DEAN C.

WORCESTER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN OCAMPO, TEODORO M. KALAW, LOPE K. SANTOS, FIDEL A. REYES,
FAUSTINO AGUILAR, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.

Felipe Agoncillo for appellants.

W. A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

On the 23rd day of January, 1909, the plaintiff commenced an action against the
defendants in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, for the purpose of
recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication. The complaint was in
the following language:

COMPLAINT.

I.

That the plaintiff as well as the defendants are residents of the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands.

II.

That for a long time before the 30th of October, 1908, the defendants, Martin
Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar,
Leoncio G. Liquete , Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo
Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the owners, directors,
writers (redactores), editors (editores) and administrators of a certain daily
newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which
newspaper during all the time mentioned in this complaint was published and
circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila,
having a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands.

III.

That for a long time the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and
attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last on the 30th of October,
1908, with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, who on said date was,
and still is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of
the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the honesty and
reviled the fame of the plaintiff, not only as a private person but also as an official
of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and with the object of exposing him
to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, printed, wrote (redactaron),
and published in said newspaper in its ordinary number of the 30th of October,
 1908, a malicious defamation and false libel which was injurious (injurioso) to the
plaintiff, said libel reading as follows:

"EDITORIAL.

"BIRDS OF PREY.

"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to
be eaten and devoured.

"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel
against an order of things which makes them the prey and food of the
insatiable voracity of the former. At times they have been fortunate, putting
to flight the eaters and devourers, but in the majority of cases they did not
obtain but a change of name or plumage.

"The situation is the same in all the spheres of creation: the relation
between the ones and the others is that dictated by the appetite and the
power to satisfy it at the fellow-creatures' expense.

"Among men it is very easy to observe the development of this daily

phenomenon. And for some psychological reason the nations who believe
themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and most harmful creatures
as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or the serpent. Some have
done so by a secret impulse of affinity and others in the nature of
simulation, of infatuated vanity, making themselves appear that which they
are not nor ever can be.

"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the
most adepts. And men, collectively and individually, have desired to copy
and imitate the most rapacious bird in order to triumph in the plundering of
their fellow-men.

"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the
vulture, the owl and the vampire.

"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls

of the Igorots and study and civilize them and to espy in his flight, with the
eye of the bird of prey, where are the large deposits of gold, the prey
concealed amidst the lonely mountains, to appropriate them to himself
afterwards, thanks to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always
for his own benefit.

"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances, an illegal slaughtering of

diseased cattle in order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meat
which he himself was obliged to condemn by virtue of his official position.
 "Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist
who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when
his whole scientific labor is confined o dissecting insects and importing fish
eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country were less nourishing and less
savory, so as to make it worth the while replacing them with species
coming from other climes.

"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindoro,

in Mindanao, and in other virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the
money of the people, and under the pretext of the public good, when, as a
strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the data and the key to the
national wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the
acquisition of immense properties registered under he names of others.

"Promoting, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of
worthless land at fabulous prices which the city fathers dare not refuse,
from fear of displeasing the one who is behind the motion, and which they
do not refuse for their own good.

"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in-land, with the prospects of

enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of the people.

"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle
who surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and
putrid meats, an owl who affects a petulent omniscience and a vampire
who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.

"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and their aim are never
thwarted.

"Who will detain them?

"Some share in the booty and the plunder. Others are too weak to raise a
voice of protest. And others die in the disconsolating destruction of their
own energies and interests.

"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:

"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."

IV.

That the plaintiff was, on the date of said publication, and still is, well known to
the officials of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands, and to public in general, personally as well as a member
of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior, and
the defamation and libel, and the words, terms and language used in said
defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with the intention of
indicating the said plaintiff, and that should be understood, as in effect they were
understood, by the public officials of the Government and the inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands in general, as referring to the plaintiff, by reason of the publicly
known fact that said plaintiff in compliance with his duties in his position as such
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as such Secretary of the
Interior of the Philippine Islands, ascended on a previous occasion the mountains
of the Province of Benguet to study the native tribe known as Igorot, residing in
said region; by reason of the publicly known fact that in the said mountains of
Benguet there exist large deposits of gold, and for the reason that, as member of
the Civil Commission of the Philippines, which is the legislative body of the
Philippine Islands, the plaintiff takes part in the enactment and repealing of laws
in said Islands; by reason furthermore of the fact, publicly known, that the
plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has had under
his direction and control the enforcement of the laws of the Philippine Islands and
the ordinances of the city of Manila relating to the slaughtering of cattle; by
reason furthermore of the fact, publicly known that said plaintiff, as such
Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, had under his direction and
control the Bureau of Science of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and
he is generally known as a man devoted to the study of science; by reason
furthermore of the publicly known fact that the said plaintiff, as such Secretary of
the Interior of the Philippine Islands, at a previous time, caused the importation
into the Philippine Islands of fish eggs for the purpose of supplying the mountain
streams of the Philippine Islands with fish-hatcheries; by reason furthermore of
the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the
Philippine Islands, has journeyed to and explored the Islands of Mindoro,
Mindanao, and other regions of the Philippine Archipelago; by reason
furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the
Interior of the Philippine Islands, at one time investigated and prepared a report
for the Civil Commission of the Philippines in regard to a certain proposition for
the purchase of a parcel of land for the city of Manila; by reason furthermore of
the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as member of said Civil Commission of
the Philippines together with the other members of said legislative body, once
opened negotiations with a certain firm engaged in the hotel business in regard
to the location of a prospective hotel on one of the filled-in lands of the city of
Manila.

That said defendants charged said plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the
Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with wasting public funds for the
purpose of promoting his personal welfare; with the violation of the laws of the
Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in
illegal combinations for the purpose of robbing the people; with the object of gain
for himself and for others; and lastly with being "a bird of prey;" and that said
defamation should be understood, as in effect it was understood, by the public
officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in general, as
charging the said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above specified; all
of which allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said plaintiff, as
above stated, were and are false and without any foundation whatsoever.

That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a
heading in large and showy type, and every effort made by said defendants to
see that said defamation and libel should attract the attention of the public and be
read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same.

V.

Besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said
defendants, in publishing the said libel, did so with the malicious intention of
inciting the Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was a vile despot and a
corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held, and for this reason to
oppose his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior,
and in this way they endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the
performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would
have to resign his office as member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines
and Secretary of the Interior.

In fact said defendants, by means of said libel and other false statements in said
mentioned newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of
the public in the plaintiff and to incite the people to place obstacles in his way in
the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which the plaintiff has
met with a great many difficulties which have increased to a great extent his
labors as a public official in every one of the Departments.

VI.

And for all these reasons the plaintiff alleges: That he has been damaged and is
entitled to an indemnity for the additional work to which he has been put, by the
said defendants, in the compliance of his duties, both in the past and the future,
as well as for the injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, and besides this said amount he
is entitled to collect from the defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, in the way of punitive damages, as a
warning to the defendants.

Wherefore the plaintiff files this complaint, praying the court:

(1) That the defendants be summoned according to law.

(2) That judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay the damages as
above stated, and the costs of the action.
On the 23d of February, 1909, the defendants presented the following demurrer to the
said complaint:

DEMURRER.

Now come the defendants, through their undersigned attorney, and demur to the
complaint filed herein, upon the following grounds:

First, That the complaint is vague and unintelligible.

Second. That the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause or right
of action.

Third. That there is another action pending between the plaintiff and several of
the defendants for the same cause; and

Fourth. That some of the defendants have been erroneously included therein.

Therefore, they respectfully ask the court to dismiss the complaint, with costs
against the plaintiff.

On the 27th of February, 1909, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, overruled
said demurrer in the following decision, to which the defendants duly excepted:

ORDER.

The defendant demur upon several grounds:

(1) The first ground is that the complaint is vague and unintelligible and this is
directed principally to paragraph 2, in which it is alleged that the defendants were
"dueños, directores, redactores", etc., but it is not alleged that they were such
simultaneously. If this were the sole averment of the defendants' connection with
the alleged libel, the objection might be well taken, but paragraph 3 of the
complaint alleges that the defendants "imprimieron, redactaron y publicaron",
etc., the article complained of. Under section 2 of Act 277 "every person" who
"publishes or procures to be published any belief is made responsible. (Cf.
U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep., 752.) We think, therefore, that the connection of the
defendants with the publication complained of is sufficiently charged.

(2) It is also claimed that the facts alleged are not sufficient to state a cause of
action and it is urged in support of this that the article complained of and which is
copied in the complaint, fails to mention the plaintiff or to show on its face that it
refers to him. It is, however, specifically alleged in paragraph 4 that the article
was intended to refer to the plaintiff and was so understood by the public, and
this allegation is admitted by the demurrer. Under the rule announced in Causin
vs. Jakosalem (5 Phil. Rep., 155), where the words complained of do refer to the
 plaintiff "an action for libel may be maintained even though the defamatory
publication does not refer to the plaintiff by name."

(3) It is further argued that there is another action pending between the parties
for the same cause. This, it is true, is made a ground for demurrer by the Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 91 (3), but like all grounds therein mentioned, it must
"appear upon the face" of the pleading objected to, and where it does not so
appear "the objection can only be taken by answer." (Code C. P., sec. 92.) There
is no averment in the complaint which indicates that there is no another action
pending.

The fourth ground of the demurrer is not one recognized by law (Code C. P., sec.
91) nor do we find anything in Sanidad vs. Cabotaje (5 Phil. Rep., 204) which
would necessitate any change in the views already expressed.

The demurrer is, therefore, overruled and defendants are given the usual five
days to answer.

On the 15th day of November, 1909, the defendants presented their amended answer,
which was as follows:

ANSWER.

The defendants in the above-entitled cause, through their undersigned attorney,

by their answer to the complaint, state:

That the defendants deny generally the allegation of the complaint.

As a special defense, the defendants allege:

First. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to institute this action, as it clearly
appears from the allegations of the complaint and which the defendants hereby
deny.

Second. That the facts are set out as constituting cause of action in the
complaint, are insufficient to constitute such cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants.

Third. That the said complaint is manifestly improper, for the reason that there is
now pending in the Court of First Instance of this city a criminal cause, No. 4295,
for the crime of libel against the defendants herein, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M.
Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, both actions, criminal and civil, being based upon the
same facts which the plaintiffs herein, who is also a party to the said criminal
action, now alleges as the basis of his action.
 Fourth. That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been extinguished for
the reason that plaintiff did not expressly reserve the right to enforce the same in
the aforesaid cause 4295, for the crime of libel, after the said criminal cause had
been finally disposed of.

Fifth. That the defendants, Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete,
Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto,
and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were erroneously included in the complaint for the
simple reason that the first two were acquitted in said criminal cause No. 4295,
for libel, the third was used as a witness for the prosecution in the said criminal
cause, and the others have no interest, either directly or indirectly, in the
newspaper "El Renacimiento" in which it is alleged by the plaintiff the editorial,
which is the basis of the complaint, and which it is claimed to be libelous, was
published.

Wherefore the defendants pray that they be acquitted of the complaint, with the
costs against the plaintiff.

After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the arguments if the
respective attorneys, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge, on the 14th of January,
1910, rendered the following decision:

DECISION.

This is a civil action sounding in damages to the amount of P100,000 for an

alleged libel of the plaintiff by the defendants.

The plaintiff is the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, a member of the Civil

Commission of the Philippine Islands, and Secretary of the Interior of Insular
Government. The defendants are twelve persons designated by name in the
complaint and alleged therein to be the owners, directors, writers (redactores),
editors (editores), and administrators of a certain daily newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which defendants, as well as the plaintiff,
are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

It is further alleged in the complaint that for a long time prior to the 30th of
October, 1908, the defendants were the owners, directors, writers, editors, and
administrators of said daily newspaper, and that said newspaper, during all the
time mentioned in the complaint, was published and circulated daily in the
Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila, having a large circulation
throughout the Philippine Islands.

It is also alleged that for a long time the defendants had been maliciously
persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last, on said
date, with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff who then was still is a
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior
 in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the integrity and reviled the
reputation of the plaintiff, not only as a private citizen, but also as an official of the
Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of exposing him to the
odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote, printed, and published in
said newspaper in its ordinary number of the said 30th of October, 1908, a
malicious defamation and false libel, which was injurious to the plaintiff, said libel,
as translated from the Spanish, reading as follows:

"EDITORIAL.

"BIRDS OF PREY.

"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to
be eaten and devoured.

"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel
against an order of things which makes them the prey and food of the
insatiable voracity of the former. At times they have been fortunate, putting
to flight the eaters and devourers, but in a majority of cases they do not
obtain anything but a change of name or plumage.

"The situation is the same in all spheres of creation; the relation between
the ones and the others is that dictated by the appetite and the power to
satisfy it at the fellow-creature's expense.

"Among men it is easy to observe the development of this daily

phenomenon. And for some psychological reason the nations who believe
themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and most harmful creatures
as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or the serpent. Some have
done so by a secret impulse of affinity and others in the nature of
simulation, of infatuated vanity, making themselves appear that which they
are not nor ever will be.

"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the
most adepts. And men, collectively and individually, have desired to copy
and imitate the most rapacious bird in order to triumph in the plundering if
their fellow-men.

"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the
vulture, the owl and the vampire.

"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls

of the Igorots and study and civilize them, and to espy in his flight with the
eye of the bird of prey, where are the large deposits of gold, the prey
concealed amongst the lonely mountains, to appropriate them to himself
afterwards, thanks to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always
for his own benefit.

"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances an illegal slaughtering of

diseased cattle in order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meat
which he himself was obliged to condemn by virtue of his official position.

"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist
who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when
his whole scientific labor is confined to dissecting insects and importing
fish eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country were less nourishing and
savory, so as to make it worth the while replacing them with species
coming from other climes.

"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in

Mindanao, in Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the archipelago, with
the money of the people, and under the pretext of the public good, when,
as a strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the data and the key
to the national wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by
the acquisition of immense properties registered under the names of
others.

"Promoting through secret agents and partners, the sale of the city
worthless land at fabulous prices which the city fathers dare not refuse
from fear of displeasing the one who is behind the motion, and which they
do not refuse to their own good.

"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in lands, with the prospects of

enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of the people.

"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle
who surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and
putrid meats, an owl who affects a petulant omniscience and a vampire
who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.

"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and aim are never
thwarted.

"Who will detain them?

"Some share in the body and plunder, Others are too weak to raise a
voice to protest. And others die in the disconsolating destruction of their
own energies and interests.

"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:

"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."

It is alleged, among other things, in paragraph four of the complaint, that the
plaintiff was on the date of said publication, and still is, well known to the officials
of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands, and to the public generally, personally as well as a member of
the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as a Secretary of the Interior; and the
defamation and libel, and the words, terms, and language used in said
defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with the intention of
indicating the said plaintiff, and that they should be understood, as in fact they
were understood, by the public officials of the Government and the inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands in general, as referring to the plaintiff. (Here follow the
reasons for saying the editorial referred to plaintiff and why the public understood
it as referring to him.)

