1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ARNEL ALICANDO y
—
BRIONES
G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995
FACTS: On June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the
four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with
his friends. Appellant joined them but every now and
then would take leave and return. At about 4:30 p.m.,
Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left.
At about 5:30 p.m. of that day; Luisa Rebada who lives in
the Penecilla neighborhood saw the victim at the
window of appellant's house. She offered to buy her
"yemas" but appellant closed the window. Soon she
heard the victim crying. She then approached
appellant's house and peeped through an opening
between its floor and door where she saw the appellant
naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her
neck. She retreated to her house in fright, gathered her
children together and informed her compadre, Ricardo
Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana
was also overcome with fear and hastily left.
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house in the evening. He
did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for her,
however their effort was fruitless.
As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo
Santiago went down from his house to answer the call of
nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae
under his house. Her parents were informed and so was
the police.
Thereafter, Rebada suffered a change of heart. She
informed Penecillas, that appellant committed the crime.
Forthwith, appellant was arrested and interrogated by
PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without
the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his
uncounselled verbal confession and follow up
interrogations, the police came to know and recovered
from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a
pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for
the prosecution.
Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide.
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the
assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO,
Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.
Trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.
Hence this automatic review.
ISSUE: WON the arraignment was valid
RULING: NO. The arraignment of the appellant is null and
void. Under Rule 116, Section (1) (a) which provides that:
Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the
court where the complaint or information has
been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment
must be made in open court by the judge or
clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses,
reading the same in the language or dialect
known to him and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however,
call at the trial witnesses other than those named
in the complaint or information.
In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the
Information against the appellant was read in the
language or dialect known to him. The Information
against the appellant is written in the English language. It
is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English
language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood
by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the
Information couched in English was translated to the
appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. Thus it
violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing
the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It
also denied appellant his constitutional right to due
process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the
arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted.
When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable
presumption. We cannot assume. We must be sure.
Moreover, the plea of guilt made by the appellant is
likewise null and void. The trial court violated Section 3 of
Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the
appellant.
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 116. When the accused pleads guilty
to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf.
The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be
based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the
searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1)
the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The
questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness
of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions
demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any
information about the personality profile of the appellant
which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to
give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-
economic status, and educational background of the
appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The
questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling
that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It
will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to
explain to the appellant the essential elements of the
crime of rape with homicide.
1 | RULE 116
During the verbal hearings, the trial court simply inquired if
appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not
ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested
him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he
was medically examined before and after his
interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover
late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is
caused by physical abuse alone.
FALLO: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case
No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel Alicando of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set aside and
the case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. No costs.
2. Marcos vs Ruiz
G.R. Nos. 70746-47 (213 SCRA 177, September 1, 1992)
Facts:
After conducting the appropriate preliminary
investigation, Acting Assistant City Fiscal Lorenzo A.
Lopena of the City of Tagbilaran filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol two information (Criminal Case No.
3892 and 3890) against Marcos for violating Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.
In the arraignment, Marcos appeared but asked
for a resetting on the ground that his lawyer had just
withdrawn and he had to look for another lawyer. The
court granted his request and the arraignment was reset.
It turned out, however, that petitioner settled his
obligation with Oculam, the complainant in the criminal
case, who executed a subscribed Affidavit of Desistance
in favor of petitioner. When the cases were called, neither
the petitioner nor his counsel appeared so arraignment
was rescheduled.
At the next arraignment, Petitioner was arraigned
ex parte where he automatically entered a plea of not
guilty. The prosecution then presented its evidence ex-
parte and rested its case. After this, the court then
rendered a decision against the petitioner, asserting that
his absence means that he will no longer present
evidence.
Thereafter, the trial court received an urgent
motion for the resetting of the hearing filed by the
petitioner which explained the non-appearance but the
same does not contain a notice of hearing to the
Prosecuting Fiscal so it was denied. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but it was likewise denied.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied his rights
during the course of the trial.
Held: *First case (Crim. Case. 3890) –
Petitioner was not denied of his rights during the
trial. Considering that he had been arraigned, petitioner
was not required to appear at all the trials. Section 1 (c)
of Rule 115 states that while it may be true that he has the
right to be present at every stage of the proceedings, i.e.
from the arraignment to the promulgation of judgment,
he can also validly waive his presence to be present after
the arraignment.
On the other hand, petitioner was denied his
right to be heard when the respondent Judge
capriciously and arbitrarily considered that the case was
already submitted for decision after the prosecution
rested its case. The Judge blatantly disregarded Section
1(c) of Rule 115 when he considered the accused‘s non-
appearance during the first day of trial as a waiver of his
right for the succeeding trial dates, when such should be
construed to mean that he only waived his right to be
present during that day of trial.
*Second case (Crim. Case. 3892)
Be noted that insofar as the second case,
Criminal Case No. 3892, is concerned, the court made no
ruling on, the manifestation and offer by petitioner’s
counsel that the reading of the information be waived
and a plea of not guilty be entered. The petitioner was
neither made to confirm the manifestation nor directed to
personally make the plea. There was, therefore, no valid
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 3892 Section 1(b), Rule
116 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires the
accused to personally enter his plea.
Under the Rules of Court, the accused has to be
present:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) at the arraignment pursuant to
paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 116;
(b) at the promulgation of judgment,
except when conviction is for a light
offense, in which case the judgment
may be pronounced in the presence of
his counsel or representative pursuant to
Section 6 of Rule 120, or unless
promulgation in absentia is allowed
under the third paragraph of said
section; and
(c) when the prosecution intends to
present witnesses who will identify the
accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:chanro
2 | RULE 116
 DECLARING that there was no valid arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 3892
3. ANTONIO GAMAS and FLORENCIO
SOBRIO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ORLANDO A. OCO, in his capacity as presiding
judge of Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato
The Case
This is a complaint for grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law filed by complainants Antonio
Gamas and Florencio Sobrio ("complainants") against
Judge Orlando A. Oco ("respondent judge"),
former1 Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court,
Polomolok, South Cotabato ("MTC Polomolok") and SPO4
Willie Adulacion ("respondent Adulacion"), a "police
prosecutor" in the MTC Polomolok.
The Facts
In their Complaint ("Complaint") and supporting affidavits,
complainants allege that they are the accused in a case
for theft2 which, at the time material to this case, was
pending in the sala of respondent judge. As respondent
judge had issued warrants for their arrest, complainants
on 3 October 1996 went to the MTC Polomolok to post
bail. Complainants allege that respondent Adulacion
enticed them to plead guilty to the charge, apply for
probation, and thus avoid imprisonment.
Respondent Adulacion, who had allegedly prepared a
draft decision embodying his suggestion, conferred with
respondent judge, and handed the draft decision to
respondent judge. After reading the document,
respondent judge signed it, told complainants "O, plead
guilty man kamo" ("O, you're pleading guilty"), and
handed the document to a clerk. Respondent judge told
the clerk to read the contents of the decision to
complainants and to instruct them on what to do. The
clerk read the contents of the document to complainants
and asked them to sign it. Complainants signed the
document upon respondent Adulacion's assurance that
once the police apprehend the rest of the accused,3 the
police will revive the case and respondent Adulacion will
present complainants as "star witnesses." Complainants
later found out that what they signed was an Order4 ("3
October 1996 Order") finding them guilty of theft and
sentencing them each to imprisonment for six (6) months
and one (1) day.
Finding the proceedings highly irregular, complainants
sought the assistance of a lawyer. Upon motion of
complainants' counsel, respondent judge vacated the 3
October 1996 Order, ostensibly on the ground that
complainants had entered improvident guilty pleas.
