Lagtapon was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Lagtapon. Yap’s property was then put up for execution
sale. Yap only knew of the execution sale when de la Paz, to whom Yap mortgaged the same
property, discovered that the subject property was to be sold on a public auction. Thus, Yap filed
the subject Petition for Annulment with the CA, assailing the RTC Decision on the ground that
Summons was not validly served on her, which thus prevented the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction
over her person. She alleged that at the time Summons was allegedly served (as evidenced by the
Return of Service), she was not residing in either of the addresses supplied by Lagtapon in her
Complaint.
The CA denied the Petition for Annulment and upheld the validity of the service of Summons on
Yap. The CA held that Yap’s evidence failed to rebut the presumption of regularity, i.e., that she
failed to satisfactorily establish the fact that she was residing elsewhere during the time of the
service of Summons, contrary to what was stated in the Return of Service.
ISSUE:
Whether summons had been validly served on Yap.
RULING:
YES. It is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of
one’s official duties and functions. Here, in the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the
service of Summons on Yap is perforce deemed regular and valid. Correspondingly, the Return of
Service of Precioso as process server of the RTC constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out
therein.
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To successfully overcome such presumption of regularity, case law demands that the evidence
against it must be clear and convincing; absent the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the
presumption stands deserving of faith and credit. In this case, the burden of proof to discharge
such presumption lay with Yap.
In her Petition, Yap makes much of the failure of Precioso to include the place of service in his
Return, contrary to Section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, relying on the pronouncements
in Santiago Syjuco, Inc. v. Castro. Notably, however, the circumstances attendant in that case are
not on all fours with the facts at hand. In Syjuco, which cited Delta Motor Sales Corporation v.
Mangosing, the service of Summons involved a juridical entity and the crux of the defect there was
the process server’s failure to properly identify the person served inasmuch as Section 11 of Rule 14
of the Rules provides an exclusive list of persons that may be served Summons when the defendant
is a corporation. Here, the disputed service of Summons was made personally upon Yap as
defendant in CC No. 97-9991 and was made pursuant to Section 6 of the said Rule. Moreover, and
as previously adverted to, while such detail was indeed lacking in the said Return, the Court cannot
ignore the fact that Precioso subsequently executed an Affidavit supplying the place of service,
which, to the mind of this Court, constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules.
All told, the Court hereby upholds the finding of the CA in its questioned Decision that Yap’s
evidence does not constitute clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption of
regularity attendant to the Return of Service. Following Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., self-serving
assertions made by an aggrieved party are insufficient to disregard the statements made in the
sheriff’s certificate after service of Summons. In light of Yap’s failure to rebut such presumption,
the Court finds that the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over Yap’s person, which renders the
RTC Decision valid. Accordingly, the CA correctly dismissed the subject Petition for Annulment.
C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
1. HEARSAY RULE
i. EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY RULE
Renato S. Martinez v. Jose Maria V. Ongsiako