The said defendants charged plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the
Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with wasting public funds for the
purpose of promoting his personal welfare; and with the violation of the laws of
the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in
illegal combination of the purpose of robbing the people, with the object of gain
for himself and for others; and lastly, with being a bird of prey, and that said
defamation should be understood, as in effect it was understood by the public
officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in general, as
charging the said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above specified; all
of which allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said plaintiff, as
above stated, were and are false and without any foundation whatever. That said
defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a heading in large
and showy type, and every effort was made by said defendant to see that said
defamation and libel should attract the attention of the public and be read by all
the subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same.

In paragraph five of the complaint it is further alleged that, besides assailing the
integrity and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing
said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino to believe that
the plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position
which he held, and for this reason to oppose of his administration of the office in
his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create
enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and to make
him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior. In fact, said
defendants, by means of said libel and other false statements in said mentioned
newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public
in the plaintiff, and to in incite the people to place obstacles in his way in the
performance of his official duties, in consequence of which said plaintiff has met
with a great many difficulties which have increased to a great extent his labors as
a public official in every one of the Departments.

And the allegations end with paragraph six, in which the plaintiff states that for all
these reasons has been damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for the
additional work to which he has been put by said defendants in compliance with
his duties, both in the past and in the future, as well as for the injuries to his
reputation and feelings, in the sum, of P50,000, and that besides this said
amount he is entitled to collect from the defendants the additional sum of fifty
thousand pesos in the way of punitive damages, as a warning to the defendants.

The complaint concludes with a prayer, among other things, that judgment be
rendered ordering the defendants to pay the damages as above stated and the
costs of the action; and is dated and signed, Manila, P.I., January 23, 1909,
Hartigan and Rohde, Kincaid and Hurd, attorneys for plaintiff.

A demurrer to this complaint was filed by the defendants, through their attorney,
Sr. Felipe Agoncillo, which demurrer was heretofore heard and overruled by the
Court, and the defendants required to answer. Accordingly, the defendants within
the prescribed time, filed their answer; and on November 16, 1909, through their
attorney, filed and amended answer, which is as follows (after stating the case):

The defendants in the above-entitled action, through their undersigned

attorney, answering the complaint, state: That they make a general denial
of the allegations in the complaint, and as a special defense allege:

"(1) That the plaintiff lacks the necessary personality to institute the complaint in
question, as evidently appears from the allegations in the same, and which the
defendants deny;

"(2) That the facts set forth as a cause of action in the complaint are insufficient
to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants;

"(3) That the said complaint is in every sense contrary to law, criminal case No.
4295, for libel, against the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and
Fidel A. Reyes, in the Court of First Instance of this city, being still pending,
inasmuch as both causes, criminal and civil, are based upon the same facts
which the plaintiff, who is also interested in said criminal cause, considers a
cause of action;

"(4) That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been destroyed as a
consequence of the fact that the plaintiff did not expressly reserve his right to the
same in the said mentioned cause No. 4295 for libel, in order to exercise it after
the termination of said criminal cause:
"(5) That the defendants Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete,
Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto,
and Gregorio M. Cansipit have been erroneously included in the complaint, for
the simple reason that the first two were acquitted in said cause No. 4295 for
libel, the third was used as a witness by the prosecution in the same cause, and
the latter ones have no interest, directly or indirectly, in the newspaper "El
Renacimiento," in which the plaintiff presumes, was published the editorial which
forms the basis of the complaint, and which is said to be libelous; and concluding
with a prayer to the court to dismiss the case, with cost against the plaintiff."

The second paragraph of this "special defense" is nothing other than a general
demurrer to the complaint, which has been overruled, as already stated.

The first paragraph is not clearly stated, but the court construes it as meaning a
simple denial that the plaintiff is the person referred to in the alleged libelous
article "Birds of Prey," which issue is sufficiently raised by the general denial of
the allegations in the complaint.

The third paragraph is not a valid defense in law, for the simple reason that
section 11 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission, under which this suit is
brought, especially provides for a separate civil action for damages, as well as for
a criminal prosecution. (See Mr. Justice Johnson's recent decision.) This third
paragraph is therefore without merit; and the same may be said of the fourth
paragraph thereof. As to paragraph five, it contains no material averment which
could not have been set up and insisted upon under the general issue.

One part if this so-called special defense is therefore a demurrer already and
adjudicated, another part is covered by the general issue, and the residue is
without merit as a legal defense, and might have been stricken out. The defense
is therefore tantamount to the general issue only, there being no special plea that
these charges are true, nor any plea of justification.

The trial of this case on its merits began November 16, and ended December 10,
1909, and the proceedings and evidence introduced are to be found in the
exhibits and stenographic notes taken by the court's official reporter. At the trial
Judge Kincaid said Major Hartigan appeared for the plaintiff and Señores
Agoncillo, Cruz Herrera, and Ferrer for the defendants.

After hearing the testimony and arguments of counsel and a due consideration of
the case, the court finds the following facts established by the admissions and a
decided preponderance of the evidence:

That the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel
Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, seven in
number, are the proprietors and owners of the said daily newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," and that "El Renacimiento" and "Muling
Pagsilang," are one and the same newspaper, owned, managed, printed and
published by the same persons; that Teodoro M. Kalaw and Lope K. Santos were
the editors in chief of directors of this paper on the 30th of October, 1908, and
that said nine defendants named were the owners, editors, proprietors,
managers and publishers of said newspaper on said 30th of October, 1908, for a
long time prior thereto, and during all the time mentioned in the complaint.

As to the defendants, Reyes, Aguilar, and Liquete, they appear from the
evidence to have been editors of said paper, but in subordinate position to the
chief editors or directors, Kalaw and Santos, and to have acted under the
direction of their latter two defendants.

The court further finds that every essential or material allegation of the complaint
is true substantially as therein stated, with the exception noted to Fidel A. Reyes,
Faustino Aguilar, and Leoncio G. Liquete, and as may be hereinafter indicated.
The case is therefore dismissed as to these three defendants.

The only serious contention of the defense is (1) that the editorial "Birds of Prey"
does not refer to a determinate person; and (2) that, conceding that it does refer
to the plaintiff, none of the defendants, except Teodoro M. Kalaw, is responsible
for the writing, printing, or publication of the alleged libelous article of the
damages to the plaintiff resulting therefrom.

In the opinion of the court this article so indubitably refers to the plaintiff, and was
so easily and well understood by the readers of said paper as indicating the
plaintiff, that it would be an act of superrogation to elaborately discuss the
evidence adduced in support of or against the proposition. It is as clear to the
court from the evidence adduced as the noonday sun, that the plaintiff is the
identical and only person meant and referred to in said article "Birds and Prey;"
and it requires no argument to prove that it does mean and refer to him and was
so intended by the writer, and therefore by said nine defendants, and could not
have been otherwise understood by any intelligent reader or subscriber of said
paper, in view of the reasons assigned in the complaint, which reasons are
clearly disclosed and fully established by the evidence. And it may be added that
much valuable time was needlessly consumed by the defense at trial in an effort
to establish the contrary.

It seems to the court a reflection upon the intelligence of the subscribers and
readers of "El Renacimiento" to contend that this editorial was not well
understood by them as referring to the plaintiff, and as fully as if his name had
been mentioned in every paragraph thereof. And assuredly the omission of his
name from the editorial has made the libel less hurtful and disastrous in its
results to the reputation and feelings of the plaintiff.

Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the
twelve defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang,"
but that six of them had originally contributed their money as a partriotic donation
to the Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and
property of the paper as trustees for this people, and that the paper was being
devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo and
Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends, but had not done so.

This proposition in the light of evidence is so preposterous as to entitle it to little,

if any, serious consideration. To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to
asking the court to stultify reason and common sense. That those seven
defendants named contributed their respective sums of money, as shown by the
evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper in 1901 for their own personal
benefit and profit is fully and unmistakably established. It is equally well
established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner, but that he
has been and is still the administrator or business manager of said newspaper,
and that the other six persons named are shareholders, part owners and
proprietors thereof, and were such on said 30th of October, 1908.

Arcadio Arellano testified positively that Galo Lichauco was one of the seven
founders, and that Lichauco contributed P1,000. Martin Ocampo testified that
Galo Lichauco promised to contribute an amount which he (the witness) did not
remember but that Lichauco did not keep his promise. (See pp. 107, 108, and
231 of the evidence.)

The other evidence and circumstances strongly corroborate Arcadio Arellano,

and the court is constrained to believe that Arellano told the truth and Ocampo
did not. See Exhibit B-J, a copy of "El Renacimiento" containing the article
"Infamy Among Comrades," page 87 of the evidence, in which there was
published that these seven persons named are the shareholders of the paper.

Furthermore, Galo Lichauco failed to appear and testify, so as to enlighten the

court as to which witness, Arellano or Ocampo, told the truth, or whether chief
editor Kalaw had his authority to publish in said paper, as he did in November 22,
1907, that he, Galo Lichauco, was one of the shareholders. The presumptions
are therefore against Galo Lichauco. See S.S. Co. vs. Brancroft-Whitney Co. (36
C. C. A., 136 and 153).

It also appears from the evidence that Teodoro M. Kalaw was the chief editor or
director of the Spanish section of said paper, and that Lope K. Santos was the
chief editor or director of the Tagalog section on said 30th of October, 1908, and
that the Spanish and Tagalog sections are, and then were, one and the same
newspaper, but printed and published in different languages.

It is alleged that said newspaper has a large circulation throughout the Philippine
Islands, and was published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog
languages in the city of Manila. Not only are these allegations true, but it is also
true that said newspaper has a daily circulation and subscribers in other parts of
the world, notably in the United States and Spain; and it has subscribers
numbering in toto not less than 5,200, and a daily issue of 6,000 copies.

It is also true as alleged, and the court so finds that since the year 1906 to said
30th of October, 1908, these nine defendants had been maliciously persecuting
and attacking the plaintiff in their said newspapers, until at last, on said 30th of
October, 1908 with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, who on said
date was and still is a member of the Civil Commission and Secretary of the
Interior in the Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of
exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote,
printed, and published in their said newspaper, in its ordinary number of said
30th of October, 1908, the malicious defamation and false libel of and concerning
the plaintiff, entitled and herein alluded to as the editorial "Birds of Prey," which
libel was and is highly injurious to the plaintiff and from which the plaintiff has
sustained serious damage.

This editorial, when properly interpreted and read between the lines, means,
besides other things, and was intended by the writer to mean and be understood
by the readers thereof as meaning substantially the following:

That the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, was born on the surface of the globe to eat
and devour, like a bird of prey, and that others, born to be eaten and devoured,
are the prey and the food of the insatiable voracity of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff
had a desire to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird, the eagle, in order to
triumph in plundering his fellowman; that the plaintiff besides being an eagle, has
the characteristics of the vulture, the owl, and the vampire.

That the plaintiff ascended the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the
skulls of the Igorots, and study and civilize them and to espy in his flight with the
eye of the bird of prey the large deposits of gold-the prey concealed amidst the
mountains-and to appropriate them to himself afterwards, and that to this end the
plaintiff had the legal facilities, made and unmade at his own will, and that this is
always done for his own benefit.

That the plaintiff authorized, inspite of laws and ordinances, the illegal
slaughtering is diseased cattle in order to derive benefit from the infected and
putrid meant which he himself was obliged to condemn by virtue of his official
position; that while the plaintiff presents himself on all occasions with the wrinkled
brow of the scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of
science, his whole scientific labor is confined to dissecting insects and importing
fish eggs.

That although the plaintiff gave an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy
lodes in Mindanao and Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the Archipelago,
with the money of the people, under the pretext of the public good, as a strict
matter of truth his object was to possess all the data and the key to the national
wealth for his essentially personal benefit, and that this is shown by his
acquisition of immense properties registered under the names of others.

That the plaintiff promoted, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the
city of Manila of worthless land at fabulous prices, which the city fathers dared
not refuse from fear of displeasing the plaintiff, who was behind the project, and
which they did not refuse for their own good; that the plaintiff favored
concessions for hotels in Manila on filled-in land; with the prospect of enormous
profits, at the expense of the blood of the people.

That such are the characteristics of the plaintiff, who is at the same time an eagle
that surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges his self on deed and rotten
meats, an owl that affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the
blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. And this libelous article concludes
with the asseveration in substance that the plaintiff has been "weighed in the
balance and found wanting" — "Mane, Tecel, Phares."

That this editorial is malicious and injurious goes without saying. Almost every
line thereof teems with malevolence, ill will, and wanton and reckless disregard of
the rights and feelings of the plaintiff; and from the very nature and the number of
the charges therein contained the editorial is necessarily very damaging to the
plaintiff.

That this editorial, published as it was by the nine defendants, tends to impeach
the honesty and reputation of the plaintiff and publishes his alleged defects, and
thereby exposes him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule is clearly seen by a
bare reading of the editorial.

It suffices to say that not a line is to be found in all the evidence in support of
these malicious, defamatory and injurious charges against the plaintiff; and there
was at the trial no pretense whatever by the defendants that any of them are
true, nor the slightest evidence introduced to show the truth of a solitary charge;
nor is there any plea of justification or that the charges are true, much less
evidence to sustain a plea.

In the opinion of the court "Birds of Prey," when read and considered in its
relation to and connection with the other articles libelous and defamatory in
nature, published of and concerning the plaintiff by these nine defendants
anterior and subsequent to the publication of this article, and having reference to
the same subject matter as shown by the evidence, is one of the worst libels of
record. It is safe to say that in all the court reports to the Philippine Islands, or of
Spain, or the United States, there is not to be found a libel case in which there is
a more striking exemplification of the spirit of hatred, bad faith, evil motive,
mischievous intent, actual malice, nefarious purpose, base malignity, or gross
malevolence.
It is proper to observe also that since the beginning of this attack on the plaintiff
in the year 1906 down almost to the present time, so far from there being any
apology, retraction, or effort to repair the injury already done as far as lay in the
power of the defendants, the persecution, wrong, and tortious injury to the
plaintiff had been steadily kept up and persisted in, without the slightest
abatement of the malevolent spirit.

There has been neither retraction, apology, nor reparation; per contra, the libel
has been repeated, reiterated, and accentuated, and widely and extensively
propagated by these nine defendants through the columns of their said paper
and otherwise; and it appears from the evidence that especial effort has been
made by these same defendants to give as much publicity as possible to the
libelous and defamatory words used of and concerning the plaintiff in said
editorial.

Through their instrumentality and persistency in asserting and reasserting its

truth, this diabolical libel has been spread broadcast over the Philippine Islands
and to other parts of the world. In said criminal case No. 4295 some of these nine
defendants pleaded the truth of the charges; and in Exhibit A-Q is to be found
this language: "The defense will adduce its evidence demonstrating the truth of
every one of the facts published."

In their said paper of the 11th of January, 1909, there is published statement:

"The brief period of time allowed us by the court, at the request of the
counsel, to gather evidence which we are to adduce in our effort to
demonstrate the truth of the accusation that we have formulated in the
article which is the subject of the agitation against us, having expired, the
trial of the case against our director had been resumed." (See pp. 63 and
67 of the evidence.)

