Republic of The Philippines

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R.

Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May
27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the
Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, to whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for
investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of

Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R.
Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs,
against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning
the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes,
the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs.
Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased
Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the
deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the
only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes
with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who
were the children of the deceased by his second
marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the
deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter
and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties
were acquired by the deceased during his second
marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made,
those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into
two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to
defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased
mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the
share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be
divided equally among his children by his two
marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by

respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING

CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a
preponderance of evidence, finds and so
holds, and hereby renders judgment (1)
Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only
children legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene
Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales to have been an illegitimate child of
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots
Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581,
4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses
Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4)
Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No.
3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco
Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common
partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No.
1184 as belonging exclusively to the
deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6)
Declaring the defendant Bernardita R.
Macariola, being the only legal and forced
heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the
exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots
Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581,
4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892,
5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of
one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging
to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7)
Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive
owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and
one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot
2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-
fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to
the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8)
Directing the division or partition of the estate
of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as
to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving
widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary
share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in
relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code),
and the remaining portion of the estate to be
divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R.
Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes
and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in
such a way that the extent of the total share
of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the
hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share
of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the
defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of
the latter to receive equal shares from the
hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14
Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G.
[3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties,
within thirty days after this judgment shall
have become final to submit to this court, for
approval a project of partition of the
hereditary estate in the proportion above
indicated, and in such manner as the parties
may, by agreement, deemed convenient and
equitable to them taking into consideration
the location, kind, quality, nature and value of
the properties involved; (10) Directing the
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of
this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by
the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by the
second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other
claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of

an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of
partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is
marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project
of partition was not signed by the parties themselves
but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order
dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is
quoted hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective

counsels, presented to this Court for approval
the following project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the

defendant in the above-entitled case, to this
Honorable Court respectfully submit the
following Project of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and

4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita
Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of

2,373.49 square meters along the eastern
part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to
Bernardita R. Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be

awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of

1,834.55 square meters along the western
part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to
Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided

equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of

Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions
awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall
be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares,
provided, however that the remaining portion
of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to
Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that

the Project of Partition indicated above which
is made in accordance with the decision of
the Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the

Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the

Plaintiff Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for

all the parties to have signed this Project of
Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of
both counsels of the respective parties to this
Court that the Project of Partition, as above-
quoted, had been made after a conference
and agreement of the plaintiffs and the
defendant approving the above Project of
Partition, and that both lawyers had
represented to the Court that they are given
full authority to sign by themselves the
Project of Partition, the Court, therefore,
finding the above-quoted Project of Partition
to be in accordance with law, hereby
approves the same. The parties, therefore,
are directed to execute such papers,
documents or instrument sufficient in form
and substance for the vesting of the rights,
interests and participations which were
adjudicated to the respective parties, as
outlined in the Project of Partition and the
delivery of the respective properties
adjudicated to each one in view of said
Project of Partition, and to perform such other
acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate
the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of

October, 1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended

on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving
authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of
title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the
project of partition (see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of

partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an
area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according
to the decision was the exclusive property of the
deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said
project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita
Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in
equal shares, and when the project of partition was
approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot
1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot
1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a

stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1
and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of
2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr.
Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer
certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of
the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife

Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around
1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife,
Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion
was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh.
F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses

Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest
in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of
said sale the stockholders of the corporation were
Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime
Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife,
Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the
President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-
4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we
shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-
385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the

instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of
action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article
1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that
he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a
ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor
and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing
with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly
advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in
fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not
a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable
defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent
Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his

answer to which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein
complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred
this case to then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of
Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After
hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated
May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be
reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action
alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action,
respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is
prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and
fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that
respondent Judge be exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968

(pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R.
Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants,"
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the
annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by
respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of
the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It
appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the
civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was
dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March
6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on
August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case
against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground
that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the
aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184
acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon
was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases
against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben
Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial,
Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and
Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the
conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her
counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on
June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and
now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and
decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B.

ASUNCION
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First

Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of
Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C"
and "C- 3"] approving the partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B.

Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola

to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED

THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral
damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND

PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary
damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS

[P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and
(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS

[PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR
HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants

Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased
Gerardo Villasin;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants

Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the
cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE

DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET
AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 3010 —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants

Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis,
Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O.
Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT

BONIFACIO RAMO —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio

Ramo the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision

was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the
appeal on February 22, 1971.
I
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant

Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491,
paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties
involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by

purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of

superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession
[emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or

assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the
persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for
the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property
must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513,
519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA
641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased
on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already
final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer
subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March
6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the
amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October
16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963
decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said
orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on

March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010
but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31,
1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla
Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184
or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal
shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto
Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the
same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to
1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to
Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold
a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who
declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent
sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses
Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E
to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which
respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took
place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010
and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the
project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or
about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to
annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the
same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent
conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6,

1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence,
after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8,
1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated
October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the
property was no longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case

No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts
— that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of
Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after the
finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent

Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders
approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of
the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of
the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31,

1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes,
Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to
conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent
Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of
partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the
Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important
question whether or not the acquisition by respondent
of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer
of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent
was the President and his wife the Secretary, was
intimately related to the Order of respondent approving
the project of partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or

participation in the transactions between the Reyeses
and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he
insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show
that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot
1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of
Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no

evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio
Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in
acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon
appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen,
credible and sincere, and I believe him when he
testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for
valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any
intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge
Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge

acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was
not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of
the Investigating Justice, as follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should

have required the signature of the parties more
particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of
partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that
respect was done in good faith as according to Judge
Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the
counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was
authorized by his client to submit said project of
partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969).
While it is true that such written authority if there was
any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor
did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of
respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was
presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations
of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that
she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A,
and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the
following documents:
1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520

covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in
which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4
share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order
dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the
project of partition was duly entered and registered on
November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale

executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola on October
22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-
fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot
1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she
was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the
same having been adjudicated to her as her share in
the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per
decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under
case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly
registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on
December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is

to be noted that in the project of partition dated October
16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on
October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on
November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was
adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot
1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October
22, 1963, several days after the preparation of the
project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however,

that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by
virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not
because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such
contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C,
it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154
belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while
the other half of said one-fourth was the share of
complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words,
the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-
fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs.
C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of the
entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the
project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola
sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other
reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution
of the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A
and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs.
Macariola admitted during the cross-examination that
she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of
Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968)
from which we can deduce that she could not have
been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010
relative to the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition

because according to her the properties adjudicated to
her were insignificant lots and the least valuable.
Complainant, however, did not present any direct and
positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities
in the choice and distribution of the real properties
when she could have easily done so by presenting
evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and
market value of said properties. Without such evidence
there is nothing in the record to show that there were
inequalities in the distribution of the properties of
complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his
court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the
same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should
be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating
Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent
to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property
that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be
transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking
officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted
position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of
maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of
justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust
in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular
case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot
1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion
and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E
was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing
it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he
should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and
transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were
financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his
acquisition was related in one way or another to his official
actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave
cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in
his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and
fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice"
(pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant

alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself
with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been
organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in

commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they
hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or
financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or
towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of

the department of public prosecution in active service.
This provision shall not be applicable to mayors,
municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys
nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging
the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions

may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is

incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the
nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between
the government and certain public officers and employees, like
justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which
deals with the organization and operation of the governmental
organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897
[1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces
constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law
including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature
of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of
certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in
business: hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the

Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications
made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de
Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal
Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this
jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States
and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330,
311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory

by one nation to another, either following a conquest or
otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their
nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
government immediately cease upon the transfer of
sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not

in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue
in force without the express assent or affirmative act of
the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int.
Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of
the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be
continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by
affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the
war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's
Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed.
142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs.
356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed.
242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it

has never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any
change. Their relations with their former
sovereign are dissolved, and new relations
are created between them and the
government which has acquired their territory.
The same act which transfers their country,
transfers the allegiance of those who remain
in it; and the law which may be denominated
political, is necessarily changed, although
that which regulates the intercourse and
general conduct of individuals, remains in
force, until altered by the newly- created
power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this
Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the

effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce
after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States
and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article
14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and
cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First
Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge

violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In

addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or

pecuniary interest in any business, contract
or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any Iaw from having any
interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated

paragraph because there is no showing that respondent
participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or
transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which
respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection
with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that
kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case
involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code
which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or
indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in
which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a
public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by
reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or
transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts
or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit
this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134,
cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174,
Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid
corporation gained any undue advantage in its business
operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it,
or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any
case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was
no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party plaintiff
or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R.
Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the
complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the
aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case
No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided
on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when
respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation,
having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph

because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law
expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or
having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended,

also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any
prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of
said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other
vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but
with the permission of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits

judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated,
deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New

Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in
litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform
their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale
of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders
approving the project of partition; hence, the property was no
longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service

Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an
officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of department, the same,
however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the last
portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by
the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any
interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or
regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or
employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business
without a written permission from the Department Head may not
constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated

Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the
Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service
Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule
XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said
Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a

member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as
amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by
Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss
judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in
the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds,
namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the
recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is
authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the
Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding
investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds
and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution,

only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as
well as other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959:

"The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil
Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in
the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or
employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for
not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not
exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of
Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service
officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil

service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority
of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the
Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which
they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and
the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the
department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260)
[1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only
other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973
Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot
be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges
because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be
adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as
aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two
grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and
inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is

the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive
jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after
submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent
officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as
provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their
removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating
to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and
employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations
governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied).
There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government as a Presidential
appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision.
WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of
Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent
officers and employees who belong to the classified service come
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil
Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-
Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private

business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not
violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as
well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the
impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon
25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal
investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved
in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the
bench, he should not retain such investments
previously made, longer than a period sufficient to
enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is
desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible,
refrain from all relations which would normally tend to
arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias
his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in
the administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge

and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the
aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third
parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not
in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as
there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles
of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of
respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such
disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the
corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation,
indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in
the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent
Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their
immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and
before it became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant

alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and
acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was
culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE
agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating
Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the
aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the
pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the

claim that respondent associated and closely
fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and
publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see
Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said
Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of
Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as
certified to in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador

Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the
time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member
of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion
of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that
Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as
an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a
signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at
Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was
but natural for respondent and any person for that
matter to have accepted that statement on its face
value. "Now with respect to the allegation of
complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with
Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his
wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism
(Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render
respondent guilty of violating any canon of judicial
ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador
A. Tan and family did not influence his official actuations
as a judge where said persons were concerned. There
is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent
gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador
Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of
law from his personal relations with respondent, or that
he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of
the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador
Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the

judiciary to refrain as much as possible from
maintaining close friendly relations with practising
attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid
suspicion 'that his social or business relations or
friendship constitute an element in determining his
judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but
if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would
not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it
be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his
official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his
friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate

Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in
his court and in engaging in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in
his private and business activities, because his conduct as a
member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with
propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF

THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE
MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,

Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I vote with Justice Aquino.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I vote with Justice Aquino.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR.
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND

HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.

CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR.,
FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY
LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN,
EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ,
ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-
JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,
GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,
MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE
GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO
PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY,
JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III,
ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN,
MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS,
CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO
BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA,
JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA
SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO
IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA
LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON,
JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO
DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA,
ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR.,
AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA.

CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD,
JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.

GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR,

MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO,
EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO
NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO
MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS,
NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE
TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN,
MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO,
MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA
LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE,
JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ,
ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY
SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA,
RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA,
ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA,
JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA,
MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T.

REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A

MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY
THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY
HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE
SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.

PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-
RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S.
RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.
DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO,
SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND
IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP
OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE
HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT
TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES
OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT

AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY.
DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY

CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU
PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY
ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF
ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
[CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA,
MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW],
REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY
THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE
NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT
CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY
REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON,
AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no

matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may
appear to be, over the determination by the independent
branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their
respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often

frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among
these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such
today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn
legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that

the present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether
the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives
falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view
that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution

is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy
spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first
instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of
resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its
resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to,
not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy,

this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances

which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper
the official acts of each of these three branches must be given
effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican

government, intended as they are to insure that governmental
power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a
relationship of interdependence and coordination among these
branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting
and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and
well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and

employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the

Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have

the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the

House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of

impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against

the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend

further than removal from office and disqualification to hold
any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on

impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the

Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28,
2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions
between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are
shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS 12TH CONGRESS

RULES NEW RULES
RULE II RULE V
INITIATING BAR AGAINST

IMPEACHMENT INITIATION OF
IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of PROCEEDINGS
Initiating AGAINST THE SAME
Impeachment. – OFFICIAL
Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a Section 16.
verified complaint for – Impeachment
impeachment filed by Proceedings
any Member of the Deemed Initiated. – In
House of cases where a
Representatives or by Member of the House
any citizen upon a files a verified
resolution of complaint of
endorsement by any impeachment or a
Member thereof or by a citizen files a verified
verified complaint or complaint that is
resolution of endorsed by a
impeachment filed by at Member of the House
least one-third (1/3) of through a resolution of
all the Members of the endorsement against
House. an impeachable
officer, impeachment
proceedings against
such official are
deemed initiated on
the day the Committee
on Justice finds that
the verified complaint
and/or resolution
against such official,
as the case may be, is
sufficient in substance,
or on the date the
House votes to
overturn or affirm the
finding of the said
Committee that the
verified complaint
and/or resolution, as
the case may be, is
not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a
verified complaint or a
resolution of
impeachment is filed
or endorsed, as the
case may be, by at
least one-third (1/3) of
the Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are
deemed initiated at
the time of the filing
of such verified
complaint or
resolution of
impeachment with
the Secretary
General.
RULE V Section 17. Bar

Against Initiation Of
BAR AGAINST Impeachment
IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – Within
a period of one (1)
Section 14. Scope of
year from the date
Bar. – No impeachment
impeachment
proceedings shall be
proceedings are
initiated against the
deemed initiated as
same official more than
provided in Section 16
once within the period
hereof, no
of one (1) year.
impeachment
proceedings, as such,
can be initiated against
the same official.
(Italics in the original;
emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a

Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be

filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that

the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this
effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of
the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of
the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First
District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of

Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as
it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr.,

alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of
the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th
Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment
complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been
violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28,
2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V,
Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof
be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et.
al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or
strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to
promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and
(3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as

citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the
Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad

Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for
Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public
funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further
proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that

this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring
petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v.
PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second
impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as

taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their
petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House
of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and
transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint,
and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F.

Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as
members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal
interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment
proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and
any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming

that they have a right to be protected against all forms of
senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an
obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and
the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that
(1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be
declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and
the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying
and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ
of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents
to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose

members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin
T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar,
both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature
is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves
paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a

citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N.
Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to
enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines,

alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules
be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with
the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in

his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu

Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all
citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of
succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate
from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment
complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the
second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent
House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of
the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio
Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and
that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a
direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the
Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from
receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due
course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer,

alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella
and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment
complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as
they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief
Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and

Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an
abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they
are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the
House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the
Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without

alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second
impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not
the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance
with law and that the House of Representatives does not have
exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays
in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of
Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging

that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in
its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives
be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the
Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting
the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as

citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint
as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the
respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void
and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon
be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against
the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the
same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and

160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed
for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and
160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar
relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No.
160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a
legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of
the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of

Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but
it was not carried because the House of Representatives
adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date,
the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the
Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary

restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were
filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug
offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer.
Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him
to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in

its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the
petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and
the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the
petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the
petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.;
and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In
addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to
maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting
for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would
render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or
its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear,
much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which
is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally
mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date,
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion
to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that
"the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings
and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as
the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases,
including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be
recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of
the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this

Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier
consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their
comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c)
include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through

Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating
that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature
and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of
the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented
before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the
Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal
issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for
Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status
quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the
ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in
a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the
petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete

Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition
in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol

ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for
Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World
War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator

Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's
Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici
curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator
Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by
this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may

be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what
time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this
time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of

impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of

impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on

Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive

issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad
arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of
the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them
to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or
not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-
requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These
matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the

power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present
1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to

settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
(Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively

expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present
Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII,
Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice
Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement,

the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course

lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by
which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels,for then the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions
of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere
political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in
any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not
to speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of

government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that
is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function
is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the
government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to

"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review
is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such
power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period
of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the
1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of
judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to
wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in

declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the
United States generally, but those only which shall be made
in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of

the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by
that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its

express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial
review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally
infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor
and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the
executive and legislative branches of our government in fact
effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7
of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and

their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations

shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review

is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks
and balances which, together with the corollary principle of
separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for
the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in

our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary
in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise
of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice

Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and
the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him,
"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in
that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb

grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities
of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block
letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the
following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former

Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read

it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of
the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a
product of our experience during martial law. As a matter
of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of
the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of
cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the
writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order
the release of political detainees, and other matters related
to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary
feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial
law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of

power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty
to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant

petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself
which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our

search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there,
but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. They are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule
of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with
the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the

intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus,
it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by
its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light
of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as
to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where,

speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-
Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping

with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be

interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this
Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention

could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution
merely for the benefit of one person without considering
that it could also affect others.When they adopted
subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this

Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional

construction that no one provision of the Constitution is
to be separated from all the others, to be considered
alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be
so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject
should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by
any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if

practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult

the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when
the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional

refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial
review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the
Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the
coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De

Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot
assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or
incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is
beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the

Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely
excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine
constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment

proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely
heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in
the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to
try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under
which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary;
and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US
Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review
in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American

jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the
Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as
provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues
pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion
of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave
abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support
the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the

American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no
longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is
concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n
resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the
Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In
the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical
cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine

Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while
the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also
a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution

and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the
House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While
the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the
House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section
3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year
bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of

impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon
this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the
people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted
the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows
that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language
of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through
the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v.

Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that
the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review,
are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for
writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised

the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,
in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within
the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of
the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable
controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a
resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it
held that the resolution of whether the House representation in
the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza
v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives
in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments
is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that
although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of
the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by
the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective
of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges
of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that

the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts'

power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to

actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function
is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal

and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions,

contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the
Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal
injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners
have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing
to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases
involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental
importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the
need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan
of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing
transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception
that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights
by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice
who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-

interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of
civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding
standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling
in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus
standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in

interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to
note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and
public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions
relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in
interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain
parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a
partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy
concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain
areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because

in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or by
official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest"

is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured
by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a
violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights
– as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in
a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession –
which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional
acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers

and legislators when specific requirements have been met have
been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the

constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must
be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact
that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a

claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is
a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or
not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to
grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that
any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of

any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives
has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its

members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial
taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the
mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any
member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of
law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice
to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the
petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of
all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to
fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to
deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a
judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members
of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it
clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently
represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the
numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class
suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as
citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the

sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U.
Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance,

the following instructive determinants formulated by former
Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1)
the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2)
the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court
is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of
transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude
on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to
craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as
when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the
requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is
totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the
existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can
take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege
any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of

the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the
courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino

Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in
G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise
the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the
part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this
Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang

Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No.
160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that
"they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members
of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found
the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos.

160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310
were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-
Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue
of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the
Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed
by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were
hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene
for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of
view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that
submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President
does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit
as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly,
Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the
herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate
all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to
Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to
argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same

must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he
failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's
suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the

expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do
said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there
is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC,
or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to

allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement
of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar
does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando,

held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what
was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate
legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of
the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is
questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the
second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed
before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the

instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate
President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent
need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the
final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should
first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P.

College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice
of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second
impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines
that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for
members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the
Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to
the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming
that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice
can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a
motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by

the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure
the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity.
Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only
place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the
Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer
their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from

either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is
shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the
House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the
power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality,
whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as
said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier
quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot
be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto

Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance,

what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly

without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of
taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In
some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political
question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial
review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political
nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed
jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the
landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which
raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified,
hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine
and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a
Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question
doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he
became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's
power of judicial review and its application on issues involving
political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I

suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest
among the three major branches of the service. Since the
legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the
judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or
commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience
which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful
of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the
body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by
the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former

Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read

it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of
the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a

product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of
fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of
cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly
the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts
to order the release of political detainees, and other
matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the defense of
political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well,
since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the
people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the
members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for
the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not
lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the
Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the
Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was
announced on September 22, although the proclamation
was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay
in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on
September 21. So that when martial law was announced on
September 22, the media hardly published anything about it.
In fact, the media could not publish any story not only
because our main writers were already incarcerated, but
also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were
under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling
party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on
June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished
the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of
the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of
martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional
Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them
was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So,
the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by
representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished
what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The
draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President
around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued
a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation
of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters
of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a
free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a
plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may
use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople,
during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution
was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President
suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
announced that he would consult the people in a referendum
to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions
to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until
the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed
supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what
was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays."
Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to
be propounded were released with proposed answers
thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a
plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court
praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended.
When the motion was being heard before the Supreme
Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a
proclamation of the President declaring that the new
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming
majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister
of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case
was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties
the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in
force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the
presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense
put up by the government was that the issue was a political
question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain
the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January

10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court
were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified
of any referendum in their respective places of residence,
much less did they participate in the alleged referendum.
None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire.

So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had
been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a

plebiscite. There is a big difference between a
referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of
justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is
not the only major case in which the plea of "political
question" was set up. There have been a number of
other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected

because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to
perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What
is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main
function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of
rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are
rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced
by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband
complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties
as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her
duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with
them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her
main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights
guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce
them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to
human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I

provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,

hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another
important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of
justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty
to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1,

which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the

Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief

Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power,
thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial

power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme
Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be
created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The
Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial

power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers

to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to
whether the government had authority or had abused its
authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess
of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore,
the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be

decided by the Supreme Court according to the new
numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do

away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an

abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. .
.
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is

not intended to do away with the political question
doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to
define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will
notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason
being that the definition that we might make may not
cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the

problems arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the

fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of
judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986

Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not
only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated
by the mere specter of this creature called the political question
doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there
are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions"
and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the

reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not
truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of

the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases
taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political
following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame

Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice

Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that

this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as
held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination
of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.
It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does
away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz,

this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection

becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are
justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political
questions, however. Identification of these two species of political
questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard.
The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.112(Underscoring
supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3)
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are
not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in
that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the
others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the

American concept of judicial review is radically different from our
current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether
they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question

from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment

complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in

accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee

on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an
unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on

Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred

under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second

impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue
would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is
a purely political question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate
the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes
than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both,
without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-
justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its
judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing

the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided
whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on
Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass

upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by
the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may
rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until
a case arises in which a decision upon such question
will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and
32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of
due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry
into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must
be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper
party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality

unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all

seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint,
collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the
outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial
issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related
cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue

that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is
invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a
legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative
inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being:
(a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in
aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation
of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s
claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative
inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the
second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said
issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than
is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion
is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have
raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not
be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of

legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court
in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of

both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its

respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries

in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its
exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of
the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right
to due process and the right not be compelled to testify
against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete

Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the
second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of

proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of

Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that
the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed
"by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the
exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the
signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the
same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point
to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which
states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of

Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the

Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment
complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment
and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least
one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not
having complied with this requirement, they concede that the
second impeachment complaint should have been calendared
and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section
3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be

filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong

who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to
apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed
and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants,
signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of
impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-
third of the members of the House of Representatives
as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated
by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files
a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal
and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional
issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling
considerations militate against its adoption as the lis
mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the
fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in
G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt
this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant
consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts
of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as

unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made
easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra
have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the
latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they
are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues,

inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the
instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of
the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on

the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has
the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again,
this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue

that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume
jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members
thereof are subject to impeachment."125But this argument is very
much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to
pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of
Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an

option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined,
because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction
be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be
shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the
Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this
Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas,
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not
be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a
dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our

system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do
so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested
party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter
"not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty
and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by
[his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of
the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit
to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this
reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render
justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power
and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the
temptations lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of

interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate
Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification
or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing
and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of
them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein.
This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its
three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought,
leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the

substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of
his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave
the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no
other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the

Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is
in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that

the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware
of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all
Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface
again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but
for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake.
Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators
designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their
trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-

Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case
before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as
his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying
is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power
of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held

that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,

particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a
judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge
is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the
jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of
this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is
equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court
itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation
of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the

Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan

cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial
review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of

legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the
last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never
was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an
inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional

law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not
the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law

broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question

although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application.
Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide
only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment
can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is
more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one
who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge
by a public official interested only in the performance of his
official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v.
Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by
a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a

statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in

question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided (citations
omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as

required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other

ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by

reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by

this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of

judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to

challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the

earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of

the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument
for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of
impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between
the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid
the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and
abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to
remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this
argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its
judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the
judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As

correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court
to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just
because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court

refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or

executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme
Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act
involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also
political consequences. Those political consequences may
follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's
prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and
validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was
split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant
the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing
constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes

that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in
a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no
reason to believe that any of the branches of government will
behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence,
chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the
fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well
guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our

system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted
beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the
exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under
its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided
by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments,
political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De
Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our
present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not
mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of
Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not
possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article
XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways,
to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member
of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3
of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials
could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had
not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the

term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in
order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the

Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually
became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the
meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado)
as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added
that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on
the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate"
as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as

dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action,"
which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father
Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act.

It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle
and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those
deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the
filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on
Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by

Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice
Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the
House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that
the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are
initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is
recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution

is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding
the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee
action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the

Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings,
copies of which have been furnished the Members of this
body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government
which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed
before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information
of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in
the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation,
action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the
Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for

a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of
record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of
the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as
I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts
with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually
done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one
approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by

the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts
on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the
case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard
Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of
Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved
the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only
approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that
score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging these words because we have to be very
technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules
of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The
Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of
Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal,
but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just
want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a

reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is
only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the
House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to

any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines
17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert
on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE
ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third
of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment
OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the
initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the
United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of
the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach
always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a
matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are
mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a
verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my
amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only
in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you,
Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was

clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of
Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with

the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in
deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as
contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle
and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution
of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI
of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the

same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used
in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that
the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint
moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas

clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional
provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the

exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx

the same official more than once within a period of one year,
(Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment

proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common

verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is
"impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is
"impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo
singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the
term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted
first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all
its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense
that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding"
must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium,
means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive
noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not
in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1)
there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the
House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a
Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may
either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution
of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4)
there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-
third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members
upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House
"initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he
or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case"
before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is

not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for
trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the
beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates
on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the
House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation
or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its

ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the
line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No

impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year," it means that
no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the
meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people
read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse
meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a

body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1)
says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading
of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo
singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus

curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third
of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment

Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there
is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once
the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before
the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3
of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a
meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this
Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in
the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v.
Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions
(referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's
our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly
recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing
said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of
the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in
their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more
about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present

petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court
who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief
Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide
has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons.
Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional
Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations
and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under

Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and
only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing
impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that
Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall

promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules
on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules
were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power
to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the

House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of

proceed.

the same official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which
is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the

province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that
it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of
its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission
on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique
Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis
in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction
to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the
Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v.
De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph &
Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that
while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of
method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the
same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in
his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic
as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more
reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of
Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed

by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that
we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if
we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the
United States, the principle of separation of power is no
longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition
of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144

US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each

house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It
appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had,
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of
the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a
quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported
to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and
be counted and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and
not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort
to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what
matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place
upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present
any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the
question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is
no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It
is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to

pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e,
whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined
by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did
not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate
any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to
be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling

reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up
abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new
and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in
view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and
the Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to

this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to
exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of
government or any of its officials done with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has
elongated the checking powers of this Court against the
other branches of government despite their more democratic
character, the President and the legislators being elected by
the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of

the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone
of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade
the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of
government. This provision was dictated by our experience
under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to

annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from
passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our
distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions,
this Court approached constitutional violations by initially
determining what it cannot do; under the 1987
Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by
finding out what it should not do but what
it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by
not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious

consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case
at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our
power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will
not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against
government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new
power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this
exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that
has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator
Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of
judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and
not the experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the

instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of
private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon

v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply
provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No
limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to
impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives
since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several
provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be
exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House

Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by
the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed

by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003
violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is

always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our
individual and collective consciousness as a people with our
characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course
this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the
Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have
proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a
dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to
be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions
had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with
their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter.
Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to
the academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for
a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived
resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically
asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and
form with respect to the prosecution by the House of
Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the
subject respondent public official. When the present petitions
were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the
same clamor for non-interference was made through what are
now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move
that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far
as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the
Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for
its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial
review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law
of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-
cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-
to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the
Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it
to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself

with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime
of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny

and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this
Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and
legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the
beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society
upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of

constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the
Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed
ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling
on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice.
Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other
courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to
resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice
over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or
speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment
according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted
to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the
highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the
validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits
set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the
inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case
in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now
from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely
incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a
case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic

precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men
before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of
its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands.
Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality
that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality
other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real
meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous
cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither
is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the
Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than
anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights
irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt

been put to test once again by this impeachment case against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted
to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what
many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is
indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers
in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it
went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to
discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force
and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of

Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.

Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting
opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see
separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the
separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.
Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito

Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the
validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections
enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was
not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of
any express power granted to respondent by the Constitutional
Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication
arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to
the principle that a statute is to be construed consistently with the
fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to freedom of
expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes.
On November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally
argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a week
away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of
prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more
fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970,
petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat,
Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission
on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days previously,
informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due
course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which,
according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to
freedom of speech."1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of
prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction.
On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring
respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later
than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for
hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction
was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by
respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set
forth in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was
premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention
Act,2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts,
hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or
foreign origin."3 It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be
used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and
therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute
subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for
lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3, 1970, with
petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C.
Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for
urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the
afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of
prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the
part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the
doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the
construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on
Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering
the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its
concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for,
respondent Commission on Elections is permanently restrained
and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding
compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political
jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately executory."4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the

question before us was one of power. Respondent Commission
on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed
on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the
Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one of
its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens,
lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding
with the words "and the like."5 For respondent Commission, the
last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the
matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval
under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general
words following any enumeration being applicable only to things
of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.6 It is
quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the
distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent

Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal
principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to
assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription.7 Thus, certain
Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which
should be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental
law."8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of
constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always
commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary
meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute
provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to
reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional
defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional,
but also grave doubts upon that score.9
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has

in its favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view
advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the
taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of
unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal
language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech
or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this
preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when
what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make
more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What
respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship
on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is
directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by
the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle,
would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his
mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not
to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but
not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other
mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent
Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from
a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate
indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures. 10
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the

fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any
public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the
lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government.
That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded
to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy.
The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on
guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or
formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the
laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of
applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the
judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by
the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass
upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the
course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle
that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental
measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a
recognition of its being the supreme law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent

Commission was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice
thus: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department —
although independent of the President — to which the
Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the
'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to
purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant
holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that
respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict
with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the
Constitution. 12Our decisions which liberally construe its powers
are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its
responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and
honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no
justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing
from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to
nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's
case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid
footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3,

1970, respondent Commission is permanently restrained and
prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding
compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political
taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer1 on the

unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971
Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr.
Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no
justification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing
nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only
add the following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test
of reasonableness required by the due process clause of our
Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines
prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit
— roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of
the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place
for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself,
there is no violation."2Acting upon petitioner's application,
however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound
system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or
part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there
are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a

'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no
different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of
election propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall
under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and "the
record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be
subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission under par.
(E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the
electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and
inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system
throughout the candidate's district, respondent Commission would
outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the
candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only
by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his
"jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he
loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so
personally even if this should prove more expensive and less
effective than using a recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore,

petitioner's basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot
pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far
beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object
and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on

the mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's
adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section
12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I
would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use
of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster'
"in that these both represent forms of election advertisements —
to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the
voters — is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign
appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the
"streamers" is through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the
Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably,
oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free
expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend
some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being
placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers"
are less likely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise
be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary
curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by

respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be
sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the
earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict
and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section
12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate
or by another person with his knowledge and consent.
# Separate Opinions
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer1 on the

unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971
Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr.
Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no
justification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing
nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only
add the following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test
of reasonableness required by the due process clause of our
Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines
prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit
— roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of
the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place
for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself,
there is no violation."2Acting upon petitioner's application,
however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound
system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or
part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there
are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a

'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no
different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of
election propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall
under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and "the
record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be
subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission under par.
(E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the
electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and
inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system
throughout the candidate's district, respondent Commission would
outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the
candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only
by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his
"jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he
loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so
personally even if this should prove more expensive and less
effective than using a recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore,
petitioner's basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot
pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far
beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object
and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on

the mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's
adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section
12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I
would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use
of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster'
"in that these both represent forms of election advertisements —
to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the
voters — is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign
appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the
"streamers" is through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the
Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably,
oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free
expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend
some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being
placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers"
are less likely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise
be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary
curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by

respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be
sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the
earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict
and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section
12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate
or by another person with his knowledge and consent.
# Footnotes
1 Petition, paragraphs 1 to 5.
2 Republic Act No. 6132 (1970).
3 Section 12 (E), Ibid.
4 Resolution of Nov. 3, 1970.
5 Section 12(E), Constitutional Convention Act.
6 Cf. United States v. Santo Nino, 13 Phil. 141 (1909);

Go Tiaoco y Hermanos v. Union Insurance Society of
Canton, 40 Phil. 40 (1919); People vs. Kottinger 45
Phil. 352 (1923); Cornejo v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930);
Ollada v. Court of Tax Appeals, 99 Phil. 605 (1956);
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security
Commission, L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10.
7 Cf. Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945);

Manila Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Employees
Association, 79 Phil. 409 (1947); Araneta v. Dinglasan,
84 Phil. 368 (1949); Guido v. Rural Progress
Administration, 84 Phil. 847 (1949); City of Manila v.
Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil. 663 (1950); Ongsiako v.
Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950); Radiowealth v. Agregado,
86 Phil. 429 (1950); Sanchez v. Harry Lyons
Construction, Inc., 87 Phil. 532 (1950); American Bible
Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957);
Gonzales v. Hechanova, L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, 9
SCRA 230; Automotive Parts and Equipment Co., Inc.
v. Lingad, L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248; J. M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-
21064, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
8 Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950).
9 Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Ross, 289 US 373 (1933).

10 Cf. Saia v. People of the State of New York, 334 US
558 (1948).
11 Abcede v. Hon. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136 (1958). The

portion of the opinion from which the above excerpt is
taken reads in full: 'Lastly, as the branch of the
executive department — although independent of the
President — to which the Constitution has given the
'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is
limited to purely 'administrative questions.' (Article X,
sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines) It has no
authority to decide matters 'involving the right to vote.' It
may not even pass upon the legality of a given vote
(Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 47 Off.
Gaz., [6], 2851). We do not see, therefore, how it could
assert the greater and more far-reaching authority to
determine who — among those possessing the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have
complied with the procedural requirements, relative to
the filing of certificate of candidacy — should be
allowed to enjoy the full benefits intended by law
therefore. The question whether in order to enjoy those
benefits — a candidate must be capable of
'understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true
significance of election,' and must have — over a
month prior to the elections (when the resolution
complained of was issued) 'the tiniest chance to obtain
the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the
electorate, is a matter of policy, not of administration
and enforcement of the law which policy must be
determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative
functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory
grant of such general, broad power as the Commission
claims to have, it is dubious whether, if so granted — in
the vague, abstract, indeterminate and undefined
manner necessary in order that it could pass upon the
factors relied upon in said resolution (and such grant
must not be deemed made, in the absence of clear and
positive provision to such effect, which is absent in the
case at bar) — the legislative enactment would not
amount to undue delegation of legislative power.
(Schechter vs. U.S., 295 US 495, 79 L. ed. 1570.)" pp.
141-142.
12 Cf. Cortez v. Commission on Elections, 79 Phil. 352

(1947); Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections,
85 Phil. 149 (1949); Guevara v. Commission on
Elections, 104 Phil. 268 (1958); Masangcay v.
Commission on Elections, L-13827, Sept. 28, 1962, 6
SCRA 27; Lawsin v. Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964,
11 SCRA 643; Ututalum v. Commission on Elections,
L-25349, Dec. 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465; Janairo v.
Commission on Elections, L-28315, Dec. 8, 1967, 21
SCRA 1173; Abes v. Commission on Elections, L-
28348, Dec. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 1252; Ibuna v.
Commission on Elections,
L-28328, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1457; Binging Ho v.
Mun. Board of Canvassers,
L-29051, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 829.
13 Cf. Cauton v. Commission on Elections, L-25467,

April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 911. The other cases are
Espino v. Zaldivar, L-22325, Dec. 11, 1967, 21 SCRA
1204; Ong v. Commission on Elections, L-28415, Jan.
29, 1968, 22 SCRA 241; Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections, L-28517, Feb. 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662;
Pedido v. Commission on Elections, L-28539, March
30, 1968, 22 SCRA 1403; Aguam v. Commission on
Elections, L-28955, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 883;
Pelayo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, L-28869, June
29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1374; Pacis v. Commission on
Elections, L-29026, Sept. 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 377; Ligot
v. Commission on Elections, L-31380, Jan. 21, 1970, 31
SCRA 45; Abrigo v. Commission on Elections, L-31374,
Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 27; Moore v. Commission on
Elections, L-31394, Jan. 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 60; Ilarde
v. Commission on Elections, L-31446, Jan. 23, 1970, 31
SCRA 72; Sinsuat v. Pendatun,
L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 630.
1 L-32546 & 32551, Oct. 17, 1970, re: sections 8(A)

and 12(F) and other related provisions.
2 Petition, page 9.
EN BANC
June 23, 1987
G.R. No. L-69401

RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR
ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD
RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI,
WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN,
MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA
ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH VDA DE
FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED
COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL
ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)
AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND
1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred

Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces
raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez
street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition
and other explosives. 1
The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a

"zona," which was not unlike the feared practice of
the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the
people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded
informer, and executing them outright (although the last part is not
included in the modern refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to

resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as
presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and
deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in
incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon enough. The
soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in
a number of casualties. 2
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and

sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed,
paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military
also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle,
nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in
the premises. 3
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a

petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles
seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence
against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing
and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-
incrimination.4
The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer

for the return of the articles alleged to have been illegally seized,
referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial
court, Zamboanga City. 5 After receiving the testimonial and
documentary evidence of the parties, he submitted the report and
recommendations on which this opinion is based. 6
The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on

the ground that they were taken without a search warrant as
required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said report
and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance. 7
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force

at the time of the incident in question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the

preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required

such warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they
were acting under superior orders. 8 There was also the
suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the
aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the
assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. 9
Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the

Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of
the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-
cuts the respondents took. As eloquently affirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan: 10
The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances.
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the

time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify,
assuming it could, the repressions committed therein against the
petitioners.
It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved

the arbitrary treatment they received to take them into custody;
but that is a criminal argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious
flaw lies in the conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably
guilty on the strength alone of unsubstantiated reports that they
were stockpiling weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted
criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they
were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact
even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were
presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by
the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they
were guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to the
protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and
the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution
coddles criminals. What it does simply signify is that, lacking the
shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution,
to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary
punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no
exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of
the people who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill
of Rights, a majority of one.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when

they made their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance
of doing so. This is truly regrettable for it was incumbent on them,
especially during those tense and tindery times, to encourage
rather than undermine respect for the law, which it was their duty
to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian
authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the
respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the
authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause to
search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make
the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized
determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid

because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the
petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search
warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the
weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could
have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive
measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should
disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and
instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's
premises with all the menace of a military invasion.
Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the
search and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it
was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law
enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any
house and then pick up anything they see there on the ground
that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well
delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have easily obtained a search

warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then open and
functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged into
the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior
officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's house on
the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed,
even the humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion
because of the ancient rule, revered in all free regimes, that a
man's house is his castle.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the
rain may enter. But the King of England may not enter. All
the forces of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement. 13
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court in connection with a crime about to be committed, being
committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no
allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it
may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b),
the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v.
Burgos.14
If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was

violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken
from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of
the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits
of the poisonous tree. 15 As Judge Learned Hand observed, "Only
in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
repressed. 16 Pending determination of the legality of such
articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to
such appropriate disposition as the corresponding courts may
decide. 17
The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-

testing of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition
against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only.
As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material."
The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other

dreaded operations should remain in the past, banished with the
secret marshals and their covert license to kill without trial. We
must be done with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement.
Those who are supposed to uphold the law must not be the first to
violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his
concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, 19 "It is time that the
martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be discarded and
that there be a return to the force and rule of law."
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and
democratic, where every individual is entitled to the full protection
of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid
sentinel for all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the
basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on

November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the
articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence
against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said
articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the
criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,

Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in

the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos,1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which
owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain
that the provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask
whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program
of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC.
The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to
provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen
the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.2 In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent

GSIS state —
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY

CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions

set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November
3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead
offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and

execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International Marketing/Reservation
System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic
plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the

Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING

BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning

Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions
are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with

GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995
(reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC

and COP (Committee on
Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are
obtained.3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning

bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10
October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by
Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00)
as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group,
Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .5 which respondent GSIS refused to
accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the
sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS
and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this
Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents
from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the

Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The
case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici
curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation
of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part
of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of

the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part
of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second

par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said
provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down
conditions under which business may be done."9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel

does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers
to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in
its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first
and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests
who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired
therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make
the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the
mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own
separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable
since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of
the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot
be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the
Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the
beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the

bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents
postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not
yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the
submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since
Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of
shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege
to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of

discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did
abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should
fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws

for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law
to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if
a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies

and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact
laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely
establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which
lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid
of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that
the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have

been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is,
as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be

considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from
discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am

asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of
"PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a
preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do
we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as
against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of

Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the
word "QUALIFIED?".
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely

"TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think

that is understood. We use the word
"QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or
prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be
done. For example, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in

such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing
but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is
not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still

enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not,
by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of

Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and
third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still
to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and
the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the
third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and
non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain
constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and
policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in
the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the
vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social
justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance 26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice
and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in
nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33A reading of these provisions indeed clearly
shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights
but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the
provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the
legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is
no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right,
such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986

Constitutional Commission 34 explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved

and developed refers not only to out rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It
also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our
lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but
also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony

pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of

Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel
when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of
the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries
and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine
hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The
Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37During World
War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military
Administration into a military headquarters. When the American
forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their
final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became
the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation
and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the
hotel was the site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for
vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine
Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become
part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control
and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as

used in Our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60%
of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is
recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an

amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And
the amendment would consist in substituting
the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the
following: "CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES
OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING
STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH
CITIZENS.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently

the proponent is agreeable, but we have to
raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation
that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it
preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would

refer to an individual Filipino. What about a
corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam

President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we

would be limiting it if we say that the
preference should only be 100-percent
Filipino.
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning

clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may
refer only to individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam

President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I

request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read:

"IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES
AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY,
THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word
"Filipinos" here, as intended by the
proponents, will include not only individual
Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or
entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained

thus —
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to

request Commissioner Nolledo to please
restate his amendment so that I can ask a
question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF

RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY,
THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment,
if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a
Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in

some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will
the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision

Commissioner Nolledo continues —
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of

"MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GlVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This
embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That
means that Filipinos should be given preference in the
grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the
national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional

Commission regarding the subject provision was still further
clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-

Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is better
known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision
was never found in previous Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that

preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since
such an indiscriminate preference would be counter
productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and

concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
"qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter
shall be chosen over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so

considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of
the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here
is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant
equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall
management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate
the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the

Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-
executory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision
— by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt
such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure
faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions
of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation
have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial
remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that
arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or
guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., on constitutional government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional duty to

implement laws, including the Constitution, even before
Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable
legal standards for executive action. When the
executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of
applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and
understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the
sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive
would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for
an interpretation every time the executive is confronted
by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is

addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument
again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of
the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As
correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact
alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered "state
action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident
that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of
"state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the
people but also to the government as elements of the State. After
all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power —
legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to
the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the

higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared
the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest
bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to
all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject

constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic
principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must
conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate
the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any
reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason
enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the
foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even
the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason
than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in
a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that
the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life
and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is,
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy
may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws
of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public
scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider
when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of
its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights
and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from

questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well
aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike
were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the
sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to
match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case
before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception
of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner
had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it
did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent
GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched
the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a
cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional

safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To
insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a
Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to
insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we
would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by

Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is
left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the
bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian
firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is

embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so
must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance,
the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention
of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the
influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages
and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly
sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference
is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this
matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by
Chief Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not

its function to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature or the executive about the wisdom and
feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the
Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress
and development . . . in connection with a temporary
injunction issued by the Court's First Division against
the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its
partner, certain statements were published in a major
daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates
that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle
to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is

no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the
kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether
they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to
make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or
the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how
buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its

business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-
material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-
material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the
Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all,
there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw
itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines

being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing
in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority
emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the
people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher
purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must
adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments,
while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands
of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just
any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake
of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of
property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic
relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the
short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a
hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a
strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the
highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus
the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant
role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine
history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection
of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur; a most
historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a
country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined
efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand
Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien
hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever
manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which
cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained
by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold
to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the
nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the
other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous
and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning
of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution.
And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation,
will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE
and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching
bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as
may be necessary for purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and

Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same

time, I would like to expound a bit more on the concept of national
patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions
such as the Manila Hotel.
It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under

"national patrimony" over which qualified Filipinos have the
preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional
provision on point states:
xxx xxx xxx
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions

covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos.1
Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987

Constitution, "national patrimony" consists of the natural
resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory
(Article I) consisting of land, sea, and air.2study of the 1935
Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" originated,
would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more
comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief
that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only their
natural resources of the country but practically everything that
belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as
well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of
the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with
conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell
progress; and that this may be achieved only through
development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not
only the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of
their national patrimony).3
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as

referring not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our
race.4
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a

part of our national patrimony and, as such, deserves
constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its
operation. This institution has played an important role in our
nation's history, having been the venue of many a historical event,
and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest
House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities,
and others.5
It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future

generations of Filipinos. As President Manuel L. Quezon once
said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we
should do so with. an eye to the welfare of the future generations.
In other words, the leaders of today are the trustees of the
patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and
reserve it for Filipinos was the intent of the distinguished
gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the
need for nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one
expounded that we should "put more teeth into our laws, and; not
make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a
subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional enactment"6 To
quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and
trespassers in their own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to
them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens and
encumbrances".7
Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified

Filipinos", to be meaningful, must refer not only to things that are
peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the
very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in
the acquisition of things that pertain to the national patrimony,
preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to
match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference
shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and
the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should
undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional
preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to
match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the
preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude

towards foreign investments in our country, stress is on the
elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the
country. While government agencies, including the courts should
re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and
even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we
should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos
certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are
involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have
established themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the
Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop
us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel
Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping
with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our national
patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the
hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut

statements, shared by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in a well
written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that

"(I)n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
to qualified Filipinos"1 is self-executory. The provision verily does
not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by,
an enabling law or a set of rules.
Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the

country's natural resources but also to its cultural heritage. A
"historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P.
Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of
Philippine heritage.
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System

("GSIS"), a government entity which derives its authority from the
State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an
act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.
On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified

Filipinos," I find it somewhat difficult to take the same path
traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the
particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it
seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the
foreign bid for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that
literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent)
with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such
that it becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand
exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could
trigger the right of preference.
It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared

this great disappointment, a letdown that it did not deserve, by a
simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with
the peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed
transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at time is seen, to
instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create
the perception that it even takes on non-justiciable controversies.
All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the
only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is
to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the
Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling
shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the
only way a qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or
concession given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign
national corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and

Insurance System, if petitioner and the Malaysian firm had offered
the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder
seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC,"2 so that petitioner
bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian
corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine
corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one,
where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential
treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by
declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of
stocks.3 That, to me, is what "preference to qualified Filipinos"
means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos
whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno4 to a 1947

statute giving "preference to Filipino citizens in the lease of public
market stalls."5 This Court upheld the cancellation of existing
leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not
Filipinos and the award thereafter of the stalls to qualified Filipino
vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly,
in Vda. de Salgado v. De la Fuente,6 this Court sustained the
validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the statute
(R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls
and granting preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new
licenses for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao
v. Raymundo,7 the preference granted under the statute was held
to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls
occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even if there were
available other stalls as good as those occupied by aliens. "The
law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of
interest between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in
public markets, in which situation the right to preference
immediately arises."8
Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a

century efforts began only in the 1970s in America to realize the
promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse
discrimination programs designed to remedy past discrimination
against colored people in such areas as employment, contracting
and licensing.9 Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy,
there are situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in
control of the national economy as contemplated in the
Constitution 10 is to give them preferential treatment where they
can at least stand on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either

invite foreign retaliation or deprive the country of the benefit of
foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with
common trades of common means of livelihood which are open to
aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of government property,
which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and
concessions covering the national economy" and therefore no
one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our
citizens. That at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For
the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the Government. It is
being privatized. Privatization should result in the relinquishment
of the business in favor of private individuals and groups who are
Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.
Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of

stocks to petitioner we would be trading competence and
capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm
are qualified, having hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is
only the result of the public bidding that is sought to be modified
by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.
Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a
Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of an alien could
encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then
do would be not to make a bid or make only a token one and,
after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest
bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not
possible under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Under
these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share for
a range of 9 to 15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will
not be considered. On the other hand, if the Filipino entity, after
passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he
will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm
because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly
submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and
has no basis in fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:
Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this

as we are not confronted in the case at bar with legal and
constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the
side of history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the
words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of history is
worth a volume of logic."
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the

Manila Hotel has a historical and cultural aspect within the
meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the
"patrimony of the nation".
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx

shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over

foreign investments within its national goals and
priorities.
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with
Article II of the same Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies" which ordain —
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent

national economy effectively by Filipinos. (Sec. 19).
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos"

was one of the highlights in the 1987 Constitution Commission
proceedings thus:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment

will read: "IN THE GRANT OF
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS". And the
word "Filipinos" here, as intended
by the proponents, will include not
only individual Filipinos but also
Filipino-Controlled entities fully
controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III,
Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 608).
MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to

add, as Commissioner Villegas
said, this committee and this body
already approved what is known as
the Filipino First policy which was
suggested by Commissioner de
Castro. So that it is now in our
Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p.
225).
Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision

adverted to above, said:
MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of

rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that

amendment, if a foreign enterprise
is qualified and the Filipinos
enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more

qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred:?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is