G.R. No. 209057 March 15, 2017 SERENO, CJ.:
The Revised Rules on Evidence provide that depositions previously taken are only admissible in
evidence against an adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Because
depositions are an exception to the general rule on the inadmissibility of hearsay testimony, the
process of cross-examination is an important safeguard against false statements.
FACTS:
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On 17 May 2010, Jose Maria V. Ongsiako (Jose Ongsiako) filed a Petition before the RTC Makati
seeking permission to perpetuate his testimony under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. He
alleged that the taking of his deposition was necessary, because (a) he expected to be a party to
certain actions involving properties in which he had an interest; (b) he was diagnosed with end-
stage renal disease secondary to chronic glomerulonephritis; (c) his health continued to deteriorate;
and (d) he needed to preserve his testimony on certain material facts in anticipation of future suits.
He also identified the areas to be covered by his proposed testimony. In his Petition, Jose Ongsiako
named the expected adverse parties in the actions he anticipated would be filed: (a) Renato S.
Martinez (Martinez) as the administrator of the estate of Nori V. Ongsiako; (b) Juan Miguel V.
Ongsiako, respondent's brother; and (c) the Bank of the Philippines Islands (BPI), a mortgagee of a
certain property over which respondent had an interest. Martinez filed a Comment/Opposition to
the Petition, on the ground that estate proceedings over the properties mentioned by respondent
in the latter's petition were then pending before RTC Makati. He explained that it was more
appropriate to perpetuate the testimony of Jose Ongsiako in those proceedings, since the latter was
also an active participant in that case, in which the intended testimony would inevitably be used.
Martinez likewise asserted that the filing of a separate action for the perpetuation of testimony was
tantamount to forum shopping. The RTC granted the Petition noting that all the requirements
under Rule 24 had been satisfied; hence, Jose Ongsiako should be allowed to perpetuate his
testimony. The trial court ordered his deposition to be taken on 23 June 2010.
Martinez, with other expected adverse parties, sought a reconsideration of the RTC Resolution but
was thereafter denied in open court. To allow the parties to attempt settlement negotiations, the
scheduled cross-examination did not proceed on date set. The parties, however, failed to reach an
agreement. The RTC was, again, constrained to cancel the cross-examination of respondent and
reset the hearing due to the withdrawal of appearance by the law firm representing Juan Miguel.
This was announced to all parties present in open court and for those who were absent during the
hearing, copies of the written order were served upon them. On 16 August 2010, RTC received a
copy of the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner with the CA questioning the Resolution dated
21 June 2010, as affirmed by the Order dated 23 June 2010, allowing the perpetuation of respondent's
testimony in a separate proceeding. On 18 August 2010, the cross-examination of respondent finally
proceeded. Juan Miguel's new counsel requested for a continuance but the RTC denied his request
upon noting that he had already been given sufficient time to do so. BPI's counsel then proceeded
to cross-examine respondent; Juan Miguel's counsel, on the other hand, persisted in his refusal to
participate in the proceedings.
As to Martinez and his counsel, both were again absent at the hearing. The RTC noted, however,
that Martinez had filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings right before the start of hearing on 18
August 2010. He requested that the proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony be suspended
pending the final resolution of the Petition for Certiorari earlier filed with the CA. Towards the end
of the proceedings on 18 August 2010, the RTC issued an Order declaring that Martinez and Juan
Miguel had waived their right to cross-examine respondent. Counsel for petitioner appeared before
the trial court for the hearing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings. He was informed that the
motion had merely been noted by the RTC, considering that the testimony of respondent had
already been perpetuated.
Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 18 August 2010, pointing out that
neither he nor his counsel received notice of the scheduled hearing on 18 August 2010 and for this
reason, they were not in court at the time. Martinez emphasized that under the circumstances,
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their absence should not have been taken as a waiver of his right to cross-examine respondent. The
RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration, ruling that petitioner and his counsel had been
properly notified of the hearing, although the notice sent to counsel was returned unserved,
because the latter had moved to a new address without notifying the trial court. The RTC also noted
that Martinez and his counsel failed to attend the hearing on 11 August 2010 despite due notice, and
that their absence caused them to miss the announcement of the resetting. Martinez filed a Notice
of Appeal with the RTC to manifest his intention to elevate the matter to the CA. The trial court
gave due course to the appeal. In his appeal, Martinez claimed that the RTC deprived him of the
right to cross-examine respondent in violation of the fundamental principles of due process. The
CA denied the appeal. It ruled that since depositions consist merely in the taking down of
statements of witnesses for discovery purposes, the rules governing the procedure are accorded a
broad and liberal treatment. Martinez sought for a reconsideration but the CA denied. The
appellate court ruled that the failure of petitioner and his counsel to attend hearings without
justification was sufficient to warrant the waiver of the party's right to cross-examination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the RTC ruling that declared petitioner to have waived
his right to cross-examination
RULING:
NO. An examination of the records of the RTC reveals that petitioner and his counsel had not been
properly notified of the hearing to be held on 18 August 2010. Consequently, their failure to attend
the hearing must be considered an excusable circumstance, and not a waiver of the right to cross-
examine respondent. It is therefore evident that the CA committed a reversible error when it
sustained the pronouncement of the RTC depriving petitioner of his right to cross-examine
respondent. The right to cross-examine opposing witnesses has long been considered a
fundamental element of due process in both civil and criminal proceedings. In proceedings for the
perpetuation of testimony, the right to cross-examine a deponent is an even more vital part of the
procedure. In fact, the Revised Rules on Evidence provide that depositions previously taken are
only admissible in evidence against an adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. Because depositions are an exception to the general rule on the inadmissibility of hearsay
testimony, the process of cross-examination is an important safeguard against false statements.
Nevertheless, it is true that the right to cross-examination is far from absolute. Indeed, it may be
waived by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right; for instance, the failure of a party to
avail itself of the opportunity to cross-examine a deponent.
In this case, the conduct of petitioner cannot be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine
respondent. The ruling of the RTC declaring that petitioner waived his right to cross-examination
was premised on his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 18 August 2010. However, the
records of the case reveal that neither he nor his counsel was adequately informed of the new
schedule for the cross-examination of respondent. While the RTC ordered that Notices of Hearing
be sent to both petitioner and his counsel, they did not receive these processes in time for the
hearing through no fault of their own. Taking all factors into account, it would be unfair and unjust
to consider the failure of petitioner to attend the hearing on 18 August 2010 as signifying his
intention to waive the right to cross-examine respondent. For this reason, we are compelled to
remand the case to the RTC to allow petitioner to conduct his cross-examination of respondent.
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D. OFFER AND OBJECTION

Republic of the Philippines v. Valentina Espinosa,
Registrar of Deeds of Negros Occidental et.al.,
Due process requires a formal offer of evidence for the benefit of the adverse party, the trial court and
the appellate courts. When evidence has not been formally offered, it should not be considered by the
Court in arriving at its decision.
FACTS:
A Cadastral decree was issued in favor of Espinosa covering a 28,800 sq. m. lot located in Negros
Occidental and was subsequently sold to Leonila Caliston. The Regional Director of DENR through
the OSG filed an action for annulment of title and reversion of land claiming that the property is
inalienable falling within a timberland area per Land Classification Map No. 2978, as certified by
the Director of Forestry. The RTC ruled in favor of the State. While on appeal the CA reversed the
RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State was able to prove that the property is part of inalienable forest land at the
time the Cadastral decree was issued.
RULING:
NO. The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the grant
of the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to
prove that the property was classified as timberland or forest at the time it was decreed to Espinosa.
To reiterate, there is no burden on Caliston to prove that property in question is alienable and
disposable land. At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston
derived her title, had already established that the property is alienable and disposable land
considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion proceeding, the State
must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property in Espinosa’s
title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof
rests on the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case asserts the
affirmative of an issue.
Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land classification map
prepared in 1986. The records show however that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in
evidence. The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after
the presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally or if allowed by the court, in
writing. Not having been formally offered, it was error for the trial court to have considered the
survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the reversion of the property to the mass of the
public domain on the basis of the same.
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IX. REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

A. CASES COVERED BY THE RULE
Rafael Uy v. Estate of Vipa Fernandez
G.R. No. 200612, April 5, 2017, Bersamin, J.
Section 5 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides that affirmative and negative
defenses not pleaded in the answer shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Complaints by or against corporations, partnerships or other juridical entities may not be filed with,
received or acted upon by the barangay for conciliation.
FACTS:
Rafael Uy entered into a contract of lease with Vipa Hernandez in Iloilo City agreeing among others
that he is bound to pay 3,000 per month with a 10% increase every year. After Vipa’s death, Uy
stopped paying monthly rentals. Hence, the heirs of Vipa, filed an action for unlawful detainer
against him. Uy however, in his defense, denied that he refused to pay the rent, instead he deposited
the same to the court because of his confusion as to who should receive it. The MTCC ruled against
Uy but the RTC reversed the said same and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff
failed to bring the case to a barangay conciliation. The CA, on appeal reversed the RTC’s decision..
ISSUE:
Whether or not barangay conciliation in this case is necessary.
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RULING:
NO. Rafael failed to plead in the answer he filed with the MTCC that Grace Joy has no authority to
represent the Estate of Vipa. Neither did he raise therein the lack of barangay conciliation between
the parties herein prior to the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer. Accordingly, the
foregoing defenses are already deemed waived.
In any case, there was no need to refer the dispute between the parties herein to the barangay for
conciliation pursuant to the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. It bears stressing that only individuals
may be parties to barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents.
Complaints by or against corporations, partnerships or other juridical entities may not be filed with,
received or acted upon by the barangay for conciliation. The Estate of Vipa, which is the
complainant below, is a juridical entity that has a personality, which is separate and distinct from
that of Grace Joy. Thus, there is no necessity to bring the dispute to the barangay for conciliation
prior to filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC.
X. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES (AM No. 09-

6-8-SC)
A. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
1. WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Victoria Segovia, et al. vs. The Climate Change Commission

G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, CAGUIOA, J.
There is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient
that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of
the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to
one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
FACTS:
Petitioners Victoria Segovia, et al. (Segovia) are Carless People of the Philippines, parents,
representing their children, who in turn represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who
would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available,
and reliable". They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs of
Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents Climate
Change Commission, et al. (CCC), et al. to perform an act mandated by environmental laws, and
violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos. Segovia contends that the failure of CCC to
implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air
quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the Segovia’s constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or
"land, water, and air" by the government without due process of law.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.
RULING:
NO. The petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for.
For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1.) there is an actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2.) the actual
or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and (3.) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces.
A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or
regulation was violated or would be violated. Segovia failed to show that CCC is guilty of any
unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
CCC sufficiently showed that they did not unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect the laws,
executive and administrative orders as claimed by the petitioners. Projects and programs that seek
to improve air quality were undertaken by CCC, jointly and in coordination with stakeholders, such
as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated
Transport System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke
Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening
Programs.
Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.
There is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient
that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject
of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available
to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
Segovia failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the CCC to be
entitled to the writ.11While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental
cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.
The Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It cannot be considered