Respondent judge scheduled complainants' re-
arraignment on 2 February 1997.
In the present complaint, complainants contend that
respondent judge is administratively liable for rendering
judgment against them without the benefit of an
arraignment and in violation of their right to be
represented by counsel.5
In his Answer ("Answer"), respondent judge denied
complainants' allegations regarding the alleged
procedural irregularities in the issuance of the 3 October
1996 Order. According to respondent judge, the following
transpired in his sala on 3 October 1996:
2. On [the] session day [of October 3, 1996,] prosecutor
Willie Adulacion with two men who turned out to be
complainants, Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobrio
approached me. It was Adulacion who talked. He stated
that these two have long pending warrants of arrest and
they cannot afford to file P10,000.00 bail. They were
charged of theft of corn worth P4,500.00. x x x They were
caught with two others who are their relatives hauling 3 or
4 tricycle loads of corn cabs [sic]. Adulacion said that
Gamas and Sobrio asked him to propose to the judge
that Sobrio and Gamas would plead guilty, but be meted
the most minimum penalty, allowed probation and after
which they be released [on] their own recognizance
because they cannot file their bailbonds.
3. Their predicament at that moment if I cannot attend to
them immediately was that Mr. Adulacion [would] have
to lock them in jail because they surrendered. Gamas
and Sobrio were lucky that instant because there was a
lull in my proceedings so they were able to see me.
4. As soon as Adulacion ha[d] articulated his piece of
talk, in the hearing distance of Gamas and Sobrio
because we were face to face[,] I asked them if what
Adulacion said was true and they replied yes.
5. That instant I knew that Sobrio and Gamas wanted
things done instantly so they will not be locked in jail so I
ordered for the records from my staff. I read thoroughly
while the three waited across the table, seated.
6. I gathered from my readings that [the] tricycle drivers
with their tricycles were apprehended in flagrante delicto
carrying corn cabs [sic] right in the corn field of Dole. I
asked why there were released with the tricycles inspite
of this apprehension but I did not get satisfactory answer
from any of the 3. x x x
3 | RULE 116
7. For me to instantly respond to their plea that they be
allowed to plead guilty, meted the minimum sentence,
allowed probation and pending probation they be
released on recognizance, they will solve their very
immediate problem of being locked in jail because they
had surrendered to Adulacion and they had no ready
bails. Knowing the course of action they wanted, I begun
discoursing on their rights as accused. I told them of their
right to counsel, to be given free of charge if they cannot
afford to solicit services of one, to confront the witnesses
and cross examine and because they had voluntarily
articulated the desire to plead guilty, I estimated to them
the probable penalty. I also told them that they have [a]
right to apply for probation but pending action they may
be required to file bailbonds but they begged that they
be allowed to plead guilty but released pending
probation proceedings.
8. After the discourse I read from them that they would
like to really plead guilty and wanted instant action so
that they will not be in jail. As called for by the situation I
arraigned them. I read to them in the dialect they
understand the accusation and informed them [of] the
nature of the evidence arrayed but they pleaded guilty,
always begging that they be sentenced with the most
minimum penalty, allowed probation and released
immediately in their recognizance.
11. [Thus], there was arraignment and that their plea of
guilt was voluntary.
12. I wrote the decision in long hand in their very
presence then handed it to the typist who typed it; then I
read silently what the typist typed and satisfied that what
I wrote was correctly typed I signed [the 3 October 1996
Order], then required my court interpreter to read the
whole decision in the language they know. I looked while
the interpreter was reading. They looked satisfied that
what the interpreter was reading corresponded with
what they proposed and what we discussed. After the
reading, Gamas and Sobrio signed the decision.
13. It was I who wrote that decision, Mr. Adulacion
cannot write that.
14. So it is clear that before deciding I arraigned Gamas
and Sobrio upon their demand for instant solution to their
predicament. Before arraignment I counselled them of
their rights and I even warned them the exact penalty I
will give them. There was no lawyer in attendance but
the lawyer was their problem. I heard them saying that
since they were caught carrying the corn, a lawyer
would not have much use, moreover they expressed they
have no money to pay for a lawyer. I argued that I can
give them a PAO lawyer but they insisted they plead
guilty so that all will get done without jailing them that
instant.6
Respondent judge claims that complainants assailed the
validity of the 3 October 1996 Order to avoid serving their
sentences as they had allegedly violated the terms of
their probation by failing to report to their probation
officer. Respondent judge maintains that there was no
irregularity in the issuance of the 3 October 1996 Order.
Respondent judge adds that he decided to set aside his
ruling merely out of compassion for complainants.7
We referred this matter to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Polomolok, South Cotabato ("RTC
Polomolok") for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The OCA's Evaluation and Recommendation
In its Memorandum dated 11 May 2001, the OCA, while
agreeing with the findings of Executive Judge Roxas, finds
respondent judge liable not for mere simple neglect of
duty but for gross ignorance of the law. Accordingly, the
OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined
P20,000. The OCA explains:
[R]espondent judge showed his ignorance not only of the
scope of his authority to arraign the complainants but
also of the procedure to follow in conducting an
arraignment. Moreover, respondent failed to properly
apprise complainants of their right to counsel and to
provide them with counsel de oficio particularly during
the arraignment, if they do not have a counsel by reason
of their poverty. This is a fundamental constitutional
precept which respondent Judge is expected to know.
Where, as in this case, the law involved is simple and
elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.9
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA well-
taken.
Respondent Judge Failed to Properly Apprise
Complainants of their Right to Counsel
The Constitution mandates that "[I]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel."10 Indeed, the accused
has a right to representation by counsel from the
custodial investigation all the way up to the appellate
proceedings.11 At the arraignment stage, Section 6 of
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to
counsel. — Before arraignment, the court shall inform the
accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires
to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend
himself in person or has employed counsel of his choice,
4 | RULE 116
the court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Rule 116 means that:
[W]hen a defendant appears [at the arraignment]
without [an] attorney, the court has four important duties
to comply with: 1 – It must inform the defendant that it is
his right to have [an] attorney before being arraigned; 2 –
After giving him such information the court must ask him if
he desires the aid of attorney; 3 – If he desires and is
unable to employ attorney, the court must assign [an]
attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 – If the accused
desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must
grant him a reasonable time therefor.12
Compliance with these four duties is mandatory.13 The
only instance when the court can arraign an accused
without the benefit of counsel is if the accused waives
such right and the court, finding the accused capable,
allows him to represent himself in person. However, to be
a valid waiver, the accused must make the waiver
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.14 In determining
whether the accused can make a valid waiver, the court
must take into account all the relevant circumstances,
including the educational attainment of the accused. In
the present case, however, respondent judge contends
that complainants waived their right to counsel and
insisted on their immediate arraignment.
After reviewing the records and taking into account the
circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that
respondent judge did not properly apprise complainants
of their right to counsel prior to their arraignment.
Consequently, there was no basis for complainants'
alleged waiver of such right.
In his Answer, respondent judge does not deny that when
he "arraigned" complainants, no lawyer assisted the
complainants. However, respondent judge asserted that
the attendance of a "lawyer was their (complainants')
problem." Respondent judge stated that before
arraigning complainants, he gave a "discourse [of] their
rights as accused." Respondent judge also stated that
since the police caught complainants in flagrante
delicto, complainants told him "a lawyer would not have
much use." Respondent judge further stated that
complainants "expressed that they have no money to
pay for a lawyer." Respondent judge informed
complainants "he can give them a PAO lawyer" if they so
desired. However, respondent judge did not appoint a
PAO lawyer despite being informed by complainants that
they could not afford a lawyer.