And about the same time they also declared in their said paper that "there is
more graft than fish in the rivers of Benguet." And this in the year of our Lord
1909! the persecution having begun in 1905; thus indicating that there is to be no
"let-up" or cessation of the hostile attitude toward the plaintiff or the vilification of
his name and assaults upon his character, much less a retraction or an apology,
unless drastic means and measures are made use of to the end that there may
be no further propagation of the libel, or asseveration, or reiteration of its truth.

This article "Birds of Prey" charges the plaintiff with malfeasance in office and
criminal acts, and is therefore libelous per se. It in substance charges the plaintiff
with the prostitution of his office as a member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippine Islands and Secretary of the Interior of said Islands for personal ends.
It is charged also substantially that plaintiff in his official capacity wasted the
public funds for the purpose of promoting his own personal welfare, and that he
violated the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of
Manila.

In its essence he is charged with taking part in illegal combinations for the
purpose of robbing the people with the object of gain for himself and for others;
with being a bird of prey, a vulture (buzzard), an owl, and a vampire that sucks
the blood of the victim (meaning the people) until he leaves it bloodless, that is to
say, robs the people, until he leaves them wretched and poverty-stricken,
deprived of all worldly possessions; and lastly, that he, the plaintiff, like
Belshazzar, has been weighed in the balance and found wanting as a high
Government functionary; all of which charges are false and malicious and without
and foundation whatever in fact, as the evidence fully demonstrates.

It is also a matter of fact, and the court so finds, that said defamation was written
and published that it might be understood, and it was understood, by the public
officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in general,
and wherever else said newspaper may have circulated and been read, as
charging the plaintiff with the tortious and criminal acts and conduct charged in
said editorial as hereinbefore specified and interpreted.

The court finds it also true that, besides assailing the integrity and reviling the
reputation of the plaintiff, said nine defendants, in publishing said libel, did so
with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino people to believe that the
plaintiff was despotic and corrupt and unworthy of the position which he held, and
for this reason to oppose his administration of the office in his charge as
Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous
difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and to make him so
unpopular that he would have to resign his office as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior.

It is also true that the said nine defendants, by means of said libel, and other like
false statements in their said newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy
the confidence of the public in the plaintiff and to incite the people to place
obstacles in his way in the performance of his official duties, in consequence of
which the plaintiff has met with many difficulties which have greatly increased his
labors as a public official.

It further appears from the evidence that not only has an effort been made by
these nine defendants to give as much publicity as possible to the charges, but in
order that said defamation should attract the attention of the public, they
published the same under a heading in large, bold and showy type, so that it
might be easily seen and read by all the subscribers and readers of said paper.

In full view of all the evidence, therefore, it is clearly seen that every essential
allegation of the complaint is true substantially as therein claimed, and that the
whole of the said editorial relating to the misconduct and bad character of the
plaintiff is false and without the slightest foundation in fact. Not a scintilla of
evidence was introduced in support of any injurious charge made therein against
the plaintiff, to say nothing of the plaintiff's evidence that each and every charge
of malfeasance therein contained is false, and without reference to whether a
failure to plead the truth admits the falsity of the charge.

The evidence shows no "special" or "actual pecuniary damage," and none is

alleged in the complaint. Two other kinds of damages, however are claimed, to
wit, general damages for injuries to the feelings and reputation of the plaintiff and
additional work to which he has been put by the conduct of the defendants, which
are laid in the sum of P50,000, and "punitive," exemplary, or vindictive damages,
"as a warning to the defendants," or as expressed in Act 277 of the Philippine
Commission, as a just punishment to the libelers and an example to others,"
which are laid in the same sum of P50,000.

The nine defendants being liable to the plaintiff for damages, the next question to
be decided is what amount of damages should be awarded the plaintiff for the
injury to his reputation and feelings and his being a proper case for punitive
damages, the further question is, what sum shall be awarded as a just
punishment to these nine libelers and as an example to others. In neither of
these cases is there any precise measure of damages.

In determining the amount to be awarded in the first instance it is proper to

consider the previous character, influence, reputation, standing, official position,
hope of advancement, prospect of promotion, and social status of the plaintiff
and his family, and all the circumstances connected with the case.

The plaintiff is a man in the prime of life, holding, as he has held for the last ten
years an important, responsible, lucrative, high and exalted position of trust and
honor in the service of the Government of the United States, in the Philippine
Islands, without a blotch on his family escutcheon, so far as the evidence shows,
and with an untarnished reputation as a man, as a citizen, and as a Government
official.

He is a man of honesty, integrity, and high social position; a man of learning,

famous as a scientist, and scientific achievements and scholarly attainments, a
man of industrious habits, genuine worth, and intellectual force. He has read,
studied, traveled and learned much, and is an author of merit and distinction. He
was for a long while a professor in one of the largest and most renowned
institutions of learning in the world; he is a man of vast experience, broad and
liberal views, and an extensive acquaintanceship, not only in the Philippine
Islands, but in the United States and other countries of the world. He was well
and favorably received by the people wherever he journeyed previous to this
atrocious libel upon his integrity and reputation.
He has discharged the duties of his lofty official position in a manner that reflects
credit upon himself as well as the Government which he represents, and
apparently with entire satisfaction to all of his superiors in office and the people
generally; and but for this pernicious, outrageous, and highly reprehensible
assault upon his good name, fame and reputation, there were prospects of
promotion to higher honors. And so far as his personal and private record is
concerned it was without a blemish anterior to the time when these unfounded
and dastardly aspersions were cast upon it by these nine defendants.

Indeed, it is only necessary to advert to the testimony of the defense itself to

ascertain that the plaintiff is an honorable man, and without a stain upon his
character, officially or otherwise. It would be interesting to note here in parallel
columns and compare the charges made in "Birds of Prey" and the testimony of
one of the witnesses for the defendants.

Felipe Buencamino, an intelligent witness for the defense, in his testimony (p.
240) when asked the question, Do you know Mr. Worcester?" he answers, "Yes,
sir: I know him as an honorable man. I also know him as an honest, honorable
public official." In answer to another question he says, "As I have said, I know Mr.
Worcester as a private citizen and as a public official, and my opinion of him is
that of honorable man and an upright official." And no other witness testified
anything to the contrary.

"A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches and loving favor
rather than silver of gold."

"Who steals my purse steals trash;

xxx xxx xxx

But he that filches from me my good name,

Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed."

The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the

possession of life, liberty or property. It is one of those rights necessary to human
society that underlie the whole scheme of human civilization.

"The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest rewards of
a well-spent life vouchsafed to man in this existence. The hope of it is the
inspiration of youth, and their possession the solace of later years. A man
of affairs, a business man, who has been seen and known of his
fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and who has
developed a great character and an unblemished reputation, has secured
a possession more useful, and more valuable than lands, or houses, or
silver, or gold . . .
 "The law recognizes the value of such a reputation, and constantly strives
to give redress for its injury. It imposes upon him who attacks it by
slanderous words, or libelous publication, a liability to make full
compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the shame and
obloquy, and for the injury to the feelings of the owner, which are caused
by the publication of the slander or the libel.

"It goes further. If the words are spoken, or the publication is made, with
the intent to injure the victim, or with the criminal indifference to civil
obligation, it imposes such damages as a jury (in this case the judge), in
view of all the circumstances of the particular case adjudge that the
wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public, to deter others from
committing like offenses, and as a punishment for the infliction of the
injury.

"In the ordinary acceptance of the term, malice signifies ill will, evil intent,
or hatred, while it is legal signification is defined to be "a wrongful act done
intentionally, without legal justification." (36 C. C. A., 475.)

Surely in the case at bar there was a wrongful or tortious act done intentionally
and without the semblance of justification or excuse, or proof that the libelous
charges against the plaintiff were "published and good motives and justifiable
ends."

But the Legislature and the highest judicial authority of these Islands have
spoken in no uncertain words with regard to the rights of the plaintiff in this case;
and we need not necessarily turn to the law of libel elsewhere, or the decision of
the courts in other jurisdictions to ascertain or determine his rights.

In sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Libel Law (Act 277, Philippine Commission)

is to be found the law of these Islands especially applicable to this case. Section
1 thereof defines libel. Section 2 provides that every person who willfully and with
a malicious intent to injure another publishes, or procures to be published, any
libel shall be punished as therein provided. Section 3 provides that an injurious
publication is presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable motive for making
it is shown. Section 4 provides, among other things, that in all criminal
prosecutions the truth may be given in evidence; but to establish this defense,
not only must the truth of the matter charged as libelous be proven, but also that
it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends; and the
presumptions, rules of evidence, and special defenses are equally applicable in
civil and criminal actions, according to section 11 of said Act.

Section 6 is as follows:

"Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial

publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in
 any part of such book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if
he were the author of the same."

And section 11 provides as follows:

"In addition to such criminal action, any person libeled as hereinbefore set
forth shall have a right to a civil action against the person libeling him for
damages sustained by reason of such libel, and the person so libeled shall
be entitled to recover in such civil action not only the actual pecuniary
damages sustained by him, but also damages for injury to his feelings and
reputation, and in addition such punitive damages as the court may think
will be a just punishment to the libeler and an example to others. Suit may
be brought in any Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the parties.
The presumptions, rules or evidence and special defenses provided for in
this chapter for criminal prosecutions shall be equally applicable in civil
actions under this section."

"The proprietor of a printing plant is responsible for publishing a libel.

According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States,
the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the
same." (Mr. Justice Torres, in U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep., 757.) But said
section 6 plainly fixes the liability of editors and proprietors of newspapers,
and is clear enough for all the purposes of this case.

Mr. Justice Carson (5 Phil. Rep. 1551), speaking for our Supreme Court, says:

"When there is an averment in the complaint that the defamatory words

used refer to the plaintiff, and it is proven that the words do in fact refer to
him and are capable of bearing such special application, an action for libel
may be maintained even though the defamatory publication does not refer
to the plaintiff by name."

And Mr. Justice Willard (12 Phil. Rep., 4282), for the same high authority, says:

"In an action for libel damages for injury to feelings and reputation may be
recovered though no actual pecuniary damages are proven.

"Punitive damages cannot be recovered unless the tort is aggravated by

evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression."

That is to say, if there is evil motive, or actual malice or deliberate violence, or

oppression then punitive damages, or "smart money," may be recovered.

And Justice Carson (U.S. vs. Sedano, 14 Phil., Rep., 338), also says:
 "Actual or express malice of an alleged libelous publication may be
inferred from the style and tone of the publication.

"The publication of falsehood and calumny against public officers and

candidates for public office is specially reprehensible and is an offense
most dangerous to the people and to the public welfare.

"The interest of society require that immunity should be granted to the

discussion of public affairs, and that all acts and matters of a public nature
may be freely published with fitting comments and strictures; but they do
not require that the right to criticise public officers shall embrace the right
to base such criticism under false statements of fact, or attack the private
character of the officer, or to falsely impute to
him malfeasance or misconduct in office."

And there are almost numberless English and American authorities in perfect
harmony with these decisions of our Supreme Court too numerous indeed to be
cited here; and it is not necessary.

Among the leading cases, however, in the United States, is that of Scott vs.
Donald (165 U.S., 58) and cases therein cited. In this case the court says:
"Damages have been defined to be the compensation which law will allow for an
injury done, and are said to be exemplary and allowable in excess of the actual
loss when the tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence
or oppression," which is in entire harmony with Justice Willard's decision
hereinbefore cited.

And quoting from the decision in Day vs. Woodworth (13 Howard, 371) the same
high court says:

"In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and malicious,
or gross or outrageous, courts permit juries (here the court) to add to the
measured compensation of the plaintiff which he would have been entitled
to recover, had the injury been inflicted without design or intention,
something further by way of punishment or example, which has
sometimes been called "smart money." "

It thus clearly appears that the facts established in the case at bar are more than
sufficient to bring it within the rule of law here laid down by the highest judicial
authority.

Section 11 of the Libel Law expressly allows general damages; and Mr. Justice
Willard, in Macleod vs. Philippine Publishing Company,3 says:

"The general damages which are allowed in actions of libel are not for
mental suffering alone, but they are allowed for injury to
 the standing and reputation of the person libeled, and the common law of
England and America presumed that such damages existed without proof
thereof from the mere fact of publication of the libel."

In Day vs. Woodworth, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the
power of a jury in certain actions in tort to assess against the tort feasor punitive
damages. Where the injury has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with
circumstances of contumely, or indignity, the judge or jury, as the case may be, is
not limited to the ascertainment of a simple compensation for the wrong
committed against the aggrieved person.

"The public position of the plaintiff, as an officer of the Government, and

the evil example of libels, are considerations with the jury (here the judge)
for increasing damages." (Tillotson vs. Cheetham, 3 Johns, 56.)

"The character, condition and influence of the plaintiff are relevant on the
matter of the extent of damages." (Littlejohn vs. Greely, 22 How. Prac.,
345; 13 Abb. Prac., 41, 311.)

"Where the publication is libelous, the law presumes that it was made with
malice — technical, legal malice, but not malice in fact — and the amount
of damages depends in a large degree upon the motives which actuated
the defendants in its publication; and in such cases the law leaves it to the
jury (here the judge) to find a return such damages as they think right and
just, by a sound, temperate, deliberate, and reasonable exercise of their
functions as jurymen." (Erber vs. Dun. (C. C.) 12 Fed., 526.)

"Actions of libel, so far as they involve questions of exemplary damages,

and the law of principal and agent, are controlled by the same rules as are
other actions of tort. The right of a plaintiff to recover exemplary damages
exists wherever a tortious injury has been inflicted recklessly or wantonly,
and it is not limited to cases where the injury resulted from personal
malice or recklessness of the defendant. It follows that the owner of a
newspaper is as responsible for all the acts of omission and commission
of those he employs to edit it and manage its affairs, as he would be if
personally managing the same.' (Malloy vs. Bennett, (C. C.) 15 Fed., 371.)

"The fact that a publication, libelous per se, was made without any attempt
to ascertain its correctness is sufficient to justify a finding that defendant
committed libel client with a wanton indifference, and with actual malice
sufficient to sustain exemplary damages." (Van Ingen vs. Star Co., 1 App.
Div., 429, 37 N.Y., 114.)

"The court is not authorized to set aside a verdict for $45,000 in an action
for libel, where it appears that plaintiff was persistently persecuted in the
columns of defendant's newspaper, and that he and his family were held
 up to public contempt and ridicule, and defendants withdraw from the case
after failing to establish a plea of justification." (Smith vs. Times Co.,
(Com. p. 1) 4 Pa. Dist. Rep., 399.)

"In considering the amount with the defendant shall pay, on this account
(exemplary damages) the turpitude of his conduct and his financial ability
are only considered; and such consideration is not in view of the injury or
distress of the plaintiff, but in behalf of the public; the wrongful act is
regarded as an indication of the actor's vicious mind — an overt deed of
vindictive or wanton wrong, offensive and dangerous to the public good.
This is the view of those damages which generally prevails." (Sutherland
on Damages, vol. 2, p. 1092. title Exemplary Damages.)

"Punitive damages are recoverable not to compensate the plaintiff, but

solely to punish the defendant. This legal motive would suffer defeat if
punitive damages could not be given for a malicious attack on a reputation
too well established to receive substantial injury at the hands of a libeler."
(Judge Bond in Ferguson vs. Pub. Co., 72 Mo. App., 462.)