an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of CCC to determine the manner by which
this principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the
performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and
the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty
being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus,
the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the
corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.
In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the CCC to perform any act that
the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon
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by Segovia that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing
Principle. To the opposite, the CCC were able to show that they were and are actively implementing
projects and programs that seek to improve air quality.1âwphi1
Clearly, the determination of the means to be taken by the executive in implementing or actualizing
any stated legislative or executive policy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion.
OTHER TOPICS
Federal Builders, Inc. vs Power Factors, Inc.
G.R. No. 211504, March 8, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.
An agreement to submit to voluntary arbitration for purposes of vesting jurisdiction over a

construction dispute in the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) need not be
contained in the construction contract, or be signed by the parties. It is enough that the agreement
be in writing.
FACTS:
Federal Builders Inc. (Federal) is the general contractor of the Bullion Mall under a construction
agreement with Bullion Investment and Development Corporation (BIDC). Federal engaged
respondent Power Factors Inc. (Power) as its subcontractor for the electric works at the Bullion
Mall and the Precinct Building.
Power sent a demand letter to Federal claiming the unpaid amount for work done by Power for the
Bullion Mall and the Precinct Building. Federal replied that its outstanding balance under the
original contract only amounted to ₱1,641,513.94, and that the demand for payment for work done
by Power after June 21, 2005 should be addressed directly to BIDC. Nonetheless, Power made several
demands on Federal to no avail.
Power filed a request for arbitration in the CIAC invoking the arbitration clause of the Contract of
Service
The counsel of Federal, submitted a letter to the CIAC manifesting that Federal agreed to
arbitration. However, the said counsel filed his withdrawal of appearance stating that Federal had
engaged another counsel. The new counsel of Federal, (Domingo, Dizon, Leonardo and Rodillas
Law Office), moved to dismiss the case on the ground that CIAC had no jurisdiction over the case
inasmuch as the Contract of Service between Federal and Power had been a mere draft that was
never finalized or signed by the parties. Federal contended that in the absence of the agreement for
arbitration, the CIAC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Federal contends that there
was no mutual consent and no meeting of the minds between it and Power as to the operation and
binding effect of the arbitration clause because they had rejected the draft service contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CIAC has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
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YES. The parties had an effective agreement to submit to voluntary arbitration; hence, the CIAC
had jurisdiction.
The need to establish a proper arbitral machinery to settle disputes expeditiously was recognized
by the Government in order to promote and maintain the development of the country's
construction industry. With such recognition came the creation of the CIAC through Executive
Order No. 1008 (E.O. No. 1008), also known as The Construction Industry Arbitration Law.
Under the CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration (CIAC Revised
Rules), all that is required for the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction is for the parties of any construction
contract to agree to submit their dispute to arbitration. The CIAC Revised Rules also state that the
agreement may be reflected in an arbitration clause in their contract or by subsequently agreeing
to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration. The CIAC Revised Rules clarifies, however, that
the agreement of the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration need not be signed or be formally
agreed upon in the contract because it can also be in the form of other modes of communication in
writing.
The liberal application of procedural rules as to the form by which the agreement is embodied is
the objective of the CIAC Revised Rules. Such liberality conforms to the letter and spirit of E.O. No.
1008 itself which emphasizes that the modes of voluntary dispute resolution like arbitration are
always preferred because they settle disputes in a speedy and amicable manner. They likewise help
in alleviating or unclogging the judicial dockets.
Pursuant to Article 1356 and Article 1357 of the Civil Code, contracts shall be obligatory in whatever
form they may have been entered into, provided that all the essential requisites for their validity
are present. Indeed, there was a contract between Federal and Power even if the Contract of Service
was unsigned. Such contract was obligatory and binding between them by virtue of all the essential
elements for a valid contract being present.
Although the agreement to submit to arbitration has been expressly required to be in writing and
signed by the parties therein by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 876 (Arbitration Law), the
requirement is conspicuously absent from the CIAC Revised Rules, which even expressly allows
such agreement not to be signed by the parties therein. Consistent with the policy of encouraging
alternative dispute resolution methods, therefore, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.
Juanito Victor Remulla v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and Erineo Maliksi