"yes". (Vol. III, p. 616, Records of
the Constitutional Commission).
The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the

history and spirit of the Malolos Constitution of 1898, the 1935
Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no
reneged on this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the
earliest case, this Court said —
The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various
provisions of the Constitution. . . . It cannot therefore be
said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit
underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional (Ichong, et al.
vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and

traditions are not legislated and is the product of events, customs,
usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and
acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and
soul of a people.
The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every
inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to historic events (too
numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84
years.
As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to

examine the single instances of the legal largese which have
given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been
exhaustively discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this
point that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in
the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits
subverts the cherished historical values of our people.
As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has

its enviable tradition which, in the words of the philosopher
Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone,
it keeps flowing, and one must view the flowing , and one must
view the flow of both directions. If you look towards the hill from
which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful
currents that push the river or people towards the future, and if
you look the other way, you progress."
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress
depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not jettison the tradition of
the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.
I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in
different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is

always right who suspects that he makes mistakes". On this note,
I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding
the belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his
own land.
I vote GRANT the petition.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the

Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a domestic corporation, to stop
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling
the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign
corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the second paragraph of
section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled

corporation. It is the sole owner of the Manila Hotel which it
operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation.
Manila Hotel was included in the privatization program of the
government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buyers
30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000
shares, in the Manila Hotel Corporation. After the absence of bids
at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale was
increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning
bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner" of the GSIS was
required to "provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support
to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel"1 The proposal was approved by respondent Committee on
Privatization.
In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification

documents and the bidding rules were furnished interested
parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation,
and Renong Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as
operator, prequalified.2
The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and

Procedures: Second Prequalification and Public Bidding of the
MHC Privatization" provide:
I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS
DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC

PARTNER
The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below

will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner
and will be awarded the Block of Shares:
First — Pass the prequalification process;
Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share

basis for the Block of Shares;
Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts

with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995;
xxx xxx xxx
IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR
PREQUALIFICATION
The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be

expected to provide management expertise
and/or an international marketing reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen
the profitability and performance of The
Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is
inviting to the prequalification process any
local and/or foreign corporation,
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with
at least one of the following qualifications:
a. Proven management .expertise

in the hotel industry; or
b. Significant equity ownership (i.e.

board representation) in another
hotel company; or
c. Overall management and

marketing expertise to successfully
operate the Manila Hotel.
Parties interested in bidding for MHC should

be able to provide access to the requisite
management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila
Hotel.
xxx xxx xxx
D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
xxx xxx xxx

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE

REGISTRATION OFFICE
The prequalification documents can be

secured at the Registration Office between
9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days
within the period specified in Section III. Each
set of documents consists of the following:
a. Guidelines and Procedures:

Second Prequalification and Public
Bidding of the MHC Privatization
b. Confidential Information
Memorandum: The Manila Hotel
Corporation
c. Letter of Invitation. to the

Prequalification and Bidding
Conference
xxx xxx xxx
4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING

CONFERENCE
A prequalification and bidding conference will

be held at The Manila Hotel on the date
specified in Section III to allow the Applicant
to seek clarifications and further information
regarding the guidelines and procedures.
Only those who purchased the
prequalification documents will be allowed in
this conference. Attendance to this
conference is strongly advised, although the
Applicant will not be penalized if it does not
attend.
5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION
DOCUMENTS
The applicant should submit 5 sets of the

prequalification documents (1 original set
plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office
between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working
days within the period specified in Section III.
F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated

by the PBAC with the assistance of
the TEC based on the Information
Package and other information
available to the PBAC.
2. If the Applicant is a
Consortium/Joint Venture, the
evaluation will consider the overall
qualifications of the group, taking
into account the contribution of
each member to the venture.
3. The decision of the PBAC with

respect to the results of the PBAC
evaluation will be final.
4. The Applicant shall be evaluated

according to the criteria set forth
below:
a. Business
management expertise,
track record, and
experience
b. Financial capability.
c. Feasibility and
acceptability of the
proposed strategic plan
for the Manila Hotel
5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of

Applicants as it may deem appropriate.
6. The parties that prequalified in the first

MHC public bidding — ITT Sheraton, Marriot
International Inc., Renaissance Hotels
International Inc., consortium of RCBC
Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in the
Public Bidding without having to undergo the
prequalification process again.
G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. A notice of prequalification results

containing the shortlist of Qualified Bidders
will be posted at the Registration Office at the
date specified in Section III.
2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture,

the withdrawal by member whose
qualification was a material consideration for
being included in the shortlist is ground for
disqualification of the Applicant.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN
THE PUBLIC BIDDING
All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders

will be eligible to participate in the Public
Bidding.
B. BLOCK OF SHARES
A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen

Million Three Hundred Thousand
(15,300,000) shares of stock representing
Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-
51%) of the issued and outstanding shares of
MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by
the GSIS. The Qualified Bidders will have the
Option of determining the number of shares
within the range to bid for. The range is
intended to attract bidders with different
preferences and objectives for the operation
and management of The Manila Hotel.
C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE

PER SHARE BASIS
1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share

basis. The minimum bid required on a price
per share basis for the Block of Shares is
Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos
(P36.67).
2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency

payable to the GSIS.
3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per
share below the minimum required will not
considered.
D. TRANSFER COSTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. OFFICIAL BID FORM
1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed

Official Bid Form, a copy of which is attached
as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be
properly accomplished in all details; improper
accomplishment may be a sufficient basis for
disqualification.
2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified

Bidder will submit the Official Bid Form, which
will indicate the offered purchase price, in a
sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."
F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
During the Public Bidding, the following

documents should be submitted along with
the bid in a separate envelop marked
"SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS":
1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER

OATH).
If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the

representative of the Qualified Bidder should
submit a Board resolution which adequately
authorizes such representative to bid for and
in behalf of the corporation with full authority
to perform such acts necessary or requisite to
bind the Qualified Bidder.
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint

Venture, each member of the
Consortium/Joint venture should submit a
Board resolution authorizing one of its
members and such member's representative
to make the bid on behalf of the group with
full authority to perform such acts necessary
or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
2. BID SECURITY
a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-

Three Million Pesos (P33,000,00), in
Philippine currency as Bid Security in the
form of:
i. Manager's check or unconditional

demand draft payable to the
"Government Service Insurance
System" and issued by a reputable
banking institution duly licensed to
do business in the Philippines and
acceptable to GSIS; or
ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued

by a reputable banking institution
acceptable to the GSIS.
b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:
i. The bid does not have Bid

Security; or
ii. The Bid Security accompanying
the bid is for less than the required
amount.
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a

manager's check or unconditional demand
draft, the interest earned on the Bid Security
will be for the account of GSIS.
d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the

winning Bidder/Strategic Partner, the Bid
Security will be applied as the downpayment
on the Qualified Bidder's offered purchase
price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder

will be returned immediately after the Public
Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not declared
the Highest Bidder.
f. The Bid Security will be returned by

October 23, 1995 if the Highest Bidder is
unable to negotiate and execute with
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other types of contract specified
by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for
The Manila Hotel.
g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will

be forfeited in favor of GSIS if the Highest
Bidder, after negotiating and executing the
Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract
specified by the Highest Bidder or other types
of contract in its strategic plan for The Manila
Hotel, fails or refuses to:
i. Execute the Stock Purchase and

Sale Agreement with GSIS not later
than October 23, 1995; or
ii. Pay the full amount of the offered

purchase price not later than
October 23, 1995; or
iii. Consummate the sale of the

Block of Shares for any other
reason.
G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS
1. The Public Bidding will be held on

September 7, 1995 at the following location:
New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be

stationed at the Public Bidding to accept any
and all bids and supporting requirements.
Representatives from the Commission on
Audit and COP will be invited to witness the
proceedings.
3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid

using the Official Bid Form. The
accomplished Official Bid Form should be
submitted in a sealed envelope marked
"OFFICIAL BID."
4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the
following documents in another sealed
envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS"
a. Written Authority Bid
b. Bid Security
5. The two sealed envelopes marked

"OFFICIAL BID" and "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS" must be submitted
simultaneously to the Secretariat between
9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, Philippine Standard
Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No
bid shall be accepted after the closing time.
Opened or tampered bids shall not be
accepted.
6. The Secretariat will log and record the

actual time of submission of the two sealed
envelopes. The actual time of submission will
also be indicated by the Secretariat on the
face of the two envelopes.
7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes

will be dropped in the corresponding bid
boxes provided for the purpose. These boxes
will be in full view of the invited public.
H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS
1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the

date of the Public Bidding, the PBAC will
open all sealed envelopes marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" for
screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those
who submitted incomplete/insufficient
documents or document/s which is/are not
substantially in the form required by PBAC
will be disqualified. The envelope containing
their Official Bid Form will be immediately
returned to the disqualified bidders.
2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL

BID" will be opened at 3:00 PM. The name of
the bidder and the amount of its bid price will
be read publicly as the envelopes are
opened.
3. Immediately following the reading of the

bids, the PBAC will formally announce the
highest bid and the Highest Bidder.
4. The highest bid will be, determined on

a price per share basis. In the event of a tie
wherein two or more bids have the same
equivalent price per share, priority will be
given to the bidder seeking the larger
ownership interest in MHC.
5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed

bidding in case:
a. No single bid is submitted within

the prescribed period; or
b. There is only one (1) bid that is

submitted and acceptable to the
PBAC.
CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the

conditions set forth below by October 23,
1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right
to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS
will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must

negotiate and execute with
GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International Marketing
Reservation System Contract or
other type of contract specified by
the Highest Bidder in its strategic
plan for The Manila Hotel. If the
Highest Bidder is intending to
provide only financial support to
The Manila Hotel, a separate
institution may enter into the
aforementioned contract/s with
GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must

execute the Stock Purchase and
Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy
of which will be distributed to each
of the Qualified Bidder after the
prequalification process is
completed.
2. In the event that the Highest Bidder

chooses a Management Contract for The
Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the
management fee structure that GSIS/MHC
are prepared to accept in the Management
Contract are as follows:
a. Basic management fee:

Maximum of 2.5% of gross
revenues.(1)
b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0%

of gross operating profit(1) after
deducting undistributed overhead
expenses and the basic
management fee.
c. Fixed component of the

international marketing/reservation
system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of
gross room revenues.(1) The
Applicant should indicate in its
Information Package if it is wishes
to charge this fee.
Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of

account for hotels.
The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the

acceptable parameters for the hotel
management fees to facilitate the
negotiations with the Highest Bidder for the
Management Contract after the Public
Bidding.
A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management

Contract for The Manila Hotel should
determine whether or not the management
fee structure above is acceptable before
submitting their prequalification documents to
GSIS.
J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED

BIDDERS
1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder

cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per
share.
2. The order of priority among the interested

Qualified Bidders will be in accordance wit
the equivalent price per share of their
respective bids in their public Bidding, i.e.,
first and second priority will be given to the
Qualified Bidders that submitted the second
and third highest bids on the price per
share basis, respectively, and so on.

BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the

Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary

contract with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995; and
b. Requisite approvals from the
GSIS/MHC and COP/OGCC are
obtained.
I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF

SHARES
1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts

with GSIS/MHC, the Winning Bidder/Strategic
Partner must fully pay, not later than October
23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the
Block of Shares after deducting the Bid
Security applied as downpayment.
2. All payments should be made in the form

of a Manager's Check or unconditional
Demand Draft, payable to the "Government
Service Insurance System," issued by a
reputable banking institution licensed to do
business in the Philippines and acceptable to
GSIS.
M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the

right to reject any or all applications, waive
any formality therein, or accept such
application as maybe considered most
advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS
similarly reserves the right to require the
submission of any additional information from
the Applicant as the PBAC may deem
necessary.
2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call

off the Public Bidding prior to acceptance of
the bids and call for a new public bidding
under amended rules, and without any
liability whatsoever to any or all the Qualified
Bidders, except the obligation to return the
Bid Security.
3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the

date of the prequalification/bidding
conference, the deadline for the submission
of the prequalification documents, the date of
the Public Bidding or other pertinent activities
at least three (3) calendar days prior to the
respective deadlines/target dates.
4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights,

interest and participation it has on the Block
of Shares.
5. All documents and materials submitted by

the Qualified Bidders, except the Bid
Security, may be returned upon request.
6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the

results of the Public Bidding is final. The
Qualified Bidders, by participating in the
Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed
to accept and abide by these results.
7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless

form any liability, suit or allegation arising out
of the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidders
who have participated in the Public Bidding.3
The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995.

Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for 15,300,000 shares and
Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000
shares. The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder
and immediately returned petitioner's bid security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner

wrote to GSIS offering to match the bid price of Renong Berhad. It
requested that the award be made to itself citing the second
paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a
manager's check for thirty-three million pesos (P33,000,000.00)
as bid security.
Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong

Berhad the terms and conditions of the contract and technical
agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain
petitioner's request.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a

temporary restraining order on October 18, 1995.
Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII,

Section 10 of the Constitution4 on the "National Economy and
Patrimony" which provides:
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the

Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is
self-executing whether the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as
a nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State,"

hence, mandated to implement section 10, paragraph 2
of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed

to give preference to petitioner, a qualified Filipino
corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation;
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the

sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation.
Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution

provides the guiding policies and principles upon which is built the
substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government.5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing
and can be enforced without further legislative action.6 Some of its
provisions, however, can be implemented only through
appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-
executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is

self-executing is a hard row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of
the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its
language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the
provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as
a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and
enforcement.7 The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text
and the context of the provision in question.8
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as
self-executing,9 rather than as requiring future legislation for their
enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they
are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental
law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and
nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the
unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to
constitutional rights but congressional in action should not
suffocate them. 12
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill

of Rights on arrests, searches and seizures, 13 the rights of a
person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an
accused, 15 and the privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is
recognize a that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental
rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. 17 The same
treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the
taking or damaging of property for public use without just
compensation.18
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional

provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy
and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the
means by which the policy shall be carried into
effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II
of our Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies" should generally be construed as mere statements of
principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions
of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article
XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture end
Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights.
Their enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress
though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate
their policy content. 24
Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider
whether Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-
executing or not. It reads:
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of

the economic and planning agency, when the national
interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or
such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned
by Filipinos.


foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain

areas of investments in the country 25 to Filipino citizens or to
corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further
commands Congress to enact laws that will encourage the
formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-
owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second
paragraph orders the entire State to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges
covering the national economy and patrimony. The third
paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign
investments in line with our national goals and well-set
priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its
express text, there is a categorical command for Congress to
enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of
investments in the country and to encourage the formation
and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right
granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has
to breathe life to the right by means of legislation.
Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from section 3,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The provision in the
1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark case
of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 28where we upheld the
discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas
of investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first
paragraph of section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to
nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipinos.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They

are directed to the State and not to Congress alone which is but
one of the three great branches of our government. Their
coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy
and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national
jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments."
Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the
exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving
preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and
privileges covering our national economy and patrimony. Their
language does not suggest that any of the State agency or
instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its
implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to
implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the third
paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution

entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." Its Section
19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."
It engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy in our fundamental
law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its
enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half-
pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of

the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our
national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission
show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its
meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers
not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural
heritage of our race. 30 By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel
falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights
involving our national patrimony. The unique value of the Manila
Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic
eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As
chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on July
4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular
Government for Americans living in, or passing through, Manila
while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino
craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it
was exclusively used by American and Caucasian travelers and
served as the "official guesthouse" of the American Insular
Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming
to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When
the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters
and lodging for the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at
the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their last
stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel
again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and
kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous
international film and sports celebrities were housed in the Hotel.
It was also the situs of international conventions and conferences.
In the local scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties
and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped and
continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from
international hotel and travel award-giving bodies, a fitting
acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These are
judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.
The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural
treasure pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not
exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846,
"The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely
provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural property may
be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural
property. 32 Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374
in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot be read as the
exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure
and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of
the nation."
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State

includes the respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that
GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that
administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of
government employees and the government. 33 The funds are
held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of
indifferently. 34 They are to be used to finance the retirement,
disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the
administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS, 35Excess
funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other
ventures for the benefit of the employees.36 It is thus contended
that the GSIS investment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a
simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation
of section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private
corporation. It is essentially a public corporation created by
Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public
purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service
Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As state-owned
and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the
policies spelled out in the general welfare of the people. One of
these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated
as a constitutional command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase

"qualified Filipinos" and their "preferential right." The Constitution
desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for a
Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which
can bent to meet today's manifest needs and tomorrow's
unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity
can grow as a living constitution.
Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission,

Commissioner Nolledo to define the phrase brushed aside a
suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained
that present and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem
of its interpretation, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT. What is the

suggestion of Commissioner
Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say

definitely "TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President,
I think that is understood. We use
the word "QUALIFIED" because
the existing laws or the prospective
laws will always lay down
conditions under which business
map be done, for example,
qualifications on capital,
qualifications on the setting up of
other financial structures, et cetera.
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter

of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. If we say,

"PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS," it can be understood
as giving preference to qualified
Filipinos as against Filipinos who
are not qualified.

that was the intention of the
proponents. The committee has
accepted the amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
As previously discussed, the constitutional command to

enforce the Filipino First policy is addressed to the State and
not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be
understood as limited to legislations but all state actions
which include applicable rules and regulations adopted by
agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of
their rule-making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules
and regulations set forth the standards to measure the
qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is
not seriously disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did
Renong Berhad. 39
Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference

which GSIS should have accorded petitioner, a qualified Filipino,
over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after
losing the bid, this right of preference gives it a second chance to
match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.
With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I

prescind from the premise that the second paragraph of section
10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien.
It is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not,
however, anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely bar aliens in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of
qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these
rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will
promote the weal of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of

the Constitution, the stellar task of our State policy-makers is to
maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the
need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of
foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our
economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the
Constitution did not define the degree of the right of preference to
be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to
serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that
can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing needs
of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos
is to be determined by degree as time dictates and circumstances
warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the
degree of the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and
vice verse.
Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to

determine the degree of this privilege at any given time is
addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional
scheme, the right primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking
department of our government, other branches of government,
and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to
enforce this state policy. Within the limits of their authority, they
can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of
this right of preference in cases where they have to make grants
involving the national economy and judicial duty. On the other
hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the state that violate the
policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of

the preferential right. Consequently, we must turn to the rules and
regulations of on respondents Committee Privatization and GSIS
to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to
as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look at the
rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree
of preferential right to be accorded qualified Filipino bidder.
Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean that
they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for
paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is deemed
part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics
which demand that we interpret rules to save them from
unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of
petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that
instance, all things stand equal, and bidder, as a qualified Pilipino
bidder, should be preferred.
It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that
petitioner has a right to match the bid of Renong Berhad.
Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if
we examine the rules inside-out .thousand times, they can not
justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the
highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder
cannot be awarded block of shares . . ." No reason has arisen
that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as
bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the
highest bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS
and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a
matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as
a qualified Filipino privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner.
What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our
symphaties may be with petitioner but the court has no power to
extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as
defined by the rules. The parameters of the right of preference
depend on galaxy of facts and factors whose determination
belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and
agencies of the State. We are duty-bound to respect that
determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment.
The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for
as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a
State action amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can
come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the

winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules
and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and
regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can
match the winning bid submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the
bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even
during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate
the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey
the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If
sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc on he essence of
bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest bidding to
raise as much funds as possible for the government to maximize
its capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a
duty that must be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners
participating in a bidding contest and the rules are carefully
written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are
prequalified to insure their financial capability. The bidding is
secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the
parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner
that privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to match it.
For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to
strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.
We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The

visionary nationalist Don Claro M. Recto has warned us that the
greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his
own land. The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a
state policy. But while the Filipino First policy requires that we
incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien.
Our policy makers can write laws and rules giving favored
treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a
foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are
written, they must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and
foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution
protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without
unfairness to foreigner.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:

I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting
Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, may I just add
1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to

mean that, after a bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino
bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid,
and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII]
simply states that "in the grant of rights . . . covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no
law defining the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically,
no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid
and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such
empowering law, the majority's strained interpretation, I
respectfully submit constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation,
which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can
lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!.
2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is

short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-
term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries — in the guise
of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to
discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by authorizing
their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of
Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing
similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their
nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as
pariahs in the global marketplace with absolute no chance of
winning any bidding outside our country. Even authoritarian
regimes and hermit kingdoms have long ago found out
unfairness, greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-
term, self-destructing.
The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you
dont want other to do unto you.
3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the
"Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the constitutional
preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where
all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead
without self-destructing him and without being unfair to the
foreigner.
In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified

Filipino only when the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame
is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same

time, I would like to expound a bit more on the concept of national
patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions
such as the Manila Hotel.
It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under

"national patrimony" over which qualified Filipinos have the
preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional
provision on point states:
xxx xxx xxx

shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos.1
Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987

Constitution, "national patrimony" consists of the natural
resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory
(Article I) consisting of land, sea, and air.2study of the 1935
Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" originated,
would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more
comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief
that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only their
natural resources of the country but practically everything that
belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as
well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of
the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with
conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell
progress; and that this may be achieved only through
development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not
only the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of
their national patrimony).3
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as

referring not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our
race.4
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a

part of our national patrimony and, as such, deserves
constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its
operation. This institution has played an important role in our
nation's history, having been the venue of many a historical event,
and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest
House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities,
and others.5
It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future

generations of Filipinos. As President Manuel L. Quezon once
said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we
should do so with. an eye to the welfare of the future generations.
In other words, the leaders of today are the trustees of the
patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and
reserve it for Filipinos was the intent of the distinguished
gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the
need for nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one
expounded that we should "put more teeth into our laws, and; not
make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a
subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional enactment"6 To
quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and
trespassers in their own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to
them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens and
encumbrances".7
Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified

Filipinos", to be meaningful, must refer not only to things that are
peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the
very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in
the acquisition of things that pertain to the national patrimony,
preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to
match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference
shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and
the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should
undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional
preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to
match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the
preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude

towards foreign investments in our country, stress is on the
elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the
country. While government agencies, including the courts should
re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and
even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we
should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos
certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are
involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have
established themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the
Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop
us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel
Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping
with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our national
patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the
hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut

statements, shared by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in a well
written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that

"(I)n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
to qualified Filipinos"1 is self-executory. The provision verily does
not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by,
an enabling law or a set of rules.
Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the

country's natural resources but also to its cultural heritage. A
"historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P.
Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of
Philippine heritage.
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System

("GSIS"), a government entity which derives its authority from the
State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an
act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.
On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified

Filipinos," I find it somewhat difficult to take the same path
traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the
particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it
seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the
foreign bid for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that
literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent)
with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such
that it becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand
exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could
trigger the right of preference.
It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared

this great disappointment, a letdown that it did not deserve, by a
simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with
the peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed
transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at time is seen, to
instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create
the perception that it even takes on non-justiciable controversies.
All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the
only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is
to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the
Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling
shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the
only way a qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or
concession given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign
national corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and

Insurance System, if petitioner and the Malaysian firm had offered
the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder
seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC,"2 so that petitioner
bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian
corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine
corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one,
where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential
treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by
declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of
stocks.3 That, to me, is what "preference to qualified Filipinos"
means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos
whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno4 to a 1947

statute giving "preference to Filipino citizens in the lease of public
market stalls."5 This Court upheld the cancellation of existing
leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not
Filipinos and the award thereafter of the stalls to qualified Filipino
vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly,
in Vda. de Salgado v. De la Fuente,6 this Court sustained the
validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the statute
(R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls
and granting preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new
licenses for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao
v. Raymundo,7 the preference granted under the statute was held
to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls
occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even if there were
available other stalls as good as those occupied by aliens. "The
law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of
interest between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in
public markets, in which situation the right to preference
immediately arises."8
Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a

century efforts began only in the 1970s in America to realize the
promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse
discrimination programs designed to remedy past discrimination
against colored people in such areas as employment, contracting
and licensing.9 Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy,
there are situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in
control of the national economy as contemplated in the
Constitution 10 is to give them preferential treatment where they
can at least stand on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either

invite foreign retaliation or deprive the country of the benefit of
foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with
common trades of common means of livelihood which are open to
aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of government property,
which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and
concessions covering the national economy" and therefore no
one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our
citizens. That at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For
the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the Government. It is
being privatized. Privatization should result in the relinquishment
of the business in favor of private individuals and groups who are
Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.
Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of

stocks to petitioner we would be trading competence and
capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm
are qualified, having hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is
only the result of the public bidding that is sought to be modified
by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.
Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a
Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of an alien could
encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then
do would be not to make a bid or make only a token one and,
after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest
bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not
possible under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Under
these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share for
a range of 9 to 15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will
not be considered. On the other hand, if the Filipino entity, after
passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he
will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm
because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly
submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and
has no basis in fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:
Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this

as we are not confronted in the case at bar with legal and
constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the
side of history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the
words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of history is
worth a volume of logic."
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the

Manila Hotel has a historical and cultural aspect within the
meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the
"patrimony of the nation".
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx


foreign investments within its national goals and
priorities.
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with
Article II of the same Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies" which ordain —
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent

national economy effectively by Filipinos. (Sec. 19).
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos"

was one of the highlights in the 1987 Constitution Commission
proceedings thus:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment

will read: "IN THE GRANT OF
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS". And the
word "Filipinos" here, as intended
by the proponents, will include not
only individual Filipinos but also
Filipino-Controlled entities fully
controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III,
Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 608).
MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to

add, as Commissioner Villegas
said, this committee and this body
already approved what is known as
the Filipino First policy which was
suggested by Commissioner de
Castro. So that it is now in our
Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p.
225).
Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision

adverted to above, said:
MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of

rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that

amendment, if a foreign enterprise
is qualified and the Filipinos
enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more

qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred:?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is

"yes". (Vol. III, p. 616, Records of
the Constitutional Commission).
The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the

history and spirit of the Malolos Constitution of 1898, the 1935
Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no
reneged on this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the
earliest case, this Court said —
The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various
provisions of the Constitution. . . . It cannot therefore be
said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit
underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional (Ichong, et al.
vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and

traditions are not legislated and is the product of events, customs,
usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and
acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and
soul of a people.
The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every
inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to historic events (too
numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84
years.
As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to

examine the single instances of the legal largese which have
given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been
exhaustively discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this
point that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in
the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits
subverts the cherished historical values of our people.
As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has

its enviable tradition which, in the words of the philosopher
Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone,
it keeps flowing, and one must view the flowing , and one must
view the flow of both directions. If you look towards the hill from
which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful
currents that push the river or people towards the future, and if
you look the other way, you progress."
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress
depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not jettison the tradition of
the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.
I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in
different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is

always right who suspects that he makes mistakes". On this note,
I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding
the belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his
own land.
I vote GRANT the petition.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the

Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a domestic corporation, to stop
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling
the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign
corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the second paragraph of
section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled

corporation. It is the sole owner of the Manila Hotel which it
operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation.
Manila Hotel was included in the privatization program of the
government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buyers
30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000
shares, in the Manila Hotel Corporation. After the absence of bids
at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale was
increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning
bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner" of the GSIS was
required to "provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support
to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel"1 The proposal was approved by respondent Committee on
Privatization.
In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification

documents and the bidding rules were furnished interested
parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation,
and Renong Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as
operator, prequalified.2
The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and

Procedures: Second Prequalification and Public Bidding of the
MHC Privatization" provide:
I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS
DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC

PARTNER
The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below

will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner
and will be awarded the Block of Shares:
First — Pass the prequalification process;
Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share

basis for the Block of Shares;
Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts

with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995;
xxx xxx xxx
IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR
PREQUALIFICATION
The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be

expected to provide management expertise
and/or an international marketing reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen
the profitability and performance of The
Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is
inviting to the prequalification process any
local and/or foreign corporation,
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with
at least one of the following qualifications:
a. Proven management .expertise

in the hotel industry; or
b. Significant equity ownership (i.e.

board representation) in another
hotel company; or
c. Overall management and

marketing expertise to successfully
operate the Manila Hotel.
Parties interested in bidding for MHC should

be able to provide access to the requisite
management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila
Hotel.
xxx xxx xxx
D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
xxx xxx xxx

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE

REGISTRATION OFFICE
The prequalification documents can be

secured at the Registration Office between
9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days
within the period specified in Section III. Each
set of documents consists of the following:
a. Guidelines and Procedures:

Second Prequalification and Public
Bidding of the MHC Privatization
b. Confidential Information
Memorandum: The Manila Hotel
Corporation
c. Letter of Invitation. to the

Prequalification and Bidding
Conference
xxx xxx xxx
4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING

CONFERENCE
A prequalification and bidding conference will

be held at The Manila Hotel on the date
specified in Section III to allow the Applicant
to seek clarifications and further information
regarding the guidelines and procedures.
Only those who purchased the
prequalification documents will be allowed in
this conference. Attendance to this
conference is strongly advised, although the
Applicant will not be penalized if it does not
attend.
5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION
DOCUMENTS
The applicant should submit 5 sets of the

prequalification documents (1 original set
plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office
between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working
days within the period specified in Section III.
F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated

by the PBAC with the assistance of
the TEC based on the Information
Package and other information
available to the PBAC.
2. If the Applicant is a
Consortium/Joint Venture, the
evaluation will consider the overall
qualifications of the group, taking
into account the contribution of
each member to the venture.
3. The decision of the PBAC with

respect to the results of the PBAC
evaluation will be final.
4. The Applicant shall be evaluated

according to the criteria set forth
below:
a. Business
management expertise,
track record, and
experience
b. Financial capability.
c. Feasibility and
acceptability of the
proposed strategic plan
for the Manila Hotel
5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of

Applicants as it may deem appropriate.
6. The parties that prequalified in the first

MHC public bidding — ITT Sheraton, Marriot
International Inc., Renaissance Hotels
International Inc., consortium of RCBC
Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in the
Public Bidding without having to undergo the
prequalification process again.
G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. A notice of prequalification results

containing the shortlist of Qualified Bidders
will be posted at the Registration Office at the
date specified in Section III.
2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture,

the withdrawal by member whose
qualification was a material consideration for
being included in the shortlist is ground for
disqualification of the Applicant.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN
THE PUBLIC BIDDING
All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders

will be eligible to participate in the Public
Bidding.
B. BLOCK OF SHARES
A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen

Million Three Hundred Thousand
(15,300,000) shares of stock representing
Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-
51%) of the issued and outstanding shares of
MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by
the GSIS. The Qualified Bidders will have the
Option of determining the number of shares
within the range to bid for. The range is
intended to attract bidders with different
preferences and objectives for the operation
and management of The Manila Hotel.
C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE

PER SHARE BASIS
1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share

basis. The minimum bid required on a price
per share basis for the Block of Shares is
Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos
(P36.67).
2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency

payable to the GSIS.
3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per
share below the minimum required will not
considered.
D. TRANSFER COSTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. OFFICIAL BID FORM
1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed

Official Bid Form, a copy of which is attached
as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be
properly accomplished in all details; improper
accomplishment may be a sufficient basis for
disqualification.
2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified

Bidder will submit the Official Bid Form, which
will indicate the offered purchase price, in a
sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."
F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
During the Public Bidding, the following

documents should be submitted along with
the bid in a separate envelop marked
"SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS":
1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER

OATH).
If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the

representative of the Qualified Bidder should
submit a Board resolution which adequately
authorizes such representative to bid for and
in behalf of the corporation with full authority
to perform such acts necessary or requisite to
bind the Qualified Bidder.
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint

Venture, each member of the
Consortium/Joint venture should submit a
Board resolution authorizing one of its
members and such member's representative
to make the bid on behalf of the group with
full authority to perform such acts necessary
or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
2. BID SECURITY
a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-

Three Million Pesos (P33,000,00), in
Philippine currency as Bid Security in the
form of:
i. Manager's check or unconditional

demand draft payable to the
"Government Service Insurance
System" and issued by a reputable
banking institution duly licensed to
do business in the Philippines and
acceptable to GSIS; or
ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued

by a reputable banking institution
acceptable to the GSIS.
b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:
i. The bid does not have Bid

Security; or
ii. The Bid Security accompanying
the bid is for less than the required
amount.
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a

manager's check or unconditional demand
draft, the interest earned on the Bid Security
will be for the account of GSIS.
d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the

winning Bidder/Strategic Partner, the Bid
Security will be applied as the downpayment
on the Qualified Bidder's offered purchase
price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder

will be returned immediately after the Public
Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not declared
the Highest Bidder.
f. The Bid Security will be returned by

October 23, 1995 if the Highest Bidder is
unable to negotiate and execute with
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other types of contract specified
by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for
The Manila Hotel.
g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will

be forfeited in favor of GSIS if the Highest
Bidder, after negotiating and executing the
Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract
specified by the Highest Bidder or other types
of contract in its strategic plan for The Manila
Hotel, fails or refuses to:
i. Execute the Stock Purchase and

Sale Agreement with GSIS not later
than October 23, 1995; or
ii. Pay the full amount of the offered

purchase price not later than
October 23, 1995; or
iii. Consummate the sale of the

Block of Shares for any other
reason.
G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS
1. The Public Bidding will be held on

September 7, 1995 at the following location:
New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be

stationed at the Public Bidding to accept any
and all bids and supporting requirements.
Representatives from the Commission on
Audit and COP will be invited to witness the
proceedings.
3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid

using the Official Bid Form. The
accomplished Official Bid Form should be
submitted in a sealed envelope marked
"OFFICIAL BID."
4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the
following documents in another sealed
envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS"
a. Written Authority Bid
b. Bid Security
5. The two sealed envelopes marked

"OFFICIAL BID" and "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS" must be submitted
simultaneously to the Secretariat between
9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, Philippine Standard
Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No
bid shall be accepted after the closing time.
Opened or tampered bids shall not be
accepted.
6. The Secretariat will log and record the

actual time of submission of the two sealed
envelopes. The actual time of submission will
also be indicated by the Secretariat on the
face of the two envelopes.
7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes

will be dropped in the corresponding bid
boxes provided for the purpose. These boxes
will be in full view of the invited public.
H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS
1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the

date of the Public Bidding, the PBAC will
open all sealed envelopes marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" for
screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those
who submitted incomplete/insufficient
documents or document/s which is/are not
substantially in the form required by PBAC
will be disqualified. The envelope containing
their Official Bid Form will be immediately
returned to the disqualified bidders.
2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL

BID" will be opened at 3:00 PM. The name of
the bidder and the amount of its bid price will
be read publicly as the envelopes are
opened.
3. Immediately following the reading of the

bids, the PBAC will formally announce the
highest bid and the Highest Bidder.
4. The highest bid will be, determined on

a price per share basis. In the event of a tie
wherein two or more bids have the same
equivalent price per share, priority will be
given to the bidder seeking the larger
ownership interest in MHC.
5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed

bidding in case:
a. No single bid is submitted within

the prescribed period; or
b. There is only one (1) bid that is

submitted and acceptable to the
PBAC.
CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the

conditions set forth below by October 23,
1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right
to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS
will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must

negotiate and execute with
GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International Marketing
Reservation System Contract or
other type of contract specified by
the Highest Bidder in its strategic
plan for The Manila Hotel. If the
Highest Bidder is intending to
provide only financial support to
The Manila Hotel, a separate
institution may enter into the
aforementioned contract/s with
GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must

execute the Stock Purchase and
Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy
of which will be distributed to each
of the Qualified Bidder after the
prequalification process is
completed.
2. In the event that the Highest Bidder

chooses a Management Contract for The
Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the
management fee structure that GSIS/MHC
are prepared to accept in the Management
Contract are as follows:
a. Basic management fee:

Maximum of 2.5% of gross
revenues.(1)
b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0%

of gross operating profit(1) after
deducting undistributed overhead
expenses and the basic
management fee.
c. Fixed component of the

international marketing/reservation
system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of
gross room revenues.(1) The
Applicant should indicate in its
Information Package if it is wishes
to charge this fee.
Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of

account for hotels.
The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the

acceptable parameters for the hotel
management fees to facilitate the
negotiations with the Highest Bidder for the
Management Contract after the Public
Bidding.
A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management

Contract for The Manila Hotel should
determine whether or not the management
fee structure above is acceptable before
submitting their prequalification documents to
GSIS.
J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED

BIDDERS
1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder

cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per
share.
2. The order of priority among the interested

Qualified Bidders will be in accordance wit
the equivalent price per share of their
respective bids in their public Bidding, i.e.,
first and second priority will be given to the
Qualified Bidders that submitted the second
and third highest bids on the price per
share basis, respectively, and so on.

BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the

Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary

contract with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995; and
b. Requisite approvals from the
GSIS/MHC and COP/OGCC are
obtained.
I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF

SHARES
1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts

with GSIS/MHC, the Winning Bidder/Strategic
Partner must fully pay, not later than October
23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the
Block of Shares after deducting the Bid
Security applied as downpayment.
2. All payments should be made in the form

of a Manager's Check or unconditional
Demand Draft, payable to the "Government
Service Insurance System," issued by a
reputable banking institution licensed to do
business in the Philippines and acceptable to
GSIS.
M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the

right to reject any or all applications, waive
any formality therein, or accept such
application as maybe considered most
advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS
similarly reserves the right to require the
submission of any additional information from
the Applicant as the PBAC may deem
necessary.
2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call

off the Public Bidding prior to acceptance of
the bids and call for a new public bidding
under amended rules, and without any
liability whatsoever to any or all the Qualified
Bidders, except the obligation to return the
Bid Security.
3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the

date of the prequalification/bidding
conference, the deadline for the submission
of the prequalification documents, the date of
the Public Bidding or other pertinent activities
at least three (3) calendar days prior to the
respective deadlines/target dates.
4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights,

interest and participation it has on the Block
of Shares.
5. All documents and materials submitted by

the Qualified Bidders, except the Bid
Security, may be returned upon request.
6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the

results of the Public Bidding is final. The
Qualified Bidders, by participating in the
Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed
to accept and abide by these results.
7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless

form any liability, suit or allegation arising out
of the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidders
who have participated in the Public Bidding.3
The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995.

Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for 15,300,000 shares and
Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000
shares. The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder
and immediately returned petitioner's bid security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner

wrote to GSIS offering to match the bid price of Renong Berhad. It
requested that the award be made to itself citing the second
paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a
manager's check for thirty-three million pesos (P33,000,000.00)
as bid security.
Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong

Berhad the terms and conditions of the contract and technical
agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain
petitioner's request.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a

temporary restraining order on October 18, 1995.
Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII,

Section 10 of the Constitution4 on the "National Economy and
Patrimony" which provides:
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the

Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is
self-executing whether the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as
a nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State,"

hence, mandated to implement section 10, paragraph 2
of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed

to give preference to petitioner, a qualified Filipino
corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation;
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the

sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation.
Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution

provides the guiding policies and principles upon which is built the
substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government.5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing
and can be enforced without further legislative action.6 Some of its
provisions, however, can be implemented only through
appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-
executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is

self-executing is a hard row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of
the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its
language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the
provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as
a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and
enforcement.7 The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text
and the context of the provision in question.8
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as
self-executing,9 rather than as requiring future legislation for their
enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they
are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental
law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and
nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the
unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to
constitutional rights but congressional in action should not
suffocate them. 12
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill

of Rights on arrests, searches and seizures, 13 the rights of a
person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an
accused, 15 and the privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is
recognize a that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental
rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. 17 The same
treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the
taking or damaging of property for public use without just
compensation.18
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional

provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy
and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the
means by which the policy shall be carried into
effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II
of our Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies" should generally be construed as mere statements of
principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions
of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article
XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture end
Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights.
Their enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress
though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate
their policy content. 24
Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider
whether Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-
executing or not. It reads:
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of

the economic and planning agency, when the national
interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or
such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned
by Filipinos.


foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain

areas of investments in the country 25 to Filipino citizens or to
corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further
commands Congress to enact laws that will encourage the
formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-
owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second
paragraph orders the entire State to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges
covering the national economy and patrimony. The third
paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign
investments in line with our national goals and well-set
priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its
express text, there is a categorical command for Congress to
enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of
investments in the country and to encourage the formation
and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right
granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has
to breathe life to the right by means of legislation.
Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from section 3,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The provision in the
1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark case
of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 28where we upheld the
discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas
of investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first
paragraph of section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to
nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipinos.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They

are directed to the State and not to Congress alone which is but
one of the three great branches of our government. Their
coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy
and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national
jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments."
Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the
exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving
preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and
privileges covering our national economy and patrimony. Their
language does not suggest that any of the State agency or
instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its
implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to
implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the third
paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution

entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." Its Section
19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."
It engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy in our fundamental
law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its
enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half-
pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of

the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our
national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission
show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its
meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers
not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural
heritage of our race. 30 By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel
falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights
involving our national patrimony. The unique value of the Manila
Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic
eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As
chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on July
4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular
Government for Americans living in, or passing through, Manila
while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino
craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it
was exclusively used by American and Caucasian travelers and
served as the "official guesthouse" of the American Insular
Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming
to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When
the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters
and lodging for the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at
the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their last
stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel
again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and
kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous
international film and sports celebrities were housed in the Hotel.
It was also the situs of international conventions and conferences.
In the local scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties
and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped and
continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from
international hotel and travel award-giving bodies, a fitting
acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These are
judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.
The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural
treasure pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not
exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846,
"The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely
provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural property may
be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural
property. 32 Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374
in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot be read as the
exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure
and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of
the nation."
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State

includes the respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that
GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that
administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of
government employees and the government. 33 The funds are
held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of
indifferently. 34 They are to be used to finance the retirement,
disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the
administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS, 35Excess
funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other
ventures for the benefit of the employees.36 It is thus contended
that the GSIS investment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a
simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation
of section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private
corporation. It is essentially a public corporation created by
Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public
purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service
Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As state-owned
and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the
policies spelled out in the general welfare of the people. One of
these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated
as a constitutional command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase

"qualified Filipinos" and their "preferential right." The Constitution
desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for a
Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which
can bent to meet today's manifest needs and tomorrow's
unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity
can grow as a living constitution.
Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission,

Commissioner Nolledo to define the phrase brushed aside a
suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained
that present and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem
of its interpretation, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT. What is the

suggestion of Commissioner
Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say

definitely "TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens over aliens?
I think that is understood. We use
the word "QUALIFIED" because
the existing laws or the prospective
laws will always lay down
conditions under which business
map be done, for example,
qualifications on capital,
qualifications on the setting up of
other financial structures, et cetera.
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter

of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. If we say,

"PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS," it can be understood
as giving preference to qualified
Filipinos as against Filipinos who
are not qualified.

that was the intention of the
proponents. The committee has
accepted the amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
As previously discussed, the constitutional command to

enforce the Filipino First policy is addressed to the State and
not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be
understood as limited to legislations but all state actions
which include applicable rules and regulations adopted by
agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of
their rule-making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules
and regulations set forth the standards to measure the
qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is
not seriously disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did
Renong Berhad. 39
Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference

which GSIS should have accorded petitioner, a qualified Filipino,
over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after
losing the bid, this right of preference gives it a second chance to
match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.
With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I

prescind from the premise that the second paragraph of section
10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien.
It is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not,
however, anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely bar aliens in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of
qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these
rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will
promote the weal of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of

the Constitution, the stellar task of our State policy-makers is to
maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the
need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of
foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our
economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the
Constitution did not define the degree of the right of preference to
be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to
serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that
can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing needs
of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos
is to be determined by degree as time dictates and circumstances
warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the
degree of the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and
vice verse.
Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to

determine the degree of this privilege at any given time is
addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional
scheme, the right primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking
department of our government, other branches of government,
and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to
enforce this state policy. Within the limits of their authority, they
can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of
this right of preference in cases where they have to make grants
involving the national economy and judicial duty. On the other
hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the state that violate the
policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of

the preferential right. Consequently, we must turn to the rules and
regulations of on respondents Committee Privatization and GSIS
to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to
as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look at the
rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree
of preferential right to be accorded qualified Filipino bidder.
Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean that
they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for
paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is deemed
part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics
which demand that we interpret rules to save them from
unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of
petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that
instance, all things stand equal, and bidder, as a qualified Pilipino
bidder, should be preferred.
It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that
petitioner has a right to match the bid of Renong Berhad.
Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if
we examine the rules inside-out .thousand times, they can not
justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the
highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder
cannot be awarded block of shares . . ." No reason has arisen
that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as
bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the
highest bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS
and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a
matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as
a qualified Filipino privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner.
What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our
symphaties may be with petitioner but the court has no power to
extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as
defined by the rules. The parameters of the right of preference
depend on galaxy of facts and factors whose determination
belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and
agencies of the State. We are duty-bound to respect that
determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment.
The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for
as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a
State action amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can
come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the

winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules
and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and
regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can
match the winning bid submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the
bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even
during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate
the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey
the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If
sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc on he essence of
bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest bidding to
raise as much funds as possible for the government to maximize
its capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a
duty that must be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners
participating in a bidding contest and the rules are carefully
written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are
prequalified to insure their financial capability. The bidding is
secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the
parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner
that privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to match it.
For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to
strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.
We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The

visionary nationalist Don Claro M. Recto has warned us that the
greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his
own land. The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a
state policy. But while the Filipino First policy requires that we
incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien.
Our policy makers can write laws and rules giving favored
treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a
foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are
written, they must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and
foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution
protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without
unfairness to foreigner.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting

Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, may I just add
1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to

mean that, after a bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino
bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid,
and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII]
simply states that "in the grant of rights . . . covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no
law defining the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically,
no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid
and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such
empowering law, the majority's strained interpretation, I
respectfully submit constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation,
which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can
lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!.
2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is

short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-
term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries — in the guise
of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to
discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by authorizing
their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of
Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing
similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their
nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as
pariahs in the global marketplace with absolute no chance of
winning any bidding outside our country. Even authoritarian
regimes and hermit kingdoms have long ago found out
unfairness, greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-
term, self-destructing.
The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you
dont want other to do unto you.
3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the

"Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the constitutional
preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where
all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead
without self-destructing him and without being unfair to the
foreigner.
In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified

Filipino only when the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame
is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and
AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION

(PHILCONSA), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with
preliminary injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing

Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any act that will result
in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the
constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1
and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines, approved
on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing
ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor
General from passing in audit any disbursement from the
appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913; and
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate
and the House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that

Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be
amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the
present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned
among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to
the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province
shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to

said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2)
elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected
in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of
November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the
same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and
members of the House of Representatives to become delegates
to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by

the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913,
providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be
held on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the

hearing thereof, on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General
appeared on behalf of respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David
and counsel for the Philippine Constitution Association —
hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA — were allowed to
argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr.
Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in this case
be deferred until after a substantially identical case brought by
said organization before the Commission on Elections,1 which
was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in
all probability, be appealed to this Court — had been submitted
thereto for final determination, for a joint decision on the identical
issues raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the
PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No. L-
28224, for review by certiorari of the resolution of the Commission
on Elections2 dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases
were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon
the filing of the answer of respondent, the memorandum of the
petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent in L-28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a

Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have
instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all
citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although
respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer
denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that they
have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth
thereof, such denial would appear to be a perfunctory one. In fact,
at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General expressed
himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the
issued raised in said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a

corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization
the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the
Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or
onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned
statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor
General maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is
"merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator
Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on
Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition
therein, was allowed to appear before this Court and objected to
said petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction
either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the
legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b)
that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in operational
the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to
enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal
effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected
thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court —
speaking through one of the leading members of the
Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of
Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,5 this Court
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one,
declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given
number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed
amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to
the people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote
requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent
has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of
the Senate,6 Avelino vs. Cuenco,7 Tañada vs.
Cuenco,8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9In the first,
we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the
Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this
Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary
for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election,
by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of
votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2)
Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second
party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we
declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to
apportion the representative districts for the House of
Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not
been made as may be possible according to the number of
inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory,
advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised
were political questions the determination of which is beyond
judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress.10 It is part of the inherent
powers of the people — as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours11 — to make, and, hence, to amend
their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments
to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants
such power.12 Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of
a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the
people, when performing the same function,13 for their authority
does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very
source of all powers of government, including the Constitution
itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments

to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their
authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that
they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are
within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush
aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that
ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature
of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,14 the
power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently
political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress —

acting as a constituent assembly — violates the Constitution
essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with
the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are
unanimous on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-

fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may

be proposed, either by Congress, or by a convention called by
Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such
amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3

have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions
are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed

amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to
propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose —
amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of
both — that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention
— at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the

Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be
a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the
national and local governments — such as the elections
scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 — will be chosen;
and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in

which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people
for ratification, must be held under such conditions — which,
allegedly, do not exist — as to give the people a reasonable
opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of
said amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the

Constitution, which provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may
be according to the number of their respective inhabitants,
but each province shall have at least one Member. The
Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three
years after the return of every enumeration, and not
otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made,
the House of Representatives shall have the same number
of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly,
who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the
present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and compact
territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960;

that, no apportionment having been made within three (3) years
thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of
its Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members,
likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de
facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the
disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution,
as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an

apportionment within three years after the enumeration or census
made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which became Republic
Act No. 3040,17 purporting to make said apportionment. This Act
was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the ground that the
apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according
to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the
Philippines.18
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of

the failure of Congress to make a valid apportionment within the
period stated in the Constitution, Congress became an
"unconstitutional Congress" and that, in consequence thereof, the
Members of its House of Representatives are de facto officers.
The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the
constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after
the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory.
The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said
apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that
failure to comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or
unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de
facto officers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935,
Congress has not made a valid apportionment as required in said
fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been envisioned
in the Constitution, pursuant to which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the

House of Representatives shall have the same number of
Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who
shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
Assembly districts. . . . .
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration
of the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails
to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it
implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with
the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of
said period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the

elections held in 1935. This theory assumes that an
apportionment had to be made necessarily before the first
elections to be held after the inauguration of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is, however,
unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and
nobody could foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted
and adopted the Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore,
that the three-year period, after the earliest possible enumeration,
would expire after the elections in 1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the

Constitution, particularly those on the legislative department, were
amended in 1940, by establishing a bicameral Congress, those
who drafted and adopted said amendment, incorporating therein
the provision of the original Constitution regarding the
apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have
known that the three-year period therefor would expire after the
elections scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and

ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of the
amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision
concerning said apportionment and the effect of the failure to
make it were expected to be applied to conditions
obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even
after subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the
last enumeration was submitted to the President on November
30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to make the
apportionment did not expire until 1963, or after the Presidential
elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore, that the
Senate and the House of Representatives organized or
constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that
the Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory
of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three years,
or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at
least, those of the House of Representatives, became illegal
holder of their respective offices, and were de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year

period without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or
repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the
House of Representatives, and are not aware of any rule or
principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither do
they allege that the term of office of the members of said House
automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in
Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In
fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in
particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory
duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the
forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election

Law relative to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were
not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make
an apportionment within three (3) years after the census of 1960.
Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably held
in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions
creating Congress — with a House of Representatives composed
of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts
as they existed at the time of said elections — remained in force,
we can not see how said Members of the House of
Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the
failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment
within the period aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the

impeachment of the President, the Vice-President, the Justices of
the Supreme Court and the Auditor General for, inter alia,
culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the enforcement of which
is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main function.
This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such
mandatory duty, the title to their respective offices remains
unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a judgment of
conviction rendered in accordance with Article IX of the
Constitution. In short, the loss of office or the extinction of title
thereto is not automatic.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of

Congress are merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the
contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and
void. In fact, the main reasons for the existence of the de
facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons
holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be,
likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as distinguished
from the officer in question — is concerned.21 Indeed, otherwise,
those dealing with officers and employees of the Government
would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their
title to the positions they hold, before dealing with them, or before
recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if
they should act within the limits of the authority vested in their
respective offices, positions or employments.22 One can imagine
this great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in
the absence of the de facto doctrine.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be

assailed collaterally.23 It may not be contested except directly,
by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts
be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de
facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an
indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de
facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid,
insofar as the public is concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at

bar because the acts therein involved have not been completed
and petitioners herein are not third parties. This pretense is
untenable. It is inconsistent with Tayko vs. Capistrano.25 In that
case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge
Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the
reason that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement.
This Court held that the objection could not be entertained,
because the Judge was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can
not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko was not
a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko was one
of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge
Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much less
rendered decision therein. No rights had vested in favor of the
parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's
objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is
concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein contested
and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing
else to do in connection therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under
consideration is untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress

may either propose amendments to the Constitution or call a
convention for that purpose, but it can not do both, at the same
time. This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2)
alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive
"or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other
circumstances — and none has brought to our attention —
supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the
term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa,
when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.26
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose

amendments to the constitutional provision on Congress, to be
submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967,
whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to consider
proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other
words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of
R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under
R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several
years before those that may be proposed by the constitutional
convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3)
resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up
and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other
words, they were not passed at the same time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the
history thereof anything that would negate the authority of
different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of
the same Congress to pass the same in, different sessions or
different days of the same congressional session. And, neither
has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of
authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional

convention to propose amendments, why not let the whole thing
be submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing
some specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before
said convention is held? The force of this argument must be
conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken
by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose
thereof to permit Members of Congress to run for election as
delegates to the constitutional convention and participate in the
proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress.
Whether or not this should be done is a political question, not
subject to review by the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of

the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for

Ratification in a General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of

three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election"

therein referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The
circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution
had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so
under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in
general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of

the proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the
people's approval independently of the election of public officials.
And there is no denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the
merits and demerits proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the
choice of personalities involved in general elections, particularly
when provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But,
then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of
holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public
officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose
either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without
qualification, in the abovequoted provision of the Constitution.
Such authority becomes even more patent when we consider: (1)
that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection
of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the
word used in Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant of
suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1

of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a
special election. Some members of the Court even feel that said
term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election,"
general or special, of public officers. They opine that constitutional
amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if
not transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the
attention of the people be focused exclusively on the subject-
matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no more
than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits
of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted
by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan
political considerations that are likely to affect the selection of
elective officials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the

attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal conditions are,
however, one thing. The question whether the
Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment
to the people except under such conditions, is another thing.
Much as the writer and those who concur in this opinion admire
the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe
thereto without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what they
believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from
the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter
of sheer speculation.
The majority view — although the votes in favor thereof are

insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional —
as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is,
however, otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the

People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution?
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved

on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry
shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the
amendments in question. Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the
election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be

posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and
provincial office building and in every polling place not later than
October 14, 1967," and that said copy "shall remain posted
therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in
each polling place, to be made available for examination by the
qualified electors during election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native

languages, as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies

of said amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever
practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distributing:"
and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the

back of the ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are

palpably inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement
that proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for
their ratification," and that said measures are manifestly
insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of
the amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the

people of the subject submitted to them for ratification, from the
original Constitution down to the Parity Amendment. Thus,
referring to the original Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200,
provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto,

shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in
Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days
prior to said election, and a printed copy of said Constitution,
with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial
government office building and in each polling place not later
than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and
thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein continually until
after the termination of the election. At least ten copies of the
Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in English
and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available
for examination by the qualified electors during election day.
Whenever practicable, copies in the principal local dialects
as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior shall
also be kept in each polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of

Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:
Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the

Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three
consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election,
and the said Article V shall be posted in a conspicuous place
in each municipal and provincial office building and in each
polling place not later than the twenty-second day of April,
nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein
continually until after the termination of the plebiscite. At
least ten copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in
English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place
available for examination by the qualified electors during the
plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal
native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of
the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the

1940 amendments, is of the following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and

Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at
least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof
shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal,
city, and provincial government office building and in every
polling place not later than May eighteen, nineteen hundred
and forty, and shall remain posted therein until after the
election. At least ten copies of said amendments shall be
kept in each polling place to be made available for
examination by the qualified electors during election day.
When practicable, copies in the principal native languages,
as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall
also be kept therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No.