It may be suggested that the reputation of the plaintiff in this case is too well
established to be seriously affected by the defamatory words used of and
concerning him in "Birds of Prey," but it would not be proper to gravely consider
this suggestion.

The conditions in these Islands are peculiar. The minds, thoughts, and opinions
of the people are easily molded, and the public is credulous and perhaps
frequently too ready to believe anything that may be said in derogation of an
American official, especially when it is published and vouched for by the editorial
and business management and proprietors if a newspaper of the prominence,
pretensions, circulation and influence if "El Renacimiento," which paper is
everlastingly proclaiming in its columns that it is being conducted and published
solely in the interests of the Filipino people — pro bono publico. There is stronger
disposition to give credence to what is said in a newspaper here in the Islands
the elsewhere, and when abuse, vilification, and defamation are persistently
practiced for a period of several years, without modification or retraction, but with
renewed emphasis, the people naturally come to believe in its verity and
authenticity.

It is apparent from the evidence that as an effect of the persecution of the plaintiff
by "El Renacimiento" and the libel published in its columns, the minds of the
major part of the Filipino people have been poisoned and prejudiced against the
plaintiff to such an extent that he is regarded by these people as odious,
dishonest, unscrupulous and tyrannical.

It may be that his reputation has not suffered so severely with those of his own
race, but when it is considered that his vocation has tenfold more to do with the
Filipinos than with his own people, that his official duties place him in constant
contact with them, and that his success in his chosen career is largely dependent
upon their good will and support, it is manifest that the damage to his reputation
has been very great and that a large sum of money should be awarded to
indemnify him, as far as money can indemnify, for the loss of his good name with
the Filipino people.

The plaintiff came to the Philippine Islands when a young man, full of hope and
ambition. Since his arrival he has devoted himself incessantly and indefatigably
to the uplifting of the inhabitants of the Archipelago and to the faithful
performance, as far as he was able, of the pledges and promises of the
Government to the Filipino people. The duties of his particular office were such
as brought him in more immediate and constant contract with the people than
any other official of the same category in these Islands.

It is clearly shown that the plaintiff faithfully endeavored to perform, and did
efficiently perform, all of these duties, doing everything that he could in an
unselfish and disinterested manner of the welfare and development of the
country and its people, knowing full well that his career, as well as his
advancement, depended largely upon the good will of these people, and that by
incurring their censure or displeasure he would have little hope of success in his
chosen work.

Imagine, therefore, the chagrin, disappointment, mortification, mental suffering,

and distress, and perturbation of spirit that would necessarily be occasioned him
when he discovered that through the nefarious, studied, and practiced
persecution of the paper in question, these high hopes were blasted, and that,
instead of having gained the respect and gratitude of the people for the
assiduous labors devoted to their uplifting, they had been made to believe that,
instead of being a benefactor, he was a vampire that was sucking their life blood,
a corrupt politician who was squandering the money wrung from the people by
means of taxation, in schemes for his own personal aggrandizement and
enrichment.

That instead of developing the mineral wealth of the Islands he was taking up all
the rich veins and appropriating them in the names of subservient tools, to his
own personal use, benefit and profit. That instead of protecting the people from
disease, he was, by means of infected meat and for his own personal gain,
spreading contagion among them.

That he united in his person all the bad qualities of the vulture, the eagle, and the
vampire; that, in short, he was a "bird of prey," with all that is implied in that term
in its worst acceptation; that he was a corrupt tyrant, who never lost an
opportunity to do the people hurt; that instead of wishing them well and seeking
their advancement, he was their enemy, who never lost an opportunity to
degrade and humiliate them; that instead of preferring them for office and
positions of official trust, he treated them with all sorts of contempt and
indifference.

It is difficult to appreciate the feelings of a refined soul in its contemplation of a

result so disastrous, so unjust, and so unmerited.

It is furthermore shown that when the plaintiff came to these Islands a young
scientist he had already won fame in his own country; that he is a fellow of the
important scientific associations in the world. His election as a fellow or member
of these scientific bodies shows that his labors in the Philippines were the object
of solicitude by the prominent scientific and learned men not only of his own race,
but in many other civilized countries of the world. Important results were evidently
expected of him by them, and it can not be doubted that they expected of him of
life honestly devoted to the conscientious discharge of his duties as a trusted
public functionary of the American Government in the Philippine Islands.

And yet he is falsely denounced in the columns of said newspaper to his fellows
of these societies as a man who is so absolutely corrupt, so inordinately selfish
and avaricious that he has not considered for a moment the duties incumbent
upon him; that he has been oblivious to every obligation of trust and confidence,
and that he is unworthy of the respect of honest men.

One witness testified that he read this libel in the public library of the city of
Boston. It is furthermore shown that copies of this paper went to Spain, England,
and to different parts of the United States; and inasmuch as the plaintiff is a man
of prominence in the scientific world, it is to be inferred that his fellows became
more or less aware of these heinous charges.

Thus we find that the plaintiff is here confronted with disappointed ambition and
frustrated hopes, and placed in the humiliating attitude of having to explain to his
fellows that the charges are untrue, of adducing evidence to clear himself,
perhaps never with complete success, of the stain that has been cast upon his
reputation by the libelous and defamatory declarations contained in "Birds of
Prey."

In view of the foregoing findings of fact and circumstances of the case and the
law applicable thereto,

It is the opinion of the court, and the court so finds, that the plaintiff has sustained
damages on account of wounded feelings and mental suffering and injuries to his
standing and reputation in the sum of thirty-five thousand (P35,000) pesos, and
that he is entitled to recover this sum of the nine defendants named, as being
responsible for having written, printed, and published said libel; and that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover of them the further sum of twenty-five thousand
(P25,000) pesos, as punitive damages, which the court thinks will be a just
punishment to these nine libelers and an example to others.
 Wherefore, it is so ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester,
have and recover of the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K.
Santos, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe
Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally, the sum of sixty
thousand (P60,000) pesos, and the costs of suit, for which execution may issue.

It is ordered. At Manila, P.I., this 14th day of January , 1910.

From said decision the defendants appealed and made the following assignments of
error in this court:

I.

The court erred in overruling our motions for suspension of this case, in its
present state, until final judgment should be rendered in criminal case No. 4295
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, pending appeal in the Honorable
Supreme Court, for libel based also on the editorial, "Birds of Prey."

II.

The court erred in admitting as evidence mere opinion adduced by counsel for
the plaintiff with the intention of demonstrating to whom the editorial, alleged to
the libelous, refers.

III.

The court erred in giving greater preponderance to the opinions of the witnesses
for the plaintiff than to the expert testimony of the defense.

IV.

The court erred in declaring the editorial on which the complaint is based to be
libelous per se and to refer necessarily to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester.

V.

The court erred in declaring the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma,
Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo
Lichauco to be owners of "El Renacimiento."

VI.

The court erred in not admitting Exhibits 1 and 3 presented by counsel for the
defendants.

VII.
 The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendants.

VIII.

The court erred in sentencing the defendants jointly "and severally" to pay to the
plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, the sum of P60,000.

IX.

The court erred in not ordering that execution of the judgment to be confined to
the business known as "El Renacimiento" and to the defendant Teodoro M.
Kalaw, without extending to property of the alleged owners of said newspaper
which was not invested therein by them at its establishment.

X.

The court erred in granting damages to the plaintiff by virtue of the judgment
rendered against the defendants.

XI.

The court, finally, erred in granting to the plaintiff punitive damages against the
alleged owners of "El Renacimiento," admitting the hypothesis that said editorial
is libelous per se and refers to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester.

The theory of the defendants, under the first assignment of error, is that the civil action
could not proceed until the termination of the criminal action, relying upon the provisions
of the Penal Code in support of such theory. This court, however, has decided in the
case of Ocampo et al. vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681) that a judgment in a criminal
prosecution for libel, under the provisions of Act 277 of the Civil commission, constitutes
no bar or estoppel in a civil action based upon the same acts or transactions. The
reason most often given for this doctrine is that the two proceedings are not between
the same parties. Different rule as to the competency of witnesses and the weight of
evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings always exist. As between
civil and criminal actions under said Act (No. 277) a judgment in one is no bar or
estoppel to the prosecution of the other. A judgment in a criminal cause, under said Act,
can not be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action. (Stone vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 178;
Boyd vs. U.S., 616 U. S., 616, 634; Lee vs. U.S., 150 U.S., 476, 480; U.S. vs. Jaedicke,
73 Fed. Rep., 100; U.S. vs.Schneider, 35 Fed. Rep., 107; Chamberlain vs. Pierson, 87
Fed. Rep., 420; Steel vs. Cazeaux, 8 Martin (La.), 318, 13 American Decisions, 288;
Betts vs. New Hartford, 25 Conn., 185.)

In a criminal action for libel the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the
guilt of the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient
for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by a preponderance of evidence only.
(Ocampo vs. Jenkins (supra); Reilly vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 27
American decisions, 708; Cooley on Torts, sec. 208; Greenleaf on Evidence, 426;
Wigmore on Evidence, secs. 2497, 2498.)

With reference to the second assignment of error above noted, we find that this court
has already decided the question raised thereby, in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al.
(18 Phil. Rep., 1).

During the trial of the cause the plaintiff called several witnesses for the purpose of
showing that the statements made in said alleged libelous editorial were intended to
apply to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the Interior. The defendants
duly objected to these questions and excepted to the ruling of the court admitting them.

In the case of Russell vs. Kelley (44 Cal., 641, 642) the same question was raised and
the court, in its decision, said:

The rule laid down in 2 Stockey on Slander (p. 51) is that the application of the
slanderous words to the plaintiff and the extrinsic matters alleged in the
declaration may be shown by the testimony of witnesses who knew the parties
and circumstances and who can state their judgment and opinion upon the
application and meaning of the terms used by the defendant. It is said that where
the words are ambiguous on the face of the libel, to whom it was intended to be
applied, the judgment and opinion of witnesses, who from their knowledge of the
parties and circumstances are able to form a conclusion as to the defendant's
intention and application of the libel is evidence for the information of the jury.

Mr. Odgers, in his work on Libel and Slander (p. 567), says:

The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or others acquainted with the
circumstances, to state that, in reading the libel, they at once concluded it was
aimed at the plaintiff. It is not necessary that all the world should understand the
libel. It is sufficient if those who know the plaintiff can make out that he is the
person meant. (See also Falkard's Stockey on Libel and Slander, 4th English
edition, 589.)

The correctness of this rule is not only established by the weight of authority but is
supported by every consideration of justice and sound policy. The lower court
committed no error in admitting the opinion of witnesses offered during the trial of the
cause. One's reputation is the sum or composite of the impressions spontaneously
made by him from time to time, and in one way or another, upon his neighbors and
acquaintances. The effect of a libelous publication upon the understanding of such
persons, involving necessarily the identity of the person libeled is of the very essence of
the wrong. The issue in a libel case concerns not only the sense of the publication, but,
in a measure its effect upon a reader acquainted with the person referred to. The
correctness of the opinion of the witnesses as to the identity of the person meant in the
libelous publication may always be tested by cross-examination. (Enquirer
Co. vs. Johnston, 72 Fed. Rep., 443; 2nd Greenleaf on Evidence, 417;
Nelson vs. Barchenius, 52 Ill., 236; Smith vs.Miles, 15 Vt., 245; Miller vs. Butler, 6
Cushing (Mass.), 71.)

It is true that some of the courts have established a different rule. We think, however,
that a large preponderance of the decisions of the supreme courts of the different States
is in favor of the doctrine which we have announced here.

We are of the opinion that assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, and 7 may fairly be
considered together, the question being whether or not the evidence adduced during
the trial of the cause in the lower court shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the said editorial was libelous in its character. Here again we find that this question has
been passed upon by this court in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1),
and we deem it unnecessary to discuss this question again, for the reason that the
evidence adduced in the present cause was practically the same, or at least to the
same effect, as the evidence adduced in the cause of U.S. vs. Ocampo et al. It is
sufficient here to say that the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause
shows, by a large preponderance of the evidence, that said editorial was one of the
most pernicious and malicious libels upon a just, upright and honorable official, which
the courts have ever been called upon to consider. There is not a scintilla of evidence in
the entire record, notwithstanding the fact that the defendants from time to time
attempted to make a show of proving the truthfulness of the statements made in said
editorial, which in any way reflects upon the character and high ideals of Mr. Dean C.
Worcester, in the administration of his department of the Government.

With reference to the fifth assignment of error, to wit: That the court erred in holding that
the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe
Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco, were the proprietors of "El
Renacimiento," the lower court said:

Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the
twelve defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang,"
but that six of them had originally contributed their money as a patriotic donation
to the Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and
property of the paper as trustee for this people, and that the paper was being
devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo Lichauco
had agreed to contribute to the same ends but had not done so.

"This proposition," said the lower court, "in the light of the evidence, is so preposterous
as to entitle it to little, if any, serious consideration. To ask the court to believe it is
tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and common sense. That those seven
defendants named contributed their respective sums of money, as shown by the
evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper in 1901, for their own personal benefit
and profit, is fully and unmistakably established. It is equally well established that Martin
Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner, but that he has been and is still the
administrator or business manager of said newspaper, and that the other six persons
named are shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof and were such on the said
30th of October, 1908."

Examining the evidence adduced during the cause in the lower court, we find, sometime
before the commencement of the present action and before any question was raised
with reference to who were the owners of the said newspaper, that the defendant,
Arcadio Arellano, in the case of United States vs. Jose Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338),
testified upon that question as follows:

Q. Who are the proprietors of "El Renacimiento"?

A. I, Martin Ocampo, Gregorio Mariano (Cansipit), Mr. Barretto, and Galo

Lichauco.

Q. Who else?

A. No one else.

Q. And Rafael Palma — is not so?

A. No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother of Rafael Palma.

During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio Arellano testified that his declarations in
other cause were true.

It also appears from the record (Exhibit B-J) that in the month of November, 1907, long
before the commencement of the present action, "El Renacimiento," in reply to an
article which was published in "El Comercio," published the following statement:

They (it) say (s) that this enterprise" (evidently meaning the publication of "El
Renacimiento") "is sustained by Federal money; that we are inspired by Federal
personages. We declare that this, besides being false, is calumnious. The
shareholders of this company are persons well known by the public, and never at
any moment of their lives have they acted with masks on--those masks for which
"El Comercio" seems to have so great an affection. They are, as the public
knows: Señores Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose,
Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit.

Arcadio Arellano also testified during the trial of the present cause that he contributed
P750 to the establishment of "El Renacimiento;" that Martin Ocampo contributed the
sum of P500; that Mariano Cansipit, Felipe Barretto and Angel Jose contributed the sum
of P250 or P500 each; that Galo Lichauco contributed the sum of P1,000 and that
Manuel Palma contributed P3,000.

