Cangco vs Manila Railroad 38, Phil.

768

FACTS

Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San
Mateo which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. He used to
travel by trade to the office located in Manila for free. On January 21, 1915, on his way
home by rail and when the train drew up to the station in San Mateo, he rose from his
seat, making his exit through the door. When he stepped off from the train, one or both
of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons causing him to slip off from under
him and he fell violently on the platform. He rolled and was drawn under the moving car.
He was badly crushed and lacerated. He was hospitalized which resulted to amputation
of his hand. He filed the civil suit for damages against defendant in CFI of Manila
founding his action upon the negligence of the employees of defendant in placing the
watermelons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the
security of passengers alighting from the train. The trial court after having found
negligence on the part of defendant, adjudged saying that plaintiff failed to use due
caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering, hence
this appeal.

ISSUE

Is the negligence of the employees attributable to their employer whether the

negligence is based on contractual obligation or on torts?

RULING

YES. It cannot be doubted that the employees of defendant were guilty of negligence in
piling these sacks on the platform in the manner stated. It necessarily follows that the
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is
barred by the plaintiff’s own contributory negligence. It is to note that the foundation of
the legal liability is the contract of carriage. However Art. 1903 relates only to culpa
aquiliana and not to culpa contractual, as the Court cleared on the case of Rakes v.
Atlantic Gulf. It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection
and control of the servant relieves the master from liability fro the latter’s act. The
fundamental distinction between obligation of this character and those which arise from
contract, rest upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligations it is the wrongful
or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in
contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary
duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. When the
source of obligation upon which plaintiff’s cause of action depends is a negligent act or
omission, the burden of proof rest upon the plaintiff to prove negligence. On the other
hand, in contractual undertaking, proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is
suffient prima facie to warrant recovery. The negligence of employee cannot be invoked
to relieve the employer from liability as it will make juridical persons completely immune
from damages arising from breach of their contracts. Defendant was therefore liable for
the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as
constituting culpa aquiliana or contractual. As Manresa discussed, whether negligence
occurs as an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or is
itself the source of an extra-contractual obligation, its essential characteristics are
identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness
or inattention on the part of the defendant. The contract of defendant to transport
plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe
means of entering and leaving its trains. Contributory negligence on the part of
petitioner as invoked by defendant is untenable. In determining the question of
contributory negligence in performing such act- that is to say, whether the passenger
acted prudently or recklessly- age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered. It is to be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his
daily routine. Our conclusion is there is slightly underway characterized by imprudence
and therefore was not guilty of contributory negligence. The decision of the trial court is
REVERSED.

RP vs Luzon Stevedoring 21, SCRA 279

Facts:

A barge being towed by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" all owned by Luzon
Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due
to the swollen current of the Pasig after heavy rains days before. The Republic sued
Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; that the
damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to
sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.

Issue:

Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the
Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

Held:

There is a presumption of negligence on part of the employees of Luzon Stevedoring,

as the Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law
are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It
is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated,
as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere
difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. Luzon
Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current, and
voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the
risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned
out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages.