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G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988 vs.

GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN et al. petitioners, DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
vs. On January 20, 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
DIMAPORO T. CASAR, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
OF POONABAYABAO, TAMPARAN AND MASIU, LANAO DEL Philippine General Headquarters, AFP to establish an effective territorial
SUR and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. defense, maintain peace and order, and provide an atmosphere conducive to
the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
On July 27, 1985, at least five people died and at least two others were
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
wounded in a shooting in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur. Atty. Mangurun
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Batuampar, alleged counsel of the widow of one of the victims, filed a
complaint with the Provincial Fiscal of Marawi. The Provincial Fiscal
On July 9, 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
requested Judge Dimaporo Casar that all cases related to the shooting
Valenzuela, Bulacan was gunned down by members of the NCRDC for
incident be forwarded to his office.
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for speeding off despite
warning shots fired in the air. Ricardo Valmonte and ULAP claim that the
On August 10, 1985, a complaint for multiple murder was filed before Judge
checkpoints give the NCRDC blanket authority to conduct warrantless
Casar by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan. After personally examining under oath the
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution.
three witnesses brought by Laruan, Judge Casar issued a warrant of arrest
against 14 named persons and 50 John Does.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NCRDC checkpoints are valid
Atty. Batuampar filed a motion to recall the warrant on the ground that Casar
HELD: No proof was presented to Court to show that the military committed
issued the warrant in a “hasty and manifestly haphazard manner” with “no
violations against unlawful searches and seizures in the checkpoints. Concern
searching questions”. Judge Casar denied the motion.
for safety and apprehension at potential harassment do not make the
checkpoints illegal. While susceptible to abuse, the occasional inconvenience
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrants of arrest are valid
brought about by the checkpoints is a price for peace and order. On July 17,
1988, the checkpoints were temporarily lifted for the review of the rules in
HELD: The warrant is valid as to the 14 named persons but void as to the 50
conducting the checkpoints. The petition was dismissed.
John Does. None of the witnesses could identify the indicated John Does.
Such warrant is of the nature of a general warrant and violates the
Constitutional mandate requiring the particular description of people to be
G.R. No. 83988 May 24, 1990
arrested or seized.
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND
ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLES'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND
DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,

A motion for reconsideration was filed regarding the decision declaring the
military checkpoints as not illegal per se.
HELD: The military checkpoints by the NCRDC are valid exercises of
police power. Given the situation with the NPA and the coup d’état,
checkpoints are allowed to secure the survival of government and the safety
of people. When the danger is no longer present, the checkpoints have no
reason to remain. The checkpoints must involve only a brief detention of
motorists where they are required to answer a few questions. As long as the
search of the vehicle is limited to a visual search and the occupants are not
conducted to a body search, the routine checks do not violate the rights
against unreasonable search and seizure.
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
On May 11, 1989 Captain Alen Velasco, Commanding Officer of NARCOM
in Camp Dangwa set up a checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, Mt. Province, because
of the reports that vehicles from Sagada were transporting marijuana and
other drugs. They also received a tip that morning that a Caucasian from
Sagada was in possession of illegal drugs.
At 1:30 pm, a Skyline bus was stopped by the NARCOM officers for
inspection. One of the officers observed a foreigner seated at the back having
a suspicious bulge in his waist. Suspecting it to be a gun, the officer asked for
his passport. The foreigner did not comply. The foreigner was ordered to
bring out whatever was bulging in his waist. It turned out to be a pouch
containing hashish. The foreigner was invited outside for questioning. Before
he got down, he got two bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them.
They contained teddy bears which had bulges. The foreigner presented his
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passport, identifying himself as Mikael Malmstedt. At the NARCOM office
in Camp Dangwa, the teddy bears were opened and were found to contain
hashish.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid
HELD: The search and seizure was valid. Malmstedt was caught in flagrante
delicto while transporting prohibited drugs. Warrantless search of the
accused is valid upon the existence of probable cause. The NARCOM
received a tip only a few hours before the arrest of Malmstedt. The police did
not have the time to secure a warrant.
The NARCOM officers at first were merely conducting a routine check and
no extensive search was made. It was during the investigation that the
officers noticed a suspicious bulge on the waist of Malmstedt. He was then
asked to show his passport but refused. This brought about suspicion that he
was trying to hide his identity. Probable cause arose from these
circumstances, justifying the warrantless search.
G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR
ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD
RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI,
WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN
MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA
ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED
COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL
ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND
INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IdC
MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT

DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR,
INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
On November 25, 1984, more than 200 marines raided the compound of
Rizal Alih et al., in Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, to search for
firearms, ammunitions and other explosives. This operation was known as a
“zona” similar to the “kempeitai” during the Japanese occupation. The raid
ended in a shoot-out resulting to a number of casualties. Sixteen men were
arrested in the operation while 9 M16 rifles, 1 M14 rifle, 9 rifle grenades and
ammunitions were seized.
On December 21, 1984, a petition for mandamus and injunction was filed by
Alih et al for the recovery of the things seized and to prevent the use of these
as evidence against them. The respondents admitted the lack of a warrant but
claimed that they were acting under superior orders because of the
lawlessness in Zamboanga resulting from the assassination of Mayor Cesar
Climaco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid
HELD: The search and seizure is illegal. There was no urgency in the search
because the military knew where the suspects lived. They could have
obtained a warrant. The seized items were held inadmissible as evidence
against them but remained in custody of the courts subject for proper
disposition.
People vs Castiller
Facts:
At around nine o'clock in the morning of April 18, 1988, the anti-narcotics
intelligence division of the Taguig Police Station received information from
an undisclosed caller that marijuana was being sold by an old woman (Adelina
Castiller) in a small store in North Daang Hari Street, Taguig. In a buy-bust
operation, Pat. Mendibel went to the store, and said to the woman: "La paiskor
ng dalawang foil" The woman went inside the store and came back with two
(2) foils of marijuana which she gave to Pat. Mendibel. Castiller, upon learning
that her "customer" was a police officer, scampered into the back of her store
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and locked herself inside. Pat. Mendibel’s teammates immediately assisted in
arresting the appellant. The police officers knocked at the door but appellant
refused to open the door. Later, however, she voluntarily opened the door and
allowed them to enter the store. They found a hole at the bottom of the large
gray plastic container, and stored inside were a plastic "Ajinomoto" bag
containing substances which appeared to be marijuana leaves, ten (10) sticks
of what appeared to be marijuana cigarettes, five (5) foils of what appeared to
be marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper, six (6) packs of "Capitol" brand
rolling paper and a red leatherette bag.
Appellant and the confiscated evidence were brought to the police station.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search is valid.
Held:
The search conducted upon the premises of appellant's store and the
consequent seizure of incriminating evidence were valid.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which provides that "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant." In such an instance, a
contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and
the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. The inclusion of the seized
items in the evidence for the prosecution cannot be challenged as they were
seized in conformity with the provision on lawful searches.
Papa vs Mago
Facts:
Martin Alagao, head of counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information that a certain shipment of
personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released
the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on
two trucks and upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and
duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate

1 of the customs zone. The counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks when
they left gate 1 and intercepted hem at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The
two trucks and their load, consisting of nine bales of goods were seized.
Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?
Held:
Yes. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The
Tariff and Customs Code does not require warrant in the case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope
or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast
or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need
of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the
Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." Except in the case
of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under
the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.
Roldan vs Arca
Facts:
Respondent company filed a case against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N.
Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been
seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the
Philippine Nay. The CFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company took to
possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI. Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy
to apprehended vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called
Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the
Fisheries Act. On August 5, or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually
seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.
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Issue: Whether or not the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites
therein was valid.
Held:
The seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites was valid. Search and
seizure of vessels and aircraft without search warrant for violations of the
customs laws have been traditional exception to the constitutional requirement
of a search warrant because, the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality
and jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sough before such search
or seizure can be constitutionality effected. The same exception should apply
to the seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually
equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the
Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. Another exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure, is a search or
seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. Under our Rules of Court, a police
officer or a private individual may, without warrant, arrest a person a) who has
committed, is actually committing or is about the commit an offense which has
been actually committed; b)who is reasonably believed to have committed the
offense which has been actually committed; or c) who is detention
prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving final
judgement or from temporary detention during pendency of his case or while
being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case at bar, the
members of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with
dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus, their apprehension without a
warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure
of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an
incident to a lawful arrest.
People of the Philippines vs Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX,
Quezon City
Facts:
The Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed by an
undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be
transported to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge car. Spurred by such

lead, they stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the North
Diversion Road
atBalintawak,QuezonCity. A light blue Dodge car driven by Sgt. Hope who
was accompanied by Monina Medina approached theexit gate and after giving
the toll receipt sped away towards Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase
and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt.
Hope to stop but the latter instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the North
Diversion Road, but he could not go through because of the buses in front of
his car. At this point, the agents succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the
latter stopped. The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge
and upon inquiry as to what those boxes were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do not
know." Respondents told that they were bringing the boxes to the Tropical Hut
at Epifanio de los
Santos. Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who
had joined them waited for the man who according to Monina Medina was
supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad "called
off the mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo. An
inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded eleven (11) sealed
boxes, four (4) on the rear seat and seven (7) more in the baggage compartment
which was opened on orders of Col. Abad.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure is valid.
Held:
Yes. What ASAC agents did was a faithful performance of a duty authorized
under the Tariff and Customs Code directing them as authorized agents to
retrieve articles reasonably suspected of having been possessed, issued or
procured in violation of the tariff laws for which the government has a direct
interest.
The circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the
privileged area where search and seizure may lawfully be effected without the
need of a warrant. The facts being no less receptive to the applicability of the
classic American ruling, the latter's force and effect as well as the Mago
decision must be upheld and reiterated in this petition. the find that the
constitutional guarantee has not been violated and the respondent court gravely
erred in issuing the order of August 20, 1975 declaring as inadmissible
evidence the items or articles obtained and seized by the apprehending agents
without any search warrant, as well as the pictures of said items attempted to
be presented as evidence against the accused.
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Pacis vs Pamaran
Facts:
Respondent Ricardo Santos is an owner of a car which he bought from a tax-
exempt individual. He paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes. Pedro Pacis,
the Acting Collector of Customs, received a letter stating that Santos' car was
a hot car. The amount collectible was P2,500.00, not just P311.00.
Based on such discrepancy, Pacis instituted seizure proceedings and issued a
warrant of seizure and detention. The car was taken by agents who were
authorized to do so by virtue of the said warrant. Santos wrote to Pacis about
the seizure. Santos also filed a case of usurpation of authority against Pacis.
Manuel Pamaran, an Assistant Fiscal, proceeded with the charge against
Pacis.
Issue: Whether or not warrant of seizure and detention is valid.
Held:
Yes. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require warrant in the instant case.
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to such search and seizure. Except in the case of
the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws. The plenitude of the competence vested in
customs officials is undeniable.
Lopez vs Commisioner, GR. L-27968
FACTS:
A seizure was made by by the Collector of Customs of Davao of the 1,408
sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee allegedly owned by the petitioners Jose
Lopez and Tomas Velasco. Petitioners claim that the 1,408 sacks of copra and
86 sacks of coffee in question were purchased in the province of Cotabato,
from a certain Osmeña Juanday. Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the said
goods were not imported and of foreign origin, they are not legally subject to
seizure and forfeiture. They explained that the forfeiture made by the Collector
 Page 6 of 26