During the trial of the present cause Arcadio Arellano, Martin Ocampo, and Angel Jose
testified as witnesses, relating to the ownership of the newspaper called "El
Renacimiento." They testified that whatever money they gave for the purpose of
establishing said newspaper, was given as a donation, and that they were neither the
owners nor coowners of said periodical. The defendants, Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, did not testify as witnesses during the trial of the
cause in the lower court. No reason is given for their failure to appear and give
testimony in their own behalf. The record does not disclose whether or not the
declarations of Arcadio Arellano, in the case of U. S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338) at
the time they were made, were called to the attention of Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, as well as the reply to "El Comercio," above
noted. Proof of said declarations and publication was adduced during the trial of the
cause in the present case, and the attorney of these particular defendants well knew the
purpose and effect of such evidence, if not disputed; but, notwithstanding the fact that
said declarations and publication were presented in evidence, and notwithstanding the
fact that the attorney for the defendants knew of the purpose of such proof, the
defendants, Palma, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit, were not called as witnesses for
the purpose of rebutting the same. It is a well settled rule of evidence, that when the
circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to offer
evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the
circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural
conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the
inferences against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion. (Railway
Company vs. Ellis, C. C. A. Reports, vol. 4, p. 454; Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5
Cush. (Mass.), 295; People vs.McWhorter 4 Barb. (N. Y.), 438.)

Lord Mansfield, in the case of Blatch vs. Archer (Cowper, 63, 65) said:

It is certainly a maxim that all the evidence is to be weighed according to the

proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of
the other side to have contradicted.

Mr. Starkey, in his valuable work on evidence (vol. 1, p. 64), lays down the rule that:

The conduct of a party in omitting to produce evidence in elucidation of the

subject matter in dispute, which is within his power and which rests peculiarly
within his own knowledge, frequently offers occasion for presumptions against
him, since it raises the strong suspicion that such evidence, if adduced, would
operate to his prejudice. (Pacific Coast et al. Co. vs. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 36 C.
C. A. Reports, 136, 153.)

At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio Arellano in the case of Sedano and at the
time of the said publication in reply to "El Comercio," there was no reason for stating
anything except the truth: neither does there seem to have been any reason for
publishing the fact that the defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" unless it
was true.
At the time there seemed to be no reason to have it appear that they were donors and
public benefactors only. They seemed to be proud of the fact that they were the owners.
The editors, publishers, and managers of "El Renacimiento," at the time the reply to "El
Comercio" was published, seemed to be anxious to announce to the public who its
owners were. It ("El Renacimiento") had not then realized that it belonged to no one;
that it had been born into the community without percentage; that it had been created a
terrible machine for the purpose of destroying the good character and reputation of men
without having any one to respond for its malicious damage occasioned to honorable
men; that it was a cast-off, without a past or the hope of a future; that it was liable to be
kicked and buffetted about the persecuted and destroyed without any one to protect it;
that its former friends and creators had scattered hither and thither and had
disappeared like feathers before a cyclone, declaring, under oath, that they did not
know their offspring and were not willing to recognize it in public. It seems to have been
a Moses found in the bulrushes, destined by its creators to be a great good among the
Filipino people, in teaching them to respect the rights of persons and property; but,
unlike its Biblical prototype, it became, by reason of its lack of parentage, an engine of
destruction let loose in the State, to enter the private abode of lawabiding citizens and to
take from them their honor and reputation, which neither it nor the State could restore.
To rob a man of his wealth is to rob him of trash, but to take from him his good name
and reputation is to rob him of that which does not make the robber richer and leaves
the person robbed poor indeed.

The appellants tried to make it appear that the money which they gave for the
establishment of "El Renacimiento" was a pure donation. They claim that it was a
donation to the Filipino people. They do not state, however, or attempt to show what
particular persons were to manage, control, and direct the enterprise for which the
donation was made. A donation must be made to definite persons or associations. A
donation to an indefinite person or association is an anomaly in law, and we do not
believe, in view of all of the facts, that it was in fact made. A donation must be made to
some definite person or association and the donee must be some ascertained or
ascertainable person or association.

A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but it must be made, in the very
nature of things, to some definite person or association. A donation made to no person
or association could not be regarded as a donation in law. It could not be more than an
abandonment of property. Of course where a donation is in fact made, without
reservation to a particular person or association, the donor is no longer the owner of the
thing donated nor responsible, in any way, for its use, provided that the object, for which
the donation was made, was legal. A person does not become an owner or part owner
of a church, for example, to the construction of which he has made a donation; neither
is he responsible for the use to which said edifice may be applied. No one disputes the
fact that donations may be made for the public use, but they must be made to definite
persons or associations, to be administered in accordance with the purpose of the gift.

We can not believe, in the light of the whole record, that the defendants and appellants,
at the time they presented the defense that they were donors simply and not owners,
had a reasonable hope that their declarations as to said donation, given in the manner
alleged, would be believed by the court.

After a careful examination of the evidence brought to this court and taking into
consideration the failure of the other defendants to testify, we are of the opinion that a
preponderance of such evidence shows that the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit, were the coowners of the newspaper known as "El Renacimiento," at the time
of the publication of the said alleged libel.

With reference to the sixth assignment of error above noted, to wit: That the lower court
committed an error in not admitting in evidence the judgment of acquittal of the
defendant, Lope K. Santos, rendered in the criminal cause, we are of the opinion that
the refusal to admit said evidence in the civil cause was not an error. The fact that the
evidence in the criminal cause was insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was guilty
of the crime charged, in no way barred the right of the person injured by said alleged
libel to maintain the present civil action against him. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil. Rep.,
681.) The criminal action had to be sustained by evidence showing the culpability of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while in the civil action it is sufficient to show that
the defendants injured the plaintiff by the alleged libelous publication, by a
preponderance of the evidence only. (Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 426; Cooley on
Torts, 208; Reilley vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 23 Am. Dec., 708.)

In the case of Steel vs. Cazeaux (8 Martin, La., 318; 13 American Decisions, 288), the
supreme court of Louisiana said:

A judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution can not be given in evidence in

a civil action.

In the case of Betts et al. vs. New Hartford (25 Conn., 180) Mr. Justice Ellsworth said (in
a case where a judgment in a criminal case was offered in evidence):

A conviction in a criminal case is not evidence of facts upon which the judgment
was rendered, when those facts come up in a civil case, for this evidence would
not be material; and so the law is perfectly well settled. (1 Greenleaf on
Evidence, secs. 536, 524; 1 Phillips on Evidence, 231; Hutchinson vs. Bank of
Wheeling, 41 Pa. St., 42; Beausoleil vs. Brown, 12 La. Ann., 543;
McDonald vs. Stark, 176 Ill., 456, 468.)

While we believe that the lower court committed no error in refusing to admit the
sentence acquitting Lope K. Santos in the criminal case, we are of the opinion, after a
careful examination of the record brought to this court, that it is insufficient to show that
Lope K. Santos was responsible, in any way, for the publication of the alleged libel, and
without discussing the question whether or not the so-called Tagalog edition of "El
Renacimiento" and "El Renacimiento" constituted one and the same newspaper, we find
that the evidence is insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos is responsible in damages,
in any way, for the publication of the said alleged libel.

The appellants discussed the eight and ninth assignments of error together, and claim
that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and
severally against the defendants and in allowing an execution against the individual
property of said owners, and cite provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes in
support of their contention. The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they
fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the
universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in
which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The defendants might
have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might have been sued
jointly and severally, as they were. (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English Common Law
Reports), 558.) If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured,
has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately,
because the tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. (1 Chiddey, Common
Law Pleadings, 86.) It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct,
corporeal act, for, to give an example, in a case of assault and battery committed by
various persons, under the common law all are principals. So also is the person who
counsels, aids or assists in any way he commission of a wrong. Under the common law,
he who aided or assisted or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as
much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. (Page vs. Freeman, 19
Mo., 421.)

It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or
abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133;
Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 Ill., 313 (63 Am. Dec., 312 and note); Berry vs. Fletch, 1st Dill., 67;
Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L. 64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb. (N. Y.), 612;
Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90; Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The
person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the
whole damage caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It
is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act
are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation
in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others. (Forebrother vs. Ansley,
1 Campbell (English Reports), 343; Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East, 171; Booth vs. Hodgson,
6 Term Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505; Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1;
Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449; Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishop vs. Ealey,
9 Johnson (N. Y.), 294.)

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among
them, except among themselves. They can no insist upon an apportionment, for the
purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full
amount. (Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 Ill. App., 639; Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417;
Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark., 337; Bevins vs. McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.)

A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies
any claim which might exist against the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The
release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement, generally operates to discharge all.
(Wright vs. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N.Y.), 290;
Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34
Vt., 387; Turner vs.Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310; Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)

Of course the courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tort feasors
are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of
evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even
though they are charged jointly and severally. (Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 Johnson (N.
Y.), 382; Drake vs. Barrymore, 14 Johnson, 166; Owens vs. Derby, 3 Ill., 126.)

This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of the Philippine Commission. Section 6
provides that:

Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is chargeable with the publication of any

words in any part . . . or number of each newspaper, as fully as if he were the
author of the same.

In our opinion the lower court committed no error in rendering a joint and several
judgment against the defendants and allowing an execution against their individual
property. The provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes cited by the defendants and
appellants have no application whatever to the question presented in the present case.

The tenth assignment of error above noted relates solely to the amount of damages
suffered on account of wounded feelings, mental suffering and injury to the good name
and reputation of Mr. Worcester, by reason of the alleged libelous publication. The lower
court found that the damages thus suffered by Mr. Worcester amounted to P35,000.
This assignment of error presents a most difficult question. The amount of damages
resulting from a libelous publication to a man's good name and reputation is difficult of
ascertainment. It is nor difficult to realize that the damage thus done is great and almost
immeasurable. The specific amount the damages to be awarded must depend upon the
facts in each case and the sound discretion of the court. No fixed or precise rules can
be laid down governing the amount of damages in cases of libel. It is difficult to include
all of the facts and conditions which enter into the measure of such damages. A man's
good name and reputation are worth more to him than all the wealth which he can
accumulate during a lifetime of industrious labor. To have them destroyed may be
eminently of more damage to him personally than the destruction of his physical wealth.
The loss is immeasurable. No amount of money can compensate him for his loss.
Notwithstanding the great loss which he, from his standpoint, sustains, the courts must
have some tangible basis upon which to estimate such damages.
In discussing the elements of damages in a case of libel, the Honorable James C.
Jenkins, who tried the present case in the court below, correctly said that, "The
enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of
life, liberty or property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society, that underlie
the whole scheme of human civilization. The respect and esteem of his fellows are
among the highest rewards of a wellspent life vouchsafed to man in this existence. The
hope of it is the inspiration of youth and its possession is a solace in later years. A man
of affairs, a business man, who has been seen known by his fellowmen in the active
pursuits of life for many years, and who has developed a great character and an
unblemished reputation, has secured a possession more useful and more valuable than
lands or houses or silver or gold. The law recognizes the value of such a reputation and
constantly strives to give redress for its injury. It imposes upon him who attacks it by
slanderous words or libelous publications, the liability to make full compensation for the
damage to the reputation, for the shame, obloquy and for the injury to the feelings of its
owner, which are caused by the publication of the slander or libel. The law goes further.
If the words are spoken or the publication is made with the intent to injure the victim or
with criminal indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as the jury, in view
of all the circumstances of the particular case, adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay
as an example to the public and to deter others from doing likewise, and for punishment
for the infliction of the injury."

As was said above, the damages suffered by Mr. Worcester to his good name and
reputation are most difficult of ascertainment. The attorney for the appellants, in his
brief, lends the court but little assistance in reaching a conclusion upon this question.
The appellants leaves the whole question to the discretion of the court, without any
argument whatever.

After a careful examination, we are of the opinion that part of the judgment of the lower
court relating to the damages suffered by the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, should be
modified, and that a judgment should be rendered in favor of Mr. Dean C. Worcester
and against the defendants, jointly and severally, for the sum of P15,000, with interest
at 6 per cent from the 23d of January, 1909.

With reference to the eleventh assignment of error above noted, to wit: That the court
erred in imposing punitive damages upon the defendants, we are of the opinion, after a
careful examination of the evidence, and in view of all of the facts and circumstances
and the malice connected with the publication of said editorial and the subsequent
publications with relation to said editorial, that the lower court, by virtue of the provisions
of Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, was justified in imposing punitive damages
upon the defendants.

Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an action for libel, to render a judgment for
punitive damages, in an amount which the court may think will be a just punishment to
the libeler and an example to others.
Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may always be recovered if the defendant
or defendants are actuated by malice. In the present case there was not the slightest
effort on the part of the defendants to show the existence of probable cause or
foundation whatever for the facts contained in said editorial. Malice, hatred, and ill will
against the plaintiff are seen throughout the record. The said editorial not only
attempted to paint the plaintiff as a villain, but upon every occasion, the defendants
resorted to ridicule of the severest kind.

Here again we find difficulty in arriving at a conclusion relating to the damages which
should be imposed upon the defendants for the purpose of punishment. Upon this
question the courts must be governed in each case by the evidence, the circumstances
and their sound discretion. Taking into consideration the fact that some of the
defendants have been prosecuted criminally and have been sentenced, and considering
that fact as a part of the punitive damages, we have arrived at the conclusion that the
judgment of the lower court should be modified, and that a judgment should be
rendered against the defendants, jointly and severally, and in favor of the plaintiff, the
Honorable Dean C. Worcester, in the sum of P10,000, as punitive damages, with
interest at 6 per cent from the 23d day of January, 1909.

Therefore, after a full consideration of all the facts contained in the record and the errors
assigned by the appellants in this court, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the
lower court should be modified and that a judgment should be rendered in favor of Dean
C. Worcester and against the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit, jointly and severally, for the sum of P25,000 with interest at 6 per cent from the
23d of January, 1909, with costs, and that a judgment should be entered absolving
Lope K. Santos from any liability under said complaint. So ordered.
J. H. CHAPMAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, defendant-appellee.

Wolfson & Wolfson for appellant.

Bruce, Lawrence, Ross & Block for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

At the time the accident occurred, which is the basis of this action, there was a single-
track street-car line running along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars
to meet and pass each other. One of these switches was located at the scene of the
accident.

The plaintiff had been visiting his friend, a man by the name of Creveling, in front of
whose house the accident happened. He desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car
coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was
approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed from the gate into the
street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the
entrance being from the front or the rear flatform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front
platform but, seeing that he could not reached it without extra exertion, stopped beside
the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him in order
to board. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the
defendant's automobile.

The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his
chauffeur, a competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana being
immediately in front of him, he followed along behind it. Just before reaching the scene
of the accident the street car which was following took the switch — that is, went off the
main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. Thereupon the
defendant no longer followed that the street car nor went to the left, but either kept
straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the
plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to
that in which the defendant was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car, the
one the plaintiff attempted to board, was almost in front of the defendant's automobile,
defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff, as
above described.

The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.

A careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's
driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an
oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, in common out to board the car, was
not obliged, for his own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon him from
his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that,
according to the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left
should pass upon his side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his
right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the
street car.

The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the
facts and circumstances of this case. As we have said in the case of Johnson vs.
David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903
of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible.

Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the
alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the
owner is present, unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length
of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his
driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and
permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent
acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an
automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of
60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable
opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the
results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a
sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to
prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the
owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is
not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the
automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient
time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver.
Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet
and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be
sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.

Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a competent driver, would be

responsible, whether present or not, for the negligent acts of his driver when the
automobile was a part of a business enterprise, and was being driven at the time of the
accident in furtherance of the owner's business, we do not now decide.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM
CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father,
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs-appellants.

De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and Divino for defendants-appellants

MAKALINTAL, J.:

As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members
of his family were injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the
defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on February
26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following disposition:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in favor of

the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo,
jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the sum of
P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs against the
defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby
ordered dismissed, for lack of merits.

On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of
P3,705.11 in favor of the plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view of
the total amount of the plaintiffs' claim.

There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the
accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu
Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael
Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held his employer solidarily liable with him.

The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54
(now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was
driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where
his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were
Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac
of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his
Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were
traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the
absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at
approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers). Their headlights were mutually
noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was
a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse
by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held
at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him,
only eight meters away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence.
The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should have
given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not
notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have
been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of
his headlights for a considerable while.

In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction.
Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that
lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his
car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and
carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the
oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he
slackened his speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded
that the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble —
beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or else
squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk
should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles
per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the
brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he
had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite
lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its
rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose.
Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last
moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at
the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the
road at the moment of impact.

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's
negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
The next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily
liable with the driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver,
if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if
he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least
twice within the next preceding two months.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the
owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented
the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as
law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs.
Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:

... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of
the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his
driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts,
after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of
an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at
a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had
a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally
and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other
hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or
violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at
the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner
for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver
act his own.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant,
if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe
Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware
Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of
violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all
may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be
sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure
to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the
danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may
be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed.
The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no
reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the
skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of
the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it
earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even
when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden
decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was
approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver
accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a
sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation
worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence
required by law to prevent the misfortune.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great
degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible
standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from
driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely
because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules
of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are
continually encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under
aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to
handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person
who is not similarly equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or
proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before
he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article
2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he
should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent
a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to
one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the
law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers
by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services,
would be effectively proscribed.

We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is
an error. The next question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages.
The award of P48,000 by way of moral damages is itemized as follows:

1. Marcial Caedo P
20,000.00

2. Juana S. Caedo 15,000.00

3. Ephraim Caedo 3,000.00

4. Eileen Caedo 4,000.00

5. Rose Elaine Caedo 3,000.00

6. Merilyn Caedo 3,000.00

Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them
also actual or compensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they
sustained. Defendants, on the other hand maintain that the amounts awarded as moral
damages are excessive and should be reduced. We find no justification for either side.
The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their
injuries, other than expenses for medical treatment, has not been shown by the
evidence. Actual damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain and suffering are
not capable of pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting moral,
not actual, damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.

The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:

MARCIAL T. CAEDO:

A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest wall,

anterior;
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a double
fracture; Subparieto-plaural hematoma; Basal disc atelectasis, lung, right
lower lobe, secondary;
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull.

JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement.
D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx right, big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III and V right.
F. Concussion, cerebral.

EPHRAIM CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital

EILEEN CAEDO:

A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral aspect.

B. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral;
(3) shin, lower 1/3.

ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3)
nasolabial region; (4) leg, lower third, anterior.

MARILYN CAEDO:
 A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third

C. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right. (See
Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, and D- 5)

It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries,
the amounts of moral damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring

defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with
respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.
FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO R. LUNA,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE E. DELA ROSA and LUIS
DELA ROSA, respondents.

Ezequiel S. Consulta for petitioners.

David M. Castro for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the defunct Court of Appeals. The petitioners
are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision
took place on January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business
executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no
driver's license.

In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna against Luis dela Rosa
and his father Jose dela Rosa, the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
81078, rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the defendants

Luis dela Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to pay, jointly and severally, to the
plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto
Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss
of his companionship, with legal interest from the date of this decision;
plus attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit.
(Record on Appeal, p. 35.)

The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals which in a decision dated
May 22, 1979, affirmed in totothat of the trial court. (Rollo, p. 48.) However, upon a
motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants-appellants, the Court of Appeals, in a
resolution dated June 19, 1981, modified its judgment thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in this case is hereby modified

insofar as the judgment ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and
severally, the sum of P 1,650,000.00 to plaintiffs with legal interest from
July 5, 1973, is concerned. In lieu thereof, defendants are hereby ordered
to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) as unearned net earnings of Roberto R.
 Luna, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint
until the whole amount shall have been totally paid.

The rest of the other dispositions in the judgment a quo stand. (Rollo, pp.
33-34.)

Both parties filed separate petitions for review of the appellate court's decision.

In G.R. No. 57362, the petition for review of Jose and Luis dela Rosa was denied for
lack of merit on October 5, 1981. Subsequently, they informed that the decision sought
to be reviewed was not yet final because the Lunas had a pending motion for
reconsideration. For prematurity, this Court set aside all previous resolutions. On
February 16, 1983, acting upon the motion and manifestation of the petitioners, they
were required to file an amended petition within thirty days from notice. On June 20,
1983, this Court resolved: "For failure of the petitioners to file an amended petition as
required, this case is hereby DISMISSED and the dismissal is final."

The instant case — G.R. No. 62988 — is the separate appeal of the Lunas. Their
petition contains the following prayer:

1. That the petition be given due course;

2. That after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered, setting aside or

modifying the RESOLUTION of respondent Court of Appeals dated June
19, 1981, attached as Annex "A" to the petition, only insofar as it reduced
the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00, s• as to affirm the trial court's
finding as to the unearned net earnings of the deceased in the amount of
P1,650,000.00;

3. Ordering that the award of attorney's fees shall also be with interest, at
the legal rate. (Rollo, p. 27.)

On June 27, 1983, the petition was given due course. (Rollo, pp. 122-123.)

In the light of the foregoing, the resolution stated:

It thus appears that the questions in esse are with respect to the award for
unearned net earnings — should the award be P450,000.00 only or
should it be P1,650,000.00 as originally adjudged; and whether the award
for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at the legal rate.

The Court takes notice that the wrongful death occurred as early as
January 18, 1970, and that until now the process of litigation is not yet
over. In the meantime the value of the Philippine peso has been seriously
eroded so that the heirs of the deceased may ultimately have a greatly
depreciated judgment. In the interest of justice, the private respondents
 are hereby ordered to PAY to the petitioners within thirty (30) days from
notice the following amounts adjudged against them: P450,000.00 for
unearned net earnings of the deceased; (P12,000.00 as compensatory
damages; P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship with legal interest
from July 3, 1973; and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Still to be resolved shall be the following: whether the award for unearned
net earnings shall be increased to P1,650,000.00; and whether the award
for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at the legal rate. The costs
will be adjudged as a matter of course. (Rollo, p. 123.)

The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to explain they
said that they had no cash money. Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to
issue a writ of execution but the attempt of the special sheriff to enter the private
respondent's premises so that he could make an inventory of personal properties was
thwarted by guards and this Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary
to assist in enforcing the writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal
amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two children, and
living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually employed. It is said: "His
compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as
yet." (Rollo, p. 208.)

1. On the amount of the award.

The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased
Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income
was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual
personal expenses.

This is what the trial court said on Luna's life expectancy:

According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at age 33 the life

expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4 years, and under the Commissioner
Standard Ordinary, used by our domestic insurance companies since
1968 for policies above P5,000.00 his life expectancy was 38.51 years.
Dr. Vicente Campa, medical director of San Miguel Corporation, testified
that he was the regular physician of Roberto Luna since his marriage to
Felina Rodriguez in 1957. He said that except for a slight anemia which he
had ten years earlier, Roberto Luna was of good health. Allowing for this
condition, he could reasonably expect to have a life expectancy of 30
years. (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)

The Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial court's conclusion said:

We have not been persuaded to disturb the conclusion that the deceased
had a life expectancy of thirty years. At the time of Luna's death, he was
 only thirty-three years old and in the best of health. With his almost perfect
physical condition and his sound mind, the expectation that he could have
lived for another thirty years is reasonable, considering that with his
educational attainment, his social and financial standing, he had the
means of staying fit and preserving his health and well-being. That he
could have lived at least until the age of sixty-three years is an
assessment which is more on the conservative side in view of the
testimony of Dr. Vicente Campa that the general life expectancy
nowadays had gone up to seventy years. (Rollo, p. 45.)

The Court of Appeals likewise sustained the trial court in respect of Luna's annual
income and expense. This is what the trial court said:

Roberto Luna was 33 years old when he died, and was survived by his
wife Felina Rodriguez-Luna, and two children, Roberto Jr., 13 years, and
Jose, 12 years. His wife was 35 years old at the time. He declared a gross
income of P16,900.00 for 1967 (Exhibit I), P29,700,000 for 1968 (Exhibit
H) and P45,117.69 for 1969 (Exhibit G). He had investments in various
corporations amounting to P136,116.00 (Exhibits K, M, M-1, N, N-1 to N-3,
O, O-1, P, Q and R) and was the president and general manager of
Rodlum Inc.; general manager of Esso Greenhills Service Center;
Assistant manager of Jose Rodriguez Lanuza Sons; director of Steadfast
Investment Corporation; chairman and treasurer of Greenhills Industrial
Corporation; vice-president of Oasis, Inc.; director of Nation Savings
Association; director of Arlun Taxi; and treasurer of National Association of
Retired Civil Employees.

... . His income tax returns show an increase in his income in the short
period of three years. It is reasonable to expect that it would still go higher
for the next fifteen years and reach a minimum of P75,000.00 a year. The
potential increase in the earning capacity of a deceased person is
recognized by the Supreme Court. ... the court believes that the expected
gross earnings of Roberto Luna should be fixed in the sum of P75,000.00
a year for the period of his life expectancy of 30 years, but deducting his
personal expenses which, because of his business and social standing the
court in the amount of P20,000.00 a year, in accordance with the rulings of
the Supreme Court. (Record on Appeal, pp. 32-34.)

Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the Court of Appeals
took into account the fact "that the deceased Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car
racing as a sport, having participated in tournaments both here and abroad;" it said that
Luna's habit and manner of life should be "one of the factors affecting the value of
mortality table in actions for damages;" and, consequently, concluded that Luna could
not have lived beyond 43 years. The result was that the 30-year life expectancy of Luna
was reduced to 10 years only.
Further on the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals ruled in respect of
Luna's annual personal expenses:

... . Considering the escalating price of automobile gas which is a key

expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing, We should increase that
amount to P30,000.00 as the would be personal expenses of the
deceased per annum. (Rollo, p. 33.)

The Court of Appeals then determined the amount of the award thus: P75,000.00
annual gross income less P30,000.00 annual personal expenses leaves P45,000.00
multiplied by 10 years of life expectancy and the product is P450,000.00.

The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by its resolution of June
19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 Years and increased his
annual personal expenses from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. We sustain the petitioners.

The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years said that
his habit and manner of life should be taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged
in car racing as a sport both here and abroad - a dangerous and risky activity tending to
shorten his life expectancy. That Luna had engaged in car racing is not based on any
evidence on record. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement
but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are
extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedalled four
wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to have disturbed
the determination of the trial court which it had previously affirmed.

Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the
deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses but without at the same time
increasing his annual gross income. It stands to reason that if his annual personal
expenses should increase because of the "escalating price of gas which is a key
expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a statement which lacks complete
basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase
considering the manifold sources thereof.

In short, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.

2. Attorney's fees — with or without interest at the legal rate.

The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the petitioners in the sum of P50,000.00. This
award was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of May 22, 1979. The
resolution of June 19, 1981, reaffirmed the award. The two decisions as well as the
resolution do not provide for interest at the legal rate to be tacked to the award.

The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be with interest at the legal
rate from the date of the filing of the complaint. There is merit in this prayer. The
attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and
under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of
the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As with the other damages awarded, the interest
should accrue only from the date of the trial court's decision.

The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May 26,1977; 77 SCRA 98,
where it was held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied to Atty. Marvin Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but since
Reginald had attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become
merely subsidiary to that of his son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married
and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the liability of his father should be
subsidiary only.

We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do so will
not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of
Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property either in the Philippines or
elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1981, is hereby
set aside; its decision dated May 22, 1979, is reinstated with the sole modification that
the award for attorney's fees shall earn interest at the legal rate from July 5, 1973, the
date of the trial court's decision. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Quasi-tort means a tort for which a non-perpetrator is held liable. In a quasi tort, a
person who did not actually commit a wrong is anyway held liable. For instance, a
master will be held liable for a tort committed by a servant under the principle of
vicarious liability. Under quasi tort, the liability is fixed on the presumption that some
legal duty exists that cannot be classified strictly as a personal duty or as a contractual
duty, but rather as some other kind of duty recognizable by the law.

PD 603

Chapter 4

LIABILITIES OF PARENTS

Art. 58. Torts. - Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the
child under their parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code.

RA 9344

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.

Magno T. Bueser for appellant.

Alver Law Offices and Edon B. Brion and Vencedor A. Alimario for appellees.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial,
Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to
bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno
was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the
decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed the crime.

In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin
Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of
P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the defense that
if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante Capuno
and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under
the control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was sustained by the
lower court and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages
claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of
law.

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a
student of the Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo
and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city
upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other
students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel
and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep
turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a
consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his
son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a
parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he
attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.

The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held
civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the
death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5,
which provides:
 ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceable
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question
jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the
negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then
living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of
the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the
father from liability.

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla,
Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante
capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his
extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that
Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred.
In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's
supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then
a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who
live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them
in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they
can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish
Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants
Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of
P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a
touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two
lovers died while still in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives
they have touched. While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their
families through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least
terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting from the
unfortunate occurrence.

In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately
initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the
judgment of respondent court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No.
69060 with the following decretal portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is hereby
reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and
solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;

2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;

3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.

However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed." 1

Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses
are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable
incident which took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-
year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while
petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of
age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same
date.

For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi
were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with
Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first
and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands
for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to
threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best
friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu
City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound
inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem
streets of the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the

death of both minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their
respective theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available
reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.

Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell
caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the
gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise
distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of
his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must
have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the
then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages
arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial,
the court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing

plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is
likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit." 2

On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the
complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was
rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by
certiorari, now submit for resolution the following issues in this case:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance
with established decisional laws; and

2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by
respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3

In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal
Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining
whether or not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act.
However, undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder
or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be
emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in
the determination of whether it was suicide or not.

It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-
contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by
private respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the
funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from
the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the
body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to
conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting
a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on
Wendell’s hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.cralawnad

More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of
Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and
twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death; that when he arrived at the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy
table and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was
dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval,
he never saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or washed in the
area of the wound on the head which he examined because the deceased was inside
the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the
entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are
concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6

He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim
and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the
gunshot wound of entrance which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact
fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these
clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be
no black residue or tattooing that could result from these guns because they are what
we call clean?

A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.

ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those
indications that you said may not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24
inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless
powder.

Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have
noticed, the singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as
shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have been fired by the
person himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little
above the right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?

A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the
bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could
have been fired by the victim." 7

As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the
crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi,
respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National
Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance
located at the right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest
inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal
region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus,
directed slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making
a punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating
extensively along its course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally
making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left,
2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory meatus.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
x x x

"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of
entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or
bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying
tissue, are absent." 10

On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of
the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself
24 inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been
possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length.

ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right
arm almost straight towards his head." 11

Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies
of defendants’ witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of
an apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the
house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a
person at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.

On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying
faces the gas station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see
directly the gate of the Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and
the gas station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop
of the Tans, she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on,
she talked with James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate
towards his rooftop. 13

However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the
Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained
that he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to
Felipe Gotiong’s house; and he further gave the following answers to these
questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).

Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your house?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A It is about 8 feet.

ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)

Q And where were you looking from?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A From upstairs in my living room.

ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)

Q From Your living room window, is that correct?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14

Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do
not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’ observations,
since the visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective
houses in relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand,
witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and
his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her
scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the
Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he
heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to the police
station to report the incident. 15 Manolo’s direct and candid testimony establishes and
explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the
"shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.

We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was
another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not
even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any
alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi
did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial,
documentary and pictorial — the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant
of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a
reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son,
is not borne out by the evidence on record either.

Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio
Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom.
Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is
always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their
son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night
the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but
entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence
of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have
gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left
lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child
relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child.
Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the
activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at
the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent
and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were
sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of
their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being
drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the
photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof,
18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in
possession of that firearm.

In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as
explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of
diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be
engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-
appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping
said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.’

"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said
gun which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are
subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was
living in their company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been
reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of
Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed
by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts
and criminal offenses.’

‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children
who acted with discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C.
and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only
covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused
with criminal intent.’ (3 SCRA 361-362).

". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi
somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without
defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety box
since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said
gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then,
Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed
role of a CANU agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

x x x

"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the
lower court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because
as preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing
this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to
Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock,
but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been
committed." (Emphases ours.) 19

We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable
for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed
by their minor son. We take this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its
ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court
cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability
of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses," followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining
why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children.
The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for
purposes of the discussion hereunder.chanrobles law library

Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but
the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature
requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter
which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the
liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary,
then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that
they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the
other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that
diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.

We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if
we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint
tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and
the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.
Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last
paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damages."cralaw virtua1aw library

We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their
minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —

x x x

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under
fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21

Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing
provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is
likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence
on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.

That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is
buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor
shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in
case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article
2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against
him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors,
an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal
guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with
(his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil
law."cralaw virtua1aw library

The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated
in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180
of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a
number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta
v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25
and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically
on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children
over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15
years of aye or over, since these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised
Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability
should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore
enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to
quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act
involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is
caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances
resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court’s determination of whether the
liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor
children, is primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through
reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his
father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence
of a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability
was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old
son who was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of
the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for a quasi-delict.

However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from
the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying
Article 2180 but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present
case, as already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly
in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil
liability for serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other
hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for
damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to
"lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the son, "although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity" the father was only held
subsidiarily liable.

It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability
only for persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry;
29 and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-
accused in the other classes. 30

Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the
present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability
of the parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted
verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to
Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary"
liability. However, such categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the
decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and
Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of
evidence submitted therein by both parties, independent of the criminal case. And
responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action
was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or
negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind
the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is of
no moment."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and
should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in
their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto
caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age
who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of
age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
31

Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the
Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death
or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a
relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family Code,
this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil
liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a
felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in
holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding
modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly
exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of

respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch
20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this
case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence
was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however,
was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted
without discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura
had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No.
0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption
was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the
adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the
moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually
living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished
by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.

Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the
15-day reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January
1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that
said notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both motions were denied by the
trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal,
this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
ending 22 December 1987.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition

for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December
1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent
spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the
acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the
following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to
appeal, may still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take
cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and
(2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned
may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the
latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for

reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of
Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were
considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period
to appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and
place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the
reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the
service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. 2

In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order
that substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the
application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of
appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having
interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals: 3

Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where

the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits.
The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid technical
sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override,
substantial justice. if d technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made
their aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article
2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault

or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .

Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor
child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)

This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as

vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law,
where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of
vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the
following terms:

With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence,

whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect —
and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in
which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally
culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that
liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position
to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which
 adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability —
with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability
can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's
own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and
control of one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to
the person made liable for their conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living
with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the
Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an
unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents
were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to
supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in
other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of
the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual
custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of
adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental
authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The
Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.

Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code 8 which reads as follows:

Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and
the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is
qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody
period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which
shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall
state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis
supplied)
 The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in
relation to Article 39 of the same Code:

Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the
time the Petition for adoption was filed.

The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and
the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this
rule:

Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the
civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the
requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of
the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions
of their unemancipated children living in their companyand under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been

retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at
the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may
be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority
had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not
have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen
since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above.
Article 35 provides as follows:

Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted
unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised
trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and
emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody,
parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis
supplied)

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting
parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child
during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet
begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,
actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,

were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-
G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed
before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court
for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc
spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P.
CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.

Rodolfo J. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees.

Luis G. Torres and Abraham E. Tionko for defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant
to the Court of Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue.

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six
at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher
assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school
premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an
ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud
that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the
object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the
object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated
it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then
that the girl related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August
4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the
parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria
Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.

In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter
against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to
pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.

The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor
child which causes damage to another under the specific facts related above and the
applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof,
which read:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
 the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this
Chapter.

ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.

The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence
accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause
damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is
responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different
cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the
circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as
in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be
rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last
paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article
shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."

Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof
necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence
contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or
omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his
immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure
applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in
every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the
damage could have been prevented.

In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant
could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any
way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or
the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty
to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care
and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was
concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no
parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's
character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame
could be attributed to her parents.

The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy
that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the
obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of
good conscience.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
AQUINAS SCHOOL, G.R. No. 184202
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA
S. INTON, on their behalf and on
behalf of their minor child, JOSE LUIS
S. INTON, and SR. MARGARITA Promulgated:
YAMYAMIN, OP,
Respondents. January 26, 2011
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the private schools liability for the outside catechists act of
shoving a student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to
remain in his seat and not move around the classroom.

The Facts and the Case

In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at
Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a
religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose
Luis grade three religion class.

On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left
his assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising
him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis
got up again and went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the childs
behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She
also pulled and shoved his head on the classmates seat.Finally, she told the child to stay
where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the blackboard
while seated on the floor.
 As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed
an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also
filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she
pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.

With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral,
and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his
mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victorias personal claims but ruled in Jose
Luis favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary
damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.[1]

Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).[2] They
asked the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee relation existed between Aquinas and
Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The CA, however, declined
to increase the award of damages.[3] Jose Luis moved for partial reconsideration but this
was denied. Aquinas, for its part, appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision
through a petition for review on certiorari.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA was correct in
holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.

The Courts Ruling

The CA found Aquinas liable to Jose Luis based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code
upon the CAs belief that the school was Yamyamins employer. Aquinas contests this.

The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test to determine the existence of
an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the employee;
(b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of
these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the employer,
whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the
means and methods by which he accomplishes the same.[4]

In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a
congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would
send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students.Aquinas insists
that it was not the school but Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her for the
task of catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the way bishops designate
the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was
quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods. The
Intons had not refuted the school directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was
error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.

Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only
qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it
cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct
towards the students by their religion teacher.

First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she
was qualified to teach religion.

Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from
a legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the
school had reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the students.

Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative Faculty
Staff Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also required her to attend a
teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998. [5]

Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach[6] to
ensure that she was really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation.[7] Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school year,
Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted
promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the
incident. [8] It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.
 Regarding the Intons plea for an award of greater amounts of damages, the Court
finds no justification for this since they did not appeal from the decision of the CA. The
Intons prayed for the increase only in their comment to the petition.They thus cannot
obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other than those that the CA already granted
them in its decision.[9]

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August 4, 2008, and HOLDS petitioner
Aquinas School not liable in damages to respondent Jose Luis Inton.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A.
YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA,
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS,
VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO
ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and
MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.

Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.

Padilla Law Office for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his
relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were
scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny
him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a
gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim
was only seventeen years old. 1

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other
students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants
liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss
of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees .3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the
decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved . 4

In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school
at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear
identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the
necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos
on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a
classmate. On the implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply
disagree.

The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment
as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private
respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the
school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in
their custody because the semester had already ended.

There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider
important because of an earlier incident which they claim underscores the negligence of
the school and at least one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the
respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated
from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a
report to the principal or taking any further action .6 As Gumban was one of the
companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners
contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that
their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The
respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that
killed Alfredo.

Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180
which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting positions.
The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be

liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so
long as they remain in their custody.

Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-
quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and
Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better
resolution of the case at bar.

In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School
and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school
supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so
recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was
found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil action
flied against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article
1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.

This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957,
exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the
ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom
Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the
school authorities who should be held liable Liability under this rule, he said, was
imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in
particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades" should apply only
to "heads" and not "teachers."

Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut a
classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in
Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages.
Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had
also not been sued that the school was not liable because it was not an establishment
of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that
the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents."
Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other members of the court concurred in
this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.

In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed
by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute.
Although the wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not boarding in the school,
the head thereof and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The
Court declared through Justice Teehankee:

The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in
their custody" — means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.
There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the
pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado
(as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have
been set aside by the present decision.

This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
who stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that even students already of age
were covered by the provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and
subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three others,11 Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the rule should apply
only to torts committed by students not yet of age as the school would be acting only
in loco parentis.

In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the
Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved at bar is a non-academic
school, the question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic
institutions will have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.

Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly
impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is
not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties
herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion
that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case
of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be
held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in
which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon
of reddendo singula singulis"teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students"
and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."

The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Exconde where he said in part:

I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to
teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial
difference is there between them insofar as concerns the proper
supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended
that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his
pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third Persons, so long as
they are in a position to exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil.
In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and
trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments."
The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms
"preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes.

If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of

negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under
the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for
the very reason/that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the
 teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority,
there can be no responsibility.

There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance
is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde
and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of
the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but
if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the
teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the
head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of
the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a school
of arts and trades.

The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the
school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. There does
not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the
school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-
academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the
school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply
showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head
would be held liable if the school were non-academic.

These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be
held answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school
only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in
the case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the
head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?

The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the
school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the
academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such
a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who
usually even boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision and
influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his
students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the
persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then
(as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could
not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and
trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion
of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the
corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision
must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees
fit to enact the necessary amendment.

The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-
extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the
school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners
themselves?

From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of
the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in
the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises. In the
view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only
upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered
and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed
ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain
requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports,
term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to
the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether
from observance of its rules.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.
Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in
the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere
of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for
his students' torts, in practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the
child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the
dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils
in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at
the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the
influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such
influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent
shag be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at
any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to
fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the
school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts
of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat
superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.

Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as
the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the
injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article
2180, which also states that:

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the Persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damages.

In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only
when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student
be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor,
the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the
teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of
age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.

The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his
dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under
this article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause
violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the school
that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in
case it is sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head
or the teacher in its employ.

The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its
teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the
pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among
them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the
assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those
rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken
adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.

A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to
hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as they are
in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is
disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on
the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent
can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is
greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the
child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's influence, besides
being coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the
students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the
child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher
for the tort committed by the child.

And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice even if he is already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor —
then there should all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less
accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury.
After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he has
reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's control, there is then all the
more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of the
student.

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following
conclusions:

1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the
authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year
classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish
his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is
that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere
savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate
purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.

2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them
was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control
and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections
and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did
not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo's killer.

3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that
Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-
observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against
him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while
it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even
if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been
established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student.
On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that
discipline.

4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be

held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated
an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was
clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does
not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he
confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.

5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held

directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other
private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the
custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted
by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply
sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances
here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek,
as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so

ordered.
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND
ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS,
CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO
CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.

Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.

Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed, with the following
modifications: (1) Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 are hereby
awarded to plaintiffs, in addition to the actual damages of P30,000.00, moral
damages of P20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00
awarded to plaintiffs in the decision under appeal; (2) St. Francis High School,
represented by the Spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, and
Benjamin Illumin, are hereby held jointly and severally liable with defendants
Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment
to plaintiffs of the abovementioned actual damages, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees, and for costs; and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and
Nida Aragones are hereby absolved from liability, and the case against them,
together with their respective counterclaims, is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)

The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C
at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B
and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents
spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not
allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic,
with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of
persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.

During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of
the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who
drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was
brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General
Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8834, in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena City, against the St. Francis High
School, represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula,
Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas,
Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which
respondents allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand
Castillo. Contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners
to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's
drowning, respondents prayed of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and expenses for litigation.

The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio,
de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally
to pay respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral
damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The court a
quo reasoned:

Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Court believes that the
defendant teachers namely: Connie Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly
Jaro, Nida Aragones and Patria Cadiz had failed to exercise the diligence
required of them by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they
had foreseen. (pp. 2930, Rollo)

xxx xxx xxx

While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at
the picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not
and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming
late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students. (p. 30, Rollo)

The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were easily attracted
to the sea without aforethought of the dangers it offers. Yet, the precautions and
reminders allegedly performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of
the standard required by law under the circumstances. While the defendants-
teachers admitted that some parts of the sea where the picnic was held are
deep, the supposed lifeguards of the children did not even actually go to the
water to test the depth of the particular area where the children would swim. And
indeed the fears of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was dangerous was
confirmed by the fact that three persons during the picnic got drowned at the
same time. Had the defendant teachers made an actual and physical observation
of the water before they allowed the students to swim, they could have found out
that the area where the children were swimming was indeed dangerous. And not
only that, the male teachers who according to the female teachers were there to
 supervise the children to ensure their safety were not even at the area where the
children were swimming. They were somewhere and as testified to by plaintiffs'
witness they were having a drinking spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)

On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High
School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the court a quo:

As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find sufficient evidence
showing that the picnic was a school sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has
been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna
responsible for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant
teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not
consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand,
defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she
was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to
supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)

Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents-

spouses assigned the following errors committed by the trial court:

1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St. Francis High School
and its administrator/principal Benjamin Illumin as equally liable not only for its
approved co-curricular activities but also for those which they unreasonably failed
to exercise control and supervision like the holding of picnic in the dangerous
water of Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.

2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis High School and
principal Benjamin Illumin as jointly and solidarily liable with their co-defendants-
teachers Rosario Lacandula, et als., for the tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in a
picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon, last March 20, 1982.

3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for actual and moral
damages for the untimely and tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in favor of
plaintiffs-appellants against all the defendants. (pp. 56-57, Rollo)

The Court of Appeals ruled:

We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.

Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school-sponsored
activity, nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the same was held under the
supervision of the teachers employed by the said school, particularly the teacher
in charge of Class I-C to whom the victim belonged, and those whom she invited
to help her in supervising the class during the picnic. Considering that the court a
quo found negligence on the part of the six defendants-teachers who, as such,
were charged with the supervision of the children during the picnic, the St.
 Francis High School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under
Article 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. They cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the picnic
was not an "extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis High School." We find from
the evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school principal had
knowledge of the picnic even from its planning stage and had even been invited
to attend the affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition against
undertaking the picnic, nor did he prescribe any precautionary measures to be
adopted during the picnic. At the least, We must find that the school and the
responsible school officials, particularly the principal, Benjamin Illumin, had
acquiesced to the holding of the picnic.

Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal
must be found jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the
damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. It is the
rule that in cases where the above-cited provisions find application, the
negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a
presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the
establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its principal);
and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear
and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the
employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the
defendants-teachers). The record does not disclose such evidence as would
serve to overcome the aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High
School and its principal from liability under the above-cited provisions.

As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-appellants, while We cannot

but commiserate with the plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell them in the untimely
death of their son Ferdinand Castillo and understand their suffering as parents,
especially the victim's mother who, according to appellants, suffered a nervous
breakdown as a result of the tragedy, We find that the amounts fixed by the
court a quo as actual damages and moral damages (P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively) are reasonable and are those which are sustained by
the evidence and the law.

However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of

P20,000.00 may and should be, as it is hereby, imposed in the present case by
way of example of correction for the public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of the
Civil Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)

On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors committed by the
trial court:

1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chavez, Luisito Vinas,
Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly and
 severally liable for damages such finding not being supported by facts and
evidence.

2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendants. (p. 59, Rollo)

On this score, respondent Court ruled:

The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the parents of

the victim Ferdinand Castillo, were not able to prove by their evidence that they
did not give their son consent to join the picnic in question. However, We agree
with the trial court in its finding that whether or not the victim's parents had given
such permission to their son was immaterial to the determination of the existence
of liability on the part of the defendants for the damage incurred by the plaintiffs-
appellants as a result of the death of their son. What is material to such a
determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of
defendants vis-a-visthe supervision of the victim's group during the picnic; and,
as correctly found by the trial court, an affirmative reply to this question has been
satisfactorily established by the evidence, as already pointed out.

However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of the defendants-

teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, are concerned. As to them, the trial
court found:

While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones
arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such
fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could
be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the
students.

The evidence shows that these two defendants had satisfactorily explained why
they were late in going to the picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the
entrance examination being conducted by the school which is part of their duty
as teachers thereof. Since they were not at the picnic site during the occurrence
in question, it cannot be said that they had any participation in the negligence
attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in
the supervision of the children during the picnic and which failure resulted in the
drowning of plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or omission to the
two teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury
caused to the plaintiffs because of the death of their son resulting from his
drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they must be absolved from any liability.

As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-appellants, We agree with

the court a quo that the counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 59-
60, Rollo)

Hence, this petition.

The issues presented by petitioners are:

A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will
warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs;

B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is
applicable to the case at bar;

C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under
the circumstances surrounding the case at bar. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)

In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The petition is impressed with merit.

If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own negligence or
the negligence of people under them. In the instant case however, as will be shown
hereunder, petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the
negligence of those under them.

Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they
cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.

At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim
Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.

Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores

Q Now, when your son asked you for money to buy food, did you not ask
him where he will bring this?

A I asked him where he was going, he answered, I am going to the picnic,

and when I asked him where, he did not answer, sir.

Q And after giving the money, you did not tell him anything more?

A No more, sir.

Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was drowned in
the picnic came to you, is that correct?
 A Yes, sir.

Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of March 20,
1982, you did not know that your son join the picnic?

A No, sir, I did not know.

Q Did you not look for your son during that time?

A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I was not able, sir.

Q You did not ask your wife?

A I did not, sir.

Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the picnic?

A Later on after 12:00, sir.

Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire whether
your son have joined that picnic?

A Yes, sir.

(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness Romulo Castillo)

The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing
where it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same. Furthermore.

Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:

Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination?

A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself She even felt
guilty about the death of her son because she cooked adobo for him so he
could join the excursion where her son died of drowning.

Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was the
one who personally cooked the adobo for her son?

A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient herself.
She was very sorry had she not allowed her son to join the excursion her
son would have not drowned. I don't know if she actually permitted her son
although she said she cooked adobo so he could join. (Emphasis
Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30, 1984, Dr. Lazaro — witness).
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil
Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son.

Article 2180, par. 4 states that:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice
must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.

In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their
assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school
day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private
affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some
members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan
Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin
because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an
extra-curricular activity.

As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of
the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in
any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application
therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any
jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score,
employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to
answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or omission he
committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.

Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the

award of damages to the respondents-spouses.

Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand
belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.

In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both
P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and
swimming. Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the
defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in
case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez
and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.

Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,

Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand Castillo, you approached the boy
and claim also having applied first aid on him?

A Yes, sir.

Q And while you were applying the so called first aid, the children were
covering you up or were surrounding you?

A Yes, sir.

Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?

A No, sir.

Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition?

A Yes, sir.

Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your
application of first aid?

A Yes, sir.

Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" in the process of your

application of the first aid on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?

A No, sir, because we were attending to the application of first aid that we
were doing, sir.

Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you claimed
the boy did not respond, were you not disturb anyway?

A I was disturbed during that time, sir.

Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back pressure?

A From 9 to 11 times, sir.

Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your body on

the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
 A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of back to back
pressure?

A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards, then the
face was a little bit facing right and doing it by massaging the back of the
child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing of July 30, 1984)

Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination

ATTY. FLORES:

Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the child?

A Myself, sir.

Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?

A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I applied
back to back pressure and took notice of the condition of the child. We
placed the feet in a higher position, that of the head of the child, sir.

Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position, where the feet
were on a higher level than that of the head, what did you do next?

A The first thing that we did, particularly myself, was that after putting the
child in that position, I applied the back to back pressure and started to
massage from the waistline up, but I noticed that the boy was not
responding, sir.

Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy?

A About 10 seconds, sir.

Q What about Mr. Vinas?

A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds, sir.

Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding, what did you do?

A When we noticed that the boy was not responding, we changed the
position of the boy by placing the child facing upwards laying on the sand
then we applied the mouth to mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-93, Rollo)
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of
respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant
moral damages.

Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act or omission.

Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or
negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.

While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the
picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to
observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the
children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised
the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes
baseless.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated November 19, 1987, finding
petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and
awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners
herein are concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim,
there being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S.
CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL,
SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals as
well as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages
arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign
to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.

The Facts

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II
and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.

On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the

following manner:

1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs
William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:

a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of

life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred
by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral
damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel
are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the
event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;

3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort
and who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is
ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against
defendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;

4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim

not being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).

From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St.
Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-
1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin,
along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to LarayanElementary School,
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a
student of the same school.Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and
as a result the jeep turned turtle.

Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. [2]

In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.[3]
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the
actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.[4]
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion.[5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]

The Issues

1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages
for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages
against the petitioner.
 The Courts Ruling

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that
petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged
in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus,
such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the
pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or
its teachers.[9]
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.[10]
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. [11]

In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words,
the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in
what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the
injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. [12]

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of
the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel
II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted
the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased
Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator
who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide
that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving
of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code
that those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel
II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson
of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was
driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time
of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver
or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened
the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.

The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.[13]

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which
petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the
accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages
in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. [14] In this case,
the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of
the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos
must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the
exception rather than the rule.[15] The power of the court to award attorneys fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification. [16] Thus,
the grant of attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was
respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that
the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. [17] Hence, with the overwhelming
evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident
occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages
for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19]The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys
Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President,
respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known under the name and style of
"Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M.
QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.

Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .

Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .

Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. .

TEEHANKEE, J.:

An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. .

Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a

student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard,
Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for damages arising from the death
on March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute. .

Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at
the time when the incident which gave rise to his action occurred was a member of the
Board of Directors of the institute;1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president
thereof; the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the
deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the
deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship,
but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."

The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by the trial
court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were
classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock,
they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room
located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and
Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely
looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a
foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist
blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon
followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block
which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was
administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital.
He never regained consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the substance of the
testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident."

The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as testified to by
the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the protagonists, as that of a
disinterested witness who "has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in
favor of any party" and rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon
denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. .

With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police Department
who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death: shock due to traumatic fracture of
theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric
hemorrhage and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that
these internal injuries of the deceased were caused "probably by strong fist blows," the
trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code.3 It held that "(T)he act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the
deceased strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs and
caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the Code." 4

The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of
the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:

... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code which reads:

Art. 2180. ... .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and

trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.

In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to the
case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the control or
influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the
conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE

CONSTRUED: — The clause "so long as they remain in
their custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new civil code
contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the
pupil supersedes those of the parents. In those
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and
actions of the pupil as well as the responsibilities for their
 sort would pass from the father and mother to the teachers.
(Ciriaco L. Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals,
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-
14862, May 30, 1960).5

There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These defendants
cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.

Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:

1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as heirs

of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P6,000.00 for the death of
Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses;
(c) P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning
power, considering that the deceased was only between sixteen and
seventeen years, and in good health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for
attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action. .

2. Absolving the other defendants. .

3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.

Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual findings of the
trial court, which are now beyond review, the trial court erred in absolving the
defendants-school officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable as
tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their
son's death. The Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be meritorious. .

1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground that the
provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold "teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades ... liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody," are not applicable to
to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the
fatal fistblows]6 lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of
the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the
defendant Daffon."

The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado
vs. Court of Appeals,7 that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in
their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of
the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and
actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would
the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case
at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes
with their parents after school is over." This dictum had been made in rejecting therein
petitioner father's contention that his minor son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at
Kanlaon, Quezon City [which was not a party to the case] should be held responsible,
rather than him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for
the physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a
piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and cure,
since the wound left no scar.] The moral damages award was after all set aside by the
Court on the ground that none of the specific cases provided in Article 2219, Civil Code,
for awarding moral damages had been established, petitioner's son being only nine
years old and not having been shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting the
injuries on his classmate. .

The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case
of Exconde vs. Capuno,8 where the only issue involved as expressly stated in the
decision, was whether the therein defendant-father could be civilly liable for damages
resulting from a death caused in a motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and
negligently by his minor son, (which issue was resolved adversely against the father).
Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that "It is true that under the law
abovequoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused
by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational
institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. .

2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises
the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180, Civil Code, for
damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school
premises. Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved,
since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question,
either, that the school involved is a non-academic school,9 the Manila Technical Institute
being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .

The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the
Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable
jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's
minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability
attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors.
The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly
impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading
improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court found that it
had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus
incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so,
notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request
for admission had expressly manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C.
Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is
now a corporation and is not owned by any individual person."10
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of
their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a
certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
"exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." 11 This is expressly
provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.12 In the law of torts, the
governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as
well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities
during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time,
as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody
from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that
some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow
students. .

4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion

in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is
some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred
in the exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the
parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority
and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction." The school itself,
likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers
under the same cited article.14

5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the
ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student
who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase
used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to
attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as
in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the
present decision. .

6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school

must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co-
defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased
Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the
protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the
school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil
Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said
defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. .

7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death
of their son should be increased to P12,000.00 as set by the Court in People vs.
Pantoja,15 and observed in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The Court,
in Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had
expressed its "considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages
for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court
thereby adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death caused by
a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code, from the old stated minimum of
P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which amount is to be awarded "even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the express provisions of said codal article. .

8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court should have awarded
exemplary damages and imposed legal interest on the total damages awarded, besides
increasing the award of attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law to the
discretion of the trial court and the Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the
exercise of such discretion on the part of the trial court.16 Decisive here is the
touchstone provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross
negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to warrant the
imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of interest and increased attorney's fees,
and the Court has not been shown in this appeal any compelling reason to disturb such
finding. .

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: .

1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M.

Quibulue jointly and severallyto pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador
Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of
earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both
instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .

Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. .

Dizon, J., took no part. .

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: .

I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee but would like to clarify that the
argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and
school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors (below
the age of majority) is not in accord with the plain text of the law. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines is to the following effect: .

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. .

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company. .

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated

persons who are under their authority and live in their company. .

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise

responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. .

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. .

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special

agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article
2176 shall be applicable. .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be

liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damages.

Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is
limited to illegal acts during minority, the article expressly so provides, as in the case of
the parents and of the guardians. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to
similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in
the article, it would have expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done so indicates
an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. Further, it is
not without significance that the teachers and heads of scholarly establishments are not
grouped with parents and guardians but ranged with owners and managers of
enterprises, employers and the state, as to whom no reason is discernible to imply that
they should answer only for minors. .

Giorgi, in his well-known "Teoria de las Obligaciones en el Derecho Moderno", Volume

5, page 404, No. 272 (Sp. Ed.), after noting the split among commentators on the point
it issue, observes with considerable cogency that —

272. Ante esta variedad de opiniones, ninguna de las cuales se funds en

argumentos merecedores de seria ponderacion, no es facil tomar un
partido. Esto no obstante, debiendo manisfestar nuestra opinion, nos
acercamos a la de los que no estiman necesaria la menor edad del
discipulo o del aprendiz; porque si el aforismo ubi voluit dixit, ubi noluit
tacuit, no es siempre argumento seguro para interpreter la ley, es infalible
cuanto se refiere a una misma disposicion relative a varios casos. Y tal es
el art. 1.153. Lo que haya establecido important poco si, elevandones a
los principios de razon, puede dudarse de la oportunidad de semajante
diferencia; porque la voluntad cierta del legislador prevalece in iure
condito a cualquier otra consideracion. Por otra parte, si bien se
considera, no puede parecer extrano o absurdo el suponer que un
discipulo y un aprendiz, aunque mayores de edad, acepten
voluntariamente la entera vigilancia de su preceptor mientras dura la
educacion. Ni parece dudoso desde el momento que los artesanos y los
preceptores deben, al par de los padres, responder civilmente de los
daños comitidos por sus discipulos, aun cuando estos esten faltos de
discernimiento.

Similarly, Planiol-Ripert, in their "Droit Civil Pratique," Volume VI, No. 635 (Spanish
version), say that —

635. Personas de quien responde. — Si bien la responsibilidad del

maestro es originalmente una estension de la de los padres (1), el art.
1384 no especifica que los alumnos y aprendices han de ser menores de
edad, por lo que la presuncion de culpa funcionara aun cuando sean
mayores (2); pero, la vigilancia no tendra que ser ejercida en iguales
terminos. Aun respecto a los menores variara segun la edad, extremo que
tendra que ternese en ceunta a los fines de apreciar si el maestro ha
podido impedir el acto nocivo o no. .

I submit, finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their authority and
supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority
age, the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of
the latter. A student over twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school, places himself
under the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority of the school authorities,
which is the basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while
under such authority. Of course, the teachers' control is not as plenary as when the
student is a minor; but that circumstance can only affect the decree of the responsibility
but cannot negate the existence thereof. It is only a factor to be appreciated in
determining whether or not the defendant has exercised due diligence in endeavoring to
prevent the injury, as prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 2180. .

Barredo, J., concurs.