These do not amount to compliance with Section 6 of
Rule 116. Respondent judge has the duty to insure that
there is no violation of the constitutional right of the
accused to counsel. Respondent judge is grossly
mistaken in saying that securing a "lawyer was their
(complainants') problem." Once the accused informs the
judge that he cannot afford a lawyer and the court has
not allowed the accused to represent himself, or the
accused is incapable of representing himself, the judge
has the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio to give
meaning and substance to the constitutional right of the
accused to counsel.
Respondent judge knew that complainants are mere
tricycle drivers. Respondent judge could not have
expected complainants to be conversant with the rules
on criminal procedure.15 Respondent judge should not
only have followed Section 6 of Rule 116 to the letter, but
should also have ascertained that complainants
understood the import of the proceedings. Respondent
judge should not have proceeded with complainants'
arraignment until he had ascertained that complainants'
waiver of their right to counsel was made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently and that they were capable
of representing themselves. As well observed by
Executive Judge Roxas:
[Respondent judge] is not only duty-bound to tell the
complainants the right to which they are entitled, he must
also explain their effects in practical terms, and in a
language the complainants fairly understand. In other
words, the right of the complainants to be informed of
their right to have a counsel implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the Respondent Judge to
explain and contemplates an effective communication
that results in understanding what is conveyed. Since the
right to be informed implies comprehension, the degree
of explanation required will necessarily vary, depending
upon the education, intelligence and other relevant
personal circumstances of the complainants. Suffice it to
say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed
when the subject is unlettered as in this particular case.
Short of this, there is a denial of the right as it cannot truly
be said that the herein complainants have been
informed of their rights to counsel.16 (Emphasis supplied)
The unfortunate but expected result of respondent
judge's failure to comply strictly with Section 6 of Rule 116
surfaced during the investigation of this case.
Complainants uniformly testified that they were unaware
of the meaning and consequence of their guilty pleas.
These testimonies underscore the need for trial court
judges to comply strictly with Section 6 of Rule 116. That
the accused, like complainants, insist on their
arraignment without representation is no reason for a
judge to accede readily to their wishes. A judge has the
duty to protect the accused in their rights, even against
their wishes, when it is clear, as in this case, that they are
not in a position to validly exercise or waive those rights.
As we had occasion to observe:
5 | RULE 116
[E]ven the most intelligent or educated man may have
no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel
is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign
one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, by subsequently vacating his 3 October 1996
Order, respondent judge tacitly admits that complainants
were in no position to represent themselves during their
arraignment, causing them to enter guilty pleas
improvidently.
Respondent Judge's Arraignment of Complainants Highly
Irregular
Section 1(a), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states:
Arraignment and plea; how made. – The accused must
be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment
shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect
known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or
not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses
other than those named in the complaint or information.
We have explained the rationale, requirements, and
compliance of this rule in this manner:
[S]ection 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment
should be made in open court by the judge himself or by
the clerk of court [1] furnishing the accused a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated
therein, then [2] reading the same in the language or
dialect that is known to him, and [3] asking him what his
plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading
be made in a language or dialect that the accused
understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just
as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed
by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all-important constitutional
mandate regarding the right of an accused to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled
at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be
able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It
is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the
Constitution.20
We subscribe to Executive Judge Roxas' finding that
respondent judge similarly failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 1(a) of Rule 116. Complainants
deny respondent judge's claim that he arraigned
complainants by "read[ing] to them [the information] in
the dialect they understand and inform[ing] them [of] the
nature of the evidence arrayed [against
them].21 However, there is no disputing that respondent
judge failed to furnish complainants a copy of the
information with the list of the witnesses.
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116
are not empty rituals that a judge can take lightly. Each
step constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in
criminal litigation "where the issues are joined x x x and
without which the proceedings cannot advance
further."22 Respondent judge may have genuinely
desired to spare complainants the travails of being
detained in jail, thus the rush in arraigning them,
accepting their guilty pleas, imposing a light sentence,
and granting them probation. While well-intentioned,
such conduct unjustifiably short-circuited the mandatory
arraignment procedure in Section 1(a) of Rule 116.
Respondent Judge's Acts and Omissions
Constitute Gross Ignorance of the Law
The rule is that when the law is so elementary, not to know
it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.23 The provisions of the Constitution
on the right of the accused to counsel, and of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on the requirements
for the arraignment of an accused, are basic. Every
judge should know the fundamental substantive and
procedural requirements on arraignment and right to
counsel.
By holding complainants' arraignment in the manner he
conducted it, respondent judge is liable for this
administrative transgression. It may very well be that
respondent judge knew the substantive and procedural
rules in question. What renders him liable is that he acted
as if he did not.
On the Appropriate Imposable Penalty
Under Section 11(A), in relation to Section 8(8), of Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is punishable
by:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
6 | RULE 116
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in
no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from the office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
This schedule of penalties under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
which took effect on 1 October 2001, does not apply
retroactively.24 Accordingly, we sustain the OCA's
recommendation that respondent judge be required to
pay a fine of P20,000, a penalty we have meted in similar
administrative cases involving gross ignorance of the
law.25
The Court has no Jurisdiction Over Respondent Adulacion
We refrain from passing upon the complaint against
respondent Adulacion, as he is neither a member of the
Bar26nor a judiciary employee. This Court's administrative
jurisdiction extends only to members of the bar and over
all courts and their personnel.27 However, the dismissal is
without prejudice to any action complainants may wish
to file against respondent Adulacion before the
appropriate body.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Orlando A. Oco, former
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok,
South Cotabato, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law.
Accordingly, we FINE respondent Orlando A. Oco
P20,000, to be taken from his withheld retirement benefits.
The complaint against respondent Willie Adulacion is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
4. People v. De la Cruz G.R. No. 128362 (January 16, 2001)
FACTS: Accused-appellant Dominador De la Cruz, alis "Boyet," was
charged with murder in the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
in relation to the death of Manolito Cauba.
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
whereupon he was tried. Relying on the eyewitness account of
Victorino Castillo who saw the shooting incident, the RTC convicted
De la Cruz for murder.
ISSUE: Whether a witness who was not included in the preliminary
investigation be presented by the prosecution during trial?
RULING: YES. The fact that the witness’ s name was not mentioned
during the preliminary investigation (and therefore not listed in the
information) of the case does not preclude the prosecution from
presenting him as a witness during the trial. (doctrine)
The fact Victorino Castillo's name was not mentioned during the
preliminary investigation of the case did not preclude the
prosecution from presenting him as a witness during the trial. The
non-inclusion of some of the names of the eyewitness in the
information filed before the trial court does not preclude the
prosecutor from presenting them during the trial. There is thus no
basis for the allegation that this fact indicates that Castillo's
presentation as an eyewitness was a mere "afterthought.
5. People vs Demetrio Cabale
185 SCRA 140 | G.R. Nos. 73249-50 May 8, 1990
FACTS:
The 4 accused in this case are Cabale, Daniel, Bodoy,
and Cualteros. The crime is robbery with homicide. The 4
accused on June 7, 1968 allegedly entered the store of
Rufina Rosello, an old woman, fired shots in the air,
grabbed her outside, and failing to produce money, was
killed by strangulation. While outside, the accused also
stopped Ricardo Fernando who was riding on his
motorcycle, took his wallet, and caused him physical
injuries.