of Customs of Davao was invalid because the said forfeiture was based on FACTS:
documents and papers which were illegally seized by agents of the
Reynaldo Cruz alias Rene Hapon was charged with the crime of Illegal
Government through violence and intimidation. The Commisioner denied this
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. The police led by Lt. Noel Manabat
saying that the evidence is sufficient to hold that the goods in question came
nabbed Romeo Fernandez and Joey Flores after acting on an intelligence report
from Indonesia and subsequently brought to the Philippines in violation of our
of an impending transaction for a carnapped vehicle. After confessing to the
laws and, therefore, subject to forfeiture. The evidence does not show any
crime, Fernandez and Flores told the police they had other members of the
plausible motive for respondent's witnesses to falsify the truth because they
carnapping group waiting in Quezon City for their share in the proceeds. They
represent different agencies of the government. From all appearances, they
helped lead the police to their safehouse where the police apprehended Cruz.
have no personal interest whatsoever over the goods subject of the forfeiture
When they reached the house, they were allowed to enter by Cruz’s sister, the
proceedings. According to Lopez, the search was done at about 3:00 o'clock in
owner of the house. The police also found a revolver, ammunition, and a
the afternoon of September 19, 1966, by a combined team of Constabulary and
grenade in a clutch bag owned by Cruz. During investigation, Cruz did not
Regional Anti-Smuggling Center operatives headed by NBI agent Earl
admit ownership of the bag and its contents saying it was planted by the
Reynolds raided the hotel room then being rented by petitioner Tomas Velasco
operatives nor was he in actual possession thereof at the time he was arrested.
without any search warrant and in the absence at the time of such petitioner
He contested there was no search warrant and the arrest was against his
Tomas Velasco or the presence of any other person, except one Teofila Ibañez,
constitutional rights. Judge Willelmo C. Fortun found the accused guilty as
a mere manicurist of Davao City by occupation and "forcibly opened luggages
charged, and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
and boxes from which only several documents and papers were found, then
costs. The firearm, ammunition and the hand grenade, as well as the bag which
seized, confiscated and took away the same.
contained the same, were confiscated and ordered forfeited in favor of the
ISSUE: government.
Whether or not the search was valid. ISSUE:
HELD: Whether or not the firearm and explosive in question cannot be used as
evidence Cruz since the authorities had no warrant of arrest when they entered
Yes. The court believed Commisioner’s version. Teofila Ibañez, wife of
the apartment, in violation of Cruz’s constitutional rights.
petitioner Tomas Velasco, issued a written statement stating she has
voluntarily and freely allowed her husband's and her personal belongings to be HELD:
searched and freely gave the following items. The assistant manager supported
No. Judgment affirmed. Cruz’s contention is devoid of merit. It should be
her claim stating Teofila Ibañez, the actual occupant of the room at the time,
noted that the unlicensed firearm and explosive were found when they arrested
voluntarily consented to the request of Atty. Earl Reynolds and Lt. Romeo
the accused and his companions for "carnapping" and not for illegal possession
Arceño, to search their room (Rm. 220) after the latter introduced themselves
of firearm ammunition. The illegality of the search is independent from the
by showing their respective identifications cards. The search was done while
illegal possession of prohibited arms. The illegality of the search did not make
both of them are present and it was done in a bpeaceful and orderly manner.
legal an illegal possession of firearms. When, in pursuing an illegal action or,
The court concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with
in the commission of a criminal offense, the offending Police officers should
the need for a search warrant.
happen to discover, a criminal offense being committed by any person, they
are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the
apprehension of the guilty person. This is considered as in line with the
PEOPLE VS. CRUZ, GR 76728

principle of corpus delicti. Though he was not informed of his right to remain
silent under the presence of a counsel, the evidence presented by the
prosecution, even without considering his extrajudicial confession, is enough
to support a finding of guilt.
Nolasco vs. Pano , 132 SCRA 152
FACTS:
Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high
ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6,
1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428
documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that day,
Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s
leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the
basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG
were filed by but the fiscal’s office merely charged her and Nolasco with
illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for
suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and
that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not
sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and
seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of
searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness. Petitioners assail
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that portion of the Decision holding that, inso far as petitioner Mila Aguilar-
Roque is concerned, the search made in her premises was incident to her
arrestand could be made without a search warrant. Petitioners submit that a
warrantless search can be justified only if it is an incident to a lawful arrest
and that since Mila Aguilar was not lawfully arrested a search without
warrantcould not be made.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant was valid?
HELD:
NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure
of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-
embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does
not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus

giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should
seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent
rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered
null and void for being too general.
People v. Claudio, G.R. No. 72564
FACTS:
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted the accused Anita Claudio y
Bagtang for violating Sec. 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Prosecution’s witness Danel Obiña, a policeman, testified that while on board
the Victory Liner heading back to his home in Olongapo, Claudio boarded the
same bus and took the seat in front of him after placing a woven buri bag made
of plastic containing some vegetables she was carrying at the back of Obiña’s
seat. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search
the woven plastic bag so when they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, he
inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven
bag and smelt marijuana. He could recognize the smell of marijuana because
he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not,
however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the
plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused
alighted from the bus. Obina intercepted her and showed her his ID Identifying
himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the
suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. Claudio replied,
"Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not
heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a
tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her
bag appearing to contain vegetables. At the police headquarters Investigation
Page 8 of 26
Section, the bag was searched in the presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco,
Obiña, Claudio and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a
big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo.
ISSUE:
WON Claudio’s warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were unlawful?
RULING:
NO, the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were lawful. Rule 113,
Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides for thein flagrante delicto arrest, that is, a
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Meanwhile, its Rule 126,
Sec. 12 provides for a warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest to be
lawful. In other words, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant. Appellant Claudio was caught
transporting prohibited drugs. Daniel Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest
Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search
being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. Therefore, there was no
infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
People vs. Joselito del Rosario, GR 127755
FACTS
The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and
sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based on the testimony
of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the
tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was
then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the location where
he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the supposed hide-out,
a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the suspects.
After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his
statement was taken on May 14, 1996. However, this was only subscribed on
May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of detention in

the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was
handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the
authorities belief that the accused migh tattempt to escape otherwise.
ISSUES
1. Whether then right to remain silent of the accused-appellant were
violated.
2. Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.
HELD:
1. YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel in the course of
the investigation. The court held thatthe accused should always be apprised of
his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested bythe authorities as this is
deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the court included
invitations by police officers in the scope of custodial investigations. It is
evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the
station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore, the
questions asked of him were no longer generalinquiries into an unsolved crime,
but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the crime.
However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is
voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such
a waiver.
2. NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful
warrantless arrest (1) when the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (2) when
the arrest is made immediately after the crime was committed and (3) when
the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this
case did not fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted
immediately after the consummation of the crime rather, it was done a day
after. The authorities also did not have personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense because
they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the
account of one eyewitness. Unfortunately, although the warrantless arrest was
not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the court in this case because
the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In
effect,he waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.
Page 9 of 26
Harvey vs. Miriam Defensor-Santiago , June 26 , 1988
FACT
 Nature of the Case: Petition for Habeas Corpus
 Petitioners in this case are three old foreigners
o Andrew Harvey, American, 52
o John Sherman, American, 72
o Adriaan Van Den Elshout, Dutch, 58.
 This case stems from the apprehension of these three from their
respective residences at Pagsanjan, Laguna by agents of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of
Mission orders issued by Miriam. The Three are currently detained at
the CID Detention Center.
 There were actually originally 22 pedophiles
o 17 left the country
o One was released for lack of evidence
o Another was charged not for being a pedophile, but for
working without a valid working visa.
o So out of the original 22, only these three have to face
deportation.
 During the apprehension, the team found rolls of photo negatives,
and actual photos of suspected child prostitutes in provocative poses,
as well as photos of boys and girls having sex. There were also
posters and other literature advertising these child prostitutes.
 According to the Operation Reports, the Three accused were found
in compromising positions
o Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room.
o Harvey was found with two young boys.
o Van Den Elshout was found with two children, aged 14 and
16, who had been living-in with him for quite some time.
 On 4 March 1988, Deportation Proceedings were instituted against
the three for being Undesirable Aliens under Sec. 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. “This office charges the [three pedophiles] as
undesirable aliens, in that: they, being pedophiles, are inimical to
public morals, public health and public safety as provided in Section
69 of the Revised Admin Code.”
 On 7 March, Warrants of Arrest were issued against the three
accused, for violation of the Immigration Act and Sec. 69 of the
Revised Admin Code.