73 is to the effect that:
The said amendment shall be published in English and

Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at
least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof
shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal,
city, and provincial government office building and in every
polling place not later than February eleven, nineteen
hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein
until after the election. At least, ten copies of the said
amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made
available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native
Elections, shall also be kept in each polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that
obtaining in connection with the former proposals does not arise
from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs from the
circumstance that the major political parties had taken sides on
previous amendments to the Constitution — except, perhaps, the
woman's suffrage — and, consequently, debated thereon at some
length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said
political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the
amendments now being contested and have, accordingly,
refrained from discussing the same in the current political
campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken place —
on a rather limited scale — on the latest proposals for
amendment, have been due principally to the initiative of a few
civic organizations and some militant members of our citizenry
who have voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot,
however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of
the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or
unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those
existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the
acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those
that take place subsequently to the passage or approval of the
law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment,

the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the
submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14,
1967, depends — in the view of those who concur in this opinion,
and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the minority
— upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such
as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the
substance of said proposals, which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 —
the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of
Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 —
the authority given to the members of Congress to run for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto,
to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their
seats in Congress. We — who constitute the minority — believe
that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that
said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160
of the proposed maximum of representative districts are actually
apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the
Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that they are not
interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful
reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear
vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more
sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading
the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places,
the copies kept in the polling places and the text of contested
resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the ballots they will
use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may

fail to realize or envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the
work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our
Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell such effect with certainty.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the
Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R.
B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as
legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions
of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished

and esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that
such factors affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that
of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, not the authority of Congress to approve
the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power

to strike down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending
the confines set forth in the fundamental laws is not in derogation
of the principle of separation of powers, pursuant to which each
department is supreme within its own sphere. The determination
of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be
submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within
the legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily
shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting
Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done something
better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof. But,
then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond
improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional
and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe, however, said
Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of

declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases
must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed
for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few
words on the question of jurisdiction.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing opinion of the Chief Justice. I would

make some additional observations in connection with my
concurrence. Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act No. 4913 provide:
Sec. 2. The amendments shall be published in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty
days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be
posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and
provincial office building and in every polling place not later
than October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven,
and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At
least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in
each polling place to be made available for examination by
the qualified electors during election day. When practicable,
copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in
each polling place. The Commission on Elections shall make
available copies of each amendments in English, Spanish
and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages,
for free distribution.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. The ballots which shall be used in the election for the
approval of said amendments shall be printed in English and
Pilipino and shall be in the size and form prescribed by the
Commission on Elections: Provided, however, That at the
back of said ballot there shall be printed in full Resolutions of
both Houses of Congress Numbered One and Three, both
adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-
seven, proposing the amendments: Provided, further, That
the questionnaire appearing on the face of the ballot shall be
as follows:
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section five

of Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this
ballot?
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to section
sixteen of Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of
this ballot?
To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the

voter shall write the word "yes" or its equivalent in Pilipino or
in the local dialect in the blank space after each question; to
vote for the rejection thereof, he shall write the word "No" or
its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local dialect.
I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without

reference to extraneous factors and circumstances, the manner
prescribed in the aforesaid provisions is sufficient for the purpose
of having the proposed amendments submitted to the people for
their ratification, as enjoined in Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution. I am at a loss to say what else should have been
required by the Act to make it adhere more closely to the
constitutional requirement. Certainly it would have been out of
place to provide, for instance, that government officials and
employees should go out and explain the amendments to the
people, or that they should be the subject of any particular means
or form of public discussion.
The objection of some members of the Court to Republic Act No.

4913 seems to me predicated on the fact that there are so many
other issues at stake in the coming general election that the
attention of the electorate, cannot be entirely focused on the
proposed amendments, such that there is a failure to properly
submit them for ratification within the intendment of the
Constitution. If that is so, then the defect is not intrinsic in the law
but in its implementation. The same manner of submitting the
proposed amendments to the people for ratification may, in a
different setting, be sufficient for the purpose. Yet I cannot
conceive that the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law
may be made to depend willy-nilly on factors not inherent in its
provisions. For a law to be struck down as unconstitutional it must
be so by reason of some irreconcilable conflict between it and the
Constitution. Otherwise a law may be either valid or invalid,
according to circumstances not found in its provisions, such as
the zeal with which they are carried out. To such a thesis I cannot
agree. The criterion would be too broad and relative, and
dependent upon individual opinions that at best are subjective.
What one may regard as sufficient compliance with the
requirement of submission to the people, within the context of the
same law, may not be so to another. The question is susceptible
of as many views as there are viewers; and I do not think this
Court would be justified in saying that its own view on the matter
is the correct one, to the exclusion of the opinions of others.
On the other hand, I reject the argument that the ratification must
necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that
purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the
Constitution speaks simply of "an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification,"
and I do not subscribe to the restrictive interpretation that the
petitioners would place on this provision, namely, that it means
only a special election.
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
It is the glory of our institutions that they are founded upon law,
that no one can exercise any authority over the rights and
interests of others except pursuant to and in the manner
authorized by law.1 Based upon this principle, petitioners Ramon
A. Gonzales and Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) come to this Court in separate petitions.
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly
in representation thru class suit of all citizens of this country, filed
this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the
Commission on Elections, Director of Printing and Auditor General
from implementing and/or complying with Republic Act 4913,
assailing said law as unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan

corporation, assails the constitutionality not only of Republic Act
4913 but also of Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 of
March 16, 1967.
Republic Act 4913, effective June 17, 1967, is an Act submitting to

the Filipino people for approval the amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of the
Philippines in Resolutions of Both Houses Numbered 1 and 3,
adopted on March 16, 1967. Said Republic Act fixes the date and
manner of the election at which the aforesaid proposed
amendments shall be voted upon by the people, and appropriates
funds for said election. Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3
propose two amendments to the Constitution: the first, to amend
Sec. 5, Art. VI, by increasing the maximum membership of the
House of Representatives from 120 to 180, apportioning 160 of
said 180 seats and eliminating the provision that Congress shall
by law make an apportionment within three years after the return
of every enumeration; the second, to amend Sec. 16, Art. VI, by
allowing Senators and Representatives to be delegates to a
constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.
Since both petitions relate to the proposed amendments, they are

considered together herein.
Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales' objections are as

follows: (1) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitution, in submitting the proposed amendments to the
Constitution, to the people for approval, at the general election of
1967 instead of at a special election solely for that purpose; (2)
Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution,
since it was not passed with the 3/4 vote in joint session required
when Congress proposes amendments to the Constitution, said
Republic Act being a step in or part of the process of proposing
amendments to the Constitution; and (3) Republic Act 4913
violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Sec. 1,
Subsec. 1, Art. III), in not requiring that the substance of the
proposed amendments be stated on the face of the ballot or
otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed
amendments, such as by stating the provisions before and after
said amendments, instead of printing at the back of the ballot only
the proposed amendments.
Since observance of Constitutional provisions on

the procedure for amending the Constitution is concerned, the
issue is cognizable by this Court under its powers to review an Act
of Congress to determine its conformity to the fundamental law.
For though the Constitution leaves Congress free to propose
whatever Constitutional amendment it deems fit, so that
the substance or content of said proposed amendment is a matter
of policy and wisdom and thus a political question, the
Constitution nevertheless imposes requisites as to
the manner or procedure of proposing such amendments, e.g.,
the three-fourths vote requirement. Said procedure or manner,
therefore, from being left to the discretion of Congress, as a
matter of policy and wisdom, is fixed by the Constitution. And to
that extent, all questions bearing on whether Congress in
proposing amendments followed the procedure required by the
Constitution, is perforce justiciable, it not being a matter of policy
or wisdom.
Turning then to petitioner Gonzales' first objection, Sec. 1, Art. XV

clearly does not bear him on the point. It nowhere requires that
the ratification be thru an election solely for that purpose. It only
requires that it be at "an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification." To join it with an
election for candidates to public office, that is, to make it
concurrent with such election, does not render it any less an
election at which the proposed amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification. To prohibition being found in the plain
terms of the Constitution, none should be inferred. Had the
framers of requiring Constitution thought of requiring a special
election for the purpose only of the proposed amendments, they
could have said so, by qualifying the phrase with some word such
as "special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They did not.
It is not herein decided that such concurrence of election is wise,

or that it would not have been better to provide for a separate
election exclusively for the ratification of the proposed
amendments. The point however is that such separate and
exclusive election, even if it may be better or wiser, which again,
is not for this Court to decide, is not included in the procedure
required by the Constitution to amend the same. The function of
the Judiciary is "not to pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation".2 It is limited to determining whether the
action taken by the Legislative Department has violated the
Constitution or not. On this score, I am of the opinion that it has
not.
Petitioner Gonzales' second point is that Republic Act 4913 is

deficient for not having been passed by Congress in joint session
by 3/4 vote.
Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote

of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
at an election to which the amendments are submitted to the
Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the

Constitution? If by the term "propose amendment" is meant to
determine WHAT said amendment shall be, then Republic Act
4913 does not; Resolutions of Both Houses 1 and 3 already did
that. If, on the other hand, it means, or also means, to provide for
how, when, and by what means the amendments shall
be submitted to the people for approval, then it does.
A careful reading of Sec. 1, Art. XV shows that the first sense. is

the one intended. Said Section has two sentences: in the first, it
requires the 3/4 voting in joint session, for Congress to "propose
amendments". And then in the second sentence, it provides that
"such amendments . . . shall be submitted to the people for their
ratification". This clearly indicates that by the term "propose
amendments" in the first sentence is meant to frame the
substance or the content or the WHAT-element of the
amendments; for it is this and this alone that is submitted to the
people for their ratification. The details of when the election shall
be held for approval or rejection of the proposed amendments, or
the manner of holding it, are not submitted for ratification to form
part of the Constitution. Stated differently, the plain language of
Section 1, Art. XV, shows that the act of proposing amendments is
distinct from — albeit related to — that of submitting the
amendments to the people for their ratification; and that the 3/4
voting requirement applies only to the first step, not to the second
one.
It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can be

done thru an ordinary statute passed by Congress. The
Constitution does not expressly state by whom the submission
shall be undertaken; the rule is that a power not lodged elsewhere
under the Constitution is deemed to reside with the legislative
body, under the doctrine of residuary powers. Congress therefore
validly enacted Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and
manner of submitting the proposed amendments to the people for
their ratification. Since it does not "propose amendments" in the
sense referred to by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, but merely
provides for how and when the amendments, already proposed,
are going to be voted upon, the same does not need the 3/4 vote
in joint session required in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution.
Furthermore, Republic Act 4913 is an appropriation measure.
Sec. 6 thereof appropriates P1,000,000 for carrying out its
provisions. Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution states that "All
appropriation . . . bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives". Republic Act 4913, therefore, could not have
been validly adopted in a joint session, reinforcing the view that
Sec. 1, Art. XV does not apply to such a measure providing for the
holding of the election to ratify the proposed amendments, which
must perforce appropriate funds for its purpose.
Petitioner Gonzales contends, thirdly, that Republic Act 4913

offends against substantive due process. An examination of the
provisions of the law shows no violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution. The publication in the Official Gazette at least
20 days before the election, the posting of notices in public
buildings not later than October 14, 1967, to remain posted until
after the elections, the placing of copies of the proposed
amendments in the polling places, aside from printing the same at
the back of the ballot, provide sufficient opportunity to the voters
to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. Due process refers
only to providing fair opportunity; it does not guarantee that the
opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of
the voter and the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and
reasonable opportunity to be informed is given, and it is, the due
process clause is not infringed.
Non-printing of the provisions to be amended as they now stand,
and the printing of the full proposed amendments at the back of
the ballot instead of the substance thereof at the face of the ballot,
do not deprive the voter of fair opportunity to be informed. The
present wording of the Constitution is not being veiled or
suppressed from him; he is conclusively presumed to know them
and they are available should he want to check on what he is
conclusively presumed to know. Should the voters choose to
remain ignorant of the present Constitution, the fault does not lie
with Congress. For opportunity to familiarize oneself with the
Constitution as it stands has been available thru all these years.
Perhaps it would have been more convenient for the voters if the
present wording of the provisions were also to be printed on the
ballot. The same however is a matter of policy. As long as the
method adopted provides sufficiently reasonable chance to
intelligently vote on the amendments, and I think it does in this
case, it is not constitutionally defective.
Petitioner Gonzales' other arguments touch on the merits or

wisdom of the proposed amendments. These are for the people in
their sovereign capacity to decide, not for this Court.
Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress

cannot both call a convention and propose amendments; second,
that the present Congress is a de facto one, since no
apportionment law was adopted within three years from the last
census of 1960, so that the Representatives elected in 1961
are de facto officers only. Not being de jure, they cannot propose
amendments, it is argued.
As to the first point, Sec. 1 of Art. XV states that Congress "may

propose amendments or call a convention for that purpose". The
term "or", however, is frequently used as having the same
meaning as "and" particularly in permissive, affirmative sentences
so that the interpretation of the word "or" as "and" in the
Constitution in such use will not change its meaning (Vicksburg S.
& P. R. Co. v. Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La, 442). And it
should be pointed out that the resolutions proposing amendments
(R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3) are different from that calling for a
convention (R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if Congress deems it better or
wise to amend the Constitution before a convention called for is
elected, it should not be fettered from doing so. For our purposes
in this case, suffice it to note that the Constitution does not
prohibit it from doing so.
As to the second argument, it is also true that Sec. 5 of Art. VI of

the Constitution provides in part that "The Congress shall by law
make an apportionment within three years after the return of
every enumeration, and not otherwise". It however further states
in the next sentence: "Until such apportionment shall have been
made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number
of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who
shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
assembly districts." The failure of Congress, therefore, to pass a
valid redistricting law since the time the above provision was
adopted, does not render the present districting illegal or
unconstitutional. For the Constitution itself provides for its
continuance in such case, rendering legal and de jure the status
quo.
For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of

Republic Act 4913, and fully concur with the opinion of the Chief
Justice.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The

opinion prepared by the Chief Justice discusses the matter with a
fullness that erases doubts and misgivings and clarifies the
applicable principles. A few words may however be added.
We start from the premise that only where it can be shown that
the question is to be solved by public opinion or where the matter
has been left by the Constitution to the sole discretion of any of
the political branches, as was so clearly stated by the then Justice
Concepcion in Tañada v. Cuenco,1 may this Court avoid passing
on the issue before it. Whatever may be said about the present
question, it is hard to speak with certitude considering Article XV,
that Congress may be entrusted with the full and uncontrolled
discretion on the procedure leading to proposals for an
amendment of the Constitution.
It may be said however that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,2 this Court

through Justice Tuason followed Coleman v. Miller,3 in its holding
that certain aspects of the amending process may be considered
political. His opinion quoted with approval the view of Justice
Black, to which three other members of the United States
Supreme Court agreed, that the process itself is political in its
entirety, "from submission until an amendment becomes part of
the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or
interference at any point." In a sense that would solve the matter
neatly. The judiciary would be spared the at times arduous and in
every case soul-searching process of determining whether the
procedure for amendments required by the Constitution has been
followed.
At the same time, without impugning the motives of Congress,

which cannot be judicially inquired into at any rate, it is not
beyond the realm of possibility that a failure to observe the
requirements of Article XV would occur. In the event that judicial
intervention is sought, to rely automatically on the theory of
political question to avoid passing on such a matter of delicacy
might under certain circumstances be considered, and rightly so,
as nothing less than judicial abdication or surrender.
What appears regrettable is that a major opinion of an esteemed

jurist, the late Justice Tuason, would no longer be controlling.
There is comfort in the thought that the view that then prevailed
was itself a product of the times. It could very well be that
considering the circumstances existing in 1947 as well as the
particular amendment sought to be incorporated in the
Constitution, the parity rights ordinance, the better part of wisdom
in view of the grave economic situation then confronting the
country would be to avoid the existence of any obstacle to its
being submitted for ratification. Moreover, the Republic being less
than a year old, American Supreme Court opinions on
constitutional questions were-invariably accorded uncritical
acceptance. Thus the approach followed by Justice Tuason is not
difficult to understand. It may be said that there is less propensity
now, which is all to the good, for this Court to accord that much
deference to constitutional views coming from the quarter.
Nor is this mode of viewing the opinion of Justice Tuason to do

injustice to his memory. For as he stated in another major opinion
in Araneta v. Dinglasan,4 in ascertaining the meaning to be given
the Emergency Powers Act,5 one should not ignore what would
ensue if a particular mode of construction were followed. As he so
emphatically stated, "We test a rule by its results."
The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed

amendment on the economic survival of the country, an
erroneous appraisal it turned out later, constituted an effective
argument for its submission. Why not then consider the question
political and let the people decide? That assumption could have
been indulged in. It could very well be the inarticulate major
premise. For many it did bear the stamp of judicial statesmanship.
The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystal-clear
why as of this date and in the foreseeable future judicial inquiry to
assure the utmost compliance with the constitutional requirement
would be a more appropriate response.
SANCHEZ, J., in separate opinion:
Right at the outset, the writer expresses his deep appreciation to

Mr. Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
for their invaluable contribution to the substance and form of the
opinion which follows.
Directly under attack in this, a petition for prohibition, is the

constitutionality of Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17,
1967. This Act seeks to implement Resolutions 1 and 3 adopted
by the Senate and the House of Representatives on March 16,
1967 with the end in view of amending vital portions of the
Constitution.
Since the problem here presented has its roots in the resolutions
aforesaid of both houses of Congress, it may just as well be that
we recite in brief the salient features thereof. Resolution No. 1
increases the membership of the House of Representatives from
120 to 180 members, and immediately apportions 160 seats. A
companion resolution is Resolution No. 3 which permits Senators
and Congressmen — without forfeiting their seats in Congress —
to be members of the Constitutional Convention1 to be convened,
as provided in another resolution — Resolution No. 2.
Parenthetically, two of these proposed amendments to the
Constitution (Resolutions I and 3) are to be submitted to the
people for their ratification next November 14, 1967. Resolution
No. 2 just adverted to calls for a constitutional convention also to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The delegates thereto
are to be elected on the second Tuesday of November 1970; the
convention to sit on June 1, 1971; and the amendments proposed
by the convention to be submitted to the people thereafter for their
ratification.
Of importance now are the proposed amendments increasing the

number of members of the House of representatives under
Resolution No. 1, and that in Resolution No. 3 which gives
Senators and Congressmen the right to sit as members of the
constitutional convention to be convened on June 1, 1971.
Because, these are the two amendments to be submitted to the
people in the general elections soon to be held on November 14,
1967, upon the provisions of Section 1, Republic Act 4913, which
reads:
The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines

proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions
of both Houses Numbered One and Three, both adopted on
March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty- seven, shall be
submitted to the people for approval at the general election
which shall be held on November fourteen, nineteen
hundred and sixty- seven, in accordance with the provisions
of this Act.
Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem thrust
upon us — the manner in which the amendments proposed by
Congress just adverted to be brought to the people's attention.
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that

proposed amendments to the Constitution may become effective,
Section 1, Article XV thereof commands that such amendments
must be "approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification."2 The accent is on two words complementing
each other, namely, "submitted" and "ratification."
1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of the
problem facing us. And this, because the amendments submitted
are transcendental and encompassing. The ceiling of the number
of Congressmen is sought to be elevated from 120 to 180
members; and Senators and Congressmen may run in
constitutional conventions without forfeiting their seats. These
certainly affect the people as a whole. The increase in the number
of Congressmen has its proportional increase in the people's tax
burdens. They may not look at this with favor, what with the
constitutional provision (Section 5, Article VI) that Congress "shall
by law make an apportionment", without the necessity of
disturbing the present constitutionally provided number of
Congressmen. People in Quezon City, for instance, may balk at
the specific apportionment of the 160 seats set forth in Resolution
No. 1, and ask for a Congressman of their own, on the theory of
equal representation. And then, people may question the propriety
of permitting the increased 180 Congressmen from taking part in
the forthcoming constitutional convention and future conventions
for fear that they may dominate its proceedings. They may
entertain the belief that, if at all, increase in the number of
Congressmen should be a proper topic for deliberation in a
constitutional convention which, anyway, will soon take place.
They probably would ask: Why the hurry? These ponderables
require the people's close scrutiny.
2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the philosophy

behind the constitutional directive that constitutional amendments
be submitted to the people for their ratification.
A constitutional amendment is not a temporary expedient. Unlike

a statute which may suffer amendments three or more times in
the same year, it is intended to stand the test of time. It is an
expression of the people's sovereign will.
And so, our approach to the problem of the mechanics of
submission for ratification of amendments is that reasoning on the
basis of the spirit of the Constitution is just as important as
reasoning by a strict adherence to the phraseology thereof. We
underscore this, because it is within the realm of possibility that a
Constitution maybe overhauled. Supposing three-fourths of the
Constitution is to be amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the
all important; Bill of Rights in its entirety. We believe it to be
beyond debate that in some such situations the amendments
ought to call for a constitutional convention rather than a
legislative proposal. And yet, nothing there is in the books or in
the Constitution itself. which would require such amendments to
be adopted by a constitutional convention. And then, too, the spirit
of the supreme enactment, we are sure, forbids that proposals
therefor be initiated by Congress and thereafter presented to the
In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the words
"submitted to the people for their ratification", if construed in the
light of the nature of the Constitution — a fundamental charter
that is legislation direct from the people, an — expression of their
sovereign will — is that it can only be amended by the people
expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by
the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid
before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are
not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They
must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions compare them with the proposed amendments, and try
to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest,
free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly in insidious
influences. We believe, the word "submitted" can only mean that
the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain
every effort to inform very citizen of the provisions to be amended,
and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and
effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying
that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be
reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the
word as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the
Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting
an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or
agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection.
For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and
another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent,
consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still
approve the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is to them,
then so be it. For, the people decree their own fate.
Aptly had it been said:
. . . The great men who builded the structure of our state in

this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution
voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said "A good Constitution
should beyond the reach of temporary excitement and
popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and
steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to
the whim of the people, or the thought evolved the
excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought,
which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed
efficiency. . . . Changes in government are to be feared
unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: "All great
mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not
necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a
worse." Am. Law Rev. 1889, p. 3113
3. Tersely put, the issue before us funnels down to this

proposition: If the people are not sufficiently informed of the
amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate
thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner can it be said
that in accordance with the constitutional mandate, "the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification?"
Our answer is "No".
We examine Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17,

1967 — the statute that submits to the people the constitutional
amendments proposed by Congress in Resolutions 1 and 3.
Section 2 of the Act provides the manner of propagation of the
nature of the amendments throughout the country. There are five
parts in said Section 2, viz:
(1) The amendment shall be published in three consecutive

issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the
election.
(2) A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous

place in every municipality, city and provincial office building
and in every polling place not later than October fourteen,
nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and shall remain posted
therein until after the election.
(3) At least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept

in each polling place to be made available for examination
by the qualified electors during election day.
(4) When practicable, copies in the principal native

Elections, shall be kept in each polling place.
(5) The Commission on Elections shall make available

copies of said amendments in English, Spanish and,
whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for
free distribution.
A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for

dissemination of information regarding the amendments
effectively brings the matter to the people. A dissection of the
mechanics yields disturbing thoughts. First, the Official Gazette is
not widely read. It does not reach the barrios. And even if it
reaches the barrios, is it available to all? And if it is, would all
under stand English? Second, it should be conceded that many
citizens, especially those in the outlying barrios, do not go to
municipal, city and/or provincial office buildings, except on special
occasions like paying taxes or responding to court summonses.
And if they do, will they notice the printed amendments posted on
the bulletin board? And if they do notice, such copy again is in
English (sample submitted to this Court by the Solicitor General)
for, anyway, the statute does not require that it be in any other
language or dialect. Third, it would not help any if at least five
copies are kept in the polling place for examination by qualified
electors during election day. As petitioner puts it, voting time is not
study time. And then, who can enter the polling place, except
those who are about to vote? Fourth, copies in the principal native
languages shall be kept in each polling place. But this is not, as
Section 2 itself implies, in the nature of a command because such
copies shall be kept therein only "when practicable" and "as may
be determined by the Commission on Elections." Even if it be said
that these are available before election, a citizen may not intrude
into the school building where the polling places are usually
located without disturbing the school classes being held there.
Fifth, it is true that the Comelec is directed to make available
copies of such amendments in English, Spanish or whenever
practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distribution.
However, Comelec is not required to actively distribute them to
the people. This is significant as to people in the provinces,
especially those in the far-flung barrios who are completely
unmindful of the discussions that go on now and then in the cities
and centers of population on the merits and demerits of the
amendments. Rather, Comelec, in this case, is but a passive
agency which may hold copies available, but which copies
may notbe distributed at all. Finally, it is of common knowledge
that Comelec has more than its hands full in these pre-election
days. They cannot possibly make extensive distribution.
Voters will soon go to the polls to say "yes" or "no". But even the
official sample ballot submitted to this Court would show
that only the amendments are printed at the back. And this, in
pursuance to Republic Act 4913 itself.
Surely enough, the voters do not have the benefit of proper notice
of the proposed amendments thru dissemination by publication in
extenso. People do not have at hand the necessary data on which
to base their stand on the merits and demerits of said
amendments.
We, therefore, hold that there is no proper submission of the

proposed constitutional amendments within the meaning and
intendment of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution.
4. Contemporary history is witness to the fact that during the

present election campaign the focus is on the election of
candidates. The constitutional amendments are crowded out.
Candidates on the homestretch, and their leaders as well as the
voters, gear their undivided efforts to the election of officials; the
constitutional amendments cut no ice with them. The truth is that
even in the ballot itself, the space accorded to the casting of "yes"
or "no" vote would give one the impression that the constitutional
amendments are but a bootstrap to the electoral ballot. Worse
still, the fortunes of many elective officials, on the national and
local levels, are inextricably intertwined with the results of the
votes on the plebiscite. In a clash between votes for a candidate
and conscience on the merits and demerits of the constitutional
amendments, we are quite certain that it is the latter that will be
dented.
5. That proper submission of amendments to the people to enable

them to equally ratify them properly is the meat of the
constitutional requirement, is reflected in the sequence of uniform
past practices. The Constitution had been amended thrice — in
1939, 1940 and 1947. In each case, the amendments were
embodied in resolutions adopted by the Legislature, which
thereafter fixed the dates at which the proposed amendments
were to be ratified or rejected. These plebiscites have been
referred to either as an "election" or "general election". At no time,
however, was the vote for the amendments of the Constitution
held simultaneously with the election officials, national or local.
Even with regard to the 1947 parity amendment; the record shows
that the sole issue was the 1947 parity amendment; and the
special elections simultaneously held in only three provinces,
Iloilo, Pangasinan and Bukidnon, were merely incidental thereto.
In the end we say that the people are the last ramparts that guard
against indiscriminate changes in the Constitution that is theirs. Is
it too much to ask that reasonable guarantee be made that in the
matter of the alterations of the law of the land, their true voice be
heard? The answer perhaps is best expressed in the following
thoughts: "It must be remembered that the Constitution is the
people's enactment. No proposed change can become effective
unless they will it so through the compelling force of need of it
and desire for it."4
For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913 must be
stricken down as in violation of the Constitution.
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Angeles, JJ., concur in the result.
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:

I concur in the result with the opinion penned by Mr. Justice
Sanchez. To approve a mere proposal to amend the Constitution
requires (Art. XV) a three-fourths (3/4) vote of all the members of
each legislative chamber, the highest majority ever demanded by
the fundamental charter, one higher even than that required in
order to declare war (Sec. 24, Article VI), with all its dire
consequences. If such an overwhelming majority, that was
evidently exacted in order to impress upon all and sundry the
seriousness of every constitutional amendment, is asked for a
proposal to amend the Constitution, I find it impossible to believe
that it was ever intended by its framers that such amendment
should be submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification", if the concentration of the people's
attention thereon to be diverted by other extraneous issues, such
as the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the
Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of
the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could
have only meant that any amendments thereto should be
debated, considered and voted upon at an election wherein the
people could devote undivided attention to the subject. That this
was the intention and the spirit of the provision is corroborated in
the case of all other constitutional amendments in the past, that
were submitted to and approved in special elections exclusively
devoted to the issue whether the legislature's amendatory
proposals should be ratified or not.
Dizon, Angeles, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and

MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO
PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as
founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL

ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-
intervenors.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for

prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special
attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of
this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting
of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission
itself, through the original proponent1 and the main sponsor2 of
the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".3 Indeed it
is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two
methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed,
we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin

filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter,
COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin
Petition)5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all

over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order
and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all

Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time
and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the

Movement for People's Initiative,6 a group of citizens desirous to
avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that
he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers
intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in
proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC;
that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature
stations shall be established all over the country, with the
assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the
signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the
Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is
necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the
purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC;
and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process
involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the
Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in
newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be

amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,7Section 4 of Article
VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution. Attached to the
petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which
consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the
provisions concerning term limits, and with the following
proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS

OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND
SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be

submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve
per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it
will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the
number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its
Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal,
proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and
the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general
circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996;
and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at
10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the

following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator
Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not
the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and

the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam

Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin
— filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to

amend the Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act
Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments
by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago
filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the
Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three

systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation.
However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the
matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution
was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo
Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his
privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994:
"There is not a single word in that law which can be
considered as implementing [the provision on
constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions
have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of

the law after publication in print media. This indicates
that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments because the latter take effect only upon
ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16

January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national
and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the
COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to
amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by
the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to

the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for

people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has realigned
funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for

prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC
grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by
PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general
re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to
mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would
be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the
issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure
and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's
suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to

comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten
days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining
public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin
Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa
from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend
the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra,

filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL

EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE
"COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC
GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN.
ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT
DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES
SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED
COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE
SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and
TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS
P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC

IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH
BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO
SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS
"INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER
26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4,

1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE
POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS
A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY
PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300

PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT
TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER
26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT
SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO
NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY
PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR
BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S
SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO
"PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS
AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE
PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290,
ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM

OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A
"REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN
AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION
CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO
WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-
413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own

behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the
instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed
yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory
Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to
start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put
the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin
maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a

law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence
therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since
subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides

that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of
the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300

is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-
C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the
power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b)
Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve

a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions
of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those
which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or
overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin

considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for
only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will
be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay
Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a
priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of
the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also
on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends
that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia,

people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section
2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes,
and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes
initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as
the power to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on
the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is

not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national
in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and
Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent
provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing
therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a

material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials

constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not
a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued

under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the
Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the
COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No.
6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the
temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned
Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order
filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the
latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private
respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment
he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for
Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and
allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20
January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January
1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang

Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a
Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition
in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition
in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a

mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it
would involve a change from a political philosophy that
rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited
tenure; and although the change might appear to be an
isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public
service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done
by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited
to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President
and the limits provided for all other national and local
elective officials are based on the philosophy of
governance, "to open up the political arena to as many
as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands
of leadership, to break the concentration of political and
economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote
effective proper empowerment for participation in policy
and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to
remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble
vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of

initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that
may be availed of by the people only if they are
dissatisfied with the performance of their elective
officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to

be called the enabling law that implements the
people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It
fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the
petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the
petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of
gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and
3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who
may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures,
(g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the
signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the
appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the
holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of
funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there
being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified

or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since
the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the
procedure for a people's initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively
pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does
not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the
former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in

Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law
that implements the people's right to initiate constitutional
amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and
even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of
that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to
order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory
pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No.
6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution
is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the
required number of registered voters. He also submits that the
proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the
authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is
securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's
role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the
determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the
call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which
it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following
arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law

mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute

for the required implementing law on the initiative to
amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect

in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the

Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress
or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting

the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by
the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by
LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK
and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco
and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a
nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments
on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring
LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible
period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment
thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of
the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued
on the following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light
of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far
filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for

a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include
or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution;
and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No.

2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative
and Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the
law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national

and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a
revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or

has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain
an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to
assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the
publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take
cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to

submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty
days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of
the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention

wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main
Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have
dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause
of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions

of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No.
21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the
proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee
on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill
No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their

Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter
filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to

this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall

first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial
procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE

PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no
serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this
Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is
a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an
affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance

of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This
being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec
from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of
Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is
the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial

writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of
preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v.
Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent
necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse
environmental consequences on the body politic of the
questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of
legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial
statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of

constitutional law is threatened by the political
ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount
majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC
a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently
because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the
oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them
to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December
1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by
ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together
with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the
notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The
COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its
insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the
instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the

proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the

COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because
the said petition is not supported by the required minimum
number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required
number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case
may likewise be treated as a special civil action
for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his

Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural

technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues
raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this
Court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF

INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER
THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise

be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise

of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin

Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot

operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose

amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.
Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress,
for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the

draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the
Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7
(Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be

proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-

fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as
provided for in Article___ Section ___of the
Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of

amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of
the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2;
thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call attention of the
Members of the Commission that pursuant to
the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of
the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the
last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least
ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original

Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for

carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two

simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative
upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are
no details in the provision on how to carry this
out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are
leaving this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam

President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand,

therefore, that for as long as the legislature
does not pass the necessary implementing
law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up

during the committee hearing, especially with
respect to the budget appropriations which
would have to be legislated so that the
plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best
that this matter be left to the legislature. The
Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the
power of initiative can be called until after five
years from the date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment
that could be proposed through the exercise
of this initiative power would be after five
years. It is reasonably expected that within
that five-year period, the National Assembly
can come up with the appropriate rules
governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the

legislature — the details on how this is to be
carried out — is it possible that, in effect,
what will be presented to the people for
ratification is the work of the legislature rather
than of the people? Does this provision
exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that

possibility because even the legislature itself
as a body could propose that amendment,
maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to
muster the three-fourths vote in order to
constitute itself as a constituent assembly
and submit that proposal to the people for
ratification through the process of an
initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the

sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to
vest constituent power in the people to
amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct,

Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the

underlying precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the
drafting of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of
difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of
Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor
agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
mandate, constituent power has primacy over
all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right,
Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree

with me that in the hierarchy of legal values,
the Constitution is source of all legal
mandates and that therefore we require a
great deal of circumspection in the drafting
and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is

nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to

underscore the primacy of constituent power
we have a separate article in the constitution
that would specifically cover the process and
the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam

President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor

inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to
again concede to the legislature the process
or the requirement of determining the
mechanics of amending the Constitution by
people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing

this could very well be placed in the hands of
the National Assembly, not unless we can
incorporate into this provision the mechanics
that would adequately cover all the
conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the
aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND — not
to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was

suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to
be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The committee members felt
that this system of initiative should not extend
to the revision of the entire Constitution, so
we removed it from the operation of Section 1
of the proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously

bothered by providing this process of initiative
as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in
terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if
it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable

except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a
revision which contemplates a total overhaul
of the Constitution. That was the sense that
was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee
was attempting to distinguish the coverage of
modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the
process of revision; whereas the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the
public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the

terms envisioned in the Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter

introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the
Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I

propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with
the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have

modified the proposed amendment after
taking into account the modifications
submitted by the sponsor himself and the
honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and
Romulo. The modified amendment in
substitution of the proposed Section 2 will
now read as follows: "SECTION 2. —
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION
MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED
BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN
FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION
NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW

PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering

that the proposed amendment is reflective of
the sense contained in Section 2 of our
completed Committee Report No. 7, we
accept the proposed amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified

amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative
act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner

Davide's amendment, is it possible for the
legislature to set forth certain procedures to
carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's

amendment does not prevent the legislature
from asking another body to set the
proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct.

In other words, the implementation of this
particular right would be subject to legislation,
provided the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including

the determination of the proper form for
submission to the people, may be subject to
legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy

the substantive right to initiate. In other
words, none of the procedures to be
proposed by the legislative body must
diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the

Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified

amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to —
NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam

President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question:

Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment."
Does it not cover the word "revision" as
defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because
"amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative
is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of

proposing amendments through initiative must be more rigorous
and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made

that under this proposal, what is involved is
an amendment to the Constitution. To amend
a Constitution would ordinarily require a
proposal by the National Assembly by a vote
of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number.
Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a
constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import
being that the process of amendment must
be made more rigorous and difficult than
probably initiating an ordinary legislation or
putting an end to a law proposed by the
National Assembly by way of a referendum. I
cannot agree to reducing the requirement
approved by the Committee on the
Legislative because it would require another
voting by the Committee, and the voting as
precisely based on a requirement of 10
percent. Perhaps, I might present such a
proposal, by way of an amendment, when the
Commission shall take up the Article on the
Legislative or on the National Assembly on
plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to
amendments, and the final version, which the Commission
approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President.

Section 2, as amended, reads as follows:
"AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION
MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED
BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN
FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION
NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW

PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions

was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986. 41Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration,
Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was
withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved
on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the
approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per
centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by
law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The
Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of
the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of

initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of

this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like
the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us
R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to

implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a
statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the
last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to
substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then
reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the

implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of

the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress

of a power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise
of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right]
is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended
to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The
Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis
of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No.
497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b)
House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of
House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum
under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative
provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate
Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning
ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The
Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently
approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House of
Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of
Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the
right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC,

Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the

people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions
passed by any legislative body upon compliance with
the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a
delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor
relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative
and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances,
and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on
the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to "directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only
do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this

section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which
solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and
referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and
enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act

defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions
it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5
(Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the
percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative,
the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires,
among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition,
the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the
case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in
full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters;

and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than

one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written
or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted,

approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only
strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier,
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to
fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our
reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and
Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for
doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the
initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national
initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local
initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,
ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of
initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of
the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a

petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition

proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a

petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should

have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is
not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs
(b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution

approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by

majority of the votes cast in an election called for the
purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation of the Commission.
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to

indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments;
thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited

people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of
Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of

the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency
of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be
petitions for both national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under

subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national
and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall
prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring
null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this
Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity
of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and
care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative
and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving
them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent
the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the
following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the

petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the

required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the

proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official

Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; and
55
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of

registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body
concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act

thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a
consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its

official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the
required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of

the proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which
must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the

Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections,
merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b)
defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in
an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by
the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the
number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides
for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more

important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus
delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip
service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is

incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or

as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari
potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section

28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under

Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising

quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a
form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above.
However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b)
fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is

concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT

PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate

rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under
R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws
and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full

compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to
initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested
upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section

5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution
must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not
contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself
admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the
purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive
to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition
cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative

only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading.
Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en
banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of
the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records and
Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered
voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its
election registrars, in the establishment of signature
stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A.
No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition does
not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number.
Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a
mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of

whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and
local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be

permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose

amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the
cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength.
Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the
right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of

initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the

Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith

DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is

made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is
LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan,

Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague,

Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss
the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that
R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally
defective and cannot implement the people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to
the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.
With due respect:
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right
of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution thru
initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No. 6735
should start with the search of the intent of our lawmakers. A
knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the legislature is
the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation.1 Stated
otherwise, intent is the essence of the law, the spirit which gives
life to its enactment.2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No.

6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear
from the history of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill
No. 215053 and Senate Bill No. 17.4 Senate Bill No. 17 was
entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in
Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact
Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance
or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body." Beyond
doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. In checkered contrast,
House Bill No. 21505 5expressly included people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco
emphasized in his sponsorship remarks:6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following

backgrounder on the constitutional basis of the
proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential

system which was introduced by the 1935 Constitution
saw the application of the principle of separation of
powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973

Constitution the principle remained applicable, the 1981
amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured
presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing

of legislative powers between the Legislature and the
Executive departments. Transcending changes in the
exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the
Philippine Constitution that the Philippines is a
republican state where sovereignty resides in the
people and all sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is

still preserved in Congress; however, to institutionalize
direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986
Revolution, the Constitution recognizes the power of
the people, through the system of initiative and
referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress does not have plenary powers since reserve
powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of
the same Article mandates Congress to pass at the
soonest possible time, a bill on referendum and
initiative, and to share its legislative powers with the
people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the

other hand, vests in the people the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative, upon petition of at least 12 percent of the total
number of registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's

response to the duty imposed on Congress to
implement the exercise by the people of the right to
initiative and referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the
beginnings of the system of initiative and referendum
under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the Local
Government Code which vests in the barangay
assembly the power to initiate legislative processes,
decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of the
Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of
the power of initiative and referendum. He added that
the holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum are
likewise provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same
Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that

pertinent quotation on the subject which he will later
submit to the Secretary of the House be incorporated
as part of his sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum

similar to those contained in the instant Bill among
which are the constitutions of states in the United
States which recognize the right of registered voters to
initiate the enactment of any statute or to project any
existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These
states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama, Montana,
Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the

kind of laws to which initiative and referendum apply is
also without limitation, except for emergency measures,
which are likewise incorporated in House Bill No.
21505. He added that the procedure provided by the
Bill from the filing of the petition, the requirements of a
certain percentage of supporters to present a
proposition, to the submission to electors are
substantially similar to the provisions in American laws.
Although an infant in Philippine political structure, the
system of initiative and referendum, he said, is a tried
and tested system in other jurisdictions, and the Bill is
patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections,

and recalled that the Constitutional Commissioners saw
the system of the initiative and referendum as an
instrument which can be used should the legislature
show itself to be indifferent to the needs of the people.
This is the reason, he claimed, why now is an
opportune time to pass the Bill even as he noted the felt
necessity of the times to pass laws which are
necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of

initiative and referendum as advocated in House Bill
No. 21505. He stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political
judgment, submit a Bill for the consideration of the
general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative,

namely; the initiative to amend the Constitution once
every five years; the initiative to amend statutes
approved by Congress; and the initiative to amend local
ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows

the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to define
rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the

consent of the people on measures that they have
approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a

referendum which is a mode of plebiscite by presenting
a petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as
the signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the
total of registered voters at which every legislative
district is represented by at least three percent of the
registered voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of
the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and set the
date of the referendum within 45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is

approved by the required number of votes, it shall
become effective 15 days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco

stressed that the Members cannot ignore the people's
call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body to
approve House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the

prepared text of his speech together with the footnotes
be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement

people's initiative to amend the Constitution was stressed by
then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador
Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz:7
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have

been clamoring for a truly popular democracy ever
since, especially in the so-called parliament of the
streets. A substantial segment of the population feels,
he said, that the form of democracy is there, but not the
reality or substance of it because of the increasingly
elitist approach of their representatives to the country's
problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the

Constitution has provided a means whereby the people
can exercise the reserved power of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution, and requested that
Sections 1 and 32, Article VI; Section 3, Article X; and
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be made part
of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is

needed for the aforecited Constitutional provisions.
While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong
competition among cause-oriented and sectoral groups,
he continued, it will hasten the politization of the
citizenry, aid the government in forming an enlightened
public opinion, and produce more responsive
legislation. The passage of the Bill will also give street
parliamentarians the opportunity to articulate their ideas
in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the
early approval of the Bill so that it can be initially used
for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage
of House Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can
set aside their personal and political consideration for
the greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House

Bill No. 21505 were threshed out in a Bicameral Conference
Committee.8 In the meeting of the Committee on June 6,
1989,9 the members agreed that the two (2) bills should be
consolidated and that the consolidated version should
include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as
contemplated by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the
meeting states:
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as

I have said, because this is new in our
political system, the Senate decided on a
more cautious approach and limiting it only to
the local government units because even with
that stage where . . . at least this has been
quite popular, ano? It has been attempted on
a national basis. Alright. There has not been
a single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado
doon. And, second, we consider also that it is
only fair that the local legislative body should
be given a chance to adopt the legislation bill
proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect
system of initiative. If after all, the local
legislative assembly or body is willing to
adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to be any
reason for initiative, ano for initiative. And,
number 3, we feel that there should be some
limitation on the frequency with which it
should be applied. Number 4, na the people,
thru initiative, cannot enact any ordinance
that is beyond the scope of authority of the
local legislative body, otherwise, my God,
mag-aassume sila ng power that is broader
and greater than the grant of legislative
power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5,
because of that, then a proposition which has
been the result of a successful initiative can
only carry the force and effect of an
ordinance and therefore that should not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction to declare
it null and void for want of authority. Ha, di
ba? I mean it is beyond powers of local
government units to enact. Iyon ang main
essence namin, so we concentrated on that.
And that is why . . . so ang sa inyo naman
includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to
the Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa
amin, if you insist on that, alright, although we
feel na it will in effect become a dead statute.
Alright, and we can agree, we can agree. So
ang mangyayari dito, and magiging basic
nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin and
magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is the
Senate Bill or whether it is the House bill.
Logically it should be ours sapagkat una
iyong sa amin eh. It is one of the first bills
approved by the Senate kaya ang number
niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating
pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong
features ng national at saka constitutional,
okay. ____ gagawin na natin na consolidation
of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of

the Senate and House Bill No. so and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for

approval, then Congressman Roco upon interpellation by
Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it
covered people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The
record of the House Representative states: 11
xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The

Gentleman from Camarines Sur is
recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee

Report on the disagreeing provisions
between Senate Bill No. 21505 which refers
to the system providing for the initiative and
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we
consolidated the Senate and the House
versions, so both versions are totally intact in
the bill. The Senators ironically provided for
local initiative and referendum and the House
Representatives correctly provided for
initiative and referendum on the Constitution
and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the

pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor

answer just a few questions?

Gentlemen will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that

the only difference in the two bills was that in
the Senate version there was a provision for
local initiative and referendum, whereas the
House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version

provide purely for local initiative and
referendum, whereas in the House version,
we provided purely for national and
constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding

therefore, that the two provisions were
incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a

complete initiative and referendum both in the
constitutional amendment and national
legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as

municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and

referendum is in consonance with the
provision of the Constitution whereby it
mandates this Congress to enact the
enabling law, so that we shall have a system
which can be done every five years. Is it five
years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For

constitutional amendments in the 1987
Constitution, it is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr.

Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot

have multiple initiatives and referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was

no substantial difference between the two
versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by

the Senate which, as I said earlier, ironically
was about local, provincial and municipal
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were
consolidated?
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion

to approve this consolidated bill on Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none;

the motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to

implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution, it
is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by
the legislature. We have ruled that once intent is
ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is as
old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, that
interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the manifest
intent of the legislature will be adopted. 12
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably

construed to effectuate its intent to implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not
torture the text of said law to reach the conclusion that it
implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution. R.A. No.
6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
First, the policy statement declares:

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions
recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to

propose amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the
Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative
to amend the Constitution. Section 5(b) states that "(a) petition for
an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters
as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein." It also states that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution
may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment.
Section 9(b) states that "(t)he proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained

interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its intent which it itself
concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word
"Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the policy thrust
of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These
lapses are to be expected for laws are not always written in
impeccable English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our
legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with
poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like
Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to
refuse to effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is
badly written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco 13 reminds
us: "Many laws contain words which have not been used
accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate language or words,
will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can be
ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to awkward,
slovenly, or ungrammatical expressions, that is, such expressions
and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the
legislature intended that they bear, although such a construction
necessitates a departure from the literal meaning of the words
used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not
include people's initiative to amend the Constitution simply
because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the
weight of helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is
that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and sections of a statute
may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn
therefrom are entitled to very little weight, and they can never
control the plain terms of the enacting clauses. 14
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that

refuses to enforce the manifest intent or spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It
blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the
law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the law is its body but its
spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the
stewardship of Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then its Acting
Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. This is in accord with
the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 to
the COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is
hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." By no
means can this delegation of power be assailed as infirmed. In
the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17 this Court,
thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test
to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative
power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of

the Government the power to fill details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
— and (b) to fix standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, which is the essence of every law, and, without
the aforementioned standard, there would be no means
to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon
himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also —
and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting
measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining
the very foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not

meet these well-settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy
to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to
guide the COMELEC in promulgating the law's implementing
rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2 spells
out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735
are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing.
Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a
people's initiative, 18 directs how initiative proceeding is
commenced, 19 what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the
petition for initiative, 20 how a proposition is approved, 21 when a
plebiscite may be held, 22 when the amendment takes effect 23 and
what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any
measure, these standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a

sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of the
delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and
indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and
effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent a
total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to
the delegate." 25 In enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that
Congress totally transferred its power to enact the law
implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close look at
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided
the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life
to the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The
debates 26 in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the
rules of procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be
delegated, thus:

Davide's amendment, it is possible for the
carry out the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx




MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution

Writers, 27 Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In response to
questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the
extent of the power of the legislature over the process: it
could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form before (the
amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize
another body to check the proper form. It could also
authorize the COMELEC, for instance, to check the
authenticity of the signatures of petitioners. Davide
concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy the substantive right
to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be
proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the
right conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against
the legislature is to impair the substantive right of the people
to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is not, however,
prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce the
people's right of initiative or to delegate it to another body
like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially
refrained from invalidating administrative rules on the ground of
lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their promulgation.
As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself
does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend
backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the
statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling
in Hirabayashi v. United States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a

particular standard to which orders of the military
commander are to conform, or require findings to be
made as a prerequisite to any order. But the Executive
Order, the Proclamations and the statute are not to be
read in isolation from each other. They were parts of a
single program and must be judged as such. The Act of
March 21, 1942, was an adoption by Congress of the
Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The
Proclamations themselves followed a standard
authorized by the Executive Order — the necessity of
protecting military resources in the designated areas
against espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-
lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law cannot miss
them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible ink.
The policy and standards can also be found in no less than
section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Amendments or
Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the standards
provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in other
cases we have upheld as adequate more general standards
such as "simplicity and dignity," 30 "public interest," 31 "public
welfare," 32 "interest of law and order," 33 "justice and
equity,"34 "adequate and efficient instruction," 35 "public
safety," 36 "public policy", 37 "greater national
interest", 38 "protect the local consumer by stabilizing and
subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and "promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in government." 40 A due regard and
respect to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch
of government, should counsel this Court to refrain from
refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly
unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he

dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The inclusion of the
Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that
the case at bar started when respondent Delfin alone and by
himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's
Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the petition. It was Senator
Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed to do so by the
COMELEC. The petition was heard and before the COMELEC
could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at bar was filed by the
petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus
Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities
as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original action
for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the

Pedrosas. The only allegation against the Pedrosas is that they
are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake
the signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an organization was
not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we
order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist from conducting a signature
drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." On
December 19, 1996, we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas ". . .
the Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the
temporary restraining order against the Pedrosas. It should
dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt against them
without equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in
soliciting signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act.
Their solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and
white by section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution which
provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative. . ." This right
springs from the principle proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the
Constitution that in a democratic and republican state
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the people and
their voice is part of the voice of the people. They may constitute
but a particle of our sovereignty but no power can trivialize them
for sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution

provides: "The right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The
State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the
1987 Constitution strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of
our people. In soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the
Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-making process
of our people. The Constitution says their right cannot be
abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark
on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to

amend the Constitution is an exercise of their freedom of speech
and expression and their right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. We have memorialized this universal right
in all our fundamental laws from the Malolos Constitution to the
1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings
that freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other
important rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of speech
enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let
think. For this reason, the Constitution encourages speech even if
it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures

to start a people's initiative to amend the Constitution does not
depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. No law, no Constitution can chain the
people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are no
irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions.
Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear
change. Mankind has long recognized the truism that the only
constant in life is change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as

expanded in the 1987 Constitution. On October 5, 1993, we
observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an article of
faith in our Constitution. 41 On September 30, 1994, we postulated
that people power can be trusted to check excesses of
government and that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of
people's initiatives ought to be rejected. 42 On September 26,
1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a matter of policy and
doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote
their legitimate exercise." 43 Just a few days ago, or on March 11,
1997, by a unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in
Caloocan City involving the mayor and ordered that he submits
his right to continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the
people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people
power from an opaque abstraction to a robust reality. The
Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to
blossom in full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature
campaigns to amend the Constitution without setting back the
flowering of people empowerment. More important, the Court
cannot seal the lips of people who are pro-change but not those
who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter
change into a sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a
dialogue and not by a monologue for in a democracy nobody can
claim any infallibility.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin

Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of

the Court to engross, let alone to commit, itself on all the issues
raised and debated upon by the parties. What is essential at this
time would only be to resolve whether or not the petition filed with
the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his capacity as
a "founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative" and
seeking through a people initiative certain modifications on the
1987 Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due
course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed amendment
under this method, is explicit. Section 2, Article XVII, thereof
provides:


The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying

with the constitutional imperatives, the petition would rather have
much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The
petition would require COMELEC to schedule "signature
gathering all over the country," to cause the necessary publication
of the petition "in newspapers of general and local circulation,"
and to instruct "Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the
Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court
which, consequentially, is made permanent under
theponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and
must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to
embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a
right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people
initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who

reign are the governed themselves. The postulate is no longer
lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable reality. The
past has taught us that the vitality of government lies not so much
in the strength of those who lead as in the consent of those who
are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it can only have its
true meaning if it comes with the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form

and substance, it behooves the Court, I most respectfully submit,
to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively and sufficiently
implemented the Constitutional provision on right of the people to
directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view
formulated by the Court at this point would at best be only a non-
binding, albeitpossibly persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for
clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not
prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign
for constitutional amendments.
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice

Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia.
Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No.
6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the

people and all government authority emanates from them.1 Unlike
our previous constitutions, the present 1987 Constitution has
given more significance to this declaration of principle for the
people are now vested with power not only to propose, enact or
reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local
legislative body, but to propose amendments to the constitution as
well.2 To implement these constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989
enacted Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as "The
initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to my mind, amply
covers an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view
maintained by petitioners is based principally on the alleged lack
of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and on
their allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the
law after publication in print media. [And] [t]his indicates
that Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments, because constitutional
amendments take effect upon ratification not after
publication.3
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective

interpretation of the law, for under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum
Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a

majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective
as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with

reference the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 Thus, the provisions
of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted in isolation. The
legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the
statute as a whole.5
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative

as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose".6The same section, in
enumerating the three systems of initiative, included an "initiative
on the constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the constitution"7 Paragraph (e) again of Section
3 defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an
initiative on the constitution is approved or rejected by the people"
And as to the material requirements for an initiative on the
Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of the registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Initiative on the constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress

the intent being to provide for the implementation of the right
to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of
initiative. "A legal provision", the Court has previously said,
"must not be construed as to be a useless surplusage, and
accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to
the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon". 8 That this
is the legislative intent is further shown by the deliberations
in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration

of the Conference Committee Report on the
disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505, it was noted:

between Senate Bill No. 17 and the
consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which
refers to the system providing for the initiative
and referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker,
we consolidated the Senate and the House
of Representatives correctly provided for
initiative and referendum an the Constitution
MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.


THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does

the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.

Gentleman will please proceed.


provided purely for local initiative and
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding,

incorporated?

legislation.


provision of the Constitution to enact the

constitutional amendments to the 1987
Constitution, it is every five years." (Id.
[Journal and Record of the House of
Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June 1989, p.
960; quoted in Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA
279, 292-293 [1994]; emphasis supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have

comprehended initiatives on the Constitution. When
consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill
and as approved and enacted into law, the proposal
included initiative on both the Constitution and ordinary
laws.9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on
the constitution. Any other construction as what petitioners
foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and
spirit behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on

Elections, at present, cannot take any action (such as those
contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and
12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its having already
assumed jurisdiction over private respondents' petition. This is so
because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would
appear that proof of procurement of the required percentage of
registered voters at the time the petition for initiative is filed, is a
jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:

number of registered voters as signatories, of which
Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the

required signatures. This defect notwithstanding, it is without
prejudice to the refiling of their petition once compliance with
the required percentage is satisfactorily shown by private
respondents. In the absence, therefore, of an appropriate
petition before the Commission on Elections, any
determination of whether private respondents' proposal
constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in
the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an "inadequate" legislation to
cover a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. I, however, register my concurrence with the
dismissal, in the meantime, of private respondents' petition for
initiative before public respondent Commission on Elections until
the same be supported by proof of strict compliance with Section
5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.,

writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion in entertaining the "initiatory" Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly

proposed by the people through initiative," there is no
implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules

and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory
petition can show the required number of signatures — in this
case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at
least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be
spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative
to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even
entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent
most respectfully from the majority's two other rulings. Let me
explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's

majority, the Constitution cannot be amended at all through a
people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not
even by all the voters of the country acting together. This decision
will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and
render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the
very least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional
discretion on whether to pass a new law to implement it, when
there is already one existing at present. This right to amend
through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:

With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping
and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house
to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of
pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should
reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future effort to
exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact
that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not
justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to
do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution,
RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to
Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority

openly concedes — intended by the legislature to cover and, I
respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an
initiative on the Constitution.1 I completely agree with the inspired
and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr.
Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on
initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no
longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this
Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that "provisions for
initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their
purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters
of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that
any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives
ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative

details. In recognition of this, RA 6735 wisely empowered 4 the
Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this
Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution
2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words,
was promulgated "to govern the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local
laws," not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one
then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms.
Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario
C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these
Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the
Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto
them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give
life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard

to national laws and local legislations, it is void in reference to
constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such
differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is
the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly

and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4
6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power
to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa

Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the

temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18 December
1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses
Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe
that such restraining order as against private respondents should
not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the
Comelec should be stopped from using public funds and
government resources to help them gather signatures, I firmly
believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from
exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose
amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of
free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be
tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and
persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent
Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not
really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes wrote,
"freedom for the thought that we hate."5
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my

Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a new
and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All
three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA
people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed
expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic
rights of our people to be used as their final weapons against
political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and
misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact
transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their chosen
leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be
resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise
should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D.

Santiago et al. and to DIRECT Respondent Commission on
Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of
prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the
majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order issued
on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto
Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right to free
speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague,

Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss
the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that
R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally
defective and cannot implement the people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to
the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.
With due respect:
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right
of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution thru
initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No. 6735
should start with the search of the intent of our lawmakers. A
knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the legislature is
the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation.1 Stated
otherwise, intent is the essence of the law, the spirit which gives
life to its enactment.2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No.

6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear
from the history of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill
No. 215053 and Senate Bill No. 17.4 Senate Bill No. 17 was
entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in
Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact
Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance
or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body." Beyond
doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. In checkered contrast,
House Bill No. 21505 5expressly included people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco
emphasized in his sponsorship remarks:6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO

At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following
backgrounder on the constitutional basis of the
proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential

system which was introduced by the 1935 Constitution
saw the application of the principle of separation of
powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973

Constitution the principle remained applicable, the 1981
amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured
presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing

of legislative powers between the Legislature and the
Executive departments. Transcending changes in the
exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the
Philippine Constitution that the Philippines is a
republican state where sovereignty resides in the
people and all sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is

still preserved in Congress; however, to institutionalize
direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986
Revolution, the Constitution recognizes the power of
the people, through the system of initiative and
referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,

Congress does not have plenary powers since reserve
powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of
the same Article mandates Congress to pass at the
soonest possible time, a bill on referendum and
initiative, and to share its legislative powers with the
people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the
other hand, vests in the people the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative, upon petition of at least 12 percent of the total
number of registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's

response to the duty imposed on Congress to
implement the exercise by the people of the right to
initiative and referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the
beginnings of the system of initiative and referendum
under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the Local
Government Code which vests in the barangay
assembly the power to initiate legislative processes,
decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of the
Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of
the power of initiative and referendum. He added that
the holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum are
likewise provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same
Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that

pertinent quotation on the subject which he will later
submit to the Secretary of the House be incorporated
as part of his sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum

similar to those contained in the instant Bill among
which are the constitutions of states in the United
States which recognize the right of registered voters to
initiate the enactment of any statute or to project any
existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These
states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama, Montana,
Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the
kind of laws to which initiative and referendum apply is
also without limitation, except for emergency measures,
which are likewise incorporated in House Bill No.
21505. He added that the procedure provided by the
Bill from the filing of the petition, the requirements of a
certain percentage of supporters to present a
proposition, to the submission to electors are
substantially similar to the provisions in American laws.
Although an infant in Philippine political structure, the
system of initiative and referendum, he said, is a tried
and tested system in other jurisdictions, and the Bill is
patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections,

and recalled that the Constitutional Commissioners saw
the system of the initiative and referendum as an
instrument which can be used should the legislature
show itself to be indifferent to the needs of the people.
This is the reason, he claimed, why now is an
opportune time to pass the Bill even as he noted the felt
necessity of the times to pass laws which are
necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of

initiative and referendum as advocated in House Bill
No. 21505. He stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political

judgment, submit a Bill for the consideration of the
general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative,

namely; the initiative to amend the Constitution once
every five years; the initiative to amend statutes
approved by Congress; and the initiative to amend local
ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows

the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to define
rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the

consent of the people on measures that they have
approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a

referendum which is a mode of plebiscite by presenting
a petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as
the signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the
total of registered voters at which every legislative
district is represented by at least three percent of the
registered voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of
the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and set the
date of the referendum within 45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is

approved by the required number of votes, it shall
become effective 15 days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco

stressed that the Members cannot ignore the people's
call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body to
approve House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the

prepared text of his speech together with the footnotes
be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was stressed by
then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador
Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz:7
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have

been clamoring for a truly popular democracy ever
since, especially in the so-called parliament of the
streets. A substantial segment of the population feels,
he said, that the form of democracy is there, but not the
reality or substance of it because of the increasingly
elitist approach of their representatives to the country's
problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the

Constitution has provided a means whereby the people
can exercise the reserved power of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution, and requested that
Sections 1 and 32, Article VI; Section 3, Article X; and
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be made part
of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is

needed for the aforecited Constitutional provisions.
While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong
competition among cause-oriented and sectoral groups,
he continued, it will hasten the politization of the
citizenry, aid the government in forming an enlightened
public opinion, and produce more responsive
legislation. The passage of the Bill will also give street
parliamentarians the opportunity to articulate their ideas
in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the
early approval of the Bill so that it can be initially used
for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage
of House Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can
set aside their personal and political consideration for
the greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House

Bill No. 21505 were threshed out in a Bicameral Conference
Committee.8 In the meeting of the Committee on June 6,
1989,9 the members agreed that the two (2) bills should be
consolidated and that the consolidated version should
include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as
contemplated by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the
meeting states:
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as

I have said, because this is new in our
political system, the Senate decided on a
more cautious approach and limiting it only to
the local government units because even with
that stage where . . . at least this has been
quite popular, ano? It has been attempted on
a national basis. Alright. There has not been
a single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado
doon. And, second, we consider also that it is
only fair that the local legislative body should
be given a chance to adopt the legislation bill
proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect
system of initiative. If after all, the local
legislative assembly or body is willing to
adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to be any
reason for initiative, ano for initiative. And,
number 3, we feel that there should be some
limitation on the frequency with which it
should be applied. Number 4, na the people,
thru initiative, cannot enact any ordinance
that is beyond the scope of authority of the
local legislative body, otherwise, my God,
mag-aassume sila ng power that is broader
and greater than the grant of legislative
power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5,
because of that, then a proposition which has
been the result of a successful initiative can
only carry the force and effect of an
ordinance and therefore that should not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction to declare
it null and void for want of authority. Ha, di
ba? I mean it is beyond powers of local
government units to enact. Iyon ang main
essence namin, so we concentrated on that.
And that is why . . . so ang sa inyo naman
includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to
the Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa
amin, if you insist on that, alright, although we
feel na it will in effect become a dead statute.
Alright, and we can agree, we can agree. So
ang mangyayari dito, and magiging basic
nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin and
magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is the
Senate Bill or whether it is the House bill.
Logically it should be ours sapagkat una
iyong sa amin eh. It is one of the first bills
approved by the Senate kaya ang number
niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating
pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong
features ng national at saka constitutional,
okay. ____ gagawin na natin na consolidation
of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of

the Senate and House Bill No. so and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for

approval, then Congressman Roco upon interpellation by
Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it
covered people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The
record of the House Representative states: 11
xxx xxx xxx

Gentleman from Camarines Sur is
recognized.

between Senate Bill No. 21505 which refers
to the system providing for the initiative and
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we
consolidated the Senate and the House
Representatives correctly provided for
initiative and referendum on the Constitution
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.



Gentlemen will please proceed.


provide purely for local initiative and
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding

incorporated?

legislation.


provision of the Constitution whereby it
mandates this Congress to enact the

constitutional amendments in the 1987
Constitution, it is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr.

Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot

have multiple initiatives and referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was

no substantial difference between the two
versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by

the Senate which, as I said earlier, ironically
was about local, provincial and municipal
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were

consolidated?
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion

to approve this consolidated bill on Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none;

the motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to

implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution, it
is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by
the legislature. We have ruled that once intent is
ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is as
old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, that
interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the manifest
intent of the legislature will be adopted. 12
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably

construed to effectuate its intent to implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not
torture the text of said law to reach the conclusion that it
implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution. R.A. No.
6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people

propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to

propose amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the
Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative
to amend the Constitution. Section 5(b) states that "(a) petition for
an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters
as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein." It also states that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution
may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment.
Section 9(b) states that "(t)he proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained

interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its intent which it itself
concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word
"Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the policy thrust
of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These
lapses are to be expected for laws are not always written in
impeccable English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our
legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with
poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like
Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to
refuse to effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is
badly written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco 13 reminds
us: "Many laws contain words which have not been used
accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate language or words,
will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can be
ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to awkward,
slovenly, or ungrammatical expressions, that is, such expressions
and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the
legislature intended that they bear, although such a construction
necessitates a departure from the literal meaning of the words
used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not
include people's initiative to amend the Constitution simply
because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the
weight of helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is
that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and sections of a statute
may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn
therefrom are entitled to very little weight, and they can never
control the plain terms of the enacting clauses. 14
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that

refuses to enforce the manifest intent or spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It
blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the
law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the law is its body but its
spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the

stewardship of Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then its Acting
Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. This is in accord with
the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 to
the COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is
hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." By no
means can this delegation of power be assailed as infirmed. In
the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17 this Court,
thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test
to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative
power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of

the Government the power to fill details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
— and (b) to fix standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, which is the essence of every law, and, without
the aforementioned standard, there would be no means
to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon
himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also —
and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting
measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining
the very foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet these well-settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy
to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to
guide the COMELEC in promulgating the law's implementing
rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2 spells
out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a
recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735
are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing.
Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a
people's initiative, 18 directs how initiative proceeding is
commenced, 19 what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the
petition for initiative, 20 how a proposition is approved, 21 when a
plebiscite may be held, 22 when the amendment takes effect 23 and
what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any
measure, these standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a

sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of the
delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and
indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and
effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent a
total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to
the delegate." 25 In enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that
Congress totally transferred its power to enact the law
implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close look at
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided
the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life
to the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The
debates 26 in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the
rules of procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be
delegated, thus:

Davide's amendment, it is possible for the
carry out the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx



MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution

Writers, 27 Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In response to
questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the
extent of the power of the legislature over the process: it
could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form before (the
amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize
another body to check the proper form. It could also
authorize the COMELEC, for instance, to check the
authenticity of the signatures of petitioners. Davide
concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy the substantive right
to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be
proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the
right conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against
the legislature is to impair the substantive right of the people
to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is not, however,
prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce the
people's right of initiative or to delegate it to another body
like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially
refrained from invalidating administrative rules on the ground of
lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their promulgation.
As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself
does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend
backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the
statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling
in Hirabayashi v. United States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx

It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a
particular standard to which orders of the military
commander are to conform, or require findings to be
made as a prerequisite to any order. But the Executive
Order, the Proclamations and the statute are not to be
read in isolation from each other. They were parts of a
single program and must be judged as such. The Act of
March 21, 1942, was an adoption by Congress of the
Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The
Proclamations themselves followed a standard
authorized by the Executive Order — the necessity of
protecting military resources in the designated areas
against espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-
lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law cannot miss
them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible ink.
The policy and standards can also be found in no less than
section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Amendments or
Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the standards
provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in other
cases we have upheld as adequate more general standards
such as "simplicity and dignity," 30 "public interest," 31 "public
welfare," 32 "interest of law and order," 33 "justice and
equity,"34 "adequate and efficient instruction," 35 "public
safety," 36 "public policy", 37 "greater national
interest", 38 "protect the local consumer by stabilizing and
subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and "promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in government." 40 A due regard and
respect to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch
of government, should counsel this Court to refrain from
refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly
unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he
dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The inclusion of the
Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that
the case at bar started when respondent Delfin alone and by
himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's
Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the petition. It was Senator
Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed to do so by the
COMELEC. The petition was heard and before the COMELEC
could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at bar was filed by the
petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus
Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities
as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original action
for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the

Pedrosas. The only allegation against the Pedrosas is that they
are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake
the signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an organization was
not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we
order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist from conducting a signature
drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." On
December 19, 1996, we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas ". . .
the Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the
temporary restraining order against the Pedrosas. It should
dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt against them
without equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in

soliciting signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act.
Their solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and
white by section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution which
provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative. . ." This right
springs from the principle proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the
Constitution that in a democratic and republican state
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the people and
their voice is part of the voice of the people. They may constitute
but a particle of our sovereignty but no power can trivialize them
for sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution

provides: "The right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The
State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the
1987 Constitution strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of
our people. In soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the
Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-making process
of our people. The Constitution says their right cannot be
abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark
on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to

amend the Constitution is an exercise of their freedom of speech
and expression and their right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. We have memorialized this universal right
in all our fundamental laws from the Malolos Constitution to the
1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings
that freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other
important rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of speech
enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let
think. For this reason, the Constitution encourages speech even if
it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures

to start a people's initiative to amend the Constitution does not
depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. No law, no Constitution can chain the
people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are no
irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions.
Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear
change. Mankind has long recognized the truism that the only
constant in life is change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as

expanded in the 1987 Constitution. On October 5, 1993, we
observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an article of
faith in our Constitution. 41 On September 30, 1994, we postulated
that people power can be trusted to check excesses of
government and that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of
people's initiatives ought to be rejected. 42 On September 26,
1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a matter of policy and
doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote
their legitimate exercise." 43 Just a few days ago, or on March 11,
1997, by a unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in
Caloocan City involving the mayor and ordered that he submits
his right to continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the
people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people
power from an opaque abstraction to a robust reality. The
Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to
blossom in full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature
campaigns to amend the Constitution without setting back the
flowering of people empowerment. More important, the Court
cannot seal the lips of people who are pro-change but not those
who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter
change into a sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a
dialogue and not by a monologue for in a democracy nobody can
claim any infallibility.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin

Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of

the Court to engross, let alone to commit, itself on all the issues
raised and debated upon by the parties. What is essential at this
time would only be to resolve whether or not the petition filed with
the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his capacity as
a "founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative" and
seeking through a people initiative certain modifications on the
1987 Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due
course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed amendment
under this method, is explicit. Section 2, Article XVII, thereof
provides:

The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying

with the constitutional imperatives, the petition would rather have
much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The
petition would require COMELEC to schedule "signature
gathering all over the country," to cause the necessary publication
of the petition "in newspapers of general and local circulation,"
and to instruct "Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the
Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court
which, consequentially, is made permanent under
theponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and
must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to
embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a
right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people
initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who

reign are the governed themselves. The postulate is no longer
lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable reality. The
past has taught us that the vitality of government lies not so much
in the strength of those who lead as in the consent of those who
are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it can only have its
true meaning if it comes with the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form

and substance, it behooves the Court, I most respectfully submit,
to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively and sufficiently
implemented the Constitutional provision on right of the people to
directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view
formulated by the Court at this point would at best be only a non-
binding, albeitpossibly persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for
clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not
prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign
for constitutional amendments.
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice

Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia.
Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No.
6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the

people and all government authority emanates from them.1 Unlike
our previous constitutions, the present 1987 Constitution has
given more significance to this declaration of principle for the
people are now vested with power not only to propose, enact or
reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local
legislative body, but to propose amendments to the constitution as
well.2 To implement these constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989
enacted Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as "The
initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to my mind, amply
covers an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view
maintained by petitioners is based principally on the alleged lack
of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and on
their allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the

law after publication in print media. [And] [t]his indicates
that Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments, because constitutional
amendments take effect upon ratification not after
publication.3
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective

interpretation of the law, for under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum
Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a

majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective
as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with

reference the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 Thus, the provisions
of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted in isolation. The
legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the
statute as a whole.5
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative

as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose".6The same section, in
enumerating the three systems of initiative, included an "initiative
on the constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the constitution"7 Paragraph (e) again of Section
3 defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an
initiative on the constitution is approved or rejected by the people"
And as to the material requirements for an initiative on the
Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:

number of the registered voters as signatories, of which
Initiative on the constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress

the intent being to provide for the implementation of the right
to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of
initiative. "A legal provision", the Court has previously said,
"must not be construed as to be a useless surplusage, and
accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to
the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon". 8 That this
is the legislative intent is further shown by the deliberations
in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration

of the Conference Committee Report on the
disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505, it was noted:

between Senate Bill No. 17 and the
consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which
refers to the system providing for the initiative
and referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker,
we consolidated the Senate and the House
of Representatives correctly provided for
initiative and referendum an the Constitution

MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.


THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does

the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.

Gentleman will please proceed.


provided purely for local initiative and
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding,

incorporated?

legislation.


provision of the Constitution to enact the

constitutional amendments to the 1987
Constitution, it is every five years." (Id.
[Journal and Record of the House of
Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June 1989, p.
960; quoted in Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA
279, 292-293 [1994]; emphasis supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have

comprehended initiatives on the Constitution. When
consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill
and as approved and enacted into law, the proposal
included initiative on both the Constitution and ordinary
laws.9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on

the constitution. Any other construction as what petitioners
foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and
spirit behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on
Elections, at present, cannot take any action (such as those
contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and
12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its having already
assumed jurisdiction over private respondents' petition. This is so
because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would
appear that proof of procurement of the required percentage of
registered voters at the time the petition for initiative is filed, is a
jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:

number of registered voters as signatories, of which
Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the

required signatures. This defect notwithstanding, it is without
prejudice to the refiling of their petition once compliance with
the required percentage is satisfactorily shown by private
respondents. In the absence, therefore, of an appropriate
petition before the Commission on Elections, any
determination of whether private respondents' proposal
constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in

the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an "inadequate" legislation to
cover a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. I, however, register my concurrence with the
dismissal, in the meantime, of private respondents' petition for
initiative before public respondent Commission on Elections until
the same be supported by proof of strict compliance with Section
5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.,

writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion in entertaining the "initiatory" Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly

proposed by the people through initiative," there is no
implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules

Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory
petition can show the required number of signatures — in this
case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at
least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be
spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative
to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even
entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent
most respectfully from the majority's two other rulings. Let me
explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's
majority, the Constitution cannot be amended at all through a
people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not
even by all the voters of the country acting together. This decision
will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and
render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the
very least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional
discretion on whether to pass a new law to implement it, when
there is already one existing at present. This right to amend
through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:

With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping
and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house
to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution,

RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to
Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority
openly concedes — intended by the legislature to cover and, I
respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an
initiative on the Constitution.1 I completely agree with the inspired
and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr.
Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on
initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no
longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this
Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that "provisions for
of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that
any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives
ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative

details. In recognition of this, RA 6735 wisely empowered 4 the
Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario
C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these
Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the
Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto
them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give
life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard
the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly

and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4

I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the

Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not
"freedom for the thought that we hate."5
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my
rights of our people to be used as their final weapons against
political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and
misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact
transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their chosen
leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be
resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise
should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D.

Santiago et al. and to DIRECT Respondent Commission on
Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of
prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the
majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order issued
on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto
Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right to free
speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Footnotes
1 Commissioner Blas Ople.
2 Commissioner Jose Suarez.
3 I Record of the Constitutional Commission, 371, 378.
4 Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution and

Section 1(1), Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution.
5 Annex "A" of Petition, Rollo, 15.

6 Later identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity.
7 These sections read:
Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six

years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives

shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall

serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
8 The section reads:
Sec. 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be

elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six
years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The
President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No
person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two

successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length or time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full
term for which he was elected.
9 The section reads:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,

except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
10 Rollo, 19.
11 Annex "B" of Petition, Rollo, 25.
12 Order of 12 December 1996, Annex "B-1" of

Petition, Rollo, 27.
13 Id.
14 Citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949];

Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 [1976].
15 Rollo, 68.
16 Rollo, 100.
17 Rollo, 130.
18 A Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
19 Section 26, Article II, Constitution.
20 Citing Commissioner Ople of the Constitutional

Commission, I Record of the Constitutional
Commission, 405.
21 Rollo, 239.
22 Rollo, 304.
23 Rollo, 568.
24 These were submitted on the following dates:
(a) Private respondent Delfin — 31 January

1997 (Rollo, 429);
(b) Private respondents Alberto and Carmen

Pedrosa — 10 February 1997 (Id., 446);
(c) Petitioners — 12 February 1997 (Id., 585);
(d) IBP — 12 February 1997 (Id., 476);
(e) Senator Roco — 12 February 1997 (Id.,

606);
(f) DIK and MABINI — 12 February 1997 (Id.,

465);
(g) COMELEC — 12 February 1997 (Id.,

489);
(h) LABAN — 13 February 1997 (Id., 553).
25 Rollo, 594.
26 Annex "D" of Roco's Motion for Intervention in this
case, Rollo, 184.
27 Rollo, 28.
28 232 SCRA 110, 134 [1994].
29 II The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,

A Commentary 571 [1988].
30 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 370-371.
31 Id., 371.
32 Id., 386.
33 Id., 391-392. (Emphasis supplied).
34 Id., 386.
35 Id., 392.
36 Id., 398-399.
37 Id., 399. Emphasis supplied.
38 Id., 402-403.
39 Id., 401-402.
40 Id., 410.
41 Id., 412.
42 II Record of the Constitutional Commission 559-560.
43 The Congress originally appeared as The National

Assembly. The change came about as a logical
consequence of the amended Committee Report No.
22 of the Committee on Legislative which changed The
National Assembly to "The Congress of the Philippines"
in view of the approval of the amendment to adopt the
bicameral system (II Record of the Constitutional
Commission 102-105). The proposed new Article on the
Legislative Department was, after various amendments
approved on Second and Third Readings on 9 October
1986 (Id., 702-703)
44 V Record of the Constitutional Commission 806.
45 See footnote No. 42.
46 As Stated by Commissioner Bernas in his

interpellation of Commissioner Suarez, footnote 28.
47 Entitled "Initiative and Referendum Act of 1987,"

introduced by then Congressmen Raul Roco, Raul del
Mar and Narciso Monfort.
48 Entitled "An Act Implementing the Constitutional

Provisions on Initiative and Referendum and for Other
Purposes," introduced by Congressmen Salvador
Escudero.
49 Entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative

and Referendum, and the Exceptions Therefrom,
Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and
Ordinances or Approve or Reject Any Ordinance or
Resolution Passed By the Local Legislative Body,"
introduced by Senators Gonzales, Romulo, Pimentel,
Jr., and Lina, Jr.
50 IV Record of the Senate, No. 143, pp. 1509-1510.

51 VIII Journal and Record of the House of
Representatives, 957-961.
52 That section reads:
Sec. 1. Statement of Policy. The power of the people

propose and enact resolutions and ordinances or
approve or reject, in whole or in part, any ordinance or
resolution passed by any local legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
53 It must be pointed out that Senate Bill No. 17 and

House Bill No. 21505, as approved on Third Reading,
did not contain any subtitles.
54 If some confusion attended the preparation of the

subtitles resulting in the leaving out of the more
important and paramount system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it was because there
was in the Bicameral Conference Committee an initial
agreement for the Senate panel to draft that portion on
local initiative and for the House of Representatives
panel to draft that portion covering national initiative
and initiative on the Constitution; eventually, however,
the Members thereof agreed to leave the drafting of the
consolidated bill to their staff. Thus:
CHAIRMAN GONZALES.
. . . All right, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang

mangyayari dito, ang magiging basic nito, let us not
discuss anymore kung alin ang magiging basic bill, ano,
whether it is the Senate Bill or whether it is the House
Bill. Logically it should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa
amin, eh. It is one of the first bills approved by the
Senate kaya ang number niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh.
Huwag na nating pag-usapan. Now, if you insist,
really iyong features ng national at saka constitutional,
okay. Pero gagawin na nating consolidation of both
bills. (TSN, proceedings of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on 6 June 1989 submitted by Nora, R, pp.
1-4 — 1-5).
xxx xxx xxx
HON. ROCO. So how do we proceed from this? The

staff will consolidate.
HON. GONZALES. Gumawa lang ng isang draft.

Submit it to the Chairman, kami na ang bahalang
magconsult sa aming mga members na kung okay,
HON. ROCO. Within today?
HON. GONZALES. Within today and early tomorrow.

Hanggang Huwebes lang tayo, eh.
HON. AQUINO. Kinakailangang palusutin natin ito.

Kung mabigyan tayo ng kopya bukas and you are not
objecting naman kayo naman ganoon din.
HON. ROCO. Editing na lang because on a physical

consolidation nga ito, eh. Yung mga provisions naman
namin wala sa inyo. (TSN, proceedings of Bicameral
Conference Committee of 6 June 1989, submitted by
E.S. Bongon, pp. III-4 — III-5).
55 Sec. 5(a & c), Sec. 8, Section 9(a).
56 Sections 13, 14, 15 and 16.

57 It would thus appear that the Senate's "cautious
approach" in the implementation of the system of
initiative as a mode of proposing amendments to the
Constitution, as expressed by Senator Gonzales in the
course of his sponsorship of Senate Bill No. 17 in the
Bicameral Conference Committee meeting and in his
sponsorship of the Committee's Report, might have
insidiously haunted the preparation of the consolidated
version of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505.
In the first he said:
Senate Bill No. 17 recognizes the initiatives and

referendum are recent innovations in our political
system. And recognizing that, it has adopted a
cautious approach by: first, allowing them only
when the local legislative body had refused to act;
second, not more frequently than once a year;
and, third, limiting them to the national level. (I
Record of the Senate, No. 33, p. 871).
Today is Thursday, September 05,
2019
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH

6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL

L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and
CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo,

BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel
Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr.
Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary
General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY
represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented
by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY
SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR.
REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA

HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO

F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and
AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO

BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION

(PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL

VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A.

LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL
TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU

PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and

SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG

PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V.

SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter
Doe,, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of

the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an
initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L.

Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other
groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino
Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic
Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by

modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections
1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their
petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a
plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND

VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM
TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due

course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this
Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs
of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31
August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition
since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group
claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition
deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require
respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not
be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction
in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-
in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined
causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite
the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA
6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the
system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings

supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting
intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing
intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding
precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino
Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering
and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the
minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative
petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the
nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as
provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the
Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA
6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26

September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court
considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2,

Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying

due course to the Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements
of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no
need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based
alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago,
no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional

provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the

meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some

voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft
of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown
to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam

President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is

ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares
the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already

a draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they
want to propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that

proposal and pass it around for signature.13 (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to
the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that
"before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal
itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through

initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative
upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition"
only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face
of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the
fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the
time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had
seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's

initiative from the United States where various State constitutions
incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative
petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify
their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several
decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot
Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the

person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is
that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose
interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a
significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally
the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without
the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily
mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even
flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to
the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when,
in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of
the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing
that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by

initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The
purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient
information so that registered voters can intelligently
evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x
(publication of full text of amended constitutional provision
required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the
section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he
is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in
many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.")
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of

the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However,
the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the
framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's
initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they
sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full
text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the
people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially
explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to
the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people
and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or
their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the

constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear
the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements
in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated
by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a
copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The
Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after
the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court
during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the
opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete
Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature
sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We
reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of
Verified
Legislative Barangay:
District: Signatures:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF

ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE
FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY,
SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN
ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My

signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend
the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification

Number
Last MM/DD/YY
Name,
First
Name,
M.I.
6
7
10
______________ ______________ _______________

___ ___ ___
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and (Print Name and (Print Name and
Sign) Sign) Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino

Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached
to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments
before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a
shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people
the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the
framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative
clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-

gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated,
together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's
draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC.
When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition
filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied
that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and
stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006
amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the
draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier
in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico
B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as
well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC,
states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition

in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf
of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown
by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as
representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No.
2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE

PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER
CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of

the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach
to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission
on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda

of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for
constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration
for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP
and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in
Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter

Change created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to
the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in
December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political

developments in Congress which militates against the use of the
expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members

and the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a
constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue
the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and
Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to
pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY

RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE
UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE
THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A
MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special
meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel,
Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to

prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
"support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission
on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode
of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative
Commission24 are vastly different from the proposed changes of the
Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended
petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission

affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the
Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on
the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing
Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not
touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only
Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of
new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more

than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30
August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group
caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature
sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the
contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the
Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together
with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer
at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed
changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the
COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the
proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically,
paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the
Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to
correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition
because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people
during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the
Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30
August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated
printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets.
Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before
this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together
with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any
indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the
signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that

the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative
filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is

not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure
attached to a referendum petition cannot question his
signature on the ground that he did not understand the
nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224,
S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who
signed the signature sheets circulated together with the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are
presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the
petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought,
made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that
the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In
their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated
"the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition.
This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments
that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30
August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that
"a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority
that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the
people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the
proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the
Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment

must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the
people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes
were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The
Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundumpulls the rug from under
their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated,

from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the
draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC.
The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated
claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the
petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino
Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering
period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited
copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they
printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than
six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also
asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he
could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other
supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the
printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of
these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October

2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino
initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition
for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show
the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the
people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have
received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100
percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached
one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature
sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains
space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these
100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number
of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets
would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically

impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have
seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable
conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than
one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature
sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full
text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or
as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is
also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This
omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes
in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with
the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The
signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the
Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed
changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be

lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected
indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until

its members, who are almost all the present members of
Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus,
the members of the interim Parliament will determine the
expiration of their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed

changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the
Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature
sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These
three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his
group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007
local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local
elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found

in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election
of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and
held simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will
be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely
requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the

proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the
phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured
that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local
elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the
absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the
elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local
elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of
their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of
Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office,
and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of
the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty.
Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million
signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid
fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and
his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the
proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million
signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would
require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who
signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim
Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The
proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these

amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent
with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a
strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a
"surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from
being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative
petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This
puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to
the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains
two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire

proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v.
Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal

constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is
to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the
proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the
electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's
proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the
iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of
the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot
language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness
of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and
effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments
embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v.
McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence,
stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the
problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are
exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage,
and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud"
in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative
operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often
emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent
on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating
to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic
advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and
eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative
before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or
splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties
clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not
have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4)

to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution
within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May
2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim
Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the
Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want
the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the
Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in
amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets
do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need
for such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the
dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because
the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's

amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the
Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be

members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member
of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the
regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart
provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if
their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that
of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House
will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the
Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30
June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of
the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the

Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could
not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate
against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures
would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's
choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to
the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why
the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by
the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital
an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of
the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a
general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose

amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people
even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who
sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to
the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the
petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because

it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution

Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an

amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress
or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions
to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this

Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members,
or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the

Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of
all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention.
The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to
"[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2
of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to
this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the

Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night,
we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution
thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered
voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee

Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this
matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from
the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied
in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of
initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process

of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment.
Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in
terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of
Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if
it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified

a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was
the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting

to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1
to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned

in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam
President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's

proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments."
Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between
the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and

"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments"
not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended,
and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions
to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United
States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32the Supreme Court of California
ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to

the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the
adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the
Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a
constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of
the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by
the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention
called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if
the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed
'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure
became law a substantial revision of our present state
Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first
agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought
by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner

in which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those
who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through
the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself
recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and
a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure
here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is
generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The
document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the
constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional
Revision' authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and
submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in
the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required
by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the

measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough
overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a
measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative.
If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII,
Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a
convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section
1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative

can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution
itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular
clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation
from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No.

364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be

revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the
instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution
in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is
almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and
revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the
people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a
constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in
doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled
principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting
a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people
may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law
in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the
Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure
compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ― that a people's
initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an

amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative
constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for
being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a

revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the
distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a

permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the
underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like
permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the

constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters
the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions
to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-
part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test
asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
"accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus,
"a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change
in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the
system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the
Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes
alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as

when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in
the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive
Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress
alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of
the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes
will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the
Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and

separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to
improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet
new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become
obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the
guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the
entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all
implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent
they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential
system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its
over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of
its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the

Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and
unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several
other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking
down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as
follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968

Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not
only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides
for a change in the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since
the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is
basic in the American form of government. It would not only
radically change the whole pattern of government in this
state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but
would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on
government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed

amendment were adopted by the people at the General Election
and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit
further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous
inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after
submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse
to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of
this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for
instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme
Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too
numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the
answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of

men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing
about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies
and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant,
homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear
very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the
manner proposed in the initiative petition here.43(Emphasis
supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the
present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive
and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the
executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the

Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less
than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the
count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the
Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the
structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and
"revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group
posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members
of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the
same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
"amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who
do not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such
endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in
their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional

provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision"
when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while
the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment"
when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent
distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on
one hand the common people in general are not expected to work
full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that
is not their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other
hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates
are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is
their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference
between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only
to the process or procedure of coming up with the
corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment"

and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or
extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional

convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino
Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision
of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the
proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if
Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes.
However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the
proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing
the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the
framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated,
courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any
theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language
deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by
creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the
Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and
inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of
the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed
change involving a radical structural change in government does not
constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in

American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success.
In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory,
thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to

changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is
that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by
which the legislature can propose a revision of the
constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions
initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a

wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted
through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction
between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the
scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that
revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the
constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far
reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument,
including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and
radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a
defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the
proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles
of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it
violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot
without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1),

does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v.
Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the
constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the
provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1,

authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending the
Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use
as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and

said: "It is the only section of the constitution which provides the
means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an
individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before
the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII,

section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions
proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates
the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end

green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the
middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining
whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is
indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision
begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing
separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government,
requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the
Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the

Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino
ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an
amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree
as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment
and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or

articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended.
These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system
of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three
examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far
red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment

or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution
may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of
the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article
II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government
and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each
specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how
it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of
government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the
underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several

provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with
those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions
to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's
initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or
recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the

Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent

President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall
hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be
deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to
26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary
system of government, in which case, they shall be amended
to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably

inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to
construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section
2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by
stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision
"shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until
the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate
constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty.
Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of
a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to
reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision
automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is
not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the

Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
"Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be
resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the

Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among
the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes
could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary
forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian,
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have
all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets
realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or
New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for
revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the
present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system
requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution.
Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in
gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a

revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct
and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no
need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to
cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that
RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a

statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds.
Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that
courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the

constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not
change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative
must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even
before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which
requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have
at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the
amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty.
Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra
signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the
Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories,
merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition.
Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not
even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group
claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA

6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of
the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the
Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in

Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc

merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for
Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following
this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright
dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse

of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent
COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it
appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the
Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on
March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost
respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize
the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of
the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the
Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution
in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political
group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the
Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the
new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes
in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door
constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of

the total votes cast53 − approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite
held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of
the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That
approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the
Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures

gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the
specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when
they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional
change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will and
discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should
never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which
embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people

decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as
prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the
people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society
― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups
gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases
to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice."
However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP
maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino
Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to
the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or
"sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the
Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will,
is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the
Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by
deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution
is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET
AL.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
Without the rule of law, there can be no lasting

prosperity and certainly no liberty.
Beverley McLachlin 1
Chief Justice of Canada
After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the
parties' respective arguments -- both oral and written -- as well as the
enlightened and enlightening Opinions submitted by my esteemed
colleagues, I am fully convinced that the present Petition must be dismissed.
I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely

consistent with my previous Opinions and votes on the two extant Supreme
Court cases involving an initiative to change the Constitution.
In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,2 I opined "that taken

together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly
Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide
more than sufficient
__________________
'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following
the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.'
"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping
and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house to
exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,

the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the

majority openly concedes — intended by the legislature to cover
and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to
effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree with
the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno
and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law
on initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to
initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall
no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with
this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that "provisions for
of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any
"effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to
be rejected."
"No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative

details. In recognition of this, R.A. 6735 wisely empowered the
Alfredo
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend

the Constitution."
__________________
E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C.

Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners
who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission,
and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than
an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a cherished
right of our people.
"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard

the same law, R.A. 6735.
"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly

and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A.