Initial investigations revealed that one of the robbers was
Florencio Daniel. When questioned, Daniel admitted that
he participated in the commission of the robberies and
pointed to the other 3 accused as his companions in the
crime.
The 4 accused were then charged with 2 informations,
one for Robbery in band with less serious physical injuries,
and the other for Robbery in band with homicide.
The 3 accused, except for Cualteros, were duly
convicted and sentenced to death penalty which was
automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua. Cualteros
was acquitted of both charges on reasonable doubt, but
was ordered to indemnify, jointly with his co-accused, the
offended parties Fernando and Rosello.
Accused Daniel informed that he was no longer
interested in pursuing an appeal, and he was willing to
serve the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, judgment against him was considered final.
Judgment against Cabale has also become final due to
his escape from detention.
Only the appeal of accused Bodoy was left for
consideration. He denies having participated in the
crime, and interposed the defense of alibi. He claims that
there was an irregularity in his arraignment since it was
done after the cases had been submitted for decision, so
that he was not afforded the chance to prepare properly
for his defense.
ISSUE: W/N the arraignment done was irregular.
7 | RULE 116
HELD:
The Court found that while the arraignment was done
after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error
is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured.
In this case, counsel for the appellant entered into trial
without objecting that his client, the appellant herein,
had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel had also the
full opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses for the
prosecution. Then, when the cases were being retried
after the appellant had been arraigned, appellant’s
counsel filed a joint manifestation with the prosecution,
adopting all proceedings prior to the arraignment of the
appellant.
There was, therefor, no violation of the appellant’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
6. Francisco Larranaga vs CA
G.R. No. 130644
March 13, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Juan Larranaga is charged with two
counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
docketed as CBU-45303 and CBU-45304 pending before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Cebu City. He is
presently detained at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation
Center.
On October 1, 1997, petitioner, represented by his
mother, Margarita G. Larranaga, filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
Petitioner alleged that he was denied the right to
preliminary investigation and sought to annul the
informations as well as the warrant of arrest issued in
consequence thereof. In the alternative, petitioner
prayed that a preliminary investigation be conducted
and that he be released from detention pending the
investigation. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition
for habeas corpus or bail on October 6, 1997.
On October 30, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC of
Cebu an urgent ex parte motion praying for his
immediate release pursuant to our October 27 resolution.
The following day, on October 31, 1997, Judge Martin A.
Ocampo, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City,
issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner's
motion. It stated that it would be premature to act on the
motion since the trial court has not yet received an
official copy of our October 27 resolution and that said
resolution has not yet attained finality. Furthermore,
Judge Ocampo called the Court's attention to the fact
that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14, 1997
and waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
On November 17, 1997, the counsels for the prosecution
in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304 filed a motion for
reconsideration of our October 27 resolution. They raised
the following arguments:
1. Petitioner is charged with a continuing offense; hence,
his arrest and detention about two months after the
abduction of the victims was lawful;
2. Since petitioner was arrested without a warrant, his
case comes within the purview of Section 7 of Rule 112,
not under Section 3 thereof;
3. The filing of the informations in court and the issuance
of the corresponding warrants of arrest by Executive
Judge Priscila S. Agana cured whatever defect there was
in petitioner's arrest and detention;
4. Petitioner was validly arraigned on October 14, 1997
and the validity of such arraignment was not set aside by
this tribunal;
The Solicitor General, meanwhile, in its comment to
petitioner's urgent motion for release, modified its stance
regarding the validity of petitioner's detention. It stated:
Considering that petitioner was arraigned (a supervening
event after the filing of the petition and before the
issuance of the TRO), petitioner should be kept in
detention without prejudice to his right to preliminary
investigation.
Issue/s: Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular
preliminary investigation
Ruling:YES.
The prosecutors argue that petitioner is entitled only to an
inquest investigation under Section 7 of Rule 112 since he
was lawfully arrested without a warrant under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The prosecutors' argument is bereft of merit. Section 7 of
Rule 112 applies only to persons lawfully arrested without
a warrant. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not
arrested either by a peace officer or a private person.
The facts show that on September 15, 1997, some
members of the Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation Group (PNP CIG) went to the Center for
Culinary Arts in Quezon City to arrest
petitioner, albeit without warrant.
An arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody
in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is made by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission
to the custody of the person making the arrest. The
foregoing facts show no restraint upon the person of
petitioner. Neither do they show that petitioner was
8 | RULE 116
deprived of his own will and liberty. Hence, Section 7 of
Rule 112 does not apply to petitioner. To be sure, even if
petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG personnel, such
arrest would still be illegal because of the absence of a
warrant.
Judge Martin Ocampo of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City, and
the state prosecutors assert that petitioner is no longer
entitled to a preliminary investigation because he had
previously waived his right to such investigation. Judge
Ocampo held that petitioner waived his right to
preliminary investigation when he failed to appear during
the preliminary investigation set by the City Prosecutor in
the afternoon of September 17, 1997, despite the express
warning that "failure of the counsel (to present the
petitioner to the Cebu City Prosecutor on said time and
date) would be treated as a waiver of his client's right to
preliminary investigation."
We disagree. A waiver, whether express or implied, must
be made in clear and unequivocal manner. Mere failure
of petitioner and his counsel to appear before the City
Prosecutor in the afternoon of September 17, 1997
cannot be construed as a waiver of his right to
preliminary investigation, considering that petitioner has
been vigorously invoking his right to a regular preliminary
investigation since the start of the proceedings before
the City Prosecutor.
Furthermore, petitioner and his counsel cannot be faulted
for their refusal to comply with the City Prosecutor's
directive to appear before him in the afternoon of
September 17, 1997 for preliminary investigation. As
stated above, petitioner's counsel appeared before the
City Prosecutor earlier that day and specifically
demanded a regular preliminary investigation for his
client. The City Prosecutor, however, insisted that
petitioner was entitled only to an inquest investigation
which he scheduled in the afternoon of the same day.
Petitioner and his counsel refused to submit to such
investigation as it might be construed as a waiver of
petitioner's right to a regular preliminary investigation.
Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has
been arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the
right to preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering
a plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been
actively and consistently demanding a regular
preliminary investigation even before he was charged in
court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the
arraignment because there was a pending case in this
Court regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary
investigation. 19 Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his
counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary
investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot
be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and
informed.
7. HONORATO GALVEZ and GODOFREDO DIEGO
vs
COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), First Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor. DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO of Pasig, Rizal; THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PNP P/SR. SUPT. RICARDO
F. DE LEON, Camp Commander and Head of the PNP
Custodial Group, Camp Crame, Cubao, Quezon City,
respondents
G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
FACTS:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the
incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one
Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate
informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated
homicide.
On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor
Liberato L. Reyes filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment and
Subsequent Proceedings to enable him "to review the
evidence on record and determine once more the
proper crimes chargeable against the accused," which
was granted by Judge Villajuan. Thereafter, respondent
Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was instructed to
conduct a re-investigation of the aforesaid criminal cases
filed against herein petitioners.8
By virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion dated
November 23, 1993 filed by respondent prosecutor, the
proceedings were again ordered suspended by Judge
Villajuan until after the prosecution's request for change
of venue shall have been resolved by the Supreme Court,
and the preliminary investigation being conducted by
the former shall have been terminated.
On December 27, 1993, the scheduled arraignment
before Judge Pornillos were reset due to the absence of
respondent prosecutor.
At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners
on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order
denying the motion to quash (the new informations) filed
by petitioners and, at the same time, directed that a plea
of not guilty be entered for petitioners when the latter
refused to enter their plea.
