In the matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C.
Del
Castillo. [A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC]
FACTS: On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition
filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio
Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among
others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books
when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books to support the
assailed decision. These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle
and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b. Breaking the Silence:
Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law (2006); and c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge
University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable
negligence. Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that
their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision
is different from what their works advocated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.
HELD: No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in
its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on
plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or
ideas. To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas,
writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own.The passing off of the work of
another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation
of another person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the
assailed decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by
Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is
therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.
But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents
vs CA, 313 SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in
plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for
errors. This would be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable
and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as
background facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its
development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can
support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to
said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo
twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no
malice, fraud or corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence (explanation of Justice Del Castillo)
The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The
researcher is a highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and
abroad from reputable educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class
and 4th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that the software she
used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her that certain important portions of her
drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be said to be
constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was grossly
negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has
been a long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized
though that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the
researcher and in every sense, the justice is in control in the writing of the draft.
With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained,
most legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in
electronic diskettes or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles.
Here, as the researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded
or copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of materials that she
thought she might need.
She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website
and pasted these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for
discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program.
Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would take, she began
pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions in the
general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences,
and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor,
demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court
researchers use everyday in their work.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Promulgated June 21, 1988)
CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
[G.R. NOS. 174813-15 : March 17, 2009]
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO REPRESENTING
JAYCEE CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR
VILLARUEL, Petitioners, v.HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Hall of Justice, Quezon City, Branch 86, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of
the Order dated 2 October 2006 of respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which denied the Motion to Withdraw
Informations of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The facts of the case are as follows.
On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the
crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño,
Arthur Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284, No. Q-03-123285 and No. Q-03-123286. The Informations
were signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.
On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA1 and BBB filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the
proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay
granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.
On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before
the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for
the crimes charged.
On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the
reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused in
Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor
Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed
the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On
the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge
Bay.
On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of
even date.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the
present Petition for Mandamus, bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:
CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE
THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?2
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done,
when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the
respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the
latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.3
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it
is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.4
In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to
grant the Office of the City Prosecutor's Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against
petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay's exercise of judicial discretion.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are
beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in
those matters, when refused.5 However, mandamus is never available to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of either.6 In other words, while a judge refusing to act
on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same,
he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the
case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he
had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available
anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy
of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of
Judge Bay.
Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor
General, is contrary to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that the proper remedy
in such cases is a Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following
excerpt from our ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou7 :
The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a
grave abuse of such discretion.
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or
in special cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the
prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as
a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of
discretion that will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such
a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition
for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.8 (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of Sanchez,
Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court,
challenging the order of the respondent Judge therein denying his motion to quash the
Information filed against him and six other persons for alleged rape and homicide. One of
the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because of
the non-inclusion of two other persons in the Information. We held that even this Court
cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find
sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if there was an
unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in that
case, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of
charges against said two other persons.
In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but
against the trial court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw
Informations by the City Prosecutor's Office. The prosecution has already filed a case
against petitioners. Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr.,9 we reiterated the doctrine we
established in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul,10 that once a criminal complaint or an
information is filed in court, any disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal or
conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the
trial court. Thus, we held:
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests
within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The trial
court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule
applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after
arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private
complainant to due process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the
Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said
motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of
Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should
have "deferred to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the
case."11 Petitioners cite the following portion of our Decision in People v. Montesa, Jr.12 :
In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and
directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation.
The former was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution
arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and
determine whether the information it had filed should stand.13
Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took specific statements from our
Decision, carefully cutting off the portions which would expose the real import of our
pronouncements. The Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was directed against a judge
who, after granting the Petition for Reinvestigation filed by the accused, proceeded
nonetheless to arraign the accused; and, shortly thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss
the case on the basis of a Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending
the dismissal of the case. The dismissal of the case in Montesa, Jr. was done despite the
disapproval of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor's Resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor
(annotated in the same Resolution), and despite the fact that the reinvestigation the latter
ordered was still ongoing, since the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had
not yet attained finality. We held that the judge should have waited for the conclusion of
the Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before acting on whether or not the case
should be dismissed for lack of probable cause, and before proceeding with the
arraignment. Thus, the continuation of the above paragraph of our Decision in Montesa, Jr.
reads:
Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final resolution of the
incident. In Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an
accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for
reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on
the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss
based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was
taken thereon to the Department of Justice.
The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the
case never became final, for it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the
contrary, the latter disapproved it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to
the reinvestigation is that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief
state prosecutor. Also, under Section l(d) of R.A. No. 5180, as amended by P.D. No. 77 and
P.D. No. 911.14
As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant
to establish a doctrine that the judge should just follow the determination by the
prosecutor of whether or not there is probable cause. On the contrary, Montesa, Jr. states:
The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests
in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control
of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case
filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation,
should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not,
however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due
process of law.15
In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners' counsel, he tries to convince
us that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Informations from the prosecution
only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such
withdrawal; and that, where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Informations is void. Petitioners'
counsel states in the Memorandum:
6.10. Furthermore, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006 of the Respondent Judge BAY
consisting of 9 pages which was attached to the URGENT PETITION did not point out any
iota of grave abuse of discretion committed by Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera in issuing his
Resolution in favor of the sons of the Petitioners. Hence, the ORDER issued by RJBAY is
NULL and VOID in view of the recent ruling of the Hon. Supreme Court in Ledesma v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278 SCRA 657 which states
that:
"In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the court's bare denial of a motion
to withdraw information pursuant to the Secretary's resolution is void."(Underscoring
ours).
6.11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon. Supreme Court disregard the
argument of the OSG because of its falsity.16
This statement of petitioners' counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in
our Decision in Ledesma.17 The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a
resemblance to the statement allegedly quoted from said case, provides:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of
the correctness of the justice secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in
petitioner's letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to
dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration - all of which
were submitted to the court - the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous
reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an
independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to
dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the
absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so.
He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the
secretary's recommendation.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in
violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repel or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Counsel's use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it
appear that the passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words
"Underscoring ours" after the text implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a
faithful reproduction of the original. Accordingly, we are ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran,
Jr. to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar.
To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to
Withdraw Information from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that
where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of
the Motion to Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is that a trial judge
commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion to Withdraw Information without
an independent and complete assessment of the issues presented in such Motion. Thus,
the opening paragraph of Ledesma states:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of
probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the
trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having
acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is
required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling
is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error or
even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and
simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired
jurisdiction over the criminal action.19 (Emphases supplied.)ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ
Petitioners also try to capitalize on the fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed
Order apparently states that there was no probable cause against petitioners:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause against the herein accused for the crimes of rapes
and acts of lasciviousness, the motion to withdraw informations is DENIED.
Let the case be set for arraignment and pre-trial on October 24, 2006 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning.20(Underscoring ours.)
Thus, petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge himself found no probable
cause against them, the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the Office of the City
Prosecutor should be granted.21
Even a cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly shows that the insertion of
the word "no" in the above dispositive portion was a mere clerical error. The assailed Order
states in full:
After a careful study of the sworn statements of the complainants and the resolution dated
March 3, 2006 of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, the Court finds that
there was probable cause against the herein accused. The actuations of the complainants
after the alleged rapes and acts of lasciviousness cannot be the basis of dismissal or
withdrawal of the herein cases. Failure to shout or offer tenatious resistance did not make
voluntary the complainants' submission to the criminal acts of the accused (People v.
Velasquez, 377 SCRA 214, 2002). The complainants' affidavits indicate that the accused
helped one another in committing the acts complained of. Considering that the attackers
were not strangers but their trusted classmates who enticed them to go to the house
where they were molested, the complainants cannot be expected to react forcefully or
violently in protecting themselves from the unexpected turn of events. Considering also
that both complainants were fifteen (15) years of age and considered children under our
laws, the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Malones, G.R. NOS. 124388-90, March
11, 2004 becomes very relevant. The Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature
individuals would when placed in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of
children who have undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected
from adults under similar circumstances. The range of emotions shown by rape victim is yet
to be captured even by calculus. It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from
rape victims (People v. Malones, G.R. NOS. 124388-90, March 11, 2004).
The Court finds no need to discuss in detail the alleged actuations of the complainants after
the alleged rapes and acts of lasciviousness. The alleged actuations are evidentiary in
nature and should be evaluated after full blown trial on the merits. This is necessary to
avoid a suspicion of prejudgment against the accused.22
As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court found
probable cause against the petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate discussion of the
reasons for such finding. Indeed, the general rule is that where there is a conflict between
the dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls.
However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to
show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will
prevail.23
In sum, petitioners' resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant
their Motion to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to
compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never
available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. 24 The trial court,
when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of
probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government,
but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a
requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar.25
Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the
finding of probable cause by the trial court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records
of the case. After going through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial
court that there is indeed probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for
trial. We decided to omit a detailed discussion of the merits of the case, as we are not
unmindful of the undue influence that might result should this Court do so, even if such
discussion is only intended to focus on the finding of probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case
be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the resumption of the
proceedings therein. The Regional Trial Court is directed to act on the case with dispatch.
Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar for his disquieting conduct as herein discussed.
G.R. No. 108089 January 10, 1994
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FILOTEO
ALANO, Respondents.
Ocampo, Quiroz, Mina & Associatesn for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
Pelaez, Gregorio, Sipin, Bala & Robles for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 33307. The said decision affirmed in toto the order of the trial court
dismissing the petitioner's complaint on the ground of res
judicata.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The factual and procedural antecedents are in the main
undisputed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The private respondent is one of several parties named as co-defendants of Dearfield,
Incorporated (Dearfield) in a complaint 1filed by the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati on 25 May 1987, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 16837 (hereinafter
the First Case) and raffled off to Branch 149 of the said court. The complaint is based on
promissory notes, letters of credit, and trust receipts executed by the principal obligor,
Dearfield. On 16 November 1987, the private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it falls to state a cause of action as against him. 2He
specifically averred that a reading of the first to the seventh causes of action will reveal
that he is never mentioned therein as having a contractual relation with the plaintiff; that
the allegations therein "don't even cite or mention any participation of defendant ALANO
in these transactions"; that on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, the court
cannot render a valid judgment against him; and that the complaint served on him did not
contain Annexes "S", "T", and "U", the alleged copies of the "Continuing
Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety" documents, thereby violating Section 7, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court and rendering the complaint against him defective. The petitioner opposed
the motion to dismiss. 3chanrobles virtual law library
In the Order of 20 June 1988, the trial court granted the motion after finding that "on the
basis of the allegations of the complaint, there is really no cause of action against
defendant Alano." 4Its motion for reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit in
the Order of 15 September 1988, 5the petitioner filed a notice of appeal on 30 September
1988. 6Subsequently, on 14 December 1988, it filed an appeal by certiorari 7with this Court,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 86009. It prayed therein that the orders of the trial court
be reversed. In the Resolution of this Court of 17 April 1989, 8the petition was dismissed for
having been filed late and for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
On 31 October 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a new complaint 9against
the private respondent and Feliciana Camara, a surety who was also a defendant in the first
complaint. The case (hereinafter the Second Case) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54998
and raffled off to Branch 46 of the said court. The complaint practically restates the causes
of action in and involves the promissory notes, letters of credit, and trust receipts covered
in the First Case. The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Second Case on the
grounds that (a) the issue raised therein against him had already been settled with finality
in the First Case, i.e., the case is barred by res judicata , and
(b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action against him. 10chanrobles virtual law library
In its Order of 1 March 1991, the trial court sustained the motion and ordered the dismissal
of the case as against the private respondent. 11The petitioner appealed the order to the
Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 33307. The Court of Appeals
found no reversible error in the challenged order and affirmed it in toto in its Decision of 25
November 1992. 12chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner thus filed the instant petition for review on certiorari on
21 January 1993. We gave it due course in our Resolution of 23 August 1993 after the filing
of the Comment on the petition and the Reply to the
Comment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner contends that the public respondent erred in holding that the judgment in
the First case bars the filing of the Second case. It submits that the judgment dismissing the
First case for failure to state a cause of action is not a judgment on the merits and that
there is no identity of causes of action between the First case and the Second Case. It
argues that the main reason why the First case was dismissed on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action was because the copies of the "Continuing
Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety" agreements were not attached to the First case. The
second complaint, on the other hand, is an entirely different complaint for attached to it
are the pertinent documents absent in the first complaint. It further avers that by filing a
motion to dismiss, the private respondent hypothetically admitted the allegations thereof
and that with these admissions, it is clear that there exists a cause of action against the
private respondent. Since there is no identity of causes of action between the two
complaints, res judicata cannot apply.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In his Comment, the private respondent argues that all the elements of
res judicata are present in this case and that res judicata operates to bar not only the
relitigation in the subsequent action of the issued squarely raised, passed upon, and
adjudicated in the first suit, but also the ventilation in a subsequent suit of any other issue
which could have been raised in the first but was not. 13chanrobles virtual law library
In its Reply to the Comment, the petitioner insists that there is a significant difference
between the First Case and the Second Case in that the former fails to state a cause of
action while the latter does so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The primary issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in affirming the ruling of the trial court dismissing the Second Case on the ground of res
judicata.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A careful deliberation on the arguments of the parties discloses no such error. The instant
petition must therefore be denied for want of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Well-entrenched is the rule that even at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final at some definite time fixed by law and that parties should not be
permitted to litigate the same issues over again. This is the raison d'etre upon which the
doctrine of res judicata rests. 14 Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." 15This doctrine is an old
axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad
principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by
the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has appropriately said
that it is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon
two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the state that there should be an end to
litigation - republicae ut sin finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he
should be vexed twice for the same cause - nemo debet bis veraxi et eadem causa. A
contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to
the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. 16chanrobles virtual law library
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between
the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of
causes of action. 17chanrobles virtual law library
The parties do not dispute the fact that Branch 149 of the RTC of Makati had jurisdiction
over the First case. Its Order of 20 June 1988 dismissing the said case on the ground that
"there is really no cause of action against defendant Alano" had long become final and
executory and no less than this Court had affirmed its finality when it dismissed on 17 April
1989, on the grounds of late filing and lack of merit, the petitioner's action (G.R. No. 86009)
to set aside the trial court's order. It is likewise undisputed that there is an identity of
parties (insofar as the petitioner and the private respondent are concerned) and an identity
of subject matter between the First and Second Case. The petitioner however submits that
there is no identity of causes of action between the two cases since there was no cause of
action against private respondent in the First case as held by the trial court, while there is
now a cause of action in the Second Case. He also argues that there was no judgment on
the merits in the First Case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The argument that there is no identity of causes of action is meretricious. It betrays the
petitioner's misunderstanding of what a cause of action is as component of res judicata.