G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017, Mendoza, J.
It must be emphasized that the balancing test is a relative and flexible concept. The factors therein
must be weighed according to the different facts and circumstances of each case. The courts are given
wide judicial discretion in analyzing the context of the case, bearing in mind the prejudice caused by
the delay both to the accused and the State.
FACTS:
Page 200 of 208

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On August 12, 2005, Remulla filed a criminal complaint against Maliksi before the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. He alleged that Maliksi, as
purchased medical supplies from Allied Medical Laboratories Corporation without conducting any
public bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefit or preference to it. The OMB found probable
cause and in 2014 filed the information in the Sandiganbayan. Maliksi filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated. The
Sandiganbayan thereafter granted the motion and dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the case.
RULING:
YES. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed. There is no constitutional or legal provision
which states that it is mandatory for the accused to follow up his case before his right to its speedy
disposition can be recognized. To rule otherwise would promote judicial legislation where the
Court would provide a compulsory requisite not specified by the constitutional provision. It simply
cannot be done, thus, the ad hoc characteristic of the balancing test must be upheld.
It was downright unnecessary to prolong the proceedings for a period of nine (9) years. To
summarize, the initial delay began when the Ombudsman did not act with dispatch on the approval
or disapproval of the proposed resolution and decision in the Remulla. Then, when the
memorandum was approved, it took ten (10) months before the records could be transferred from
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to the Ombudsman. Finally, for a period of four (4) years, the
consolidated cases sat at the Ombudsman. As the OSP did not submit an explanation as to the
status of the case in that 4-year period, the Court can only conduct guesswork on the cause of its
delay.
The prosecution could not give an acceptable reason to justify the 9-year interval before the case
was filed in court. The proceedings were marred by the delay in the mechanical transfer of
documents and records. No steps were taken by the Ombudsman to ensure that the preliminary
investigation would be resolved in a timely manner. Clearly, the failure of the prosecution to justify
the 9-year interval before the case was filed in court far outweighs Maliksi' s own inaction over the
delay.
Page 201 of 208

REMEDIAL LAW
Chiquita Brands, Inc, et.al., v. Hon. George Omelio, RTC Davao City, et.al.
G.R. No. 189102, June 7, 2017, Leonen, J.
Courts can neither amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a compromise validly entered into
by the parties. A writ of execution that varies the respective obligations of the parties under a judicially
approved compromise agreement is void.
FACTS:
In the 1990s, class suits were filed against banana plantations for having allegedly exposed its
farmers to dibromochloropropane (DBCP) while working in said plantations. The Petitioners
together with the other defendants in said cases, entered into a worldwide settlement with all the
banana plantation workers. The RTC approved the compromise agreements by way of judgment on
compromise. Thereafter, several claimants moved for the execution of the judgment on the
compromise. Thus, petitioners opposed averring that there was nothing left to execute because they
have already settled the amounts due. The RTC granted the motion for execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly granted the motion.
RULING:
NO. A compromise is defined under the Civil Code as "a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." It may either
be judicial or extrajudicial depending on its object or the purpose of the parties. A compromise is
judicial if the parties' purpose is to terminate a suit already commenced. On the other hand, a
compromise is extrajudicial if its object is to avoid litigation.
The doctrine on immutability of judgments applies to compromise agreements approved by the

courts in the same manner that it applies to judgments that have been rendered on the basis of a
full-blown trial. Thus, a judgment on compromise that has attained finality cannot be "modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land."
The Writ of Execution ordering the collection of the settlement amount directly from petitioners
and its co-defendants in Civil Case No. 95- 45 is void. Under the judicially approved Compromise
Agreement, petitioners are obliged to deposit the settlement amount in escrow within 10 business
days after they receive a signed Compromise Agreement from the counsel of the claimants.
There was nothing in the Compromise Agreement that required petitioners to ensure the
distribution of the settlement amount to each claimant. Petitioners' obligation under the
Compromise Agreement was limited to depositing the settlement amount in escrow. On the other
hand, the actual distribution of the settlement amounts was delegated to the chosen mediator, Mr.
Mills. To require proof that the settlement amounts have been withdrawn and delivered to each
claimant would enlarge the obligation of petitioners under the Compromise Agreement.
Page 202 of 208

REMEDIAL LAW
Moreover, this jurisdiction should not alter the mechanism established for claims here and abroad
as it can undo the entire process for all the farmers involved. The remedy of any unpaid claimant
would be to establish their claims with the mediator named in the Compromise Agreement.
Counsels for the farmers and their families should have followed this clear, legal course mandated
in the Compromise Agreement.
Emma G. Alfelor Vs. Hon. Augustus C. Diaz