Petitioners dispute the legality of their arraignment on
January 24, 1994, when Judge Pornillos entered a plea of
not guilty for them after they refused to plead, without
furnishing them copies of the information with the list of
witnesses, after merely reading the informations against
them and asking whether they understood the same,
which were allegedly in palpable violation of Section 1,
Rule 116. Petitioners aver that they were requesting for
the suspension of the arraignment as they wanted to
have a final copy of the order of January 24, 1994 which
was merely read in open court, and to take the
necessary steps to question the same by way of a motion
for reconsideration or an appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January
24, 1994 in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93
was valid.
RULING:
9 | RULE 116
YES
In criminal cases, it is the duty of the accused, in addition
to the other pleas authorized by law, to plead whether
he is guilty or not of the crime charged. In that way only
can an issue be created upon which the trial shall
proceed. Section 1 (c) of Rule 116 is quite explicit that
where the accused refuses to plead, a plea of not guilty
shall be entered for him. Hence, under such mandatory
language, if the accused refuses to plead, the court must
enter a plea of not guilty. The words are so plain and
unambiguous that no construction is necessary. It
actually calls for a literal application thereof. Any
explanation or defense which petitioners would want to
invoke can be properly raised during the trial, but they
cannot refuse to enter their plea. Nonetheless, the
alleged defect in their arraignment on January 24, 1994 is
deemed to have been cured when they were again
arraigned on February 18, 1994 with the assistance of
counsel de oficio, and the information was read to them
in the vernacular.
In conclusion, considering that Branch 10 of the same trial
court handling Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-
93 legally acquired jurisdiction over the new informations
which we have likewise declared valid, petitioners may
be prosecuted thereunder.
8. G.R. No. 140863 August 22, 2000
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court Branch 257 of Parañaque and
MA. FE F. BARREIRO, respondents.
FACTS
On May 28, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed
an Information1 for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro (private
respondent) based on the complaint2 filed by Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. (petitioner).
On May 28, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed
an Information1 for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro (private
respondent) based on the complaint2 filed by Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. (petitioner). The case was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 99-536 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Ma. Fe F. Barreiro" before the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257, presided by public
respondent Judge Rolando G. How.
Before the scheduled arraignment of private respondent
on August 5, 1999 could take place, respondent court
issued an Order3 dated June 29, 1999, resetting the
arraignment of private respondent on September 2, 1999
on the ground that private respondent had "filed an
appeal with the Department of Justice (DOJ)".4 Private
respondent manifested in the same Order that she would
submit a certification from the DOJ granting due course
to her appeal on or before the second scheduled
arraignment.5 On September 24, 1999, respondent court
issued an Order6denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the order that previously reset the
arraignment of private respondent. Said order further
rescheduled the arraignment of private respondent to
November 18, 1999.
On November 10, 1999, private respondent filed another
"Motion to Defer Arraignment".7 On November 15, 1999,
before the scheduled date of the arraignment of private
respondent and before the date set for the hearing of
private respondent’s "Motion to Defer Arraignment",
respondent court issued an Order8 further deferring the
arraignment of private respondent "until such time that
the appeal with the said office (SOJ) is
resolved".9 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
order was denied by respondent court on November 22,
1999.10
Petitioner bewails the fact that six months have elapsed
since private respondent appeared or submitted herself
to the jurisdiction of respondent court and up to now she
still has to be arraigned.11 Respondent court allegedly
violated due process when it issued the assailed order
before petitioner received a copy of the "Motion to Defer
Arraignment" of private respondent and before the
hearing for the same motion could be
conducted.12 Petitioner points out that despite the order
of respondent court dated September 26, 1999 which
stated that the arraignment of private respondent on
November 18, 1999 is "intransferable", respondent court,
in utter disregard of its own order, issued the now assailed
order indefinitely suspending the arraignment of private
respondent.13
Petitioner is convinced that the twin orders further
delaying the arraignment of private respondent and
denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner
violate Section 7, of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA
8493) and Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner further submits that this instant petition raises "a
pure question of law of first impression"14 since "it involves
the application and interpretation of a law of very recent
vintage, namely Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known
as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998".15 Petitioner mainly relies
on Section 7 of said law that states that:
"Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and
Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. – The
arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the information, or from the date
the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or
court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last
occurs. xxx"
By issuing the assailed order, respondent court allegedly
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack/excess of jurisdiction.
10 | RULE 116
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court can indefinitely suspend the
arraignment of the accused until the petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) has been resolved.
HELD
YES. The power of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates even after the information
has already been filed in court is well settled. In Marcelo
vs. Court of Appeals,18 reiterated in Roberts vs. Court of
Appeals,19 we clarified that nothing in Crespo vs.
Mogul20 forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary
of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in
criminal cases despite an information already having
been filed in court.21
The nature of the Justice Secretary’s power of control
over prosecutors was explained in Ledesma vs. Court of
Appeals 22 in this wise:
"Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to
appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised
Administrative Code,23 exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who
may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice
secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity
or by an administrative agency should be corrected by
higher administrative authorities, and not directly by
courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are
exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed."24
Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information,
the court is in complete control of the case and any
disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion.25 The
decision to suspend arraignment to await the resolution of
an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of
such discretion. Consistent with our ruling in Marcelo,26 we
have since then held in a number of cases that a court
can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to
resolve, once and for all, the issue of whether or not
sufficient ground existed to file the information.27 This is in
line with our general pronouncement in Crespo28 that
courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion
over criminal prosecution.29 Thus, public respondent did
not act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended
the arraignment of private respondent to await the
resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice.
It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to
adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since the
court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess
the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree
with the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice.34 Reliance alone on the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial
court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine prima
facie case.35
Petitioner insists that in view of the passage of the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998, the review authority of the Secretary of
Justice after an information has been already filed in
court may possibly transgress the right of a party to a
speedy disposition of his case, in light of the mandatory
tenor of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 requiring that the
accused must be arraigned within thirty (30) days from
the filing of an information against him. Petitioner then
impresses upon this Court that there is a need to
reconcile the review authority of the Secretary of Justice
and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and submits that "the
Secretary of Justice must review the appeal and rule
thereon within a period of thirty (30) days from the date
the information was filed or from the date the accused
appeared in court (surrendered or arrested)"36 if only to
give meaning to the Speedy Trial Act.
We are not persuaded. The authority of the Secretary of
Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after
an information has already been filed in court does not
present an irreconcilable conflict with the thirty-day
period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act.
Contrary to the urgings of petitioner, Section 7 of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 prescribing the thirty-day period
for the arraignment of the accused is not absolute. In
fact, Section 10 of the same law enumerates periods of
delay that shall be excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence
As stated earlier, prudence and wisdom dictate that the
court should hold in abeyance the proceedings while the
Secretary of Justice resolves the petition for review
questioning the resolution of the prosecutor. The delay in
such a case is justified because the determination of
whether the delay is unreasonable, thus amounting to a
transgression of the right to a speedy trial, cannot be
simply reduced to a mathematical process. Hence, the
length of delay is not the lone criterion to be considered,
several factors must be taken into account in determining
whether or not the constitutional right to a speedy trial has
been violated. The factors to consider and balance are
the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion of the
right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by
such delay.38
The importance of the review authority of the Secretary
of Justice cannot be overemphasized; as earlier pointed
out, it is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies that holds that "mistakes, abuses
or negligence committed in the initial steps of an
administrative activity or by an administrative agency
should be corrected by higher administrative authorities,
and not directly by courts."39
We are not unmindful of the principle that while the right
to a speedy trial secures rights to the defendant, it does
not preclude the rights of public justice.40 However, in this
case, petitioner as private complainant in the criminal
11 | RULE 116
case, cannot deprive private respondent, accused
therein, of her right to avail of a remedy afforded to an
accused in a criminal case. The immediate arraignment
of private respondent would have then proscribed her
right as accused to appeal the resolution of the
prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice since Section 4 of
DOJ Order No. 223 of June 30, 1993 forestalls an appeal
to the Secretary of Justice if the accused/appellant has
already been arraigned.41 Hence, in this case, the order
suspending the arraignment of private respondent merely
allowed private respondent to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to her as accused in the criminal case
before the court could proceed to a full-blown trial.