"I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the
Voltaire once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it.' After all, freedom is not
'freedom for the thought that we hate.'
Epilogue
"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my

rights of our people to be used as
Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Comelec,3 I joined the rest of the
members of the Court in ruling "by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the Comelec in dismissing the petition filed
by
__________________
Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case were

not direct parties in Santiago, nonetheless the Court's injunction
against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin
petition which was the immediate subject of said case. As a
dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do, that the
majority gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping
injunction, but I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with
the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio
decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the
highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its
obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only
recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would
have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been
struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious
disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of
justiciable controversies.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to

cover initiatives on the Constitution, and that whatever
administrative details may have been omitted in said law are
satisfactorily provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The
promulgation of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which vests upon the Comelec the
power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall." The Omnibus Election Code likewise empowers the
electoral body to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing
the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is
required to enforce and administer x x x." Finally and most
relevantly, Section 20 of Ra 6735 specifically authorizes Comelec
"to promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this Act."
"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do

the right thing at the right time and for the right reason." Let me
explain further.
The Right Thing
"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right

thing that citizens may avail themselves of to articulate their will. It
is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional
system. Even the majority implicitly conceded its value and worth
in our legal firmament when it implored Congress "not to tarry any
longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for
implementation of the right (of initiative) of the people x x x."
Hence, in the en banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. Comelec, [G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996], this Court
unanimously held that "(l)ike elections, initiative and referendum
are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular
PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied" with

the Santiago Decision.
__________________
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will

exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate
exercise."
The Right Way
"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken
together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement,
effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the
Constitution." Let me now demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735
by outlining, in concrete terms, the steps to be taken – the right
way – to amend the Constitution through a people's initiative.
"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe

the form of the petition which shall contain the proposition and the
required number of signatories. Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the
petition shall state the following:
'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to

be x x x amended, x x x;
c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly

explained];
c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one

hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed
at the top of every page of the petition.'
"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires

that the petition include a formal designation of the duly
authorized representatives of the signatories.
"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures

becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is
jurisdictional. Without such requisite signatures, the Commission
shall motu proprio reject the petition.
"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above

requirements, they may thence file the petition with the Comelec
which is tasked to determine the sufficiency thereof and to verify
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits and voters' identification cards. In deciding whether the
petition is sufficient, the Comelec shall also determine if the
proposition is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it consists of an
amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution. Any decision of
the electoral body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from notice.
I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the

validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso
__________________
"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the
determination of its sufficiency, the Comelec shall publish the
same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circulation, and set the date of the plebiscite.
The conduct of the plebiscite should not be earlier than sixty (60)
days, but not later than ninety (90) days after certification by the
Comelec of the sufficiency of the petition. The proposition, if
approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite,
becomes effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding

the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution
2300 will not ipso facto validate the PIRMA petition and
automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far
from it. Among others, PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle the
following searching issues:
1. Does the proposed change – the lifting of the term limits of

elective officials -- constitute a mere amendment and not a
revision of the Constitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in

the petition? This question is relevant considering that under RA
8189, the old registry of voters used in the 1995 national elections
was voided after the barangay elections on May 12, 1997, while
the new list may be used starting only in the elections of May
1998.
3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution

really emanate from the people who signed the petition for
initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term extension who are in
fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-
interest?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they

really belong to qualified warm bodies comprising at least 12% of
the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district
is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein?
"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The
Right Reason. Question Nos. 1 and 2 above, while important, are
basically legal in character and can be determined by
argumentation and memoranda. However, Question No. 4
involves not only legal issues but gargantuan hurdles of factual
determination. This to my mind is the crucible, the litmus test, of a
people's petition for initiative. If herein petitioners, led by PIRMA,
succeed in proving -- not just alleging -- that six million voters of
this country indeed want to amend the Constitution, what power
on earth can stop them? Not this Court, not the Comelec, not
even the President or Congress.
facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to

amend the Constitution. Far from it." I stressed that PIRMA must show the
following, among others:
__________________
"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at

EDSA, and the very rafters and foundations of the martial law
society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On the other hand,
PIRMA and its co-petitioners are claiming that they have gathered
six million signatures. If, as claimed by many, these six million
signatures are fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned
for all history in a signature-verification process conducted under
our open system of legal advocacy.
"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this

Court and as a citizen of this country, would like to seek: Are these
six million signatures real? By insisting on an entirely new doctrine
of statutory inadequacy, the majority effectively suppressed the
quest for that truth.
The Right Reason
"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if

the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution
2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does the clamor for the
proposed change to the Constitution really emanate from the
people who signed the petition for initiative? Or is it the
beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact orchestrating such
move to advance their own political self-interests? In other words,
is PIRMA's exercise of the right to initiative being done in
accordance with our Constitution and our laws? Is such attempted
exercise legitimate?
"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative,

along with referendum, as the 'ultimate weapon of the people to
negate government malfeasance and misfeasance.' In Subic
Bay, we specified that 'initiative is entirely the work of the
electorate x x x a process of lawmaking by the people themselves
without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
representatives.' As ponente of Subic Bay, I stand foursquare
on this principle: The right to amend through initiative
belongs only to the people – not to the government and its
minions. This principle finds clear support from utterances of
many constitutional commissioners like those quoted below:
"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they

are dissatisfied with the National Assembly x x x [and] precisely a
fallback position of the people in the event that they are
dissatisfied." -- Commissioner Ople
"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and

resorted to] only if the legislature is not as responsive to the vital
and urgent needs of people." -- Commissioner Gascon
(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective officials --
"constitute[s] a mere amendment and not a revision of the Constitution."
_________________
"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and]

reserved for the people [which] should not be frivolously resorted
to." -- Commissioner Romulo
"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or

even to revise it, our Charter itself provides them other ways of
doing so, namely, by calling a constitutional convention or
constituting Congress into a constituent assembly. These are
officialdom's weapons. But initiative belongs to the people.
"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate
people's organizations or are they merely fronts for incumbents
who want to extend their terms? This is a factual question which,
unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered anymore, because
the Supreme Court majority ruled that the law that implements it,
RA 6735, is inadequate or insufficient insofar as initiatives to the
Constitutions are concerned. With such ruling, the majority
effectively abrogated a constitutional right of our people. That is
why in my Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that such
precipitate action "is equivalent to burning the whole house to
exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of
pain." I firmly maintain that to defeat PIRMA's effort, there is no
need to "burn" the constitutional right to initiative. If PIRMA's
exercise is not "legitimate," it can be exposed as such in the ways
I have discussed – short of abrogating the right itself. On the other
hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be legitimate – if it hurdles
the four issues I outlined earlier – by all means, we should allow
and encourage it. But the majority's theory of statutory inadequacy
has pre-empted – unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view – any
judicial determination of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has
silenced the quest for truth into the interstices of the PIRMA
petition.
The Right Time
"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes

thereto may be proposed. Section 2 of Article XVII precludes
amendments "within five years following [its] ratification x x x nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter." Since its
ratification, the 1987 Constitution has never been amended.
Hence, the five-year prohibition is now inoperative and
amendments may theoretically be proposed at any time.
"Be that as it may, I believe – given the present circumstances –

that there is no more time to lift term limits to enable incumbents
to seek reelection in the May 11, 1998 polls. Between today and
the next national
(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable"; and they "really
belong to qualified warm bodies comprising at
__________________
elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where the
single issue of the sufficiency of RA 6735 was resolved, took this
Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months to decide the
motion for reconsideration. The instant case, where the same
issue is also raised by the petitioners, took two months, not
counting a possible motion for reconsideration. These time spans
could not be abbreviated any further, because due process
requires that all parties be given sufficient time to file their
pleadings.
"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy
of RA 6735 – as I believe it should – and allow the Comelec to act
on the PIRMA petition, such eight-month period will not be enough
to tackle the four weighty issues I mentioned earlier, considering
that two of them involve tedious factual questions. The Comelec's
decision on any of these issues can still be elevated to this Court
for review, and reconsiderations on our decisions on each of
those issues may again be sought.
"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six

million signatures is enormously time-consuming, considering that
any person may question the authenticity of each and every
signature, initially before the election registrar, then before the
Comelec on appeal and finally, before this Court in a separate
proceeding. Moreover, the plebiscite itself – assuming such stage
can be reached – may be scheduled only after sixty (60) but not
more than ninety (90) days, from the time the Comelec and this
Court, on appeal, finally declare the petition to be sufficient.
"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties,

groups organizations or coalitions may start selecting their official
candidates for President, Vice President and Senators on
November 27, 1997; the period for filing certificates of candidacy
is from January 11 to February 9, 1998; the election period and
campaign for national officials start on February 10, 1998, while
the campaign period for other elective officials, on March 17,
1998. This means, by the time PIRMA's proposition is ready – if
ever – for submission directly to the voters at large, it will have
been overcome by the elections. Time will simply run out on
PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term limits in time for the 1998
elections.
"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998

elections via a people's initiative does not detract one whit from
(1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate to
implement this constitutional right and, more important, (2) my
faith in the power of the people to initiate changes in local and
national laws and the Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can
deliberate on these two items even more serenely and wisely now
that the debates will be free from the din and distraction of the
1998 elections. After all, jurisprudence is not merely for the here
and now but, more so, for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me
therefore stress, by way of epilogue, my unbending credo in favor
of our people's right to initiative.
least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative

district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein."
__________________
Epilogue
"I believe in democracy – in our people's natural right to determine

our own destiny.
"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of

enabling our people to express their will and chart their history.
Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution, internal chaos and
civil strife. It is an inherent right of the people – as basic as the
right to elect, the right to self-determination and the right to
individual liberties. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the
capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative
wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves
and their posterity.
"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to

perpetuate a particular official or group of officials in power. Far
from it. Such perpetuation is anathema to democracy. My firm
conviction that there is an adequate law implementing the
constitutional right of initiative does not ipso facto result in the
victory of the PIRMA petition or of any proposed constitutional
change. There are, after all, sufficient safeguards to guarantee
the proper use of such constitutional right and to forestall its
misuse and abuse. First, initiative cannot be used to revise the
Constitution, only to amend it. Second, the petitioners' signatures
must be validated against an existing list of voters and/or voters'
identification cards. Third, initiative is a reverse power of and by
the people, not of incumbent officials and their
machinators. Fourth and most important of all, the signatures
must be verified as real and genuine; not concocted, fictitious or
fabricated. The only legal way to do this is to enable the
Commission on Elections to conduct a nationwide verification
process as mandated by the Constitution and the law. Such
verification, it bears stressing, is subject to review by this Court.
"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people

who gathered at EDSA in 1986, and yet they changed the history
of our country. PIRMA claims six times that number, not just from
the National Capital Region but from all over the country. Is this
claim through the invention of its novel theory of statutory
insufficiency, the Court's majority has stifled the only legal method
of determining whether PIRMA is real or not, whether there is
indeed a popular clamor to lift term limits of elected officials, and
whether six million voters want to initiate amendments to their
most basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such
questions, the Court may have unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the
benefit of the legal presumption of legality and regularity. In its
misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it burned down the whole
house. It unceremoniously divested the people of a basic
constitutional right.
In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the right thing

[initiative] in the right way at the right time and for the right reason."
In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions

in Santiago and PIRMA. Tested against them, the present Petition of Raul
Lambino and Erico Aumentado must be DISMISSED. Unfortunately,
the right thing is being rushed in the wrong way and for the wrong
reasons. Let me explain.
No Grave Abuse
of Discretion by Comelec
As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of

the Lambino Petition. After all, the Commission merely followed the holding
in Santiago permanently
____________________
"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and
to make it prevail. This mission is undertaken not only to resolve
the vagaries of present events but also to build the pathways of
tomorrow. The sum total of the entire process of adversarial
litigation is the verity of facts and the application of law thereto. By
the majority cop-out in this mission of discovery, our country and
our people have been deprived not only of a basic constitutional
right, as earlier noted, but also of the judicial opportunity to verify
the truth."
enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any

petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law
shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system."
Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any
jurisprudence.4 Neither can whim, caprice, arbitrariness or personal
bias be attributed to the Commission.5 Quite the contrary, it prudently
followed this Court's jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming
arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and unsettled
question of law, this Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to
the poll body with respect to that action.6
The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of

PIRMA in 1997. The differences pointed out by Justice Reynato S. Puno
are, with due respect, superficial. It is argued that, unlike the present
Lambino Petition, PIRMA did not contain verified signatures. These are
distinctions that do not make a difference. Precisely, Justice Puno is urging
a remand, because the verification issue is "contentious" and remains
unproven by petitioners. Clearly, both the PIRMA and the Lambino
Petitions contain unverified signatures. Therefore, they both deserve
the same treatment: DISMISSAL.
Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v.
Comelec was that the Commission had "only complied" with this Court's
Decision in Santiago, the same reason given by Comelec in this case. The
Separate Opinions in PIRMA gave no other reason. No one argued, even
remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should have been dismissed because
the signatures were unverified.
To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional

requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to
the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional.7 Without those signatures, the
Comelec shall motu proprio reject the petition."
So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the
legal moorings of the exercise of the right are substantially changed, the
Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in accord with this Court's
pronouncements. Respondent Commission has no discretion, under any
guise, to refuse enforcement of any final decision of this Court.8 The
refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino Petition was its only recourse.
Any other mode of action would appear not only presumptuous, but also
contemptuous. It would have constituted defiance of the Court and would
have surely been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and
contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final arbiter of
justiciable controversies.
Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the
reasons given in my Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA), that Republic Act
6735 is indeed sufficient to implement an initiative to amend the
Constitution, still, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
Comelec for merely following prevailing jurisprudence extant at the time it
rendered its ruling in question.
Only Amendments,
Not Revisions
I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper
subject of an initiative to change the Constitution. This principle is crystal
clear from even a layperson's reading of the basic law.9
I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to

parliamentary and the form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral
contemplates an overhaul of the structure of government. The ponencia
has amply demonstrated that the merger of the legislative and the executive
branches under a unicameral-parliamentary system, "[b]y any legal test and
under any jurisdiction," will "radically alter the framework of government as
set forth in the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have an overall
implication on the entire Constitution; they effectively rewrite its most
important and basic provisions. The prolixity and complexity of the changes
cannot be categorized, even by semantic generosity, as "amendments."
In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution,
revisions (or amendments) may be proposed only through the first two: by
Congress or by a constitutional convention. Under the third mode -- people's
initiative -- only amendments are allowed. Many of the justices' Opinions
have cited the historical, philosophical and jurisprudential bases of their
respective positions. I will not add to the woes of the reader by reiterating
them here.
Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment

from a revision is found in the Constitution itself: a revision may be done
only when the proposed change can be drafted, defined, articulated,
discussed and agreed upon after a mature and democratic debate in a
deliberative body like Congress or a Convention. The changes proposed
must necessarily be scrutinized, as their adoption or non-adoption must
result from an informed judgment.
Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the
1987 Constitutions had to spend many months of purposeful discussions,
democratic debates and rounds of voting before they could agree on the
wordings covering the philosophy, the underlying principles, and the
structure of government of our Republic.
Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local

governments take several weeks or even months of drafting, reading, and
debating before Congress can approve them. How much more when it
comes to constitutional changes?
A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-

bicameral to parliamentary-unicameral is monumental. Even the initiative
proponents admit this fact. So, why should a revision be rammed down our
people's throats without the benefit of intelligent discussion in a deliberative
assembly?
Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA

6735 expressly prohibiting petitions for initiative from "embracing more than
one subject matter."10 The present initiative covers at least two subjects: (1)
the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government; and (2)
the change from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.11 Thus, even under
Republic Act 6735 -- the law that Justice Puno and I hold to be sufficient and
valid -- the Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.
12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds

Not Proven by Petitioners
The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the
constitutional requirement that it be supported by at least 12 percent of the
registered voters nationwide, of which at least 3 percent of the registered
voters in every legislative district must be represented. As pointed out by
Intervenors One Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show that there was a
failure to meet the minimum percentages required.12
Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent

constitutional requirements involve "contentious facts," which have not been
proven by the Lambino Petition. Thus, he is urging a remand to the
Comelec.
But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the
Constitution itself mandates the said requisites of an initiative petition. In
other words, a petition that does not show the required percentages is
fatally defective and must be dismissed, as the Delfin Petition was,
in Santiago.
Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present

Petition is void and unconstitutional. It points out that the Petition dismally
fails to comply with the constitutional requirement that an initiative must be
directly proposed by the people. Specifically, the ponencia has amply
established that petitioners were unable to show that the Lambino Petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
changes.
So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven
before the Commission, the Petition must still be dismissed for
proposing a revision, not an amendment, in gross violation of the
Constitution. At the very least, it proposes more than one subject, in
violation of Republic Act 6735.
Summation
Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in
the words of Justice Puno who supports them, the "people's voice is
sovereign in a democracy."
I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate

Opinion in PIRMA that "initiative is a democratic method of enabling our
people to express their will and chart their history. x x x. I believe that
Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use
this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for
themselves and their posterity."
This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to
change the Constitution, because the present Petition violates the following:
· The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments,
not revisions, and requires definite percentages of verified signatures)
· The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions

containing more than one subject)
· Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the

Petition then under consideration on the ground that, by following
the Santiago ruling, the Comelec had not gravely abused its discretion).
I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and
futile. More tellingly, it is a cop-out, a hand-washing already discredited
2000 years ago. Instead of finger-pointing, I believe we must confront the
issues head on, because the people expect no less from this august and
venerable institution of supreme justice.
Epilogue
At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.13 Initiative,
like referendum and recall, is a treasured feature of the Filipino
constitutional system. It was born out of our world-admired and often-
imitated People Power, but its misuse and abuse must be resolutely
rejected. Democracy must be cherished, but mob rule vanquished.
The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the

government and the people, between each individual and the rest of the
citizenry. Through it, the people have solemnly expressed their will that all of
them shall be governed by laws, and their rights limited by agreed-upon
covenants to promote the common good. If we are to uphold the Rule of
Law and reject the rule of the mob, we must faithfully abide by the
processes the Constitution has ordained in order to bring about
a peaceful, just and humane society. Assuming arguendo that six million
people allegedly gave their assent to the proposed changes in the
Constitution, they are nevertheless still bound by the social covenant --
the present Constitution -- which was ratified by a far greater majority almost
twenty years ago.14 I do not denigrate the majesty of the sovereign will;
rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest perch, because our government
must remain as one of laws and not of men.
Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a
solemn oath to uphold the Constitution. Being the protectors of the
fundamental law as the highest expression of the sovereign will, they must
subject to the strictest scrutiny any attempt to change it, lest it be
trivialized and degraded by the assaults of the mob and of ill-
conceived designs. The Court must single-mindedly defend the
Constitution from bogus efforts falsely attributed to the sovereign people.
The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless,

when ranged against incessant voices from the more powerful branches of
government, it should never cower in submission. On the other hand, I
daresay that the same weakness of the Court becomes its strength when it
speaks independently through decisions that rightfully uphold the
supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law. The strength of the
judiciary lies not in its lack of brute power, but in its moral courage to
perform its constitutional duty at all times against all odds. Its might is in its
being right.15
During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and
innuendoes about alleged carrots offered and sticks drawn by those
interested in the outcome of this case.16 There being no judicial proof of
these allegations, I shall not comment on them for the nonce, except to
quote the Good Book, which says, "There is nothing hidden that will not be
revealed, and nothing secret that will not be known and come to light."17
Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its

decision, the Court and each of its members shall be judged by posterity.
Ten years, fifty years, a hundred years -- or even a thousand years -- from
now, what the Court did here, and how each justice opined and voted, will
still be talked about, either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-washing
of Pontius Pilate, the abomination of Dred Scott, and the loathing
of Javellana still linger and haunt to this day.
Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be
known throughout the nation and the world for its independence, integrity,
industry and intelligence.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with

6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A. Q.

SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
ABALOS, JR. and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno,
that the Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC1 is not a binding precedent.
However, it is my position that even if Santiago were reversed and Republic
Act No. 6735 (R.A. 6735) be held as sufficient law for the purpose of
people's initiative to amend the Constitution, the petition for initiative in this
case must nonetheless be dismissed.
There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with R.A.

6735, even as they blindly invoke the said law to justify their alleged
people's initiative. Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735 requires that "[a] petition for
an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." On the other hand, Section
5(c)2 of the same law requires that the petition should state, among others,
the proposition3 or the "contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed." If we were to apply
Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the Constitution, as petitioners submit,
the petition for initiative signed by the required number of voters should
incorporate therein a text of the proposed changes to the Constitution.
However, such requirement was not followed in the case at bar.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they printed a
mere 100,000 copies of the text of the proposed changes to the
Constitution. According to him, these were subsequently distributed to their
agents all over the country, for attachment to the sheets of paper on which
the signatures were to be affixed. Upon being asked, however, if he in fact
knew whether the text was actually attached to the signature sheets which
were distributed for signing, he said that he merely assumed that they
were. In other words, he could not tell the Court for certain whether their
representatives complied with this requirement.
The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to
this Court, indubitably establish that the full text of the proposed changes
was not attached to the signature sheets. All that the signature sheets
contained was the general proposition and abstract, which falls short of the
full text requirement of R.A. 6735.
The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes
in the petition for initiative to be signed by the people cannot be seriously
disputed. To begin with, Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution
unequivocally states that "[a]mendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein." Evidently, for the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution, they must, in the first instance, know
exactly what they are proposing. It is not enough that they merely possess a
general idea of the proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a
"direct" proposal by the people.
Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the
constitutional right of initiative to Congress, it might be noted that they
themselves reasonably assumed that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendments would be shown to the people during the process of signature
gathering. Thus –
MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report

provides: "upon petition of at least 10 percent of the registered
voters." How will we determine that 10 percent has been
achieved? How will the voters manifest their desire, is it by
signature?
MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.

MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some
voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of
the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the
people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam

President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready
and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the
draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.4
It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of R.A.
6735, the full text of the proposed changes must necessarily be stated in or
attached to the initiative petition. The signatories to the petition must be
given an opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning and effect of the
proposed changes to enable them to make a free, intelligent and well-
informed choice on the matter.
Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the
proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard against fraud
and deception. If the whole text of the proposed changes is contained in or
attached to the petition, intercalations and riders may be duly avoided. Only
then can we be assured that the proposed changes are truly of the people
and that the signatories have been fully apprised of its implications.
If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or

deception in the initiative and referendum process, such provision must be
viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to substantially comply
therewith is fatal.5 The failure of petitioners in this case to comply with the
full text requirement resultantly rendered their petition for initiative fatally
defective.
The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the
one subject rule under Section 10(a) of R.A. 6735:
SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.— The following cannot be the

subject of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be

submitted to the electorate; x x x
The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution,

has the same object and purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied
in Article VI, Section 26(1)6 of the Constitution.7 To elaborate, the one
subject-one bill rule was designed to do away with the practice of inserting
two or more unrelated provisions in one bill, so that those favoring one
provision would be compelled to adopt the others. By this process of log-
rolling, the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished and ensured,
when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.
As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially

designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the electorate. It is meant to
safeguard the integrity of the initiative process by ensuring that no unrelated
riders are concealed within the terms of the proposed amendment. This in
turn guarantees that the signatories are fully aware of the nature, scope and
purpose of the proposed amendment.
Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition for
initiative relate only to one subject matter, that is – the shift from presidential
to a parliamentary system of government. According to petitioners, all of the
other proposed changes are merely incidental to this main proposal and are
reasonably germane and necessary thereto.8An examination of the text of
the proposed changes reveals, however, that this is not the case.
The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are
beyond the main proposal espoused by the petitioners. Apart from a shift
from the presidential to a parliamentary form of government, the proposed
changes include the abolition of one House of Congress,9 and the
convening of a constituent assembly to propose additional amendments to
the Constitution.10 Also included within its terms is an omnibus declaration
that those constitutional provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are
inconsistent with the unicameral-parliamentary form of government, shall be
deemed amended to conform thereto.
It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only
to a shift in the form of government, it actually seeks to affect other subjects
that are not reasonably germane to the constitutional alteration that is
purportedly sought. For one, a shift to a parliamentary system of
government does not necessarily result in the adoption of a unicameral
legislature. A parliamentary system can exist in many different "hybrid" forms
of government, which may or may not embrace unicameralism.11 In other
words, the shift from presidential to parliamentary structure and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause nor effect of the
other.
I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the
proposed change in our system of government. As a subject matter, the
convening of a constituent assembly to amend the Constitution presents a
range of issues that is far removed from the subject of a shift in government.
Besides, the constituent assembly is supposed to convene and propose
amendments to the Constitution after the proposed change in the system of
government has already taken place. This only goes to show that the
convening of the constituent assembly is not necessary to effectuate a
change to a parliamentary system of government.
The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which
are inconsistent with a unicameral-parliamentary system of government
shall be deemed amended is equally bothersome. The statement does not
specify what these inconsistencies and amendments may be, such that
everyone is left to guess the provisions that could eventually be affected by
the proposed changes. The subject and scope of these automatic
amendments cannot even be spelled out with certainty. There is thus no
reasonable measure of its impact on the other constitutional provisions.
The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a people's

initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Taken together, the
proposed changes indicate that the intendment is not simply to
effect substantial amendments to the Constitution, but a revision thereof.
The distinction between an amendment and revision was explained by Dean
Vicente G. Sinco, as follows:
"Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves

alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may
result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the
greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important
provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the
factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original
intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and
plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the
constitution to determine which one should be altered or
suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced
with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages

a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act
to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire
constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather
is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to
it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions
or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect."12
The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment

and revision has indeed guided us throughout our constitutional history.
However, the distinction between the two terms is not, to my mind, as
significant in the context of our past constitutions, as it should be now under
the 1987 Constitution. The reason for this is apparent. Under our past
constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting either as a constituent assembly
or by calling out a constitutional convention, that exercised authority to
either amend or revise the Constitution through the procedures therein
described. Although the distinction between the two terms was theoretically
recognized under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the need to
highlight the difference was not as material because it was only Congress
that could effect constitutional changes by choosing between the two
modalities.
However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution. Apart from

providing for the two modes of either Congress constituting itself as a
constituent assembly or calling out for a constitutional convention, a third
mode was introduced for proposing changes to the Constitution. This mode
refers to the people's right to propose amendments to the fundamental law
through the filing of a petition for initiative.
Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision

under the past constitutions is not determinative of what the two terms mean
now, as related to the exercise of the right to propose either amendments or
revision. The changes introduced to both the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973
could have indeed been deemed an amendment or revision, but the
authority for effecting either would never have been questioned since
the same belonged solely to Congress. In contrast, the 1987 Constitution
clearly limits the right of the people to directly propose constitutional
changes to amendments only. We must consequently not be swayed by
examples of constitutional changes effected prior to the present fundamental
law, in determining whether such changes are revisory or amendatory in
nature.
In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice
Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. Executive Secretary13 related to the
procedure to be followed in ratifying a completely new charter proposed by a
constitutional convention. The authority or right of the constitutional
convention itself to effect such a revision was not put in issue in that case.
As far as determining what constitutes "amendments" for the purpose of a
people's initiative, therefore, we have neither relevant precedent nor prior
experience. We must thus confine ourselves to Dean Sinco's basic
articulation of the two terms.
It is clear from Dean Sinco's explanation that a revision may either be of the
whole or only part of the Constitution. The part need not be a substantial
part as a change may qualify as a revision even if it only involves some of
the important provisions. For as long as the intention and plan to be carried
out contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution "to
determine which should be altered or suppressed, or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one," the proposed
change may be deemed a revision and not merely an amendment.
Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that the
same may be considered as either an amendment or revision. In so
determining, another overriding factor is the "original intention and plan
authorized to be carried out" by the proposed changes. If the same relates
to a re-examination of the entire document to see which provisions remain
relevant or if it has far-reaching effects on the entire document, then the
same constitutes a revision and not a mere amendment of the Constitution.
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the

quantitative and qualitative test is necessary in assessing what may be
considered as an amendment or revision. It is not enough that we focus
simply on the physical scope of the proposed changes, but also consider
what it means in relation to the entire document. No clear demarcation line
can be drawn to distinguish the two terms and each circumstance must be
judged on the basis of its own peculiar conditions. The determination lies in
assessing the impact that the proposed changes may have on the entire
instrument, and not simply on an arithmetical appraisal of the specific
provisions which it seeks to affect.
In McFadden v. Jordan,14 the California Supreme Court laid down the

groundwork for the combination of quantitative and qualitative assessment
of proposed constitutional changes, in order to determine whether the same
is revisory or merely amendatory. In that case, the McFadden court found
the proposed changes extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles
contained in the California Constitution would either be repealed in their
entirety or substantially altered, and four new topics would be introduced.
However, it went on to consider the qualitative effects that the proposed
initiative measure would have on California's basic plan of government. It
observed that the proposal would alter the checks and balances inherent
in such plan, by delegating far-reaching and mixed powers to an
independent commission created under the proposed measure.
Consequently, the proposal in McFadden was not only deemed as broad
and numerous in physical scope, but was also held as having a substantive
effect on the fundamental governmental plan of the State of California.
The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the

California Supreme Court in Raven v. Deukmeijan.15 Proposition 115, as
the initiative in that case was called, would vest in the United States
Supreme Court all judicial interpretative powers of the California courts over
fundamental criminal defense rights in that state. It was observed that
although quantitatively, the proposition did "not seem so extensive as to
change directly the substantial entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions," the same, nonetheless, "would
substantially alter the substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a
document of independent force and effect." Quoting Amador Valley Joint
Union High School District v. State Board of
Equalization,16 the Raven court said:
". . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions,

additions and amendments involving many constitutional articles,
'even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as
to amount to a revision also…[A]n enactment which purported to
vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to a
revision without regard either to the length or complexity of the
measure or the number of existing articles or sections affected by
such change.'" (Underscoring supplied and citations omitted)
Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court

examines both the quantitative and qualitative effects of a proposed
measure on its constitutional scheme. Substantial changes in either respect
could amount to a revision.17
I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same

manner. The experience of the courts in California is not far removed from
the standards expounded on by Dean Sinco when he set out to differentiate
between amendment and revision. It is actually consistent, not only with our
traditional concept of the two terms, but also with the mindset of our
constitutional framers when they referred to the disquisition of Justice
Antonio in Javellana.18 We must thus consider whether the proposed
changes in this case affect our Constitution in both its substantial physical
entirety and in its basic plan of government.
The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of

whether these are simple or substantial, amount to a revision as to be
excluded from the people's right to directly propose amendments to
the fundamental law?
As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in

determining the nature of the proposed changes. These tests are consistent
with Dean Sinco's traditional concept of amendment and revision when he
explains that, quantitatively, revision "may result in the rewriting either of the
whole constitution, or the greater part of it, or perhaps only some of its
provisions." In any case, he continues, "the factor that characterizes it as an
act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out."
Unmistakably, the latter statement refers to the qualitative effect of the
proposed changes.
It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the

proponents in this case will affect only two (2) out of the eighteen (18)
articles of the 1987 Constitution, namely, Article VI (Legislative Department)
and Article VII (Executive Department), as well as provisions that will ensure
the smooth transition from a presidential-bicameral system to a
parliamentary-unicameral structure of government. The quantitative effect of
the proposed changes is neither broad nor extensive and will not affect the
substantial entirety of the 1987 Constitution.
However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have

serious qualitative consequences on the Constitution. The initiative petition,
if successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic governmental plan,
but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation to government. The
proposed changes will set into motion a ripple effect that will strike at the
very foundation of our basic constitutional plan. It is therefore an
impermissible constitutional revision that may not be effected through a
people's initiative.
Petitioners' main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government

from the presidential to the parliamentary system. An examination of their
proposal reveals that there will be a fusion of the executive and legislative
departments into one parliament that will be elected on the basis of
proportional representation. No term limits are set for the members of
parliament except for those elected under the party-list system whose terms
and number shall be provided by law. There will be a President who shall be
the head of state, but the head of government is the Prime Minister. The
latter and his cabinet shall be elected from among the members of
parliament and shall be responsible to parliament for the program of
government.
The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the
executive and legislature shall be one and the same, such that parliament
will be the paramount governing institution. What this implies is that there
will be no separation between the law-making and enforcement powers of
the state, that are traditionally delineated between the executive and
legislature in a presidential form of government. Necessarily, the checks and
balances inherent in the fundamental plan of our U.S.-style presidential
system will be eliminated. The workings of government shall instead be
controlled by the internal political dynamics prevailing in the parliament.
Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers

among the three branches of government. The legislature is generally
limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws
and the judiciary to the application of laws. This separation is intended to
prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group that might lead
to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our
republican institutions. In the words of Justice Laurel, the doctrine of
separation of powers is intended to secure action, to forestall overaction, to
prevent despotism and obtain efficiency.19
In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal

institutional checks on the legislative and executive powers of the state,
since both the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet are drawn
from parliament. There are no effective limits to what the Prime Minister and
parliament can do, except the will of the parliamentary majority. This goes
against the central principle of our present constitutional scheme that
distributes the powers of government and provides for counteraction among
the three branches. Although both the presidential and parliamentary
systems are theoretically consistent with constitutional democracy, the
underlying tenets and resulting governmental framework are nonetheless
radically different.
Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of

government cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic change. It will
require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a re-
orientation in the cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional set-up. As
explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a switch from the presidential system
to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact
on the entire constitutional structure.20 It cannot, by any standard, be
deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific

and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an
amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific
portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and
plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications for
the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they
should be altered.21 (Underscoring supplied)
The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise

shows the intention of the proponents to effect even more far-reaching
changes in our fundamental law. If the original intent were to simply shift the
form of government to the parliamentary system, then there would have
been no need for the calling out of a constituent assembly to propose further
amendments to the Constitution. It should be noted that, once convened, a
constituent assembly can do away and replace any constitutional provision
which may not even have a bearing on the shift to a parliamentary system of
government. The inclusion of such a proposal reveals the proponents' plan
to consider all provisions of the constitution, either to determine which of its
provisions should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document
should be replaced with an entirely new one.
Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by the
alleged people's initiative. The proposal to convene a constituent
assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize the
future of the entire Constitution and place it on shaky grounds. The plan of
the proponents, as reflected in their proposed changes, goes beyond the
shifting of government from the presidential to the parliamentary system.
Indeed, it could even extend to the "fundamental nature of our state as a
democratic and republican state."
To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of
government is therefore a fallacy. To repeat, the combined effect of the
proposed changes to Articles VI and VII and those pertaining to the
Transitory Provisions under Article XVIII indubitably establish the intent and
plan of the proponents to possibly affect even the constitutions of liberty and
sovereignty. Indeed, no valid reason exists for authorizing further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution if the intention of the proposed
changes is truly what it purports to be.
There is no question here that only amendments to the Constitution may be

undertaken through a people's initiative and not a revision, as textually
reflected in the Constitution itself. This conclusion is inevitable especially
from a comparative examination of Section 2 in relation to Sections 1 and 4
of Article XVII, which state:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution

may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its

Members; or
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five
years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter.

of this right.
xxxx
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this

Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval
of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when

ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the certification by the Commission of Elections of the sufficiency
of the petition. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the
Constitution is limited to amendments and does not include a revision
thereof. Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to provide for Section 2
to distinguish its scope from the rights vested in Congress under Section 1.
The latter lucidly states that Congress may propose both amendments and
a revision of the Constitution by either convening a constituent assembly or
calling for a constitutional convention. Section 2, on the other hand, textually
commits to the people the right to propose only amendments by direct
action.
To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments

amounting to revision obliterates the clear distinction in scope
between Sections 1 and 2. The intention, as may be seen from a cursory
perusal of the above provisions, is to provide differing fields of application for
the three modes of effecting changes to the Constitution. We need not even
delve into the intent of the constitutional framers to see that the distinction in
scope is definitely marked. We should thus apply these provisions with a
discerning regard for this distinction. Again, McFadden22 is instructive:
". . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words;

more accurately it is between two procedures and between their
respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow
elementary principles of statutory construction, must be
understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be x x
x a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two
words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only
a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its
procedure. The people of this state have spoken; they made it
clear when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment
relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a
constitutional convention as a protection against improvident or
hasty (or any other) revision, that they understood that there was
a real difference between amendment and revision. We find
nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative amendment of
1911 (art. IV, § 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference. On
the contrary, the distinction appears to be x x x scrupulously
preserved by the express declaration in the amendment x x x that
the power to propose and vote on "amendments to the
Constitution" is reserved directly to the people in initiative
proceedings, while leaving unmentioned the power and the
procedure relative to constitutional revision, which revisional
power and procedure, it will be remembered, had already been
specifically treated in section 2 of article XVIII. Intervenors'
contention--that any change less than a total one is but
amendatory--would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark
so carefully erected and preserved. Each situation involving the
question of amendment, as contrasted with revision, of the
Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its own facts."
Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the
1987 Constitution, with the provisions on amendments and revisions under
Article XVII. The voice and will of our people cannot be any clearer when
they limited people's initiative to mere amendments of the fundamental law
and excluded revisions in its scope. In this regard, the task of the Court is to
give effect to the people's voice, as expressed unequivocally through the
Constitution.
Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a "constitution of

sovereignty" because it defines the constitutional meaning of "sovereignty of
the people." It is through these provisions that the sovereign people have
allowed the expression of their sovereign will and have canalized their
powers which would otherwise be plenary. By approving these provisions,
the sovereign people have decided to limit themselves and future
generations in the exercise of their sovereign power.23 They are thus bound
by the constitution and are powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or
thwart its mandates, except through the means prescribed by the
Constitution itself.24
It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the
Constitution through people's initiative because their representatives, whose
power is merely delegated, may do so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may
be considered as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of
amendment and revision to Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a self-
limitation on that sovereign power. In the words of Cooley:
x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated

the exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they
have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They
retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful to
do so, a power to control the governments they create, and the
three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered,
directed, changed or abolished by them. But this control and
direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously
agreed upon. The voice of the people, acting in their sovereign
capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the times
and under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed
and pointed out by the Constitution, or which, consistently with the
Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for them by
statute; and if by any portion of the people, however large, an
attempt should be made to interfere with the regular working of
the agencies of government at any other time or in any other
mode than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or
statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must be
resisted and repressed by the officers who, for the time being,
represent legitimate government.25 (Underscoring supplied)
Consequently, there is here no case of "the spring rising above its source."
Nor is it one where the people's sovereign power has been relegated to a
lesser plane than that of Congress. In choosing to exercise self-limitation,
there is no absence or lack of even a fraction of the sovereign power of the
people since self-limitation itself is an expression of that sovereign
power. The people have chosen to delegate and limit their sovereign power
by virtue of the Constitution and are bound by the parameters that they
themselves have ordained. Otherwise, if the people choose to defy their
self-imposed constitutional restraints, we will be faced with a revolutionary
situation.26
It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and

republican state.27 Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of direct
democracy, we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are
a constitutional democracy. To uphold direct democracy at the expense of
the fundamental law is to sanction, not a constitutional, but an extra-
constitutional recourse. This is clearly beyond the powers of the Court who,
by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and keeper of the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No.

174153.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. NO. 174153
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO TOGETHER WITH

6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), petitioners-
intervenors,
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO
BAYA, petitioners-intervenors,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION
(PTGWO) AND VICTORINO F. BALAIS,petitioners-intervenors,
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL
L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE AND
CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., oppositors-intervenors,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., oppositor-intervenor,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, oppositor-intervenor,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL
BISHOPS FROUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,LEONARDO
SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, AND DR.
REGINALD PAMUGAS, oppositors-intervenors,
LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, oppositors-intervenors,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
F.ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS AND
AMADO GAT INCION, oppositors-intervenors,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR. AND
SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P.
EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM, AND
PANFILO M. LACSON, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND PWERSA NG MASANG
PILIPINO, oppositors-intervenors,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY AND CEBU
CHAPTER, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA KARINA A.
LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR AND RANDALL C.
TABAYOYONG, oppostors-intervenors,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
MANUEL VILLAR, JR., oppositor-intervenor;
G.R. NO. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. AND RENE A. Q.

SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. AND COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION
Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR. ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE
V. SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
CONCURRING OPINION
SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:
Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution
should be exercised in choosing one's battlecry, lest it does more harm than
good to one's cause. In its original context, the complete version of this Latin
phrase means exactly the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It
originated from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne,
"nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas
vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit," meaning, "And those people should
not be listened to who keep on saying, 'The voice of the people is the
voice of God,' since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close
to madness."1 Perhaps, it is by providence that the true meaning of the
Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies – that they may
reflect upon the sincerity and authenticity of their "people's initiative."
History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of
God. Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and oppressions justified – all
these transpired as man boasted of God's imprimatur. Today, petitioners and
their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people's
initiative is the "voice of the people" and, therefore, the "voice of God."
After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that
man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating
the voice of God. It is against this kind of genius that the Court must guard
itself.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the power
of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

once every five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the

exercise of this right.
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court
by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled "Miriam Defensor
Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA),
respondents."2 The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325. On March 19,
1997, this Court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, holding that
Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is
"incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned."
A majority of eight (8) Justices fully concurred with this ruling, while five (5)
subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule
on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.
On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered
their positions. One (1) filed an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the
minority opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who
participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion,
while the other six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.3
A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a

similar case, entitled People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections4 on the ground that the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed PIRMA's Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the
Constitution "it appearing that that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of the Court in G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago
v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of
June 10, 1997." Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to re-
examine its ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735.
Another Justice concurred, but on the different premise that the case at bar
is not the proper vehicle for such re-examination. Five (5) Justice opined
otherwise.
This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the
Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), have gathered
signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the Constitution,
which entail a change in the form of government from bicameral-
presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended

to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be

vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as
many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned
among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at
least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory, and each province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the
election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto,
and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term
of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except
those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by
law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the
total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

are hereby amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of

State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime
Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister
shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament
from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the
Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the

bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall

serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day
of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under
the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of
all the members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal

from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice
President shall succeed as President. In case of death,
permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the
incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime
Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime
Minister under Article VII as amended.

renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26,
unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of
government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform
with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided,
however, that any and all references therein to "Congress,"
"Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress"
shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references
therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of
Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or
"Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby be
amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby
deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14,
unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which
case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a
unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided,
shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references
therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of
the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as
"Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read
"Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these

amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the
Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and
shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and
the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of
executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a

Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a
ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall
preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime
Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a
majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from
among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members

of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments,
the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to,
or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of
local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief

Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the
interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected
by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime
Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform
such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by
the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials.
The duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and
perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim
Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right
hand portion is the abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as
follows:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII

of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from
the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary
system of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency,
simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article
XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system
to another?
On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein

petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the
Constitution.5 Five (5) days thereafter, they filed an Amended Petition
alleging that they are filing the petition in their own behalf and together
with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their
signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that
the signatures of registered voters appearing on the signature sheets,
constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the
country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per
cent (3%) of all the registered voters, were verified by their respective city or
municipal election officers.
Several organizations opposed the petition. 6
In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to
the petition, citing as basis this Court's ruling in Santiago, permanently
enjoining it "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system."
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that this
Court set aside the COMELEC Resolution and direct the latter tocomply with
Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 4 x x x

the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency
of the petition.
I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant
the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here,
petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be
required to show why they should not be punished for contempt7 of court for
disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.
I
Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the
resolution of the present petition hinges on this singular issue -- did the
COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino, et
al.'s petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this
Court's Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?
In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved,
still, the ultimate yardstick is the attendance of "grave abuse of discretion"
on the part of the COMELEC.
Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be

considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.8
The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition

for initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot,
in any way, be characterized as "capricious or whimsical," "patent and
gross," or "arbitrary and despotic." On the contrary, it was the most
prudent course to take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this Court
permanently enjoins respondent COMELEC "from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted." It
being a fact that Congress has not enacted a sufficient law, respondent
COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago. Otherwise, it is
vulnerable to a citation for contempt. As succinctly stated by Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in
the subsequent case of PIRMA vs. COMELEC:9
x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even
if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi.
Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court
of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot
constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA
petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other
mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and
would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and
contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final
arbiter of justiciable controversies.
It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns
supreme. All courts, tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-
judicial functions are obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has the
last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from
whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.10 As a
warning to lower court judges who would not adhere to its rulings, this Court,
in People v. Santos,11 held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his

mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine
promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or
against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter,
but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his
personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the
law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any
deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would
unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences,
delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here
said, a Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then
he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position
that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment
on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal
way to do that.
Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in

dismissing the petition of Lambino, et al. for it merely followed this Court's
ruling in Santiago.
Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,12 a unanimous Court implicitly

recognized that its ruling in Santiago is the established doctrine and that the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in invoking it, thus:

appearing that it only complied with the dispositions of this Court
in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
resolution on June 10, 1997.
Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the

COMELEC's obedience and respect to the pronouncement of this Court
in Santiago.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago
It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court

or eight (8) Justices (as against five (5) Justices) concurred in declaring R.A.
No. 6735 an insufficient law. When the motion for reconsideration was
denied via an equally-divided Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not mean that the
Decision was overturned. It only shows that the opposite view fails to muster
enough votes to modify or reverse the majority ruling. Therefore, the original
Decision was upheld.13 In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs.
Velasco,14 this Court ruled that the denial of a motion or reconsideration
signifies that the ground relied upon have been found, upon due
deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to
warrant a modification of the judgment or final order.
With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative,
petitioners persistently stress that the doctrine of stare decisis does not bar
its re-examination.
I am not convinced. The maxim stare decisis et non quieta

movere translates "stand by the decisions and disturb not what is
settled."15 As used in our jurisprudence, it means that "once this Court has
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which
the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy."16
There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare

decisis is a good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually justified by
arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law
and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his
treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one
set of litigants and the opposite way between another. 'If a group
of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same
decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate
cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against
me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the
same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently
would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast;
it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my
rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than
the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed
administration of justice in the courts.17
That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be
appreciated by considering the observation of American philosopher William
K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two

similar individuals in similar circumstances and one of them
is treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of
injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group;
and unless that agent or group can establish that there is some
relevant dissimilarity after all between the individuals concerned
and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as charged.18
Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if
need be, overruling prior decisions, "It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential
policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though
the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current
justices. This policy x x x 'is based on the assumption that certainty,
predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the
legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct
and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the
governing rules of law.19 Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent
faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to
a number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature and
extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or
inconsistency with other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to
discharge their task.
Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or

more than nine (9) years ago. During that span of time, the Filipino people,
specifically the law practitioners, law professors, law students, the entire
judiciary and litigants have recognized this Court's Decision as a precedent.
In fact, the Santiago doctrine was applied by this Court in the subsequent
case of PIRMA. Even the legislature has relied on said Decision, thus,
several bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure the
deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or set aside merely
on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al. Indeed, this Court's conclusion
in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned remains a precedent and must be upheld.
III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute revisions and not
mere amendments
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment
and revision. Thus:
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution

may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its

members; or
(2) A Constitutional Convention.

votes, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as

means by which the people can directly propose changes to the
Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Thus, under these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the
distinction between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by a
uniform process. This is not so under our present Constitution. The
distinction between an amendment and a revision becomes crucial because
only amendments are allowed under the system of people's
initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a
vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that

Section 2, Article XVII covers only amendments, thus:
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing initiative. This
is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report.
With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
voters.

matter of initiative which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section
1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution,
so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished

proponent of the amendment yield to a few questions?
MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davide's

proposed amendment on line I refers to "amendments." Does
it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision?"
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and

"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments"
not "revision"
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.20
Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments,

it is imperative to examine whether petitioners' proposed changes partake of
the nature of amendments, not revisions.
The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought
to amend the following provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and
4 of Article VII (The Executive Department). It further includes Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from
the bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of
government.
Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from

bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the
present Congress of the Philippines to an Interim National Assembly;
change in the terms of Members of Parliament; and the election of a Prime
Minister who shall be vested with executive power.
Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of

amendments, hence, within the coverage of a "people's initiative."
I disagree.
The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, characterized an
amendment and a revision to the Constitution as follows:

dangerous. In revision however, the guiding original intention
and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire
document, or of provisions of the document which have over-
all implications for the document to determine how and to
what extent they should be altered.21
Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction

between the two must be based upon the degree of change contemplated.
In Kelly v. Laing,22 the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following
comparison of the two terms:
"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of

working changes in the charter, and are sometimes used in
exactly the same sense but there is an essential difference
between them.
"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a

redraft without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or
structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a
constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine the
whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument
whether the desired changes from the old are few or
many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan
and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish
its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change,
while amendment is a correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's
form of government may be accomplished by a process of "amendment,"
the cases which so hold seem to involve statutes which only distinguish
between amendment and totally new charters.23 However, as in Maine law,
where the statute authorizing the changes distinguishes between "charter
amendment" and "charter revision," it has been held that "(a) change in the
form of government of a home rule city may be made only by revision
of the city charter, not by its amendment."24
In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and
scheme would probably be interpreted as a "revision" and should be
achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation.
Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes appear to cover

isolated and specific provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it
becomes clear that the proposed changes will alter the very structure of
our government and create multifarious ramifications. In other words,
the proposed changes will have a "domino effect" or, more appropriately,
"ripple effect" on other provisions of the Constitution.
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the

people to effect changes in the Constitution includes the power to amend
anysection in such a manner that the proposed change, if approved,
would "be complete within itself, relate to one subject and not
substantially affect any other section or article of the Constitution or
require further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its
purpose."25 This is clearly not the case here.
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government

affects the well-enshrined doctrine of separation of powers of government,
embodied in our Constitution, by providing for an Executive, Legislative and
Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary form of government, the Executive
Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect support of
the Parliament, as expressed through a "vote of confidence." To my mind,
this doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of
our Constitution, that any change affecting such doctrine must
necessarily be a revision.
In McFadden vs. Jordan,26 the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be

accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised
constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose x x
x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed initiative
measure now before us is so broad that if such measure
became law a substantial revision of our present state
Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is
first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x.
Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is

not a mere amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams
v. Gunter27:
The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968

Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects
not only many other provisions of the Constitution but
provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since
the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is
basic in the American form of government. It would not only
radically change the whole pattern of the government in this
state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but
would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on
government.
Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than
amendments, especially, with the inclusion of the following "omnibus
provision":

bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamnetary form of
government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory
Provisions" which shall read, as follows:
xxxxxxxxx

President and Vice-President, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3
and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby
amended x x x x x x and all other Sections of Article VII shall be
retained and numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up
to 14,unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof,
in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to
conform to a unicameral Parliamentary system of
government x x x x x x .
xxxxxxxxx
Section 4. (1) x x x

the Interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to,
or revisions of, this Constitution, consistent with the principles of
The above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple effect" on the other
provisions of the Constitution to make them conform to the qualities of
unicameral-parliamentary form of government. With one sweeping stroke,
these proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of the
Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the Court
to be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional
convention. I quote the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the

various and many articles and sections of our present Constitution
which would be affected, replaced or repealed. It purports only to
add one new article but its framers found it necessary to include
the omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any
section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution
is in conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such section,
subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such
conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the
proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if
such measure become law a substantial revision of our present
state Constitution would be be effected, then the measure may
not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is
first agreed upon by a constitutional convention.28
Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere

amendments which will only affect the Articles or Sections sought to be
changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions which will affect
considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the alteration of our
form of government. The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation
since these are connected or "interlocked" with the other provisions of our
Constitution. Accordingly, it has been held that: "If the changes attempted
are so sweeping that it is necessary to include the provisions
interlocking them, then it is plain that the plan would constitute a
recasting of the whole Constitution and this, we think, it was intended
to be accomplished only by a convention under Section 2 which has
not yet been disturbed."29
I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature
of a revision of the Constitution, then they cannot be the subject of an
initiative. On this matter, Father Bernas expressed this insight:
But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments?

The answer, which one can easily glean from the rather long
deliberation on initiative and referendum in the 1986
Constitutional Commission, is practicality. In other words, who is
to formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision,
as concretely being proposed now, is nothing less than a
rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional structure. Who
were involved in formulating the structure? What debates
ensued? What records are there for future use in interpreting the
provisions which may be found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional

Convention, decisions are reached after much purifying debate.
And while the deliberations proceed, the public has the
opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an
authorized body has been completed that it is presented to the
electorate for final judgment. Careful debate is important
because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it
even sight unseen.30
IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People's initiative
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

once every five years thereafter,

exercise of this right.
On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an

enabling law is imperative for its implementation. Thus, Congress enacted
R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision.
However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for
being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned.
The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A.
No. 6735. Congress neither amended it nor passed a new law to supply its
deficiencies.
Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn,

enumerating three (3) justifications why R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a
sufficient law, thus:
1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the

right of people to initiate changes to the Constitution;
2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear

intent of the lawmakers to use it as instrument to implement the
people's initiative; and
3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735

demonstrate the legislative intent to use it as instrument to
implement people's initiative.
I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.
A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers
only initiatives on national and local legislation. Its references to initiatives
on the Constitution are few, isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the
initiatives on national and local legislation, where R.A. No. 6735 provides a
detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their
implementation,31 however, as regards initiative on the Constitution, the law
merely:
(a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;32
(b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the

enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3;33
(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition

in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by
the people;34
(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of

voters who should sign the petition;35 and
(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved

proposition.36
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative
on the Constitution may be accomplished. This is not the enabling law
contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor
Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in
Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress
providing for a complete and adequate process for people's initiative, such
as:
· Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be

registered voters;
· A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part

thereof sought to be amended and the proposed amendment;
· The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a

petition by any individual, group, political party or coalition with
members in the congressional district;
· The language used: the petition should be printed in English and

translated in the local language;
· Signature stations to be provided for;
· Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is,

after the signatures shall have been verified by the Commission,
the verified signatures shall be posted for at least thirty days in the
respective municipal and city halls where the signatures were
obtained;
· Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the

authenticity of the signatures to be filed with the COMELEC and
decided within sixty (60) days from the filing of said protest.
None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus,
demonstrating its incompleteness and inadequacy.
V
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative
VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does not Comply
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6735
I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and
inseparable. The determination of whether petitioners are proper parties to
file the petition for initiative in behalf of the alleged 6.3 million voters will
require an examination of whether they have complied with the
provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise

be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.

of this right. (Underscoring supplied)
The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and

categorical. For a people's initiative to prosper, the following requisites
must be present:
1. It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose"

"amendments" to the Constitution;
2. The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition

voters;" and
3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered

voters "must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters" of "every legislative district."
In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.
The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners
Lambino and Aumentado, two registered voters. As shown in
the "Verification/Certification with Affidavit of Non-Forum
Shopping" contained in their petition, they alleged under oath that they have
caused the preparation of the petition in their personal capacity as
registered voters "and as representatives" of the supposed 6.3 million
registered voters. This goes to show that the questioned petition was not
initiated directly by the 6.3 million people who allegedly comprised at least
12% of the total number of registered voters, as required by Section 2.
Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself could be found the signatures
of the 6.3 million registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners
Lambino and Aumentado were affixed therein "as representatives" of those
6.3 million people. Certainly, that is not the petition for people's
initiative contemplated by the Constitution.
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file

the petition "as representatives" of the alleged 6.3 million registered
voters. Such act of representation is constitutionally proscribed. To
repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the Constitution shall
be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters."
Obviously, the phrase "directly proposed by the people" excludes any
person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of
registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon the people the right
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be
usurped by anyone under the guise of being the people's representative.
Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation. For it is
only "the people" (comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who are
the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution. Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein
petitioners Lambino and Aumentado is not a people's initiative. Necessarily,
it must fail.
Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should "hear" and "heed" "the people's
voice" is baseless and misleading. There is no people's voice to be heard
and heeded as this petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of
petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their allies.
VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue

that: (1) "the validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to
amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six
million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for initiative is
a purely political question;" and (2) "[t]he power to propose amendments
to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people.
Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose
amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls
squarely within the ambit of a political question."
The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the US Supreme

Court in Luther v. Borden.37 Faced with the difficult question of whether the
Supreme Court was the appropriate institution to define the substantive
content of republicanism, the US Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty in every State resides in
the people, as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the
circumstances of the case, a political question to be settled by the
political power." In other words, the responsibility of settling certain
constitutional questions was left to the legislative and executive branches of
the government.
The Luther case arose from the so-called "Dorr Rebellion" in the State of
Rhode Island. Due to increased migration brought about by the Industrial
Revolution, the urban population of Rhode Island increased. However,
under the 1663 Royal Charter which served as the State Constitution, voting
rights were largely limited to residents of the rural districts. This severe mal-
apportionment of suffrage rights led to the "Dorr Rebellion." Despairing of
obtaining remedies for their disenfranchisement from the state government,
suffrage reformers invoked their rights under the American Declaration of
Independence to "alter or abolish" the government and to institute a new
one. The reformers proceeded to call for and hold an extralegal
constitutional convention, drafted a new State Constitution, submitted the
document for popular ratification, and held elections under it. The State
government, however, refused to cede power, leading to an anomalous
situation in that for a few months in 1842, there were two opposing state
governments contending for legitimacy and possession of state of offices.
The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered and
searched the house of Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter. He brought suit
against Luther Borden, a militiaman. Before the US Supreme Court, Luther's
counsel argued that since the State's archaic Constitution prevented a fair
and peaceful address of grievances through democratic processes, the
people of Rhode Island had instead chosen to exercise their inherent right in
popular sovereignty of replacing what they saw as an oppressive
government. The US Supreme Court deemed the controversy as non-
justiciable and inappropriate for judicial resolution.
In Colgrove v. Green,38 Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase

"political thicket" to describe situations where Federal courts should not
intervene in political questions which they have neither the competence nor
the commission to decide. In Colgrove, the US Supreme Court, with a
narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment of legislative districts in Illinois
"as a political question and that the invalidation of the districts might,
in requiring statewide elections, create an evil greater than that sought
to be remedied."
While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's "political thicket,"
nonetheless, it has sought to come up with a definition of the term "political
question." Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,39 this Court ruled that properly, political
questions are "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government." In Tañada and Macapagal v.
Cuenco,40 the Court held that the term political question connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of
a particular measure.
In Aquino v. Enrile,41 this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down
in Baker v. Carr42 in determining whether a question before it is political,
rather than judicial in nature, to wit:
1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of

the issue to a coordinate political department; or
2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable

standards for resolving it; or
3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an

initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or
4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an

independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due the
coordinate branches of government; or
5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a

political decision already made; or
6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from

multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this
Court. Accordingly, the issues are justiciable. What is at stake here is the
legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this Court
are political in nature, it is not precluded from resolving them under its
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, following Daza v. Singson.43 As pointed out in Marcos v.
Manglapus,44 the present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial power which the Court, under
previous charters, would have normally and ordinarily left to the political
departments to decide.
CONCLUSION
In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view

that the so-called people's initiative to amend our Constitution from
bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an
initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our politicians. It has not
been shown by petitioners, during the oral arguments in this case, that the
6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures understood what
they signed. In fact, petitioners admitted that the Constitutional provisions
sought to be amended and the proposed amendments were not explained
to all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means of knowing, to
the point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what petitioners
and their group asked them to sign.
Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary.45 The Court then ruled that "This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect," although it had notice that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by
the people in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded,
among others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies "was and
is null and void ab initio." That was during martial law when perhaps majority
of the justices were scared of the dictator. Luckily at present, we are not
under a martial law regime. There is, therefore, no reason why this Court
should allow itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by the so-called
people's initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves in power.
At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our
present government structure. Consequent1y, we must not change it.
America has a presidential type of government. Yet, it thrives ideally and has
become a super power. It is then safe to conclude that what we should
change are some of the people running the government, NOT the
SYSTEM.
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more

efficient, more economical and more responsive government.
Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable,
may be elected as members and leaders of the unicameral-parliament? Or
will the present members of the Lower House continue to hold their
respective positions with limitless terms?
Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and
the marginalized? Will it be able to provide homes for the homeless, food for
the hungry, jobs for the jobless and protection for the weak?
This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before us is crucial
with transcendental significance. And history will judge us on how we
resolve this issue – shall we allow the revision of our Constitution, of which
we are duty bound to guard and revere, on the basis of a doubtful people's
initiative?
Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or

structure is a herculean task affecting the entire Filipino people and the
future generations. Let us, therefore, entrust this duty to more
knowledgeable people elected as members of a Constitutional Convention.
Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the
circumstances in this case, the voice of God is not audible.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and

to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with

6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
G.R. No. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q.