 On 14 March, The Three filed an Urgent Petition for Release under
Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their
continuous detention.
o Miriam ordered CID doctor to examine petitioners.
o CID Doctor said they were healthy.
 On 22 March, Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail – Miriam denied,
considering that they were healthy. To avoid congestion, Miriam
ordered that the three be transferred to Fort Bonifacio, but the
transfer was deferred pending trial.
 On 4 April, Harvey stated that he had finally agreed to a self-
deportation, and prayed that he be provisionally released for at least
15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas, before he
departed the country. The Board of Special Inquiry, on April 7,
allowed a provisional release of five days under certain conditions
ISSUES
 The three accused question the validity of their detention on the
following grounds:
o There is no Provision in the Phil. Immigration act, nor under
Sec. 69 of the RAC, which clothes Miriam, as Commissioner
of the CID, with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners
pending determination of the existence of probable cause
leading to an administrative investigation.
o Miriam violated Sec. 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, since the
CID agents were not clothed with valid warrants of arrest,
search and seizure, as required by the said provision.
o Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and
their suspicion of Petitioners’ activities that they were
pedophiles, along with their association with other suspected
pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and
detention unless they are caught in the act.
 They further allege that being a pedophile is not
punishable by any Philippine law, nor is it a crime to
be a pedophile.
HELD
 The SC REJECTED the Arguments of the three accused and
UPHELD Miriam’s Official Acts
Page 10 of 26
o In this case, the arrest of the Three was based on probable
cause.
o Determined after close surveillance for three months, during
which period their activities were monitored.
o This existence of probable cause justified the arrest and
seizure of the photos and other stuff without warrant.
 These articles were seized as an incident to a lawful
arrest.
 They are admissible in evidence.
 The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal.
o The writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose, the process
of the law is being followed.
o “Where a person’s detention was later made by virtue of a
judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed
against the detainee, his petition for habeas corpus becomes
moot and academic.”
o “It is a fundamental rule that a Writ of HC will not be
granted when the confinement is or has become legal,
although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.”
 That the Three were not “caught in the act” does not make their
arrest illegal.
o They were found with young boys in their respective rooms.
o Under those circumstances, the CID had reasonable grounds
to believe that the three accused had actually committed
pedophilia – psychosexual perversion involving children.
 Paraphilia (unusual sexual activity) where children
are the preferred sexual object.
 While not a crime under the RPC, it is behavior
offensive to public morals and violative of the
declared policy of the State to protect the youth
 Art. II, Sec. 13 of the Consti.
 At any rate, the filing of the Petition to be Released on Bail was a
waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from
questioning its validity.
 The deportation charges instituted by Miriam are in accordance with
Sec. 37(a) the Phil. Immigration Act in relation to Sec. 69 of the
RAC (Revised Administrative Code), providing that aliens may be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of the CID, or any
other officer designated by him, and deported upon the warrant of

the CID, after a determination of the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of a deportable ground.
o This section is not constitutionally prohibited.
o The specific constraints in the Constitution contemplate
prosecutions which are essentially criminal in nature.
o Deportation proceedings are administrative in character.
 Order of deportation is not a punishment.
 It is preventive, not a penal process.
 It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with
ordinary court proceedings.
 The requirement of probable cause being determined by a judge does
not extend to deportation proceedings.
o In this case, probable cause had already been shown to exist
before the warrants were issued.
o What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, and
that a fair hearing be conducted.
 Miriam’s denial of the release on bail was in order.
o In deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of
right but a matter of discretion on the part of the CCID.
o Sec. 37(e) of the Immigration Act: “Any alien under arrest in
a deportation proceeding may be released under bond
or…other conditions as may be imposed by the [CCID].”
 Use of the word “may” – merely permissive.
o Neither the Consti nor the RAC guarantees aliens facing
deportation with the right to bail.
 Again, since its not a criminal proceeding, the
constitutional guarantee to bail does not apply.
 Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from
its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-
preservation or public interest
o The power to deport is an act of State
o It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
presence in the country is injurious to the public good.
o State may protect itself.
Page 11 of 26
Moreno vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6, 1932,
arrived in the Philippines on November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel
Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her children by a first
marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai With her was Fu Yan Fun, her minor
son also by the first marriage, born in Hongkong on September 11, 1957.
Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the
Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they
posted a cash bond of P4,000.00.
On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born
Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban
Morano, Jr.
To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun
obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10,
1962.
In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered
Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before
September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a
warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.
Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with
her husband Esteban Morano) and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First
Instance of Manila for mandamus to compel the Commissioner of
Immigration to cancel petitioners' Alien Certificates of Registration;
prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing a warrant for their arrest,
and preliminary injunction to restrain the Commissioner from confiscating
their cash bond and from issuing warrants of arrest pending resolution of this
case.1 The trial court, on November 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for, upon a P2,000-bond. After trial and the stipulations of
facts filed by the parties, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment,
ISSUE:

Whether the Commissioner has the power to issue a warrant of arrest?
HELD:
They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants
of arrest and that the legislative delegation of such power to the
Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of Rights.
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require
judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in
accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of
arrest in the exercise of judicial power4 as a step preliminary or incidental to
prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not
as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent
official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
The following from American Jurisprudence,5 is illuminating:
It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the
deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful.
Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the deportation of an alien
who is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation
of liberty without due process of law. This is so, although the inquiry
devolves upon executive officers, and their findings of fact, after a
fair though summary hearing, are made conclusive.
The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution
for, or a conviction of, crime; nor is the deportation a punishment,
even though the facts underlying the decision may constitute a crime
under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the
government to harbor persons whom it does not want. The
coincidence of local penal law with the policy of Congress is purely
accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a criminal
prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate and
independent.
Page 12 of 26
In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article
III of the Constitution aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be
determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.6
The view we here express finds support in the discussions during the
constitutional convention. The convention recognized, as sanctioned by due
process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of liberty, other than by order
of a competent court.7
Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty.
Such power is planted on the "accepted maxim of international law, that
every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions."8 So it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that there can be no
controversy on the fact that where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors,
"the law is to the effect that temporary visitors who do not depart upon the
expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation by the
Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition
under which they were admitted as non-immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec.
37 (a), subsection (7); C.A. 613, as amended)."9
And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the Commissioner to
issue warrants of arrest was challenged as unconstitutional, because "such
power is only vested in a judge by Section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our
Constitution," this Court declared —
This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of appellant Ng Hua
To as temporary visitor is subject to certain contractual stipulations
as contained in the cash bond put up by him, among them, that in
case of breach the Commissioner may require the recommitment of
the person in whose favor the bond has been filed. The
Commissioner did nothing but to enforce such condition. Such a step
is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for
his deportation under section 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A
contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the
detriment of the State.10
It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of
1940 is not constitutionally prescribed.

Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299
FACTS
On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto
Timbangcaya of Brooke's Point, Palawan a motor launch named M/L "SAN
RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that
after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal
Francisco Ponce de Leon in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan the corresponding
information for Robbery the Force and Intimidation upon Persons against
Jikil Taha. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2719.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that
the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander
of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac
to impound and take custody of the motor launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the
Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its
subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot
prevent the court from taking custody of the same. So, on July 6, 1962 upon
order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela,
Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch
"SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
On July 15, 1962 plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando
Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused. Likewise, on
September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations
with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiff-appellant
Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the same
was the subject of a criminal offense.
All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plaintiffs-appellants
Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha, on November 19, 1962, filed with the Court of
Page 13 of 26
First Instance of Palawan a complaint for damages against defendants-
appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging
that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim
without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor
launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal
Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with
authority to order the seizure of a private property
ISSUE:
May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (whether or not
defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure
of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure)?
HELD:
The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low degree, gives
him no more right than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break
in upon the privacy of a home and subject its occupant to the indignity of a
search for the evidence of crime, without a legal warrant procured for that
purpose. No amount of incriminating evidence whatever its source, will
supply the place of such warrant. At the closed door of the home be it palace
or hovel even bloodhounds must wait till the law, by authoritative process,
bids it open.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon would also invoke lack of time to
procure a search warrant as an excuse for the seizure of the motor launch
without one. He claimed that the motor launch had to be seized immediately
in order to preserve it and to prevent its removal out of the locality, since
Balabac, Palawan, where the motor launch was at the time, could only be
reached after three to four days' travel by boat. The claim cannot be
sustained. The records show that on June 15, 1962 Fiscal Ponce de Leon
made the first request to the Provincial Commander for the impounding of
the motor launch; and on June 26, 1962 another request was made. The
seizure was not effected until July 6, 1962. In short, Fiscal Ponce de Leon
had all the time to procure a search warrant had he wanted to and which he
could have taken in less than a day, but he did not. Besides, there is no basis
for the apprehension that the motor launch might be moved out of Balabac
because even prior to its seizure the motor launch was already without its
 Page 14 of 26

engine. In sum, the fact that there was no time to secure a search warrant
would not legally justify a search without one. number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated
assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights
have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
the public officer or employee responsible therefor. A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding
the return of the confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due
process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a private residence, it
was robbery.
HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS. HON TOMAS ACHACOSO, G.R.
NO. 81510, March 14, 1990 (En bane) ` On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.
Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby
FACTS:
making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to
view of the grave public interest involved.
issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code,
prohibiting illegal recruitment.
ISSUE:
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint
May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary
against petitioner. Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to
of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D.
Article 38 of the Labor Code?
Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement
HELD:
the order. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance
PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search
Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure
and arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into
the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance PRES'L ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE CASE, March
Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when 16, 1989

required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the
studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance
FACTS

State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force (PADS Task Force) for purposes of convenience,
issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against
Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine
Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation,
Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan
Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U.
Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty.
Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member
of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of
Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task
Force.
The Karamfil Import-Exports, et al. went to RTC which found the material
issues to be:
1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the
petitioners;
2) Validity of the search warrants issued by respondent State
Prosecutor;
3) Whether or not the petition has become moot and
academic because all the search warrants sought to be
quashed had already been implemented and executed.
The regional trial court declared the search warrants to be null and void.
The PADS task force went to court of appeals that renders the RTC’s
judgement reversered. Upon motion of the Kamarfil the judgement of the
court of appeals was reversed in favor of Kamarfil by the issue: whether or
not PADS task force is a “responsible officer” which was granted by the
1973 constitution with the power to issue warrants. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE
Page 15 of 26
May the presidential body PADS task force be said to be "such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" to issue search warrants
under the 1973 Constitution questions we take up seriatim.
HELD
NO, they cannot issue warrant. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an
organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule
making." What they can do is to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial
recourse, and to “recommend action” of appropriate authorities.
It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary investigation to
determine whether or not prima facie evidence exists to justify haling the
respondent to court.
It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest
and search are exclusive upon judges.
Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it was so
unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its provisions conferring the power to
issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by fiat of
legislation have been at best controversial.
It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible
officer" to whom the authority to issue arrest and search warrants may be
delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the license to
give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter
itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible".
We are not saying, of course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging
its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the Constitution, to
mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and
independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer.
A prosecutor can in no manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.
Hence petition is dismissed.