A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883. July 11, 2017, Caguioa, J.
Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence by the judge in making his decisioncannot be excused by
a claim of good faith.
FACTS:
Romeo (Alfelor's brother) filed a BP 22 complaint against Alfelor due to the 10 dishonored Landbank
checks she issued to the former as payment for her loan. MeTC acquitted Alfelor in nine BP 22 cases
against her for the prosecution's failure to prove that Alfelor received a demand letter notifying
dishonor of checks.
Later, respondent judge convicted Alfelor for BP 22 involving the one check (raffled to his sala) as
well as the nine other checks which were subjects of the BP 22 cases where she was previously
acquitted by another judge.
This prompted Alfelor to file an administrative complaint against respondent judge with the OCA
for gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, and manifest bias and partiality.
Respondent Judge apologized to Alfelor and attributed his lapses to plain oversight on his part and
heavy caseload.
OCA absolved respondent judge but he was reprimanded and given a stern warning.
ISSUE:
Whether gross errors committed by the judge in making his decision can be excused by a claim of
good faith.
RULING:
NO. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was gross or patent,
deliberate or malicious. Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim
of good faith.
Had respondent judge been more circumspect in reviewing the records of the case, he could have
easily noticed the glaring fact as well as the other judge's prior order of acquitting Alfelor of the
nine BP 22 cases, and promulgated a decision based only on that particular check raffled in this
sala. Moreover, since he was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, it puts his
competency in the discharge of duties into serious doubt.
Page 203 of 208

REMEDIAL LAW
DPWH v. CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/HI-TRI JOINT VENTURE

G.R. No. 179732, September 13, 2017, Third Division, Leonen, J.
As the administrative agency tasked with resolving issues pertaining to the construction industry,
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission enjoys a wide latitude in recognition of its
technical expertise and experience. Its factual findings are accorded respect and even finality,
particularly when they are affirmed by an appellate court.
FACTS:
On 2002, one of the Joint Venture’s trucks and several equipment were set on fire while on 2003,
a bomb exploded at the Joint Venture’s batching plant located at Zamboange Del Sur, allegedly
caused by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The Joint Venture made several written demands
for extension and payment of the Contract between them and the DPWH. Despite having sent 17
demand letters to the DPWH, the latter still failed to pay, even if the project was 80% when it was
halted. The Joint Venture filed a complaint with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission worth P77,206,047.88.
On July 8, 2004, the Joint Venture sent a Notice of Mutual Termination of Contract which the
DPWH accepted. The CIAC promulgated an award directing DPWH to pay money claims plus
legal interest in favor of the Joint Venture. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to
the determination of the number of days extension the Joint Venture is entitled to and the
conversion rate in pesos of the awarded foreign exchange payments stated.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in completely ignoring, overlooking, or

misappreciating facts of substance, which, if duly considered, would materially affect the outcome
of the case
RULING:
CIAC’s authority to arbitrate construction disputes was incorporated into the general statutory
framework on alternative dispute resolution through RA 9285. Sec. 34 thereof provides the
arbitration of construction disputes shall be governed by EO No. 10008 or the Construction Industry
Arbitration Law. Sec. 35 thereof provides construction disputes which fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission shall include those
between or among parties to, or who are otherwise bound by, an arbitration agreement, directly or
by reference whether such parties are project owner, contractor, subcontractor, quantity surveyor,
bondsman or issuer of an insurance policy in a construction project.
As a general rule, findings of fact of CIA, a quasi-judicial tribunal which has expertise on matters
regarding the construction industry, should be respected and upheld. CIAC’s factual findings, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be overturned except as to the most compelling of
reasons. Voluntary arbitration under the Labor Code and construction arbitration derive their
authority from statute in recognition of the public interest inherent in their respective spheres.
Page 204 of 208