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE
V. SARMIENTO, and JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) did not commit an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the
amended petition before it. The proposals of petitioners incorporated in said
amended petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the
amended petition before the respondent COMELEC is insufficient in
substance.
The Antecedents
On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado

filed with the COMELEC a petition entitled "IN THE MATTER OF
PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO
A UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING
ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM." The case was docketed as EM (LD)-06-01.
On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed an amended petition. For brevity, it is
referred to as the petition for initiative.
Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their petition in their own
behalf and together with those who have affixed their signatures to the
signature sheets appended thereto who are Filipino citizens, residents and
registered voters of the Philippines, and they constitute at least twelve
percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each
legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the
registered voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is
based on their constitutional right to propose amendments to the 1987
Constitution by way of people's initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article
XVII thereof, which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

years thereafter.

of this right."
According to petitioners, while the above provision states that "(T)he
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right,"
the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of Republic Act
(RA) 6735,1are sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the
power. The said sections of RA 6735 state:
Sec. 5. Requirements. – (a) To exercise the power x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have

at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered
voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be

enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred

(100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the
top of every page of the petition.
xxxx
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall

verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters,
voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.
They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and
obligation to give due course to the petition for initiative, in compliance with
the constitutional directive for the COMELEC to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall."2
Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they

proposed to be incorporated in the 1987 Constitution and prayed that the
COMELEC issue an order:
1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4,

Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at

least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later

than ninety days after the Certification by this Honorable
Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the Filipino
people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable
in the premises.
The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution

denying due course and dismissing the petition for initiative. The COMELEC
ruled that:
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the

solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other

provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be

directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x.

exercise of this right."
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self-

executory provision needed an enabling law for its
implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the
constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted
RA 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v.

Commission on Elections struck down the said law for being
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission

should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted
to provide for the implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet

the required minimum per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, still
the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court
categorically declared RA 6735 as inadequate to cover the system
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental

importance of the right of the people under a system of initiative.
However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of
the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this
right of the people remains nothing but an "empty right," and that
this Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. (Citations omitted.)
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition

for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Petitioners' Case
In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that:
I.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO
THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED
SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME
COURT EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS
RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997,
NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO DECLARE
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE
AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735,

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF
THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND
AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE,
THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE
AND COMPLETE.
III.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY
VIOLATING AN EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND
DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE.
A.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT

APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE
FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.
1.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED

TO GIVE THE PEOPLE THE POWER TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES
ARE NOW GIVING VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING

OF 19 MARCH 1997, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE
TO EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF
INITIATIVE AND RECALL HAS BEEN INVARIABLY
UPHELD
3.
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE

AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH
SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE
SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED

TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE DULY VERIFIED
BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE
CHOSEN TO PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE
OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.
B.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT

APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE
FILED BY THE PETITIONERS
C.
THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V.

COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO THE DELFIN PETITION.
1.
IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION

AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS IN THE BODY OF
THE DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN
CONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR

NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY MANDATED BY
LAW.
A.
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET

THE INITIATIVE FOR PLEBISCITE.3
Petitioners Failed to Allege and Demonstrate All the Essential

Facts To Establish the Right to a Writ of Certiorari
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the

judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set
out in the petition and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law. x x x4
The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was
exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must
be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the
very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with
centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.5
There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it
acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise
of its judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough.6 The only question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or
excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.7 An error of
judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal.8
In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the

COMELEC that it denied the petition for initiative solely in obedience to the
mandate of this Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elections.9 In said case,
the Court En Banc permanently enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining
or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the system. When the COMELEC denied the
petition for initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress to
provide for the implementation of the system.
It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying
due course to the petition for initiative as "capricious, despotic, oppressive
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." In
fact, in so doing, the COMELEC merely followed or applied, as it ought to
do, the Court's ruling in Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on the system of initiative is a non self-executory provision
and requires an enabling law for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA
6735 was found by the Court to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to implement the constitutional provision on
initiative. Consequently, the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system." The decision of
the Court En Banc interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the
Philippines.10 And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc
may be modified or reversed except by the Court En Banc,11 certainly not by
the COMELEC. Until the Court En Banc modifies or reverses its decision,
the COMELEC is bound to follow the same.12 As succinctly held in
Fulkerson v. Thompson:13
Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered

as finally settled. The inferior court is bound by the judgment or
decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution
according to the mandate. The inferior court cannot vary it, or
judicially examine it for any other purpose than execution. It can
give no other or further relief as to any matter decided by the
Supreme Court even where there is error apparent; or in any
manner intermeddle with it further than to execute the mandate
and settle such matters as have been remanded, not adjudicated
by the Supreme Court….
The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively

established by the authority of adjudged cases. And any further
departure from them would inevitably mar the harmony of the
whole judiciary system, bring its parts into conflict, and produce
therein disorganization, disorder, and incalculable mischief and
confusion. Besides, any rule allowing the inferior courts to
disregard the adjudications of the Supreme Court, or to refuse or
omit to carry them into execution would be repugnant to the
principles established by the constitution, and therefore void.14
At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as well as the
pronouncement made by the Court therein. Like petitioners in the instant
case, in Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin, the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), et al., invoked Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution as they filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, By People's Initiative"
(the Delfin petition). They asked the COMELEC to issue an order fixing the
time and date for signature gathering all over the country; causing the
necessary publications of said order and their petition in newspapers of
general and local circulation and instructing municipal election registrars in
all regions all over the country and to assist petitioners in establishing
signing stations. Acting thereon, the COMELEC issued the order prayed for.
Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for
prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its order. The Court,
speaking through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted
the petition as it declared:
1. RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and

concerned";
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 230015 invalid insofar as it prescribed rules

Constitution because the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate the
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative; and
3. The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of
signatures of registered voters.
The Court concluded in Santiago that "the COMELEC should be

permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition
for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of

initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the

Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS

the Delfin petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996

is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but
is LIFTED as against private respondents.16
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another petition which was filed
with the Court by PIRMA and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa
(who were parties in Santiago) docketed as PIRMA v. Commission on
Elections.17 The said petitioners, undaunted by Santiago and claiming to
have gathered 5,793,213 signatures, filed a petition with the COMELEC
praying, inter alia, that COMELEC officers be ordered to verify all the
signatures collected in behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that it
(COMELEC) declare the petition sufficient for the purpose of scheduling a
plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Like the Delfin petition in Santiago, the
PIRMA petition proposed to submit to the people in a plebiscite the
amendment to the Constitution on the lifting of the term limits of elected
officials.
The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the
Court in PIRMA has no basis. The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8,
1997, dismissed the PIRMA petition citing the permanent restraining order
issued against it by the Court in Santiago. PIRMA and the spouses Pedrosa
forthwith elevated the matter to the Court alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over, and
thereby dismissing, their petition for initiative to amend the Constitution.
The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by

PIRMA and the spouses Albert Pedrosa. The Court declared that the
COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in the decision of the
Court in Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave
abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition before it:

Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March
19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was

need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners,
namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735.
On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the
Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan
and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug,
J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said
second issue since the case a bar is not the proper vehicle for
that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo,
Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that
there was need for such a re-examination. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.18 (Underscoring

supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side
of petitioners and argues that the COMELEC should not have applied the
ruling in Santiago to the petition for initiative because the permanent
injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses
this argument by pointing out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated
December 18, 1996 that was made permanent in the dispositive portion
referred only to the Delfin petition.
The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the
Court's decision in Santiago is futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive
portion must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions
of the decision of which it forms a part. To get to the true intent and meaning
of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same
must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and
does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in
the fallo thereof.19
The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago permanently

enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
system" is thus as much a part of the Court's decision as its dispositive
portion. The ruling of this Court is of the nature of an in rem judgment
barring any and all Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in denying due course to the
present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution conformably
with the Court's ruling in Santiago did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
On the contrary, its actuation is in keeping with the salutary principle of
hierarchy of courts. For the Court to find the COMELEC to have abused its
discretion when it dismissed the amended petition based on the ruling of this
Court in Santiago would be sheer judicial apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "there is only one Supreme Court
from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings."20 This
truism applies with equal force to the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for,
after all, judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution
"assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to
abide thereby but also of those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto."21
Petitioners Cannot Ascribe

Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in Santiago
It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court,
not the opinion of the minority, prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the
majority cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of
the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit

unconvincingly, that the Court's declaration therein on the inadequacy,
incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement the system of
initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not constitute the
majority opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,22 or

the majority of the members of the Court, who actually took part in the
deliberations thereon. On the other hand, five Justices,23 while voting for the
dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from
the majority opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient
to implement the system of initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices,
concurred in the decision in Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA
6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
concerned" constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of
the Santiago decision were denied with finality as only six Justices, or less
than the majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution expressly stated
that the motion for reconsideration failed "to persuade the requisite majority
of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977."24 In fine,
the pronouncement in Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19,
1997 remains the definitive ruling on the matter.
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve
the issue posed by them and to re-examine its ruling as regards RA 6735.
By a vote of seven members of the Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres,
Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was no need to
resolve the issue. Five members of the Court opined that there was a need
for the re-examination of said ruling. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court
in Santiago remains the law of the case and binding on petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the
Court in Santiago, the Court should have resolved to set aside its original
resolution dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for reconsideration
and the petition. But the Court did not. The Court positively and
unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the
Court in Santiago in dismissing the petition before it. No less than Senior
Justice Reynato S. Puno concurred with the resolution of the Court. It
behooved Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of the Court on the motion
for reconsideration of petitioners precisely on the ground that there was no
doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's right to directly
propose constitutional amendments through the system of initiative had
already been conclusively settled in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding
these decisions, several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General
Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he was then a member of the House of
Representatives,25 have filed separate bills to implement the system of
initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are
pending. In the Senate, the three (3) pending bills are: Senate Bill No. 119
entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution
introduced by Senator Luisa "Loi" P. Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189
entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution
introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247
entitled An Act Providing for a System of People's Initiative to Propose
Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills:
House Bill No. 05281 filed by Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No.
05017 filed by Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by
Representative Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026 filed by
Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House bills are similarly entitled An
Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills
uniformly recognize that there is, to date, no law to govern the process by
which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people directly
through the system of initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the
occurrence of any compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a law to
implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, that would warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it
behooves the Court to apply to the present case the salutary and well-
recognized doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier shown, Congress and other
government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court can do
no less with respect to its own ruling.
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of

a law cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members
who compose it – the Supreme Court, as an institution, has already
determined RA 6735 to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned" and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any
change in the Court's composition.26 Indeed, it is vital that there be stability
in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample
consideration. Parties should not be encouraged to seek re-examination of
determined principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with every
change in the expounders of it.27
Proposals to Revise the Constitution,

As in the Case of the Petitioners'
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its
pronouncement in Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken together with
other extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative, still, the
amended petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the denomination of
their petition, the proposals of petitioners to change the form of government
from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary
system of government are actually for the revision of the Constitution.
Petitioners propose to "amend" Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this

manner:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read

as follows:
"Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be

vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as
many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned
among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at
least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory, and each province must have at least one member.
"(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the
election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto,
and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term
of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except
those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by
law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the
total membership coming from the parliamentary districts."
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are
hereby amended to read, as follows:
"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of

State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime
Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister
shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament
from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the
Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-

Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there
shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which
shall read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall

serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day
of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under
the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of
all the members of the interim parliament.,
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal

from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice
President shall succeed as President. In case of death,
permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the
incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime
Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime
Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent

unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of
government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform
with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided,
"Senate," "House of Representatives" and "House of Congress,"
"Senator[s] or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" and
"House of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that
any and all references therein to "Member[s] of the House of
Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of
Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or
"Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent

3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby
amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby
deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which
case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a
unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided,
shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references
therein to "Member[s] of Congress," "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of
the House of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and of "Acting President" shall be changed to read
"Prime Minister."

amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the
Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and
shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and
the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of
executive departments.

Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a
ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall
preside over its session for the election of the interim Prime
Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a
majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from
among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members

of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.

the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to,
or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of
"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief

interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected
by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime
Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform
such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by
the incumbent President."
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. [Thereafter, the Vice-President, as Member of
Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall
initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the
Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its
members, from among themselves.] The duly-elected Prime
Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties
and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President.28
Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters

have been complied with, i.e., the signatories to the petition constitute
twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein
each legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all
the registered voters therein. Certifications allegedly executed by the
respective COMELEC Election Registrars of each municipality and city
verifying these signatures were attached to the petition for initiative. The
verification was allegedly done on the basis of the list of registered voters
contained in the official COMELEC list used in the immediately preceding
election.
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino

people in a plebiscite to be called for the said purpose reads:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND

VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM
TO THE OTHER?29
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII

would effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive
government. The parliamentary system would allegedly ensure harmony
between the legislative and executive branches of government, promote
greater consensus, and provide faster and more decisive governmental
action.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:
Article XVII

may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members;

or
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.
It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes
and procedures for proposals for the amendment and revision of the
Constitution:
1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of,

the Constitution may be proposed by –
a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
b. A constitutional convention.
2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution

may be likewise directly proposed by the people through initiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms "amendment"

and "revision" and provided for their respective modes and procedures for
effecting changes of the Constitution fully cognizant of the distinction
between the two concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez, the Chairman of
the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions, explained:
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is,
"amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed to use the
terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called
by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in
the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a
result of our research, we came up with the observations made in
the famous – or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the
decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he
made the following distinction between "amendment" and
"revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a
rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of
amending a constitution envisages a change of specific provisions
only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the
entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or
the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of
new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered
obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935

Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these
two terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article
governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.30
Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term

"revision" in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution because it was their
intention to reserve the power to propose a revision of the Constitution to
Congress or the constitutional convention. Stated in another manner, it was
their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not be undertaken through the
system of initiative. Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done
either by Congress or by a constitutional convention.
It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative

was included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The
original draft provided:
SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may

be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its

members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for

in Article __ Section __ of the Constitution.31
However, after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the

Commission agreed to remove the provision on the system of initiative from
Section 1 and, instead, put it under a separate provision, Section 2. It was
explained that the removal of the provision on initiative from the other
"traditional modes" of changing the Constitution was precisely to limit the
former (system of initiative) to amendments to the Constitution. It was
emphasized that the system of initiative should not extend to revision.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.

Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night,
we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:
voters.

matter of initiative, which came about because of the
in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of
initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article
on Amendment or Revision. x x x32
The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a mode that may be

undertaken through the system of initiative was reiterated and made clear
by Commissioner Suarez in response to a suggestion of Commissioner
Felicitas Aquino:
MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the

provisions of Section 4, except that in Section 4, as it is presently
drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day and 90-day
periods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative

mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution which would
further require the process of submitting it in a plebiscite, in which
case it is not self-executing.
MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off
period.
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing

this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another
separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified

contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to

distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to
include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation
to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by

the Committee.33
Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the
clarification with respect to the observation of Commissioner Regalado
Maambong:
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's

proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it
not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla
when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and

"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative
is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."34
After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following

wording of Section 2:
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE

DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER
THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION
NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:
Article XVII

may be proposed by:
(3) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members;

or
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.
The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a

substantial differentiation not only between the two terms but also between
two procedures and their respective fields of application. Ineluctably, the
system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII as a mode of effecting
changes in the Constitution is strictly limited to amendments – not to a
revision – thereof.
As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for

"amendment" and "revision" as different modes of changing the fundamental
law, were cognizant of the distinction between the two terms. They
particularly relied on the distinction made by Justice Felix Antonio in his
concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,35 the controversial
decision which gave imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as follows:
There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of

an existing constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of the
whole constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on the
other hand, envisages a change of only specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts of the
existing constitution of the addition of provisions deemed essential
as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts
already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the
times. The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the
1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.36
Other elucidation on the distinction between "amendment" and "revision" is

enlightening. For example, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, an eminent authority on
political law, distinguished the two terms in this manner:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves

provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the

is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to
add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed
conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or
dangerous, or misleading in their effect.37
In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board of

Trustees38 had the occasion to make the distinction between the two terms
with respect to Ga.L. 1945, an instrument which "amended" the 1877
Constitution of Georgia. It explained the term "amendment:"
"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not destruction.

It repeals or changes some provision, or adds something thereto.
A law is amended when it is in whole or in part permitted to
remain, and something is added to or taken from it, or it is in some
way changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to
fit it the better to accomplish the object or purpose for which it was
made, or some other object or purpose.39
On the other hand, the term "revision" was explained by the said US
appellate court:
x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is

erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired
and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the
materials contained in the old house may be used again, some of
the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter
the fact that you have altogether another or a new house. We
conclude that the instrument as contained in Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to
89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the constitution of 1877; but
on the contrary it is a completely revised or new constitution.40
Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional

Commission, expounded on the distinction between the two terms thus:

dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and
plan contemplate a re-examination of the entire document – or of
provisions of the document (which have overall implications for
the entire document or for the fundamental philosophical
underpinnings of the document) – to determine how and to what
extent it should be altered. Thus, for instance, a switch from the
presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure.
So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is

not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the
fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision. Hence, I
must reject the puerile argument that the use of the plural form of
"amendments" means that a revision can be achieved by the
introduction of a multiplicity of amendments!41
Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-
reaching effects on the Constitution, the framers thereof wisely withheld the
said mode from the system of initiative. It should be recalled that it took the
framers of the present Constitution four months from June 2, 1986 until
October 15, 1986 to come up with the draft Constitution which, as described
by the venerable Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the President of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, "gradually and painstakingly took shape
through the crucible of sustained sometimes passionate and often
exhilarating debates that intersected all dimensions of the national life." 42
Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision thereof

should, in like manner, be a product of the same extensive and intensive
study and debates. Consequently, while providing for a system of initiative
where the people would directly propose amendments to the Constitution,
they entrusted the formidable task of its revision to a deliberative body, the
Congress or Constituent Assembly.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the

principles upon which the government is founded, and regulating the
division of sovereign powers, directing to what persons each of those
powers is to be confided and the manner in which it is to be exercised.43 The
Philippines has followed the American constitutional legal system in the
sense that the term constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a
written organic instrument, under which governmental powers are both
conferred and circumscribed.44
The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An
overwhelming 16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes cast during the
plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the present Constitution on February 2,
1987.45 In expressing that will, the Filipino people have incorporated therein
the method and manner by which the same can be amended and revised,
and when the electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law the
particular manner in which the same may be altered or changed, then any
course which disregards that express will is a direct violation of the
fundamental law.46
Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution,

where the validity of a constitutional amendment or revision depends upon
whether such provisions have been complied with, such question presents
for consideration and determination a judicial question, and the courts are
the only tribunals vested with power under the Constitution to determine
such question.47
Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms
"amendment" and "revision," clearly makes a differentiation not only
between the two terms but also between two procedures and their
respective fields of application. On this point, the case of McFadden v.
Jordan48 is instructive. In that case, a "purported initiative amendment"
(referred to as the proposed measure) to the State Constitution of California,
then being proposed to be submitted to the electors for ratification, was
sought to be enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated as "California
Bill of Rights," comprised a single new article with some 208 subsections
which would repeal or substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of the
California State Constitution and add at least four new topics. Among the
likely effects of the proposed measure were to curtail legislative and judicial
functions, legalize gaming, completely revise the taxation system and
reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts. The proposed measure
also included diverse matters as ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor
control and naturopaths.
The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed

measure to the electors for ratification because it was not an "amendment"
but a "revision" which could only be proposed by a convention. It held that
from an examination of the proposed measure itself, considered in relation
to the terms of the California State Constitution, it was clear that the
proposed initiative enactment amounted substantially to an attempted
revision, rather than amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the
California State Constitution specifies (Article XVIII §2 thereof) that it may be
revised by means of constitutional convention but does not provide for
revision by initiative measure, the submission of the proposed measure to
the electorate for ratification must be enjoined.
As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court

in McFadden, the differentiation required (between amendment and
revision) is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between
two procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each
procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must
be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be a mere
alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must
be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field
of application appropriate to its procedure.49
Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in
the nature of safety-valves – they must not be so adjusted as to discharge
their peculiar function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary
escape-pipes of party passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge
it with such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is sufficient also
to explode the machine. Hence, the problem of the Constitution maker is, in
this particular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the
requisites for progress with the requisites for safety.50
Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the

Constitution is, despite its denomination, one for its revision. It purports to
seek the amendment only of Articles VI and VII of the Constitution as well as
to provide transitory provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the
amendment of these two provisions will necessarily affect other numerous
provisions of the Constitution particularly those pertaining to the specific
powers of Congress and the President. These powers would have to be
transferred to the Parliament and the Prime Minister and/or President, as
the case may be. More than one hundred (100) sections will be affected or
altered thereby:
1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress

to impose the death penalty for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes;
2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to

provide for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well
as a system for absentee voting;
3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;
4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;
5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):
- Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and

apportion the jurisdiction of various courts;
- Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the

qualifications of judges of lower courts;
- Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC)

which includes representatives of Congress as ex officio
members and on the power of the President to appoint the
regular members of the JBC;
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the

members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts;
- Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report

to the President and Congress.
6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional

Commissions);
- (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make

annual report to the President and Congress;
- (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for

the standardization of compensation of government officials;
- (B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer

shall accept, without the consent of Congress, any present,
emolument, etc. x x x"
- (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the

Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments;
- (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to

recommend to Congress measures to minimize election
spending x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to

recommend to the President the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to

the President and Congress a report on the conduct of
election, plebiscite, etc.;
- (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the

favorable recommendation of the COMELEC, to grant
pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules and regulations;
- (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor

of organization registered under party-list system;
- (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions

under the party-list system;
- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint

the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on
Audit (COA) with the consent of the Commission of
Appointments;
- Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the

President and Congress.
7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local

government code;
- Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general

supervision over local government units (LGUs);
- Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources

of income x x x, subject to such guidelines as Congress may
provide;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special

metropolitan political subdivisions;
- Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for
regional development councils x x x;
- Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise

general supervision over autonomous regions;
- Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act

for each autonomous region as well as the power of the
President to appoint the representatives to the regional
consultative commission;
- Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under

the Constitution to pass the organic act for autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public

Officers):
- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-

President, etc.);
- Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of

the House to initiate complaint and sole power of the Senate
to try and decide impeachment cases);
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the

Ombudsman and his deputies;
- Section 16 which provides in part that "x x x no loans or

guaranty shall be granted to the President, Vice-President,
etc.
- Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities

by public officials including the President, Vice-President,
etc.
9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and
Patrimony):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-

scale utilization of natural resources and power of the
President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations and duty to notify Congress of every contract;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of

lands of public domain;
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific

limits of forest lands;
- Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for

applicability of customary laws;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an

independent economic and planning agency to be headed by
the President;
- Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino

citizens or domestic corporations(at least 60% Filipino-
owned) certain areas of investment;
- Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant

franchise for public utilities;
- Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency

to promote viability of cooperatives;
- Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except

by general law, form private corporations;
- Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President,

etc. and the power of Congress to adjust the same;
- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central
monetary authority.
10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and

Human Rights):
- Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest

priority to enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of people x x x
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention

limits in agrarian reform;
- Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human

Rights to recommend to Congress effective measures to
promote human rights;
- Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other

cases to fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Human Rights.
11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and

Technology, etc.):
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino

equity participation in educational institutions;
- Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as

Congress may provide, the Government shall sustain the use
of Filipino as medium of official communication;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national

language commission;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for

incentives to promote scientific research.
12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for

the country, new national anthem, etc.;
- Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which

may be extended by the President in times of war or national
emergency declared by Congress;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit

monopolies in mass media;
- Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative

body to advise the President on indigenous cultural
communities.
13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or

Revisions):
- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by

Congress;
- Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the

implementation of the system of initiative;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional

convention to amend or revise the Constitution.
14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).
The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big bulk of the 1987
Constitution will not be affected."51Petitioners' proposition, while purportedly
seeking to amend only Articles VI and VII of the Constitution and providing
transitory provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or repeal other
numerous articles and sections thereof. More than the quantitative effects,
however, the revisory character of petitioners' proposition is apparent from
the qualitative effects it will have on the fundamental law.
I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the

revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of
the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change;
while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be
altered in a constitution.52
For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean

Sinco's more comprehensive differentiation of the terms:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves

provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the

is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to
add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed
conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or
dangerous, or misleading in their effect.53
A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to

unicameral-parliamentary, following the above distinction, entails a revision
of the Constitution as it will involve "alteration of different portions of the
entire document" and "may result in the rewriting of the whole constitution,
or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions."
More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without doubt,
fundamentally change the basic plan and substance of the present
Constitution. The tripartite system ordained by our fundamental law divides
governmental powers into three distinct but co-equal branches: the
legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative power, vested in Congress
which is a bicameral body consisting of the House of Representatives and
the Senate, is the power to make laws and to alter them at discretion.
Executive power, vested in the President who is directly elected by the
people, is the power to see that the laws are duly executed and enforced.
Judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is the
power to construe and apply the law when controversies arise concerning
what has been done or omitted under it. This separation of powers furnishes
a system of checks and balances which guards against the establishment of
an arbitrary or tyrannical government.
Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation

of power is dissolved as there is a fusion between the executive and
legislative powers. Essentially, the President becomes a mere "symbolic
head of State" while the Prime Minister becomes the head of government
who is elected, not by direct vote of the people, but by the members of the
Parliament. The Parliament is a unicameral body whose members are
elected by legislative districts. The Prime Minister, as head of government,
does not have a fixed term of office and may only be removed by a vote of
confidence of the Parliament. Under this form of government, the system of
checks and balances is emasculated.
Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would
be effected, not to mention that the Constitution's basic plan and substance
of a tripartite system of government and the principle of separation of
powers underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely destroyed,
there can be no other conclusion than that the proposition of petitioners
Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an
amendment or "such an addition or change within the lines of the original
instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for
which it was framed."54 As has been shown, the effect of the adoption of the
petitioners' proposition, rather than to "within the lines of the original
instrument" constitute "an improvement or better carry out the purpose for
which it was framed," is to "substantially alter the purpose and to attain
objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast." 55
To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners' contention that any change less than

a total one is amendatory would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the
bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. A case might, conceivably, be
presented where the question would be occasion to undertake to define with
nicety the line of demarcation; but we have no case or occasion here.
As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "a switch from the presidential system
to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact
on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral
system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution. It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision
from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is
the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision."56
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by

petitioners Lambino, et al., being in truth and in fact a proposal for the
revision thereof, is barred from the system of initiative upon any legally
permissible construction of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
The Petition for Initiative on

Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance
Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement

the system of initiative and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it
prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution, is valid, still, the petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution must be dismissed for being insufficient in form and
substance.
Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution

must state the following:
1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,

approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
2. The proposition;
3. The reason or reasons therefor;
4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one

hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at
the top of every page of the petition.
Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:
SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall

voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the
signatures. This is a solemn and important duty imposed on the election
registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even
to barangay officials. Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons
other than the election registrars has no legal effect.
In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners

showed that the verification of signatures was made, not by the election
registrars, but by barangay officials. For example, the certification of the
election officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur reads in full:
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION57
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by the

Barangay Officials in this City/Municipality, as attested to by two
(2) witnesses from the same Barangays, which is part of the
2nd Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del Sur, the names
appearing on the attached signature sheets relative to the
proposed initiative on Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are
those of bonafide resident of the said Barangays and correspond
to the names found in the official list of registered voters of the
Commission on Elections and/or voters' affidavit and/or voters'
identification cards.
It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the

registered voters for the City/Municipality of LUMBATAN, LANAO
DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed signatures sheets is ONE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).
April 2, 2006
IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer
(Underscoring supplied)
The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in the

Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) alone is shown by the
certifications, similarly worded as above-quoted, of the election registrars of
Buldon, Maguindanao;58 Cotabato City (Special Province);59 Datu Odin
Sinsuat, Maguindanao;60 Matanog, Maguindanao;61 Parang,
Maguindanao;62 Kabantalan, Maguindanao;63 Upi, Maguinadano;64 Barira,
Maguindanao;65 Sultan, Mastura;66 Ampatuan, Maguindanao;67 Buluan,
Maguindanao;68 Datu Paglas, Maguindanao;69 Datu Piang,
Maguindanao;70 Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao;71 Pagalungan,
Maguindanao;72Talayan, Maguindanao;73 Gen. S.K. Pendatun,
Maguindanao;74 Mamasapano, Maguindanao;75 Talitay,
Maguindanao;76 Guindulungan, Maguindanao;77 Datu Saudi Ampatuan,
Maguindanao;78 Datu Unsay, Maguindanao;79 Pagagawan,
Maguindanao;80 Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao;81 Indanan, Sulu;82 Jolo,
Sulu;83Maimbung, Sulu;84 Hadji Panglima, Sulu;85 Pangutaran,
Sulu;86 Parang, Sulu;87 Kalingalan Caluang, Sulu;88 Luuk, Sulu;89 Panamao,
Sulu;90 Pata, Sulu;91 Siasi, Sulu;92 Tapul, Sulu;93 Panglima Estino,
Sulu;94 Lugus, Sulu;95 and Pandami, Sulu. 96
Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall be done

by the election registrar, and by no one else, including the barangay officials.
The foregoing certifications submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their
cause, justify the outright dismissal of their petition for initiative. Because of
the illegal verifications made by barangay officials in the above-mentioned
legislative districts, it necessarily follows that the petition for initiative has
failed to comply with the requisite number of signatures, i.e., at least twelve
percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three percent
(3%) of the registered voters therein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications

because they themselves submitted the same to the COMELEC and to the
Court in the present case to support their contention that the requirements
of RA 6735 had been complied with and that their petition for initiative is on
its face sufficient in form and substance. They are in the nature of judicial
admissions which are conclusive and binding on petitioners.97 This being the
case, the Court must forthwith order the dismissal of the petition for initiative
for being, on its face, insufficient in form and substance. The Court should
make the adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further
proceedings, as it has done in other cases.98
It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is

correct in relying on Santiago that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover initiative
to the Constitution, this cannot be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the
people's will. The fact that there is no enabling law should not prejudice the
right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution,
which right has already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective
and resounding act of the particles of sovereignty must not be set aside.
Hence, the COMELEC should be ordered to comply with Section 4, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution via a writ of mandamus. The submission of
petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right
and to compel the persons of a public duty most especially when mandated
by the Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, for a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the
subject of the petition is a ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary
on the part of the board, officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public official and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty should
be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.100
To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined,

clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.101 In this case, petitioners
failed to establish their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the
foregoing disquisitions.
Remand of the Case to the

COMELEC is Not Authorized by
RA 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not the petition for
initiative has complied with the requisite number of signatures of at least
twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the
registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. The dissenting
opinion cites the petitioners' claim that they have complied with the same
while the oppositors-intervenors have vigorously refuted this claim by
alleging, inter alia, that the signatures were not properly verified or were not
verified at all. Other oppositors-intervenors have alleged that the signatories
did not fully understand what they have signed as they were misled into
signing the signature sheets.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for

initiative and its compliance with the requirements of RA 6735 on initiative
and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the
COMELEC at the first instance. It thus remands the case to the COMELEC
for further proceedings.
To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted.

There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
granting that it is valid to implement the former statute, that authorizes the
COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type
hearing, summary hearing or administrative hearing, on a petition for
initiative.
Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that "[a]n initiative

shall be conducted under the control and supervision of the Commission in
accordance with Article III hereof." Pertinently, Sections 30, 31 and 32 of
Article III of the said implementing rules provide as follows:
Sec. 30. Verification of signatures. – The Election Registrar shall

voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the
Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission. – The Commission

shall act on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the
petition for initiative or referendum.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has not

been obtained, the petition shall be deemed defeated and the
Commission shall issue a declaration to that effect.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has

been obtained, the Commission shall set the initiative or
referendum in accordance with the succeeding sections.
Sec. 32. Appeal. – The decision of the Commission on the

findings of the sufficiency and insufficiency of the petition for
initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not

authorized to conduct any kind of hearing to receive any evidence for or
against the sufficiency of the petition for initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules
require of the COMELEC to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the
petition for initiative on its face. And it has already been shown, by the
annexes submitted by the petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its
face, insufficient in form and substance. The remand of the case to the
COMELEC for reception of evidence of the parties on the contentious
factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the abovequoted rules of the
COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not empowered to do.
The Present Petition Presents a

Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further,
the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves
to Abide by the Constitution
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution,

are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government.102 A political question has two aspects: (1)
those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity; and (2) matters which have been specifically designated to some
other department or particular office of the government, with discretionary
power to act.103
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De Venecia,104 Senior

Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the doctrine of political
question vis-à-vis the express mandate of the present Constitution for the
courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government:
In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for

courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For Section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts "... to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This
power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was also not xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
[Constitutional Commission] granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by
the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-
à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now
beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the
political question defense.
xxxx
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use

as a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing
courts to penetrate the shield with new power to review acts of
any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but
of purportedly more than six million registered voters who have signified
their assent to the proposal to amend the Constitution, the same still
constitutes a justiciable controversy, hence, a non-political question. There
is no doubt that the Constitution, under Article XVII, has explicitly provided
for the manner or method to effect amendments thereto, or revision thereof.
The question, therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the
terms of the Constitution is for the Court to pass upon.105
In the United States, in In re McConaughy,106 the State Supreme Court of

Minnesota exercised jurisdiction over the petition questioning the result of
the general election holding that "an examination of the decisions shows
that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine
the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional
amendments." The cases cited were Dayton v. St. Paul,107 Rice v.
Palmer,108 Bott v. Wurtz,109 State v. Powell,110 among other cases.
There is no denying that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican

State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them."111 However, I find to be tenuous the asseveration that
"the argument that the people through initiative cannot propose substantial
amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty in its head. At the
very least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise
of the direct sovereignty of the people."112 In effect, it is theorized that
despite the unambiguous text of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
withholding the power to revise it from the system of initiative, the people, in
their sovereign capacity, can conveniently disregard the said provision.
I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign
capacity, can disregard the Constitution altogether. Such a view directly
contravenes the fundamental constitutional theory that while indeed "the
ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate
authority"; nonetheless, "by the Constitution which they establish, they not
only tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their own hands as well;
and neither the officers of the state, nor the whole people as an aggregate
body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental
law."113 The Constitution, it should be remembered, "is the protector of the
people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the people against
injury by the people."114 This is the essence of constitutionalism:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political

institutions and ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically
always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now become
restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves
over to a law that we made and promised to keep. And though a
government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did
mean that now men, democratic men, would try to live by their
word.115
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited

only to proposals to amend to the Constitution, and does not extend to its
revision. The Filipino people have bound themselves to observe the manner
and method to effect the changes of the Constitution. They opted to limit the
exercise of the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative, but did not extend the same to the revision thereof. The
petition for initiative, as it proposes to effect the revision thereof,
contravenes the Constitution. The fundamental law of the state prescribes
the limitations under which the electors of the state may change the same,
and, unless such course is pursued, the mere fact that a majority of the
electors are in favor of a change and have so expressed themselves, does
not work a change. Such a course would be revolutionary, and the
Constitution of the state would become a mere matter of form.116
The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and

abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicated
the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as
well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like
permanent and abiding nature.117
The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and
revision in Article XVII of the Constitution. The Court is mandated to ensure
that these safety valves embodied in the Constitution to guard against
improvident and hasty changes thereof are not easily trifled with. To be sure,
by having overwhelmingly ratified the Constitution, the Filipino people
believed that it is "a good Constitution" and in the words of the learned
Judge Cooley:
x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and

popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and
steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the
whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot
blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the
government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. Changes in
government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As
Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state.
Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may
succeed and worse.118
Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental

importance. Accordingly, I have approached and grappled with them with full
appreciation of the responsibilities involved in the present case, and have
given to its consideration the earnest attention which its importance
demands. I have sought to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution at
whatever hazard. I share the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v.
Hill:119 "it is for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed.
Sometimes constitutions must be interposed for the protection of majorities
even against themselves. Constitutions are adopted in times of public
repose, when sober reason holds her citadel, and are designed to check the
surging passions in times of popular excitement. But if courts could be
coerced by popular majorities into a disregard of their provisions,
constitutions would become mere 'ropes of sand,' and there would be an
end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of
temperance can sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which
would be at all comparable to the injury to republican institutions which a
violation of the constitution would inflict. That large and respectable class of
moral reformers which so justly demands the observance and enforcement
of law, cannot afford to take its first reformatory step by a violation of the
constitution. How can it consistently demand of others obedience to a
constitution which it violates itself? The people can in a short time re-enact
the amendment. In the manner of a great moral reform, the loss of a few
years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of republican freedom.
The young men coming forward upon the stage of political action must be
educated to venerate it; those already upon the stage must be taught to
obey it. Whatever interest may be advanced or may suffer, whoever or
whatever may be 'voted up or voted down,' no sacrilegious hand must be
laid upon the constitution."120
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and

to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 (RAUL LAMBINO, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ET AL.) and
G.R. No. 174299 (MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.).
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
AZCUNA, J.:
"Why, friends, you go to do you know not what."
-- Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2.
Article XVII of the Constitution states:
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may

be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members;

or
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

three per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment
years thereafter.
of this right.
Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its

Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of
all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling
such a convention.
Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under

Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.

the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency
of the petition.
This Article states the procedure for changing the Constitution.
Constitutions have three parts – the Constitution of Liberty, which states the
fundamental rights of the people; the Constitution of Government, which
establishes the structure of government, its branches and their operation;
and the Constitution of Sovereignty, which provides how the Constitution
may be changed.
Article XVII is the Constitution of Sovereignty.
As a result, the powers therein provided are called constituent powers. So

when Congress acts under this provision, it acts not as a legislature
exercising legislative powers. It acts as a constituent body exercising
constituent powers.
The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not

apply, or do not apply strictly, to the actions taken under Article XVII.
Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the people's right directly to propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress
pursuant thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a
constituent act.
As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for the exercise of
the people of the right to propose a law or amendments to the Constitution
is, with respect to the right to propose amendments to the Constitution, a
constituent measure, not a mere legislative one.
The consequence of this special character of the enactment, insofar as it

relates to proposing amendments to the Constitution, is that the
requirements for statutory enactments, such as sufficiency of standards and
the like, do not and should not strictly apply. As long as there is a sufficient
and clear intent to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right,
it should be sustained, as it is simply a compliance of the mandate placed
on Congress by the Constitution.
Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the
procedure for proposing amendments to the Constitution, can and should be
upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in legislative headings and
standards.
For this reason, I concur in the view that Santiago v. Comelec1 should be re-
examined and, after doing so, that the pronouncement therein regarding the
insufficiency or inadequacy of the measure to sustain a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of allowing the
exercise of this sovereign right.
And applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v. Hermosisima,2 penned by

Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code, that a decision
of this Court interpreting a law forms part of the law interpreted as of the
time of its enactment, Republic Act No. 6735 should be deemed sufficient
and adequate from the start.
This next point to address, there being a sufficient law, is whether the
petition for initiative herein involved complies with the requirements of that
law as well as those stated in Article XVII of the Constitution.
True it is that ours is a democratic state, as explicitated in the Declaration of

Principles, to emphasize precisely that there are instances recognized and
provided for in the Constitution where our people directly exercise their
sovereign powers, new features set forth in this People Power Charter,
namely, the powers of recall, initiative and referendum.
Nevertheless, this democratic nature of our polity is that of a

democracy under the rule of law. This equally important point is emphasized
in the very Preamble to the Constitution, which states:
". . . the blessings of . . . democracy under the rule of law . . . ."
Such is the case with respect to the power to initiate changes in the
Constitution. The power is subject to limitations under the Constitution itself,
thus: The power could not be exercised for the first five years after the
Constitution took effect and thereafter can only be exercised once every five
years; the power only extends to proposing amendments but not revisions;
and the power needs an act of Congress providing for its implementation,
which act is directed and mandated.
The question, therefore, arises whether the proposed changes in the

Constitution set forth in the petition for initiative herein involved are mere
amendments or rather are revisions.
Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and not mere parts
of it.
The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the
people through initiative is a practical one, namely, there is no one to draft
such extensive changes, since 6.3 million people cannot conceivably come
up with a single extensive document through a direct proposal from each of
them. Someone would have to draft it and that is not authorized as it would
not be a direct proposal from the people. Such indirect proposals can only
take the form of proposals from Congress as a Constituent Assembly under
Article XVII, or a Constitutional Convention created under the same
provision. Furthermore, there is a need for such deliberative bodies for
revisions because their proceedings and debates are duly and officially
recorded, so that future cases of interpretations can be properly aided by
resort to the record of their proceedings.
Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained in the petition

for initiative herein involved will show on its face that the proposed changes
constitute a revision of the Constitution. The proposal is to change the
system of government from that which is bicameral-presidential to one that
is unicameral-parliamentary.
While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are involved, the fact is, as
the petition and text of the proposed changes themselves state, every
provision of the Constitution will have to be examined to see if they conform
to the nature of a unicameral-parliamentary form of government and
changed accordingly if they do not so conform to it. For example, Article VIII
on Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a parliamentary system, for
under such a system, the Parliament is supreme, and thus the Court's
power to declare its act a grave abuse of discretion and thus void would be
an anomaly.
Now, who is to do such examination and who is to do such changes and

how should the changes be worded? The proposed initiative does not say
who nor how.
Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a prohibited

revision but it also suffers from being incomplete and insufficient on its very
face.
It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits contained in
providing for the power under the Constitution.
Neither does it comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which states in Section
10 that not more than one subject shall be proposed as an amendment or
amendments to the Constitution. The petition herein would propose at the
very least two subjects – a unicameral legislature and a parliamentary form
of government. Again, for this clear and patent violation of the very act that
provides for the exercise of the power, the proposed initiative cannot lie.
This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners.
For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable
in nature – a unicameral legislature is one; a parliamentary form of
government is another. The first is a mere amendment and contains only
one subject matter. The second is clearly a revision that affects every article
and every provision in the Constitution to an extent not even the proponents
could at present fully articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go about
proposing changes the nature and extent of which they do not as yet know
exactly what.
The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative, regarding a

change in the legislature from a bicameral or two-chamber body to that of a
unicameral or one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of the changes
needed to carry it out are perfunctory and ministerial in nature. Once it is
limited to this proposal, the changes are simply one of deletion and
insertions, the wordings of which are practically automatic and non-
discretionary.
As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix "A" showing how the

Constitution would read if we were to change Congress from one consisting
of the Senate and the House of Representatives to one consisting only of
the House of Representatives. It only affects Article VI on the Legislative
Department, some provisions on Article VII on the Executive Department, as
well as Article XI on the Accountability of Public Officers, and Article XVIII on
Transitory Provisions. These are mere amendments, substantial ones
indeed but still only amendments, and they address only one subject matter.
Such proposal, moreover, complies with the intention and rationale behind
the present initiative, which is to provide for simplicity and economy in
government and reduce the stalemates that often prevent needed
legislation.
For the nonce, therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to
the filing of an appropriate initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution to change Congress into a unicameral body. This is not say that
I favor such a change. Rather, such a proposal would come within the
purview of an initiative allowed under Article XVII of the Constitution and its
implementing Republic Act, and should, therefore, be submitted to our
people in a plebiscite for them to decide in their sovereign capacity. After all
is said and done, this is what democracy under the rule of law is about.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952

REGISTERED VOTERS
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q.

SAGUISAG
vs.
ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA,
SARMIENTO, and NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
"It is a Constitution we are expounding…"1
– Chief Justice John Marshall
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux of the controversy
is the critical understanding of the first and foremost of our constitutional
principles — "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them."2 Constitutionalism dictates that this creed must be respected
with deeds; our belief in its validity must be backed by behavior.
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside the resolution of
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006,
denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with
some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures
thereon, and praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite for the ratification of
the proposed amendments to the Constitution in accordance with Section 2,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996, the

Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the sovereign people's
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative
under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Its founding member,
Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, filed with the COMELEC on December 6, 1996, a
"Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials,
by People's Initiative" (Delfin Petition). It proposed to amend Sections 4 and
7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution by deleting the provisions on the term limits for all elective
officials.
The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first be
submitted to the people and would be formally filed with the COMELEC after
it is signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of
registered voters in the country. It thus sought the assistance of the
COMELEC in gathering the required signatures by fixing the dates and
time therefor and setting up signature stations on the assigned dates
and time. The petition prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing
the dates and time for signature gathering all over the country; (2) causing
the publication of said Order and the petition for initiative in newspapers of
general and local circulation; and, (3) instructing the municipal election
registrars in all the regions of the Philippines to assist petitioner and the
volunteers in establishing signing stations on the dates and time designated
for the purpose.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.
On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander

Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition
before this Court, seeking to restrain the COMELEC from further
considering the Delfin Petition. They impleaded as respondents the
COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (Pedrosas) in their
capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) which was likewise engaged in signature
gathering to support an initiative to amend the Constitution. They argued
that the constitutional provision on people's initiative may only be
implemented by a law passed by Congress; that no such law has yet been
enacted by Congress; that Republic Act No. 6735 relied upon by Delfin does
not cover the initiative to amend the Constitution; and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, the implementing rules adopted by the COMELEC on
the conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative to amend the
Constitution was concerned. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325,
entitled Santiago v. Commission on Elections.3
Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining

order enjoining the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition and
the Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to
amend the Constitution.
On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for
prohibition. The Court ruled that the constitutional provision granting the
people the power to directly amend the Constitution through initiative is not
self-executory. An enabling law is necessary to implement the exercise of
the people's right. Examining the provisions of R.A. 6735, a majority of
eight (8) members of the Court held that said law was "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,"4 and thus
voided portions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It
was also held that even if R.A. 6735 sufficiently covered the initiative to
amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid,
the Delfin Petition should still be dismissed as it was not the proper
initiatory pleading contemplated by law. Under Section 2, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735, a petition for initiative
on the Constitution must be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters
therein. The Delfin Petition did not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. The decision stated:
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose

amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the
cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength.
Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the
right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the

system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of

the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith

DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is

made permanent against the Commission on Elections, but is
LIFTED as against private respondents.5
Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate
Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo,
Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres, fully
concurred in the majority opinion.
While all the members of the Court who participated in the

deliberation6 agreed that the Delfin Petition should be dismissed for lack of
the required signatures, five (5) members, namely, Associate Justices Jose
A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and
Artemio V. Panganiban, held that R.A. 6735 was sufficient and adequate to
implement the people's right to amend the Constitution through initiative,
and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 validly provided the details for the
actual exercise of such right. Justice Jose C. Vitug, on the other hand,
opined that the Court should confine itself to resolving the issue of whether
the Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law on
initiative, and there was no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. 6735.
The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the Court's decision.
After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)7 of the

eight (8) majority members maintained their position that R.A. 6735 was
inadequate to implement the provision on the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. Justice Torres filed an inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima
submitted a Separate Opinion adopting the position of the minority that R.A.
6735 sufficiently covers the initiative to amend the Constitution. Hence, of
the thirteen (13) members of the Court who participated in the deliberation,
six (6) members, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa and Associate Justices
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan voted to deny the
motions for lack of merit; and six (6) members, namely, Associate Justices
Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to
grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not
ripe for judicial adjudication. The motions for reconsideration were therefore
denied for lack of sufficient votes to modify or reverse the decision of March
19, 1997.8
On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative
to Propose Amendments to the Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA
Petition was supported by around five (5) million signatures in compliance
with R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the
COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in
Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected in
support of the petition and submit these to the Commission; and (3) set the
holding of a plebiscite where the following proposition would be submitted to
the people for ratification:
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the

President the chance to be reelected for another term, similarly
with the Vice-President, so that both the highest officials of the
land can serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and
also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials,
thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for
that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI
and Section 8 of Article X, respectively?
The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent

restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.
PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari
seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for
initiative. PIRMA argued that the Court's decision on the Delfin Petition did
not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was
not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for
reconsideration, and because there was no identity of parties and subject
matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine
its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.
The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its
resolution dated September 23, 1997. It explained:
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March
19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was

need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners,
namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735.
On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the
Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan
and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up.
Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said
second issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for
that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo,
Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that
there was a need for such a re-examination x x x x9
In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice
Bellosillo stated that the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata.
Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to

utilize anew the system of initiative to amend the Constitution, this time to
change the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
parliamentary system.
Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.
On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of

Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), embarked on a nationwide drive
to gather signatures to support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of
government in the country through charter change. They proposed to amend
the Constitution as follows:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended

to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be

vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed
of as many members as may be provided by law, to be
apportioned among the provinces, representative districts,
and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants
per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each
province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the
day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one
year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters
of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to
the number thereof, except those under the party-list system
which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall
be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership
coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

are hereby amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head

of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime
Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime
Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of
Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible
to the Parliament for the program of government.

bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President

shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the
thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their
powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a
vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim
parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or

removal from office of the incumbent President, the
incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In
case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal
from office of both the incumbent President and Vice
President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the
powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article
VII as amended.