The fact that public respondent issued the assailed order
suspending the arraignment of private respondent before
the "Motion to Defer Arraignment" of private respondent
could be heard is not tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion. It was well within the power of public
respondent to grant the continuance since Section 10 (f)
of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 clearly confers this
authority.
Public respondent substantially complied with the
requirement of Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act when
it stated its reasons for the deferment and eventual
suspension of the arraignment of private respondent in its
orders dated September 24, 199944 and November 22,
199945 . In said orders, public respondent reasoned that
the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent
was to give the opportunity to the accused to exhaust
the procedural remedies available,46 to allow the
Secretary of Justice to review the resolution of the City
Prosecutor47 so as not to deprive the former of his power
to review the action of the latter by a precipitate trial of
the case,48 and based on the discretionary power of the
trial judge to grant or deny the motion to suspend the
arraignment of the accused pending determination of
her petition for review at the Department of Justice.
10. People vs. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246 (1992)
FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation
of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After the prosecution
rested its case, counsel for private respondent verbally
manifested in open court that private respondent was
willing to change his former plea of “not guilty” to that of
“guilty” to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A.
No. 6425.
Respondent Judge issued an order directing private
respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to
the change of plea.
The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to
Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense.
Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court
to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging that the Rules
on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period
within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a
lesser offense. Respondent judge granted accused’s
motion and convicted him guilty beyond reasonable-
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Republic
Act No. 6425 thus this instant petition for review.
Counsel for the private respondent maintains that the
private respondent’s change of plea and his conviction
to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No.
6425 as amended is no longer open to review otherwise
his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be
violated.
ISSUE: W/N accused can invoke double jeopardy?
HELD: NO. The right against double jeopardy given to the
accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended
party consent to the private respondent’s change of
plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private
respondent cannot claim this privilege Instead, the more
pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section
7, Rule 117 which states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy-
…….
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a
bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former
complaint or information under any of the following
instances:
(a) . . . ;
(b) . . . ;
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended
party;
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be
prosecuted under the original charge of violation of
Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack
of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended
party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court’s
approval of his change of plea was irregular and
improper.
12 | RULE 116
12. People v Magat
GR 130026, 5/31/2000
FACTS:
RTC QC found accused-appellant Magat guilty of raping his
daughter twice and sentenced him to death and to pay
damages worth 750T pesos. Upon arraignment on Jan 10,
1997, Magat pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty
for each case.
RTC acknowledged and approved the lowering of penalty, and
sentenced Magat to suffer a jail term of ten (10) years
imprisonment for each case. After three months, Magat was
rearraigned because the complainant said that the penalty
imposed was “too light.”
Magat initially entered a plea of not guilty but eventually
changed to guilty. The court read to him the Informations in
English and Tagalog and repeatedly asked whether he
understood his change of plea and propounded questions as to
his understanding of the consequences of his plea.
RTC – Magat guilty of rape (2 informations), pay 220k
damages, sentenced to death by lethal injection. SC automatic
review.
ISSUE: WON trial court erred in rearraigning and proceeding
into trial despite the fact that he was already convicted per
Order of the trial court dated January 10, 1997 based on his
plea of guilt
RULING: The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court
convicting the accused-appellant on his own plea of guilt is
void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant’s plea is not
the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the
rules of procedure. The only instance where a plea bargaining
is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to
a lesser offense.
By pleading guilty to the offense charged, the accused should
be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. An accused
may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by
admitting his guilt provided that a certain penalty be meted
unto him.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to
a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and
only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as aptly observed
by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made
conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous
because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused-
appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he
pleaded.
A judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a
void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be
considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a
void judgment has no legality from its inception, and double
jeopardy will not lie. Also, when the accused failed to question
the procedural errors in the first arraignment, he is deemed to
have abandoned his right to question the same and waived the
errors in procedure.
ESCRA NOTES:
Criminal Procedure; Plea of Guilty; By pleading guilty to the
offense charged, the accused should be sentenced to the penalty
to which he pleaded. An accused may not foist a conditional plea
of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain
penalty be meted unto him.—It must be emphasized that accused-
appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the
rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as aptly
observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made
conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because
by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. It is the essence of a
plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally
his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. Hence, an
accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by
admitting his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto
him.
Where accused’s plea of guilty is a conditional plea, the
trial court should vacate such a plea and enter a plea of not
guilty.—Accused-appellant’s plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional
plea. Hence, the trial court should have vacated such a plea and
entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of guilty, or one
subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is
equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-
blown trial before judgment may be rendered.
Plea Bargaining; A judgment rendered by the trial court
which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio
and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple
reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception,
and double jeopardy will not lie.— Thus, since the judgment of
conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy
will not lie.
Arraignment; Waiver; When the accused failed to question
the procedural errors in the first arraignment, he is deemed to
have abandoned his right to question the same and waived the
errors in procedure.—Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in
the arraignment of the accused-appellant was rectified when he was
re-arraigned and entered a new plea. Accused-appellant did not
question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed
to do so, he is deemed to have abandoned his right to question the
same and waived the errors in procedure.
Plea of Guilty to a Capital Offense; Trial judges must
comply with the procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment,
particularly the rules governing a plea of guilty to a capital
offense in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the
mind of either the trial court or of the Supreme Court.—Under the
present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts
are now enjoined:
(a) to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea;
(b) to require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
(c) to ask the accused if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires.
This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges to
comply with the procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment,
particularly the rules governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense in
order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of either
the trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there
might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as
to the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty and to ascertain
the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which
justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity
in the imposition of the prescribed penalties. Apart from the
circumstances that such procedure may remove any doubt that the
accused fully understood the consequences of his plea is the fact that
the evidence taken thereon is essential to the fulfillment by this Court
of its duty of review of automatic appeals from death sentences.
The absence of the transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings during the arraignment does not make the procedure
flawed.—We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and are
convinced that the trial judge has faithfully discharged his bounden
duty as minister of the law to determine the voluntariness and full
understanding of accused-appellants’ plea of guilty.
13 | RULE 116
 The minutes of the proceedings indubitably show that the judge
read the Informations to the accused-appellant both in English and
Tagalog, asked him questions as to his understanding of the
consequences of his plea, his educational attainment and occupation.
Accused-appellant could have known of the consequence of his plea
having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the two (2)
letters sent to the trial court judge, accused-appellant not only admitted
his “sins” but also asked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to
reform.
When the trial court, in obedience to the Supreme Court’s
injunction, receives evidence to determine precisely whether or
not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which
the plea of guilty is made loses legal significance, for the simple
reason that the conviction is predicated not on the plea but on the
evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense
charged.—While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions
based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of the
improvidence of the plea, we did so only when such plea is the sole
basis of the judgment of the condemnatory judgment.