REMEDIAL LAW
CE Construction Corporation vs. Araneta Center

Jurisprudence has characterized the CIAC as a quasi-judicial, administrative agency equipped with
technical proficiency that enables it to efficiently and promptly resolve conflicts. Consistent with
CIAC’s technical expertise is the primacy and deference accorded to its decisions.
FACTS:
CECON was a construction contractor, which, for more than 25 years, had been doing business with
respondent ACI, the developer of Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City.In June 2002, ACI sent
invitations to different construction companies, including CECON, for them to bid on a project
identified as “Package #4,” a part of its redevelopment plan for Araneta Center Complex.The project
would eventually be the Gateway Mall.
The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal October 25, 2006 Decision awarded a total sum of P217,428,155.75 in
favor of petitioner CE Construction Corporation (CECON). This sum represented adjustments in
unit costs plus interest, variance in take-out costs, change orders, time extensions, attendance fees,
contractor-supplied equipment, and costs of arbitration. This amount was net of the countervailing
awards in favor of respondent Araneta Center, Inc. (ACI), for defective and incomplete works,
permits, licenses and other advances.The assailed Court of Appeals Decision modified the CIAC
Arbitral Tribunal Decision by awarding a net amount of P82,758,358.80 in favor of CECON.The CA
Amended Decision adjusted this amount to P93,896,335.71.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s award is competent and is well within its jurisdiction
in this case.
RULING:
YES. This Court commenced its discussion by underscoring that arbitration primarily serves the
need of expeditious dispute resolution. This interest takes on an even greater urgency in the context
of construction projects and the national interest so intimately tied with them. ACI’s actions have
so bogged down its contractor. Nearing 13 years after the Gateway Mall’s completion, its contractor
has yet to be fully and properly compensated. The delays have virtually bastardized the hopes at
expeditious and effective dispute resolution which are supposedly the hallmarks of arbitration
proceedings.
The CIAC was created with the specific purpose of an “early and expeditious settlement of disputes”
cognizant of the exceptional role of construction to “the furtherance of national development goals.
The CIAC does not only serve the interest of speedy dispute resolution, it also
facilitates authoritative dispute resolution. Its authority proceeds not only from juridical legitimacy
but equally from technical expertise. The creation of a special adjudicatory body for construction
disputes presupposes distinctive and nuanced competence on matters that are conceded to be
outside the innate expertise of regular courts and adjudicatory bodies concerned with other
Page 205 of 208

REMEDIAL LAW
specialized fields. The CIAC has the state’s confidence concerning the entire technical expanse of
construction, defined in jurisprudence as “referring to all on-site works on buildings or altering
structures, from land clearance through completion including excavation, erection and assembly
and installation of components and equipment.”
Jurisprudence has characterized the CIAC as a quasi-judicial, administrative agency equipped with
technical proficiency that enables it to efficiently and promptly resolve conflicts. Consistent with
CIAC’s technical expertise is the primacy and deference accorded to its decisions.
||| Soliva v. Taleon

A.M. No. P-16-3511, September 6, 2017, Second Division, Caguioa, J.
Resignation, being voluntary, contradicts a claim of illegal dismissal. When an employee tenders
resignation, he or she has the burden of proving the resignation was not voluntary but was actually
a case of constructive dismissal.
FACTS:
Rolando Soliva filed a letter-complaint against Sheriff Reynaldo Taleon of the Dipolog RTC. Soliva
lost as defendant in a forcible entry case and filed a motion for issuance of temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. While motion was pending, Taleon issued notices of
garnishment to several banks; Soliva argued Taleon should have first made a demand on the
judgment obligors before resorting to garnishment and/or levy.
In a supplemental complaint, Soliva alleged Taleon filed an ex parte request/manifestation to put

Soliva’s properties under levy on execution. Taleon also failed to submit a report or return relative
to the forcible entry case. He also caused the publication of a Notice of Sale on Levy on Execution,
in violation of Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In his Comment, Taleon merely
said Soliva did not want to pay damages to plaintiffs and Taleon had given the occupants of the
land sufficient time to vacate the promises.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended he be found guilty of simple misconduct
and for suspension for three months without pay.
ISSUE:
Whether Taleon is guilty of simple misconduct
RULING:
Sec. 9 provides the officer shall enforce execution of the judgment by demanding from the
judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all
lawful fees. Sec. 10 provides that the officer executing the judgment must make a demand to the
person against whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and
all persons claiming rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within three working days
and restore possession to the judgment oblige; otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons
therefrom. Instead of following the procedure, he proceeded to garnish the bank accounts of the
Page 206 of 208

REMEDIAL LAW
defendants; he should have first made a demand from him for the payment of damages awarded to
the judgment oblige.
There was no demand at all from Taleon, having failed to make a Sheriff’s Return as required by the
rules. Further, levy can only be availed of if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the
obligation in cash, certified bank check, or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment
oblige. The sheriff’s duty in the implementation of a writ is purely ministerial; in enforcing the writ
of execution in ejection cases, the sheriff shall give notice and demand the defendant to vacate the
property in three days.
Navaja v. De Castro and Borje