President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24
which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are
hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section
2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that
any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate,"
"House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall
be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references
therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be
changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and
all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President"
shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are
hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which
are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed
amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary
System of government; provided, however, that any all
references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of
Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be
changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references
therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be
changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and
all references to the "President" and or "Acting President"
shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue
until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been
elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the
incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet
who are heads of executive departments.

Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall
head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim
Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the
election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker
shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the
members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be

Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these

amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief

interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The
interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries
and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may
be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and
held simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to
exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities
of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of
the incumbent President and Vice President.10
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which

were written the abstract of the proposed amendments, to wit:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and

VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government
from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-
parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve greater
efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing
an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from
one system to another?
The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated non-

government organizations and volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to
the local officials. Copies of the draft petition for initiative containing the
proposition were also circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral
groups.
Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which

culminated on March 24, 25 and 26, 2006, to inform the people and explain
to them the proposed amendments to the Constitution. Thereafter, they
circulated the signature sheets for signing.
The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers
for verification based on the voters' registration record. Upon completion of
the verification process, the respective local election officers issued
certifications to attest that the signature sheets have been verified. The
verified signature sheets were subsequently transmitted to the office of
Sigaw ng Bayan for the counting of the signatures.
On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.

Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the
Constitution entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987
Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral
Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending
Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift
from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System." They filed an Amended
Petition on August 30, 2006 to reflect the text of the proposed amendment
that was actually presented to the people. They alleged that they were filing
the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered
voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached
thereto. Petitioners appended to the petition signature sheets bearing the
signatures of registered voters which they claimed to have been verified by
the respective city or municipal election officers, and allegedly constituting at
least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein
each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all
the registered voters therein.
As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners

averred that Section 5 (b) and (c), together with Section 7 of R.A.
6735, provide sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise
of the power. Hence, petitioners prayed that the COMELEC issue
an Order:
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article

XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at

least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later

than ninety days after the Certification by the COMELEC of the
sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to express
their sovereign will on the proposition.
Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to

the petition for initiative, among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S.
Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr.,
Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.,
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Senators Sergio Osmeña
III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-
Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales,
Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang
Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela
Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San
Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete
Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina
A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for
Initiative. It cited this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC11 permanently
enjoining the Commission from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
system.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus praying that the Court set aside the August 31, 2006
resolution of the COMELEC, direct respondent COMELEC to comply with
Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, and set the date of the plebiscite.
They state the following grounds in support of the petition:
I.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave

abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of, and to give
due course to the petition for initiative, because the
cited Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 cannot be considered the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court en banc, considering that
upon its reconsideration and final voting on 10 June 1997, no
majority vote was secured to declare Republic Act No. 6735 as
inadequate, incomplete and insufficient in standard.
II.
The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act No.
8189 and existing appropriation of the COMELEC provide for
sufficient details and authority for the exercise of people's
initiative, thus, existing laws taken together are adequate and
complete.
III.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave

abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of, and in
refusing to give due course to the petition for initiative, thereby
violating an express constitutional mandate and disregarding and
contravening the will of the people.
A.
Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law,

respondent COMELEC cannot ignore the will of the
sovereign people and must accordingly act on the petition for
initiative.
1.
The framers of the Constitution intended to give the

people the power to propose amendments and the
people themselves are now giving vibrant life to this
constitutional provision.
2.
Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19 March

1997, the right of the people to exercise the sovereign
power of initiative and recall has been invariably upheld.
3.
The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is

a political question which shall be determined solely by
the sovereign people.
4.
By signing the signature sheets attached to the petition

for initiative duly verified by the election officers, the
people have chosen to perform this sacred exercise of
their sovereign power.
B.
The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to the

instant petition for initiative filed by the petitioners.
C.
The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs.

COMELEC only applies to the Delfin petition.
1.
It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not other

statements in the body of the decision that governs the
rights in controversy.
IV.
The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to

act or perform a duty mandated by law.
A.
The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the

initiative for plebiscite.12
The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene

B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and
Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo
Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela, Gabriela Women's
Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo
Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Senate Minority
Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby
A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada,
and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo
Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-
Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat,
Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong moved to intervene in this
case and filed their respective Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C.

Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr.,
Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and the Senate of
the Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr., also filed
their respective motions for intervention and Comments-in-Intervention.
The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement

Foundation, Inc., Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya,
Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization, and Victorino F.
Balais likewise moved to intervene and submitted to the Court a Petition-in-
Intervention. All interventions and oppositions were granted by the Court.
The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not

commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the petition for
initiative as it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC as affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the
principle of stare decisis; that there is no sufficient law providing for the
authority and the details for the exercise of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution; that the proposed changes to the Constitution are actually
revisions, not mere amendments; that the petition for initiative does not
meet the required number of signatories under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; that it was not shown that the people have been informed
of the proposed amendments as there was disparity between the proposal
presented to them and the proposed amendments attached to the petition
for initiative, if indeed there was; that the verification process was done ex
parte, thus rendering dubious the signatures attached to the petition for
initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal
capacity to represent the signatories in the petition for initiative.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Court's
resolution of September 5, 2006, filed its Comment to the petition. Affirming
the position of the petitioners, the OSG prayed that the Court grant the
petition at bar and render judgment: (1) declaring R.A. 6735 as adequate to
cover or as reasonably sufficient to implement the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and as having provided sufficient standards
for subordinate legislation; (2) declaring as valid the provisions of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 on the conduct of initiative or amendments
to the Constitution; (3) setting aside the assailed resolution of the
COMELEC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, (4) directing the COMELEC
to grant the petition for initiative and set the corresponding plebiscite
pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and other pertinent
election laws and regulations.
The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying
the petition for initiative is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it
merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which
declared that R.A. 6735 does not adequately implement the constitutional
provision on initiative to amend the Constitution. It invoked the permanent
injunction issued by the Court against the COMELEC from taking
cognizance of petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
a valid enabling law shall have been passed by Congress. It asserted that
the permanent injunction covers not only the Delfin Petition, but also all
other petitions involving constitutional initiatives.
On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties were
required to argue on the following issues:13
1. Whether petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper

parties to file the present Petition in behalf of the more than six
million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the
Constitution.
2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission

on Elections complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the Court's decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R.

No. 127325, March 19, 1997) bars the present petition.
4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in Santiago v.

COMELEC that there is no sufficient law implementing or
authorizing the exercise of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.
5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for

Initiative filed with the COMELEC have complied with its
provisions.
5.1 Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and

substance.
5.2 Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one

subject matter.
6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or

revision of the Constitution.
6.1 Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject of

an initiative.
7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose amendments to

the Constitution is a political question to be determined solely by
the sovereign people.
8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse

of discretion in dismissing the Petitions for Initiative filed before it.
With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file

the present Petition in behalf of the more than six million
voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the
Constitution.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado

are not the proper parties to file the instant petition as they were not
authorized by the signatories in the petition for initiative.
The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the
petition for initiative should be filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. The petition
for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was
accompanied by voluminous signature sheets which prima facie show the
intent of the signatories to support the filing of said petition. Stated above
their signatures in the signature sheets is the following:
x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for

initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the
filing thereof.14
There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute
separate documents to authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in
their behalf.
Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and
Aumentado to file the petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may file a
petition for certiorari and mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 read:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or

officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court x x x x.
Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent

tribunal, board or officer may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before
the appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the
proponents of the petition for initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have
the standing to file the petition at bar.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination

of Santiago.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the
thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English
Courts.15 Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it
is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points
come again in litigation."16 As the rule evolved, early limits to its
application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly
unreasonable;" (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting
decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle
or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to
reach the decision."17
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by

the framers of the U.S. Constitution.18 According to Hamilton, "strict rules
and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the
courts."19 Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be
rejected."20 Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and
Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that
would allow a judge to abandon a precedent."21 He added that their ideas
"reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the
rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal
conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two
centuries."22
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's
observation although stare decisisdeveloped its own life in the United
States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal
scholars.23 The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of
lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving
the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires
that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy
correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as
an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as
a policy, imposing choice but not a command.24 Indeed, stare decisis is not
one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare

decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare
decisis.25 Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of
the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional
litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare
decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare
decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a
question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called
upon to consider a question once decided."26 In the same vein, the
venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of
constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about
it."27 In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of
statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has
been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by
other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as
clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." 28 This
stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the
courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of

reasons,29 viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial
economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to
be bound by the stare decisis rule where30 (1) its application perpetuates
illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4)
activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that
respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow
the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases.31 The most
famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education32 which
junked Plessy v. Ferguson's33 "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld
as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public
transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that
"separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the
shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court
has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to
promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos,34 we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining
Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,35 we
overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a
private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will

show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered
before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition,
courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the
voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.36
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare
decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.37 It
established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the
rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2)
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the
cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have
so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or
come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.
Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should
not bar the reexamination of Santiago. On the factor of intolerability,
the six (6) justices in Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it
provided no standard to guide COMELEC in issuing its implementing rules.
The Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is insufficient but without striking it down
as unconstitutional is an intolerable aberration, the only one of its kind in
our planet. It improperly assails the ability of legislators to write laws. It
usurps the exclusive right of legislators to determine how far laws
implementing constitutional mandates should be crafted. It is elementary
that courts cannot dictate on Congress the style of writing good laws,
anymore than Congress can tell courts how to write literate decisions. The
doctrine of separation of powers forbids this Court to invade the exclusive
lawmaking domain of Congress for courts can construe laws but cannot
construct them. The end result of the ruling of the six (6) justices that R.A.
6735 is insufficient is intolerable for it rendered lifeless the sovereign right of
the people to amend the Constitution via an initiative.
On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did
not induce any expectation from the people. On the contrary, the ruling
smothered the hope of the people that they could amend the Constitution by
direct action. Moreover, reliance is a non-factor in the case at bar for it is
more appropriate to consider in decisions involving contracts where private
rights are adjudicated. The case at bar involves no private rights but the
sovereignty of the people.
On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground

cannot be blinked away. The urgent need to adjust certain provisions of the
1987 Constitution to enable the country to compete in the new millennium is
given. The only point of contention is the mode to effect the change - - -
whether through constituent assembly, constitutional convention or people's
initiative. Petitioners claim that they have gathered over six (6) million
registered voters who want to amend the Constitution through people's
initiative and that their signatures have been verified by registrars of the
COMELEC. The six (6) justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is insufficient
to implement the direct right of the people to amend the Constitution
through an initiative cannot waylay the will of 6.3 million people who
are the bearers of our sovereignty and from whom all government
authority emanates. New developments in our internal and external social,
economic, and political settings demand the reexamination of
the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is no reason for this Court to
allow the people to step into the future with a blindfold.
III
A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to

implement the people's initiative.
Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735
is insufficient to implement Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution
allowing amendments to the Constitution to be directly proposed by the
people through initiative.
When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give

life to the intent of legislators. In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous
that Congress intended the said law to implement the right of the people,
thru initiative, to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action.
This all-important intent is palpable from the following:
First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the
people to initiate changes to the Constitution:
The policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. -- The power of the people under a

It defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments

to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process
by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the
people."
It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the

Constitution, viz:
(1) That "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein;"38 and
(2) That "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only

after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
and only once every five (5) years thereafter."39
It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which
provides that "(t)he proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved
by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to
the day of the plebiscite."
Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of
the lawmakers to use it as the instrument to implement people's initiative.
No less than former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
the ponente in Santiago, concedes:40
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended
to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The
Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17 x x x x The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which
was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by
the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No.
6735.
Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly

demonstrate beyond doubt this intent. In his sponsorship remarks, the
late Senator Raul Roco (then a Member of the House of Representatives)
emphasized the intent to make initiative as a mode whereby the people can
propose amendments to the Constitution. We quote his relevant remarks:41
SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO
MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the committee,

we wish to speak in support of House Bill No. 497, entitled:
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987, which later on
may be called Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989.
As a background, we want to point out the constitutional basis of

this particular bill. The grant of plenary legislative power upon the
Philippine Congress by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions,
Mr. Speaker, was based on the principle that any power deemed
to be legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily possessed
by the Philippine Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it
elsewhere. This was a citation from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).
The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw

the application of the principle of separation of powers. While
under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the
principle remained applicable, Amendment 6 or the 1981
amendments to the 1973 Constitution ensured presidential
dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of

legislative power between the legislature and the executive.
Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative power is

the declaration in the Philippine Constitution that he Philippines is
a Republican State where sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them.
In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in its

citizens participating through the right of suffrage and indicating
thereby their choice of lawmakers.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still preserved in

Congress. However, to institutionalize direct action of the people
as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, there is a practical
recognition of what we refer to as people's sovereign power. This
is the recognition of a system of initiative and referendum.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I

quote:
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the

Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution,

Congress does not have plenary powers. There is a reserved
legislative power given to the people expressly.
Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the

Constitution provides, and I quote:
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a

system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered voters, or which
three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which

describes legislative power, there are reserved powers given to
the people. In Section 32, we are specifically told to pass at the
soonest possible time a bill on referendum and initiative. We are
specifically mandated to share the legislative powers of Congress
with the people.
Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is

Section 2, Article XVII, Mr. Speaker. Under the provision on
amending the Constitution, the section reads, and I quote:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within
five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the duty

to implement the exercise by the people of the right of initiative
and referendum.
House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on

Suffrage and Electoral Reforms last December 14, 1988, Mr.
Speaker, is the response to such a constitutional duty.
Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show

where initiative and referendum under Philippine law has
occurred.
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not new. In

a very limited extent, the system is provided for in our Local
Government Code today. On initiative, for instance, Section 99 of
the said code vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate
legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear reports of the
sangguniang barangay. There are variations of initiative and
referendum. The barangay assembly is composed of all persons
who have been actual residents of the barangay for at least six
months, who are at least 15 years of age and citizens of the
Philippines. The holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum
is also provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent quotations but
will just submit the same to the Secretary to be incorporated as
part of my speech.
To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are extensively

applied by the Local Government Code as it is now mandated by
the 1987 Constitution.
In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples of

initiative and referendum similar to what is now contained in
House Bill No. 21505. As in the 1987 Constitutions and House Bill
No. 21505, the various constitutions of the states in the United
States recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the
enactment of any statute or to reject any existing law or parts
thereof in a referendum. These states are Alaska, Alabama,
Montana, Massachusetts, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
In certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and

referendum applies is also without ay limitation, except for
emergency measures, which is likewise incorporated in Section
7(b) of House Bill No. 21505.
The procedure provided by the House bill – from the filing of the
petition, the requirement of a certain percentage of supporters to
present a proposition to submission to electors – is substantially
similar to those of many American laws. Mr. Speaker, those
among us who may have been in the United States, particularly in
California, during election time or last November during the
election would have noticed different propositions posted in the
city walls. They were propositions submitted by the people for
incorporation during the voting. These were in the nature of
initiative, Mr. Speaker.
Although an infant then in Philippine political structure, initiative

and referendum is a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions,
and House Bill No. 21505 through the various consolidated bills is
patterned after American experience in a great respect.
What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow me to try to
bring our colleagues slowly through the bill. The bill has basically
only 12 sections. The constitutional Commissioners, Mr. Speaker,
saw this system of initiative and referendum as an instrument
which can be used should the legislature show itself indifferent to
the needs of the people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may be
timely, since we seem to be amply criticized, as regards our
responsiveness, to pass this bill on referendum and initiative now.
While indifference would not be an appropriate term to use at this
time, and surely it is not the case although we are so criticized,
one must note that it is a felt necessity of our times that laws need
to be proposed and adopted at the soonest possible time to spur
economic development, safeguard individual rights and liberties,
and share governmental power with the people.
With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone,

together with the Senators when they are minded to agree with
us, are left with the burden of enacting the needed legislation.
Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process

advocated by the bill.
First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined. Initiative

essentially is what the term connotes. It means that the people, on
their own political judgment, submit fore the consideration and
voting of the general electorate a bill or a piece of legislation.
Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of initiative.
One is an initiative to amend the Constitution. This can occur once
every five years. Another is an initiative to amend statutes that we
may have approved. Had this bill been an existing law, Mr.
Speaker, it is most likely that an overwhelming majority of the
barangays in the Philippines would have approved by initiative the
matter of direct voting.
The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition

proposing to enact regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay
laws or ordinances. It comes from the people and it must be
submitted directly to the electorate. The bill gives a definite
procedure and allows the COMELEC to define rules and
regulations to give teeth to the power of initiative.
On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of the

people to approve or reject something that Congress has already
approved.
For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities or

the barangays into two or three, we must first get the consent of
the people affected through plebiscite or referendum.
Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However,

referendum can also be petitioned by the people if, for instance,
they do not life the bill on direct elections and it is approved
subsequently by the Senate. If this bill had already become a law,
then the people could petition that a referendum be conducted so
that the acts of Congress can be appropriately approved or
rebuffed.
The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the petition. As

envisioned in the bill, the initiative comes from the people, from
registered voters of the country, by presenting a proposition so
that the people can then submit a petition, which is a piece of
paper that contains the proposition. The proposition in the
example I have been citing is whether there should be direct
elections during the barangay elections. So the petition must be
filed in the appropriate agency and the proposition must be clear
stated. It can be tedious but that is how an effort to have direct
democracy operates.
Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will not be

all that easy to have referendum or initiative petitioned by the
people. Under Section 4 of the committee report, we are given
certain limitations. For instance, to exercise the power of initiative
or referendum, at least 10 percent of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented
by at least 3 percent of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a
petition. These numbers, Mr. Speaker, are not taken from the air.
They are mandated by the Constitution. There must be a
requirement of 10 percent for ordinary laws and 3 percent
representing all districts. The same requirement is mutatis
mutandis or appropriately modified and applied to the different
sections. So if it is, for instance, a petition on initiative or
referendum for a barangay, there is a 10 percent or a certain
number required of the voters of the barangay. If it is for a district,
there is also a certain number required of all towns of the district
that must seek the petition. If it is for a province then again a
certain percentage of the provincial electors is required. All these
are based with reference to the constitutional mandate.
The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be supervised

and shall be upon the call of the Commission on Elections.
However, within a period of 30 days from receipt of the petition,
the COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the petition,
publish the same and set the date of the referendum which shall
not be earlier than 45 days but not later than 90 days from the
determination by the commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
Why is this so, Mr. Speaker? The petition must first be determined
by the commission as to its sufficiency because our Constitution
requires that no bill can be approved unless it contains one
subject matter. It is conceivable that in the fervor of an initiative or
referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may be more than two topics
sought to be approved and that cannot be allowed. In fact, that is
one of the prohibitions under this referendum and initiative bill.
When a matter under initiative or referendum is approved by the
required number of votes, Mr. Speaker, it shall become effective
15 days following the completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to do is to
enlarge and recognize the legislative powers of the Filipino
people.
Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House, cannot

ignore or cannot be insensitive to the call for initiative and
referendum. We should have done it in 1987 but that is past.
Maybe we should have done it in 1988 but that too had already
passed, but it is only February 1989, Mr. Speaker, and we have
enough time this year at least to respond to the need of our
people to participate directly in the work of legislation.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our

colleagues to approve House Bill No. 21505 as incorporated in
Committee Report No. 423 of the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared text of my

speech, together with the footnotes since they contain many
references to statutory history and foreign jurisdiction, be
reproduced as part of the Record for future purposes.
Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the sponsorship speech
of former Representative Salvador Escudero III, viz:42
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO
MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years

highlighted the need to heed the clamor of the people for a truly
popular democracy. One recalls the impatience of those who
actively participated in the parliament of the streets, some of
whom are now distinguished Members of this Chamber. A
substantial segment of the population feel increasingly that under
the system, the people have the form but not the reality or
substance of democracy because of the increasingly elitist
approach of their chosen Representatives to many questions
vitally affecting their lives. There have been complaints, not
altogether unfounded, that many candidates easily forge their
campaign promises to the people once elected to office. The 1986
Constitutional Commission deemed it wise and proper to provide
for a means whereby the people can exercise the reserve power
to legislate or propose amendments to the Constitution directly in
case their chose Representatives fail to live up to their
expectations. That reserve power known as initiative is explicitly
recognized in three articles and four sections of the 1987
Constitution, namely: Article VI Section 1; the same article,
Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and Article XVII, Section 2. May
I request that he explicit provisions of these three articles and four
sections be made part of my sponsorship speech, Mr. Speaker.
These constitutional provisions are, however, not self-executory.

There is a need for an implementing law that will give meaning
and substance to the process of initiative and referendum which
are considered valuable adjuncts to representative democracy. It
is needless to state that this bill when enacted into law will
probably open the door to strong competition of the people, like
pressure groups, vested interests, farmers' group, labor groups,
urban dwellers, the urban poor and the like, with Congress in the
field of legislation.
Such probability, however, pales in significance when we consider

that through this bill we can hasten the politization of the Filipino
which in turn will aid government in forming an enlightened public
opinion, and hopefully produce better and more responsive and
acceptable legislations.
Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the parliamentarians of

the streets and cause-oriented groups an opportunity to articulate
their ideas in a truly democratic forum, thus, the competition which
they will offer to Congress will hopefully be a healthy one. Anyway,
in an atmosphere of competition there are common interests dear
to all Filipinos, and the pursuit of each side's competitive goals
can still take place in an atmosphere of reason and moderation.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished

Gentleman from Camarines Sur and this Representation filed our
respective versions of the bill in 1987, we were hoping that the bill
would be approved early enough so that our people could
immediately use the agrarian reform bill as an initial subject
matter or as a take-off point.
However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee on

Local Government, it took sometime before the committee could
act on these. But as they say in Tagalog, huli man daw at
magaling ay naihahabol din. The passage of this bill therefore, my
dear colleagues, could be one of our finest hours when we can
set aside our personal and political consideration for the greater
good of our people. I therefore respectfully urge and plead that
this bill be immediately approved.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the "[c]ourts
have the duty to interpret the law as legislated and when possible, to honor
the clear meaning of statutes as revealed by its language, purpose and
history."43
The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6) justices,
nevertheless, ruled that "x x x R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned" for the following reasons: (1)
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; (2) the Act does not provide for the contents of the petition for
initiative on the Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for
National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution.
To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle
the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution through initiative.
R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative policy for the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. The fact that the
legislature may have omitted certain details in implementing the people's
initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is
insufficient. What were omitted were mere details and not fundamental
policies which Congress alone can and has determined. Implementing
details of a law can be delegated to the COMELEC and can be the subject
of its rule-making power. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-making power has
long been recognized by this Court. In ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but
without striking it down as unconstitutional, the six (6) justices failed to give
due recognition to the indefeasible right of the sovereign people to amend
the Constitution.
IV
The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are

mere amendments and can be undertaken through people's
initiative.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the

1987 Constitution, only allow the use of people's initiative to amend and not
to revise the Constitution. They theorize that the changes proposed by
petitioners are substantial and thus constitute a revision which cannot be
done through people's initiative.
In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from
proposing substantial amendments amounting to revision, the oppositors-
intervenors cite the following deliberations during the Constitutional
Commission, viz:44
MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the theory

that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
in Section 1. The Committee members felt that this system of
initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing

this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another
separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified

contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to

distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to
include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation
to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in

the Committee.
Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the

same view:45
MR. DAVIDE. x x x x We are limiting the right of the people, by

initiative, to submit a proposal for amendment only, not for
revision, only once every five years x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's

proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it
cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla
when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision?"
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and

"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative
is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo

S. Azcuna also clarified this point46 -
MR. OPLE. To more closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I

suggest that we add to "Amendments" "OR REVISIONS OF" to
read: "Amendments OR REVISION OF this Constitution."
MR. AZCUNA. I think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution

by initiative.
MR. OPLE. How is that again?
MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of the

Constitution by initiative but merely by amendments.
MR. BENGZON. Only by amendments.
MR. AZCUNA. I remember that was taken on the floor.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, just amendments.
The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals, petitioners

will "change the very system of government from presidential to
parliamentary, and the form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral,"
among others. They allegedly seek other major revisions like the inclusion of
a minimum number of inhabitants per district, a change in the period for a
term of a Member of Parliament, the removal of the limits on the number of
terms, the election of a Prime Minister who shall exercise the executive
power, and so on and so forth.47 In sum, oppositors-intervenors submit that
"the proposed changes to the Constitution effect major changes in the
political structure and system, the fundamental powers and duties of the
branches of the government, the political rights of the people, and the
modes by which political rights may be exercised."48 They conclude that they
are substantial amendments which cannot be done through people's
initiative. In other words, they posit the thesis that only simple but not
substantial amendments can be done through people's initiative.
With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words "simple" and
"substantial" are not subject to any accurate quantitative or qualitative test.
Obviously, relying on the quantitative test, oppositors-intervenors assert
that the amendments will result in some one hundred (100) changes in the
Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is also arguable that
petitioners seek to change basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18)
articles of the 1987 Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and
Article VII (Executive Department), together with the complementary
provisions for a smooth transition from a presidential bicameral system to a
parliamentary unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution
will not be affected including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V
(Suffrage), VIII (Judicial Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X
(Local Government), XI (Accountability of Public Officers), XII (National
Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV
(Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The
Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even XVII (Amendments or
Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we use simple
arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are "simple" or
"substantial."
Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to

determine whether the said changes are "simple" or "substantial" as to
amount to a revision of the Constitution. The well-regarded political
scientist, Garner, says that a good constitution should contain at least three
(3) sets of provisions: the constitution of liberty which sets forth the
fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain limitations on the
powers of the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of these
rights; the constitution of government which deals with the framework of
government and its powers, laying down certain rules for its administration
and defining the electorate; and, the constitution of sovereignty which
prescribes the mode or procedure for amending or revising the
constitution.49 It is plain that the proposed changes will basically affect
only the constitution of government. The constitutions of liberty and
sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes will not
change the fundamental nature of our state as "x x x a democratic and
republican state."50 It is self-evident that a unicameral-parliamentary form
of government will not make our State any less democratic or any less
republican in character. Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative test
resolve the issue of whether the proposed changes are "simple" or
"substantial."
For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any
quantitative or qualitative test to determine whether an "amendment"
is "simple" or "substantial." Nor did they provide that "substantial"
amendments are beyond the power of the people to propose to change
the Constitution. Instead, our Constitutions carried the traditional
distinction between "amendment" and "revision," i.e., "amendment" means
change, including complex changes while "revision" means complete
change, including the adoption of an entirely new covenant. The legal
dictionaries express this traditional difference between "amendment" and
"revision." Black's Law Dictionary defines "amendment" as "[a] formal
revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution, pleading,
order, or other instrument; specifically, a change made by addition, deletion,
or correction."51 Black's also refers to "amendment" as "the process of
making such a revision."52 Revision, on the other hand, is defined as "[a]
reexamination or careful review for correction or improvement."53 In
parliamentary law, it is described as "[a] general and thorough rewriting of a
governing document, in which the entire document is open to
amendment."54 Similarly, Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "amendment"
– as "[a] correction or revision of a writing to correct errors or better to state
its intended purpose"55 and "amendment of constitution" as "[a] process of
proposing, passing, and ratifying amendments to the x x x constitution."56 In
contrast, "revision," when applied to a statute (or constitution),
"contemplates the re-examination of the same subject matter contained in
the statute (or constitution), and the substitution of a new, and what is
believed to be, a still more perfect rule."57
One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we owe

a lot of intellectual debt, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, of the University of the
Philippines College of Law, (later President of the U.P. and delegate to the
Constitutional Convention of 1971) similarly spelled out the difference
between "amendment" and "revision." He opined: "the revision of a
constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of
the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change;
while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be
altered in a constitution."58
Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they

effected changes in our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In 1940, the
changes to the 1935 Constitution which included the conversion from a
unicameral system to a bicameral structure, the shortening of the tenure
of the President and Vice-President from a six-year term without reelection
to a four-year term with one reelection, and the establishment of the
COMELEC, together with the complementary constitutional provisions to
effect the changes, were considered amendments only, not a revision.
The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was,

however, considered a revision since the 1973 Constitution was
"a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and
economic concepts."59 Among those adopted under the 1973 Constitution
were: the parliamentary system in place of the presidential system, with the
leadership in legislation and administration vested with the Prime Minister
and his Cabinet; the reversion to a single-chambered lawmaking body
instead of the two-chambered, which would be more suitable to a
parliamentary system of government; the enfranchisement of the youth
beginning eighteen (18) years of age instead of twenty-one (21), and the
abolition of literacy, property, and other substantial requirements to widen
the basis for the electorate and expand democracy; the strengthening of the
judiciary, the civil service system, and the Commission on Elections; the
complete nationalization of the ownership and management of mass media;
the giving of control to Philippine citizens of all telecommunications; the
prohibition against alien individuals to own educational institutions, and the
strengthening of the government as a whole to improve the conditions of the
masses.60
The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of significant

changes in 1976, 1980, 1981, and 1984. The two significant
innovations introduced in 1976 were (1) the creation of
an interim Batasang Pambansa, in place of the interim National Assembly,
and (2) Amendment No. 6 which conferred on the President the power to
issue decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, whenever the Batasang
Pambansa fails to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his
judgment requires immediate action, or there is grave emergency or threat
or imminence thereof, with such decrees, or letters of instruction to form part
of the law of the land. In 1980, the retirement age of seventy (70) for justices
and judges was restored. In 1981, the presidential system with
parliamentary features was installed. The transfer of private land for use as
residence to natural-born citizens who had lost their citizenship was also
allowed. Then, in 1984, the membership of the Batasang Pambansa was
reapportioned by provinces, cities, or districts in Metro Manila instead of by
regions; the Office of the Vice-President was created while the executive
committee was abolished; and, urban land reform and social housing
programs were strengthened.61 These substantial changes were simply
considered as mere amendments.
In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated

the 1973 Constitution. She governed under Proclamation No. 3, known as
the Freedom Constitution.
In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a

plebiscite and superseded the Provisional or Freedom Constitution. Retired
Justice Isagani Cruz underscored the outstanding features of the 1987
Constitution which consists of eighteen articles and is excessively long
compared to the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, on which it was largely
based. Many of the original provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly
those pertaining to the legislative and executive departments, have been
restored because of the revival of the bicameral Congress of the Philippines
and the strictly presidential system. The independence of the judiciary has
been strengthened, with new provisions for appointment thereto and an
increase in its authority, which now covers even political questions formerly
beyond its jurisdiction. While many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were
retained, like those on the Constitutional Commissions and local
governments, still the new 1987 Constitution was deemed as a revision of
the 1973 Constitution.
It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment

and revision was abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. It is urged that Section
1 of Article XVII gives the power to amend or revise to Congress acting as a
constituent assembly, and to a Constitutional Convention duly called by
Congress for the purpose. Section 2 of the same Article, it is said, limited the
people's right to change the Constitution via initiative through simple
amendments. In other words, the people cannot propose substantial
amendments amounting to revision.
With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the oppositors-intervenors

who peddle the above proposition rely on the opinions of some
Commissioners expressed in the course of the debate on how to frame the
amendment/revision provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar
learning, however, that opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if
inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful
phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the
constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from the action of the
convention but from the powers (of the people) who have ratified and
adopted it.62 "Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons
for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law.'"63 Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the Constitutional
Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion that there was no
abandonment of the traditional distinction between "amendment" and
"revision." For during the debates, some of the commissioners referred to
the concurring opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary,64 that stressed the traditional distinction between
amendment and revision, thus:65
MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one term

and that is, "amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed
to use the terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our attention
was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial
difference in the connotation and significance between the said
terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the
observations made in the famous – or notorious – Javellana
doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice
Makasiar,66 wherein he made the following distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision"
may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other
hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of
specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not
the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of
specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a
consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already
considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935

Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these
two terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article
governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.
To further explain "revision," former Justice Antonio, in his concurring

opinion, used an analogy – "When a house is completely demolished and
another is erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired
and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the material
contained in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be
constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have
altogether another or a new house."67
Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used
the word "revision," they had in mind the "rewriting of the whole
Constitution," or the "total overhaul of the Constitution." Anything
less is an "amendment" or just "a change of specific provisions only," the
intention being "not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the
improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential
as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already
considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times." Under this
view, "substantial" amendments are still "amendments" and thus can be
proposed by the people via an initiative.
As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of

the Commissioners on the difference between "simple" and "substantial"
amendments or whether "substantial" amendments amounting to revision
are covered by people's initiative, it behooves us to follow the cardinal rule
in interpreting Constitutions, i.e., construe them to give effect to
the intention of the people who adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains
its rationale well, viz:68
x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the convention
which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be
arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that
they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words
employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense
most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the
instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be
conveyed. These proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the
proper construction of the instrument than are legislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the
latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the
former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people
through the discussion and deliberations of their representatives.
The history of the calling of the convention, the causes which led
to it, and the discussions and issues before the people at the time
of the election of the delegates, will sometimes be quite as
instructive and satisfactory as anything to be gathered form the
proceedings of the convention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical

principles, but liberally and on broad general lines, to accomplish the
object of its establishment and carry out the great principles of
government – not to defeat them.69 One of these great principles is the
sovereignty of the people.
Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted initiative
as a mode to amend the 1987 Constitution. We start with the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies which Sinco describes as "the basic political
creed of the nation"70 as it "lays down the policies that government is bound
to observe."71 Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1,
Article II of the 1973 Constitution, similarly provide that "the Philippines is
a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." In a republican state, the power of the
sovereign people is exercised and delegated to their
representatives. Thus in Metropolitan Transportation Service v. Paredes,
this Court held that "a republican state, like the Philippines x x x (is) derived
from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government 'of the
people, by the people, and for the people' – a representative government
through which they have agreed to exercise the powers and discharge the
duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare."72
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people delegated
to Congress or to a convention, the power to amend or revise our
fundamental law. History informs us how this delegated power to amend
or revise the Constitution was abused particularly during the Marcos
regime. The Constitution was changed several times to satisfy the power
requirements of the regime. Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was passed giving
unprecedented legislative powers to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. A
conspiracy of circumstances from above and below, however, brought down
the Marcos regime through an extra constitutional revolution, albeit a
peaceful one by the people. A main reason for the people's revolution
was the failure of the representatives of the people to effectuate timely
changes in the Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly
or by calling a constitutional convention. When the representatives of
the people defaulted in using this last peaceful process of constitutional
change, the sovereign people themselves took matters in their own
hands. They revolted and replaced the 1973 Constitution with the 1987
Constitution.
It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the

1987 Constitution as it stressed the power of the people to act directly
in their capacity as sovereign people. Correspondingly, the power of
the legislators to act as representatives of the people in the matter of
amending or revising the Constitution was diminished for the spring
cannot rise above its source. To reflect this significant shift, Section 1,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution was reworded. It now reads: "the
Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." The
commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained
the addition of the word "democratic," in our first Declaration of
Principles, viz:
MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because of the

provisions that we are now adopting which are covering consultations with
the people. For example, we have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of
the people even to participate in lawmaking and other instances that
recognize the validity of interference by the people through people's
organizations x x x x73
MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word "democratic"

to "republican," and, therefore, the first sentence states: "The
Philippines is a republican and democratic state x x x x
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word
"democratic" to "republican"? The constitutional framers of the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with "republican." Was
this done merely for the sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x "democratic" was added because of

the need to emphasize people power and the many
provisions in the Constitution that we have approved related
to recall, people's organizations, initiative and the like, which
recognize the participation of the people in policy-making in
certain circumstances x x x x
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer

and I think it does meet a need x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid,

"democracy" here is understood as participatory
democracy. 74 (emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento

and Adolfo S. Azcuna is of the same import:75
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic

state, are we referring to representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation

under the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions which used the words
"republican state" because "republican state" would refer to a
democratic state where people choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the

people in government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state," we

are stressing the participation of the people x x x x So the word
"republican" will suffice to cover popular representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the

committee felt that in view of the introduction of the aspects
of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall, it
was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of
republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we want
to add the word "democratic" to emphasize that in this new
Constitution there are instances where the people would act
directly, and not through their representatives. (emphasis
supplied)
Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems of initiative,

referendum, and recall were enthroned as polestars in the 1987
Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas F. Ople who introduced the
provision on people's initiative said:76
MR. OPLE. x x x x I think this is just the correct time in history

when we should introduce an innovative mode of proposing
amendments to the Constitution, vesting in the people and their
organizations the right to formulate and propose their own
amendments and revisions of the Constitution in a manner
that will be binding upon the government. It is not that I believe
this kind of direct action by the people for amending a constitution
will be needed frequently in the future, but it is good to know
that the ultimate reserves of sovereign power still rest upon
the people and that in the exercise of that power, they can
propose amendments or revision to the
Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the people's initiative as a

safety valve, as a peaceful way for the people to change their Constitution,
by citing our experiences under the Marcos government, viz:77
MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing this

particular provision, but we are providing a channel for the
expression of the sovereign will of the people through this
initiative system.
MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not

sufficient channel for expression of the will of the people,
particularly in the amendment or revision of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know

what happened during the 20 years under the Marcos
administration. So, if the National Assembly, in a manner of
speaking, is operating under the thumb of the Prime Minister or
the President as the case may be, and the required number of
votes could not be obtained, we would have to provide for
a safety valve in order that the people could ventilate in a very
peaceful way their desire for amendment to the Constitution.
It is very possible that although the people may be

pressuring the National Assembly to constitute itself as a
constituent assembly or to call a constitutional convention,
the members thereof would not heed the people's desire and
clamor. So this is a third avenue that we are providing for the
implementation of what is now popularly known as people's
power. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the people's

initiative could avert a revolution, viz:78
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the

Constitution could actually avert a revolution by providing a
safety valve in bringing about changes in the Constitution through
pacific means. This, in effect, operationalizes what political law
authors call the "prescription of sovereignty." (emphasis supplied)
The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which
expressed the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the
Constitution by direct action or through initiative. To that extent, the
delegated power of Congress to amend or revise the Constitution has
to be adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution has to be reminted and now provides: "The legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum."
Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people
through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change
the Constitution turns sovereignty on its head. At the very least,
the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the
direct sovereignty of the people. It also denigrates the sovereign people who
they claim can only be trusted with the power to propose "simple" but not
"substantial" amendments to the Constitution. According to Sinco, the
concept of sovereignty should be strictly understood in its legal meaning as
it was originally developed in law.79 Legal sovereignty, he explained, is "the
possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor is the legal
sovereign. It implies the absence of any other party endowed with legally
superior powers and privileges. It is not subject to law 'for it is the author
and source of law.' Legal sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal
omnipotence."80
To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy

of the people's will over the state which they themselves have created. The
state is created by and subject to the will of the people, who are the source
of all political power. Rightly, we have ruled that "the sovereignty of our
people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in
mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our
Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to
be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern."81
James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant, scholarly, and

visionary lawyer in the United States in the 1780s, laid down the first
principles of popular sovereignty during the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention of the 1787 Constitution of the United States:82
There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from

which there is no appeal, and which, for that reason, may be
termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable.
x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with

sufficient accuracy our political systems, would answer that, in our
governments, the supreme power was vested in the constitutions
x x x x This opinion approaches a step nearer to the truth, but
does not reach it. The truth is, that in our governments, the
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the
people. As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so
the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed the superiority,
in this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over
our constitution, control in act, as well as right. (emphasis
supplied)
I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state, only the

people is sovereign - - - not the elected President, not the elected
Congress, not this unelected Court. Indeed, the sovereignty of the people
which is indivisible cannot be reposed in any organ of government. Only
its exercise may be delegated to any of them. In our case, the people
delegated to Congress the exercise of the sovereign power to amend
or revise the Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this
power to amend or revise the Constitution, can it be argued that the
sovereign people who delegated the power has no power to substantially
amend the Constitution by direct action? If the sovereign people do not have
this power to make substantial amendments to the Constitution, what did it
delegate to Congress? How can the people lack this fraction of a power to
substantially amend the Constitution when by their sovereignty, all
power emanates from them? It will take some mumbo jumbo to argue that
the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco clinch the point:83
But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of
sovereignty often is. It is delegated to the organs and agents of
the state which constitute its government, for it is only through this
instrumentality that the state ordinarily functions. However ample
and complete this delegation may be, it is nevertheless
subject to withdrawal at any time by the state. On this point
Willoughby says:
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete

autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right
to control of so slight and so negative a character as to make
its exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet so long as
such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy
of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and
continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of
those mother countries over them is complete and they are
to be considered as possessing only administrative
autonomy and not political independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the

Constitution is shared with the people. We should accord the most
benign treatment to the sovereign power of the people to propose
substantial amendments to the Constitution especially when the
proposed amendments will adversely affect the interest of some
members of Congress. A contrary approach will suborn the public weal
to private interest and worse, will enable Congress (the delegate) to
frustrate the power of the people to determine their destiny (the
principal).
All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses

acknowledging the right of the people to exercise initiative and referendum
are liberally and generously construed in favor of the people.84 Initiative
and referendum powers must be broadly construed to maintain maximum
power in the people.85 We followed this orientation in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections.86 There is not an iota of
reason to depart from it.
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Petitioners submit that "[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the
sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by
the fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of the
Petition for Initiative, is a purely political question which is beyond even
the very long arm of this Honorable Court's power of judicial review.
Whether or not the 1987 Constitution should be amended is a matter which
the people and the people alone must resolve in their sovereign
capacity."87 They argue that "[t]he power to propose amendments to the
Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence,
the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose
amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls
squarely within the ambit of a 'political question.'"88
The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been interred
by Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, viz:89
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy
refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is
definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the
Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional
authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on
the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a
downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing

his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's
authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the
procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the people
ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy
of vicious cycle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their
sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the
amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in
1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been
followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by
the people themselves – of course – who exercise no power of
judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people
themselves vested that power, a power which includes the
competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for
amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must
be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and
ratification by the people.
In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the requirements
for the exercise of the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The
amendments must be proposed by the people "upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter."90Compliance with these
requirements is clearly a justiciable and not a political question. Be that as it
may, how the issue will be resolved by the people is addressed to them and
to them alone.
VI
Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves
contentious issues of fact which should first be resolved by the
COMELEC.
Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as it allegedly lacks

the required number of signatures under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution. Said provision requires that the petition for initiative be
supported by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. Oppositors-intervenors
contend that no proper verification of signatures was done in several
legislative districts. They assert that mere verification of the names listed on
the signature sheets without verifying the signatures reduces the signatures
submitted for their respective legislative districts to mere scribbles on a
piece of paper.
Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a certification

dated August 23, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Election Officer
IV, Third District and OIC, First and Second District, Davao City, stating that
his office has not verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the
people's initiative. The certification reads:
This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third

District, Davao City) HAS NOT VERIFIED the signatures of
registered voters as per documents submitted in this office by the
proponents of the People's Initiative. Consequently, NO
ELECTION DOCUMENTS AND/OR ORDER ISSUED BY
HIGHER SUPERIORSused as basis for such verification of
signatures.91
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified
that although Atty. Casquejo and Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Acting Election
Officer IV, First District, Davao City, later issued certifications stating that the
Office of the City Election Officer has examined the list of individuals
appearing in the signature sheets,92 the certifications reveal that the office
had verified only the names of the signatories, but not their signatures.
Oppositors-intervenors submit that not only the names of the signatories
should be verified, but also their signatures to ensure the identities of the
persons affixing their signatures on the signature sheets.
Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that petitioners failed

to obtain the signatures of at least three per cent (3%) of the total number of
registered voters in the First Legislative District of South Cotabato. For the
First District of South Cotabato, petitioners submitted 3,182 signatures for
General Santos City, 2,186 signatures for Tupi, 3,308 signatures for
Tampakan and 10,301 signatures for Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of
359,488 registered voters of said district. Antonino, however, submitted to
this Court a copy of the certification by Glory D. Rubio, Election Officer III,
Polomolok, dated May 8, 2006, showing that the signatures from Polomolok
were not verified because the Book of Voters for the whole municipality was
in the custody of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
Polomolok, South Cotabato.93 Excluding the signatures from Polomolok from
the total number of signatures from the First District of South Cotabato
would yield only a total of 8,676 signatures which falls short of the three per
cent (3%) requirement for the district.
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino

likewise submitted to this Court a certification issued by Atty. Stalin A.
Baguio, City Election Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating that the list of
names appearing on the signature sheets corresponds to the names of
registered voters in the city, thereby implying that they have not actually
verified the signatures.94
The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is further bolstered

by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., which submitted copies of similarly worded
certifications from the election officers from Zamboanga del Sur95 and from
Compostela Valley.96 Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further assails the
regularity of the verification process as it alleged that verification in some
areas were conducted by Barangay officials and not by COMELEC election
officers. It filed with this Court copies of certifications from Sulu and Sultan
Kudarat showing that the verification was conducted by local officials instead
of COMELEC personnel.97
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification conducted by

the election officers sufficiently complied with the requirements of the
Constitution and the law on initiative.
Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the lack of

verification in Davao City and in Polomolok, South Cotabato, petitioner
Aumentado claimed that the same election officers cited by the oppositors-
intervenors also issued certifications showing that they have verified the
signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's initiative. He
presented copies of the certifications issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for
the Second and Third Legislative Districts of Davao City stating that he
verified the signatures of the proponents of the people's initiative. His
certification for the Second District states:
This is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of

individuals as appearing in the Signature Sheets of the Registered
Voters of District II, Davao City, submitted on April 7, 2006 by MR.
NONATO BOLOS, Punong Barangay, Centro, Davao City for
verification which consists of THIRTY THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) signatures.
Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX

HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) individuals, only TWENTY-TWO
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT (22,668) individuals
were found to be REGISTERED VOTERS, in the Computerized
List of Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, DAVAO
CITY.98
It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification
regarding the verification process conducted in Davao City. It reads:
Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered voters,

this Office has previously issued two (2) separate certifications for
the 2nd and 3rd Districts of Davao City on April 20, 2006 and April
26, 2006, respectively, specifically relating to the voters who
supported the people's initiative. It was stated therein that the
names submitted, comprising 22,668 individual voters in the
2nd District and 18,469 individual voters in the 3rd District, were
found [to] be registered voters of the respective districts
mentioned as verified by this Office based on the Computerized
List of Voters.
It must be clarified that the August 23, 2006 Certification was

issued in error and by mistake for the reason that the signature
verification has not been fully completed as of that date.
I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of

the voters as appearing in the signature sheets and has
compared these with the signatures appearing in the book of
voters and computerized list of voters x x x 99
Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated May 8,

2006 issued by Polomolok Election Officer Glory D. Rubio to support their
claim that said officer had conducted a verification of signatures in said area.
The certification states:
This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of

this municipality, as of the May 10, 2004 elections, 10,804 names
with signatures were submitted for verification and out of which
10,301 were found to be legitimate voters as per official list of
registered voters, which is equivalent to 15.07% of the total
number of registered voters of this Municipality.100
In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures in numerous

legislative districts, allegations of fraud and irregularities in the collection of
signatures in Makati City were cited by Senator Pimentel, among others,
to wit:
(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who
may be concerned, by the Makati COMELEC Office that signature
sheets have already been submitted to it for "verification." The
camp of Mayor Binay was able to witness the "verification
process" only because of their pro-active stance;
(2) In District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted

43,405 signatures for verification. 36,219 alleged voters'
signatures (83% of the number of signatures submitted) were
rejected outright. 7,186 signatures allegedly "passed"
COMELEC's initial scrutiny. However, upon examination of the
signature sheets by Atty. Mar-len Abigail Binay, the said 7,186
signatures could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay manually
counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word "OK" and 3,443
signatures marked with a check, giving only 6,236 "apparently
verified signatures." Before the COMELEC officer issued the
Certification, Atty. Binay already submitted to the said office not
less than 55 letters of "signature withdrawal," but no action was
ever taken thereon;
(3) In District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for verification.

23,521 alleged voters' signatures (80% of those submitted) were
rejected outright. Of the 5,890 signatures which allegedly passed
the COMELEC's initial scrutiny, some more will surely fail upon
closer examination;
(4) In the absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the

COMELEC personnel did not know how to treat the objections
and other observations coming from the camp of Mayor Binay.
The oppositors too did not know where to go for their remedy
when the COMELEC personnel merely "listened" to their
objections and other observations. As mentioned earlier, the
COMELEC personnel did not even know what to do with the many
"letters of signature withdrawal" submitted to it;
(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other

forgeries appear on the Sigaw ng Bayan Signature Sheets. There
is even a 15-year old alleged signatory;
(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;
(7) A Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly

signed the Signature Sheets.101
Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not understand
what they have signed as they were merely misled into signing the signature
sheets. Opposed to these allegations are rulings that a person who affixes
his signature on a document raises the presumption that the person so
signing has knowledge of what the document contains. Courts have
recognized that there is great value in the stability of records, so to speak,
that no one should commit herself or himself to something in writing unless
she or he is fully aware and cognizant of the effect it may have upon her on
him.102 In the same vein, we have held that a person is presumed to have
knowledge of the contents of a document he has signed.103 But as this Court
is not a trier of facts, it cannot resolve the issue.
In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied with the
constitutional requirement that the petition for initiative be signed by at least
twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%)
of the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. Its resolution
will require presentation of evidence and their calibration by the
COMELEC according to its rules. During the oral argument on this case,
the COMELEC, through Director Alioden Dalaig of its Law
Department, admitted that it has not examined the documents submitted by
the petitioners in support of the petition for initiative, as well as the
documents filed by the oppositors to buttress their claim that the required
number of signatures has not been met. The exchanges during the oral
argument likewise clearly show the need for further clarification and
presentation of evidence to prove certain material facts.104
The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative
was this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that R.A. 6735 was
insufficient. It has yet to rule on the sufficiency of the form and
substance of the petition. I respectfully submit that this issue should be
properly litigated before the COMELEC where both parties will be given
full opportunity to prove their allegations.
For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and
its compliance with the requirements of R.A. 6735 on initiative and its
implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC
at the first instance, as it is the body that is mandated by the Constitution to
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.105
VII
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due

course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition.
In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition,

COMELEC relied on this Court's ruling in Santiagopermanently enjoining it
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Again, I respectfully submit that COMELEC's reliance

on Santiago constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the firm doctrine that
R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to implement the constitutional provision
allowing people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To recapitulate, the
records show that in the original decision, eight (8) justices106 voted that
R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five (5) justices107 voted that said law was
sufficient; and one (1) justice108 abstained from voting on the issue holding
that unless and until a proper initiatory pleading is filed, the said issue is not
ripe for adjudication.109
Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for
reconsideration. On June 10, 1997, the Court denied the motion. Only
thirteen (13) justices resolved the motion for Justice Torres inhibited
himself.110 Of the original majority of eight (8) justices, only six (6)
reiterated their ruling that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. Justice
Hermosisima, originally part of the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his
vote and joined the minority of five (5) justices. He opined without any
equivocation that R.A. 6735 was a sufficient law, thus:
It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cluster;

another to think under fire – to think for action upon which great
interests depend." So said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and so
I am guided as I reconsider my concurrence to the holding of the
majority that "R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation" and now to
interpose my dissent thereto.
xxx
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.
I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately

providing the legal basis for the exercise by the people of
their right to amend the Constitution through initiative
proceedings and to uphold the validity of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 insofar as it does not sanction the filing of the initiatory
petition for initiative proceedings to amend the Constitution
without the required names and/or signatures of at least 12% of
all the registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein.
(emphasis supplied)
Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency of R.A.