That identity relates to the accuses of action in the prior or latter cases. No elaboration is
needed to show that the causes of action both in the First Case the and Second Case are
the same - enforcement of the rights of the petitioner under the promissory notes, letters
of credit, and trust receipts. Although the trial court declared that "on the basis of the
allegations of the complaint, there is really no cause of action against defendant Alano," it
does not follow that the complaint states no cause of action at all. It must be stressed in
this connection that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, the trial court did not
primarily base its conclusion of lack of cause of action on the failure of the petitioner to
attach to the complaint copies of the alleged "Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety"
agreements. Its main bases are the allegations in the complaint. Our own perusal of the
complaint clearly sustains the conclusion of the trial court. Indeed, the complaint neither
mentions the name of the private respondent in any of the causes of action nor suggests
what his liability is. In short, the petitioner itself had shown beyond cavil, through its
allegations in the complaint, that with respect to the promissory note, letters of credit, and
trust receipts subject of the complaint, the private respondent had incurred in liability
whatsoever.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Nor is there any doubt that the dismissal of the First Case was a dismissal on the merits.
That the dismissal of the First case was not by virtue of a decision but of an order pursuant
to a motion to dismiss does not make the dismissal any less an adjudication on the merits.
In Escarte vs. Office of the President, 18we held:
While We agree with Medina that in Civil Case No. 83215, there was no trial on the merits
because the case was decided on a motion to dismiss, there was no formal presentation or
reception of evidence and an order, not a decision, was issued by the trial court, still, the
ruling was a judgment on the merits. As a technical legal term, "merits" has been defined in
law dictionaries as a matter of substance in law, as distinguished from matter of form, and
as the real or substantial grounds of action or defense, in contradistinction to some
technical or collateral matter raised in the course of the suit. A judgment is upon the merits
when it amounts to a declaration of the law to the respective rights and duties of the
parties, based upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and
evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical
or dilatory objectives or contentions.
In dismissing the First Case for lack of cause of action, the RTC of Makati ruled:
Considering defendant Alano's Motion to Dismiss complaint and plaintiff's Opposition
thereto, as well as the Reply to Opposition filed by defendant Alano, this Court finds that
on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, there is really no cause of action against
defendant Alano, and the complaint must be dismissed for lack of cause of action against
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Alano is hereby granted.
Let complaint against defendant-movant Filoteo Alano be dismissed. 19chanrobles virtual
law library
It unequivocally determined the rights and obligations of the petitioner and the private
respondent with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the case. The
order definitely put an end to the controversy between
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
All the essential requisites of res judicata are thus present and the dismissal of the Second
Case on that ground was not tainted by any error or abuse of discretion. The petitioner
cannot evade its application by varying the form of his action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, 20or by simply adding or dropping parties in the subsequent
case. 21That in the Second Case the petitioner had attached the "Continuing
Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety" agreements allegedly signed by the private respondent
does not help the cause of the petitioner. Those documents were already touched upon in
the pleadings relative to the motion to dismiss the First Case. Moreover, if we follow the
arguments of the petitioner, said documents are inextricably linked to the promissory
notes, letters of credit, and trust receipts which are, in fact, the subject of the two cases. It
is settled that as between the same parties, on the same subject matter and causes of
action, a final valid judgment is conclusive not only on the issues actually determined by
the decision, but on all issues that could have been raised or litigated in the anterior
suit. 22chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of

merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.