G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998
ESPANO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
On July 14, 1991, at 12:30 am, Pat. Pagilagan together with other police
officers went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of
drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified
themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he
replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence
where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was
brought to the police headquarters where he was charged of possession of
prohibited drugs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible.
HELD:No. Espano was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of the buy-bust
operation. Under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a), of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: When, in the presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense . . . “
In this case, the two cellophane tea bags of marijuana seized from petitioner
during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a
lawful arrest.
The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten
cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were
not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, such search cannot
fall under search made incidental to a lawful arrest, the same being limited to
body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested,
or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of
escaping.
Page 16 of 26
G.R. No. 87429 August 27, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
REGALADO BATI
After receiving a tip involving the buying and selling of marijuana in Brgy.
Bagong Bayan, San Pablo City – Police officers, Luciano and Caraan, at
5:30pm of July 27, 1986, reached the place where the alleged transaction
would take place and while positioned at a street corner, they saw appellant
Regalado Bati and Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to
fifty meters away from them.
They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, in turn, handed a wrapped
object to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants in
front of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him
inside his pocket.
As soon as the above observed transaction was completed, Bati and Marquez
parted ways. The police officers, in their jeepney, followed Marquez who
was riding a bicycle. The police officers were able to catch up with him and
was questioned. At first, he denied having received anything from Bati
However, upon being asked about what he had inside the front of his pants,
he brought out an object wrapped in newspaper. Stripped of the wrappings,
the object turned out to be a pink plastic bag containing marijuana. Marquez
then told the police officers that he had bought marijuana for P190.00 from
Bati. Marquez was arrested on the spot and was made to board the police
jeep.
Subsequently, the police officers chased and caught up with Bati. They
confronted Bati who admitted to the police officers present that he sold the
marijuana to Marquez for P190,00. Bati then was likewise arrested and made
to board the police jeep. The money in the amount of P190.00 in Bati's
possession was confiscated. Both Bati and Marquez were brought to the
Police station where, again, they admitted they were in the buying and selling
of the confiscated marijuana.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conducted search and seizure were valid.

HELD:
Yes. there was no need for Luciano and Caraan to be armed with a warrant
of arrest when they arrested Marquez and the accused since they had
personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime viz: They were
eyewitnesses to the illegal exchange of marijuana and P190.00 between
Marquez and accused who were caught in flagrante delicto. The facts and
circumstances attendant precisely fall under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure. The subsequent arrest of Marquez and accused were
made under the principle of "hot pursuit".
The recovery of the marijuana from Marquez and the P190.00 from accused
by the said police officers were not violative of their constitutional rights
since Marquez and the accused voluntarily surrendered them to the police
officers. But even for the sake of argument that the recovery of the marijuana
and peso bills were against the consent of Marquez and accused, still, the
search on their persons was incidental to their valid warrantless arrest. The
rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute rule, search incidental to a lawful arrest is an exception.
G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985
Garcia-Padilla
vs.
Enrile
In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a
conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the
PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by
Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no
warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence
the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and
companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the
PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.
HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was
reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was
again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the
privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president.
The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political
question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the
Page 17 of 26
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry
with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to
suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to
bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those
arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they
would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution
which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that
under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that “the right to bail shall
not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.”
G.R. No. 85177 August 20, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
MOISES MASPIL
On October 30, 1986, NARCOM operatives established a checkpoint in front
of the Municipal Hall at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, which is along the
Halsema Highway, to check on vehicles proceeding to Baguio City because
they have been earlier tipped off by some confidential informers that Maspil
and Basking would be transporting a large volume of marijuana to Baguio
City.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, the operatives
intercepted a jeep driven by Maspil with Bagking as his companion. Upon
inspection, the jeep was found loaded with two plastic sacks, one jute sack
and three big round tin cans which, when opened contained several bundles
of suspected dried marijuana leaves.
The accused admitted that the marijuana dried leaves were indeed
confiscated from the jeep being then driven by Maspil with Bagking as his
helper. However, they claimed that the prohibited drugs belonged to two of
their passengers who loaded them as “flowers in closed tin cans and sealed
sacks for the commemoration of All Souls Day in Baguio City” without the
accused knowing that they were marijuana.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant’s version is valid
Whether or not the conducted search and seizure was valid
HELD:
No. The appellants' version is not believable. It is inconceivable and contrary
to human experience that the appellants did not show the slightest curiosity
as to why flowers were being kept in closed tin cans and sealed sacks and
cellophane.
Yes. This case involves a search incident to a lawful arrest as embodied in
Rule 113, Sec. 5 (a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
This case falls squarely within the exceptions. The appellants were caught in
flagrante delicto since they were transporting the prohibited drugs at the time
of their arrest. A crime was actually being committed.
Compare with People v Aminnudin:
In the Aminnudin case, the records showed that there was sufficient time and
adequate information for the PC officers to have obtained a warrant. The
officers knew the name of the accused, that the accused was on board M/V
Wilcon 9, bound to Iloilo and the exact date of the arrival of the said vessel.
On the other hand, in this case there was no information as to the exact
description of the vehicle and no definite time of the arrival. A jeepney
cannot be equated with a passenger ship on the high seas. The ruling in
the Aminnudin case, is not applicable to the case at bar.
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990
Page 18 of 26
- The validity of a warrantless search on the person of petitioner is put into
issue in this case. –
FACTS:
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat.
Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, members of the Integrated National
Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City.
While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they
spotted Posadas(below 18) carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be
acting suspiciously.
They approached Posadas and identified themselves as members of
the INP. Posadas attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted
by the two.
They checked the "buri" bag where they found (1) caliber .38 Smith
& Wesson revolver, (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a
smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber
gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further
investigation. The petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or
authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he
failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the
prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the
officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao.
The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in favor
of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn
over said items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom, Davao City.
The petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it
affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest and search was valid.
HELD:
The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag
argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person

lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used
as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant.
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without
a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others,
when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same.
The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a
"stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the
police officer seeks to obtain more information
Clearly, the search can be sustained under the exceptions, and the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not
been violated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN DE LA CRUZ y
GONZALES and REYNALDO BELTRAN y ANIBAN
G.R. No. 83260 April 18, 1990
FACTS:
Page 19 of 26
After receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their informant, a
"buy-bust" operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit
through a team composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt.
Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo
Arcoy as poseur-buyer
and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30
p.m. of 4 May 1987 to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the
poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to buy marijuana worth
P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the
scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first negotiated with on the
purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00
worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one
aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants' pocket and
delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of suspected
marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his
teammates by scratching his head and his teammates who were strategically
positioned in the vicinity, converged at the place, identified
themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and
Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession
of Juan de la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing
marijuana.
Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were
charged in Criminal Case 87-54417 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila with violation of Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section 21, Article
IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
The court, on 15 March 1988, found Dela Cruz and Beltran guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to pay a
fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and each to pay one-half of the costs.
From this decision, de la Cruz and Beltran appealed. In a letter of the
Warden, Manila City Jail, dated 3 March 1989, the Court was informed of
the death of de la Cruz on 21 February 1989. Thus, the criminal case against
de la Cruz was dismissed in the Supreme Court resolution of 25 September
1989. The present appellate proceeding is limited only to Beltran.

ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation violates
Beltran’s constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD:
A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and
catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment
since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a
crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the
purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal
intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of apprehending a
criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. While it is conceded that
in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person
without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary,
the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is
a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught
redhanded.
There being no violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in
evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO ORTIZ y BALLARES
G.R. No. 82115 : December 3, 1990 191 SCRA 836
FACTS:
The Narcotics Command Unit in Calamba, Laguna, received an
information that a certain “Meo” - Romeo Ortiz, was selling marijuana in
Canlubang, organized a buy-bust team for his apprehension. The team
consisted of Sgt. Arnel Angsioco as leader and CIC Edgar Groyon, Sgt.
Agaton Enriquez and Pat. Heidi Zulueta as members. The operation was
scheduled on June 26, 1985, and was duly recorded in the station log book. So
was the serial number of the P20.00 to be used for the pretended purchase,
Page 20 of 26
which was delivered by Major Vivencio Ramilo, the Unit Commander, to
Angsioco. The latter marked it by dotting the nose on the picture of President
Quezon, then gave it to Groyon, who was to pose as the buyer. As a routinary
precaution, Ramilo made sure before they left that none of the team members
was carrying any marijuana.
The team arrived at the Labor Hall in Canlubang, Laguna, at about
9:15 in the morning and waited for their informer. Upon his arrival, the
operation began. The informer, at Groyon's bidding, went to Ortiz and told him
Groyon was looking for marijuana. The informer returned to Groyon to tell
him that Ortiz was willing to sell. Groyon then approached Ortiz and gave him
the marked bill in exchange for which Ortiz handed him two tea bags. Groyon
gave the pre-arranged signal by touching his hair. Angsioco and Zulueta, who
were at the time about four to eight meters away, pounced upon Ortiz and
arrested him after introducing themselves as peace officers.
The team recovered the marked bill and confiscated the tea bags. Ortiz
was later taken to the police station for interrogation. The tea bags were sealed
in a letter envelope initiated by Groyon, Angsioco and Zulueta and sent to the
National Bureau of Investigation, where they were subjected to microscopic
and chemical and chromotographic examination. The contents were found to
be marijuana.: nad
Ortiz entered a flat denial, insisting that he was playing billiards at the
Labor Hall that morning when Angsioco, accompanied by Groyon and another
man, suddenly approached him and clamped handcuffs on his wrist. Angsioco
then put his closed hand inside Ortiz's pocket and pretended to draw out a
P20.00 bill. Ortiz claims he was dragged to a car and told he was under arrest
for pushing marijuana ("Nagtutulak ka ng damo.") On their way to Narcom
headquarters, Groyon offered to drop the charge against him if he agreed to
pay them P3,000.00. Ortiz says he demurred, protesting he had no money and
had not committed any offense. Groyon's reaction was to box him several
times in the chest. Ortiz said he was detained at the headquarters for three days
before he was taken to the municipal jail.
Assessing the conflicting evidence of the parties, Judge Odilon I.
Bautista of the Regional Trial Court of Laguna opted in favor of the
prosecution.
ISSUE:
WON the arrest and search is in violation of the Bill of Rights.:-cra
HELD:

Ortiz's submission that he was subjected to an illegal search and
seizure is not acceptable. The demonstrated facts are that he was arrested in
flagrante and so came under the exception to the rule requiring previous
obtention of a warrant to justify a search or seizure. Rule 113, Section 5,
provides that a peace officer or indeed even a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person who, "in his presence, has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense." In these circumstances, a
search may also be made without warrant, being incidental to a lawful arrest.
Articles seized as a result of such lawful search are admissible in evidence.
The person accused of an offense is entitled to the constitutional presumption
of innocence but this right may be offset by proof of his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. That proof has been established in the case.
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional
Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
FACTS:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street,
nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan
and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take
down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court,
setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor
reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as
bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested
without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule
112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and
procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant
because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he
had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just
Page 21 of 26
committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police
officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan
and accordingly none had the “personal knowledge” required for the
lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless
arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect
of petitioner.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan
Police in respect of petitioner Go.
2. Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation
HELD:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of
petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.”
Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of
Maguan. The “arresting” officers obviously were not present, within the
meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed”

within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers
had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the
gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted
had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which turned out to be
registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not, however,
constitute “personal knowledge.”
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by
posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation.
In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived their
right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they
filed bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that they did not
have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.”
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail
and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed
his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the
cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991.
Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary
investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a
motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he
clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary
investigation was a legitimate one.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI G.R. No.
81561 January 18, 1991
FACTS:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., Marti and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila,
carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
Page 22 of 26
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the
name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr
II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland".
Anita Reyes then asked Marti if she could examine and inspect the
packages. Marti, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In
view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a
brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was
placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed
with masking tape.
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted. His
curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves
and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams
of the contents thereof.
Job Reyes prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes
informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Job
Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes'
office at Ermita, Manila.
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were
placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed
the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the
cellophane wrappers. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera
cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars.
The NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's
stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the
agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27,
1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was
invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized

dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the
dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It
turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by
the forensic chemist.
Thereafter, Information was filed against appellant for violation of
RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is violation of appellant’s constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that it is not the NBI who made the search.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job who made search and
inspection of the said packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard
operating procedure on the part of Mr. Job as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Custom or Post. If the search is made
upon the request of law enforces, a warrant must generally must be secured
first if it to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made in
the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purpose, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of the
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcer, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure cannot
be extended to acts committed by private individual as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
The alleged violation against unreasonable search and seizure may
only invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the
exercise by the sovereign authority.
Page 23 of 26
Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538
Petitioners were arrested on April 21, 1982 at about 9:45 a.m. while they
were riding together in a motor vehicle on Laong-Laan Street, Quezon City,
by elements of Task Force Makabansa of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Since their arrest, they have been under detention. Petitioner
Morales filed his petition for habeas corpus with this Court on July 9, 1982,
while petitioner Moncupa filed his on July 19, 1982. On July 20, 1982
petitioners, together with several others, were charged with rebellion (Art.
134, Revised Penal Code) before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Criminal Case No. Q-21091 filed by the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The
trial of the case has yet to be terminated. The continued detention of
petitioners to answer for the offense charged is therefore legal.
Issue: Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest
Held:
Our Constitution clearly defines the persons who may issue a warrant of
arrest and limits them to a “judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law.” It also lays down in unmistakable terms the procedure
required before a search warrant or warrant of arrest may issue.
A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a warrant of arrest issued
by the President of the Philippines. 6 Its issuance must therefore comply with
the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to the same
extent, as a warrant of arrest issued by a judge issuance must therefore comply
with the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to the same
extent, as a warrant of arrest by a judge.
The petitioners claim they were arrested without a warrant. The
Memorandum to the President dated April 21, 1982 from Gen. Fabian C. Ver,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein he reported the
arrest of petitioners, the subversive documents seized from them and the
results of the ensuing tactical interrogation, with a recommendation for the
issuance of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, was approved by the
President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were arrested
without a warrant. However, months before their arrest, petitioners were
already under surveillance on suspicion of committing rebellion. From the
results of the said surveillance, the evidence then at hand, and the documents
seized from them at the time of their arrest, it would appear that they had
 Page 24 of 26

committed or were actually committing the offense of rebellion. Their arrest applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
without a warrant for the said offense is therefore clearly justified.
In this case, Burgos was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a
P. vs. Burgos. 144 SCRA 1 crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The
subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from
FACTS: the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without
Ruben Burgos was charged of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened
subversion. Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the or is discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is
authorities stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as necessarily also tainted.
member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life,
if he refused. Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to the house
of Burgos and saw him plowing his field when they arrived. One of the
People vs. de la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416
arresting offices called Burgos and asked him about the firearm. At first,
FACTS: After receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their informant, a
Burgos denied having any firearm, but later, Burgos's wife pointed to a place
"buy-bust" operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit
below their house where a gun was buried in the ground.
through a team composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt.
Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy
After recovery of said firearm, Burgos pointed to a stock pile of cogon where
as poseur-buyer
the officers recovered alleged subversive documents. Burgos further admitted
and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30
that the firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of sparrow
p.m. of 4 May 1987 to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the
unit.
poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to buy marijuana worth
ISSUE:
P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the
Is the warrantless arrest and search valid?
scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first negotiated with on the purchase
HELD:
and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00
NO. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has
worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one
just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants' pocket and
personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his
delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of suspected
presence or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his
teammates by scratching his head and his teammates who were strategically
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
positioned in the vicinity, converged at the place, identified
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession of
wife of Burgos.
Juan de la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing marijuana.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged in
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
Criminal Case 87-54417 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
violation of Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not
Act 6425, as amended.
enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
The court, on 15 March 1988, found Dela Cruz and Beltran guilty beyond

reasonable doubt and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to pay a fine of
P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each
to pay one-half of the costs.
From this decision, de la Cruz and Beltran appealed. In a letter of the Warden,
Manila City Jail, dated 3 March 1989, the Court was informed of the death of
de la Cruz on 21 February 1989. Thus, the criminal case against de la Cruz
was dismissed in the Supreme Court resolution of 25 September 1989. The
present appellate proceeding is limited only to Beltran.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation
violates Beltran’s constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure.
HELD: A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap
and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of
entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused
to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for
the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the
criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of
apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. While it
is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's
person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not
necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an
offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably
caught redhanded.
There being no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.
Gatchalian vs. Board, May 31, 1991
FACTS:
the question in this case is whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino
citizen. On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor,
Page 25 of 26
arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and
Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of
Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong
based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria
and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian;
while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
Although it was the Board of commissioners who allowed access to the
Philippine citizenship of the Gatchalians, it was later on reversed by the Board
itself prior to the memorandum issued by the secretary of Justice. They said
that the Gatchalians violated
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as
the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated
by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien. (Emphasis supplied)
That allegedly, a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing
the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens." ( secretary of foreign affairs in
Hong Kong forged a document stating that said Petitioners were Filipino
citizens).
It was in this manner that a warrant of arrest and a deportation proceeding was
instituted.
Held: the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner
Domingo only on August 15, 1990. 28 long years after. It is clear that
petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed.
Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years
after the cause of deportation or exclusion arises when effected under any other
clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of

the Immigration Act; andIn the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since
the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced
deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian
in 1990.
the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground
for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole
purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the
case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional
the issuance of warrant of arrest is unconstitutional
People vs. Sucro, March 18, 1991
Facts: Pat. Roy fulgencio, a member of the INP Kalibo, Aklan was instructed
by P/Lt Vicente Seraspi Jr., Station commander, to monitor the activities of
appellant. Fulgencio positioned himself to a house, adjacent of which i a
chapel. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel taking something which
turn out later to be marijuana from a compartment of a cart found inside the
chapel and return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer.
Fulgencio radioed Seraspi and reported the activity, Seraspi instructed
Fulgencio to continue monitoring. At about 6:30 PM Fulgencio again called
up Sraspi to report the third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, was
transacting with appellant. At that point, the team seraspi proceeded to the
area and fulgencio told seraspi to intercept Macabante and Appellant. Team
Seraspi caught up with macabante at a crossing. Upon seeing the police
Macabante throw something at the ground which turned to a tea bag of
marijuana. Macabante admitted that he brought the same from appellant. The
police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful
2. Whether or not the evidence resulting from arrest is admissible
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure for the instance that arrest without warrant is
Page 26 of 26
considered lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer
when the officer sees the offense, although at the distance, or hears the
disturbance created thereby and proceed at once at the scene – the act of
surveillance Second requirement: the act of macabante, throwing of the
marijuana and the admission, constitute that he just committed an illegal act
which the police officer had personal knowledge, being members of the team
which monitors Sucro’s nefarious activity People vs bati – police officers
have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had
earlier conducted surveillance activities.
Evidence - admissible because the arrest is valid