6735. In fine, the final vote on whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient law was 6-
6 with one (1) justice inhibiting himself and another justice refusing to rule
on the ground that the issue was not ripe for adjudication.
It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A.
6735 is an insufficient law failed to establish a doctrine that could serve as a
precedent. Under any alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a
majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value. The
opinion of the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco is instructive, viz:
As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the

deliberations on the issue of whether the motion for
reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision should be granted
or not, only the following justices sided with Mr. Justice Davide,
namely: Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero,
Bellosillo and Kapunan. Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza,
Hermosisima, Panganiban and the undersigned voted to grant the
motion; while Justice Vitug "maintained his opinion that the matter
was not ripe for judicial adjudication." In other words, only five, out
of the other twelve justices, joined Mr. Justice Davide's June 10,
1997 ponencia finding R.A. No. 6735 unconstitutional for its failure
to pass the so called "completeness and sufficiency standards"
tests. The "concurrence of a majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations" which Article VII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution requires to declare a law unconstitutional was,
beyond dispute, not complied with. And even assuming, for the
sake of argument, that the constitutional requirement on the
concurrence of the "majority" was initially reached in the March
19, 1997 ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open
for review by way of a motion for reconsideration. It was only on
June 10, 1997 that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was
settled with finality, sans the constitutionally required "majority."
The Court's declaration, therefore, is manifestly grafted with
infirmity and wanting in force necessitating, in my view, the
reexamination of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 127325. It
behooves the Court "not to tarry any longer" nor waste this
opportunity accorded by this new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to
relieve the Court's pronouncement from constitutional infirmity.
The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is
well-settled. Thus, in the United States, an affirmance in the Federal
Supreme Court upon equal division of opinion is not an authority for the
determination of other cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal
courts. In Neil v. Biggers,111 which was a habeas corpusstate proceeding by
a state prisoner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that its equally divided
affirmance of petitioner's state court conviction was not an "actual
adjudication" barring subsequent consideration by the district court
on habeas corpus. In discussing the non-binding effect of an equal
division ruling, the Court reviewed the history of cases explicating the
disposition "affirmed by an equally divided Court:"
In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition

"affirmed by an equally divided Court." On what was apparently
the first occasion of an equal division, The Antelope, 10 Wheat,
66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the Court simply affirmed on the point of
division without much discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced with a
similar division during the next Term, the Court again affirmed,
Chief Justice Marshall explaining that "the principles of law which
have been argued, cannot be settled; but the judgment is
affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it." Etting v.
Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419
(1826). As was later elaborated in such cases, it is the appellant
or petitioner who asks the Court to overturn a lower court's
decree. "If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for
no order can be made. The judgment of the court below,
therefore, stands in full force. It is indeed, the settled practice in
such case to enter a judgment of affirmance; but this is only the
most convenient mode of expressing the fact that the cause is
finally disposed of in conformity with the action of the court below,
and that that court can proceed to enforce its judgment. The legal
effect would be the same if the appeal, or writ of error, were
dismissed." Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154
(1869). Nor is an affirmance by an equally divided Court entitled to
precedential weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263,
264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1708 (1960).xxx"
This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has
been cited with approval in a number of subsequent cases,112 and has
been applied in various state jurisdictions.
In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a Minor

Child,113 wherein a putative father sought to set aside a decree granting
petition for adoption of an Indian child on grounds of noncompliance with the
requirements of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court of
Alaska held that its decision in In re Adoption of T.N.F. (T.N.F.),114 which
lacked majority opinion supporting holding that an action such as the
putative father's would be governed by the state's one-year statute of
limitations, was not entitled to stare decisis effect. In T.N.F., a majority of
the justices sitting did not agree on a common rationale, as two of four
participating justices agreed that the state's one-year statute of limitations
applied, one justice concurred in the result only, and one justice dissented.
There was no "narrower" reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming
justices. The concurring justice expressed no opinion on the statute of
limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he reasoned that ICWA did
not give the plaintiff standing to sue.115 The two-justice plurality, though
agreeing that the state's one-year statute of limitations applied, specifically
disagreed with the concurring justice on the standing issue.116 Because a
majority of the participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any one
ground for affirmance, it was not accorded stare decisis effect by the state
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare
decisis does not apply to plurality decisions in which no majority of the
justices participating agree to the reasoning and as such are not
authoritative interpretations binding on the Supreme Court.117
In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,118 the Supreme Court of Florida, in

an equally divided opinion on the matter,119 held that chapter 15938, Acts of
1933 must be allowed to stand, dismissing a quo warranto suit without
prejudice. The Court held:
In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be

declared unconstitutional nor its enforcement nor operation
judicially interfered with, except by the concurrence of a majority
of the members of the Supreme Court sitting in the cause wherein
the constitutionality of the statute is brought in question or judicial
relief sought against its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state
Constitution.
Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the

members of this court in holding unconstitutional said chapter
15938, supra, not having been had, it follows that the statute in
controversy must be allowed to stand and accordingly be
permitted to be enforced as a presumptively valid act of the
Legislature, and that this proceeding in quo warranto must be
dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v. Hunt (Fla.) 147 So.
282. This decision is not to be regarded as a judicial precedent on
the question of constitutional law involved concerning the
constitutionality vel non of chapter 15938. State ex rel. Hampton
v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. 51.
Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal

division of the court on question of constitutionality of statute
involved.
In U.S. v. Pink,120 the Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme
Court by an equally divided vote of a decision of the New York Court of
Appeals that property of a New York branch of a Russian insurance
company was outside the scope of the Russian Soviet government's
decrees terminating existence of insurance companies in Russia and
seizing their assets, while conclusive and binding upon the parties as
respects the controversy in that action, did not constitute an authoritative
"precedent."
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,121 the U.S. Court of Appeals Second

Circuit, in holding that printed lyrics which had the same meter as plaintiffs'
lyrics, but which were in form a parody of the latter, did not constitute
infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights, ruled that the prior case of Benny v.
Loew's, Inc.,122 which was affirmed by an equally divided court, was not
binding upon it, viz:
Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems justified by

reason as well as by authority, an affirmance by an equally divided
court is as between the parties, a conclusive determination and
adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law
involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court
sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the
determination of other cases, either in this or in inferior courts.123
In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,124 the Supreme Court of

Illinois dismissed the appeal as it was unable to reach a decision because
two judges recused themselves and the remaining members of the Court
were so divided, it was impossible to secure the concurrence of four judges
as is constitutionally required. The Court followed the procedure employed
by the U.S. Supreme Court when the Justices of that Court are equally
divided, i.e. affirm the judgment of the court that was before it for review.
The affirmance is a conclusive determination and adjudication as between
the parties to the immediate case, it is not authority for the determination of
other cases, either in the Supreme Court or in any other court. It is not
"entitled to precedential weight." The legal effect of such an affirmance is the
same as if the appeal was dismissed.125
The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English

precedents,126 an affirmance by an equally divided Court is, as between the
parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged;
but the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority
of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the
determination of other cases, either in that or in inferior courts.
After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing
doctrine is that, the affirmance by an equally divided court merely disposes
of the present controversy as between the parties and settles no issue of
law; the affirmance leaves unsettled the principle of law presented by the
case and is not entitled to precedential weight or value. In other words, the
decision only has res judicata and not stare decisis effect. It is not
conclusive and binding upon other parties as respects the controversies in
other actions.
Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and
the Delfin Petition in the Santiago case which will prevent the Santiago
ruling from binding the present petitioners. To start with, the parties are
different. More importantly, the Delfin Petition did not contain the signatures
of the required number of registered voters under the Constitution: the
requirement that twelve per cent (12%) of all the registered voters in the
country wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per
cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein was not complied with. For this
reason, we ruled unanimously that it was not the initiatory petition which the
COMELEC could properly take cognizance of. In contrast, the present
petition appears to be accompanied by the signatures of the required
number of registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin Petition prayed that an
Order be issued fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country, the Lambino and Aumentado petition, prayed for the calling of a
plebiscite to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the
proposition. COMELEC cannot close its eyes to these material differences.
Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado
petition on the basis of its mistaken notion that Santiago established the
doctrine that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. As aforestressed, that ruling
of six (6) justices who do not represent the majority lacks precedential status
and is non-binding on the present petitioners.
The Court's dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment. Suffice it to

say that we dismissed the PIRMA petition on the principle of res judicata.
This was stressed by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz:
The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily

dismissed:
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings

filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19
March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is
substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the
roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional,
yet not indispensable, parties in the present petition. But plainly,
the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in both
cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR

REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and
spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA
is self-described as "a non-stock, non-profit organization duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address
at Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village,
Makati City," with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN
PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS
were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which,
as alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to
undertake the signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were sued in
their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was

duly represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in the
COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner
therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding
member of the Movement for People's Initiative, and under
footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that said movement
was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their Comment
to the petition in Santiago, the PEDROSAS did not deny that they
were founding members of PIRMA, and by their arguments,
demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined
Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners

PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them,
from the operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no
further elaboration. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds:
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former

judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between
the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of subject
matter, and identity of causes of action.127
Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the
elements of res judicata are present. For sure, our Decision in
Santiago v. COMELEC, which was promulgated on 19 March
1997, and the motions for reconsideration thereof denied with
finality on 10 June 1997, is undoubtedly final. The said Decision
was rendered by this Court which had jurisdiction over the petition
for prohibition under Rule 65. Our judgment therein was on the
merits, i.e., rendered only after considering the evidence
presented by the parties as well as their arguments in support of
their respective claims and defenses. And, as between Santiago v.
COMELEC case and COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001
subject of the present petition, there is identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are

not identical to the parties in the instant case as some of the
petitioners in the latter case were not parties to the former case.
However, a perusal of the records reveals that the parties in
Santiago v. COMELEC included the COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S.
Delfin, spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities
as founding members of PIRMA, as well as Atty. Pete Quirino-
Quadra, another founding member of PIRMA, representing
PIRMA, as respondents. In the instant case, Atty. Delfin was never
removed, and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa were
joined by several others who were made parties to the petition. In
other words, what petitioners did was to make it appear that the
PIRMA Petition was filed by an entirely separate and distinct
group by removing some of the parties involved in Santiago v.
COMELEC and adding new parties. But as we said in Geralde v.
Sabido128-
A party may not evade the application of the rule of res

judicata by simply including additional parties in the
subsequent case or by not including as parties in the later
case persons who were parties in the previous suit. The
joining of new parties does not remove the case from the
operation of the rule on res judicata if the party against whom
the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first
action; otherwise, the parties might renew the litigation by
simply joining new parties.
The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the
PIRMA petition but were not parties in Santiago v. COMELEC
does not affect the operation of the prior judgment against those
parties to the PIRMA Petition who were likewise parties in
Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are bound by such prior
judgment.
Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based
on res judicata binds only PIRMA but not the petitioners.
VIII
Finally, let the people speak.
"It is a Constitution we are expounding" solemnly intoned the great Chief

Justice John Marshall of the United States in the 1819 case of M'cCulloch
v. Maryland.129 Our Constitution is not a mere collection of slogans. Every
syllable of our Constitution is suffused with significance and requires our full
fealty. Indeed, the rule of law will wither if we allow the commands of our
Constitution to underrule us.
The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is

the sovereignty of the people. We ought to be concerned with this first
principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign people to decide whether to
amend the Constitution. Stripped of its abstractions, democracy is all about
who has the sovereign right to make decisions for the people and our
Constitution clearly and categorically says it is no other than the people
themselves from whom all government authority emanates. This right of
the people to make decisions is the essence of sovereignty, and it
cannot receive any minimalist interpretation from this Court. If there is
any principle in the Constitution that cannot be diluted and is non-
negotiable, it is this sovereign right of the people to decide.
This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in the exercise
of their sovereignty. Let them who will diminish or destroy the sovereign
right of the people to decide be warned. Let not their sovereignty be
diminished by those who belittle their brains to comprehend changes in the
Constitution as if the people themselves are not the source and author of
our Constitution. Let not their sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of
manipulation who misrepresent themselves as the spokesmen of the
people.
Be it remembered that a petition for people's initiative that complies with the
requirement that it "must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein" is but the first step in a long
journey towards the amendment of the Constitution. Lest it be missed, the
case at bar involves but a proposal to amend the Constitution. The
proposal will still be debated by the people and at this time, there is yet
no fail-safe method of telling what will be the result of the debate. There will
still be a last step to the process of amendment which is the ratification of
the proposal by a majority of the people in a plebiscite called for the
purpose. Only when the proposal is approved by a majority of the
people in the plebiscite will it become an amendment to the
Constitution. All the way, we cannot tie the tongues of the people. It is
the people who decide for the people are not an obscure footnote in
our Constitution.
The people's voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear them. Let

us heed them. Let us not only sing paens to the people's sovereignty.
Yes, it is neither too soon nor too late to let the people speak.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of

the Commission on Elections dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to
the Petition for Initiative filed by Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in
their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who
affixed their signatures thereon and to REMAND the petition at bar to the
Commission on Elections for further proceedings.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent; TRADE UNION
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT,
ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN
MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F.
BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T.
TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA,
BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS, LEONADO
SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA
THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO,
AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P.
PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE
ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR,
JR., Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA,
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1. With due respect to the main opinion written by J. Antonio T. Carpio, and
the dissent of J. Reynato S. Puno, I view the matter before us in this petition
as one mainly involving a complex political question.1 While admittedly the
present Constitution lays down certain numerical requirements for the
conduct of a People's Initiative, such as the percentages of signatures –
being 12% of the total number of registered voters, provided each legislative
district is represented by at least 3% – they are not the main points of
controversy. Stated in simple terms, what this Court must decide is whether
the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion when it denied
the petition to submit the proposed changes to the Constitution directly to
the vote of the sovereign people in a plebiscite. Technical
questions, e.g. whether petitioners should have filed a Motion for
Reconsideration before coming to us, are of no moment in the face of the
transcendental issue at hand. What deserve our full attention are the issues
concerning the applicable rules as well as statutory and constitutional
limitations on the conduct of the People's Initiative.
2. It must be stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself

empowers the people to "directly" propose amendments through their own
"initiative." The subject of the instant petition is by way of exercising that
initiative in order to change our form of government from presidential to
parliamentary. Much has been written about the fulsome powers of the
people in a democracy. But the most basic concerns the idea that
sovereignty resides in the people and that all government authority
emanates from them. Clearly, by the power of popular initiative, the people
have the sovereign right to change the present Constitution. Whether the
initial moves are done by a Constitutional Convention, a Constitutional
Assembly, or a People's Initiative, in the end every amendment -- however
insubstantial or radical -- must be submitted to a plebiscite. Thus, it is the
ultimate will of the people expressed in the ballot, that matters.2
3. I cannot fault the COMELEC, frankly, for turning down the petition of
Messrs. Lambino, et al. For the COMELEC was just relying on precedents,
with the common understanding that, pursuant to the cases of Santiago v.
COMELEC3 and PIRMA v. COMELEC,4 the COMELEC had been
permanently enjoined from entertaining any petition for a people's initiative
to amend the Constitution by no less than this Court. In denying due course
below to Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado's petition, I could not hold the
COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion when they merely relied on
this Court's unequivocal rulings. Of course, the Santiago and
the PIRMA decisions could be reviewed and reversed by this Court, as J.
Reynato S. Puno submits now. But until the Court does so, the COMELEC
was duty bound to respect and obey this Court's mandate, for the rule of law
to prevail.
4. Lastly, I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the petition

of Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado and 6.327 million voters, for further
examination of the factual requisites before a plebiscite is conducted. On
page 4 of the assailed Resolution of the respondent dated August 31, 2006,
the COMELEC tentatively expressed its view that "even if the signatures in
the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the
total number of registered voters", the COMELEC could not give the Petition
due course because of our view that R.A. No. 6735 was inadequate. That,
however, is now refuted by Mr. Justice Puno's scholarly ponencia. Now that
we have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC decision, there is only one
clear task for COMELEC. In my view, the only doable option left for the
COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give due
course to the petition for the initiative to amend our Constitution so that the
sovereign people can vote on whether a parliamentary system of
government should replace the present presidential system.
5. I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak on their

choice of the form of government as a political question soonest. (This I say
without fear of media opinion that our judicial independence has been
tainted or imperiled, for it is not.) Thus I vote for the remand of the petition.
Thereafter, as prayed for, COMELEC should forthwith certify the Petition as
sufficient in form and substance and call for the holding of a plebiscite within
the period mandated by the basic law, not earlier than sixty nor later than
ninety days from said certification. Only a credible plebiscite itself,
conducted peacefully and honestly, can bring closure to the instant political
controversy.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
G. R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q.

vs.
HE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE
V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DISSENTING OPINION
CORONA, J.:
The life of the law is not logic but experience.1 Our collective experience as
a nation breathes life to our system of laws, especially to the Constitution.
These cases promise to significantly contribute to our collective experience
as a nation. Fealty to the primary constitutional principle that the Philippines
is not merely a republican State but a democratic one as well behooves this
Court to affirm the right of the people to participate directly in the process of
introducing changes to their fundamental law. These petitions present such
an opportunity. Thus, this is an opportune time for this Court to uphold the
sovereign rights of the people.
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has sufficiently
explained the rationale for upholding the people's initiative. However, I wish
to share my own thoughts on certain matters I deem material and
significant.
Santiago Does Not Apply to This Case But Only to the 1997 Delfin
Petition
The COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by petitioners

purportedly on the basis of this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC2 that:
(1) RA 6753 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative regarding
amendments to the Constitution and (2) the COMELEC was permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative
regarding amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law was validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the initiative provision.
However, Santiago should not apply to this case but only to the petition of
Delfin in 1997. It would be unreasonable to make it apply to all petitions
which were yet unforeseen in 1997. The fact is that Santiago was focused
on the Delfin petition alone.
Those who oppose the exercise of the people's right to initiate changes to
the Constitution via initiative claim that Santiago barred any and all future
petitions for initiative by virtue of the doctrines of stare decisis and res
judicata. The argument is flawed.
The ponencia of Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the arguments
relating to stare decisis. Hence, I will address the argument from the
viewpoint of res judicata.
Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of

competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a
subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.3 It
has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits
and (4) there must be identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of
action between the first and second actions.4
There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant case. While the
COMELEC was also the respondent in Santiago, the petitioners in that case
and those in this case are different. More significantly, there is no identity of
causes of action in the two cases. Santiago involved amendments to
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and Section 8 of Article
X of the Constitution while the present petition seeks to amend Sections 1to
7 of Article VI and Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly,
therefore, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that the present petition for initiative was barred by Santiago and, on that
ground, dismissed the petition.
The present petition and that in Santiago are materially different from each
other. They are not based on the same facts. There is thus no cogent
reason to frustrate and defeat the present direct action of the people to
exercise their sovereignty by proposing changes to their fundamental law.
People's Initiative Should Not

Be Subjected to Conditions
People's initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves

exclusively. Neither Congress nor the COMELEC has the power to curtail or
defeat this exclusive power of the people to change the Constitution. Neither
should the exercise of this power be made subject to any conditions, as
some would have us accept.
Oppositors to the people's initiative point out that this Court ruled
in Santiago that RA 6735 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and, thus, no law existed to enable the
people to directly propose changes to the Constitution. This reasoning is
seriously objectionable.
The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of

place. It was unprecedented and dangerously transgressed the domain
reserved to the legislature.
While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for determining

the validity and sufficiency of a petition to amend the constitution,5 that
procedure cannot unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege.6 In the same
vein, this Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the people's
right to directly propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law
inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but
insignificant omissions. Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower the
people will be severely emasculated, if not rendered illusory.
People's Right and Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution

Directly Should not be Unreasonably Curtailed
If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are

mere representative bodies, can propose changes to the Constitution,
there is no reason why the supreme body politic itself – the people – may
not do so directly.
Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise

of "direct democracy" as opposed to "representative democracy." The
system of initiative allows citizens to directly propose constitutional
amendments for the general electorate to adopt or reject at the polls,
particularly in a plebiscite. While representative government was envisioned
to "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations,"7 the
exercise of "direct democracy" through initiative reserves direct lawmaking
power to the people by providing them a method to make new laws via the
constitution, or alternatively by enacting statutes.8 Efforts of the represented
to control their representatives through initiative have been described as
curing the problems of democracy with more democracy.9
The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people and declares
that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them."10 Unless the present petition is granted, this
constitutional principle will be nothing but empty rhetoric, devoid of
substance for those whom it seeks to empower.
The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce changes to the
Constitution is a fundamental right and must be jealously guarded.11 The
people should be allowed to directly seek redress of the problems of society
and representative democracy with the constitutional tools they have
reserved for their use alone.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174513.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153
RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952

REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L.
ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN
MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F.
BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T.
TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA,
BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS, LEONADO
SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA
THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO,
AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P.
PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE
ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR,
JR.,Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299 entitled

SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA,
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J:
I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its enviable sang-
froid, inimitable lucidity, and luminous scholarship are all so characteristic of
the author that it is hardly a waste of pen and ink to write separately if only
to express my deep admiration for his disquisition. It is compelling because
it derives from the fundamental democratic ordinance that sovereignty
resides in the people, and it seeks to effectuate that principle through the
actual empowerment of the sovereign people. Justice Puno's opinion will in
the short term engender reactions on its impact on present attempts to
amend the Constitution, but once the political passion of the times have
been shorn, it will endure as an unequivocal message to
the taongbayan that they are to be trusted to chart the course of their future.
Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Puno's opinion. I only write
separately to highlight a few other points which also inform my vote to grant
the petitions.
I.
I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC1 and PIRMA v.

COMELEC2 had not acquired value as precedent and should be reversed in
any case. I add that the Court has long been mindful of the rule that it
necessitates a majority, and not merely a plurality, in order that a decision
can stand as precedent. That principle has informed the members of this
Court as they deliberated and voted upon contentious petitions, even if this
consideration is not ultimately reflected on the final draft released for
promulgation.
The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the denigration
heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in those cases, the Court did not invalidate
any provision of the statute. All the Court said then was that the law was
"inadequate". Since this "inadequate" law was not annulled by the Court, or
repealed by Congress, it remained part of the statute books.3
I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly "inadequate", the Court
in Santiago should not have simply let the insufficiency stand given that it
was not minded to invalidate the law itself. Article 9 of the Civil Code
provides that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws."4As explained by the
Court recently in Reyes v. Lim,5 "[Article 9] calls for the application of equity,
which[, in the revered Justice Cardozo's words,] 'fills the open spaces in the
law.'"6 Certainly, any court that refuses to rule on an action premised on
Rep. Act No. 6735 on the ground that the law is "inadequate" would have
been found in grave abuse of discretion. The previous failure by the Court to
"fill the open spaces" in Santiago further highlights that decision's status as
an unfortunate aberration.
I am mindful of the need to respect stare decisis, to the point of having

recently decried a majority ruling that was clearly minded to reverse several
precedents but refused to explicitly say so.7 Yet the principle is not
immutable.8The passionate words of Chief Justice Panganiban in Osmeña
v. COMELEC9 bear quoting:
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the
Court is maintaining the ad ban to be consistent with its previous
holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus, respondent urges reverence
for the stability of judicial doctrines. I submit, however, that more
important than consistency and stability are the verity, integrity
and correctness of jurisprudence. As Dean Roscoe Pound
explains, "Law must be stable but it cannot stand still." Verily, it
must correct itself and move in cadence with the march of the
electronic age. Error and illogic should not be perpetuated. After
all, the Supreme Court, in many cases, has deviated from stare
decisis and reversed previous doctrines and decisions.10 It should
do no less in the present case.11
Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may affirm a law as
constitutional, yet declare its provisions as inadequate to accomplish the
legislative purpose, then barred the enforcement of the law. That ruling is
erroneous, illogical, and should not be perpetuated.
II.
Following Justice Puno's clear demonstration why Santiago should not be

respected as precedent, I agree that the COMELEC's failure to take
cognizance of the petitions as mandated by Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes
grave abuse of discretion correctible through the petitions before this Court.
The Court has consistently held in cases such as Abes v.

COMELEC12, Sanchez v. COMELEC13, and Sambarani v. COMELEC14 that
"the functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially
executive and administrative in nature".15 More pertinently, in Buac v.
COMELEC16, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC relative to
the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a plebiscite fell under
the jurisdiction of the poll body under its constitutional mandate "to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a xxx
plebiscite".17
Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The
primary task of the COMELEC under Rep. Act No. 6735 is to enforce and
administer the said law, functions that are essentially executive and
administrative in nature. Even the subsequent duty of the COMELEC of
determining the sufficiency of the petitions after they have been filed is
administrative in character. By any measure, the COMELEC's failure to
perform its executive and administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
III.
It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are barred under
Republic Act No. 6735 as they allegedly embrace more than one subject.
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 classifies as a "prohibited measure," a
petition submitted to the electorate that embraces more than one
subject.18 On this point, reliance is apparently placed on the array of
provisions which are to be affected by the amendments proposed in the
Constitution
Statutes
Executive Iss
Judicial Issuances
Other Issuances
Jurisprudence
International Legal Resources
AUSL Exclusive
Today is hursday, September 05, 2019

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR,
and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA,
PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE
Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V.
BORRA, Intervenors.
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent

Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on

Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the
proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article
V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for
ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said
resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the
holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent
Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the
aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC,
the Count required that copies thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the
Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action as they may deem
proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues
with petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal
officers of the Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature,
since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds appropriated
by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief
Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the petition
was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two
thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist
petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and

even possible confusion, and considering that with the principal parties being duly
represented by able counsel, their interests would be adequately protected already,
the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to
the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the success of the
respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S.
Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion
Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right,
have been allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of
brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be duly and amply
represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding
motions for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied,
the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties, the latter in
representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of this
case with the records and the Court acknowledges that they have not been without
value as materials in the extensive study that has been undertaken in this case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971
came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines
approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of
calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions
2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969
respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by
virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act
6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose

amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, to be composed
of two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall
have the same qualifications as those required of Members of the
House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be

valid and considered part of the Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted
to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different
cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held
its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers,
organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its first formal
proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27,
1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER
THE VOTING AGE TO 18
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional

Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the

Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of

the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
(twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to
read and write, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution

of the Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age

qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to
other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971
Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section
or on other portions of the entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of

P75,000.00 from its savings or from its unexpended funds for the
expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should
there be no savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive
P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon
respondent Comelec "to help the Convention implement (the above) resolution." The
said letter reads:
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1

quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132

otherwise known as the Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may
we call upon you to help the Convention implement this resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P.
MACAPAGAL
DIOSDADO P.
MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional

Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of

separate official ballots, election returns and tally sheets for the use
of said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security

measures for the printing and shipment of said ballots and election
forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the
Commission in time so that they could be distributed at the same
time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample ballots
to be used in the elections on November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors'

Governors' statement of the genesis of the above proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad

Hoc Committee to implement the Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were
approved by the President who then transmitted them to the
Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the

progress of the implementation of the plebiscite in the afternoon of
October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters
of transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached
as Annex 8-Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the

Convention approved a resolution authored by Delegate Antonio
Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention
from November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates
to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies
of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto
attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24

submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the authority of the
President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1,
including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts
performed in connection with said implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and
the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the
Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding
of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial
and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts
in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by
said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such
a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a
legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under
Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question
cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the
other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other
hand, respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date
and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the
Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the Convention as
a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that
this power includes that of submitting such amendments either individually or jointly
at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's
delicate task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of

jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is a political question and that the
Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its
acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the courts.
In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined
intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the
convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer
acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of

this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members
of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the other matters
therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously,
distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our
decision they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its
jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called
for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at
par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very case
of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as
regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held
for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this
Court — speaking through one of the leading members of the
Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional
Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court

characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one declined
to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes
cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the
Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for
ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the
fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened,
however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil.
818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Tañada v.
Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on
Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that the
officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its
supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as
claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to
determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the
Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging
to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber,
purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first
party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of
Congress purporting to apportion the representatives districts for the
House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment
had not been made as may be possible according to the number of
inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced
in these four (4) cases that the issues therein raised were political
questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose

amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the
repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1,
Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to
amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly
grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the
Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that
Senators and members of the House of Representatives act, not as
members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive
their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, (Of amending the Constitution) for
their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they
are the very source of all powers of government including the
Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to

the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from
the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have
the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond
constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government
of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such
rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution expressly confers
upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the
power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the
Constitution), despite the eminently political character of treaty-
making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting

as a constituent assembly — violates the Constitution is essentially
justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to
the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken
in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be deemed
modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on
this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the
Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in his petition and in his oral argument and
memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what respondents and
intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of
1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its existence and derives all
its authority and power from the existing Constitution of the Philippines. This
Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case of a
revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new
government born of either a war of liberation from a mother country or of a revolution
against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat.
As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely
without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the
remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted
by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the
current convention came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a
joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1,
Article XV of the present Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of

three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary
powers generally beyond the control of any department of the existing government,
but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only with the purpose for
which the convention was called and as it may propose cannot have any effect as
part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily
follows that the acts of convention, its officers and members are not immune from
attack on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force and effect in
its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of the Convention
notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly. While it is
indubitable that in its internal operation and the performance of its task to propose
amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control
by any other authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the
Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the
equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard
of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such
Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of private property
without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or
assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a
controversy between private individuals or between such individuals and the state, in
violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot
validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of the existing Constitution, the simple
question arises, should an act of the Convention be assailed by a citizen as being
among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing Constitution,
who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence
of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a
grave constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we would have to
confess that the integrated system of government established by our founding
fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally
unworthy of their learning, experience and craftsmanship in constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very
decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors,
reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in the opinion
written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the one leaves off
and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmark of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking

perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and
balances and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment and
the principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution
are real as they should be in any living Constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts,
not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if
not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our
Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is

to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review
is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to strike conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed
as its functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power

provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered
that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the
chief palladium of constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors
of this blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever
ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression on the
authority of their Constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis then,
must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come
be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of

December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to
the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last
day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly; notwithstanding
the previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as
aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the
National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the
Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no
effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the
exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December
9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the
last day for filing protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be
upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a

conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the
other. From the very nature of the republican government established
in our country in the light of American experience and of our own,
upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries. The Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion to
refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific
purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when
and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that
it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the
people and that it is not subject to constitutional restriction. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under
the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of
the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and
other European types of constitutional government, the framers of
our Constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department.
In some countries which have declined to follow the American
example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions
prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the
fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise
would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are
bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the
Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly provides that courts shall
have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV).
The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In
countries whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have
assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and
South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary
Law to Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic,
February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of
the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to
pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the
present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies
created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of
the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict
were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to
answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion
in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we
are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present
case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara,
these postulates just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority between the
three existing regular departments of the government but to all such conflicts
between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand,
and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals
in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House
of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and
none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors,
why the same ruling should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an
assembly of delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as already
demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the
present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court
over the present case. It goes without saying that We do this not because the Court
is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the control of the
Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the
Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per
Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court,
under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents
and intervenors have joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it
within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat,
the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to
eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner
and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and
resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most
accurate and unequivocal statement of the real issue which the Court is called upon
to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not against the constitutional
extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he
has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the
herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that the proposed amendment here
involved be submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the
petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any
violation of the Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of
or in connection with the most laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it,
the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point of
whether or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the
ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the
abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said
resolution as well as in the subject question implementing actions and resolution of
the Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a
matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and
is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments
affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution
No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed "shall be
without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the
1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section or on other
portions of the entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may say or
do, in this case should be understood as reflecting, in any degree or means the
individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental issue
of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply because
that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone
that, once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do its
part so that the said proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their
approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the
youth have not blinded them to the absolute necessity, under the fundamental
principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of adhering
always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose
cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of the problem before
Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure,
because of the pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by
various elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant search for a
peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful changes in the structure
and bases of the existing social and governmental institutions, including the
provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic security of
the underprivileged classes of our people as well as those concerning the
preservation and protection of our natural resources and the national patrimony, as
an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief,
leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at times have justifiably or
unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the
youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not want confusion
and disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are law and order, peace
and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they strongly and urgently feel must be
done to change the present order of things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic
and contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow
itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the
imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution.
Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it binds other departments of the
government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court
the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and
construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking
down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved to
discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for
constitutional reforms, to the point of being convinced that meaningful change is the
only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to put any
obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there are
respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the existing
Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the
Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form
part of it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle and in logic,
the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective judgment of its members as
to what is warranted by the present condition of things, as they see it, can limit the
extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may propose, hence the
complete substitution of the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the
Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave divergence of
views, the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in which it should
discharge its constitutional duty in such premises. The issues raised by petitioner,
even those among them in which respondents and intervenors have joined in an
apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not necessarily
impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court
considers it to be of the utmost importance that the Convention should be
untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally as signed
mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in
to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and
to the specific extent only that it would be necessary to do so to avoid a
constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing Charter. Withal,
it is a very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to
be resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it, and
this rule is founded precisely on the principle of respect that the Court must accord
to the acts of the other coordinate departments of the government, and certainly, the
Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the
Convention came into being by a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to
Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in this opinion. We
reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and the
performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the
Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the
existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing
amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of Article
XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution
took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the
same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the
most valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy
such as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of
the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects
the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the
people within the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care
is taken in preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for which it is
intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is
obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less
importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and
prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very nature of things, the
drafters of an original constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any
limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon
themselves. This is not necessarily true of subsequent conventions called to amend
the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their
handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for
reasons purely personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are
supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least,
as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence,
they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or
less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions
carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the
people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And when such
limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie
in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and
disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their
original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the

number and nature and the scope and extent of the amendments the Convention
may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass on the issue
extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the power or
duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the
Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the
Congress or whether the said power can be exercised concurrently by the
Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does
not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave and important as it
may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the
members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and
deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons,
November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling,
being nigh, We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views
on this question until a more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the basis of this
decision is as important and decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or
condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of
the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in
Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and
limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be
submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that
the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first
amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the
purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is
not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the
Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt

says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention
called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing
no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may
propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that
"such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many
"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments
proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the
provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and
appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution is as
serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any
amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because the
Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable
as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately
formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights,
liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and
aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a constitution worthy
of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the
purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in
its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them,
more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can
either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before
casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document
the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole.
And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the
existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed
amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and
thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already
from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no
fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant
qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage,
there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the
proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if
a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he
feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in
the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not,
because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can
he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in
the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to
approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the
right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not
later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each
level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in
other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing
substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a
voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of
the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish
and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an
amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only
sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with
which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of
things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds,
if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the
people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.
We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section
1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to
frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that
the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that
intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed
amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the
ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the
proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for
the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the
Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on the
merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like the
Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution which
is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the
mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God has
given Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite
before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has
been called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all
subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the condition in
Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the
ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying
any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding
that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to
them not separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed
by this present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic

Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts
and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent
Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and
void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of
the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in
compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of
this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —
I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient majority of

the Court on just one ground, which to be sure achieves the result from the legal and
constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the validity of the premises
postulated and conclusions reached in support of the dispositive portion of the
decision. However, considering the urgent nature of this case, the lack of time to set
down at length my opinion on the particular issue upon which the decision is made
to rest, and the fact that a dissent on the said issue would necessarily be
inconclusive unless the other issues raised in the petition are also considered and
ruled upon — a task that would be premature and pointless at this time — I limit
myself to this reservation.
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual inimitable,
forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we do not express our individual views on
the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment, which is not in issue here
because it is a matter that properly and exclusively addresses itself to the collective
judgment of the people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional dimension

which, although they would seem to be superfluous because of the reach of the
basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion, nevertheless
appear to us to be just as fundamental in character and scope.
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal

amendments and submit each separately to the people for ratification, we are
nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submission of title proposed
amendment in question within the meaning and intendment of Section 1 of Article XV
of the Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election is not the proper
election envisioned by the same provision of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on

Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on
Elections,2 expounded his view, with which we essentially agree, on the minimum
requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the
people of a proposed constitutional amendment. This is what he said:
... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing
or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are
not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull
over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed
amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly
insidious influences. We believe the word "submitted" can only mean
that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain
every effort to inform citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof.
By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or
100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no
submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the
framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is
that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification,
should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural
framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their
act of ratification or rejection. For we have earlier stated, one thing
is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection." .
The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers of
this concurring opinion, in the following words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers

that such amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification", if the concentration of
the people's attention thereon is to be diverted by other extraneous
issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The framers
of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and
of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have
only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated,
considered and voted upon an election wherein the people could
devote undivided attention to the subject.4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do you
not want the 18-year old to be allowed to vote?," would seem to be uncomplicated
and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which appear to be simple
may turn out not to be so simple after all.
A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average
voter. Why should the voting age be lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the
new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And why not 17? Or even
16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old so that there is no need of
an educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and
dissent, can the 18-year old be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-
year old, in the past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed
amendment is voted down by the people, will the Constitutional Convention insist on
the said amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the
Constitutional Convention in having this particular proposed amendment ratified at
this particular time? Do some of the members of the Convention have future political
plans which they want to begin to subserve by the approval this year of this
amendment? If this amendment is approved, does it thereby mean that the 18-year
old should now also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old?
Will he be required to render compulsory military service under the colors? Will the
age of contractual consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against this
amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come
1973? .
The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain (of
searching questions) the bounds of which are not immediately ascertainable. Surely,
many more questions can be added to the already long litany. And the answers
cannot be had except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon
purposefully, and accorded undivided attention.
Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election
time will not be, sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and effects of the
proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded ample time to
deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted
from a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits of the
proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local elections
and politics. They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the
proposed amendment.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the
words, "at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, has not been
met.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo,
characterized by clarity and vigor, its manifestation of fealty to the rule of law
couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution occupies
the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and Constitutional
Convention alike, no less than this Court, must bow to its supremacy. Thereby
constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of what is allowable, if not
indeed required by the Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as the
acceptance of the conclusion reached. The question presented is indeed novel, not
being controlled by constitutional prescription, definite and certain. Under the
circumstances, with the express recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the
Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot discern any objection to
the validity of its action there being no legal impediment that would call for its
nullification. Such an approach all the more commends itself to me considering that
what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according
to our Constitution, sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I
find myself unable to join my brethren.
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved by
reliance on, implicit in the petition and the answer of intervenors, such concepts as
legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by petitioner on the one
hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors.
It is gratifying to note that during the oral argument of petitioner and counsel for
respondents and intervenors, there apparently was a retreat from such extreme
position, all parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy of the
Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted by this Court, should be
controlling on both Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though that in
at least one American state, that is Pennsylvania, there were decisions announcing
the doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a constitutional convention are
dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred directly
by the fundamental law. The result is a convention that is subordinate to the
lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed. It has to look to the latter
for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus made subordinate to
the legislature. Nowhere has such a view been more vigorously expressed than in
the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its holding though finds no support under
our constitutional provision.
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional
convention may lay claim to an attribute sovereign in character. The Constitution is
quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom sovereignty
resides.2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency
entrusted with the responsibility of high import and significance it is true; it is denied
unlimited legal competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to
yield to the superior force of the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the
exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of the people. It is to be admitted that
there are some American state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v.
Fredericks,3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different
conclusion. The doctrine therein announced cannot bind us. Our Constitution makes
clear that the power of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately
termed constituent, limited as it is to the purpose of drafting a constitution or
proposing revision or amendments to one in existence, subject in either case to
popular approval.
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional
convention, alike recognized by the Constitution, are coordinate, there being no
superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of proposing
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a
wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the Constitution which can be the only
source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that
the call to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be
interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary conclusion would
impair its usefulness for the delicate, and paramount task assigned to it. A
convention then is to be looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate
departments which under the principle of separation of powers is supreme within its
field and has exclusive cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A
succinct statement of the appropriate principle that should govern the relationship
between a constitutional convention and a legislative body under American law is
that found in Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a
convention was absolute. The convention was sovereign and subject to no restraint.
On the other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in
decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and subject to
the restrictions imposed on it by the legislative call. A third and intermediate view is
that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not sovereign, is a body
independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing constitution, but not by the
acts of the legislature, as to the extent of its constituent power. This view has
become increasingly prevalent in the state decisions."4
2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously

stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any limitation on the power the
Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads: "The
Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification."
Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two
steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus as to the former, two constituent
bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode therein
provided, and a constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once
assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress of the Philippines,
possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as Congress may
determine what amendments it would have the people ratify and thereafter take all
the steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be
obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be deemed possessed of all
the necessary authority to assure that whatever amendments it seeks to introduce
would be submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would
appear to me that to view the convention as being denied a prerogative which is not
withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to place it in an inferior
category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and constitutional
convention are agencies for submitting proposals under the fundamental law. A
power granted to one should not be denied the other. No justification for such a
drastic differentiation either in theory or practice exists.
Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require ordinary
legislation before the convention could be enabled to have its proposals voted on by
the people would be to place a power in the legislative and executive branches that
could, whether by act or omission, result in the frustration of the amending process. I
am the first to admit that such likelihood is remote, but if such a risk even if minimal
could be avoided, it should be, unless the compelling force of an applicable
constitutional provision requires otherwise. Considering that a constitutional
convention is not precluded from imposing additional restrictions on the powers of
either the executive or legislative branches, or, for that matter, the judiciary, it would
appear to be the better policy to interpret Article XV in such a way that would not
sanction such restraint on the authority that must be recognized as vested in a
constitutional convention. There is nothing in such a view that to my mind would
collide with a reasonable interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one way by which
freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be easier to accommodate a constitution
to the needs of an unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to the
challenge that time inevitably brings in its wake.
From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the
challenged resolution was well within the power of the convention. That would be to
brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of appraising the
legitimate scope of its competence. That would be, for me, to give added vigor and
life to the conferment of authority vested in it, attended by such grave and awesome
responsibility.
3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article XV

providing that such amendment shall be valid when submitted and thereafter
approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar to the
proposed submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by my brethren that there is to
be only one election and that therefore the petition must be sustained as only when
the convention has finished its work should all amendments proposed be submitted
for ratification. That is not for me, and I say this with respect, the appropriate
interpretation. It is true that the Constitution uses the word "election" in the singular,
but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should be accorded rules of grammar;
they do not exert a compelling force in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be
sought not from specific language in the singular but from the mosaic of significance
derived from the total context. It could be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a
mode of construction does not commend itself. The words used in the Constitution
are not inert; they derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed.
Petitioner's stress on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for me,
carry the day.
It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is provisional and
therefore is not such as was contemplated in this article. I do not find such
contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did seek to
consult the wishes of the people by the proposed submission of a tentative
amendatory provision is an argument for its validity. It might be said of course that
until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed upon by the
electorate. There is plausibility in such a view. A literal reading of the Constitution
would support it. The spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied.
From its silence I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy to the
fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the popular will. In
that sense, the Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is not
silently silent but silently vocal. What I deem the more important consideration is that
while a public official, as an agent, has to locate his source of authority in either
Constitution or statute, the people, as the principal, can only be limited in the
exercise of their sovereign powers by the express terms of the Constitution. A
concept to the contrary would to my way of thinking be inconsistent with the
fundamental principle that it is in the people, and the people alone, that sovereignty
resides.
4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its authority, an
action to restrain or prohibit respondent Commission on Elections from conducting
the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the Commission on
Elections in thus being charged with such a duty does not act in its capacity as the
constitutional agency to take charge of all laws relative to the conduct of election.
That is a purely executive function vested in it under Article X of the Constitution.5 It
is not precluded from assisting the Constitutional Convention if pursuant to its
competence to amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in this case, to submit a
proposal, even if admittedly tentative, to the electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any
rate, it may be implied that under the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it is not to
turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention to aid it in the legitimate
discharge of its functions.6
The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a force that I
mind myself unable to overcome, leave me no alternative but to dissent from my
brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from their basic premises, the
conclusion arrived at by them cannot be characterized as in any wise bereft of a
persuasive quality of a high order.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —
I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient majority of

the Court on just one ground, which to be sure achieves the result from the legal and
constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the validity of the premises
postulated and conclusions reached in support of the dispositive portion of the
decision. However, considering the urgent nature of this case, the lack of time to set
down at length my opinion on the particular issue upon which the decision is made
to rest, and the fact that a dissent on the said issue would necessarily be
inconclusive unless the other issues raised in the petition are also considered and
ruled upon — a task that would be premature and pointless at this time — I limit
myself to this reservation.
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual inimitable,
forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we do not express our individual views on
the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment, which is not in issue here
because it is a matter that properly and exclusively addresses itself to the collective
judgment of the people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional dimension

which, although they would seem to be superfluous because of the reach of the
basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion, nevertheless
appear to us to be just as fundamental in character and scope.
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal

amendments and submit each separately to the people for ratification, we are
nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submission of title proposed
amendment in question within the meaning and intendment of Section 1 of Article XV
of the Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election is not the proper
election envisioned by the same provision of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on

Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on
Elections,2 expounded his view, with which we essentially agree, on the minimum
requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the
people of a proposed constitutional amendment. This is what he said:
... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing
or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are
not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull
over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed
amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly
insidious influences. We believe the word "submitted" can only mean
that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain
every effort to inform citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof.
By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or
100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no
submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the
framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is
that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification,
should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural
framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their
act of ratification or rejection. For we have earlier stated, one thing
is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection." .
The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers of
this concurring opinion, in the following words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers

that such amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification", if the concentration of
the people's attention thereon is to be diverted by other extraneous
issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The framers
of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and
of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have
only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated,
considered and voted upon an election wherein the people could
devote undivided attention to the subject.4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do you
not want the 18-year old to be allowed to vote?," would seem to be uncomplicated
and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which appear to be simple
may turn out not to be so simple after all.
A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average
voter. Why should the voting age be lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the
new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And why not 17? Or even
16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old so that there is no need of
an educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and
dissent, can the 18-year old be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-
year old, in the past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed
amendment is voted down by the people, will the Constitutional Convention insist on
the said amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the
Constitutional Convention in having this particular proposed amendment ratified at
this particular time? Do some of the members of the Convention have future political
plans which they want to begin to subserve by the approval this year of this
amendment? If this amendment is approved, does it thereby mean that the 18-year
old should now also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old?
Will he be required to render compulsory military service under the colors? Will the
age of contractual consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against this
amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come
1973? .
The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain (of
searching questions) the bounds of which are not immediately ascertainable. Surely,
many more questions can be added to the already long litany. And the answers
cannot be had except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon
purposefully, and accorded undivided attention.
Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election
time will not be, sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and effects of the
proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded ample time to
deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted
from a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits of the
proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local elections
and politics. They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the
proposed amendment.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the
words, "at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, has not been
met.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo,
characterized by clarity and vigor, its manifestation of fealty to the rule of law
couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution occupies
the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and Constitutional
Convention alike, no less than this Court, must bow to its supremacy. Thereby
constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of what is allowable, if not
indeed required by the Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as the
acceptance of the conclusion reached. The question presented is indeed novel, not
being controlled by constitutional prescription, definite and certain. Under the
circumstances, with the express recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the
Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot discern any objection to
the validity of its action there being no legal impediment that would call for its
nullification. Such an approach all the more commends itself to me considering that
what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according
to our Constitution, sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I
find myself unable to join my brethren.
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved by
reliance on, implicit in the petition and the answer of intervenors, such concepts as
legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by petitioner on the one
hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors.
It is gratifying to note that during the oral argument of petitioner and counsel for
respondents and intervenors, there apparently was a retreat from such extreme
position, all parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy of the
Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted by this Court, should be
controlling on both Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though that in
at least one American state, that is Pennsylvania, there were decisions announcing
the doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a constitutional convention are
dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred directly
by the fundamental law. The result is a convention that is subordinate to the
lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed. It has to look to the latter
for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus made subordinate to
the legislature. Nowhere has such a view been more vigorously expressed than in
the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its holding though finds no support under
our constitutional provision.
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional
convention may lay claim to an attribute sovereign in character. The Constitution is
quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom sovereignty
resides.2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency
entrusted with the responsibility of high import and significance it is true; it is denied
unlimited legal competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to
yield to the superior force of the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the
exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of the people. It is to be admitted that
there are some American state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v.
Fredericks,3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different
conclusion. The doctrine therein announced cannot bind us. Our Constitution makes
clear that the power of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately
termed constituent, limited as it is to the purpose of drafting a constitution or
proposing revision or amendments to one in existence, subject in either case to
popular approval.
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional
convention, alike recognized by the Constitution, are coordinate, there being no
superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of proposing
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a
wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the Constitution which can be the only
source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that
the call to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be
interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary conclusion would
impair its usefulness for the delicate, and paramount task assigned to it. A
convention then is to be looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate
departments which under the principle of separation of powers is supreme within its
field and has exclusive cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A
succinct statement of the appropriate principle that should govern the relationship
between a constitutional convention and a legislative body under American law is
that found in Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a
convention was absolute. The convention was sovereign and subject to no restraint.
On the other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in
decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and subject to
the restrictions imposed on it by the legislative call. A third and intermediate view is
that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not sovereign, is a body
independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing constitution, but not by the
acts of the legislature, as to the extent of its constituent power. This view has
become increasingly prevalent in the state decisions."4
2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously

stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any limitation on the power the
Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads: "The
Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification."
Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two
steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus as to the former, two constituent
bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode therein
provided, and a constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once
assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress of the Philippines,
possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as Congress may
determine what amendments it would have the people ratify and thereafter take all
the steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be
obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be deemed possessed of all
the necessary authority to assure that whatever amendments it seeks to introduce
would be submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would

Republic of The Philippines

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Republic of The Philippines

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Republic of the Philippines

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R.

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of

The parties, through their respective

COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the

l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and

2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be

4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided

6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that

Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the

While the Court thought it more desirable for

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended

One of the properties mentioned in the project of

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the

Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B.

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B.

(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED

(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND

(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS

(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE

(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6,

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent

It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31,

Respondent vehemently denies any interest or

xxx xxx xxx

On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no

On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge

1. I agree with complainant that respondent should