In such case, it cannot be claimed that defendant was
sentenced to death without having been previously informed of the
nature of the charges against him and of the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances recited in the information, as he is fully
apprised not only of the allegations in the information but of the entire
evidence of the prosecution.
14. PEOPLE v.LAKINDANUM
G.R. No. 127123. March 10, 1999
FACTS:
On or about the 8th day of September, 1996, in the City
of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, JOSEPH
LAKINDANUM y Calma, by means of intimidation, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, have
carnal knowledge upon the person of one CATHERINE
CALAGUIN who is under 12 years of age, to her damage
and prejudice.
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded "not guilty" to the
offense charged. On October 2, 1996, however, just
before the direct examination of the victim started, the
defense counsel manifested that the accused wanted to
withdraw his original plea of "not guilty" and replace it
with a "guilty" plea. The Court gave defense counsel time
to confer with his client and apprise him of the
consequences of entering a guilty plea. läwvirtualibrär
At the next hearing, the trial court judge examined the
accused to determine the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the plea he was about to make.
Thereafter, Lakindanum was rearraigned and he pleaded
"guilty" to the charge.
The trial court then proceeded to hear the evidence of
the prosecution to establish Lakindanum's guilt and the
precise degree of his culpability. Since the defense
already admitted the genuineness and authenticity of
the victim's birth certificate and the medical certificate
issued by the doctor who examined her, only the victim,
Catherine Calaguin, was presented as the lone
prosecution witness
Based on Catherine's testimony, it appears that at around
ten o'clock in the morning of September 8, 1996, she rode
with the accused in the latter's tricycle together with her
grandmothers Sion, Anit, and Coring. The three, however,
alighted at Banaoang, leaving Catherine alone with the
accused in the tricycle.
Instead of heading home to Malued, Lakindanum drove
toward Bonuan and, upon reaching a secluded place
concealed from the highway by milly mounds, parked his
tricycle and joined Catherine in the passenger cab. He
removed his pants and underwear and proceeded to
take off Catherine's short pants and panty. Thereafter,
Lakindanum placed the girl on top of his lap and inserted
his penis into her vagina, accomplishing full penetration
and causing her to cry from excruciating pain. Not
satisfied, he then inserted his finger into Catherine's
vagina. Before taking her home, Lakindanum threatened
to kill Catherine if she told anyone about the incident.
Upon reaching home, Catherine did not tell her parents
about what happened. However, her mother noticed
that her shorts were bloodied and immediately brought
her to the hospital for examination. It was there that
Catherine revealed her ordeal to the doctor. According
to the medical certificate which was admitted as
evidence, Catherine's vagina bore lacerations and had
traces of spermatozoa.
ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court erred in accepting the plea of
guilt of the accused
RULING:
Yes. The Court observes that indeed, the manner by
which the trial court judge conducted the inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the accused-
appellant's plea of guilty leaves much to be desired.
The rule is that where the accused desires to plead guilty
to a capital offense, the court is enjoined to observe the
following:
1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to
present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if
he desires.5
From the foregoing, it is clear that the judge can hardly
be said to have satisfied the requirement of conducting a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension by the accused of entering a guilty plea.
Worse, the judge erroneously informed Lakindanum that
14 | RULE 116
by pleading guilty, the latter forfeited his right to testify
and to adduce evidence in his defense. Section 4, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court is clear on the matter:
"Sec. 4. Plea of guilty to a capital offense; reception of
evidence. -- When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf."
In People vs. Alicando,6 the Court stressed that the plea
of guilty to a capital offense is null and void where the
trial court inadequately discharged the duty of
conducting a "searching inquiry." In that case, the Court
remanded the case to the trial court for rearraignment
and trial on the merits.
Considering that Lakindanum stands accused of a
capital offense for which he may be put to death, the
trial judge should have been more vigilant and solicitous
in making sure that the accused-appellant clearly
understood the legal consequences of the plea he was
about to make.
16.People vs Toncayao
G.R. Nos. 134531-32
July 7, 2004
FACTS:
Accused was charged with 2 counts of rape. After
he manifested that he was pleading guilty, the court
simply asked him whether he knew that the possible
penalty for both crimes is death. When he answered
affirmatively, the court directed the prosecution to
adduce evidence.Thereafter, the court sentenced
accused to death.
ISSUE:
Was there sufficient compliance with Section 3, Rule
116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure?
HELD:
No. A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme
penalty of death is insufficient.20 Such procedure falls
short of the exacting guidelines in the conduct of a
"searching inquiry", as follows:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody
of the law; (b) whether he had the
assistance of a competent counsel
during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what
conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations.
This is intended to rule out the possibility
that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent quarters or simply
because of the judge's intimidating
robes.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of
questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the
personality profile of the accused, such
as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused of the exact
length of imprisonment or nature of the
penalty under the law and the certainty
that he will serve such sentence. For not
infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in
the hope of a lenient treatment or upon
bad advice or because of promises of
the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it
not only the admission of authorship of
the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it,
that increase punishment.
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the
crime with which he is charged and to
fully explain to him the elements of the
crime which is the basis of his indictment.
Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental
right to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation against him
and a denial of his right to due process.
(6) All questions posed to the accused
should be in a language known and
understood by the latter.
15 | RULE 116
 (7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that
the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly Held: YES
guilty. The accused must be required to
narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
or furnish its missing details.21 Procedure, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into
18. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
appellee, vs. PAULINO SEVILLENO y consequences of his plea. It must also require the
VILLANUEVA alias TAMAYO, accused- prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
appellant. his culpability. If the accused so desires he may also
present evidence in his behalf. This procedure is
mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it commits
G.R. No. 129058 March 29, 1999
grave abuse of discretion. 13
The questions propounded by the trial judge during
FACTS:
arraignment hardly satisfied the requisite searching
inquiry. Regrettably, there were only two (2) questions
On July 25, 1995, appellant Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva
propounded to the accused: First. Do you understand
alias Tamayo was charged with rape with homicide in an
your plea of guilt? Second. Do you know that your plea
Information which reads:
of guilt could bring death penalty?
That on or about 10:00 o’clock a.m., July 22, 1995 at
In every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty
Hacienda San Antonio, Barangay Guadalupe, San Carlos
to a capital offense, especially where he is an ignorant
City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
person with little or no education, the proper and prudent
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
course to follow is to take such evidence as are available
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
and necessary in support of the material allegations of
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
the information, including the aggravating circumstances
have carnal knowledge of one VIRGINIA BAKIA, a minor,
therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge
9 years of age, against the latter’s will and consent; and
himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining
after attaining his purpose of ravishing said Virginia Bakia,
whether the accused really and truly understood and
accused, did, then and there, with intent to hide his
comprehended the meaning, full significance and
identity and to prevent discovery thereof, with intent to
consequences of his plea. 14
kill, strangled said Virginia Bakia which directly resulted to
her death
In the instant case, the trial court did not bother to
explain the essential elements of the crime of rape with
On arraignment, appellant entered a guilty plea. Trial
homicide with which the accused was charged. On the
proceeded to determine the voluntariness and full
same note, the trial judge also failed to inform the
comprehension of the plea. However, during the
accused the certainty by which the death penalty would
pendency of the proceedings, appellant escaped from
be imposed on him and the fact that he would also be
prison but he was recaptured several months later.