G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017, Second Division, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
While the informations pertain to acts done days apart and in different locations, petitioner should
only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829 since the alleged acts, albeit separate,
were motivated by a single criminal impulse, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary
investigation.
FACTS:
Navaja, whose wife was embroiled in a case with DKT Philippines for falsification of private
document in Tagbilaran, told one of the material witnesses in the case that his wife’s lawyer
instructed her to tell the witness she was no longer needed in the scheduled hearing (March 9,
2004). Borje found out from the witness that the latter would have attended if it were not for
petitioner’s misrepresentation, that her affidavit was not personally prepared but was merely
signed out of her superior’s instruction, and that she could not have had it notarized in Cebu as
she had work that day (March 15, 2004). Separate complaints were filed against Navaja for
violation of Sec. 1(a) of PD 1829 and Section 1(f) of the same law for the March 9 and March 15
incidents.
The MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash, the RTC affirmed the MCTC-Jagna, and
the CA affirmed the RTC ruling, which in esse held petitioner allegedly committed several acts
and there is enough basis to try him for two separate crimes under two distinct informations.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly ruled petitioner may be tried for different acts constituting violations
of PD 1829
RULING:
Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes acts constituting the crime of obstruction of justice, the
elements of which are (a) the accused committed any of the acts listed under Sec. 1o f PD 1829; and
(b) such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying
the successful investigation and prosecution of cases. While the informations pertain to acts done
days apart and in different locations, petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single
violation of PD 1829 since the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal
impulse, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation.
Page 207 of 208

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The conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime
committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution. Petitioner’s acts
of preventing the witness from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation proceeding
and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly motivated by a single impulse.
Page 208 of 208

Remedial Law Principles in Philippine Court Rulings

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Remedial Law Principles in Philippine Court Rulings

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REMEDIAL LAW

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REMEDIAL LAW

No, the dismissal was not justified by the errors.

B. SUBSTANTIVE LAW VIS-À-VIS-REMEDIAL LAW

Whether or not the RTC correctly declared Petitioners in default.

C. NATURE OF PHILIPPINE COURTS

BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc., Petitioner vs.

Spouses Sergio C. Pascual and Emma Servillion Pascual, Petitioners, v.

Sps. Proceso and Helen Pontillas v. Carmen Vda. De Pontillas,

Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the case.

Senator Leila de Lima vs Hon. Juanita Guerrero, et al

3. Whether or not petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping

Loloy Unduran, et.al. v. Ramon Aberarturi, et.al.,

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez vs. Director of Lands

Diaz-Enriquez v. Director of Lands, Court of Appeals, and the Saclolos

2. REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs.Royal Ferry Services, Inc.

(2) Whether the Petition for Insolvency was properly filed.

Development Bank of the Philippines vs.Hon. Emmanuel C. Carpio, et al.

(2) Whether DBP’s application for damages was belatedly filed.

Philippine Bank of Communications, Petitioner, vs.

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, Petitioner vs.

3. METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,

Danilo Cariaga v. Emmanuel Sapigao and Ginalyn Acosta

The rule in Department Circular No. 018-14 shall be as follows:

C. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

Whether or not PARAD/DARAP has jurisdiction over the case.

D. JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES

E. JURISDICTION OVER CASES COVERED BY THE REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE

requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so

III. CIVIL PROCEDURE

Manuel C. Ubas, Sr. vs.Wilson Chan

Whether Ubas, Sr.’s complaint states a cause of action.

action by a preponderance of evidence. “‘Preponderance of evidence’ is a phrase that, in the last

2. FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

Petitioners filed a complaint for payment, reimbursement or restitution against respondents.

Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the case.

Butuan Development Corporation(BDC) v. Court of Appeals (Mindanao Station),

Whether or not BDC has a cause of action.

3. TEST OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF A CAUSE OF ACTION

Jose Diaz, Jr. and Adelina McMullen vs Salvador Valenciano, Jr.

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo and AV Manila Creative Production Co. v. Philippine

C. PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

Philippine Veterans Bank, Petitioner, V.

Petitioner, through a Notice of Cancellation by Notarial Act, cancelled or rescinded respondents'

No, the CA erred in ruling that HTPMI is an indispensable party.

Teodulfo E. Lao, Jr. vs. LGU of Cagayan De Oro City

Spring Homes Subdivision Co., Inc., Spouses Pedro L. Lumbres and

(1) Whether Spring Homes is an indispensable party.

On December 16, 1997, the RTC issued a status quo order.19

Hence, this petition.

1. Whether Francisco was a real party in interest;

2. Whether there was valid substitution of parties;

2. EFFECT OF DEATH OF PARTY LITIGANT

CONCHITA S. UY, ET AL. v. CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO, substituted by his heirs

Planters Development Bank v. Spouses Victoriano and Melanie Ramos

LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

In its Comment/Opposition-- to respondent's affirmative defense of improper venue, petitioner

||| Planters Development Bank v. Spouses Ramos

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the order of dismissal