made to indemnify the heirs of his victim. As a result, the
accused was not properly accorded his fundamental
By pleading guilty to the rape and killing of a nine (9)-
right to be informed of the precise nature of the
year old girl the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City,
accusation leveled against him. 15 Thus, it is with
Negros Occidental, Br. 57, on 6 March 1997, rendered its
apprehension that ruling for the affirmance of the
Decision finding accused guilty of rape with homicide
decision in this case will prejudice the due observance of
and sentenced him to death.
the fundamental requirements of fairness and due
process. 16 The constitutional rights of the accused are for
This case is now on automatic review. The defense
the protection of the guilty and of the innocent alike.
contends that the court a quo erred in convicting the
Only with the assurance that even the guilty shall be
accused and imposing upon him the penalty of death as
given the benefit of every constitutional guaranty can
it failed to observe the required procedure for cases
the innocent be secure in the same rights.
where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense
when arraigned. 12 The defense also argues that the
19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ERNESTO M.
arraignment conducted by the trial court was null and
MENDOZA G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994
void as it did not conduct a "searching inquiry" before
accepting the plea of guilt and sentencing the accused
FACTS:
to death. It concludes that since the arraignment was
fatally defective and not in accordance with law, the
This is a petition assailing the judgment of respondent
case must be remanded to the court of origin for the
Judge Ernesto M. Mendoza in Crim. Case No. 4264
proper arraignment of the accused before the capital
acquitting accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, private
punishment may be imposed.
respondent herein, of the crime of robbery with force
upon things notwithstanding his plea of guilt. Petitioner
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in conducting a
prays that respondent Judge be ordered to reverse his
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
judgment exonerating Magalop and, instead, to impose
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of the
upon him the proper penalty for the offense to which he
accused
pleaded guilty.

16 | RULE 116

The evidence discloses that on 20 January 1987, the
storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home
Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked.
After an on-the-spot investigation, the police found
themselves at a loss as to the identity of the culprit or
culprits. The value of the missing articles was estimated at
P15,298.15.
Eventually, responsibility for the robbery with force upon
things was laid on accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion,
Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias
Ricky. All three (3) were represented by District Citizens
Attorney Isidro L. Caracol. At the arraignment on 23 June
1987, Magalop pleaded "guilty" while Fernandez pleaded
"not guilty." The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as
he was "not mentally well."
Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the
court a quo conducted trial. The prosecution presented
Pat. Jakosalem, INP, who investigated the break-in, as
well as a clerk and a storekeeper of the BNSHI. The
prosecution likewise offered in evidence colored pictures
of the ransacked storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers
colored blue, a pair of long-nose pliers colored red, and
a coping saw. The last three items were said to have
been recovered by the police.
On 8 October 1987, respondent Judge acquitted
accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier
pleaded guilty to the charge.
The trial court ruled that:
As shown by the evidence of the prosecution, some of
the stolen things were in the possession of a certain Babie
Tan, consisting of two pliers and a saw, and these were all
allegedly sold to said Babie Tan who refused to testify on
the matter.
The evidence of the prosecution failed to prove that the
three accused were responsible for stealing these three
articles or tools.
Although Juan Magalop pleaded guilty, it was not shown
who (how?) they conspired and helped each other in the
commission of the crime charged. To the Court, the plea
of Juan Magalop was not intelligently done. In the course
of the proceedings, it was not established how Juan
Magalop and Petronilo Fernandez participated in the
looting. No evidence was introduced to show that the
accused sold the stolen things to Babie Tan, which the
prosecution could have proved to show that the
possessors of the stolen things could have been identified
as the thief or thieves; hence, the prosecution utterly
failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
doubt (emphasis supplied).
Petitioner interposed the decision and submits that the
accused Magalop, who was assisted by counsel, had
voluntarily, spontaneously and intelligently pleaded guilty
to the crime of robbery with force upon things. Thus, the
trial court had no alternative but to pronounce judgment
and impose the proper penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plea of Magalop was
intelligently made
HELD: NO
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits
his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge and
understanding of the precise nature of the crime
charged in the information as well as the consequences
of his plea.4 It is an unconditional admission of guilt with
respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to
defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court
with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law
under the circumstances.5 Thus, under the 1985 New
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when the
accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court
may receive evidence from the parties to determine the
penalty to be imposed.6
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear
abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in
holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and
sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the
evidence points to his acquittal. There is no rule which
provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty
to the charge that his conviction automatically follows.
Additional evidence independent of the plea may be
considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently
made.
Here it is evident, even from the start, that the case of the
prosecution against the three (3) accused was virtually
non-existent as the asported articles were found in the
possession of a certain Babie Tan and yet, quite
inexplicably, the prosecution did not summon him to the
witness stand. Babie Tan could have positively identified
those who sold him the stolen articles if called to testify.
Or, he could very well have been the perpetrator of the
crime himself. In the absence of an explanation of how
one has come into possession of stolen effects, the
possessor is presumed to be the author of the crime of
robbery.
Indeed, not even the testimonies and the mute exhibits
introduced during the trial could breathe life into the
moribund state of the case for the prosecution. While the
loss of articles in the storeroom of the BNSHI was
established, there was nothing, independent of the
acknowledgment of guilt, which could link accused
Magalop to the robbery. As the trial court succinctly put
it, "the plea of Juan Magalop was not intelligently done."
26. People vs Alcalde
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL ALCALDE y
PASCASIO
G.R. Nos. 139225-28 ; May 29, 2002
Facts:
ARNEL convicted of two counts of parricide committed
against his wife and his 11-month-old son and two counts
17 | RULE 116
of frustrated parricide committed against his two
daughters.
Upon his arraignment, ARNEL, who was assisted by a
counsel de parte, acted strangely in a manner as if he
[was] out of touch with the world and would not utter any
word. The trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in
each of the cases. On the same occasion, the defense
waived pre-trial. The cases were then consolidated and
jointly tried.
After the prosecution finally rested its case, Defense
counsel for ARNEL, Atty. Vasquez Sr., informed the trial
court of his inability to communicate with ARNEL because
of ARNEL’s “out of touch of the world” behavior. Atty.
Vasquez manifested that the defense was constrained to
submit the case for decision.
In these cases neither accused nor his counsel de parte
asked for the suspension of the arraignment on the
ground of mental incapacity. The OSG maintains that
such failure was tantamount to an admission that ARNEL
was not suffering from any mental disorder or to a waiver
of the right to move for suspension of arraignment.

ISSUE: Whether or not ARNEL’s arraignment was valid (as

he was in a questionable mental state).

Held: Invalid.
It must be recalled that ARNEL’s arraignment was on 22
October 1997. At the time, what was applicable was
Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Nowhere in that Section was it required that a
motion by the accused be filed for the suspension of
arraignment. Hence, the absence of such motion could
not be considered a waiver of the right to a suspension of
arraignment.
Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which was invoked by the OSG, requires a motion by the
proper party. This new requirement of “motion by the
proper party” could not be applied to these cases
because the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
prescribes such requirement, took effect only on 1
December 2000.
Besides, a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently
made by the person possessing such right. Unfortunately,
ARNEL was apparently deprived of such mental faculties.
Thus, no waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been
made by ARNEL at the time of his arraignment by reason
of his mental condition.
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of
Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to
effectively convey to the accused the information to
enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. At the
bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration
of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part
of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the
proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the
accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the
law secures or gives
Even if Atty. Vasquez’s zeal for ARNEL’s cause fell short of
that required of him, that is, for him to have asked the
court to suspend the arraignment of ARNEL on the
ground of the latter’s unsound mental health, the greater
demand of due process overwhelms such inadequate
zeal.

18 | RULE 116